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Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) For Berth No: 13 & 14 At

New Mangalore Port Panambur, Mangalore - 575010 Prepared by Telos Consultancy Services (P) Ltd., Mumbai

TELOS CONSULTANCY SERVICES (P) LTD.

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Report for

For

New Mangalore Port Trust Panambur Mangalore - 575010

Petroleum Oil Lubricants (POL) products at Berth No 13 & General Cargo Handled at Berth No14 July - 2008

Prepared by:

Telos Consultancy Services (P) Ltd.

………………………………

Venugopal Kadri Email: [email protected] Reviewed by:

61, Udyog Bhavan, Sonawala Lane Goregaon (East) Mumbai – 400063 India Tel: +9122 – 66987701/02/03/ 26864506 Fax: +9122 – 66987703

Website: www.telosrisk.com

……………………………….

R.E. Abrahams E-mail: [email protected]

I QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 2 2.1 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................................ 2 2.2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................... 2 2.3 RISK ASSESSMENT AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................... 2 2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: ................................................................................................. 3 2.4.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13............................................................................................................ 4 2.4.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve .................................................................................................................. 5

3

FACILITY DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 6 3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 3.1.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................... 6 3.1.2 Location - Latitude : 12o 55' N, Longitude : 74o 48' E ............................................................................... 7 3.1.3 Metrological Data.......................................................................................................................................... 8 3.2 IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE PORT ...................................................................................................................11 3.2.1 Port Area ......................................................................................................................................................11 3.2.2 Entrance Channel ........................................................................................................................................12 3.2.3 Berth Particulars..........................................................................................................................................12 3.2.4 Details of Storage Tanks containing Hazardous Chemicals .....................................................................13 3.2.5 Open Stack Yard...........................................................................................................................................13 3.3 POPULATION DATA (APPROXIMATE) ...................................................................................................................14 3.4 DATA SUPPLIED BY NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST FOR THE STUDY............................................................... 15 3.4.1 Details of Proposed Berth No: 13 ...............................................................................................................15 3.4.2 Berth No: 14 .................................................................................................................................................16

4

DOW’S FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX & NFPA RANKING............................................................................17 4.1 RANKING OF CHEMICAL HAZARDS ......................................................................................................................18 4.1.1 Health Hazard Factor (Nh) ..........................................................................................................................19 4.1.2 Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf) ...............................................................................................................19 4.1.3 Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nr) ....................................................................................................................20 4.1.4 Special Notes – White ..................................................................................................................................20 4.1.5 Material Factor Determination Guide........................................................................................................21 4.2 SUMMARY OF DOW’S INDEX FOR VARIOUS OPERATIONS AT THE PORT FACILITY............................................21 4.2.1 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Coal.....................................................................................................23 4.2.2 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Motor Spirit / Naphtha.......................................................................24 4.2.3 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Kerosene / Diesel ...............................................................................25 4.2.4 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Fuel Oil # 1 to # 6 ..............................................................................26 4.2.5 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Crude ..................................................................................................27

5

RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................28 5.1 OVERALL METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................................28 5.2 COMPONENTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................................................28 5.3 DATA REQUIREMENT ............................................................................................................................................29 5.4 FAILURE CASE IDENTIFICATION & DEFINITION ...................................................................................................30 5.5 PRESENTATION OF RISK ........................................................................................................................................31 5.5.1 Consequences Risk Exposure ......................................................................................................................31 5.5.2 Individual Risk Criteria ............................................................................................................................... 33 5.5.3 Existing Individual Risk Criteria for Members of the Public.....................................................................35 5.5.4 Societal Risk Criteria ...................................................................................................................................36 5.5.5 Criteria for Acceptable Risk ........................................................................................................................37 5.5.6 Framework of Risk Criteria.........................................................................................................................38

6

FAILURE RATE DATA ...........................................................................................................................................41 6.1 FAILURE DATA CONSIDERED FOR THE PROBABILITY ESTIMATION ....................................................................41 6.1.1 Frequencies for Transfer Piping .................................................................................................................41 6.1.2 Causes of Pipeline Failure ..........................................................................................................................41 I QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 7

Transfer Spills while unloading from ships ................................................................................................ 42 Reliability Data Valves (Failure to close on Demand) ..............................................................................43 Over ground Piping .....................................................................................................................................43

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................48 7.1 OBJECTIVES ...........................................................................................................................................................48 7.2 MODELS USED .......................................................................................................................................................48 7.2.1 Source Models ..............................................................................................................................................48 7.2.2 Dispersion Models .......................................................................................................................................48 7.2.3 Explosion and Fires .....................................................................................................................................49 7.3 TERMS RELEVANT FOR INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .........................................50 7.3.1 Concentration...............................................................................................................................................50 7.3.2 Flash Fire .....................................................................................................................................................50 7.3.3 Late Ignition Explosion................................................................................................................................ 51 7.3.4 Radiation Radii for Pool Fire......................................................................................................................51 7.3.5 Radiation Radii for Jet Flame .....................................................................................................................51 7.3.6 Averaging Time ............................................................................................................................................51 7.3.7 Toxic Effects .................................................................................................................................................51 7.3.8 Flammable Effects .......................................................................................................................................51 7.3.9 Explosion Effects ..........................................................................................................................................52 7.4 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LOSS SCENARIOS ..............................................................................................................52 7.5 COAL STORAGE AT BERTH NO: 14 OPEN YARD ..................................................................................................54 7.5.1 General Characteristics of Coal .................................................................................................................54 7.5.2 Effects of Coal Burning................................................................................................................................ 55 7.5.3 Spontaneous Combustion in Coal ...............................................................................................................55 7.5.4 Causes of Spontaneous Coal Fires .............................................................................................................55 7.5.5 Recommendations for Coal Storage ...........................................................................................................56 7.5.6 Roll Packing .................................................................................................................................................57 7.5.7 Checking Temperature.................................................................................................................................57 7.6 RISK ANALYSIS FOR COAL FIRES IN STORAGE YARD BERTH 14 ........................................................................57

FQ 4 K

7.6.1 Formula used for Calculation of Impact Distance (D) = .......................................57 7.6.2 Summary: .....................................................................................................................................................59 7.7 IMPACT DISTANCES FOR MCLS ...........................................................................................................................59 7.8 GENERAL COMMENTS OF THE MCLS TABLE ......................................................................................................66 7.9 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................................67 7.9.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13..........................................................................................................67 7.9.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve ................................................................................................................69 8

PROBABILITY OF SHIP COLLISION / STRIKING ........................................................................................71 8.1 SHIP FAILURE ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................................71 8.1.1 General Approach........................................................................................................................................71 8.1.2 Traffic Levels ................................................................................................................................................74 8.1.3 Collisions ......................................................................................................................................................74 8.1.4 Strikings ........................................................................................................................................................76 8.2 RESULTS OF RELEASE FREQUENCIES ARISING OUT COLLISIONS / STRIKINGS OF SHIPS AT NMPT ...................77

9

ANNEXURES .............................................................................................................................................................. 78 9.1 COMMODITY WISE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS – APRIL 07 TO MARCH 08 PROVIDED BY TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT .....................................................................................................................................................................78 9.2 NAPHTHA – MSDS................................................................................................................................................79 9.3 KEROSENE – MSDS ..............................................................................................................................................80 9.4 HIGH SPEED DIESEL OIL – MSDS ........................................................................................................................81 9.5 FURNACE OIL – MSDS .........................................................................................................................................82 9.6 MOTOR SPIRIT (PETROL) – MSDS........................................................................................................................83 9.7 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS – MSDS .................................................................................................................84

II QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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FIGURES Figure 1 – Over view of New Mangalore Port ................................................................................................... 7 Figure 2 – Storms / Cyclones ............................................................................................................................... 8 Figure 3 – Earthquake ......................................................................................................................................... 9 Figure 4 – Lightning ........................................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 5 – Tsunami ............................................................................................................................................ 10 Figure 6 - Classical Risk Assessment Procedure ............................................................................................ 29 Figure 7 – ALARP TRAINGLE......................................................................................................................... 39 Figure 8 – Hole Size Distribution for Process Piping ..................................................................................... 45 TABLES Table 1 – NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port................................................................................................... 18 Table 2 – Explanation of NFPA Classification ................................................................................................ 18 Table 3 – Summary of Dow’s Index .................................................................................................................. 21 Table 4 – Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensity ................................................................................ 31 Table 5 – Overpressure Effect of Explosion ..................................................................................................... 32 Table 6 – Selected Individual Risks of Death in the UK................................................................................ 34 Table 7 – Official Individual Risk Criteria for the Public .............................................................................. 35 Table 8 – Official Societal Risk Criteria ........................................................................................................... 37 Table 9 – Published Acceptable Values of Risk............................................................................................... 40 Table 10 – Frequency Factors for Inter unit Transfer Piping ....................................................................... 41 Table 11 – Comparison of Failure rate Frequencies (Per 1000 Km year). .................................................. 41 Table 12 – Transfer Spill Frequency Components ......................................................................................... 42 Table 13– Failure to close on Demand ............................................................................................................. 43 Table 14 – Historical Pipe Leak Frequencies .................................................................................................. 43 Table 15 – Failure Rates for Process Piping .................................................................................................... 44 Table 16 – Hole Size Distribution for Pipe Leaks ........................................................................................... 45 Table 17 – Pipe Failure Frequencies by Hole Size.......................................................................................... 46 Table 18 – Various MCLS considered for the Study ...................................................................................... 52 Table 19 – Impact Distances for MCLS – Berth No 13 .................................................................................. 59 Table 20 – Accident Frequencies by Port Type ............................................................................................... 71 Table 21 – Accident Frequencies by Cargo Group .......................................................................................... 72 Table 22 – Accident Frequencies & Release Probabilities by Ship Type ..................................................... 73

