Prince Eugene at War 1809 [PDF]

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1 -8 -0 - 9 PRINCE EUGENE AT WAR: 1809 Prince Eugene at War: 1809 is an in-depth nnilitary history study ot the heretofore largely neglected Italian and Hungarian campaigns of Mapoleon’s step-son, Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, and commander-in-chief of the French Arm y of Italy. From the preparations to war through the conclusion of hostilities, Robert M. Epstein presents a lucid, factual, unbiased, and exceptionally detailed analyses of the movements and combats of the Franco-Austrian War of 1809 between Prince Eugene and his opponent. Archduke John. Included in these analyses is the interesting development of Prince Eugene as a military commander. Dr. Epstein follows Eugene while on the battlefield and at his headquarters and shows how the Viceroy developed into a very capable field comm ander who ably planned and then skillfully executed impressive victories. Finally, the author explodes the tired myth that Mapoleon never attempted to train his subordinates in his art of war. Through the use of the Emperor’s own Correspondance and Prince Eugene’s dispatches, the clear relation.ship of teacher-student between Mapoleon and his step­ son is reconstructed with painstaking care and the conclusions drawn from this investigation are important for any student of Napoleonic history.

THE AUTHOR Robert M. Epstein received his B.A. in History from Temple University in 1970, afterwhich he studied under Gunther E. Rothenberg at the University of New Mexico and then completed his M.A. in Military and Diplomatic History at Temple in 1973. An instructor of history at Community College of Philadelphia and at Drexel University from 1978 through 1980, he received his Ph.D. from Temple in 1981. His dissertation of Prince Eugene was directed by Russel F. Weigley and Frank C. Weber of Temple, and Gunther E. Rothenberg of F\irdue. Since July, 1981, Mr. Epstein has been a professor of military history at the United States Arm y Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Dust Jacket design by Ivor Janci

Prince Eugene at War: 1809

NAPOLEON’S COMMANDERS SERIES

Prince Eugene at War; 1809 A Study of the Role of Prince Eugene de Beauharnais in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809 Robert M. Epstein

EMPIRE GAMES PRESS Arlington, Texas “History Comes Alive!"

Empire Games Press, P.O. Box 5462, Arlington, TX 76011 U.S.A. ® 1984 Robert M. Epstein Ail rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the author. Original Edition; Published in 1984 Printed in the United States of America ISBN 0-913037-05-2 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-081744

CONTENTS Page LIST OF MAPS..................................................................................................................6 a c k n o w l e d g m e n t s ................................................................................................7 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................9 CHAPTER I The Viceroy................................................................................11 CHAPTER II The Defense of Italy.................................................................19 CHAPTER III Organization and Preparations...................................... .........31 CHAPTER IV Invasion...................................................................................... 43 CHAPTER V Defeat at Sacile..........................................................................53 CHAPTER VI The Turning Pont..................................................................... 63 CHAPTER VII Battle of the Piave..................................................................... 77 CHAPTER VIII Pursuit into Austria..................................................................99 CHAPTER IX Campaign in Hungary............................................................115 CHAPTER X Conclusion.................... ...........................................................135 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................... 143

MAPS Page Seat of War: Italy and Austria.........................................................................................21 Theater of Operations: Tyrol, Friaul, Carinthia, Carniola, Istria............................................................................................23 The Battle of Sadie........................................................................................................... 52 Battle on the Piave: Situation, 8:00 a.m...........................................................................86 Battle on the Piave: Situation, 10:30 a.m........................................................................ 89 Battle on the Piave: Situation, 4:00 p.m.......................................................................... 92 Theater of Operations: June-July, 1809........................................................................116 Battle of Raab..................................................................................................................125

All photographs courtesy of Musée de l’Armée and the H. Roger Viollet collection, Paris.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There were many people who in one way or another helped me during the writing of this book, and I would like to mention them all: My parents, Irving and Estelle for their financial support during my years in graduate school. Doctors Russel F. Weigley, Gunther E. Rothenberg, and Frank G. Weber for their guidance, advice, and moral support. Lucy wilson for taking the time to proofread all of my chapters. James Reiber for checking my translations. Wayne Maxson of the Paley Library of Temple University and Robert Zaslavsky of the Canaday Library of Bryn Mawr College for their help in finding research materials. The staff of the rare book and archival section of the Firestone Library of Princeton University for their friendliness and help. Harry L. Fink for producing the maps in this study. Finally, Linda Mingle for typing my manuscript. To all, my heartfelt thanks. Kansas City, Missouri

Robert M. Epstein

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this book is to study the military career of Prince Eugene de Beauharnais in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. This study will include an analysis of his abilities as an independent military commander, an examination of the military relationship between Eugene and Napoleon I, and a narrative account of the military operations of the forces under Eugene’s command. The book will rely heavily on the published correspondence between Eugene and Napoleon and on previously unused material in the Beauharnais archives at Princeton Unviersity. Why is such a study necessary? The Napoleonic Wars have been among the most popular subjects of historical writing. Hundreds of thousands of books have been written about this subject. Yet, in spite of its popularity, there is still room for further study. Many facets of the Napoleonic Wars have been ignored, and new primary material is still available. Napoleon himself has held a fascination for his contemporaries and later historians. All of his military operations have been scrutinized and restudied to the point of excess. Napoleon’s marshals were also a colorful lot, providing good copy for many authors. Moreover, since many of the marshals fought against and were beaten by the Duke of Wellington in Spain, British historians have had a field day examining and analyzing the careers of Wellington and his French opponents. With all of this attention going either to Napoleon or to his marshals or in Spain, little has been done with the other secondary theaters of operations, in particular, the Italian Theater after 1800. Next to the army in the main theater of operations under Napoleon, or in Spain, the Kingdom of Italy contained the largest concentration of Napoleonic troops. Northern Italy was the site of military operations in 1805, 1808, 1809, 1813, and 1814. Yet save for accounts of Andre Massena’s campaign in 1805, no modern detailed analytical study of these Italian campaigns has been written. The Napoleonic Army of Italy which fought there has largely been ignored by the Napoleonic military historians. It is the “forgotten” army of the Napoleonic Wars, A modern account of the operations of this army in any of the Italian campaigns after 1805 is needed to fill out the narrative of the military history of the Napoleonic Wars. From the last days of 1805 to the fall of Napoleon in 1814, the Army of Italy was commanded by Napoleon’s stepson. Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, the Viceroy of Italy. Eugene de Beauharnais has suffered from the lack of an adequate study of his role as an independent military commander. There have been numerous biographies of Prince Eugene, but very few of them have dealt with his military abilities. For example, one of the few biographies in English, Carola Oman’s Napoleon’s Viceroy, all but ignores military history. Other recent biographies such as François Bernhardy’s Eugene de Beauharnais, or Arthur Levy’s Eugene are also inadequate concerning Eugene’s prowness as a general. Apart from biographies, some other books deal with Eugene’s abilities, or the alleged lack of them, as a military commander. Some of Eugene’s contemporaries wrote histories or memoires after the Napoleonic Wars, and their books became the basis for works by later historians. Two schools of thought were formed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries concerning Eugene’s military capabilities. One group claimed that Eugene was, at least in 1809, a well meaning but incompetent commander. The other group considered him to have been a fine general. The anti-Eugene school was begun by General Jean Pelet (Memoires sur la guerre de 1809). This school was embellished by the Recollections of Marshal Macdonald. Macdonald was a subordinate

INTRODUCTION of Eugene in 1809, and he deliberately tried to enhance his own reputation at the Viceroy’s expense. Macdonald’s book is far more critical of Eugene than Pelet’s. Two later historians, L. Adolphe Thiers (Histoire du consulat et de l’empire) and F. Lorraine Petre (Napoleon and the Archduke Charles), relied heavily on Pelet and Macdonald to write their own books. The first to write a positive biography of the Viceroy was General Frederic Vaudoncourt (Histoire politique et militaire du Prince Eugene Napoleon). Vaudoncourt was a staff officer and friend of the Viceroy and tried to refute the unfavorable picture painted by Pelet. Andre Du Casse used Vaudoncourt’s book as a basis for the biographical sections in his publication of Eugene’s correspondence, Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du Prince Eugene. Using both Vaudoncourt and some of the letters written by Eugene and Napoleon, Du Casse sought to refute the charge that Macdonald was the one who really commanded the Army of Italy in 1809, while Eugene was but a figurehead. A fresh examination of the merits of these two rival schools of thought is needed. Much has been written about the familial relationship between Napoleon and Eugene, but a serious study of the military relationship between them has yet to be made. Did Napoleon try to train Eugene in the art of independent military command? If he did, then such a discovery would fly in the face of the accepted tenets of Napoleonic military historiography. Many Napoleonic historians claim that a major cause of French military reverses from 1812-1815 was the fact that Napoleon never tried to train any of his generals in his system of war. David Chandler, whose Campaigns o f Napoleon is among the best histories of the period, has stated explicitly that the defeat of French arms, “was partly due to Napoleon’s failure to train up his subordinates for the exigencies of independent command.”* What is peculiar about Chandler’s statement is that Chandler and other historians have presumably been able to divine the “secret” of Napoleonic warfare, while his marshal supposedly could not. The discovery of the “key” to Napoleonic warfare was made by the careful study of Napoleon’s military movements and a reading of the Emperor’s correspondence. If the military historians could understand Napoleon’s methods by reading his letters, then why could not the generals who were the recipients of his dispatches and the witnesses of his maneuvers? In this study, I intend to test this theory by examining the military relationship between Napoleon and Eugene. I shall try to determine if Napoleon sought to instruct the Viceroy in his methods of war during Eugene’s debut as an independent military commander in the War of 1809. If Napoleon acted as a military tutor to Eugene, I shall also seek to gauge the effectiveness of Napoleon’s instructions. NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 'David Chandler, The Campaigns o f Napoleon (Macmillan, New York, 1966), p. 932.

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CHAPTER I The Viceroy — Beginnings Eugene de Beauharnais was born on September 3,1781. He was the first-born of the Vicomte and Vicomtesse de Beauharnais. Eugene’s mother, Marie-Joseph-Rose (later she would call herself Josephine), was born of a French colonial family in Martinique. His father, Alexandre, was a member of the French aristocracy. The couple had a daughter, Hortense, in 1784. The marriage was a stormy one; both of Eugene’s parents had a promiscuous nature and they separated in 1786. As the younger brother of a noble family, Alexandre had made a career in the French Army. He had served in America under the Comte de Rochambeau and by 1788 became a major in the Sarre Infantry Regiment. Alexandre was a member of the Estates General in 1789 and became President of the Constituent Assembly in 1791. Of a liberal persuasion, he adopted the principles of the French Revolution. He renounced his title and became a montagnard. The outbreak of the First War of the French Revolution initially gave Alexandre an opportunity to rise high in the new regime. In 1793 he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine. But as an ex-noble he became the object of suspicion back in Paris as the Revolution turned ever more radical. Unable to relieve Mainz, Beauharnais was relieved of his command in August, 1793 by the Jacobin government and was later arrested for treason along with his estranged wife, Josephine. Although there was a reconciliation of the couple while they were in prison, Alexandre went to his death on the guillotine in 1794, but Josephine was saved when the Jacobins fell later that year. Josephine emerged from prison determined that she and her children would survive. An attractive woman, she used her wit and her charm to develop contacts with the politicians and generals of the republican regime. Initially, without any financial means, she had difficulty providing for her family. Consequently she secured a post for Eugene as an ordnance officer on the staff of General Lazare Hoche. Hoche had been a friend of Alexandre and had served under him in the Army of the Rhine and had also developed a romantic interest in the widow Beauharnais. Eugene was happy with the appointment. He had been brought up in the neo-classical world of the late eighteenth century that stressed the civil and martial virtues of the ancient Romans. Patriotism had been ingrained in Eugene’s early childhood, and this element was reinforced by his father’s military career. Eugene had already decided to follow in his father’s footsteps and wanted an army career. The appointment to Hoche’s staff would serve as a first step. Hoche was sent to northwest France to campaign against the Vendeans. It was there that Eugene underwent his baptism of fire, fighting at Quiberon. After almost a year in the Vendée, he was sent back to Paris at his mother’s request so that he could continue his education. Josephine was now financially secure and could afford to send her son back to shcool. During Eugene’s stay in Paris, he met the man who would shape the course of his future career, General of Division Napoleon Buonaparte.

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THE VICEROY - BEGINNINGS There had been an attempted coup by royalists in Paris in October 1795. The insurrection was crushed by troops commanded by the newly appointed military governor of Paris, General Buonaparte. (He was to change his last name to Bonaparte in March 1796.) To insure order, Buonaparte ordered the confiscation of all privately held weapons in Paris. Among the arms that were taken was the treasured sword of Alexandre de Beauharnais. Eugene was sent by his mother to Napoleon’s headquarters to request that the sword be returned. Napoleon interviewed the youth, was impressed by his bearing, and returned the sword. The General’s graciousness favorably moved Eugene and the first meeting had laid the foundation for an affectionate relationship. Napoleon had previously met Eugene’s mother, and the incident of the sword was used as an excuse to visit the widow Beauharnais the following day. Josephine was not at home to receive the call, and so she visited the general at his headquarters the next morning. A romance developed, and Napoleon and Josephine were married in March 1796. Shortly before the marriage, Napoleon had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy. While Napoleon was conquering Piedmont and Lombardy, Eugene continued his studies in Paris. Young Beauharnais had been hoping to continue in a military career and finally, in June 1797, he got his chance; he was commissioned as a sous-lieutenant in the 1st Hussars of his stepfather’s Army of Italy. Upon arrival in Italy. Lieutenant Beauharnais was appointed aide-de-camp to Napoleon, and in that capacity took part in the campaign against Archduke Charles in Carinthia and Styria. During this time General Bonaparte took an avid interest in his stepson’s military education. Eugene sailed to Egypt with Napoleon’s army in 1798. There he saw considerable action. Eugene had some brushes with the Mamelukes while conveying messages to the various French divisons during the Battle of the Pyramids. Later he actively sought combat by joining some nighttime ambushes against Arab tribesmen. He accompanied Napoleon to Palestine and was wounded in the head and almost killed while assaulting the walls of Acre. The wound was serious, but Eugene recovered after nineteen days’ convalescence. Lieutenant Beauharnais shared all the hardships of the army’s retreat across the desert from Palestine back to Egypt. However, he still managed to find some action. At the head of a troop of horsemen he captured an Arab caravan and brought it intact back to Cairo. He became ill during the army’s march toward Aboukir but recovered in time to reach Napoleon’s headquarters at Aboukir to take part in the battle that destroyed an invading Turkish army. The bonds of mutual respect between Napoleon and Eugene had strengthened during the Egyptian Campaign. Eugene had grown up listening to the tales of the martial glory of the ancients. Bonaparte, after his conquests in Italy and Egypt, seemed the very model of a modern Roman conqueror. Eugene had already decided to follow his father in the profession of arms. Napoleon’s rising star spurred Eugene to emulate his stepfather’s exploits on the battlefield as well. Thus, the thirst for military glory had become firmly embedded in Eugene’s personality. Eugene exhibited courage and dash during the campaign. The fact that Eugene never complained, sought no special favors, and attended seriously to his duties all served to endear him to Napoleon. The pair had become close enough so that Napoleon was able to discuss with Eugene the state of his marriage to Josephine, which was deteriorating. Josephine had not amended her lascivious ways. She had a lover, Hippolyte Charles, while Napoleon was in Italy, and took up with him again when Napoleon sailed for Egypt. News of the affair

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THE VICEROY - BEGINNINGS made its way to Cairo and, naturally, upset Napoleon. Eugene wrote that the general was quite willing to discuss his personal problems with him: News had reached him from France, where someone was trying hard to upset his domestic happiness. Although I was very young at the time, he trusted me enough to confide in me. Usually it was in the evening that he told me of his worries, while he was striding up and down his tent. I was the only person upon whom he could unburden himself freely. I tried to calm him down and do my best to console him (so far as my youth and the awe with which I regarded him would let me).* Napoleon had resolved to divorce Josephine because of her unfaithfulness, but he would not allow the problems with his wife to interfere with the affection he felt for Eugene and he continued to treat his stepson with kindness. Eugene accompanied Napoleon when he left Egypt for France. After landing at Frejus on October 16, 1799, the pair traveled swiftly to Paris. Josephine learned of Napoleon’s imminent arrival and attempted to intercept him en route before Napoleon’s sisters, who disliked Josephine, had a chance to inform Napoleon of her extramarital affairs and completely ruin her marriage. Josephine missed Napoleon’s carriage and returned to their home, Malmaison, to find her luggage piled in the hall and her husband barricaded in the bedroom, refusing to see her. The manner and depth of Josephine’s love for her husband is conjectural. However, she managed to survive in a revolutionary regime by her political acumen, and she realized that the fortunes of herself and her family would be better served by staying married to the strong man of the Revolution rather than be cast out by him. Josephine wanted to save the marriage. Her tears and entreaties failed to move the general. Finally as a last resort, Josephine enlisted the help of her children, Eugene and Hortense, who she knew had won Bonaparte’s affection, to plead her case through the closed door. The tactic worked, Napoleon relented, the door opened, and the couple was reunited. The following month came the coup d’etat of Brumaire that made Napoleon the political leader of France. As chief of state. First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte organized an elite body of troops to protect him and serve as the premier military unit of France, the Consular Guard. With the creation of the Guard, Eugene received his first command; he was made a captain commanding the Guard’s troop of Chasseurs-à -cheval. Leading this superb light cavalry unit was certainly to the young officer’s taste. The Consular Guard went with Napoleon to Italy where, on June 14,1800, he defeated the Austrians at Marengo. Eugene and his chasseurs took part in a decisive cavalry charge that helped rout the main body of the Austrian army. For his conduct at the battle, Eugene was promoted chef d’escadron. Peace came to the continent of Europe in 1801 and between Britain and France in May 1802; the Wars of the French Revolution were over. In 1802 Eugene’s chasseurs were expanded to regimental strength and he was made colonel commanding the regiment. Eugene spent the years 1801 -1804 overseeing his chasseurs and improving his military education. Of this period he wrote: “I worked hard to increase my knowledge of military science, by attending lectures, and holding conversations with experienced officers. I gave myself up to studying the details of my profession. I made several trips with the First Consul who greatly contributed to my instruction.”^ Eugene’s regiment was stationed in and around Paris, and as an officer in the Guard and as a member of the First Consul’s family, he had an opportunity to get to know the whole Bonaparte clan. Napoleon’s mother and sisters had already developed a strong

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THE VICEROY - BEGINNINGS dislike of Josephine because of her infidelities. This ill feeling, especially on the part of the sisters, was exacerbated by the Bonapartes concern that their Beauharnais relations might take some of the consular benefices away from them. Furthermore, Napoleon’s sisters were jealous of Josephine’s social prestige as the wife of the First Consul and the Bonaparte sisters continuously sought to induce their brother to divorce Josephine. Napoleon now had the upper hand in his relationship with his wife. Although he would not as yet divorce her, it was he who now had the extramarital affairs. Napoleon, often with the connivance of his sisters, took a succession of mistresses. The affairs strained the marriage, and Eugene often had to intervene to patch things up. Meanwhile, the peace of Europe was short-lived. War broke out between Great Britain and France in 1803. The following year Napoleon decided to proclaim himself Emperor of France. The advent of the Empire brought honors and responsibilities to Eugene in rapid succession. The Consular Guard was designated as the Imperial Guard, and Eugene was made Colonel-General of chasseurs and later. General of Brigade commanding the Chasseurs-à-cheval of the Imperial Guard. He was also made an Arch-Chancellor of State. In February 1805, since his mother was now an Empress, he was made a Prince of the Empire. Napoleon was also the President of the Republic of Italy, whose territory consisted of Lombardy, and land taken from the Papal States, and the old Republic of Florence. Being a President was inconsistent with being an Emperor, so either the Republic had to be merged with the French Empire, or the Italian Republic had to be converted to a monarchy. Napoleon realized that a formal union of the Republic with France could provoke the continental European powers into war. So Napoleon sought to turn the Republic into a Kingdom and offered the new throne to his brothers. Unfortunately there were no takers for the new position. Joseph, Napoleon’s eldest brother, refused since he feared that he or his children might forfeit their chance to the imperial succession if one of them took the Italian crown. Louis Bonaparte, who had married Hortense de Beauharnais, likewise turned down the proffered crown for his own son Napoleon Charles. Louis claimed that the installment of his son as king would give credence to British propaganda that Napoleon was actually the father of Hortense’s child.^ Napoleon’s other brothers Lucien and Jerome were ineligible because they had married commoners. Jerome later gave up his American wife in order to wear a European crown, whereas Lucien refused to divorce his wife. Therefore, Napoleon decided to temporarily take the Italian crown until someone suitable could be found. Eugene was picked by his stepfather to govern the newly titled Kingdom of Italy until a final disposition would be made. Eugene was appointed Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy upon Napoleon’s assumption of the Italian throne in Milan during June 1805. At twenty-three years of age, Eugene was tall and handsome, a good athlete, and an excellent horseman. Although he was pleased with his appointment, the viceroyalty was a civil post and he had dedicated himself to a military career. It was, in fact, the command an army more than anything else that motivated young Eugene. War was coming to the continent. Russia had signed an alliance with Britain against France in April 1805. Napoleon’s assumption of the Italian crown was the final straw for Hapsburg Austria which had witnessed the continued expansion of French power over the last four years. In the summer of 1805, Austria joined Britain and Russia in a coalition against France, the third since the start of the French Revolution. Anticipating a major Austrian offensive against Italy, Napoleon wanted an experienced general in charge to protect his Italian possessions. Consequently, Marshal Andre Massena was