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ACRONYMS USED ALARP

:

As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Cu.M

:

Cubic Metre

Dia

:

Diameter

E

:

East

ERC

:

Emergency Release Coupling

ERS

:

Emergency Release System

F

:

Frequency

F & EI

:

Fire and Explosion Index

FO

:

Furnace Oil

GPH

:

General Process Hazard

HAZIDS

:

Hazard Identification and Development

IRC

:

Individual Risk Criteria

IRPA

:

Individual Risk Per Annum

JF

:

Jet Fire

KL

:

Kilo Litre

km

:

Kilometre

LDO

:

Light Diesel Oil

LFL

:

Lower Flammable Limit

LPF

:

Late Pool Fire

m

:

Metre(s)

MCLS

:

Maximum Credible Loss Scenario

MF

:

Material Factor

MS

:

Motor Spirit

N

:

North

Nf

:

Flammability Factor

NFPA

:

National Fire Protection Association, USA

Nh

:

Health Factor IV QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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NMPT

:

New Mangalore Port Trust

Nr

:

Reactivity Factor

Phast

:

Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool

PLL

:

Potential Loss of Life

POL

:

Petroleum Oil Liquid

QRA

:

Quantitative Risk Assessment

SAFETI

:

Software for the Assessment of Flammable Explosive Toxic Impact

SKO

:

Superior Kerosene Oil

SPH

:

Special Process Hazard

SRC

:

Societal Risk Criteria

SRL

:

Significant Radiation Level

TLV

:

Threshold Limit Values

UFL

:

Upper Flammable Limit.

UHF

:

Unit Hazard Factor

UVCE

:

Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion

VHF

:

Very High Frequency

VTMS

:

Vehicle Traffic Management System

GLOSSARY USED Acceptance Criteria

:

Consequence

:

Catastrophic Failure

:

Continuous Release

:

Defines the level of risk to which an individual is exposed, as either tolerable (negligible risk), intolerable or within the ALARP region. This is the severity associated with an event in terms of toxic doses, fire or explosion etc., i.e. the potential effects of a hazardous event. The sudden opening up of a specified part of a containment system resulting in a rapid loss of contents. The escape of a hazardous substance at a flow rate which is sustained for a prolonged period.

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Frequency

:

Failure Rate

:

Hazard

:

Individual Risk

:

Individual of Fatality

Risk

:

Individual Contours

Risk

:

Probability

:

Upper Flammable Limit Vapour Cloud Explosion

: :

This is the number of occurrences of an event expressed per unit time. It is usually expressed as the likelihood of an event occurring within one year. The number of failure events that occur divided by the total elapsed operating time during which these events occur or by the total number of demands, as applicable. A physical situation with the potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment or some combination of these. The frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of specified hazards. Individual risk with “harm” measured in terms of fatality. It is calculated at a particular point for a stationary, unprotected person for 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. Normally measured in chances of fatality per million years. As Individual Risk (IR) is calculated at a point, calculating the IR at many points allows the plotting of IR contours, these being lines that indicate constant levels of risk. Most commonly used are the 1 chance per million-year contour and the 10 chances per million-year contour. The expression for the likelihood of an occurrence of an event or an event sequence or the likelihood of the success or failure of an event on test or demand. By definition, probability must be expressed as a number between 0 and 1. That concentration in air of a flammable material above which combustion will not propagate. The preferred term for an explosion in the open air of a cloud made up of a mixture of a flammable vapour or gas with air.

VI QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

1 PREFACE Telos Consultancy Services (P) Ltd., Mumbai (Telos) is appointed by New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) Panambur, Mangalore – 575010 for carrying out Comprehensive Risk Analysis Study and updation of Disaster Management Plan for the New Mangalore Port – Berth No 13 & 14. Telos is a company comprised of professional managers including former employees of Tata AIG Risk Management Services Ltd and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. Telos technical team comprises experienced engineers from various disciplines such as Chemical, Electrical, Environment, Industrial Safety, Mechanical etc. Telos cliental includes Automobile, Cement / Building, Chemical, Corporate Offices, Design Consultants, Engineering, Hotel, Harbours, IT Enabled Services, Jetties, Pharmaceutical, Paper Industry, Power, Petrochemical & Fertilizer, Ports, Terminals, Oil Gas & Energy, Rubber Industry, Real Estate, Steel, Textile, Telecommunication, etc. Our team has carried out Rapid Safety Audit for Kandla Port, Risk Analysis for Customers Terminal at Mumbai Port Trust, Risk Analysis for Proposed Jetty for handling LSHS and Coal at Pir Pau, Disaster Management plan for Mangalore District under Tata AIG Risk Management Services. It should be noted that the findings and recommendations of the study are based on the data provided and discussions held during the site visit with the personnel at the time of study. Telos has exercised all reasonable skill, care and diligence in carrying out the study. This report is not deemed to be any undertaking, warranty or certificate.

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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2.1

Quantitative Risk Assessment

A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a valuable tool for determining the risk of the use, handling, transport and storage of dangerous substances. QRA studies are carried out when dangerous substances are present at the location (e.g. industrial sites and transportation routes) in amounts that can endanger the environment. QRA’s are used to demonstrate the risk caused by the activity and to provide the competent authority with relevant information for assessing incremental risk and for enabling decisions on the acceptability of risk related to developments on site of or around the establishment.

2.2

Objective and Scope

The purpose of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is to derive quantitative measures of the risks enabling comparison to risk level criteria, with published documents of risk criteria developed by Health & Safety Executive (HSE) U.K. As presently India has not as such adopted any tolerable risk values or defined any threshold, the U.K risk acceptability criteria have been used. Inputs to the QRA are preliminary design data, statistical frequency of accidental releases and ignition probability data, meteorological data, and a set of scenario and consequence modeling assumptions.

2.3

Risk Assessment and Methodology

The Risk Analysis was carried out in five major steps: Step 1: Involves Hazard Identification and Development (HAZIDS) based on client supplied data. These HAZIDS carried out in order to identify major accident scenarios that have potential outside consequences. New Mangalore Port Trust supplied data and gathered data includes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Description of the Site (i.e. Berth No 13 & 14). Facility / Port Berth layout. Design parameter. Maximum frequency of unloading operations. Metrological data.

Step 2: Involves data search for relevant release frequencies or event frequencies for each identified major accident event. The failure frequency of the equipment was determined from historical data base.

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Step 3: Determination of probabilities for immediate and delayed ignition of the loss of containment depending on the characteristics of the release. Step 4: Consists of consequences modelling of the major accident events. The results of the consequence modelling are maximum impact distance specific to each type of event. (Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS) / Catastrophic scenarios) Step 5: Consists of Risk Assessment of the different events. The risk of each event is calculated. Risk profile of total risk and risk of types of events (Late Pool Fire / Jet Fire / Late Explosion effect) are produced in Impact Distances for MCLS Table and presented in form of risk contour (Given in the Next Page). These contours are in units of Individual Risks Per Annum (IRPA) and are compared to risk criteria imposed by Health & Safety Executive (HSE) U.K.

2.4

Risk Assessment Results and Conclusions:

Results of the QRA are Risk Contours and Maximum Impact Distance at Berth No 13 which are plotted on the layout and are found within the range of “As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)” (Ref ALARP Triangle at (Framework of Risk Criteria - Page 39) The HSE (Health & Safety Executive, UK) has published documents outlining their approach to the development of Risk Criteria. In those documents, HSE has concluded that broadly, the limit of tolerable risk to a worker or employee is 10-3 fatalities per year. On the basis that the risk to a member of the public should be at least an order of magnitude lower than that to a worker / employee, the limit of tolerable risk to a member of the public is taken as 10-4 fatalities per year.

Maximum Tolerable Employees

Risk

Maximum Public

Risk

Tolerable

Negligible Risk

for : 10-3 fatalities year for : 10-4 fatalities year : 10-6 fatalities year

per per per

The major risk contributor in the accidental scenarios is from the rupture of unloading arm and 100 mm hole on pipe line is considered to be a worst case scenario in the report. All the scenarios for POL products worked for Berth No 13 is within the range of “As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) acceptable range.