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THE VICEROY - BEGINNINGS named Commander-in-Chief of the Napoleonic Army of Italy. Eugene’s role was limited to raising and equipping Italian troops within the Kingdom of Italy. During the War of 1805, Massena, with 50,000 troops, engaged a larger Austrian army under Archduke Charles at Caldiero. Napoleon’s victory at Ulm and his ensuing advance on Vienna forced Charles to evacuate Italy. Massena followed Charles into Austria while an army corps commanded by Lieutenant General Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr blockaded the Austrian garrison in Venice. In November, a combined Anglo-Russian army landed in Naples and prepared to march north. Massena and Saint-Cyr were occupied, and so the defense of the Kingdom’s southern frontier was left to Eugene. The Viceroy had only the troops that were left in their depots and newly raised Italian regulars and National Guard troops. They were organized into a corps of 12,000, and by mid-December this force had been increased to 25,000 men.'^ However, the threat from the south never materialized. On December 2, 1805, Napoleon destroyed the combined armies of Russia and Austria at Austerlitz. As a result of this battle. Austria was knocked completely out of the war and Russia would be unable to mount any effective military operation in eastern Europe for almost a year and the Anglo-Russian expedition shortly withdrew from Naples. Since there no longer was any threat to Italy, the senior generals of Napoleon’s army could be sent elsewhere. Massena’s old command was broken up. Some troops were to be dispatched to the Grand Army, while others, along with the troops before Venice, would be marched south to invade Naples. First Saint-Cyr and later Massena would command the Neapolitian invasion force. The reorganization of the forces in Italy brought Eugene his command. On December 24 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy. This army consisted of all of the troops west of the Tagliamento but would not include those troops earmarked for the Army of Naples. Eugene’s command, however, was largely administrative. His domain was later extended to include newly conquered Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia. But except for some minor combats in the Balkens around Cattaro, there were no fighting fronts. Eugene was new to the command of an army, but he was not completely inexperienced in such matters. Since his appointment to Napoleon’s staff in 1797, he had had opportunities to observe at close hand the functioning of relatively small armies, which hardly ever numbered more than 40,000 men or contained any formation larger than a division. Napoleon himself realized that Eugene already knew how to administer a small army: “This is one thing that you can deal with directly and with knowledge.”^ So when opportunity came Eugene would not be completely unready to command an army in wartime. The Napoleonic victories had altered the political situation in Italy. Early in 1806, Massena drove the Bourbon royal family from Naples, and Joseph Bonaparte was installed there as king. (Joseph agreed to take a crown this time because Napoleon promised that he and his family would not be excluded from their rights in the succession for the French throne.) Eugene’s future as a possible King of Italy became brighter. Napleon wanted the members of his family to marry into the royal houses of Europe. Late in December 1805 a marriage was arranged between Eugene and Princess Auguste-Amelia of Bavaria. The Princess was beautiful; she was blonde and had a stunning figure. Eugene was ordered by Napoleon to go to Munich to meet his prospective bride. Eugene was

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THE VICEROY - BEGINNINGS immediately captivated by her beauty and her shyness at their first meeting. He promptly offered to take all the responsibility for a rupture if she did not wish to marry him.^ Auguste, however, consented to the wedding, which was performed on January 13, 1806. The Emperor was pleased with this match. He referred to the couple as “models of their sex.” The marriage was a happy one. Eugene and Auguste fell deeply in love with each other and eventually had seven children. Auguste’s father, Max Joseph, King of Bavaria, had insisted on the Italian throne for his son-in-law and daughter as a condition for the marriage. But Napoleon was unwilling to grant the throne outright. However, Eugene’s position in Italy was strengthened as a consequence of his father-in-law’s actions and Josephine’s insistence that her son should get the crown. Consequently, Eugene was formally adopted by Napoleon into the line of succession for Italy. The Viceroy was renamed Eugene Napoleon, given the title Prince of Venice, and made heir presumptive to the Italian throne. The Kingdom of Italy would be his unless Napoleon could produce a male heir of his own. The viceregal couple moved to Milan shortly after their wedding. While there from 1806 to 1808 Eugene’s tasks were largely administrative. He was to institute the Napoleonic Code within the Kingdom, integrate newly conquered Venetia, and raise troops for the imperial armies. However, Eugene cared more for military glory than for crowns and administration. His chief hope was to be given a command in the Grand Army. He formally requested such a post in the anticipated war against Prussia in 1806, but Napoleon refused, stating that Eugene was needed in Italy. During 1808 tension developed between Italy and Naples, the two Napoleonic satellite states within the Italian peninsula. In that year, Joseph Bonaparte had been promoted to become the King of Spain and was replaced at Naples by Joachim Murat, Marshal of France, and husband of Caroline, Napoleon’s sister. The hostility of the Bonaparte sisters towards the Beauharnais had increased with the elevation of Josephine’s children. Eugene was heir presumptive to the Italian throne, and Hortense, who had married Louis Bonaparte, was the Queen of Holland. The arrival of the Murats in Naples produced stresses within the family. Caroline was the most ruthless and ambitious of the Bonaparte women. She was quite willing to involve her husband and others in her intrigues. Caroline viewed Naples as a mere stepping stone to a more important position and she dreamed of forcing Eugene out and gaining all of Italy. Ultimately, Caroline even hoped to become Empress of France one day. Eugene had been cool to the Italian nationalists who sought a truly independent and unified Italian peninsula. Murat, however, often goaded by Caroline, showed favor to the nationalists. The Murats were willing to foster Italian unification so long as it was done under their aegis. The knowledge that the Murats wanted to displace him and his family clearly angered Eugene. Thus, the rival courts at Milan and Naples continually sniped at each other. Finally, Eugene got his chance to discredit his rivals. When Napoleon had gone to war in Spain in 1808, Caroline, in concert with the French foreign minister, Charles Maurice Talleyrand, and the minister of police, Joseph Fouche, planned to install Murat as emperor should Napoleon be killed in Spain. Such an act would have violated Napoleon’s plans for his succession. Caroline and her partners expected to rule France, for they realized that Murat lacked any political skill and would be easy to control. Eugene intercepted a letter from Talleyrand to Murat, learned of the plot, and with much joy informed Napoleon.’^The Emperor still needed Murat and Fouché, who were

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Prince Eugene de Beauharnais

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THE VICEROY - BEGINNINGS respectively the best cavalry commander and policeman in Europe. Talleyrand, however, was sacked as foreign minister. However, this affair would not settle the rivalry between Eugene and Murat. The two would continue to bicker until 1814, when Murat abandoned Napoleon’s cause and turned on the Emperor and Eugene. War clouds began to gather again in central Europe. Napoleon’s involvement in Spain would induce Austria to go to war against France in 1809. Eugene would finally get his chance to command an army in the field. What can one say of the Viceroy as he stood on the threshold of his first independent military command in wartime? Eugene was directed by several factors; the influence of his father and stepfather, the desire to insure security for his family, and a lust for military glory. Moreover, Eugene thought he had something to prove. He had rhodeled himself after his father and stepfather; the influence of both was strong. His father had commanded an army in the field, and Eugene had witnessed the exploits of his famous stepfather in three campaigns. Wishing to emulate both, he had sought action, but since 1805, he had been frustrated in this desire. Now, for the first time, Eugene would be given his chance to play an important part in a campaign and would fulfill a lifelong dream, the command of an army in the field. Eugene knew that the future of his military career would depend on his conduct in the ensuing campaign. If he could produce victories, he would continue in a military career and possibly win a coveted marshal’s baton. Victory on the battlefield would also improve the standing of the Beauharnais family against their Bonaparte rivals. Failure to produce in war would lead to oblivion for himself and possibly for his family. If Eugene could not win glory in war, another military command might not be forthcoming, and he might be replaced as viceroy as well. Eugene’s military and political career depended on how he conducted himself in the new war with Austria. How Eugene commanded his army in his first outing as an independent military commander will be the main topic of the following chapters. NOTES TO CHAPTER I •Carola Oman, Napoleon’s Viceroy (Hadder and Stoughton Ltd., London: 1966) p. 83. ^Andre Du Casse, Memoirs et Correspondence Politique et Militaire du Prince Eugene (Michel Levy Frères, Paris: 1858) I. p. 88. The Du Casse collection contains the correspondence between Eugene and Napoleon in ten volumes. Hereafter, all citings from the correspondence will be abbreviated as DCC. There is also a biographical sketch included in these volumes; any citings from the biographical sections will be abbreviated as DCB. The Du Casse collection also contains an unfinished memoir dictated by Eugene which was begun in 1822. Eugene’s memoir covers the period of his early life until 1805, plus a survey of his 1812 Russian campaign. ^Oman, p. 172. '‘General Frederic-Francois, Le Baron de Vaudoncourt, Historic politique et mili­ taire du Prince Eugene Napoleon. 2 vols. (Librarie Universelle de P. Mongie, Paris: 1828) I, pp. 59-60. Hereinafter abbreviated as Vaud. ^Oman, p. 178. «Ibid., p. 205-206. ’Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms (MacMillan, New York: 1965), p. 107.

18

CHAPTER II The Defense of Italy

The Austrian court thirsted for revenge after Austerlitz. No Austrian considered the 1805 treaty of Pressburg to be final. Although a reckoning with Napoleonic France would come, it was only a question of timing. Austria was in no condition militarily to intervene against France either in 1806 or 1807 and the 1807 Peace of Tilsit had all but dismembered Prussia and made Russia an ally of France. It would be absurd for Austria to take on the Grand Army alone, without any immediate hope of support. Thus, Austria would have to bide her time, train and reorganize her army, and wait for the right moment. The right moment seemed to arrive in the spring of 1808, and the Austrian war party, among them the Empress Ludovica; Prince Klemens von Metternich, the Ambassador to France; and Count Philip Stadion, the Chancellor, believed that the time to attack had come because of France’s intervention in Spain. But Archduke Charles, Emperor Francis’ brother and Generalissmo of the Austrian army, did not think the time was ripe. Even with 100,000 French troops in Spain and Portugal, most of the Grand Army was still in Germany. However, in May of 1808, it wa,s decided to raise 180,000 Landwehr to supplement Austria’s standing army of 300,000.' The decision to raise the Landwehr at this point in time was a mistake. The surrender at Baylen had not yet occurred, and Napoleon was not yet heavily engaged in Spain. Organizing a Landwehr merely served to warn Napoleon of Austria’s intentions, and made him act to secure his rear prior to his personal intervention in Spain along with large units of the Grand Army. His summit meeting with Alexander I of Russia at Erfurt in September, 1808 was the result. The product of this meeting was a defensive alliance in which “Russia undertakes to declare war and make common cause with France”^if France were attacked by Austria. Although Napoleon’s faith in the Russian alliance to overawe Austria would prove to be misplaced, he now considered his rear to be secure. Believing that Austria would not dare to attack him now, he would proceed with his massive intervention into Spain. Even with Austria’s preparations for war continuing, by the end of 1808 Napoleon himself and over 300,000 of his troops were occupied in Spain^ only 70,000 to 80,000 French troops remained in Germany."* The Austrians calculated that because of the Peninsular War, Napoleon, even with the aid of his German allies, could mobilize 197,000 to 206,000 troops in Central Europe.^ This was a total that the Austrians thought could be effectivley dealt with. A crown council was held in Vienna on February 12, 1809, and Archduke Charles, believing Austria was not ready for war, remained opposed to any action. However, the war party was impressed by their estimates of Napoleon’s lack of potential for mobilization. The final push for war was made by Metternich, who spoke of French war weariness and his belief that Russian support of France would be but a sham.® Hence, it was decided that Austria would attack the Napoleonic Empire in two months time.’ Speed and surprise would be essential for the attack to succeed. Austria hoped that her invasion would catch the French unprepared and trigger an anti-French revolt

19

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY throughout Germany and Italy. Five offensive operations were planned. The major thrust would be up the Danube valley into Bavaria. Other secondary offensives were to be mounted against the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Dalmatia, the Tyrol, and Italy with the largest of the secondary offensives to be mounted against the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon was not blind to the Austrian threat. He had to arrange further defensive measures. In 1805 Austria had made the mistake of sending her largest army against Italy, and she might do so again. All the better considering that, as in 1805, the decisive theater would be in the valley of the Danube. So, in the event of war, as in 1805, Napoleon’s strategy would be initially to maintain a defensive posture in the secondary Italian theater, while the main French effort would be made in central Germany. Napoleon’s chief concern for Italy was to enable the French army, if inferior in numbers, to engage successfully a larger Austrian force especially if Austria launched a surprise attack. To do so a defensive, fortified line had to be established, from which the French Army of Italy could find security from attack and be able to launch an effective counterattack. At the time, the only fortified area in northeast Italy was between the Mincio and the Adige rivers, the famed “Quadrilateral” consisting of the fortress cities of Peschiera, Mantua, Legnago, and Verona. Although these fortresses were in good condition, there were still gaps along the Adige line through which an enemy army could penetrate. Moreover, although the “Quadrilateral” could defend Lombardy as it did in 1805, the frontier of the Kingdom had moved eastwards since then, and those fortresses could do nothing to secure Venetia, and in particular, the great port city of Venice. Another of Napoleon’s concerns was the relative inexperience of the Commander-inChief of the Army of Italy, his step-son and Prince-Viceroy of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais. Although Eugene had served well as Viceroy since the creation of the Italian Kingdom, he had been made Commander-in-Chief of the army only after Austerlitz, when the threat of any serious fighting in Italy had seemed to evaporate. Since the end of 1805, Eugene’s function as Commander-in-Chief had been largely administrative. However, Napoleon’s foremost and experiended commanders would be needed to serve in Spain or Germany, and Eugene had now spent over three years commanding the Army of Italy — long enough to learn the terrain and the measure of his officers and troops. Furthermore, a man with administrative experience was needed to prepare the Army of Italy for war, and to build up defenses and magazines throughout the Kingdom. For this task Eugene, with his record of honest administration, was better suited than some of Napoleon’s marshals. Massena, for example, the previous commander of the Army of Italy, was noted for his avarice. It had also been a tradition throughout Europe to give command of armies to inexperienced members of the Royal Family. Their inexperience would be compensated by wise counsel from the monarch and the presence of an experienced staff. Napoleon knew most of Eugene’s generals to be experienced men, some having served for many years in Italy. It was hoped that with them and Napoleon’s detailed instructions, Eugene could successfully defend Italy. To that end Napoleon sent a series of “Notes” to Eugene instructing him on how to. conduct a military campaign in Italy. These instructions, which span a period of months, tended to change with existing circumstances. Eugene was expected to obey them, and they did influence the actual course of the first months of military operations in 1809. For this reason they deserve to be quoted almost in their entirety.

20

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY The first “Note” was sent to Eugene from Bayonne on May 31, 1808, and was prompted by the news of the projected mobilization of the Austrian Landwehr. At this juncture Napoleon was concerned about an imminent attack, the Erfurt summit having yet to take place: There has never been a [defensive] line in any war in Italy. It is preferred that there will be one to cover Venice. The Piave river has this advantage.® Napoleon went on to call for the construction of a line of strong points, each consisting of several redoubts along the Piave, pointing out to Eugene how they should be utilized; Suppose one of those places [strong points] was near Asolo, with one on the right bank of the Piave, two others on the left bank was opposite the bridge, and one opposite the marsh, which lies between the bridge and the sea. It would seem tWt an army, inferior in numbers, could rally in the security of these three places and wait for the opportunity to entrap the enemy.® Napoleon also pointed out that those strong points could be used as points of maneuver from which the army could concentrate on making “oneself superior at the point of attack,” and execute a successful sortie:'^ If the French are not ready to fight on the Isonzo, they are to fall back, after leaving garrisons at Palmanova and Osoppo, to those fortified places on the lower Piave. Napoleon favored stationing the bulk of the army along the lower Piave because of its superior communications with Venice, which would serve as the army’s base. If the enemy tried to move to the upper Piave, Eugene could sortie by way of one of the strong points along the river, and catch the enemy on the march. Finally, from the lower Piave the French would have a shorter route to travel if it became necessary to retreat to the Adige. Napoleon clearly favored the Piave as the main line of defense: When the enemy takes all of the territory between the Isonzo and the Piave, he has nothing for he has merely forced the French army to leave a garrison of 2.000 men in Palmanova (and a smaller one in Osoppo), while he must weaken himself of a greater number of troops. The French army, on the other hand, has made five or six marches towards its supports and each day that it gains to rally behind the Piave is to its advantage. On the contrary, if the enemy manages to cross the Piave and throws the French army behind the Adige, from that moment it is necessary to leave 15.000 to 20,000 to garrison Venice; which is a considerable diminution of our strength, while the enemy will only use half that number ... One feels that in all the battles that one would have to fight to relieve Venice, one would have to fight both the army of observation and a large part of the blockading corps, without being able to draw upon the garrison of Venice. Thus the isolation of Palmanova would cause a weakening of the enemy, but Venice, if it becomes isolated, would cause a greater weakening of the French army. It is therefore necessary to study the line of the Piave... With the terrain thus prepared, if the French army had to hasten to expose itself at the beginning of the campaign, it would provision Palmanova and take up position behind the Piave. The Tagliamento is not as advantageous. Although the Piave is fordable at several points, it is a greater river in comparison to the Tagliamento, which habitually dries up. Finally the Taliamento is too far from Venice, and one would fear being cut off from that place.’'* Continuing his survey of the river lines, Napoleon discusses the values of the Adige and the Mincio although they are of secondary importance to the Piave: 22

23

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY After the Piave the most important line is that of the Adige, for it defends Porto-Legnago, Mantua and Peschiera, and the garrisons there can contribute 10,000 to 12,000 troops to the field army ... Verona is a poste de campagne . . . it has more or less the qualities one desires. A prudent general will make . .. a bridgehead around Verona, and at Arcole to be master of the marshes. There, a general who has studied the terrain must never abandon Arcole, reserving a place for himself there on the right bank ... The line of the Mincio is also important because during all the time one holds it, Mantua is secure.'^ It is clear that Napoleon attempted to instruct Eugene in the realm of strategy. The above plan embodied Napoleon’s principles of concentration prior to combat. Eugene was to mass his army in security behind the fortifications along the Piave, and then use those forts as bases from which either to hurl his army against detached units of the enemy or, if the enemy moved north, to envelop the enemy from the south by means of a manoeuvre sur les derrières. The other observation to be made of this “Note” is that Napoleon clearly favored the lower Piave as the main line of defense, chiefly because an army there could defend Venice and use it as a base. However, Napoleon obviously did not consider the Piave as the only defensive line, and the above “Note” does not forbid Eugene from falling back to the Adige if he thinks it necesary — a point to be remembered when operations commence. Although Napoleon believed that Italy would not be attacked, Eugene was not so sure. He was acutely conscious of the fact that the defense of Italy ultimately rested in his hands and that vigilance would have to be maintained. A network of French spies existed within the Austrian Empire, sending regular reports on Austrian military activités. By the end of 1808 these activities became quite alarming to Eugene. On November 27, 1808 he sent a dispatch to Napoleon in Spain reporting “A complete change in Austria’s conduct after the change of the Spanish dynasty.”*^ The Landwehr was being drilling daily, and the strength of the regular Austrian battalions was being increased. Units were receiving new arms, uniforms, and colors,'^ to fill the needs of an expanding military establishment.** “Bourgeois” cavalry was being raised, and troops were being drilled at Villach, Laibach and Goritzia, all staging areas for an invasion of Italy. The Austrians claimed all of their activities to be defensive, yet, as Eugene pointed out, these defensive measures were made at the same time that French troops were being withdrawn from Germany to Spain. Furthermore, the French cockade was openly assailed in the streets of Trieste, and that port city was opened to British goods. British naval officers were routinely seen about the town.^o.The Viceroy rightly concluded that all of this activity pressaged an Austrian attack. Italy was still unprepared for war in December, 1808. The Erfurt conference and Napoleon’s faith in the word of the Tsar had no doubt taken some of the urgency out of defensive preparations. The defenses along the Piave were not yet finished.T his problem was compounded by the fact that Eugene’s chief engineer. General of Division François, the Count of Chasseloup-Laubat, was against creating a defensive line along the Piave, believing that river line to be “totally bad”.^^ Chasseloup, among the most respected and experienced engineers in the French army, had a long military career which began in 1770, and he had taken part in both the defense and the capture of many fortified places. In 1805, he was the engineering chief for Massena in Italy. The next year he became the chief engineer for the Grand Army and actually directed the siege operations at Danzig.^'’ Chasseloup proposed an alternative to the Piave line, namely, along the Sil River, which runs through Treviso, west of the Piave. The Sil line was to be strengthened by digging canals to divert water from the Piave.^^ Eugene, although not

24

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY enthusiastic about the Piave line, did not like Chasseloup’s alternative, arguing that Treviso could be easily attacked, and that the Sil line could be turned quite simply by way of Vidor and Cavolo. The Viceroy also considered the digging of canals to be impractical.^® Believing Chasseloup’s objection to the Piave to be accurate, but not accepting that general’s alternative, Eugene presented both of their arguments to Napoleon for adjudication. The reports on Austria’s bellicose preparations from Eugene and others had at last convinced the Emperor that the danger from Austria was not a figment of Eugene’s imagination. Napoleon would have to leave Spain to prepare for a new war against Austria. The Army of Italy would have to be strengthened, and the fortification project completed, if not on the Piave, then somewhere else. To build up the Army of Italy orders were sent to Eugene to increase the levy of conscripts in the Kingdom.^"^ As for the location of the fortified line, Napoleon responded to Eugene’s and Chasseloup’s objections by offering the Adige as an alternative. Napoleon sent to Eugene the second of his “Notes” on the defense of Italy. This dispatch, written to further instruct Eugene as a military commander, included a general military survey of the entire northeast section of Italy and provided instructions far more precise than his previous “Note” on waging a campaign, particularly in respect to the Adige line. This new “Note on the Defense of Italy” was sent from Valladolid on January 14, 1809. The first section of the “Note” incorporates Napoleon’s belief that any plans should be flexible, having separate branches or alternatives. To this end the possibilities of relying on the fortresses at Palmanova and Osoppo are discussed in regard to supporting an offensive campaign east of the Tagliamento: Palmanova has a defensive and offensive role. Should the French army seek to move on Laibach in Carniola, Palmanova would serve as a depot and terminal, for one’s line of operations; with parks, hospitals, and magazines to enable the army to reorganize in case of a check. After threatening the enemy in Carniola and along the Isonzo, should the French army desire to march on Klagenfurt to unite with the Army of Germany, which has marched on Salzburg, Palmanova is still important. For the troops destined to garrison Palmanova can form a screen to mask this movement from the enemy for two days ... In the second hypothesis, Osoppo plays a role inverse to that of Palmanova. If one wants to move on Klagenfurt, Osoppo serves as the depot for one’s line of operations; if on the contrary, after having threatened Klagenfurt, the French want to move to engage the enemy on the Isonzo, the troops left to garrison Osoppo will mask this movement. Thus, these two places are important for an offensive war. My intention for 1809 is to spend a 1,000,000 francs on Palmanova and 200,000 francs on Osoppo.^® Turning to the defense of those places: If by any circumstance whatsoever, the Army of Italy finds itself too weak, due to a lost battle or numerical inferiority, Palmanova and Osoppo would have to be abandoned by the army. Palmanova would have to be garrisoned by at least 1,500 good infantry and 1,000 sappers, miners and depot personnel... 400 to 500 men would suffice at Osoppo. Thus with little cost to the campaign, 3,000 to 4,000 men could guard the most important places.^^ Napoleon also ordered the provisioning of those two places so “ 12,15 or even 20,000 men could find support and protection”^° there. Discussing the creation of the fortified line along the Adige: If one is obliged to abandon those places [Palmanova and Osoppo] where must one halt? My first thought was at the Piave of which I had dictated a

25

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY memorandum six months ago [the first “Note”]. But the Piave is fordable three quarters of the year, and if turned, could cause the French general [Eugene] to make a mistake; finally the Piave is too far from Mantua and Peschiera which is the center of the defense of Italy, and the French general would fear that if the enemy turned the Piave line on his left he would not reach those places, which require considerable garrisons, before the enemy, render­ ing the French general less bold. What caused me to fix my first idea on the Piave, is that the Piave covers Venice, and that a battle should be lost before abandoning that great arsenal and town, and it would be very unfortuante to leave a detachment of several thousand men to garrison Venice. These are major advantages, but would it not be possible to give the line of the Adige the same properties? The line of the Adige can never have the same quality of covering Venice because it is not sufficiently forward; but one can draw water from the Brenta and the Adige, and from the streams which run into one or the other of those rivers, diverting them to make the terrain between the Adige and the Brenta totally impractical for an enemy force to isolate Venice from the Adige. Hence, the enemy would have to cross the Adige to blockade Venice. It is scarcely two or three leagues from the mouth of the Brenta to the mouth of the Adige; the country there is already waterlogged and impractical. The art of the engineer must be used to unite all of those waters ... and to establish a defensive post covered by the waters, rendering the area inaccessible and protecting the road which runs from the Adige to Chioggi, so that it would be impossible for the enemy to blockade Venice without crossing the Adige. This is the best way to protect Brandolo. It is there that the first defensive work should be erected; it is necesary that the terrain between the Brenta and the Adige, already waterlogged, be made more so to the point where it would be absolutely impossible for the enemy to penetrate until he has first taken the post defended by the water, which is very difficult to do ... Once this is done, the French army has all the advantages; having a large and swiftly running stream with built-up banks on the right side in front, aiding the defense and a very close proximity to Mantua, Peschiera, and especially Legnago which holds an important central position. The line Mantua, Peschiera and Legnago, which fortune has placed in mutually supporting positions, combines to form a single unit for the defense of Italy. In this situation, it is necessary to fortify the Adige. The fortress of Legnago already exists. I propose, for the year 1809, to spend 200,000 francs at Porto-Legnago to improve its defenses. The road from Padua to Legnago and from Legnago to Mantua must also be put in a better state . . . Now let us suppose that the enemy, after having forced the Tagliamento and the Piave, moves on Padua and Vicenza; he might want to move on Verona, but for that there is only one road, which passes through Villanouva. The distance from Villanouva to Arcole is but a league and a half 3V4 miles]; by erecting a strong point in the form of a bridgehead at Arcole along the Alpone, a tributary of the Adige and so the Alpone is incorproated into the Adige line], which will allow the French to cross any time at Ronco and debouch towards Villanouva in an hour’s time, the enemy will never dare advance on Verona ... [This, of course, was Napoleon’s own plan during the battle of Arcole in 1796.] My intention is to spend 200,000 francs for Arcole during 1809 . . . Besides preventing the enemy from moving on Verona, the place at Arcole will also prevent the enemy from taking Caldiero, which the enemy has already successfully done twice.^' Napoleon went on to call for diverting water from the Alpone to cover Villanouva, and building a redoubt to cover its approaches. To protect the line of the Adige between Legnago and Venice, Napoleon also ordered field works, protected by inundations, at Anguillara and Castelbaldo. Napoleon allocated 100,000 francs to pay to fortify each of these places.^^ 26

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY The next part of the “Note” deals with the use Eugene is to make of the fortified Adige-Alpone line in facing an Austrian invasion force: With the French army having four crossing points over the Adige [Arcole, Legnago Castelbaldo and Anguillara] with its right resting at the fort of Malghera, its left at Arocle and its front covered by the inundations between the Brenta and the Adige, what can the enemy do? If he advances on Verona, the whole French army crosses the river at Arcole catching him divided in flagrant detail. If the enemy masks each of the four crossing points, we will concentrate at one of them during an unattended moment, attacking suc­ cessively their separate corps. Finally, if the enemy marches up the Brenta towards Trent, and moves against Montebaldo and Verona, using his line of operations from the Tyrol, he will form a detachment which will be absent for eight to ten days. He weakens himself to this extent; if the detachment is small, the few troops at Rivoli will halt it and cut it up; if it is large then the main army is weakened.^^ The above paragraph is a clear example of Napoleon’s strategic principles of using a natural barrier, such as he did during the Arcole and Ulm campaigns, to mask a rapid concentration at one point, rendering the French army superior in numbers to an opponent whose total forces were numerically superior but are scattered. Eugene was to hurl his army across the river, achieving the strategic “central position” and defeating the separate units by successively concentrating a superior number of troops at the point of contact. Continuing with Napoleon’s lesson in strategy: What if the enemy should establish his headquarters at Padua and attempt to cross the Adige between Legnago and Arcole? Well then, leaving a small garrison at Arcole and in some of the other places, the French army could debouch by the bridge at Anguillara or move into Venice and from there sortie by way of Brandolo or Malghera against anyone blockading that place, and cut the enemy’s communications in all directions, placing him in a most desperate situation.^'* Attacking the enemy’s flank and rear was among Napoleon’s favored and most effective maneuvers. Napoleon eleborated further on the advantages and proper use of a fortified river line: No experienced and prudent [enemy] general will risk anything before those great fortifications which will run from Ronco to Malghera, from where the French army, covered by inundations, can maneuver unobserved . . . Any morning the [opposing] general might find the French army concentrated three marches in his rear or on his flanks, while his own forces are scattered. What if one says, “But the enemy will take Arcole.” Arcole, surrounded by water is not easy to take. “What if the enemy will take Legnago,” which is far more important to him. Then one has greater praise for the proposed line of defense, for if it is only possible to attack [across the river] after capturing a fortified place, then it has obtained its goal. One can only hope for a defensive line to have the following advantages: To render the position of the enemy so difficult that he throws himself into faulty operations, allowing himself to be beaten by inferior numbers; or, if the enemy general is a prudent engineer, he would be obliged to methodically carry the obstacles created at our leisure, allowing us to gain time. On the other hand, viewed from the French side, the fortified line can assist the [numerical] weakness of the French general by making his position so clear and easy that he cannot commit any great mistake, and finally it will allow him time to await support. In the art of war, as in mechanics, time is the great element between mass and power. In discussing the line of the Adige, one will say that the enemy will come by Innsbruck on to Trent. If so, the enemy would have to weaken himself before

27

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY our other forces, and because of the positions at Montebaldo and Rivoli, the enemy cannot move towards Verona. If we hold Montebaldo, the enemy cannot reach Rivoli. On that side nature has done all leaving nothing to be desired.^^ Turning to a “worst case” situation, Napoleon hypothesizes what Eugene should do if the Adige-Alpone line is crossed by the Austrians; Undoubtedly, the enemy has done his best if he crosses the Adige and occupies Verona, but the French army has not been turned, because, supposing in the most exaggerated case, if the enemy has his center at Verona, his right at Peschiera, and his left at Treviso, the French army would have its right at Venice, its left at Mantua, and its center at Legnago. One feels that in his hypothesis, the advantage would be with the French army, with its flanks supported by strong points and maneuvering at will between them against the enemy whose left, right and center would each be in the air, and open to attack. 36 In summing up these instructions, Napoleon concluded: The more one reflects on this position [the Adige line], the more one thinks that with 30,000 men one has nothing to fear from 60,000 enemy troops of equal value, or that at least we shall be able to gain several months time.^"' The second “Note” favoring the Adige-Alpone line clearly supercedes the first one favoring the Piave. The tone of both “Notes” favors a flexible defensive campaign and clearly allows Eugene the option of evacuating all of the territory east of the Piave at the very least, except for Osoppo and Palmanova. Besides thinking of defensive operations, Napoleon considered eventual offensive operations for the Army of Italy. Defensive planning was still paramont, since the Army of Italy was not yet ready to face the Austrians; but once the new recruits were trained and the Army concentrated east of the Tagliamento, the army should launch an offensive against the Austrian Empire. Napoleon’s plans for an offensive operation, sent to Eugene on January 13 and 14, were merely outlines and not as detailed as his dispatches on defense, since serious consideration of an offensive was still months way, and Napoleon was not concerned about a sudden attack on Italy by Austria. Napoleon’s offensive plan was a variation of the manoeuvre sur les derrières. It called for a converging attack towards Laibach in Austrian Carniola mounted by Eugene’s own army and Marmount’s corps. Marmount’s corps, stationed in Dalmatia, was under Eugene’s overall command, and so was considered part of the Army of Italy. Marmont’s troops would be based at Zara and might with good luck be raised to a force of 17,000 (actually he would have about 14,000).^* Marmount was to strike north, drawing Austrian troops away from Eugene. If checked, Marmont was to retire on Zara.^^ If not checked, Marmount was to continue northward, while Eugene, based at Palmanova, hopefully with 60,000 troops, was to strike eastward. The two forces would converge on Laibach, catching the Austrians in Carniola between them.'*® Once united, one or more corps, depending on circumstances, would continue north to support the main French army in Germany."*' All of these dispatches on defensive and offensive operations disprove the belief, at least in Eugene’s case, that Napoleon never attempted to train his subordinates in his strategic methods. All stress the concentration of the army prior to battle, either at Osoppo, Palmanova, the lower Piave, or one of the four proposed strong points along the Adige. All of the elements of Napoleon’s methods of warfare are evident. They include the concentration of the army prior to battle either at Palmanova or Osoppo and the utilization of natural or man-made barriers to mask rapid maneuvers. The proposed turning movements via the lower Piave or from Venice as well as the pincer operation 28

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY toward Liabach are all instances of Napoleon’s strategy of envelopment (manoeuvre sur les derrières). The principle of massing a united army successively against a seperate enemy detachments is a variation of Napoleon’s strategy of using interior lines (central position). Both defensive and offensive plans were strategically sound. The problem was that Eugene would initially not obey Napoleon’s orders. Rather than conduct a defensive campaign according to his master’s plan, Eugene would briefly strike out on his own, and be defeated at Sacile. After which, having learned his lesson, Eugene would return to the defensive and offensive instructions of January, 1809, and use them as a guide for the conduct of his campaign in Italy. NOTES TO CHAPTER II 'F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon and the Archduke Charles (Originally published 1909 — reprinted Arms and Armour Press, London 1976), p. 8. ^Ibid., p. 4. ^Chandler, p. 1106. ‘’Petre, p. 13. Hbid. ^Ibid., pp. 14-15. Russia had secretly informed Austria that she would do the absolute minimum to support France. ^Ibid., p. 14. ^Correspondence de Napoleon P'' (Henri Plon et J. Dumaine, 32 Vols. 1858-1870), XVII, p. 247. Hereafter, all citing, abbreviated as NC. Hbid., XVII, 247. m id . ^^Ibid. ^'^Ibid. m id . m id ., pp. 247-248. mid., pp. 248-249. '^DCC, IV, 243-244. ^Ubid., IV, 244.

mid. mid., pp. 303-304.

m id ., p. 244. ^^Ibid. m id ., p. 249. mid., p. 250. ^'’Georges Six, Dictionnaire Biographique des Généraux et Amiraux Français de la Revolution et de L ’E mpire (G. Saffron, Paris, 1934, reprinted 1971.) I, p. 229. 25DCC, IV, 250. m id ., p. 251. ^Ubid., p. 305. 28NC, XVIII, pp. 213-214. ^nbid. mid., p. 214.

29

THE DEFENSE OF ITALY ^Ubid., pp. 215-216. p. 217 ^^Ibid. ^Hbid., pp. 217-218. ^mid., p. 218. ^h id . ^«DCC, IV, 7, 8, 311. ^^Ibid., IV, 7,8, 308-310. ^m id. ^^Ibid., IV, 313.

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CHAPTER III

Organization and Preparations In the previous and following chapters certain military terms are used. It is best to define these terms of military operations and organization to facilitate understanding of this study. The term grand strategy refers to the overall plan of war. For the French, the grand strategy of the War of 1809 was to place the onus for starting the war on Austria by waiting for an Austrian declaration of war, after which Napoleon hoped to launch a major offensive down the valley of the Danube to destroy the Austrian main army. Napoleon wanted his own offensive supported by Russia, which was to attack the Austrians in Galicia. Eugene was to repel an Austrian invasion of Italy, followed by his own supporting offensive into Austrian Carinthia and Carniola. Strategy is the plan of campaign by which a favorable battle situation is created. One method of doing so is by the strategic manoeuvre sur les-derrières or the strategy of envelopment. By this method an army would turn the flanks of an opposing force, sweep into its rear areas, and cut its lines of communication. Such a maneuver would disrupt the operations of the opposing force, compelling it either to disperse to regain its lines of communication or to turn and fight at a disadvantage to reopen them. The manoeuvre sur les derrières is best used when one’s army is either equal or superior in numbers to one’s opponent. The strategy of the central position is used when one is either equal or inferior in numbers to the enemy. In this case, one would thrust one’s concentrated army among the separate units of the enemy army and, by maneuvering within the interior lines gained by holding the central position, concentrate superior numbers successively against the detached units of the enemy. Both strategic methods were discussed in Napoleon’s instructions to Eugene. Grand tactics refers to the overall plan of battle, and deals with the movements of army corps and divisions in the field. Various tasks would be assigned to army corps and divisions. They would serve either as the masse primaire, the masse de manoeuvre, or the masse de rupture. The role of the masse primaire was to engage frontally and pin the enemy to prevent him from moving freely, and if possible to force the enemy to commit his reserves prematurely. The masse de manoeuvre was a force designed to turn tactically either flank of the enemy to threaten his rear, and roll up his battle line. The masse de rupture (sometimes called the masse de decision) was a battle group held in reserve until, ideally, the enemy had used all of his reserves to fight the masse primaire and masse de manoeuvre. Once the enemy reserves were engaged, the masse de rupture would be hurled at one point in the enemy line. The addition of this battle group to the fighting would produce a qualitative and quantitative superiority at that one point, forcing a decisive rupture of the enemy lines. The masse de rupture could also be used defensively as a reserve to blunt any enemy attack. Tactics of course refers to the use of battalions, squadrons, and batteries within the corps or divisional structure to achieve their different grand tactical assignments. These

31

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS tactical units were successively combined into regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps for easier administration and movement. The organization of Eugene’s Army of Italy was similar to that of the other Napoleonic armies. As of 1808, a French infantry battalion consisted of six companies (one grenadier, one voltigeur, and four fusilier) of 140 men each, giving a battalion a theoretical total of 840.* The infantry battalions were combined into regiments. Theoretically, a French regiment in 1809 contained four field battalions and one depot battalion of four companies for a total of 3,920 per regiment. In actuality the number of field battalions in Eugene’s army would range from two to four per regiment. For organizational purposes, the two regiments were combined to form a brigade. Two brigades made up an infantry division. For the cavalry, 200 troopers constituted a squadron. A cavalry regiment contained two to four field squadrons and one depot squadron. The brigade and divisional organization for the cavalry was the same as that of the infantry. Artillery batteries usually consisted of six to eight guns manned by twelve to fourteen men per gun. Batteries were combined into regiments for administrative purposes only. Batteries were usually assigned to army, corps, division, and later regimental headquar­ ters for tactical uses in the field. In the French army there were two types of regular divisions, infantry and cavalry. The divisions with their attached artillery batteries were the largest tactical units of an army. A French division was designed to fight independently for a period of time lasting from one to several hours against enemy units of equal or superior numerical strength. For the purpose of this study, a French regular or line infantry division consists of four regiments with a variable strength of 3,000-7,200 men. A regular cavalry division consists of four regiments totaling from 1,000-3,200 troopers per division. During the course of the War of 1809 one encounters several special units that are considered to be divisional strength. Among these units would be the Royal Guard consisting of two brigades. The Royal Guard had one infantry brigade of two infantry regiments totalling three battalions each, and a cavalry brigade of two regiments averaging two squadrons per regiment, plus two batteries of artillery bringing the grand total of this division to 5,120. During the course of the Italian Campaign a special Light division was formed under General Dessaix. This division contained six infantry battalions of converged voltigeurs, one cavalry regiment, and a battery of four guns. Beyond the tactical level was the corps or army corps. A French corps was a multi-divisional formation that usually combined the three arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and numbered from 10,000-40,000 men. In Eugene’s army the numerical strength of a corps averaged from 10,000-15,000. The corps was designed to operate on a grand tactical or strategic plane and could fight on its own against superior numbers for a period of time ranging from several hours to up to two days. Similar to the French, the Austrian army adopted the army corps system during the interwar years 1805-1809. An Austrian corps numbered approximately 20,000-25,000 at full strength. Each corps usually had one to two cavalry brigades and four to six infantry brigades plus eighteen guns attached to the Corps headquarters.^ The strength of the Austrian cavalry regiments varied. Heavy cavalry regiments had six squadrons per regiment, dragoon regiments had six, and light cavalry regiments had eight. Each squadron had 133 men at full strength. Only dragoon and light cavalry regiments were sent to Italy, so the theoretical strength of an Austrian cavalry brigade numbered from 1,108-1,597 sabers. The Austrian infantry brigades were larger than their French

32

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS counterparts and, unlike the French, served as major tactical units within the corps. Each infantry brigade had two regiments of three field battalions. The battalions had six 180-men companies.^ Hence, an Austrian infantry brigade at full strength totalled 6,480 bayonets, and attached to each brigade headquarters was at least one artillery battery of six to eight guns. Grenadier companies were detached from their parent units to form special battalions in an army’s reserve. Although formal divisions did not exist in the Austrian army, ad hoc divisions and battle groups larger than brigades but smaller than corps were formed. These battle groups were usually the numerical equivalent of a French division and will be considered as such during the course of this study. For example, three infantry brigades, totaling nine battalions, would be detached from the VIII Corps for operations in the Tyrol. Two infantry brigades under Jellachich would be detached from the Austrian VI Corps to fight in the Tyrol as well. A reinforced brigade totalling ten battalions would be sent to Dalmatia. Upon invading Italy, an advance guard for the Austrian army was formed consisting of one infantry brigade and one cavalry brigade. All of these multi-brigade or reinforced brigade groups will be classified as divisions or divisional groups. Two Austrian army corps constituted the major military formations in the provinces bordering the Kingdom of Italy. In Austrian Carinthia there was the the VIII Corps based at Klagenfurt and Villach. The IX Corps was in Carniola based at Laibach. Austria had been preparing for war for some time, and the build-up of her forces along the frontier would become apparent during March. The Austrian Army of Italy was organized as follows: UNIT COMMANDER VIII Corps Feldmarschall Leutnant Jean, the Marquis de Chasteler-Corucelle. (Chasteler was destined to command a detachment of VIII Corps in the Tyrol and was succeeded by Albert Giulay.) 1st Divisional Group Feldmarschall Leutnant Albert Giulay. 1st Brigade Generalmajor Hieronymus Colloredo-Mannsfeld. 2nd Brigade Generalmajor Anton von Gagoli 3rd Brigade Generalmajor Peter the Chevalier Marshall de Berelat 2nd Divisional Group Feldmarschall Leutnant Johann Frimont von Palota 1st Brigade Generalmajor Joseph von Wetzel 2nd Brigade Generalmajor Joseph von Schmidt IX Corps Feldmarschall Leutnant Ignatius Giulay, the Ban of Croatia 1st Divisional Group Feldmarschall Leutnant Franz Gorupp von Besanez 1st Brigade Generalmajor Vitalis von Kleinmayer 2nd Brigade Generalmajor Franz von Marziani 3rd Brigade Generalmajor Johann Kalnassy von Kalnas 2nd Divisional Group Feldmarschall Leutnant Christian Wolfskehl von Reichenberg 1st Brigade Generalmajor Joseph Hager von Altensteig 3rd Divisional Group Feldmarschall Leutnant Vinzsnz Knesevich von St.