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2.4.1

Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13 1e-009 /AvgeYear

Run Row Status Individual Risk Contours Audit No: 13579 Factors: Combination 1 1e-008 /AvgeYear

Outdoor contours Run Row Selected: 1 Study Folder: NMPT-13-QRA Risk Level 1e-006 /AvgeYear 1e-007 /AvgeYear 1e-008 /AvgeYear

1e-007 /AvgeYear

1e-009 /AvgeYear Default Model Selection 1e-006 /AvgeYear

Default Risk Ranking Point Set Default Population Set Industrial Default Ignition Set scan002

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2.4.2

Societal Risk Contour F N Curve

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3 FACILITY DESCRIPTION 3.1

Introduction

3.1.1

General

New Mangalore Port is located on the West Coast of India midway between Kochi and Mormugao at Panambur which is at a distance of around 15 kms from Mangalore city. It is an all weather port and the maritime gateway of Karnataka State. The Port is well connected by road, rail and air.  The port is connected with 3 National Highways. The national highway NH 17 is passing near the port. The highway stretches from Kochi to Mumbai linking many important cities and towns in its route. The NH 48 connects directly Mangalore to Bangalore and NH 13 Mangalore to Sholapur.  The port provides a railway siding at its Panambur yard. The railway links spread into the neighboring states of Maharastra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The rail network extends to major industrial cities like Bangalore, Chennai, Coimbatore & Mumbai.  The Mangalore Airport is located at Bajpe which is around 18 kms away from the Port. There are daily flights to Mumbai, Bangalore and Chennai & Cochin.

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3.1.2

Location - Latitude :12o 55' N, Longitude:74o 48' E

Figure 1 – Over view of New Mangalore Port

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3.1.3

Metrological Data

1) Climate

Temperature Max Temperature Min Annual rainfall Weather

: : : :

34oC 18oC About 3450 mm Tropical climate with high humidity

2) Wind

The winds in the monsoon months of June, July and August are predominantly from South-West and West with a maximum intensity of 5 in the Beaufort scale (with occasional squall up to force 6). 3) Waves

The predominant direction of waves in the vicinity of New Mangalore Port during Monsoon months of June, July and August is West and South-West whereas during the fair months is North-West and North.

Figure 2 – Storms / Cyclones Even though Mangalore is within the cyclone area of storms originating in the Arabian Sea and those that enter across the Indian Peninsula from the Bay of Bengal, cyclones are not as severe or frequent as in the Bay of Bengal. Historically, there has been no major cyclone in the region for last many years. Hence the exposure to this peril is Moderate.

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Figure 3 – Earthquake As per Munich Re world map for Natural hazards the Mangalore region comes under the Zone I of the earthquake classification as per Indian Standards which is relatively safe. However, seismic experts have opined that the Indian land mass is being constantly compressed between the sea and Himalayas and thus the developed stresses are being released in the form of earthquakes in the least expected areas. Thus taking the dynamic seismic scenario in to consideration risk exposure can be considered as Moderate.

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Figure 4 – Lightning As per Munich Re World Map for Natural hazards, Mangalore region is in Zone – I which means on an average there are 2 - 6 lightning strikes per km2 area per year which signifies moderate risk exposure. Thus risk exposure can be considered as moderate.

Figure 5 – Tsunami Tsunami is large submarine earthquake or large submarine land slides, which are often triggered by earthquakes, and volcanic eruption in the sea or on the coast. The waves spread out in all directions and at great speed, which increases with the depth of water. In great ocean basins the average speed is about 700km/h. 10 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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Thus risk exposure can be considered as moderate.

4) Currents

The current along the coast during the South-West monsoon (from June to September) is in general towards south. During the North-East monsoon (November to February) the current in general is towards North. 5) Tides

The tidal particulars at New Mangalore Port are as follows Higher High water springs Mean Higher High Water Mean Lower High Water Mean Sea Level Mean Lower Low Water Lower Low Water Springs near solstices

: : : : : :

3.2

Important Features of the Port

3.2.1

Port Area Water Spread Land Area Total

: : :

+1.68 m chart datum +1.48 m chart datum +1.26 m chart datum +0.95 m chart datum +0.26 m chart datum +0.03 m chart datum

320 acres (129 hectares) 2030 acres (822 hectares) 2350 acres (951.04 hectares)

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3.2.2

Entrance Channel Length Minimum Depth Minimum Width

3.2.3

: : :

7500 meters 15.4 meters 245 meters

Berth Particulars

There are total of 13 existing Berths. Apart from these there is a virtual jetty for handling crude to and POL from Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. which will be dismantled. Sr No

Name Berth

of

1 2 3 4

Berth No.1 Berth No.2 Berth No.3 Berth No.4

5

Berth No.5

6 7 8

Berth No.6 Berth No.7 Berth No.8 (Kudremu kh Jetty) Berth No.9 (Tanker Jetty No.1) Berth No.10 (Tanker Jetty No.2) Berth 11 Berth 12 (Proposed) Berth 13 (Proposed)

9

10

11 12 13

Type of Berth

Draught (in Mtrs) 7.00 10.50 10.30 9.50

Length of Berth (in Mtrs) 125 198 198 198

DWT (In Metric Tonnes) 4000 30000 30000 30000

9.50

198

30000

9.50 9.50 13.00

198 198 300

30000 30000 60000

POL/LPG

10.50

330

45000

Crude /POL Products

14.00

320

120000

Crude & POL POL & Chemicals POL Products

14.00 12.50

320 320

120000 50000

General Cargo General Cargo General Cargo General Cargo, Liquid Ammonia, Phosphoric acid General Cargo, Bulk Cement/ Edible Oil General Cargo General Cargo Iron ore (Mech)

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14

3.2.4

General Cargo

14.00

350

90000

Details of Storage Tanks containing Hazardous Chemicals Sr No 1

Owner/ Operator I.O.C.

25

Total Capacity 1,22,452 KL

I.M.C.

19

52,000 KL

3.

I.P.W.C.

8

52,845 KL

4.

3

12,792 KL

5.

Universal Agro Exports M.C.F.

Petroleum Products Chemicals & POL Products Molasses, Edible Oil & POL Edible Oil

2.

1

6.

M.C.F.

2

7.

Mangalore Impex Ultra Tech Cement

6

10,000 Tonnes 16,000 Tonnes 17,000 KL

Liquid Ammonia Phosphoric Acid Edible Oil

3

18,000 KL

Bulk Cement

8.

3.2.5

General Cargo

Nos.

Liquid Stored

Remarks Outside port area

Outside port area Outside port area Outside port area Silo

Outside port area

Open Stack Yard Sr.No. 1 2 3 4 5

Area Open Stack Yard with Bitumen pavement – 2 Open Stack Yard with Bitumen pavement – 1 Open Stack Yard without Bitumen pavement – 1 Semi – paved for stacking containers Semi – paved Stack Yard

Capacity 18164 Sq.m. 11534 Sq.m. 19693 Sq.m. 40,000 Sq.m. 9000 Sq. m

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3.3

Population Data (Approximate) Sr. No.

Location

1 2 3 4

General Cargo & Berths A.O. Building JNC auditorium Hospital / State Bank / Syndicate Bank/CISF office IPWC IMC MRPL Terminal HPCL Terminal KIOCL pallet plant & berth Transit shed VIP Guest House STP (Sewage Treatment plant) Ware houses (Traffic dept) Temple Coast guard office Central School CISF Colony /Custom Colony + NMPT Colony MCF Signal Station Ships crew for avg. 10 ships (@ 30 per ship) POL Products Marine Staff & others People working at jetty

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

No. of people 125 500 1200 190 14 35 8 5 500 20 10 5 100 100 50 1000 4000 5 5 300 30 150 14

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3.4

Data Supplied by New Mangalore Port Trust for the Study

3.4.1

Details of Proposed Berth No: 13 SL No

01 02

Product Pipe Line

Crude Oil

Berth No 13

Line Pressure

Temp in Pipe line

48”Dia x 1 No 20”Dia x 2 Nos

18kg/cm2

65Deg C

Length of the pipe line from Berth to the Trestle taken for the study 100 meters

Unloadin g Arm (6Nos) Pipe line size 12”Dia

Unloading Arm Capacity (6Nos) 2000m3/hr

Black Oil 20kg/cm2 Ambient 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr (Furnace Oil, LDO) 03 While Oil 20”Dia 26kg/cm2 Ambient 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr (MS / x 3 Nos Naphtha l Kerosene) 04 Space for 20”Dia 26kg/cm2 Ambient 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr future x 1 No product lines The data has been collected from Consulting Engineering Services (I) Pvt Ltd Delhi EIA Study – January 2008 provided by NMPT during our first visit on 19th & 20th June 2008 and Fax confirmation on 24th June 2008 by NMPT. Note: The length of the pipe line considered for the study (Approximately 100 meters) is from the first isolation valve below the unloading arm till the point at the beginning of the Trestle

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where the lines go under ground (approximately 2 to 3 meters as mentioned) & at the jetty unloading arm (App length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC) 3.4.1.1 Salient Features of the Proposed Oil Jetty

           3.4.2

Design Ship – 1,50,000DWT Length – 350 Meters Open Piled Structures Approach Trestle (100 x 16.4 Meters) Service Platform (46 x 18.6 Meters) Breasting Dolphin – 4Nos (13.96 x 13.4 Meters) Mooring Dolphin – 6Nos (10.8 x 10.8 Meters) Shore Protection Works Marine loading / unloading arms & associated pipelines De ballasting facilities. Pollution Control Facilities. Berth No: 14

Berth No: 14 are handling coal and Iron ore.