33

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS Helena 1st Brigade Generalmajor Andreas von Stoichewich Two Landwehr brigades, commanded respectively by Generalmajor Alois Gavassini and Generalmajor Franz Fenner von Fenneberg, were added to each of the army corps. In all the VIII and IX Corps would total 62,640 infantry, 5,852 Cavalry, and 169 guns. (The composition of the brigades would vary during the course of the campaign. Infantry and cavalry units would sometimes be combined within the brigade structure.) Besides the two corps, there were 15,000-20,000 Landwehr and reserve troops that were to be kept at home for garrison and depot duties.^ Since the defeat of Austria in 1805, the Kingdom of Italy had not been directly threatened by a major invasion. There were French military forces stationed in Italy since the days of the French Republic, when Napoleon Bonaparte’s French Army of Italy invaded the peninsula. During the Wars of the French Revolution most of the troops of the Army of Italy were recruited from the southern and southeastern departments of Fance. The creation of the satellite Italian republics during and after the Wars of the French Revolution enabled Italian military units to be raised and joined with the Army of Italy. Upon the political reorganization of the Italian peninsula after 1801, many of the French regiments of the Army of Italy established their depots either in the Italian-speaking territories that had been annexed to France or in the Italian Republic, which later became the Kingdom of Italy. Since the Kingdom was free from any danger, the Italian Kingdom with its Franco-Italian army was used primarily to raise and dispatch troops to the far-flung territories of the Napoleonic Empire. In particular, the troops were usually sent to Naples, Spain, or Dalmatia, resulting in the depletion of many of the army’s regiments. Habitually, the third and fourth battalions of most of the regiments were away on foreign service. For example, early in 1809 one infantry division had only one of its regiments at full strength; the division’s three other regiments contained but a single battalion each, and these consisted mostly of conscripts undergoing basic training.® An entire division of Italian troops was fighting in Spain during 1808. Consequently, throughout most of 1808 Eugene had only 20,000 troops ready for combat in northeast Italy.^ The rest of the troops were scattered in garrisons throughout Italy, often in depleted units. It became a major objective of both Napoleon and Eugene to enlarge and prepare the Army of Italy for the anticipated war with Austria. The Emperor hoped to raise Eugene’s effective strength to 60,000 by April 1®and to 90,000 by the end of that month. ®Reinforcements for the Army of Italy would come by way of direct conscription, by the return of detached units to their parent regiments, and by direct reinforcement from France. In January, 1809, Napoleon ordered the mobilization, within France, of 110,000 conscripts of the class of 1810,'° a portion of which would be destined for Eugene’s regiments. Within the confines of the Italian Kingdom, a fresh levy of conscripts was ordered by the Viceroy to fill the ranks of his Italian division, and Eugene was empowered by the Emperor to raise a second such division as well. The new division was designated as the Second Italian Infantry Division, and Eugene nominated A. Fontanelli to command this new formation, subject to Napoleon’s approval. (The First Italian Division was commanded by P.E.L.B. Severoli.) Other officers had to be found to staff the new Italian units. Junior officers were procured from the colleges within the Kingdom, while senior officers were promoted from the Royal Guard.'*

34

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS A new French division was to be formed from the infantry regiments stationed in Tuscany. Although located in Italy, the Grand Dutchy of Tuscany had been annexed to France, and the recruiting of these formations was the responsibility of the French War Ministry, not Eugene’s own Italian War Ministry. The new French infantry division would be commanded by Pierre-François Durutte, and would be placed under Eugene’s command once it had been organized. During the months of February, March, and April, many of the detached units serving in Spain, Naples, and Dalmatia returned to the Army of Italy. .From Spain came units of the Royal Guard, one battalion of Velites and the Gurd artillery, plus two squadrons of the Prince Royal’s Chasseurs.'^ Two regular Italian cavalry regiments also arrived from Spain, the Napoleon Dragoons and the Royal Italian Chasseurs.^^ All of these units were severely understrength. For example, the Prince Royal’s Chasseurs had lost a third of their men in Spain and almost all of their mounts.''* All of these losses were made up by fresh drafts of conscripts and new purchases of horses. From Naples came enough French and Italian troops to constitute an entire infantry division and a full cavalry brigade.*^ Six infantry battalions and six cavalry squadrons were also sent to Italy from Dalmatia.'^ By April 1, reinforcement by the return of veteran troops and conscription raised Eugene’s effective field strength to 70,00. Eugene’s Army of Italy was organized into divisions as follows:'’^ DIVISION COMMANDER 1st French Infantry Jean-Mathieu Serras 2nd French Infantry Jean-Baptiste Broussier 3rd French Infantry Paul Grenier 4th French Infantry Jean-Maximilien Lamarque 5th French Infantry Gabriel Barbou d’Escourieres 6th French Infantry Pierre-François-Joseph Durutte 1st Italian Infantry P.E.L.B. Severoli 2nd Italian Infantry A. Fontanelli 1st Dragoon Count Emmanuel Grouchy 2nd Dragoon Charles-Joseph Pully Light Cavalry Baron Louis-Michel-Antoine Sahuc Royal Guard Theodore Lechi (Temporary Commander) Each infantry division usually had ten full-strength battalions for a total of 7,200 per division. Ten to twelve guns were attached to each infantry division. The cavalry divisions were somewhat understrength, averaging 2,500 each. In addition to the forces mentioned above, Eugene also had overall command of the Army of Dalmatia. Dalmatia, located on the eastern Adriatic coast, was a province of the Kingdom of Italy. However, Dalmatia was not physically contiguous with the Kingdom, being separated by a strip of Austrian territory around Trieste. Dalmatia, under the political and military administration of General Auguste Marmont, was largely autonomous, since it was isolated from the rest of the Kingdom. It was a frontier province, and the strength of the garrison there was kept up to defend against incursions from the unruly neighboring Turkish provinces, as well as to observe the Austrians in Croatia. Marmont’s Army of Dalmatia was in fact an army corps consisting of two infantry divisions commanded by Bertrand Clauzel and Joseph Perruquet de Montrichard. Although six battalions had been detached from Marmont’s corps and sent back to Italy, his two divisions still had 7,000 men each. So if one includes Marmont’s corps.

35

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS the total front-line strength of the Army of Italy reached over 85,000 troops and 132 guns.** Almost all of the divisional generals were older and had more combat experience than Eugene. Serras, Lamarque, Pully, and Grenier had spent considerable time serving in Italy, either under Napoleon during 1796-1797, or under Massena during the cam­ paigns of 1800 and 1805. Several of Eugene’s generals had commanded corps or armies. Grenier commanded a corps in the Army of Germany in 1800, while Grouchy had briefly been in charge of the Armée des Côtes de l’Ocean in 1796. Marmont had commanded the II Corps of the Grand Army in 1805 and had held his autonomous command in Dalmatia since 1806. Besides increasing the manpower strength of his army, Eugene had to see to its logistical support as well. Both Osoppo and Palmanova had to be stocked with supplies, either to support any French offensive in Carinthia or Carniola, or to be able to withstand a siege should Austria attack and force Eugene to retreat to the west. To this end one million rations of biscuit and flour were stored in both places.’^ Supplies were also collected at other points throughout Venetia to feed the army should Eugene be forced to wage a defensive campaign behind the rivers of northeastern Italy. Conse­ quently, by the end of March, one million rations of biscuit were stockpiled in towns between the Tagliamento and Livenza Rivers. A further million rations of flour were stored at Conegliano and Treviso, which were located between the Piave and Bren ta Rivers. More supplies were assembled behind the defensive line of the Adige River, with a million rations of biscuit and flour at Venice and 200,000 rations of biscuit at Verona and Peschiera; Mantua was stocked full with biscuit, flour, and wheat.^° Ammunition was also assembled at the major fortresses in Venetia. However, it was customary to have a rolling magazine traveling with the army to provide enough ammunition for the campaign. The soldiers could forage for food but not for ammunition. Eugene ordered that all wagons being used to stockpile the fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova were to be reassigned to form an ammunition train once the fortresses were fully supplied.^' Should it be necessary to augment the army’s supply train, Eugene ordered that all private vehicles between the Isonzo and the Adige were to be registered and made liable to be requisitioned.^^ The time had come to consider forming the Army of Italy into army corps and appointing a commander for each corps: Not counting the troops in Dalmatia, Eugene’s army consisted of twelve divisions, too unwieldy a force to be commanded without a corps structure. Eugene realized this, but he also knew that army corps were usually commanded by the marshals, and the Viceroy did not want any of them in Italy. Eugene became the Commander-in-Chief only after Austerlitz, and the young Prince wanted to prove himself in battle. Eugene was afraid that he would be denied effective command if one or more of the marshals were with the army. In the Napoleonic army the term “marshal” was more than just a military rank; it was a military title that carried great prestige. Since Eugene had never been a marshal, any marshal with his army might view the Viceroy in a patronizing way and be less likely to follow any of Eugene’s orders. A marshal would also have precedence over all of the divisional generals and might try to undercut Eugene by issuing orders to all of the other generals, reducing Eugene’s status to that of a mere figurehead. Eugene would have great difficulty with any recalcitrant marshal since Napoleon never gave him the power to either appoint or remove any of the senior commanders of the Army of Italy. Any change in the senior commands could only come from Napoleon. Eugene also knew that his stepfather had some misgivings about

36

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS giving his relatively inexperienced stepson an important command, and he feared that Napoleon might send one of the marshals to Italy to act as de facto Commander-inChief. Eugene wrote to Napoleon in an attempt to forestall such a move: I desire that your Majesty does not send here any of the marshals. I feel strong enough to manage the army in such a way that would please you . .. I would prefer to deal directly with my divisional generals. I know them all and would work better with them. They are all very good and do not have the pretensions of the marshals. But if your Majesty desires to send any, I would prefer either Marshals Ney, Moncey, or Mortier over all of the others.^^ Eugene evidently thought that the three mentioned marshals would be the easiest to work with. Napoleon agreed not to send any of the marshals to Italy. However, Napoleon’s agreement may have been due to the fact that his marshals were needed elsewhere and not just to please Eugene. The best of the marshals were required to serve either in Spain or in Napoleon’s Army of Germany. Moncey was available, but he had not done well in Spain, and Napoleon did not think him to be a commander of the first rank. Although no marshals would be sent, Napoleon believed that the army would be too cumbersome and ineffective without some multi-divisional organization. Writing to Eugene on the necessity of combining the divisions into corps, Napoleon pointed out that, “A single division of 9,000 by itself is too weak and would soon be reduced to 6,000. But two divisions of 18,000 can go anywhere.^'* Napoleon, however, viewed the Army of Italy as an appendage of his own Grand Army of Germany and anticipated an eventual amalgamation of the two forces. To this end he wanted to keep the Army of Italy as a single strategic unit and forbade the formal creation of army corps. This is a curious quirk on the part of Napoleon; he rarely allowed the formation of formal army corps for his secondary armies. For exmaple, the army corps structure in Spain was abandoned in 1811 ; by 1813 the multi-divisional formations there were termed lieutenancies. For Eugene’s army, Napoleon proposed that multi-divisional units be designated as wings. Whether these formations were termed wings or lieutenancies, they were in fact army corps. The only difference between these de facto corps and the formal army corps of the Grand Army was that the former units tended to be a little smaller and contained neither a corps headquarters staff nor a corps artillery reserve. Napoleon initially decided that Eugene’s army would be divided into two wings and a reserve. One wing would consist of two infantry divisions while the other had three; each wing would have a cavalry brigade as well.^^ The larger reserve would be under the personal command of Eugene, while the smaller wings would be commanded by lieutenant generals.^’ Napoleon invited Eugene to nominate two men to command the wings.^^ Apparently, one of the men requested, upon the advice of Empress Josephine and Queen Hortense, was Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald,^® a man of considerable experience. He had served in Italy from 1798-1800 and had, for a time, commanded the Army of Naples. However, Macdonald had been in forced retirement for the last several years because of friction with Napoleon. Macdonald had republican leanings and may not have been too happy with Napoleon’s accession to the throne. Macdonald had also been a close friend of Napoleon’s exiled rival. General Jean-Victor Moreau. An ill-advised love affair with Napoleon’s sister, Pauline, lowered Macdonald’s standing with the Emperor even further.

37

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS Not certain of Napoleon’s approval of Macdonald, on April 2, Eugene proposed two other men then in Italy for promotion to lieutenant general, Paul Grenier and Louis Baraguey d’Hilliers. Paul Grenier was among the most experienced generals in Italy. He became a general of division in 1794 and served in the Army of the Sambre-et-Meuse from 1793-1798. He was sent to command a de-facto corps in the Army of Italy in 1799. Grenier commanded a corps in the Army of Germany during the Campaign of 1800-1801. He returned to the Army of Italy in 1806. Louis Baraguey d’Hilliers, currently serving as the military governor of Venice, had a distinguished military career. He had once served as chief of staff for Eugene’s father, the Vicomte de Beauharnais, in 1793. Baraguey had served with Napoleon in Italy and Egypt, and had commanded a division in Grenier’s corps in 1800. Baraguey had held an honorary position as Colonel General of Dragoons, and had commanded a dragoon division in the Grand Army of 1805. He had briefly commanded a corps of the Army of Italy in 1806. Prior to the arrival of Eugene’s letter requesting the nominations of Grenier and Baraguey as corps commanders, Napoleon approved the appointment of Macdonald as one of the lieutenant generals. Eventually all three men would serve as corps commanders under Eugene. By the end of April the Army of Italy would consist of three ad hoc corps plus the corps in Dalmatia under Marmont.^® A lot of ink has been spilled over Macdonald’s role in Eugene’s army. In 1825 Macdonald published his memoirs, The Recollections o f Marshal Macdonald, in which he pictured himself as the de facto Commander-in-Chief of the army. As will be seen in the course of this study, Macdonald claimed that it was he who served as the military instructor to a confused, inexperienced, and immature Eugene. In Macdonald’s version, all of the Viceroy’s successes in the campaign were due to his calm, firm, and expert advice. Macdonald’s Recollections have often been considered an accurate historical source and have been used as a basis for many of the military histories of the 1809 war. Among those historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who uncritically relied on Macdonald’s memoirs were L. Adolphe Thiers in his Histoire de Consulate et de VEmpire and F. Lorraine Petre in his Napoleon and the Archduke Charles. Theirs and Petre were consequently highly critical of Eugene’s performance as a military commander and credit any of the successes of the campaign to Macdonald’s presence. The writings of all three — Macdonald, Thiers, and Petre — in conjunction with the writing of another critic, Pelet, established the anti-Eugene school of thought, arguing that Eugene was a well-meaning but incompetent military commander.^^ This school is opposed by Andre Du Casse, the editor of Eugene’s papers.^^ According to Du Casse, Macdonald was to serve as a wing commander, nothing more and nothing less, and Eugene was free to dispense with any advice that Macdonald offered. An examination of Napoleon’s correspondence proves that Macdonald was sent merely as a corps commander and not as any sort of deputy Commander-in-Chief. Napoleon informed Eugene of Macdonald’s appointment in a letter dated April 2 in which the Emperor wrote the following: My son, I have given orders for General Macdonald to serve in the Army of Italy; he is going there immediately ... I suppose that he will serve you to his utmost, and that he will serve in areas that call upon his talents and previous services. I have said nothing to him. He will be employed as a general of division, but he will be given command of a wing. This favor he will receive from you will tie him to you entirely.^”*

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General Grenier

Marshal Macdonald

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ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS This letter proves that Macdonald and those who relied only on his Recollections were wrong about his intended role in the War of 1809. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, Macdonald would act as a corps commander and have the same influence as the other corps leaders. In reading the correspondence between Napoleon and Eugene, one notices a particular lack of urgency on the part of the Emperor in completing the command structure of the Army of Italy. This lack of haste on Napoleon’s part was symptomatic of all of Napoleon’s actions during March and April. The Emperor, trusting in his Russian alliance, did not think that Austria would attack him. Even if Austria did attack, Napoleon was convinced that there was still plenty of time to meet the onslaught. Throughout most of March he believed that Austria would not stir until May 1; only by March 30 did he consider that war was likely any time after April 15.^^ Consequently, there seemed to be plenty of time to organize the army’s corps command structure and to concentrate the army to repel an invasion. Napoleon would be proved wrong concerning Austria’s actions; the result was that Eugene’s army would lack a corps structure at the start of the war, and, more important, the army would find itself scattered throughout Italy. As of April 1, the Army of Italy held the following positions; Two infantry divisions and one light cavalry brigade were located between the Isonzo and Tagliamento Rivers. One infantry division and a light cavalry brigade were between the Tagliamento and the Piave, while another infantry division was behind the Piave at Treviso. The two Italian infantry divisions were found between the Brenta and the Adige Rivers. The two dragoon divisions and another infantry division were behind the Adige. Further in the rear was the Royal Guard at Milan, and the regiments forming Durutte’s division were still in Tuscany.^^ The army had taken the above positions on the direct orders of Napoleon, and Eugene had no choice but to obey. The Emperor wanted to avoid concentrating the Army of Italy for both political and logistical reasons. Politically, Napoleon hoped to keep peace with Austria by avoiding any provocation that might arise by massing the army between the Isonzo and the Tagliamento.^'' Furthermore, a premature concentration of the army would place a severe strain on its logistical support. Admittedly, depots and magazines had been established throughout Venetia, but those magazines were to supply the army once active operations would begin. If the army was kept concentrated east of the Tagliamento in peacetime, the supply bases in eastern Venetia would soon be depleted and would be unable to support the army during either offensive or defensive operations. Save for the final appointment of the corps commanders and the concentration of the army, however, Napoleon and Eugene had done all that was possible to prepare the army for war. The Army of Italy had approached a state of combat readiness. On April 9, the last day of peace, Eugene’s army totaled 57,600 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, 5,120 Royal Guard, and 120 guns manned by ten per gun, to give a grand total of 71,420 front line troops, with an additional 14,000 and twelve guns (ten men per gun) in Dalmatia — 85,540 in all.^^ The fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova were garrisoned and supplied. More magazines to support the army had been established from the Tagliamento to the Adige. Fortifications were being constructed along the Adige river line and were expected to be finished by late April. If Austria had waited until the middle of May to go to war, an additional 30,000 troops might have joined Eugene’s army.

40

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS The French Army of Italy faced its Austrian opponent with a definite numerical superiority, 85,540 Franco-Italians against 72,182 Austrians. Had the French army been fully organized and concentrated, the Austrians would have had no chance to conquer Italy. But thanks to Napoleon’s slowness in approving the corps commanders for the army and his desire to keep the army dispersed, the Austrians would be given the opportunity to destroy Eugene’s army. For if the Austrians could strike before the French had concentrated, they could bring superior numbers to bear against the scattered French detachments. This was an opportunity that the Austrians would not fail to miss. NOTES TO CHAPTER III ^NC, Item No. 13574, 8 February 1808. A partial translation of this decree may be found in Scotty Bowden and Charlie Tarbox, Armies on the Danube 1809 (Empire Games Press: 1980), pp. 25-29. The organization was the same for the French and Italian units. Although the paper stremgth of each battalion was 840, the average field strength at the start of the campaign was approximately 720 effectives. ^Information on the Austrian military organization taken from: General FredricFrançois, LeBaron de Vaudoncourt, Historié politique et militaire du Prince Eugene Napoleon 2 vols. (Librairie Universelle de P. Mongie, Paris: 1828), I, p. 132. General Jean Pelet, Mémoires Sur la guerre de 1809 4 vols. (Roret, Libraire, Paris 1825), Appendix-Order of battle. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art o f War in the Age o f Napoleon (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London: 1978), pp. 170-173. Also see Scotty Bowden and Charlie Tarbox Armies on the Danube 1809 (Empire Games Press, Arlington: 1980), pp. 1-23. ^Hungarian-speaking regiments had a paper strength of 200 men per company. ‘ My estimates based on totals listed in Vaud. 1 ,132; and Pelet’s Appendix-Order of Battle. There were ten men per gun. 5Vaud. I, p. 132. 6DCC, IV, 323-324. ’Ibid., p. 250. Hbid., pp. 332-333 nbid., p. 379. '«Chandler, p. 669. “ DCC, IV, 377. ^^Ibid., p. 369. ^^Ibid., p. 370. ^^Ibid., p. 369. ^Hbid., p. 331. ^^Ibid., p. 331. ’^All of the commanders were generals of division except for Lechi, who was a general of brigade and usually commanded the infantry of the Royal Guard. These were two Italian dragoon regiments and two Italian light cavalry regiments among the units in the cavalry divisions. ’^Estimates for the artillery are based on twelve guns per infantry division plus twelve guns with the Royal Guard. The cavalry divisions did not as yet have any artillery, and there were but twelve gus; with Marmont. Barbou’s division had twenty-four guns. Estimates for artillery are based on ten men per gun.

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ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATIONS •^DCC, IV, 401. ^^Ibid ^^Ibid

, pp. 402-403.

^^Ibid p. 366.

^^Ibid p. 413. ^^Michael Glover, The Peninsular War (Archon Books, Hamden Connecticut: 1974), p. 393. 26DCC, IV, 413. ^''The rank of lieutenant general in the French army was an ad hoc one bestowed upon generals of divisions who were appointed to command corps, wings, or lieutenancies. There was no permanent rank in the French army, at that time, between general of division and marshal. 28DCC, IV, 413-414. 290man, p. 258. ^°Later, in May, a fourth corps would be formed under Grouchy. ^'The Recollections were not published until the 1890’s, but they were written in 1825 and the manuscript was used by Thiers. Macdonald’s Recollections were written for the purpose of self-aggrandizement. Naturally he belittled the role of any rival. ^^Pelet was a friend of Massena and was an officer on the Marshal’s staff. In 1805 Massena and some of his officers looted newly conquered Venetia. Eugene was instrument in reporting the incident to Napoleon who forced Massena to disgorge his ill gotten gains. Consequently, there was bad blood between Eugene, Massena and their respective staffs. This is perhaps why Pelet is overly critical of Eugene’s military exploits. ^^Vaudoncourt also writes favorably of Eugene’s abilities as a military commander, but his own history pre-dates Macdonald’s memoirs. 34DCC, IV, 417-418. 35NC, XVIII, 404. 36DCC, IV, 399-400 and 444-449. ^'^Ibid., pp. 358-359. ^^Ibid., pp. 401-402. ^^My own estimates. See note #18. About 2,000 Royal Guard were kept in Milan as a reserve.