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4 DOW’S FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX & NFPA RANKING

In order to rate the fire and explosion hazards within the port facility at Berth No 13 & 14th, the Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI) is used. F & EI analysis is a step – by – step evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion and reactivity potential of processes, equipments and its contents. The F & EI is used for any operation in which flammable, combustible or reactive material is stored, handled or processed. The F & EI is calculated by evaluating the loss potential of chemicals handled in the facility. The F & EI is a number which indicates, damage potential due to fire and explosion of a particular unit and comparison is based on numerical value that represent the relative level of significance of each hazard. It is a product of three attributes i.e. Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazards (GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). The MF is the starting value in computation of F & EI. MF is a measure of intrinsic rate of potential energy released from fire or explosion produced by combustion or other chemical reaction. The MF is considered for the most hazardous material or mixture of materials present in the unit in sufficient quantity actually to present the hazard. The MF is obtained from Flammability factor and Reactivity factor i.e. Nf and Nr respectively given for various chemicals by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Process hazards that contribute to the magnitude of losses have been quantified as penalties, which provide factors for computation. Every penalty may not be applicable to a specific situation and the same may have to be modified. The GPH and SPH are taken into account as penalties which are applied to MF. The F & EI is defined as: F & EI = MF x (GPH) (SPH) Wherein the product of GPH and SPH is termed as the Unit Hazard Factor (UHF). The degree of hazard is identified based on F & EI range as per the criteria given below: F & EI Range 0 – 60 61 – 96 97 – 127 128 –158

Degree of Hazard Light Moderate Intermediate Heavy 17

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> 158

4.1

Severe

Ranking of Chemical Hazards

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ratings of the chemicals handled by the port are given in Table 3. The explanation of NFPA classification is given in Table 4. The NFPA classification for a chemical is based on three factors i.e. Health Hazard Factor (Nh), Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf) and Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nf).

Table 1 – NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port Chemical High Speed Diesel Crude oil SKO Naphtha Motor Spirit Coal Fuel Oil

Nh 0

Nf 2

Nr 0

0 0 1 1 1 0

3 2 3 3 1 2

1 0 0 0 0 0

Table 2 – Explanation of NFPA Classification

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4.1.1

Health Hazard Factor (Nh)

0 Material which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no hazard beyond that of ordinary combustible material.

1 Material which on exposure would cause irritation but only minor residual injury even if no treatment is given.

2 Material which on intense or continued but not chronic

exposure could cause temporary incapacitation or possible residual injury unless prompt medical treatment is given.

3 Material that on short exposure could cause serious

temporary or residual injury even though prompt medical treatments were given.

4 Material that on very short exposure could cause death

or major residual injury even though prompt medical treatments were given.

4.1.2

Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf)

0 Materials that will not burn. 1 Material must be pre-heated before ignition can occur. Flash Point At or Above 200 degree F (93.4 degree C)

2 Material must be moderately heated or exposed to

relatively high ambient temperature before ignition can occur. Flash Point at or Above 100 degree F (37.8 degree C) Below 200 degree F (93.4 degree C)

3 Liquids and solids that can be ignited under almost all ambient temperature conditions Flash Point At or Above 73 degree F (22.8 degree C) Below 100 degree F (37.8 degree C) Boiling Point At or Above 100 degree F (37.8 degree C)

4 Materials that will rapidly or completely vaporize at atmospheric pressure and normal ambient temperature, or that are readily dispersed in air and that will burn readily. Flash Point Below 73 degree F (22.8 degree C) Boiling Point Below 100 degree F (37.8 degree C)

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4.1.3

Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nr)

0 Material that in itself is normally stable, even under fire exposure conditions, and is not reactive with water.

1 Material that in itself is normally stable, but which can become unstable pressures.

at

elevated

temperatures

and

2 Material that readily undergoes violent chemical change

at elevated temperatures and pressures or which reacts violently with water or which may form explosive mixtures with water.

3 Material that in itself is capable of detonation or

explosive decomposition or reaction but requires a strong initiating source or which must be heated under confinement before initiation or which reacts explosively with water.

4 Material that in itself is readily capable of detonation or

of explosive decomposition or reaction at normal temperatures and pressures.

4.1.4

Special Notes – White

The fourth, white, field of the hazard signal can have variable content, depending on who prepared the signal. The 1990 edition of the National Fire Codes (section 704, chapter 5) specifies only "TWO" NFPA 704 approved symbols. Additional symbols are commonly included. The field may also be left blank if no special hazards are present. Material possesses oxidizing properties. A chemical which can greatly increase the rate of combustion/fire.

OX

Unusual reactivity with water. This indicates a potential hazard using water to fight a fire involving this material.(i.e. don't put water on it) Other symbols, abbreviations, and words that some organizations use in the white Special Hazards section are shown below. These uses are not compliant with NFPA 704, but we present them here in case you see them on an MSDS or container label:

ACID

This indicates that the material is an acid, a corrosive material that has a pH lower than 7.0

ALK

This denotes an alkaline material, also called a base. These caustic materials have a pH greater than 7.0

COR

This denotes a material that is corrosive (it could be either an acid or a base). 20 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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The international symbol for radioactivity is used to denote radioactive hazards; radioactive materials are extremely hazardous when inhaled. This is another symbol used for corrosive.

The skull and crossbones is used to denote a poison or highly toxic material.

Indicates an explosive material. This symbol is somewhat redundant because explosives are easily recognized by their Instability Rating. 4.1.5

Material Factor Determination Guide Flammability or Combustibility (Nf)

Reactivity or Instability (Nr) Nr = 0

Nf = 0 Nf = 1 Nf = 2 Nf = 3 Nf = 4

4.2

Nr = 1

1 4 10 16 21

Nr = 2

Nr = 3

24 24 24 24 24

29 29 29 29 29

14 14 14 16 21

Nr = 4

40 40 40 40 40

Summary of DOW’S Index for various operations at the Port Facility

For the chemicals handled at Berth No 13 & 14, F & EI has been worked out for chemicals and the ratings are provided in Table given below:

Table 3 – Summary of Dow’s Index The various chemicals listed below have been worked for Dow Index using the Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide Sixth Edition – published by American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Name of Chemical Coal Naphtha / Motor Spirit

Process Unit Storage Pipeline

MF

GPH

SPH

UHF

F & EI

14 16

2.00 1.75

2.50 2.61

5.00 4.56

70.00 73.08

Rating Moderate Moderate

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Kerosene / Diesel Fuel Oil #1 to #6 Crude

Pipeline

10

2.00

1.71

3.71

37.10

Light

Pipeline

10

2.00

1.71

3.71

37.10

Light

Pipeline

16

1.75

2.61

4.56

73.08

Moderate

Details of calculation from the Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide Sixth Edition are given below: Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)  F1 = General Process Hazard Factor  F2 = Special Process Hazards Factor Fire & Explosion Index = F3 x Material Factor (MF) Fire & Explosion Index (Ratings) 0 to 60 Light Hazard 61 to 96 Moderate Hazard 97 to 120 Intermediate Hazard 128 to 150 Heavy Hazard 150 to 320 Severe Hazard

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4.2.1

Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Coal DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

LOCATION Coal Storage Yard

DATE 3rd July 08

PLANT Storage Yard

PROCESS UNIT -

EVALUATED BY Venugopal K

REVIEWED BY R.E. Abrahams

MATERIALS AND PROCESS PROCESS UNIT Coal (Storage) STATE OF OPERATION Coal Handling at NMPT Berth No 14 MATERIAL FACTOR

BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR Coal

14

1. General Process Hazards

Penalty

BASE FACTOR A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) B. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) C. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) E. Access F. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50)

-------------------

Penalty Used 1.00 ------0.4 ---0.35 0.25

G. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A

2.0

2. Special Process Hazards BASE FACTOR A. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) B. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) C. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted not Inerted 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 2. Process upset or Purge Failure 3. Always in Flammable Range D. E. F. G.

Dust Explosion (Factor .25 TO 2.00) Pressure operating Pressure 4.5 Bar Relief Setting 50 Bar Low Temperature (Factor .20 TO .30) Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity __lbs. hc = ___BTU/lb 1. Liquids, Gases & Reactive Materials in Process 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process 4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75)

H. I. J.

Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) Use of Fire Heaters Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 TO 1.15)

Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazards Factor (F2)

B

Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)

F3

K.