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CHAPTER IV Invasion By the first week in April, the Army of Italy was dispersed across the Italian Kingdom and the province of Dalmatia. General Serras, with one infantry division and a light cavalry brigade, was at Udine, with advanced patrols along the Isonzo. Broussier’s division was watching the Austrians in Carinthia from its stations at Osoppo and Saint-Daniel. Barbou’s division was occupying Treviso, Citadella and Bassano. Grenier had his infantry division located at Pordenone, Sacile and Conegliano, from where he could move either north to support Broussier or east to reinforce Serras. Attached to Grenier’s division was a light cavalry brigade that was stationed along the Piave behind the infantry. Severoli’s First Italian Division was at Padua, while the Second, Fontanelli’s, was at Monte-Chiaro. Lamarque’s division, minus the 112th infantry which was still in Tuscany, was posted at Verona. The two dragoon divisions were along the Adige. At Milan was a miniature replica of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard, the Italian Royal Guard. Three infantry regiments, the 62nd, 22nd, and 23 légère, destined to form a reserve division under Durutte, were at Bologna. Rome had a garrison under Miollis consisting of French and Neapolitan troops.' And finally there was the detached corps in Dalmatia under Marmont. It is easy to see that Eugene’s army was too scattered to be in any position to repulse a strong attack. But like his counterpart in Germany, Marshal Alexandre Berthier, Eugene’s hands were tied, since he had been specifically ordered by Napoleon to place his divisions at the above positions.^ Napoleon believed those locations to be safe, but this belief was based on several false assumptions. First, right up until the end of March, Napoleon was convinced that hostilities would not begin until the middle of May.^ So there would still be plenty of time to concentrate the army. Second, Napoleon was expecting active Russian military support, which would force Austria to remain on the defensive. So Napoleon’s main concern was to avoid provoking the Austrians by a premature French concentration along the Austrian frontiers during April. Writing to Eugene, he said: “As for me I will remain stationary for all of April and I do not think that the Austrians will want to attack, especially after the Russians march on Hungary and Galicia.'* Lulled into a false sense of security, Napoleon thought that there was still plenty of time to prepare the Army of Italy. So the army was still without any corps commanders, except for Marmont who was in Dalmatia. Napoleon had neither approved Eugene’s candidates (Baraguey d’Hilliers and Grenier) nor had the news of Macdonald’s appointment arrived. Eugene, kept under a tight rein by his step-father, could not freely appoint his own corps commanders. The army itself was not yet at full strength. Napoleon had hoped to eventually have 10,000 men to an infantry division, but instead Eugene’s divisions averaged 7,200.^ Many of the infantry regiments had but two field battalions, each averaging 720.^ The army also contained a lot of fresh conscripts as Fontanelli’s division was newly raised and consisted almost entirely of recruits.^ Nor were all of the fortifications completed along the Adige for heavy rains had delayed the

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INVASION construction of the defenses at Venice and along the Tagliamento, and Eugene did not think they would be finished until the end of April.^ Napoleon, however, did not seem to be anxious about their completion. Even though Napoleon believed that all was safe for the time being, what did Eugene think? Eugene was closer to the Austrian frontier and as Viceroy and Commander-inChief had his own network of spies. Threatening reports were arriving with increased regularity. One report received by March 13 predicted an Austrian invasion of Italy some time between March 25 and April 1 Other information received prior to the 25th seemed to confirm this assessment. On March 20, fourteen Austrian infantry regiments, six cavalry regiments, and twelve Landwehr battalions were reported to be in Carinthia. On the 23rd Eugene learned that there were Austrian troop concentrations at Laibach, Klagenfurt, Villach, and Salzburg." The Austrians were also building fortifications at Malborghetto, Mount Predel, and Prewald opposite the Italian frontier. Eugene’s agents informed him that “all of Austria is dreaming and talking of war,”'^ and that Austrian agents were spreading rumors within Hapsburg territories that the French armies in Spain had been destroyed and the Russians were marching to support A ustria.Y et in spite of all of this intelligence, Eugene believed that there was not any real danger. Eugene was influenced by Napoleon’s confidence in the Russian alliance which was evidenced by his writing to Marmont on March 23: “The Russians are marching against Austria... She will be attacked from all sides. ' ^ “Their plan of campaign,” Eugene said, “is upset even before war is declared.”'^ Eugene sent the intelligence reports on to Napoleon but without any recommendations as he was not about to challenge the Emperor’s assumptions. Besides, Napoleon had other sources of information not available to Eugene, and neither of them had any reason to expect that Russia would be playing a double game. As it was, the rumors of an Austrian invasion were correct, except for the date; April 1 came and went without an Austrian attack. Eugene’s reports nevertheless may have had some effect on Napoleon. On March 30 the Emperor reassessed his own estimates and considered an Austrian offensive on or after April 15 to be likely.'^ Yet fresh orders to concentrate the army were not issued to Eugene. Perhaps Napoleon still expected that the Austrians would maintain a defensive posture along the Italian frontier. Since the Austrian invasion had not materialized by April 1, Eugene thereafter was even less disposed to believe that an invasion would occur, in spite of continued warnings. On April 7 Eugene learned that an anti-French riot had broken out in Tuscany on April 2, during which the rioters had shouted “Long live Prince Charles of Austria.”'* The riot was put down by the 9th Chasseurs-à-cheval and some French infantry. On April 10 Eugene received a message from a M. Segurier, his agent in Trieste, who reported that great numbers of Austrian troops and artillery were moving out of that city and a war chest of four million gold pieces had arrived. According to Segurier, “hostilities are expected soon.”^° Eugene still did not believe it; he had been receiving such reports for weeks. Yet this report was accurate. While Eugene wrote to his wife on April 10 that he did not believe Segurier’s message,^' the Austrian invasion was already under way. The invasion force, the Austrian Army of Italy, was commanded by Archduke John, the brother of Emperor Francis I and Archduke Charles. John had previously commanded an army in Germany when he was defeated by Moreau at Hohenlinden in 1801. In 1805 John was in charge of all Austrian forces in the Tyrol and Carinthia,

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INVASION where his military service consisted of leading a retreat. John was reputed to be a stubborn man with an exaggerated opinion of his military abilities. John’s army consisted of the VIII Army Corps under Feldmarschall Leutnant Jean Gabriel, the Marquis de Chasteler-Corucelle, and the IX Army Corps commanded by Feldmarschall Leutnant Igantius Giulay, the Ban of Croatia, together totaling 72,182 with an additional 15-20,000 Landwehr and depot troops acting as a general reserve.^^ The final instructions for the invasion were issued on March 18. Chasteler was to invade the Tyrol on April 9 with a detachment of his corps consisting of 10,000 infantry and 370 cavalry.^^ Chasteler’s mission was to support an insurrection in the Tyrol and cut communications between the French armies in Italy and Germany. A detachment of the IX Corps consisting of 12,000 Croatian and Landwehr infantry and 150 cavalry all under Gewera/wayor Stoichewich was to attack Marmont in Dalmatia on April 10.^'^ The rest of the VIII Corps, under Feldmarschall Leutnant Albert Giulay, commanding in Chasteler’s absence, along with the IX Corps would be used to invade Venetia beginning April 10 and to attack and destroy Eugene’s Army of Italy. John had a choice of two methods by which to invade Venetia, either a two-pronged assault or a single thrust by his united army. Because his two army corps were based in separate provinces, one to the north of Venetia, the other to the southeast, he could launch a double-pronged attack with the VIII Corps moving south down the valley of the Natisone, and the IX Corps moving north and west, both army corps converging on Cividale. Such a plan would involve less wear and tear on the army than the long march that would be necessary if either of the separate corps marched to join the other. If the IX Corps invaded Venetia from Goritzia it had to march but twenty miles to Cividale, and it was only a distance of thirty miles for the VIII Corps to march from Tarvis to Cividale. If the IX Corps, on the other hand, should have to join the VIII Corps prior to the invasion, it would have to march approximately sixty miles just to get from Laibach to Villach. The two-pronged assault would also allow the Austrians to envelop any French detachments guarding the frontier, while insuring the protection of Carinthia and Carniola from a French counter-offensive. There were, however, some dangers to such a plan. If Eugene could concentrate his army at Udine between April 1 and 10, the French would have the important central position and could concentrate successfully against the detached Austrian corps, defeating each in detail. The Austrians could not be certain that Eugene’s army would not unite sometime before April 9. They also knew that Palmanova was fortified; a French corps stationed there could threaten the flank of the IX Corps if it moved northwest to Cividale. The alternative in light of these dangers was to unite both corps prior to the invasion. If the VIII Corps moved to Carniola it would uncover southern Austria and keep John’s forces farther away from Chasteler’s. So it would be better for the IX Corps to leave a small covering force at Goritzia and march into Carinthia, joining the VIII Corps at Villach. Then the combined army could descend on Cividale by way of Caporetto, united and ready to meet Eugene’s army wherever it appeared. It is this latter plan that was chosen on March 18.^^ The Austrians moved to their jump-off positions without any difficulties. The IX Corps, leaving a covering force at Goritzia, moved towards Carinthia on April 1P By April 9 Chasteler was at the Tyrolean frontier ready to advance on Lienz. John’s main force was strung out in a long column from Caporetto to Plezzo, the VIII Corps leading, followed by the IX Corps and the cavalry.^* The covering force at Goritzia consisting of four regular battalions, three Landwehr battalions, and eight cavalry squadrons, all

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INVASION under Generalmajor Gavassini, was to cross the Isonzo and act as a flank guard on the left.2^ On the right of John’s army was another flank guard consisting of three regular battalions and two squadrons under Colonel Volkmann, which was to advance from Malborghetto and attack the French frontier outpost at Ponteba.^° To the southeast Stoichewich was in position ready to invade Dalmatia.^' Early on April 10 all along the frontier, the Austrians sent messages to the French outposts informing them that they were going to advance and “treat as enemies”^^ all who opposed them. The first blow was then struck by Volkmann, who attacked Ponteba at 5:00 a.m.^^ The invasion had begun! Eugene had been engaged on a tour of the Friaul, and was at Udine the night of April 9. On the morning of April 10, after writing a confident letter to his wife, Auguste, that there was nothing to worry about, Eugene received news of Volkmann’s attack against Ponteba.^'* The information was scanty, but hostilities had definitely begun. Eugene realized that he could no longer defer all major decisions to Napoleon. The press of events would force him to make his own decisions concerning the conduct of his army. Eugene knew that his own army was scattered, but as yet did not know the full strength and the intentions of the Austrians. Their main blow could come from Carinthia, Carniola, or perhaps the Tyrol. Eugene could either await events, order a forward concentration of his forces, or initiate the defensive campaign Napoleon had outlined in his “Note” of January, 1809 and for which fortifications were being built along the Adige. Eugene chose the second alternative on April 10. Merely to hold his positions would be dangerous, while a precautionary concentration would put his army in a better position to meet any situation. Moreover, an attack on a single French outpost did not warrant as yet a full-scale withdrawal behind the Adige. Consequently, Eugene decided to fight a delaying action along the frontier while he concentrated a large part of his army. Orders went out to his advance commanders, Broussier and Serras. Broussier was immediately ordered to move forward from Osoppo and take up a defensive position at Ospitaletto to block Volkmann’s advance.^^ Serras was ordered to hold along the lower Isonzo and repulse any attempts to cross the river. Meanwhile the infantry divisions of Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli, plus one dragoon division, were ordered to concentate at Valvasone behind the Tagliamento, from where they would be in a position to support either Broussier or S e rra s .Since Eugene was still somewhat in the dark about the Austrians’ movements, the rest of the army would wait, holding its positions until more definite news was known. This made sense, for if all of the French forces were brought east of the Piave, they could be taken in the rear by an Austrian thrust from the Tyrol. Eugene was expecting additional trouble from the Tyrol. He realized that should he be forced to fight in Venetia, an experienced general would be needed to command a corps securing the Tyrolean flank. Eugene selected Baraguey d’Hilliers, one of his nominees to command a corps, for this task. There were two French columns totalling 4,000 men marching through the Tyrol,^* plus 4,500 Bavarian troops there in garrison. Baraguey d’Hilliers was promptly ordered by Eugene to leave Venice where he was military governor, to go to the Tyrol and take command of all French and allied forces in that area.'*® This done, Eugene decided to wait further information. Events went well for the Austrians on April 10. Gavassini made an unopposed crossing of the Isonzo over a pontoon bridge. The bulk of Serras’ forces were too far away at Udine to intercept him in time. Once across, Gavassini made for Torre.'** John’s main strike force of the VIII and IX Corps moved off from Caporetto and headed toward Cividale without opposition.'*^ Volkmann’s attack on Ponteba succeeded, that post being

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INVASION held by just a squad of French troops. From Ponteba, Volkmann continued on to Villanova, where he halted for the night.'*^ The first serious French opposition occurred the next day, April 11. Advancing from Villanova, Volkmann collided at Venzone with the troops of General of Brigade Count Joseph-Marie Dessaix, who had been sent out by Broussier to reconnoiter. After a lively skirmish, Dessaix pulled back to Ospitalleto, where the rest of Broussier’s division had concentrated following Eugene’s orders. Perhaps emboldened by his initial success, Volkmann foolishly attempted to smash through Broussier’s entire division. Two assaults were launched against Broussier’s division, at 2:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.; both were principally directed against Dessaix’s brigade, and both were repulsed. The French suffered 120 killed and 100 wounded; among the latter was the dashing Dessaix, whose wound fortunately was slight. The Austrian losses were far greater.'*'^ Early on April 12 Eugene had a more accurate picture of the strength and scope of the Austrian invasion. John was at Cividale with 44,000 troops.'*^ and the Tyrol was in full-scale revolt, sparked by the invasion of 10,000 Austrians under Chasteler. The strength of John’s army was accurately estimated, but Chasteler’s forces were overestimated to a total of 18,000.“*®Eugene, however, having previously disregarded the intelligence reports about the impending Austrian invasion, now swung to the other extreme, and chose to believe the exaggerated reports. So it seemed apparent to Eugene that any stand east of the Tagliamento would be impossible. With Broussier up the Tagliamento, Eugene had only Serras’ 7,000 to 8,000 at Udine to engage John’s 44,000. One would expect that Eugene would put the defensive plan of Napoleon’s January, 1809 “Note” into operation by retiring behind the fortifications of the Adige, from whence he could launch a counterattack against an enemy whose strength would have diminished due to strategic consumption. However, Eugene committed a grave strategic error; he decided not to implement Napoleon’s plan. Instead he would fall back towards his supports until he was strong to strike back at John, which he would do as soon as he could. Why the deviation from the Emperor’s plan? There were several factors involved. First, Napoleon was wrong about the timing of the Austrian attack and had never ordered a general concentration of Eugene’s army. After scrupulously following Napoleon’s orders, Eugene perhaps thought that it was time to do Napoleon one better and strike out on his own. Second, Eugene had never been happy as an administrator and had wanted to win his spurs on the battlefield; he would prove to be a “fighting general.” He also knew that his position as Viceroy was considered by Napoleon to be temporary; a quick and decisive victory could enhance his credentials, making him more attractive as a future King of Italy. Besides, Italy was Eugene’s responsibility, and abandoning all the territory between the Isonzo and the Adige to the enemy was no doubt distasteful to him. Added to this were the pleadings of the local Italian residents who feared being abandoned to the Austrians, and the complaints of Eugene’s own more experienced officers who were unaccustomed to retiring before Austrian troops. Finally, and above all, there was the spector of Chasteler in the Tyrol. Believing the inaccurate intelligence reports of Chasteler’s strength, Eugene feared an attack from the Tyrol against his strategic left, especially if John’s army had not yet been crushed.'*’ The Viceroy feared that if he retired behind the Adige a concentration of Chasteler’s and John’s forces via the Alpine passes would become easier, making their defeat more difficult. Eugene reasoned that he could more fully utilize his central position by quickly fighting and defeating John, after which he could turn all of his attention against Chasteler.*** So as

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INVASION early as April 12, Eugene decided to disregard Napoleon’s instructions and began to look east of the Piave for a place to have a decisive battle. Several things had to be done. First, the Tyrolean flank had to be secure while Eugene fought John. The forces already there seemed inadequate, and the precise location of the French columns were unknown. So on April 12, Eugene ordered Fontanelli’s Italian division,'*^ followed by the 7th Dragoons and the 112th Infantry^^ to Trent to reinforce that sector, which would give Baraguey d’Hilliers a total of 10-12,000 troops. In order to take some of the pressure off his own front, Eugene ordered Marmont to attack northward, or at least, “make an advantageous diversion.”^' But Marmont’s forces of two infantry divisions under Count Betrand Clauzel and Joseph Perruquet de Montrichard totalling 14,000 infantry and 300 cavalry^^ were in the process of retreating before Stoichewich’s advance, and were in no position to give any direct assistance, nor would they be for some time. Finally, a phased withdrawal and concentration behind the Tagliamento had to be organized. For lack of troops, all the area east of the Tagliamento had to be evacuated save for Osoppo and Palmanova. Such a situation had been foreseen by Napoleon and both those places had been fortified, provisioned and garrisoned, with one French battalion at the former and four French battalions and one Italian at the latter.^^ Serras and Broussier were ordered to fall back to Valvasone behind the Tagliamento. All of Eugene’s other divisions except for Fontanelli’s, which was earmarked for the Tyrol, were ordered to move eastwards as quickly as possible.^'* The Tagliamento would only act as a staging area to concentrate a fraction of his army, not a site to fight a battle. By midnight of April 12 Eugene would have Serras and Broussier at Valvasone, plus Grenier’s division who had moved up from its previous position, and the light cavalry brigades which were recombined into a division for Sahuc. But this was not enough to hold that river line. The rest of the army was still too far in the rear, with Barbou at Sacile, Severoli at Campo-San-Pietro north of Padua, and the remainder still west of the Adige. Of these units, the closest to Eugene was Lamarque’s division at Verona.^^ Besides, as Napoleon pointed out, the Tagliamento was fordable. John could frontally pin Eugene’s four divisions while sending an entire corps to cross the river and turn his flank. Eugene would rest his troops along the Tagliamento on April 13 (Serras’ and Broussier’s troops needed it), then fall back to Barbou’s division at Sàcile the next day. Eugene calculated that Lamarque could also reach Sacile by April 15 and that with at least five infantry divisions he could turn and face Archduke John.^"^ It would be there, along the banks at the Livenza, that Eugene hoped: “In one day I will re-take all of the territory that I have abandoned at the moment.”^® The Austrian advance continued. By the end of April 12 John’s VIII Corps had marched into Udine, while the IX Corps held Cividale. Volkmann, after slowly following Broussier, began the investment of Osoppo, and Gavassini began to surround Palmanova.^^ The next day the IX Corps closed up on Udine while an advance guard of four battalions and eight squadrons, all under Feldmarschall Leutnant Johann Frimont, was sent on to Codropio, three miles from the Tagliamento.^® Another smaller force of two battalions and two squadrons was sent to Saint-Daniel near the Tagliamento to make contact with Volkmann.®* As Eugene withdrew on the 14th to Sacile, John’s army closed up along the Tagliamento, Frimont crossed over that day, and the rest of the army followed on the 15th moving due west along the Valvasone-Sacile road.®^ On the same day Volkmann left behind a small force to observe Osoppo and with the rest of his forces,

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INVASION crossed the Tagliamento at Dignano, moving southwest with orders to join John’s main forces at Sacile.®^ Gavassini detached another column from his command, under Colonel Gyurkovich to cross the Tagliamento and advance to La Motta with the hope of turning Eugene’s right.^'* The two opposing armies were nearing each other. The first major battle of the campaign was at hand. In the meanwhile, what was actually happening in the Tyrol from April 10 to 16? The Bavarian troops there prior to Chasteler’s invasion consisted of six battalions and one squadron of dragoons. All were dispersed among the towns of Innsbruck, Prunecken, Brixen, and Sterzing.®^ The two previously mentioned French columns numbering 2,000 men each were moving through the Tyrol en route to Augsburg to reinforce the Army of G erm any.The two columns were traveling along the same road, and were separated by a day’s march one from the other. Chasteler’s invasion sparked a pre-arranged general insurrection in the Tyrol catching the French and Bavarians completely by surprise. Tyrolean partisans attacked the Bavarians; the garrisons at Innsbruck and Sterzing were either wiped out or captured, while those at Prunecken and Brixen were driven from those towns.®"^ The capture of Brixen by the partisans had separated the two French columns, one north of the town, the other south of it. The northern column tried to continue its niarch but was intercepted and forced to surrender near Innsbruck.^* The southern column fell back, reaching Trent on April 12.^® Baraguey d’Hilliers reached Trent early on April 14 and promptly took charge. The reinforcements sent by Eugene arrived at Trent on April 16,^° after which Baraguey set about organizing his corps. The southern French column was joined with the 112th Infantry and the 7th Dragoons to form a provisional division and was placed temporarily under the command of General of Division Baron Honore Vial.’*Vial’s troops and Fontanelli’s division gave Baraguey a total of 10,300 infantry and 1,100 cavalry,’^ sufficient, it would prove, to secure Eugene’s strategic left flank. In Paris, on April 10 Napoleon believed war to be imminent and ordered a general concentration of Eugene’s army east of the Tagliamento.’^ These orders were reiterated on April 12, when Napoleon had learned that war was declared and that the Austrians had invaded Bavaria.’'* What is curious is that Napoleon still did not believe that the Austrians would invade Italy. Expecting them to remain on the defensive, Napoleon ordered Eugene to concentrate his army east of the Tagliamento with three divisions facing Carinthia, two in reserve at Udine, and one watching the Isonzo. Once secure, Eugene was to attack Tarvis with five divisions.’^These orders show the misconceptions about Austrian designs on Italy that Napoleon still entertained. Expecting John to remain passive, Napoleon made no mention of the 1808 and 1809 “Notes” on Italian defense, since he thought that Austria would remain passive. As far as Napoleon was concerned, Eugene would be safe to concentrate his army and move about almost as if the Austrians did not exist. Had a concentration east at the Tagliamento been ordered about April 1, an offensive operation against Carinthia might have been feasible; but with Eugene’s army scattered and John moving in force on Cividale and Udine, such orders were impossible to execute. Since it took about five days for the new orders to reach Eugene, they would be out of date as well. However, one part of those orders could be carried out. Napoleon at last decided on a choice of corps commanders for the Army of Italy. Napoleon consented to Eugene’s nominees,.Baraguey d’Hillers and Grenier as well as Macdonald,’^ who was already enroute to Italy. Eventually the army would be divided into three corps with a reserve under Eugene’s own command. But the actual

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INVASION organization into army corps was to occur only after the first great battle of the campaign at Sacile, and it is to that engagement that one must first turn. NOTES TO CHAPTER IV ' DCC, IV 399-499 and 444-446. y bid., p. 131 and 399. ^Ibid., p. 329. ‘^Ibid., p. 397. Russia’s support was all but nonexistent. ^Ibid., pp. 377-378. Napoleon hoped to have all regiments of four full strength battalions each. ^Ibid., p. 424, See Chapter III. \Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 435. Hbid., pp. 371-372. ^^Ibid., p. 392. "Manuscript Beauharnais collection, Princeton University, Box #27, L.B. for 1809. Hereafter all citings abbreviated as MSP for Manuscript, Princeton and L.B. 09 for Letter Book, 1809. '2DCC. IV. 415. '3lbid.,p. 342. '‘’Ibid., p. 281 (this is in the biographical section, but is the text of a report from an agent). '5MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. '^MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. ’’NC, XVIII, 404. '«DCC, IV, 431. ^nbid. ^^Ibid., pp. 440-441. ^^Ibid., p. 442. 22See Chapter III. ^^Ibid., p. 132. ^nbid. ^^Ibid. ^^DCC, IV, 446. However, there is some evidence to prove that John actually chose the double-pronged assault. This evidence is provided in a dispatch sent by Eugene to Napoleon on April 12, two days after he learned of the Austrian attack. Eugene reported that; “Prince John has arrived with 17,000 men of the VIII Corps and finally Count Giulay has crossed the Isonzo with 27,000 men of the IX Corps.” DCC, IV, 446. The wording of this sentence seems to indicate that the two Austrian corps were moving separately and were not united. Since no other information seems to support this view, it is possible that Eugene was mistaken on April 12. Most evidence supports the single-thrust plan. But in light of Eugene’s dispatch and the initial location of the two corps, the possibility that the alternative double-pronged attack occurred should be considered. 2’Vaud., I, 130-133. ^^Ibid: pp. 138-139.

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INVASION ^Vbid., pp. 137-138. ^^Ibid., pp. 138-139. ^Hbid. ^Hbid., p. 139. 34DCC, IV, 442-443. ^Hbid., pp. 441-442. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 493. 39Vaud., I, 192. 40DCC, IV, 442. 4'Vaud., I, 142. ^nbid. ^^Ibid., pp. 139-140. '“‘DCC, IV, 447. ^Hbid., p. 448. ^Hbid., p. 446. ^'^Ibid., pp. 137-138. ^Hbid.. pp. 135-136. ^nUd., pp. 446-448. 50Vaud.,I, p. 197. 5>MSP, Box #27, L.B.for 1809. 52DCB, IV, 297. 53Vaud.,I, 144-145. 54DCC, IV, 446-448. 55/è/V/. 56Vaud., I, 144-145. 5'^Vaud.,I, 149-150. 58DCC, IV, 449. 59Vaud., I, 147. ^m id. ^Hbid. ^^Ibid., pp. 150-151. ^Hbid. ^^Ibid. ^Hbid., p. 192. 66DCC, IV, 493. 6’Vaud., I, 192-193. ^Hbid., pp. 193-194. ^nbid., p. 194. ^mid., p. 197. '^^Ibid. '’^Ibid. ’^DCC, IV, 436. '^^Ibid., pp. 436-437 and 444-446. ^mid.. pp. 436-437. ''^Ibid., p. 437.

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CHAPTER V Defeat at Sacile

By the evening of April 14 Eugene had six divisions in the vicinity of the Livenza river, where he expected to fight Archduke John. Broussier’s division, which formed the left wing of the army, was at Polcenigo, Gargasso, and Santissima. Forming the center was Grenier’s division, which held the town of Sacile and the river crossings there. Barbou’s division was in supporting distance west of the town. The right wing consisted of Serras’ division at Brugnera, supported by Severoli’s Second Italian Division. The entire front from Polcenigo to Brugnera ran approximately ten miles; the spaces between the center and the wings were covered by light cavalry units from Sahuc’s division.' Seven miles due east of Sacile, Eugene posted an advance guard under Sahuc at Pordenone. Sahuc had the 6th Hussars, 8th Chasseurs-à-cheval, three battalions of the 35th Infantry, and four guns.^ Sahuc was to scout towards Valvasone, watch for the enemy, and slow the Austrians to give Eugene more time to complete the concentration of his army.3 General of Brigade Joseph Baron Pages, with four battalions of the 1st Infantry and units of the 25th Chasseurs-à-cheval, was stationed at Fontana-Fredda, midway between Sacile and Pordenone, in order to support Sahuc."* Eugene expected the bulk of his army to be at Sacile by April 16.^ It was reasonable expectation, since the rest of the army was marching there. On April 14, Grouchy’s dragoons were at Verona, Pully’s were between Padua and Mestre, half the Royal Guard was at Padua, the rest was at Bresica, and Lamarque’s division was at Vicenza.^ Lamarque, Pully, and the Guard were all sixty-five to seventy miles from Sacile. They would have to march thirty to thirty-five miles a day to reach Sacile by April 16. Traveling such a distance in so short a time was not unheard of, Davout’s III Corps, for example, had done so to reach Austerlitz. Besides, since Pully’s division was mounted, it should have had an easier time than the infantry; so Eugene should not be faulted for expecting the arrival of at least one more infantry and one more cavalry division. Eugene was so sure that he would have at least eight divisions at Sacile by the 16th that he sent a very confident letter to Napoleon on April 14. He told Napoleon that Lamarque’s division had already arrived, though it had not, and that the dragoons would be there the next day.’ This flagrant misrepresentation concerning the location of Lamarque’s division would later damage Eugene’s credibility with Napoleon. In the same letter, Eugene divulged his plans. “Tomorrow [on the 15th],” he said, “will be an affair of the advance guard [at Pordenone].”®Sahuc was to locate the enemy and delay his advance, gaining more time for the dragoons to arrive.^ “The enemy will visibly approach us [on the 16th] and will take measures to attack us; at that very moment I will prevent it.”'° Eugene went on to explain that his reasons for attacking John immediately were caused by events in the Tyrol." He had just learned that Chasteler was at Prunecken with 20,000 troops,'^ another exaggerated estimate, and so it was imperative to destroy John in order to safely reinforce Baraguey d’Hilliers.'^ Unfortunately, Eugene’s confident plan for beating John began to fall apart the next day. It had been raining heavily during the night of April 14. That rain, which would

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DEFEAT AT SACILE delay the arrival of both Pully and Lamarque, also interfered with French reconnais­ sance. Sahuc’s cavalry, which was supposed to keep a sharp watch for John’s army, became lethargic. French patrols scouted only as far as the village of Cordenons.*'* The Austrian reconnaissance was far more successful. Archduke John had sent out four cavalry regiments from Valvasone to reconnoiter towards Pordenone. They were followed by the rest of the Austrian army. The Austrian cavalry regiments reached the headwaters of the Zelline east of Cordenons at 3:00 a.m. There they halted and sent a squadron of hussars to move west of Cordenons. Although the hussars did not sight any Frenchmen, they learned from the local inhabitants of the location and strength of the garrison at Pordenone. The hussars returned to their regiment by 6:00 a.m., and the news was sent back to Archduke John.*^ Responding quickly, John decided to attack the French in Pordenone. Coordinating the attack was Frimont. Two assault forces were organized. Generalmajor Wetzel with two battalions, four squardrons, and a battery of horse artillery would attack due west from Casarsa, while Generalmajor Schmidt with two battalions and two squadrons would sweep in from the north. Together they were to destroy the French between them in Pordenone. Supporting this operation were the dragoon regiments of Hohenlohe and Savoy, and the hussar regiments of Joseph and Frimont. These four regiments were held in reserve behind Wetzel’s column.*^ The Austrian attack was well-timed and executed. Wetzel’s column was sighted first, and to meet it Sahuc sortied from Pordenone with his entire force. The three battalions of the 35th Regiment formed up east of the town, while the two cavalry regiments took post to their left. Sahuc’s 6th Hussars promptly charged Wetzel’s column, throwing the Austrians into disorder, but the reserve Austrian cavalry regiments counter-charged, throwing back the 6th Hussars. At that moment Schmidt’s column slammed into Sahuc’s left, routing all of the French cavalry. Eventually Sahuc managed to rally his troopers, but it was too late to save the 35th Infantry. The two Austrian hussar regiments had cut the road behind the French infantry while the rest of the Austrians closed in from all sides. Completely surrounded, the 35th Regiment surrendered. Sahuc fell bak on Fontana-Fredda, and was in no mood to try to recapture Pordenone. Sahuc had done poorly. Firstly, he failed to mount an adequate reconnaissance, enabling the Austrians to locate his forces and outflank them. Second, he should have remained within the town, where his troops could be better protected, rather than emerge into the open. In all, the combat at Pordenone cost the French 2,100 casualties, including half the 6th Hussars, and the entire 35th Infantry.'^ It was not an auspicious beginning for the French. After the capture of Pordenone, John sent Frimont with six battalions and two squadrons to occupy the villages of Porcia, Talponedo, and Palse, which were west of Pordenone. From those villages Frimont could observe the French at Fontana-Fredda and could cover the western approaches to Pordenone. Meanwhile, John massed the rest of his army around Pordenone. Expecting further trouble, John deployed the VIII Corps in two lines between Pordenone and Maruzzi. The first line consisted of the eleven battalions of the brigades of Colloredo and Gajoli. The second line consisted of Spleny’s and Fulda’s light cavalry brigades, totalling eighteen squadrons. Behind the VIII Corps north of the PordenoneValvasone road, the IX Corps was deployed in three lines. The first was formed by Kalnassy’s and Marziany’s brigades, totalling eight battalions. Kleinmayer’s brigade of six battalions formed his second line. Hager’s brigade of dragoons, consisting of twelve

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DEFEAT AT SACILE squadrons, formed the third line. Volkmann, with three battalions and four squadrons, occupied Rovoredo, and the two hamlets of Pieve-d’Avaiano, and Vogonovo on John’s far right, while on the extreme left Gyurkowich held La Motta with two battalions and two squadrons.’* In all, John had over 40,000 troops between La Motta and Pieve d’Aviano, a total that included 4,000 to 5,000 cavalry. Now that the enemy was approaching Sacile, Eugene, on the afternoon of April 15, studied the terrain on which he would fight the next day. The main Sacile-Pordenone road ran east-west and served to divide the field into two sections. South of the road, especially between the French outpost at Fontana-Fredda and Pordenone, the ground was broken by streams and ridges. It was in this sector that the Austrian-held villages of Tolponedo, Porcia, and Palse were located. North of the main road the terrain was more open, favoring the deployment of large masses of cavalry. In this sector, running in a line from the northwest to the southeast, were the villages of Ranxan, Roman, Vigonovo, Villadoti and Ronche. Eugene expected that the Austrians would mount a major offensive north of the main road, where they had massed most of their forces, and where they could use their superior cavalry with advantage. Although Eugene was still waiting for the arrival of Lamarque and Pully, he decided to attack at once with the 34,000 infantry and 1,950 cavalry he had at hand, for Lamarque and Pully were expected by the afternoon.'^ Imitating Frederick the Great, Eugene chose the oblique order to attack the Austrians. Eugene’s army would be divided into two wings. An attack wing of three infantry divisions would advance on the right, south of the main road, while a defending left wing of two infantry divisions would deploy north of the main road to cover the flank of the attack wing. Sahuc’s cavalry would act as a reserve. Eugene wanted to attack south of the main road because the broken nature of the ground would serve to neutralize the superior Austrian cavalry, and the area was held by numerically inferior Austrian troops. The target of Eugene’s attack wing was to be Porcia. Eugene believed that if Porcia could be quickly taken, the French could threaten the flank of any Austrian advance towards Sacile north of the main road. Once Lamarque and Pully arrived, Eugene would have a numerical party with the Austrians. Lamarque and Pully would then reinforce Eugene’s weaker left wing and frontally pin the Austrians while Eugene would use Porcia as a jump-off point to turn the Austrian flank. Eugene’s plan, however, was poorly thought out. First, although the broken nature of the ground south of the main road would neutralize the Austrian cavalry, it would also favor the defending Austrians, providing them with natural protection. To be successful against a numerically superior force, the offensive wing of the oblique attack must move rapidly before the enemy can reinforce the threatened wing. In this case, the broken terrain around Porcia would slow the pace of the French assault. Second, although Eugene did not realize it, an attack on Porcia would force him to stretch his entire line, for as his attack right wing advanced, the passive left wing would have to keep pace with the right, or Eugene’s army would break into two halves. Thus the left wing would have to move out into the open plain where it could be successfully attacked by the Austrian cavalry. Third, Eugene violated the cardinal Napoleonic principle of concentrating all of one’s troops beford the battle. Eugene was counting on the arrival of reinforcements to redress his numerical inferiority. But these reinforcements never arrived. If trouble arose, Eugene would have only Sahuc’s worn-out division in reserve, and it was too weak

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DEFEAT AT SACILE to be effective. Fourth, and perhaps worst of all, Eugene underestimated the valor and quality of the Austrian troops and discounted any movements that John might make. Although the plan was faulty, Eugene believed in the superiority of his troops. The French had made a career out of beating the Austrians. The victorious traditions of Lodi, Arcole, Marengo, and Austerlitz were tenets of faith in the French army. Although it was risky to attack the Austrains without waiting for the arrival of at least Lamarque and Pully, Eugene was willing to take the risk because he believed, just as Napoleon would believe at Aspern-Essling, that one could disregard with impunity any threat posed by the Austrian army. Thus, Eugene expected the Austrians to calmly stay put while he drove Frimont out of False, Talponedo, and Porcia. He failed to realize that Frimont could be easily reinforced in order to tie down the units of the French right, while John threw the rest of his army against the weak French left. Had the other French divisions arrived, Eugene’s plan might have succeeded, but by recklessly attacking without them, he was courting disaster. Why did Eugene feel so compelled to attack that he would not wait for the arrival of the whole of his army? General of Brigade Frederic-François, Baron Guillame de Vaudoncourt, Eugene’s staff officer, biographer and friend, claimed that Eugene had no choice but to attack, because the heavy rain has rendered all the secondary roads impassable, leaving just the one main road available for a retrograde movement. Vaudoncourt stated that if Eugene had attempted to withdraw on the 16th John could have attacked and routed the army while it was withdrawing on the one good road.^'’This argument is fallacious, since Eugene managed to extricate his army on the afternoon of the 16th from a desperate battle and fall back behind the Livenza along two separate roads. As it was, over half of Eugene’s army was still behind the river after midnight on the 16th and that would have facilitated a withdrawal of the rest of the army. If what Vaudoncourt said about the rain and its effect on the roads is true, then Eugene should have realized that either Lamarque and Pully would be delayed by the weather, or the weather would prevent a successful assault by John across the Livenza on the 16th. Eugene’s correspondence says nothing about the condition of the roads, but keeps stressing the necessity of attacking and finishing with John to deal with the threat posed by C^asteler. Whatever the case, Eugene should have waited another twenty-four hours for the rest of the troops. Eugene could afford a further delay; but he refused to wait. Abandoning all of Napoleon’s instructions on conducting a defense along the Piave or the Adige, Eugene chose to court battle in an exposed position with his army not yet united. On April 16 Eugene’s army moved out at dawn, crossed the Livenza and deployed to attack. Serras was in overall command of the right wing; he had his own division, plus Severoli’s, the 6th Chasseurs and the Italian Chasseurs-h-cheval. The attack wing advanced from Brugnera, forming a battle line at Tamais which faced northeast towards Palse and Porcia. Grenier and Barbou formed the center and advanced from Sacile. Barbou’s division deployed at Fontana-Fredda in a position to support the right, while Grenier moved north of the main road, covering the ground between Fontana-Fredda and Vigonovo. Broussier, after leaving a few battalions at Castel d’Aviano, closed up on Grenier’s left. Broussier deployed his division in three lines behind the villages of Ranxan and Roman. Broussier was supported by the 25th Chasseurs. Sahuc, with but five squadrons, was in the rear at Saint Giovanni del Tempio midway between Sacile and Fontana-Fredda. Wishing to be at the decisive point, Eugene himself accompanied the right wing.2*

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DEFEAT AT SACILE The attack began at 8:00 a.m. Serras’ division, formed in attack columns, advanced at False with Severoli’s division echeloned back on its left. Serras’ 106th infantry was kept in reserve. Frimont saw the French columns advancing from the southwest and organized his forces to meet the coming storm. He divided the bulk of his infantry between Talponedo, Porcia and Rorai Piccolo, while the garrison at Palse remained where it was. Frimont’s cavalry (ten squadrons) and a battery of horse artillery were all placed on the main road to act as a reserve. Serras’ division reached Palse by 9:00 a.m. Serras sent in the 53rd Infantry of Garreau’s brigade to seize the village. The Austrian battalion in Palse put up a sharp fight before being driven back towards Porcia. General of Brigade Louis, the baron Garreau, was wounded while capturing the hamlet, the first of many casualties to be suffered by French general officers that day.^^ Archduke John was at breakfast when the noise of the firing at Palse was heard. He ordered his àrmy to assume the position it had held the previous day and waited on events. Word soon came from Frimont advising John of what was happening. The Archduke promptly decided that Eugene’s attack on Frimont was merely a feint. John was not sure of the strength of the French army and believed that the bulk of their cavalry had arrived. So John ordered Frimont to hold on to Porcia and sent part of the VIII Corps to support him. This would keep the French occupied at Porcia while the rest of the Austrian army would remain in reserve until Eugene showed his hand.^^ After clearing Palse, Serras and Severoli deployed to attack Porcia. Serras would advance from the south, while Severoli advanced from the southwest. The axis of their advance was divided by a creek. Observing the French advance, Frimont realized that the creek channeled the French atttack into the two sectors, making lateral communication between the two divisions difficult. Therefore, with reinforcements from the VIII Corps arriving, Frimont decided that these troops would hold his left against Serras while he threw the bulk of his command against Severoli. Frimont’s counterattack succeeded. As Severoli advanced on Porcia he was hit frontally by a spirited Austrian bayonet charge, at the same time some Austrian cavalry managed to work around his left flank. The Italians held for a time, but were soon sent packing to the rear, taking Garreau’s brigade with them. Serras was forced to throw in his reserve, the 106th Infantry, to contain Frimont’s forces, while he attempted to rally the rest of his attack wing. With the first assault on Porcia having failed, Eugene ordered up reinforcements to try again. Barbou’s fresh division had been advancing eastwards, south of the main road. Its advance was delayed by the broken nature of the ground. Barbou was originally to support Serras by striking due east towards Talponedo and on to Porcia. This operation was to continue, but Eugene ordered General of Brigade Jean-Joseph-Augustin Sorbier, his aide-de-camp, to detach three battalions from this division for direct reinforcement of Serras, who was to make another attempt against Porcia from the south. Frimont’s counterattack had carried his forces beyond the protection of the village, and his trops were tired and disorganized from fighting Severoli. The three fresh battalions from Barbou’s division provided a nucleus on which Sarras could rally his forces. Once reorganized, the French returned to the attack. Now facing superior numbers, Frimont’s troops were hurled back behind Porcia. The French had finally taken the village.^'^

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DEFEAT AT SACILE However, fresh Austrian forces were at hand. Albert Giulay had arrived with two brigades of his VIII Corps. Colloredo’s brigade of six battalions deployed on Frimont’s left, while Spleny’s cavalry brigade took post at Rorai-Piccolo to act as a reserve. Once in place the Austrians returned to the attack. A battle of attrition developed around the villages of Talponedo and Porcia, in which the divisons of Barbou, Severoli, and Serras were all heavily engaged. During this fighting, Porcia changed hands several times. Realizing more troops were needed, Eugene detached the 1st Infantry Regiment (the old Picardy regiment) from Grenier’s division under General of Brigade Franc ois-Antoine, the Baron Teste, and set it into the fighting around Porcia. The village was stormed and taken, but Teste was wounded in securing it. Even though Porcia was taken, the Austrians were still putting up a bold front. With Porcia in French hands, Grenier had to advance east of Fontanna-Fredda along the main road towards Ronche to keep contact with Barbou’s left. This forward movement of Grenier’s division affected Broussier. He was forced to move southeast­ ward, emerging into the open plain between Vigonovo and Fontana-Fredda in order to maintain contact with Grenier’s left. Such a movement by Eugene’s left wing was necessary to cover the attacking right wing, and was in accordance with the oblique plan of attack. But the advance into the open by the left wing revealed to the Austrians the entire French battle order and the inherent weakness of its position. Throughout the morning, John had been under the impression that Eugene’s attack south of the main road was a feint designed to draw out the bulk of his forces while Eugene massed his troops behind Vigonovo, ready to sweep around the Austrian right as soon as the Austrians were engaged at Porcia. In anticipation of such a plan, John had held all of the IX Corps and part of the VIII deployed north of Pordenone, while Colloredo and Spleny had been fed into the battle around Porcia to help Frimont and keep the French right tied down.^^ But when Broussier emerged into the open, John began to realize that there were no hidden French reserves and that he was fighting a numerically inferior army, particularly weak in cavalry. Broussier’s division was sitting in an open plain, inviting a counterstrike. John then formed a new battle plan. Frimont and Albert Giulay would pin the French right while the rest of the VIII Corps (Gajoli’s and Volkmann’s brigades) was to engage Grenier. The entire IX Corps, except for Kleinmayer’s infantry brigade, which was to remain in reserve, was to march on Vigonovo, smash into Broussier’s flank, and roll up Eugene’s army from left to right. These orders took several hours to be transmitted but finally at 3:30 p.m. John’s army was set in motion. While the IX Corps began its wide sweep, first northwest to Rovoredo, then southwest to Vigonovo, the Austrians moved to pin Eugene’s center. Gajoli, later joined by Volkmann, who had marched south from Rovoredo, was soon in action at Ronche against Grenier. The attack against Grenier caused a halt to the French offensive south of the main road. Since Grenier was under heavy pressure, Eugene had to send reinforcements to him. This diminution of Eugene’s attack wing forced him to suspend all assaults east of Porcia. The French would not only have to go on the defensive in this sector, but Porcia would have to be abandoned to keep the right wing from becoming separated from the center which was falling back. The right wing would withdraw to a line running from Ronche to Palse.^’ Frimont’s forces had been fighting all day against superior numbers and were exhausted. They were in no condition to press the French vigorously and so, Eugene’s 58