-------------------------------------------------------

1.00 ------------------------------------1.5 ---------------2.5 5.0 70.0

FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F3 x MF = F & EI) FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS)

Moderate 23

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4.2.2

Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Motor Spirit / Naphtha DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

LOCATION NMPT Berth 13

DATE 3rd July 08

PLANT PROCESS UNIT EVALUATED BY Motor Spirit / Venugopal K Naphtha Pipeline MATERIALS AND PROCESS PROCESS UNIT – Motor Spirit

STATE OF OPERATION Motor Spirit Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No 13 MATERIAL FACTOR

REVIEWED BY R.E. Abrahams

BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR Motor Spirit / Naphtha

16

1. General Process Hazards

Penalty

BASE FACTOR A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) B. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) C. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) E. Access F. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50)

1.00 ------0.50 ------0.25

Penalty Used ----------------------

G. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A

1.75

2. Special Process Hazards BASE FACTOR L. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) M. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) N. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerter not Inerted 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 2. Process upset or Purge Failure 3. Always in Flammable Range

Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) P. Pressure operating Pressure ------ Bar Relief Setting ------ Bar Q. Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) R. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity 600 m3/hour 1. Liquids, Gases & Reactive Materials in Process 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process 4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75) S. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) T. Use of Fire Heaters U. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) V. Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) B O.

Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)

1.00 0.20 ------------0.30 ---0.10 ---------0.11 ---0.10 0.30 ------0.50

---------------------------------------------------------2.61 4.56 73.08

F3

FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F3 x MF = F & EI) FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS)

Moderate 24

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4.2.3

Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Kerosene / Diesel DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

LOCATION NMPT Berth 13

DATE 3rd July 08

PLANT Kerosene / Diesel Pipeline

PROCESS UNIT -

EVALUATED BY Venugopal K

REVIEWED BY R.E. Abrahams

MATERIALS AND PROCESS PROCESS UNIT – Kerosene / Diesel STATE OF OPERATION Kerosene / Diesel Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No 13 MATERIAL FACTOR

BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR Kerosene / Diesel

10

3. General Process Hazards

Penalty

BASE FACTOR H. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) I. J. K. L. M.

Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) Access Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50)

1.00 ------0.50 0.00 0.50

Penalty Used ----------------------

N. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A

2.00

4. Special Process Hazards BASE FACTOR W. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) X. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) Y. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted not Inerted 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 2. Process upset or Purge Failure 3. Always in Flammable Range

Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) AA. Pressure operating Pressure 4.5 Bar Relief Setting 50 Bar BB. Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) Z.

CC. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity __lbs. hc = ___BTU/lb 1. Liquids, Gases & Reactive Materials in Process 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process 4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75) DD. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) EE. Use of Fire Heaters FF. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) GG. Rotating Equipment

Special Process Hazards Factor (F2)

B

Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)

F3

1.00 0.00 ------0.00 ---------0.20 ---------0.01 ---0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.50

---------------------------------------------------------1.71 3.71 37.10

FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F3 x MF = F & EI) FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS)

Light 25

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4.2.4

Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Fuel Oil # 1 to # 6 DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

LOCATION NMPT Berth 13

DATE 3rd July 08

PLANT Fuel Oil #1 to #6

PROCESS UNIT -

EVALUATED BY Venugopal K

REVIEWED BY R.E. Abrahams

MATERIALS AND PROCESS PROCESS UNIT – Fuel Oil #1 to #6 STATE OF OPERATION Fuel Oil #1 to #6 Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No 13 MATERIAL FACTOR

BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR Fuel Oil #1 to # 6

10

5. General Process Hazards

Penalty

BASE FACTOR O. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) P. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) Q. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05)

1.00 ------0.50

R. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) S. Access

0.00 0.50

T. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50)

Penalty Used ----------------------

U. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A

2.00

6. Special Process Hazards BASE FACTOR HH. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) II. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) JJ. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted not Inerted 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 2. Process upset or Purge Failure 3. Always in Flammable Range KK. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) LL. Pressure operating Pressure 4.5 Bar Relief Setting 50 Bar MM.Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) NN. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity __lbs. hc = ___BTU/lb 1. Liquids, Gases & Reactive Materials in Process 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process 4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75) OO. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) PP. Use of Fire Heaters QQ. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) RR. Rotating Equipment

Special Process Hazards Factor (F2)

B

Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)

F3

1.00 0.00 ------0.00 ---------0.20 ---------0.01 ---0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.50

---------------------------------------------------------1.71 3.71 37.10

FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F3 x MF = F & EI) FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS)

Light 26

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4.2.5

Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Crude DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

LOCATION NMPT Berth 13

DATE 3rd July 08

PLANT Crude (Naphtha)

PROCESS UNIT -

EVALUATED BY Venugopal K

REVIEWED BY R.E. Abrahams

MATERIALS AND PROCESS PROCESS UNIT – Crude (Naphtha) STATE OF OPERATION Crude Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No 13 MATERIAL FACTOR

BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR Crude (Naphtha)

16

7. General Process Hazards

Penalty

BASE FACTOR V. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) W. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) X. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) Y. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) Z. Access AA. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50)

1.00 ------0.50 ------0.25

Penalty Used ----------------------

BB. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A

1.75

8. Special Process Hazards BASE FACTOR SS. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) TT. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) UU. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerter not Inerted 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 2. Process upset or Purge Failure 3. Always in Flammable Range VV. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) WW.Pressure operating Pressure ------ Bar Relief Setting ------ Bar XX. Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) YY. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity 600 m3/hour 1. Liquids, Gases & Reactive Materials in Process 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process 4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75)

Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) AAA. Use of Fire Heaters BBB. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) CCC. Rotating Equipment Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) B ZZ.

Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)

1.00 0.20 ------------0.30 ---0.10 ---------0.11 ---0.10 0.30 ------0.50

---------------------------------------------------------2.61 4.56 73.08

F3

FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F3 x MF = F & EI) FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS)

Moderate 27

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5 RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 5.1

Overall Methodology

In order to undertake this study TELOS has used PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) and SAFETI (Software for the Assessment of Flammable Explosive Toxic Impact) software packages. PHAST Professional is a software product designed to provide a total service for chemical process hazard analysis. PHAST Professional provides the most advanced collection of consequence models available for hazard analysis. Regular updates make the latest technical developments available in a practical format. PHAST Professional represents the best technology in loss prevention engineering available in the world today. PHAST Professional is a set of software tools that calculates the consequences of accidental or emergency atmospheric releases of toxic or flammable chemicals. It uses mathematical models of discharge, dispersion, fire and explosion to predict toxic and flammable effects. The results are presented in a tabular as well as graphical form. PHAST Professional allows engineers to examine the progress of a potential incident from initial release, through the formation of a cloud and/or pool, to its dispersion. The program automatically applies the correct entrainment and dispersion models as the conditions change. PHAST Professional integrates these models such that the transition from one behavior pattern to another is smooth and continuous. From these results, it calculates any possible effects of ignition, such as jet flames and explosions, where applicable. For the experienced hazard analyst, PHAST Professional provides an extremely powerful tool which aids in quantifying the consequences of accidental releases of hazardous chemicals. Real benefits can be obtained when engineers consider safety aspects from the start of a design. PHAST Professional allows analysis of the designs for potential hazards at the conceptual stage which can eliminate the need for costly modifications at the final stage. The program can also be used to investigate proposed plant layouts and site locations to ensure that hazardous incidents do not affect emergency escape routes or surrounding housing. SAFETI is software used for estimating Societal Risk and Individual Risk. It integrates ignition probability data and population in the vicinity along with the consequence results and probability of hazardous events. It represents results in graphical forms.

5.2

Components of Risk Assessment

The normal components of a Risk Assessment Study are: 28 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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 Hazard identification and specification (Identification of Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios).  Consequence calculations.  Failure frequency estimation.  Risk review.  Estimation of Societal Risk.  Estimation of Individual Risk.  Recommendations on risk reducing measures.

5.3

Data Requirement

Following data are collected and used for risk assessment study:    

Storages and pipeline data refer Chapter 7. Population data refer Chapter 3. Meteorological data refer Chapter 3. Generic failure rate data refer Chapter 6.

The applicability of these data and procedure of carrying out risk assessment is explained by Figure given below:.

Figure 6 - Classical Risk Assessment Procedure Port Data

Generic Failure Rate Data

Derive Failure Cases

Calculate Frequencies

Metrological Data

Calculate Consequences

Safety Management Factor

Population Data

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5.4

Failure Case Identification & Definition

The first stage in any risk assessment study is to identify the potential accidents that could result in the release of the hazardous material from its normal containment. This is achieved by a systematic review of the port facilities together with an effective screening process. Chemical hazards are generally considered to be of three types:  Flammable  Reactive  Toxic Where there is the potential for confined gas releases, there is also the potential for explosions. These often produce overpressures which can cause fatalities, both through direct action on the body or through building or structural damage. Potential accidents associated with any section of a terminal / facility or pipeline can be divided into two categories:  There is a possibility of failure associated with each mechanical component of the facility / terminal (vessels, pipes, pumps or compressors). There are generic failures and can be caused by such mechanisms as corrosion, vibration or external impact (mechanical or overpressure). A small event (such as a leak) may escalate to a bigger event, by itself causing a larger failure.  There is also a likelihood of failures caused by specific operating circumstances. The prime example of this is human error; however it can also include other accidents, for example, due to runaway reaction or the possibility of ignition of leaking tank gases due to hot work. The first class of accident requires consideration of each component under its normal operating conditions. Both classes may also require consideration of some components under abnormal conditions. In principle, an essential first stage in failure case identification of such a facility is therefore every significant mechanical component in the port which could fail, together with its operating conditions, contents and inventory. The range of possible releases for a given component covers a wide spectrum, from a pinhole leak up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). It is both time-consuming and unnecessary to consider every part of the range; instead, representative failure cases are generated. For a given component these should represent fully both the range of possible releases and their total frequency. In general, the following typical types of failures are considered:

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For Pipelines:  Full bore rupture – 100 mm hole is considered.  Medium – 25 mm hole is considered.  Small leaks – 5 mm hole is considered. Failures of other components are dealt with in a similar manner giving releases which are representative of accidents to that type of component. Leak sizes are specified in terms of equivalent hole diameter rather than flow rate. This approach is adopted for the following reasons:  The failure rate data are presented in terms of hole diameters, and use of set flow rates would require calculation of the corresponding hole sizes.  The PHAST software being used explicitly models consequences for each release case defined, so there is no saving of analysis effort through using fixed flow rates.  Consequence information (i.e. hazard zone dimensions and plots) can easily be obtained from PHAST for any desired release. For each identified failure case, the appropriate data required to define that case is input into the PHAST software. When the appropriate inputs are defined, PHAST calculates the source terms of each release, such as the release rate, release velocity, release phase and drop size. These source term parameters then become inputs to the consequence modeling.

5.5

Presentation of Risk

5.5.1

Consequences Risk Exposure

Consequential risk zones which show the geographical distribution of affected area. The criteria’s for radiation in case of fire and overpressure effect in case of explosion have been given in Tables below.

Table 4 – Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensity Incident Radiation Intensity (kW/m2) 37.5

:

Type of Damage

:

25.0

:

Sufficient to cause damage to process equipments unless the equipment is fully thermally fire protected (insulation, fire proofing, sprinkler protection etc.). Minimum energy required to ignite wood at

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12.5

:

4.5

:

1.6 0.7

: :

infinitely long exposure (non-piloted) and would damage thermally unprotected tanks, equipment, etc. Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing, etc. Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds, blistering of skin (1st degree burns) is likely. Will cause no discomfort to long exposure. Equivalent to solar radiation.

Table 5 – Overpressure Effect of Explosion Pressure (psig) 0.02

:

Damage

:

0.03

:

0.04 0.1 0.15 0.3

: : : :

0.4 0.5 – 1.0

: :

0.7 1.0

: :

1–2

:

1.3 2 2–3

: : :

Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency 1015 Hz) Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom glass failure Breakage of small windows under strain Typical pressure for glass breakage “Safe distance” (probability 0.95 no serious damage beyond this value); projectile limit; some damage to house ceiling; 10% window glass broken Limited minor structural damage Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames Minor damage to house structures Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminum panels, fastenings fail followed by buckling wood panels (standard housing) fastening fail, panels blown in Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses Concrete or cinder black walls, not reinforced, shattered

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5.5.2

2.3 2.5 3

: : :

3– 4

:

4 5

: :

5–7 7 7–8

: : :

9 10

: :

300

:

Lower limit of serious structural damage 50% destruction of brickwork of houses Heavy machines (3000lb) in industrial building suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press (40,000lb) in building slightly damaged Nearly complete destruction of houses Loaded train wagons overturned Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure Loaded train boxcars completely demolished Probable total destruction of buildings, heavy machines tools (7000lb) moved and badly damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000lb) survived Limit of crater lip

Individual Risk Criteria

5.5.2.1 Purpose

Individual Risk Criteria (IRC) is used to ensure that individuals living or working near a hazardous activity do not bear an excessive risk. They may also be used for land – use planning, and to help protect buildings which are difficult to evacuate in an emergency. 5.5.2.2 Definition of Individual Risk

Individual risk may be defined in various ways, leading to different results from a risk analysis. It is important that the calculations and criteria use the same definitions. Individual risk is defined by the I. Chem. E (1992) as the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of specified hazards. It is usually taken to be the risk of death, and usually expressed as a risk per year. The main types of individual risk in common use area:  Average Individual Risk. This is usually calculated from historical data as: Individual Risk =

Number of fatalities per year Number of people at risk 33 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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5.5.2.3 Background Individual Risks

Historical individual risks may be helpful in setting individual risk criteria. Example data from the UK is presented here. Some historical risks of death from accidents, averaged over the ages, are given in the table given below.

Table 6 – Selected Individual Risks of Death in the UK Cause of Death

Risk Per Year

Source of Estimate Eng / Wales 1984 Eng / Wales 1984 Eng / Wales 1984

Reference

All accidents

3.8 X10-4

Accidents at home

1.0 X10-4

Accidents on the road Run over by vehicle Accidents at work

1.0 X10-4

Fire

1.3 X10-5

Drowning

6.1 X10-6

Homicide

6.9 X10-6

Electrocution

2.4 X10-6

Accident on railway Death due to domestic gas Struck by lightning

1.7 X10-6

1.0 X10-7

HSE (1992)

Struck by falling aircraft Transport of petrol & Chemical

2.0 X10-8

Lees (1980)

2.0 X10-8

Lees (1980)

4.5 X10-5 2.3 X10-5

9.0 X10-7

Eng / 1984 Eng / 1984 Eng / 1984

Wales Wales Wales

Eng / Wales 1984 GB Data 1986 – 90

Henderson (1987) Henderson (1987) Henderson (1987) Carruthers (1987) Henderson (1987) Henderson (1987) Henderson (1987) Henderson (1987) Carruthers (1987) Henderson (1987) HSE (1992)

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5.5.3

Existing Individual Risk Criteria for Members of the Public

Summary of Individual Risk Criteria for members of the public used by various authorities around the world is given below. They all refer to risk of death, except the HSE criteria for new housing developments near existing installations, which refer to a dangerous dose rather than risk of death. They are roughly equivalent to risks of death a factor of 3 lower. The Dutch criteria are recognized to be quite strict, and have caused their industry considerable difficulty in meeting them. Many plants probably fall only just inside the maximum tolerable criterion. The UK HSE criteria are probably the most lenient, particularly since their risk calculations take account of people being indoors and of escape action which may reduce the risks by an order of magnitude. However, the HSE also apply the ALARP principle, which ensures that very few plants approach the maximum tolerable criterion.

Table 7 – Official Individual Risk Criteria for the Public Authority & Application

Maximum Tolerance Risk (per year)

Negligible Risk (per year)

VROM, The Netherlands (New Plants)

10-6

10-8

VROM, The Netherlands (Existing plants or combined new plants) Health & Safety Executive, UK (Existing Hazardous Industry) Health & Safety Executive, UK (New Nuclear Power Stations) Health & Safety Executive, UK (Existing Dangerous substances transport) Health & Safety Executive, UK (New Housing near Existing Plants) Hong Kong Government (New Plants) Department of Planning – New South Wales (New plants and housing) Environmental Protection Authority – Western Australia (New Plants) Santa Barbara County, California USA (New Plants)

10-5

10-8

10-4

10-6

10-5

10-6

10-4

10-6

3 x 10-6

3 x 10-7

10-5

Not Used

10-6

Not Used

10-6

Not Used

10-5

10-7

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5.5.3.1 Suggested Individual Risk Criteria

The most comprehensive and widely – used criteria for Individual Risks are the ones proposed by the UK HSE as follows for existing plants.

5.5.4

Maximum tolerable risk for workers

:

10-3 per year

Maximum tolerable risk for members of the public Negligible risk

:

10-4 per year

:

10-6 per year

Societal Risk Criteria

5.5.4.1 Purpose

Societal Risk Criteria (SRC) is used to limit the risks to local communities or to the society as a whole form the hazardous activity. In particular, they are used to limit the risks of catastrophes affecting many people at once. Societal risks include the risk to every exposed person, even if they are only exposed on one brief occasion. 5.5.4.2 Definition of Societal Risk

Societal risk is defined by the IChemE (1992) as the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering a given level of harm from the realization of specified hazards. It is usually taken to refer to the risk of death, and usually expressed as a risk per year. The term societal risk is sometimes taken to refer to members of the public. Societal risks may be expressed in the form of:  FN Curves, showing explicitly the relationship between the cumulative frequency (F) and number of fatalities (N)  Potential Loss of Life (PLL) or annual fatality rates, in which the frequency and fatality data is combined into a convenient single measure of societal risk. The use of FN curves as criteria allows control not only of the average number of fatalities but also of the risks of catastrophic accidents killing many people at once. These attempts to balance the public fear of a major accident with the benefits received from the hazardous activity. 5.5.4.3 Existing Societal Risk Criteria

Societal Risk Criteria have not been as widely used as Individual Risk Criteria because the concepts and calculations involved are much more difficult. However, their value is becoming recognized, especially for transport activities, but also as complementary to Individual Risk Criteria in general. 36 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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The UK HSE has used modified Individual Risk Criteria to account for Societal Risk Considerations (HSE, 1989b), but more recently has moved towards the use of Societal Risk Criteria. Summary of the few existing official societal risk criteria is given in the table below.