DEFEAT AT SACILE withdrawal to the new line was conducted without great difficulty. However, the three divisions of Eugene’s right had taken a battering and were in no shape to march north to engage fresh troops. The only reserve left to Eugene was Sahuc’s cavalry, which was released to Broussier as the threat posed by the IX Corps materialized. To this point, the Austrians had failed to make any major tactical mistakes, but now they did so with respect to their speed of movement and method of deployment. The march of the IX Corps was characterized by the slow, plodding pace that typified Austrian maneuvers at Eckmühl and later at Wagram. Delays in the march were caused perhaps either by indolence on the part of the Austrian officers, or by the feeling that they might be falling into a trap. Furthermore, the pace of the IX Corps was slowed by the Austrian tactical drill, which still tended to emphasize linear rather than columnar tactics. Hence, the Austrians could not march as fast as the French. As a result, the IX Corps was not in position to attack until 5:00 p.m.,^*^ and this slowness of the IX Corps gave the French time to prepare for the attack. Furthermore, the deployment of IX Corps was peculiar. After passing Rovoredo, Ignatius Giulay deployed his battle line facing Vigonovo. The corps’ three infantry brigades deployed into line, while Hager’s dragoon brigade of twelve squadrons took post on the corps’ inner flank, linking Marziany’s infantry brigade with Volkmann’s. The placement of Hager’s cavalry was a major error. From where Hager was posted, his advance would bring him up against the front of Broussier’s divison. It would have been better if the Austrian cavalry had been placed on the outer flank of the IX Corps. From there, it could have swung around the French left, at Ranxan, which was lightly held, and swept into the French rear, cutting the road to Sacile, while the IX Corps infantry frontally pinned Broussier. Without any effective reserves the French would have been cut to pieces. But since Hager was forced to charge Broussier’s front, while the Austrian infantry slowly advanced around the flank, the French left was never effectively turned. The main road to Sacile remained open, and the French were able to escape to fight another day. Slow movement, and Ignatius Giulay’s poor use of his cavalry, prevented the Austrians from destroying Eugene’s army. When Ignatius Giulay’s attack finally got under way, Eugene realized that the battle was lost. There was no sign of either Lamarque’s infantry or the dragoons. After sending off Sahuc’s squadrons to support Broussier no reserves remained. Eugene knew that Broussier and Sahuc could not stem the advance of the IX Corps; they would be overwhelmed if they stayed where they were. Retreat was the only alternative. Orders went out for the French army to disengage and wihdraw. The three divisions of the right wing were to retire southwest toward Brugnera, where they would cross the river. The divisions on the left were to fall back due east along the main road, crossing the Livenza at Sacile. The disengagement of the right wing was, initially at least, carried out in good order. The infantry divisions were formed in two lines. This was the usual tactical deployment for retreat, in which the first line could retire through gaps in the second, while the second fired volleys to keep the enemy at bay. The first line would then take up position behind the second, and the alternating process was repeated. The French 6th Chasseurs, the Italian Chasseurs, and the Napoleon Dragoons provided support by launching a series of charges, allowing additional time for the divisions of the right wing to with draw.^^ The forces of the Austrian left wing, especially Frimont’s division and Colloredo’s brigade, had taken a hard pounding that day and were in no condition to launch a

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DEFEAT AT SACILE vigorous pursuit. So the French right wing managed to retire without being severely pressed. Nevertheless, some disorder occurred during the river crossing at Brugnera. The three divisions crossed one behind the other, first Serras’, then Barbou’s, and finally Severoli’s, which was acting as the rear guard. Serras crossed without difficulty, but Barbou panicked and ordered the bridge to be destroyed once his division was across. Had this been done, Severoli’s division would have been left isolated on the left bank. Fortunately, Severoli had posted guards from his own division to keep Barbou’s engineers from destroying the bridge until he and the supporting cavalry were safely across.^° Eugene was not present with the divisions of the right wing during their withdrawal. After giving his initial orders for the retreat, Eugene galloped to the threatened left wing, which was the part of his army in the greatest danger. The divisions of Broussier, Grenier, and Sahuc would be facing fresh and more numerous troops and their retreat would be more difficult. With his presence at the most dangerous part of the field, Eugene hoped to use personal courage to salvage the army that his poor generalship had endangered. The French generals handled their troops with coolness and precision. Broussier’s division covered Grenier’s withdrawal. Once Grenier was on the road back to Sacile, Broussier formed his infantry into squares, falling back step by step, with each square supporting its neighbor. As the great mass of Hager’s cavalry surged forward, Eugene ordered Sahuc’s divison to charge the Austrian cavalry in order to protect Broussier’s infantry. Sahuc was too weak to keep the enemy back, but the infantry held firm. On numerous occasions the Austrians broke through Sahuc’s screen, only to be hurled back by the steady volleys from Broussier’s infantry squares. At 7:00 p.m. the Austrians made one last attempt to break Broussier’s division. The Hohenlohe and Savoy Dragoon Regiments smashed through Sahuc and swept down on Broussier’s infantry. A devastating musket fire broke the Austrian cavalry. After these Austrian regiments were sent reeling, the cavalry attacks on Broussier ceased. Except for some long-range skirmishing from the Austrian infantry, Broussier and Sahuc were able to follow Grenier and cross the Livenza. The last unit to cross was the 92nd Infantry, and among its ranks was the Prince Viceroy himself. The battle of Sacile was over. The French losses were 3,000 killed and wounded, 3,500 captured, and fifteen guns taken: in all, the equivalent of an entire division.^' The battle took a heavy toll among the French general officers; Severoli and Generals of Brigade Garreau, Teste, Pages, and Dutury were all w o u n d e d . ^ ^ Austrian casualties were estimated to be about 4,000.^^ Archduke John had won the first Austrian victory of the war. Although his army was across the Livenza, Eugene’s problems were far from over. Forced to retire along two separate routes, his forces were now separated. Rain had made the roads muddy and almost impassable, and the French units who had crossed the bridge at Sacile became intermingled with the army’s supply wagons and artillery trains. Crammed on the one major road west to Congeliano,^'* the units became mixed up. The confusion along the road, plus the mud, rain, and the psychological impact of defeat all took their toll. The divisions of Grenier and Broussier, who had maintained their cohesion while on the battlefield, now began to break up.^^ Had John launched a vigorous pursuit that night, he could have routed Eugene’s army, but the poor state of the roads and the battering that the Austrian cavalry had received from Broussier’s infantry that afternoon had taken the steam out of any immediate Austrian advance.

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DEFEAT AT SACILE The battle of Sacile marked the nadir of Eugene’s career as military commander. Instead of waiting to unite his army, he foolishly engaged in a premature action in which he failed to defeat Archduke John and exposed his army to destruction. It is interesting in that on the very day that Sacile was fought, Napoleon, in the role of military tutor, sent a letter to Eugene cautioning him to avoid such a mistake, “Unite your trooops, march calmly, and take all precautions before attempting anything.”^^ Good advice, except that it was sent too late! Eugene also erred in choosing Porcia as the focal point of his attack. Porcia was not the tactical key that Eugene imagined it to be. In spite of the fact that the French carried the town, they were never able to advance farther east or effectively threaten the Austrian forces north of the main road. The broken ground south of the main road favored the Austrians rather than the French, plus, the terrain enabled one-third of the Austrian army to engage one half of the French army successfully. Furthermore, the French army was divided into two disjointed wings incapable of supporting each other. Eugene’s underestimation of Austrian capabilities was another major error. He thought only of his own battle plans and did not realistically consider the reaction of the enemy. Even if Lamarque’s and Pully’s divisons had arrived in time, there was still no guarantee that the battle could have been won; for the reinforcements would have been tired from their long march while the Austrians, especially the IX Corps, would have been fresh. Finally, there was no real need to fight at Sacile. As events would prove, Eugene’s fear of Chasteler attacking from the Tyrol was exaggerated, and an engagement at Sacile was in complete violation of Napoleon’s previous instructions, which called for the waging of a defensive campaign along the Adige. Thus, Eugene’s stand at Sacile was a reckless venture, ill planned and unnecessary. For Archduke John, Sacile was the apex of his military career. He had achieved something that no Austrian general had done since 1800, defeat a French army in the field. John had committed a few mistakes, but he took advantage, albeit slowly, of the opportunities offered him. He had his entire army concentrated at Sacile. Using what later became known as “economy of force,” he kept the three French divisions south of the main road engaged by a numerically inferior force, while he held the rest of his army ready in reserve. Although cautious, upon realizing the weakness of Eugene’s position he struck at the right place with his reserve. The only fault that can be attributed to John’s generalship was his failure to exploit the weakness of the French left quickly; cumbersome Austrian Staff work delayed too long in committing the IX Corps. It also might be argued that John should have launched an immediate pursuit into Sacile. However the roads were muddy, and there was always the possibility of falling into a trap on the far side of the Livenza; the cavalry had already been heavily engaged, and a night action could prove dangerous. Of Eugene’s principal subordinate commanders, Broussier, Grenier, Serras, and Severoli did well, especially Broussier, who commanded his division with coolness and efficiency. In contrast, Barbou behaved badly. The handling of his division was marked by “indolence and ill will,”^’ and his conduct at the Brugnera bridge was disgraceful. Among the Austrian subordinates, the honors of the day went to Frimont, who commanded his advance guard division with considerable panache. With inferior forces he conducted an active defense and succeeded in tying down three French divisions. It was his conduct that laid the groundwork for John’s victory. Ignatius Giulay, however, could have done much better. His IX Corps took too long to get into action, and the

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DEFEAT AT SACILE cavalry was poorly positioned, insuring the escape of Eugene’s left wing. Giulay should have handled his corps with more boldness and dispatch. The first major battle of the campaign had been fought. Would John capitalize on his victory, and would Eugene recover from his mistakes? NOTES TO CHAPTER V ^DCC, V, 134-136. 2Vaud., I, 152. 3DCC, V, 135-136. ^Vaud.,1,152. 5DCC, V, 134-136. ^Vaud., I, 153. ’DCC, V, 134-135. Hbid., p. 135. nbid., p. 135. ^^Ibid., p. 135. ^^Ibid., pp. 135-136. ^^Ibid., pp. 135-136. ^^Ibid., p. 135. ^^Ibid., pp. 153-154. ^^Ibid., pp. 154-155. ‘6/6/W., pp. 155-156. ^’’Ibid., p. 157. ^^Ibid., pp. 160-161. ^nbid., p. 161. ^nbid., pp. 158-159. 2'/^>iW.,pp. 164-165. '^Hbid., pp. 165-166. ^^Ibid., pp. 166. ^^Ibid., pp. 166-167. ^^Ibid., pp. 168-169. ^^Ibid., pp. 169-170. ^'^Ibid., pp. 170-171. ^Hbid., p. 171. ^Hbid., pp. 171-172. ^^Ibid., pp. 174-175. ^Ubid., pp. 173-174. ^^bid., pp. 173-174. ^^Ibid., pp. 173-174. ^^Pelet, III, 159. 35Vaud., I, 174. 36DCC, V, 136-137. 3’Vaud., I, 175.

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CHAPTER VI THE TURNING POINT

The defeat at Sacile had been a severe shock to Eugene; the next twenty-four hours would be a time of great depression for him. However, this depression did not last, and Eugene managed to recover his composure. The barometer of his mood is best expressed in a letter to his wife Auguste, on April 18: Yesterday my dear Auguste, I was in despair when I wrote to you because I had witnessed the complete rout of our army. Today I am more tranquil and have recovered my courage; the enemy has not profited from his advantages, while I will gain from his mistakes which will allow me to rally my army.' First and foremost, the scattered units of Eugene’s demoralized army had to be reunited. The missing divisions of Lamarque and Fully had reached Conegliano, ten miles west of Sacile, by the night of April 16. Upon learning of their whereabouts Eugene ordered them forward to the road junction at Godega to cover the withdrawal of the separate wings of the beaten army.^ Once the separate columns from Sacile and Brugnera converged at Godega, the entire army fell back behind the Piave; the withdrawal protected by the two fresh divisions. By the evening of the 17th the entire army was over the Piave, where it was joined by the Royal Guard. The Piave River offered a place of refuge for the army, but Eugene never seriously considered making a defensive stand along its banks, and as early as April 17 he decided to use the Piave merely as a resting place before conducting a withdrawal behind the Adige-Alpone line.^ Why not remain on the Piave? There were several reasons. First, although the Piave line was favored by Napoelon in his first “Note” of May, 1808, as a defensive line, that river did not serve as an effective barrier. The Piave was fordable for most of the year, and Eugene would have little difficulty, several weeks hence, in crossing the Piave against opposition. So, if John decided to press his pursuit, the Austrians could cross the river and attack the French, who were not yet able to repel an attack. Second, Napoleon’s “Note” of January, 1809, clearly gave precedence to the Adige-Alpone line rather than the Piave as the main line of defense. The Adige-Alpone was closer to the fortress cities of the Quadrilateral, “the center of Italy’s defense, from where Eugene’s army could more easily be supplied, and defensive works had been erected along the river. Napoleon’s initial objection to the Adige-Alpone was that it did not cover the approaches to Venice, but this defect had largely been rectified by engineering, making the city well fortified and linking Venice with the defensive zone along the Adige, Third, Eugene knew that his decision to fight at Sacile had violated Napoleon’s strategic principle of concentration prior to battle, and that by fighting east of the Piave he had disobeyed both of Napoleon’s “Notes” of 1808 and 1809. Since Eugene’s difficulties were largely caused by his disregarding of Napoleon’s instructions, he now decided to follow the “Note” of 1809 to the letter, in the hope of regaining Napoleon’s good graces and rectifying his own mistakes.

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THE TURNING POINT Finally, Chasteler’s threat from the Tyrol still influenced Eugene’s thinking. By withdrawing to the Adige-Alpone, Eugene would shorten his strategic left, reducing the fear of envelopment from the Tyrol, and he would be in close proximity to Baraguey d’Hilliers should that general need support. Hence there was no agonizing over which of the river lines Eugene would retire behind. It would be the Adige-Alpone because militarily it was the logical choice; defenses had been specifically prepared along the Adige-Alpone, and the Emperor wanted it so. With the army at least temporarily safe behind the Piave on April 17, Eugene would now perform an unpleasant task. He had to inform the Emperor of his recent defeat. Realizing that he had violated his master’s insructions, Eugene sought both to jusify his decision to fight at Sacile, and to avoid any mention of his poor generalship. Numbering his reasons for fighting, the first was “Because Prince John was pressing us closely.”^ This is patently untrue. On the morning of the 16th the main body of each army was separated by a distance of seven miles and the bulk of Eugene’s army was behind the Livenza. A continued French withdrawl would have been unmolested by the Austrians. Eugene listed two other reasons. “I could not bear the idea of abandoning two departments of the kingdom without a fight, and finally the movement of General Chasteler in the Tyrol [he had reached Brixen on the 13th of this month] made an engagement with the enemy all the more indispensible.”^ Of these reasons, it was these latter two that largely induced Eugene to fight. Wishing to avoid any criticisms of his generalship, Eugene was deliberately vague about the course of the battle. All he wrote was: “The battle began at 9:00 a.m. lasting until 3:00 p.m.; success should have been ours; but by evening the enemy deployed so great a superiority in cavalry and artillery that the day was decidedly fixed in his favor.””^ That was all. What is most significant is what Eugene left out. There was no account of his actual losses, nor did he mention that Lamarque and Pully had never arrived. In his previous dispatch on April 14, Eugene had told Napoleon that Lamarque had reached Sacile. Consequently, when Napoleon received the letter of the 17th, he was under the impression that Eugene had fought with his army concentrated and had been beaten. By attempting to avoid angering his step-father, Eugene through his letter actually succeeded in making things worse for himself. For Napoleon would now believe that Eugene was incapable of beating the Austrians on even terms. Fortunately for Eugene, his position as commander was saved by the comparative slowness of nineteenth century communications. Napoleon did not receive word of Sacile until April 25, and he considered removing Eugene from command on April 30.* But when Napoleon’s chastising reply was received in the first week of May, the situation in the Italian theater had dramatically changed, with Eugene in pursuit of the Austrians. With his initial report made, Eugene returned to the task of organizing the retreat. Since the army was to retire behind the Adige-Alpone line, a garrison had to be provided for Venice. This was perhaps Eugene’s easiest task, for it gave him an opportunity of removing a fractious and unwelcome general, Barbou. Eugene had not been happy with Barbou’s performance at Sacile, and he wanted to insure that Barbou would no longer jeopardize the fate of the army. Eugene would not trust Barbou with an independent command, so Barbou would be relegated to a subordinate position within Venice. Barbou was ordered to take eight battalions of his own division, three battalions of the

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THE TURNING POINT 7th Italian Infantry, and a squadron of the Royal Chasseurs to Venice.^ However, Barbou would not command at Venice. General of Division Marie-François-Auguste, Count Caffarelli du Falga, was already there as acting military governor until Vial, who was earmarked for the post, should arrive from the Tyrol. Such a situation would clearly place Barbou in an inferior role. Later, when Eugene advanced into Austria, Barbou would be left behind at Venice without any hope of winning glory or honors in the fields. Eugene’s army remained along the Piave until April 20 to allow time for Barbou’s forces to reach Venice. Then an orderly withdrawal to the Adige began. The retreat was to be made in two stages. The army would first fall back behind the Brenta, pausing there for a time, before continuing to the Adige. The army would march in two columns, one by way of Padua, the other towards Vicenza, where Viceregal headquarters would be established. The entire withdrawal would be covered by Sahuc’s and Pully’s cavalry, who would maneuver boldly to cause John to believe that Eugene would dispute the Piave line with him.*° Eugene’s plans worked. Caution had produced a victory for John, and John would not alter his cautious modus operandi. The aggressive movements of the French cavalry convinced John that the French would fight along the Piave, and John would not move until all his forces were assembled, his artillery was in place, and his bridging equipment was brought forward. John’s delay in attempting a river crossing coupled with the continuously rainy weather enabled Eugene to withdraw unmolested from the Piave and to widen the gap between his own army and John’s. His gap between the opposing forces would provide Eugene with an additional two or three days of peace to rest, reorganize, and regain morale.** Eugene’s army was safely behind the Brenta by April 21, and remained there until April 24. The divisions of Eugene’s army deployed in a cordon between the Venetian lagoons and Bassano.'^ John’s failure to provide any pressure during the withdrawal acted as a tonic to revive the spirits of Eugene and his men. So did the knowledge that three more divisions would soon arrive to swell the ranks of the Army of Italy. His confidence returning, Eugene wrote to Napoleon on April 22: “We have forgotten our unhappiness and are ready to return to the offensive, each of us having the greatest desire to repair the latest check.” Eugene’s ongoing fears about Chasteler in the Tyrol had perhaps been partly due to the fact that Eugene was far from the Tyrol and thus could not deal with the situation directly. As he moved close to the Adige, however, Eugene also came closer to the Tyrol, where he would confront the danger. Fear of the unknown is always more terrifying than fear of the familiar and Eugene’s fears over the Tyrol noticeably diminished during the next several days. Eugene’s returning confidence came from another source as well, his inner self. Sacile had been a learning experience for him. His decision to fight there was based in part on the influence of his subordinate commanders. Eugene had heeded the complaints of his subordinates about retreating without a fight and believed the exaggerted reports of Chasteler’s strength. It was those external pressures that had influenced him to take a dangerous course. Now Eugene had learned not to give in too readily to the advice of his subordinates. In the future Eugene would not be so willing to be influenced by the desires of his generals. He would manage to study a situation with more detachment and more coolness and would strive to be the master of events rather than their victim. In the future it would be Eugene who would impose his will on his generals and would become a model of imperturbability. In short, Sacile had taught Eugene how to command. Eugene’s

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THE TURNING POINT increasing assertiveness is exemplified by the orders he issued to his subordinate commanders, especially to Baraguey d’Hilliers, over the next several days of April 21-28. Baraguey d’Hilliers had arrived in Trent on the 14th amidst great confusion, Trent was being held by the French column that had peviously been ambushed south of Brixen by the Tyrolean partisans. These French troops had been organized into ad hoc units and were no doubt quite skittish. Their anxiety about their fate may have infected Baraguey d’Hilliers. Reinforcements consisting of Fontanelli’s Second Italian Division, the 112th Infantry, and the 7th Dragoons arrived on the 16th, giving Baraguey a corps of 10,300 infantry and 1,100 cavalry.*'* They arrived just in time, for on the following day Baraguey was heavily attacked by the partisans. Although the partisans were beaten off, the horror stories of the fate of the other French and Bavarian forces in the Tyrol had an effect on Baraguey d’Hilliers. He panicked, and in his panic he magnified the strength of the opposing forces. Baraguey estimated the opposing forces to total 20,000 troops and immediately reported this guess to Eugene.'^ Baraguey’s exaggerated estimate affected Eugene, who received this report on April 19. Baraguey’s letter confirmed Eugene’s own fears about Chasteler’s descending from the Tyrol and marching into the French rear, and it reinforced Eugene’s desire to withdraw to the Adige-Alpone. April 19 was a bad day for Baraguey d’Hilliers. On that day he learned that Eugene had been defeated at Sacile and that regular Austrian units of Chasteler’s division were advancing on Trent. The nervous Baraguey believed that he was about to be surrounded and overwhelmed, and promptly decided to bolt for Verona with his entire corps.*^ It was during this time that Eugene managed to shake off the malaise of Sacile, and it was Eugene who calmed the shaken Baraguey and halted his retreat to Verona. With Baraguey halted, the French army was in place along the Brenta on April 21; Grenier’s division was at Bassano, and there was also a French outpost at Feltre, east of the Brenta. From both Bassano and Feltre, reconnaissance patrols were sent into the Tyrol and reports were passed back to Eugene.*’ The initial reports from Bassano and Feltra sharply contrasted with what Baraguey was reporting. The information coming from Grenier’s headquarters at Bassano estimated that Baraguey was facing at most 5-6,000 regular troops and that Chasteler’s main body was either at Brixen or Innsbruck.'* Admittedly, Trent might be untenable, but under no circumstances would Eugene countenance a withdrawal all the way to Verona, at least not without a fight. Baraguey was ordered to conduct a fighting withdrawal down the Adige to the Rivoli-Chiusa line where a stand would be made.'^ The Rivoli-Chiusa area, which incorporated Monte Baldo, formed an excellent place to halt an enemy thrust down the Adige. Rivoli was centrally located at the mouth of several different mountain passes, and it controlled the road running down the Adige. By tactically relying on interior lines, any French force based at Rivoli could concentrate against an enemy force emerging from the mountain passes or down the Adige valley. And any enemy force moving against Rivoli could be faced with the daunting prospect of attacking the French who would be entrenched along the ridges and hills which surround Rivoli. Napoleon himself realized the strong defensive nature of the Rivoli position, and by relying on its central position he used the tactics of interior lines to concentrate against the diverse units of Alvintzy’s army in 1797. Napoleon in his “Note” of January 1809 favored the Rivoli position to block any Austrian advance down the Adige to Verona.2® 66

THE TURNING POINT Chiusa, located on the left bank of the Adige, opposite Rivoli, offered another fine defensive position. The vilfege guarded the mouth of a narrow pass through which ran the road along the left bank. This pass could be held by a small detachment, which would be reinfoced from the other bank by way of a pontoon bridge. So, Eugene was well aware of the defensive benefits of the Rivoli-Chiusa position and was not going to allow Baraguey d’Hilliers to give it up. In three days Eugene would have two divisions at Verona ready to move north to support Baraguey.-' If Napoleon in 1797 had been able to hold Rivoli with 19,000 troops against 28,000 regular Austrian troops, Baraguey could certainly hold there with two divisions and two more in support against the far less formidable enemy force that was currently operating in the Tyrol. Nevertheless, Baraguey’s panic continued to increase, and on April 22 he sent another letter to Eugene telling him of strong enemy forces that turned both his left and right flanks. The latter force, he said, was moving down the Brenta towards Bassano.^^ Eugene, however, now had a cavalry unit at Bassano, and the patrols stationed north of that town, up the Brenta, found no evidence at all of any enemy forces. The sharply contrasting reports received from Baraguey and Grenier convinced Eugene that Chasteler’s division and the Tyrolean partisans did not constitute the threat that Eugene had previously imagined. Fear of the danger from the Tyrol had first caused Eugene to face John at Sacile. Now the Viceroy believed that he could turn all of his attention against John, secure from the menace of Chasteler. Eugene realized that as his own army approached the Adige, his battle power would increase because more troops from the interior would join his army. John’s battle power, on the other hand, would decrease as he closed up on the Adige-Alpone, because John would have to leave some forces in the rear to guard his lines of communication, as well as to blockade the fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova. Furthermore, John would have to detach a corps of observation to cover Venice and his strategic left flank while the main body of his army faced Eugene along the Adige-Alpone. So as the battle front moved to the Adige, the French would achieve numerical parity if not numerical superiority over the Austrians. Anticipating such a shift in the strategic balance, Eugene believed he could entrap and destroy the Austrians along the Adige-Alpone.^'^ Eugene planned to take up position behind the Adige-Alpone and in its fortified strong points and wait for the Austrians to advance against him. Once the Austrians had closed up along the Adige-Alpone, Eugene, following Napoleon’s instructions, would use the Adige line as a screen to mass his army, then hurl his army across the river over one of the fortified bridgeheads, bringing superior numbers to bear against a portion of the Austrian army. The role of the garrison in Venice was vital to this plan. Eugene wanted the Venetian garrison to force John to detach a large corps against Venice, thereby weakening the Austrian forces along the Adige-Alpone. If, on the other hand, John chose not to send a strong corps to watch Venice, and kept a larger force before the Adige-Alpone, then the Venetian garrison would attack and roll up to the Austrian left and rear while Eugene would frontally pin the main Austrian forces along the Adige-Alpone. In either case, John would be forced to fight on two fronts against converging French attacks, one eastward from across the Adige-Alpone, the other northward from Venice. Eugene outlined this plan to Caffarelli, the commander of the Venetian garrison, on April 20.^^ Caffarelli was ordered to be ready to mount an attack with 8,000 men, from Venice once Eugene’s army was ready along the Adige-Alpone. In the meantime,

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THE TURNING POINT Caffarelli was to maintain an active defense by launching sorties against the Austrians.-^ For the plan to work, Eugene’s strategic left had to be secure, which meant that Baraguey would have to hold the enemy in the Tyrolean passes. Eugene was rapidly losing patience with Baraguey’s continuous fears about Chasteler’s division and the partisans. Baraguey’s resolve had to be stiffened, and Eugene would have to do it. On April 23 Eugene sent a stern letter to Baraguey telling him that he was facing a “peasant army, not regular troops”^^ and that Even you must admit that the enemy has never vigorously attacked you and that you haven’t been disturbed even at the moment of retreating. For the moment I need to gain time, and will be ready to return to the offensive in a few days. My intention is for you to hold the position at Cagliano. [A more advanced location than Baraguey had wanted.] You can plan to have a second line of defense at Roverdo, scorning all of the little detachments of insurgents ... In case you are forced from your position by superior enemy forces, you will retreat down both banks of the river, disputing the ground step by step, using every inch of cover that the terrain offers, until you reach Incanale [in the Rivoli-Chiusa sector]. There you will employ all possible measures of defense.^^ Although Eugene did not completely rule out a retreat to Verona, he clearly wanted Baraguey to conduct a fighting retreat, which would delay any enemy advance down the Adige, and keep the enemy north of Rivoli. Such an operation would give Eugene time to deal with Archduke John.^^ Eugene’s letter had some effect on the comomander of his Tyrolean front. Baraguey did slow the pace of his retreat — but he did not stop it. Baraguey made a stand at Roveredo from April 24-25. Although beating off the attacks of partisans and some regular Austrian troops, Baraguey, still fearing for his flanks, ordered a withdrawal to the Rivoli-Chiusa position.After defeating another enemy attack around Ala on April 26, Baraguey reached the Rivoli-Chiusa sector on April 27. Evidently Baraguey gave the broadest interpretation to Eugene’s orders, and withdrew far more rapidly than was necessary. The road from Roveredo to Rivoli is about thirty miles in length, and the mountainous terrain through which the road ran offered Baraguey many opportunities to “dispute the ground step by step,” something Baraguey failed to do. Baraguey did not seem to be heavily outnumbered, and he managed to drive off the attacks of the Austrians and more numerous partisans. However, once the limit allowed by Eugene was reached at Rivoli and Chiusa, Eugene’s orders were strictly followed. The best that can be said about Eugene’s order of April 23 is that it slowed the pace of Baraguey’s retreat and limited the withdrawal to the Rivoli-Chiusa line. Eugene had clearly regained his nerve, and he refused to be stampeded by a nervous subordinate. The period of French retreat was about to end. The final stage of Eugene’s retrograde movement to the Adige-Alpone began on April 24. The withdrawal was orderly, and except for a skirmish between Eugene’s rear guard and Frimont on April 27, it was without interference. By midnight of April 27 Eugene’s entire army was in position along the Adige-Alpone line.^'. For the first time since the outbreak of war, the Army of Italy was concentrated and ready to be used where Eugene directed. In addition to the units already mentioned, the French army was newly joined by Grouchy’s dragoon divison and a newly formed infantry division under Pierre-François-Joseph Durutte. The latter was made up of three infantry regiments which had been stationed in Tuscany, and would soon be joined 68

General Baraguey d’Hilliers

Battle of Caldiero, 30 April 1809, by Albrecht Adam

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THE TURNING POINT by a fourth, the 112th from Vial’s provisional division.^^ If one includes the Venetian garrison and Baraguey’s forces, Eugene now had a total of 55,500 troops at his disposal. The strategic situation was turning in Eugene’s favor. Eugene’s position was a strong one. The defenses along the Adige were by now completed. The bulk of his army was massed at Caldiero in the fork between the Adige and Alpone rivers. It was close to Verona, a major base of operations. There were fortified bridgeheads at Villanuova and Arcole. Napoleon had occupied the same position in 1796 and used Verona and Arcole as a “place of maneuver” to strike at the flank and rear of an Austrian army. Napoleon had wanted Eugene to hold that position in the January “Note” of 1809.^^* Arcole was duly fortified to serve as a base of attack against any Austrian attempt towards Verona. Eugene was well aware of the strength of his position and that John’s advance was running out of steam. As Eugene expected, John’s army was rapidly losing its battle power due to “strategic consumption.” With every mile that John advanced into Italy he had to detach troops to guard his lines of communication. His army also suffered losses due to the usual wastage from combat, disease, and desertion. John lost 4,000 at Sacile and detached 10,000 to observe Venice after testing that city’s defenses at Malghera.^^ So he had at most 28,000 left to oppose Eugene at Caldiero, while Eugene, even without his troops in the Tyrol and Venice, had 35-37,000. John no longer had the strength to force the Adige-Alpone: the initiative had now passed to Eugene. The time was fast approaching for Eugene to put his offensive plan of entraping John’s army into effect. But to enable his army to move quickly and efficiently, it had to be organized into army corps. Such an organization had been planned before the outbreak of war, but was delayed until Napoleon appointed the corps commanders, one of whoni was occupied in the Tyrol while the other, Macdonald, did not arrive until late April. Besides, it was one thing to give orders directly to six divisional commanders, as Eugene had done at Sacile, but it was more difficult to handle the eleven divisions he had around Caldiero. Direct command of each division by Eugene could be unwieldy. A corps system was needed. Lieutenant General Macdonald arrived sometime between April 23 and April 28. Macdonald’s memoirs indicate that he reached Viceregal headquarters while it was still at Vicenza,^^ which meant April 23. However, in his memoirs, Macdonald wrote himself into the role of savior of the Army of Italy and conveniently avoided mentioning specific dates. Macdonald took credit for reviving Eugene’s spirit at Vicenza and claimed that it was his own idea to retire towards the Adige.^* Macdonald’s claims are false, since Eugene’s correspondence proves that a withdraw­ al to the Adige was determined on April 17, well before Macdonald’s arrival. If Macdonald’s appearance was so important, Eugene might well have reported it to Napoleon; however he did not, and Macdonald’s name is not even mentioned in Eugene’s letters until the end of April. Du Casse in his biographical section places Macdonald’s arrival on April 28, when Eugene’s headquarters was already at Caldiero.^^ In any event, once all of Eugene’s lieutenant generals had joined the army, the organization of the army corps could proceed. The army would consist, at least initially, of three line corps commanded respectively by Baraguey d’Hilliers, Macdonald, and Grenier, plus there would be a reserve corps under Eugene’s personal command. Together the four corps would form a Napoleonic battalion carre capable of moving in any direction.

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THE TURNING POINT Baraguey’s corps was already operational in the Tyrol and contained two infantry divisions, Fonanelli’s and the Provisional Division. The latter had been commanded by Vial, but he left for Venice on April 24, and was soon succeeded by General of Division Jean-Baptise-Dominique Rusca, an “old Italian hand,” who had campaigned in Italy with Napoleon in 1797. Rusca’s division was to undergo a considerable transformation. The 112th Infantry, a major component of that division, was destined to reinforce Durutte. So Rusca’s division in turn would be reinforced with Italian units from Severoli’s division."*® The Italian units sent to Rusca effectively reduced Severoli’s division to a shell. What was left would remain behind and Severoli, once he had recovered from his wound received at Sacile, would later rejoin the army to command another division. Macdonald was given the infantry divisions of Lamarque and Broussier,'** and later on, the dragoon divisions of Pully and Grouchy. Grouchy was the senior cavalry commander and would usually exercise command over both dragoon divisions. Grenier was newly promoted to lieutenant general and was given Durutte’s division and his own former division, now temporarily commanded by one of his brigadiers, Louis-Jean-Nicolas Abbe,"*^ until Abbé was succeeded in May by a new general of division, Baron Michel-Marie Pacthod. Grenier would shortly have Sahuc’s cavalry divison as well. Eugene’s reserve corps consisted of Serras’ infantry division, the Royal Guard, and for a time, the three cavalry divisions.The composition of the reserve corps was destined to change throughout the campaign. Eugene would often use his reserve corps as a replacement source, to reinforce the other line corps, in particular Grenier’s, as situations demanded. The reserve corps would often actually disappear, its units merging with the line corps. The organization of the army would be completed by May 1, at which time Eugene would be ready to pass over to the offensive. As Eugene’s situation improved militarily, his professional relationship with his step-father deteriorated. The repercussions from Sacile would threaten Eugene’s position as Commander-in-Chief. With communications through the Tyrol cut, mes­ sages had to be sent through Switzerland and on into Germany. From there a courier had to seek out Napoleon’s headquarters, which was being moved almost daily. It took over a week for Eugene’s letter of April 16 to reach Napoleon, and it took almost the same time for a letter to reach Eugene. Initially, Napoleon took the news of Sacile calmly. In his first message to Eugene after learning of the battle, the Emperor complained about the lack of specific details concerning both the battle and the current state of the Army of Italy. After getting some information, Napoleon played the role of military mentor; he criticized Eugene for engaging the enemy without first concentrating his entire army. Learning of Eugene’s exaggerated fears about Chasteler in the Tyrol, Napoleon tried to sooth the fears by telling him that there was nothing to worry about from the Tyrol so long as Eugene’s army was concentra ted'*'* (which it was by the 27 th). Napoleon also ordered Eugene “to hold the line of the Adige.”'*^ Thus he approved Eugene’s movements and the implementation of the defensive “Note” of January 1809. No mention whatsoever was yet made about standing on the Piave. However, by April 25, Napoleon had driven the main Austrian army, under Archduke Charles, north of the Danube and was planning a drive down the southern bank of the Danube towards Vienna. For such an operation to succeed, Napoleon had to be sure that John’s army could not strike northward against the French strategic right flank and

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THE TURNING POINT rear. It was important to Napoleon that John be kept as far to the east as possible, reducing the threat that John’s army might make to an extended French flank down the Danube valley. Napoleon wanted Eugene’s army to exert some pressure against John to keep the Austrians in Italy occupied and away from the Danube. Hence Napoleon became quite anxious about the state of the Army of Italy and its commander, Eugene. The inaccurate reports from Eugene concerning the expected arrival of Lamarque’s division prior to Sacile, and the all-too-brief accounts which arrived after the battle all tended to feed Napoleon’s anxiety about Eugene’s abilities to secure his own strategic right flank. The possibility of John striking Napoleon’s flank seemed greater on April 26 when Eugene’s latest dispatch, dated April 19, arrived at Imperial headquarters. This letter was written while Eugene was along the Piave and still influenced by Baraguey’s exaggerated reports of Chasteler’s strength in the Tyrol. In this dispatch Eugene reported that he was about to evacuate the Piave for the Adige, and that if a major attack developed from the Tyrol he might have to follow the “worst case” instructions of the January 1809 “Note” and withdraw from the upper and middle Adige to the line Mantua-Legnago-Venice.'*^ The rapid abandonment of the Piave, the apparent intention to withdraw all the way to Mantua, and the confusing and sketchy reports from Eugene, all made Napoleon think that Eugene had suffered a major disaster at Sacile, and that Napoleon’s own operations would be affected by that defeat. An angry Napoleon wrote to Eugene on April 26: I am ignorant about the last battle, the number of men and guns that I have lost, and what caused the defeat. Such conduct is strange; in place of sending me officers^ you only send me poor couriers who know and say nothing. You turn your attention to the Tyrol where you have absolutely nothing to fear .. The battle must have been terrible to cause you to abandon the Piave... I am unable to judge because I am still ignorant of what has occurred but to leave Venice blockaded without strong reason by the single ridiculous terror of the Tyrol is senseless. The first thing for you to do is to send me the most recent details; send me an officer daily to keep me informed of what has happened. Not having the slightest idea of what took place on the 16th ... upsets all the calculations for my campaign... I soon hope to be at Salzburg, and cut off all those in the Tyrol, but for God’s sake, instruct me as to what had happened, and make me cognizant of the situation in Italy."*’ Afraid that Eugene would actually fall back to Mantua-Legnago-Venice, Napoleon sought to keep him along the Adige line. Acting again as a military instructor, Napoleon, in a sarcastic manner, elaborated in his 1809 “Note” concerning the strategic use of the Adige line, in conjunction with the use of interior lines to divide an enemy: If you fear an attack from the Tyrol, occupy the positions that I held in my Italian campaigns; every drummer in your Army knows them. I held Montebaldo, Corona, Rivoli and the Adige. It was by preventing the junction of the enemy’s forces in the Tyrol and in the Friaul that I defeated him. I see that you don’t know the history of my campaigns very well since you say that ‘if the enemy comes from the Tyrol the plain of Verona must be abandoned’. The enemy cannot debouch from the Tyrol if you occupy the heights of Rivoli, nor can he force you from tht position if you held Corona and Montebaldo.'*® By April 30th Napoleon’s anxiety about the possible threat of John’s army to his own plans was mounting. No further news from Eugene had arrived, and so Napoleon fired off another letter to his Viceroy asking if John’s army would “soon be on my right

flank.”49

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THE TURNING POINT News in the form of a letter from Eugene finally arrived that afternoon dated April 22nd, but it contained information that Napoleon did not want to hear. Eugene’s dispatch only informed Napoleon of his evacuation of the Piave.^*^ Although Eugene’s withdrawal to the Adige had been previously sanctioned by the Emperor, Napoleon’s anxiety about his own strategic right induced him to misinterpret Eugene’s motives. To Napoleon, the evacuation of the Piave without being heavily pressed by the Austrians was one more product of the believed disaster at Sacile and a further example that Eugene’s nerve had broken and that the Viceroy was simply beyond his depth commanding an army. Because of Napoleon’s own anxiety over the fate of his own operations, he decided, in the afternoon of April 30, to relieve Eugene of command. A dispatch was duly sent to Eugene: I am sorry that you have abandoned the Piave .. . Instead of destroying the bridge over the Piave, you should have held a bridgehead showing the enemy your intention to defend it. The enemy would not have dared cross the river, Venice would not have been blockaded, and all of the territory between the Piave and the Adige would not be left open to pillage . .. I see that you have no notion of war. I am ignorant of the situation of my army [of Italy], its losses in men, generals, colors and cannons ... In war one sees one’s own problems and those of the enemy. It is necessary to show confidence. Until the time when the enemy had tired to force the Piave bridge, you should have held the bridgehead; you could alway cut the bridge after the enemy had crossed above or below the river ... War is a serious game in which one can compromise one’s reputation and country. When one is reasonable, one must perceive oneself and know whether he is made for this business or not. I know that in Italy you despise Massena, but if I had sent him there, what has happened would not have occurred. Massena has military talents before which one must bow . . . In giving you command of the army I had made a mistake. I should have sent Massena and you would have commanded the cavalry under his orders. The kings of France, even reigning emperors, often would command a regiment or a division under the orders of an experienced marshal. I think that if circum­ stances become pressing, you should write to the King of Naples [Murat] asking him to join the army; you will give up command to him and place yourself under his orders ... I repeat that unless the enemy is already retiring and perhaps in any case, you should write to bring the King of Naples to the army. You will gain merit and glory serving under one older than yourself. You will acquaint him with the fact that you have been authorized by me for this proceeding, and that upon his arrival he will find his letters of command.”^* Fortunately for all concerned, the orders to relieve Eugene were never carried out. Napoleon never again mentioned the subject to the Viceroy and Eugene never wrote to Murat. Napoleon’s letter of April 30, was, no doubt, the product of his anxiety concerning the security of his right flank, blinding him to the fact that he himself authorized a withdrawal to the Adige. However, as Napoleon’s drive down the Danube continued and as Marshal Lefebvre’s army corps penetrated the northern Tyrol, thereby guarding Napoleon’s strategic right flank, Napoleon grew calmer. So for the time being, Napoleon decided to keep Eugene at his post. Eugene never even attempted to carry out Napoleon’s order to write to Murat. What saved Eugene in this instance was the slowness of communication between his own and Napoleon’s headquarters. Eugene did not receive Napoleon’s letter of April 30 until May 6, when Eugene was about to defeat Archduke John on the Piave. After Eugene had beaten John, Napoleon’s orders were rendered out of date. Eugene knew that his victory on the Piave would cancel out the defeat of Sacile, and he knew his step-father well

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THE TURNING POINT enough to know that Napoleon would never relieve a commander who had just won a victory. Nothing succeeds like success, and both the Emperor and the Viceroy conveniently dropped the matter of a change of command of the Army of Italy. Eugene would have been severely shaken by Napoleon’s letters of April 25-April 30 had they arrived right after the battle of Sacile. But, since they did not start to arrive at Viceregal headquarters until the end of April, Eugene had already fully regained his confidence in himself, and was passing over to the offensive. The content of Napoleon’s letters, especially that of April 30, gives further proof that Napoleon did not try to keep the ingredients of his military success a secret. Rather, he sought to inculcate them in his subordinates. Although sarcastic in tone, the letter of April 30 incorporated one of the favored defensive strategies of Napoleon, keeping one’s own army between two separate enemy forces and by maneuvering between them defeat each separate detachment. The principles of Napoleon’s strategic thought were revealed. The problem for Napoleon was to get his generals, like Eugene, to follow them. The ten days from April 17 to April 27 represented a turning point in Eugene’s fortunes and that of his army. This turning point was caused by the pervasive influence of Napoleon’s instructions in the January “Note” of 1809. Those instructions served as a guide for Eugene to follow and dictated the pattern of Eugene’s movements during those ten days. Eugene had been told exactly what to do and where to place his troops. The occupation of Rivoli, Caldiero, and the fortified position along the Alpone and the Adige were all in accordance with the provisions of the 1809 “Note.” Eugene’s decision to finally follow Napoleon’s instructions was the right one. The knowledge that a fortified defensive line had been built, and that Eugene had been instructed on how to use that line against an opponent, acted to stabilize Eugene’s personality and helped them regain his nerve. In so doing, Eugene was able to assert control over his army. In nineteenth-century armies, and Napoleonic armies in particular, the character of the commander influenced the spirit of his own army. In regaining his composure, Eugene was able to impose his will on his generals and his troops. Eugene’s refusal to be stampeded by Baraguey d’Hilliers and his halting of the latter’s withdrawal to Verona showed that Eugene had regained his nerve. Eugene’s early decision to return to the offensive as soon as possible effected the morale of his army. The fact that the Army of Italy did not disintegrate after Sacile, but instead was prepared to fight again in ten days time, is proof that Eugene’s growing confidence in himself spread throughout the army. The recovery of the army’s fighting spirit was also due to the slowness and caution of Archduke John’s movements. All the will power in the world would not have enabled Eugene to rally his army if John had conducted a vigorous pursuit. Although a full third of the Austrian army had been but lightly engaged at Sacile, John never used them to energetically press Eugene. It was John who granted Eugene the precious time to linite his troops and withdrawal in an orderly manner to the Brenta and later to the Adige. A rapid pursuit after Sacile would have resulted in the destruction of Broussier’s shaken division and probably Grenier’s as well. Such losses would at least have upset the concentration of Eugene’s army and broken its offensive power. However, the leisurely pace which characterized the Austrian movements allowed the opportunity to pass. Unmolested by the Austrians, Eugene was able to regain his nerve, rally and concentrate his army. So by the last days of April, Eugene could deploy more men than John could, and the strategic intiative had passed to Eugene. The time had come for the Viceroy to launch his own victorious offensive.

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THE TURNING POINT NOTES TO CHAPTER VI >DCC, V, 139. 2Vaud.,I, 173. 3DCC, V, 138. '•NC, XVIII, 124. 5DCC, V, 137. Hbid., p. 137. nbid., p. 138. ^Ibid., pp. 159-150. 9Vaud.,I, 177. p. 178. "DCC, V, 142-143. '2Vaud.,I, p. 178. >3DCC, V, 143. ' ♦Vaud., I