Table 8 – Official Societal Risk Criteria

5.5.5

Authority

FN Curve Slope

Maximum Tolerable Intercept with N = 1

Negligible Intercept with N = 1

Limit on N

VROM, The Netherlands (New Plants) Hong Kong Government (New Plants) Health & Safety Commission, UK (Existing Ports)

-2

10-3

10-5

----

-1

10-3

10-5

1000

-1

10-1

10-4

----

Criteria for Acceptable Risk

The earliest studies of risk used the term 'Acceptable Risk'. The adoption of quantitative techniques enabled hazards to be ranked numerically in order or priority. The question immediately arose whether any or all of these hazards were 'acceptable', or of sufficient magnitude to require expenditure on potentially expensive safety measures. This required some form of guidance on criteria against which the acceptability of estimated risk levels may be judged. The search for acceptable levels of risk for industrial activities generated a considerable volume of literature. Various criteria were put forward for specific applications in a number of countries, but no clear consensus emerged. This reflects the contentious nature of the essentially political value judgments involved. It was slowly appreciated that the relative importance of different risk parameters for making decisions on safety varied considerably from case to case, depending on the numerical results of the specific analysis to be evaluated; for example individual versus societal risk, or public versus occupational risk. The predicted risks (individual, societal or occupational) from the activity were shown to be lower than 'background' levels of risk already present and apparently acceptable to society. Following early applications of Quantified Risk Assessment or QRA in the 1970s, extensive tables of such comparative 37 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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risk data were compiled for this purpose relating to natural hazards such as lightning and flooding, every day activities such as car driving and use of domestic appliances, and occupational hazards in different industries. Whilst the simplicity of its approach was attractive; it was open to severe criticisms for failure to distinguish between acceptable risks and those which were merely tolerated. It also fell into disrepute when it emerged that deaths were occurring from radiation long after the Wind scale accident of 1957 occurred in the nuclear industry (in which radioactive material was released following a fire in the air-cooled nuclear reactor). To this day the episode is seen by many as a deliberate cover-up by the UK Government. It is clear that in the past many industrial hazards were accepted in ignorance by public and employees. This was a function of the technological, social and economic conditions of the time. It is now argued that the risk comparisons failed to address the 'benefits' from hazardous activities. Where 'benefits' are not recognized by an affected individual or community, no finite level of risk - no matter how small - may be judged as tolerable by them. So while comparative risk studies provide a useful perspective on numerical risk results, they offer little to justify such risks in 'absolute' terms of acceptability. In contrast to this simple risk comparison approach, extensive research undertaken by psychologists and other social scientists over recent years has revealed a complex series of factors, values and beliefs which in practice underlie the public's perception of the risk of industrial activities. In particular, it has been shown that perceived risks cannot be readily correlated with those 'objective' risk estimates which may be statistically derived. Rather they are influenced by qualitative characteristics, such as the level of free will associated with the risks involved, their catastrophic potential and their relative unfamiliarity. The perceived importance or benefits of industrial activities have also been demonstrated to play a significant role in conditioning public attitudes. The reconciliation of the public view as based on perceived risks with estimates of objective risk is now recognized to be an issue of considerable political importance - as, for example, reflected in many national debates concerning the acceptability of nuclear power. However, as acceptability criteria are intended solely for the evaluation of QRA results, they should be based primarily on objective risk estimates. Risk perception by public or trade unions, for example, may then influence decisions on the control of major hazards as separate political factors, considered in a subsequent step. 5.5.6

Framework of Risk Criteria

An approach is being widely promulgated in the UK that the general form or framework for acceptability criteria should be represented as the three-tier system illustrated in Figure given below. It involves the definition of the following elements: 38 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore

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 An upper-bound on individual (and possibly, societal) risk levels, beyond which risks are deemed unacceptable;  A lower-bound on individual (and possibly, societal) risk levels, below which risks are deemed not to warrant regulatory concern;  An intermediate region between the upper and lower bounds, where further individual and societal risk reduction are required to achieve a level deemed 'as low as reasonably practicable' (the ALARP principle).

Figure 7 – ALARP TRAINGLE ALARP TRIANGLE

Potential loss of life > 1 in 1000 years

INTOLERABLE REGION

GENERALLY TOLERABLE TARGET REGION FOR INSTALLATIONS

Tolerable only if the cost of risk reduction is grossly disproportionate

ALARP REGION

BROADLY TOLERABLE TARGET REGION FOR THIRD PARTIES

Potential loss of life < 1 in 1,000,000 years

Levels of Risks and ALARP. (Source: Health and Safety Executive, 1992) The risk levels of the boundaries will vary according to the number of people at risk. Table given below shows some early published values of acceptable risk.

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Table 9 – Published Acceptable Values of Risk Canvey Island report, UK (1978) Netherlands N = 10 N = 100 Health and Safety Executive, Royal Society, UK (1983)

Du Pont BNFL (Thorp reprocessing plant, UK) UK Central Electricity Generating Board nuclear power Sizewell B, UK (1987)

35 x 10-6/year 1 x 10-5/year unacceptable 1 x 10-7/year acceptable 1 x 10-7/year unacceptable 1 x 10-9/year acceptable 1 x 10-5/year upper level 1 x 10-6/year acceptable 1 x 10-7/year sensitive population 0.3 x 10-6/year 0.01 x 10-6/year 1 x 10-6/year upper level 0.04 x 10-6/year design 0.3 x 10-6/year normal

The numerical values which have been suggested for upper and lower bounds show significant variation, not only in the values themselves but also in the extent to which these concepts are applied to societal risk. The values also vary between industries, reflecting considerable differences in philosophy and value judgments as expressed by individual authorities. From a practical point of view they also have a profound effect on the use of QRA as a means of demonstrating compliance. For instance, where the difference between upper and lower levels is smaller than the uncertainty band typically associated with a risk assessment, the practicality of applying the criteria is called into question. Also if the numerical values of the levels are very low, the technical uncertainties inherent in all risk assessments may make it questionable whether compliance can be demonstrated.

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6 FAILURE RATE DATA Failure frequency and reliability data for the study are presented below in the various tables. Risk is a product of severity and probability of an undesirable event. The severities (affected zones) for all Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios and Worse Case Scenarios have been covered in the study. In this chapter, the scenarios are reviewed with probability of their occurrences.

6.1

Failure Data Considered for the Probability Estimation

6.1.1

Frequencies for Transfer Piping

Transfer piping is defined to be piping within the port or terminal wherein chemical is transferred between two equipment / tank or from berth to terminal or from a terminal to neighboring installations. The pipe routing plays significant role in failure frequencies. The pipelines at ground level are more vulnerable for impact with respect to pipelines on the pipe rack at a safe elevation. Hence, corrective factors suggested in Table needs to be applied.

Table 10 – Frequency Factors for Inter unit Transfer Piping Type of piping

Inter unit Run down lines (pipe rack at elevation) Rundown lines (ground level) 6.1.2

Factor for failure frequencies relative to process piping 0.885 0.768 0.809

Causes of Pipeline Failure

Causes of failure of pipelines are generally due to design/erection defects, corrosion, impact, poor maintenance, operational factors etc. Various world wide agencies have carried out extensive study on determining the predominant causes of pipeline failure. Table below shows the comparison of failure rate frequencies (per 1000 Km year).

Table 11 – Comparison of Failure rate Frequencies (Per 1000 Km year). Pipeline system failure mode

USA Gas line Data 1970-80 Raw Data

UK gas 1969-77 (HSE)

HSE NGL Risk Study (Derived from

European oil and gas lines 1974 – 84 (CONCAWE

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(Note 1) Defect Corrosion External impact Environmental Total (Note 2) 6.1.3

0.13 0.20 0.31

0.07 0.16 0.16

CONCAWE Data) 007 0 0.16

0.11 0.79

0.007 0.56

0.007 0.23

Unmodified Data) 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.05 0.69

Transfer Spills while unloading from ships

Berth specific transfer spill frequency can be built up from the various component frequencies by selecting appropriate values from Table given below.

Table 12 – Transfer Spill Frequency Components Cause of Failure

Connection Failure Failure of hose or arm Failure of quick release connection Failure of ships pipe work etc Operator Error Ranging Failures Mooring Fault

Category

Failure Frequency (per visit)

Full Bore Probability

Arm

5.1 X10-5

0.1

Hose

6.8 X10-5

0.5

1987 specification Pre – 1987 specification Liquefied gas

5.1 X10-6

1.0

5.1 X10-5

1.0

5.4 X10-6

0.1

Liquid cargo

7.2 X10-6

0.1

Liquefied gas

5.4 X10-6

0.1

Liquid cargo

7.2 X10-6

0.5

Liquefied gas without ranging alarm Liquefied gas with ranging alarm

3.0 X10-6

1.0

6.0 X10-7

1.0

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Passing Ships

Overflow

6.1.4

Liquid cargo

1.9 X10-5

1.0

Liquefied gas without ranging alarm Liquefied gas with ranging alarm Liquid cargo

1.0 X10-6

1.0

2.0 X10-7

1.0

6.6 X10-6

1.0

Liquefied gas loading without vapour return Liquid cargo loading

2.4 X10-5

0.0

1.2 X10-4

1.0

Reliability Data Valves (Failure to close on Demand)

Table 13– Failure to close on Demand Valve Type

Failure to Close on Demand 0.005

ESD Valve Excess flow valve Check (non return) valve

6.1.5

0.013 0.05

Source

DNV Technica (1994 Hlll) COVO (1982) DNV Technica (1993 C3 105. Addendum B1 Revision A)

Over ground Piping

For welded piping, a confidential Technica source (LO56, 1980 – unpublished data from a major chemical company) gives general pipe leak frequency data as shown in Table below. This is considered to be the best data on pipe failures which has been identified.

Table 14 – Historical Pipe Leak Frequencies Type Small Leaks Big Leaks

% of Cross Sectional Area 38

6.0

0.7

Nh = 0

Nf =2

SPECIFIC GRAVITY

LIQUID 0.8

Nr=0

WATER SOLUBILITY

PHYSICAL STATE AT STORAGE CONDITION

NO

LIQUID

VAPOUR 4.5

IDLH=N.A.

TLV=N.A.

REACTIVITY WITH WATER NO

HEALTH HAZARD DATA EFFECTS

INHALATION Cause headache, dizziness, nausea, anaemia and bronchitis.

INGESTION If swallowed, it causes irritation of mouth, throat, nausea, vomiting, drowsiness and respiratory disturbances.

SKIN

EYES Irritant

EMERGENCY MEASURES

If vapors are inhaled in high concentration, remove the victim from the contaminated atmosphere to fresh air and secure medical attention.

Wash the affected parts of the body with soap and water.

If kerosene comes contact with eyes, flush them immediately with large quantities of water.

P.P.E.s

Personnel should also be provided with rescue harness, life-line and selfcontained breathing apparatus to permit safe escape, in case of emergency Mechanical exhaust ventilation should be provided for tank cleaning.

Rubber hand gloves, protective face shield

Chemical goggles tight)

safety (gas-

EMERGENCY / FIRST AID MEASURES COMBUSTION PRODUCTS

-

FIRE FIGHTING

Small fires involving kerosene can be extinguished using foam, Dry Powder or Carbon Dioxide extinguishers. Fires involving built storage of kerosene can be controlled using foam or water spray by trained fire fighting personnel. They should be made aware of hazards of kerosene and should be provided with protective equipment during fire fighting.

FIRST AID ANTIDOTES

/

SPILL CONTROL MEASURES

Seek immediate medical help. Spilled kerosene should never be left unattended. Shut off all sources of ignition. Use protective clothing while handling large kerosene spillages and leaks. Flush spills with a large quantity of water, and ventilate the area till odor is eliminated completely.

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9.4 Sr. No

High Speed Diesel Oil – MSDS C.A.S.NO.

H1

CHEMICAL NAME HIGH SPEED DIESEL OIL

HAZARD CLASSIFICATION FLAMMABLE -Y

T0XIC - N

CORROSIVE - N

SAFETY RELATED PROPERTIES FLASH POINT 0C

U.E.L. (%V/ V)

L.E.L. (%V/V )

71

13.5

6.0

Nh = 1

Nf = 1

Nr = 0

SPECIFIC GRAVITY

LIQUID 66

-

-

Nh = 1

Nf = 1

SPECIFIC GRAVITY

LIQUID 0.95

Nr = 0

WATER SOLUBILITY

PHYSICAL STATE AT STORAGE CONDITION

NO

LIQUID

VAPOUR >1

IDLH, = N.A.

TLV =N.A.

REACTIVITY WITH WATER NO

HEALTH HAZARD DATA INHALATION Irritation to upper respiratory tract

INGESTION Harmful.

SKIN Irritation. Repeated contact may cause dermatitis.

EMERGENCY MEASURES

Move victim to fresh air. Give artificial respiration, if breathing has stopped.

Have victim drink water or milk. Do not induce vomiting

Remove contaminated clothing. Wash affected skin with soap and water

Flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 10 min.

P.P.E.s

Breathing apparatus required.

Use PVC or rubber gloves

Goggles

EFFECTS

if

EYES Irritation

EMERGENCY / FIRST AID MEASURES COMBUSTION PRODUCTS

Fire extinguishing by water fog, alcohol resistant foam or dry agent such as with dry chemical powder and CO2.

FIRE FIGHTING FIRST AID ANTIDOTES

/

SPILL CONTROL MEASURES

Seek immediate medical help. No specific antidote. Treat symptomatically. Stop leak, if safe to do so. Contain spillage. Absorb in sand or earth for disposal. Eliminate all sources of ignition. Use personal protective equipment. Cordon off the area. Stay upwind.

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9.6

Motor Spirit (Petrol) – MSDS

Sr. No

C.A.S.NO.

CHEMICAL NAME

HAZARD CLASSIFICATION

M5

8006-61-9

MOTOR SPIRIT(PETROL)

FLAMMABLE -Y

T0XIC -Y

CORROSIVE -Y

SAFETY RELATED PROPERTIES FLASH POINT 0C

U.E.L . (%V/ V)

L.E.L. (%V/V )

-45

7.4

1.4

Nh = 1

Nf = 3

Nr = 0

SPECIFIC GRAVITY

LIQUID 0.731

VAPOUR 5.4

IDLH, = N.A.

WATER SOLUBILITY

PHYSICAL STATE AT STORAGE CONDITION

NO

LIQUID

TLV = 500 ppm

REACTIVITY WITH WATER NO

HEALTH HAZARD DATA INHALATION Mildly toxic. May cause hallucinations, CNS depression, asphyxia and pulmonary edema (which may be fatal).

INGESTION

EMERGENCY MEASURES

Move victim to fresh air. Give artificial respiration, if breathing has stopped.

Have victim drink water or milk. Do not induce vomiting

P.P.E.s

Breathing apparatus required.

EFFECTS

SKIN May Repeated may dermatitis.

if

irritate. contact cause

EYES May irritate.

Remove contaminated clothing. Wash affected skin with soap and water

Flush eyes with plenty of water for atleast 10 min.

Use PVC or rubber gloves

Goggles

EMERGENCY / FIRST AID MEASURES COMBUSTION PRODUCTS

Oxides of lead. Foam or dry agent such as with dry chemical powder and CO2

FIRE FIGHTING FIRST AID ANTIDOTES

/

SPILL CONTROL MEASURES

Seek immediate medical help. No specific antidote. Treat symptomatically. Stop leak, if safe to do so. Contain spillage. Absorb in sand or earth for disposal. Eliminate all sources of ignition. Use personal protective equipment. Cordon off the area. Stay upwind.

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9.7

Liquefied Petroleum Gas – MSDS

Sr. No

C.A.S.NO.

CHEMICAL NAME

L2

LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS

HAZARD CLASSIFICATION FLAMMABLE - Y

T0XIC - Y

CORROSIVE - N

SAFETY RELATED PROPERTIES FLASH POINT 0C

U.E.L. (%V/V)

L.E.L. (%V/V)

SPECIFIC GRAVITY

Propane = -104.4, Butane= -60

Propane= 9.5, Butane= 8.4

Propane = 2.2, Butane= 1.6

LIQUID

VAPOUR

0.510.58

1.5

Nh = 1

Nf = 4

Nr = 0

IDLH, = 19,000 ppm

WATER SOLUBILITY

PHYSICAL STATE AT STORAGE CONDITION

NO

LIQUID

TLV = 1000 ppm

REACTIVITY WITH WATER NO

HEALTH HAZARD DATA

EFFECTS

INHALATION Concentration in air greater than 10%, cause dizziness in a few minutes, 1% concentrations give the same symptom in 10 min. High concentrations cause asphyxiation.

EMERGENCY MEASURES

Remove victim from exposure and apply artificial respiration. Guard against self-injury if confused.

P.P.E.s

Self contained breathing apparatus for high vapor concentration

INGESTION

SKIN

EYES

EMERGENCY / FIRST AID MEASURES COMBUSTION PRODUCTS

-

FIRE FIGHTING

Allow to burn while cooling adjacent equipment with water spray. Extinguish small fires with dry chemical powder. Water not to be used.

FIRST AID ANTIDOTES

/

SPILL CONTROL MEASURES

Seek immediate medical help. Stop discharge if possible. Keep people away. Shut-off ignition sources and call fire department. Stay upwind and use water spray to 'knock down' vapor. Evacuate area if large discharge. Avoid contact with Liquid.

84 QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore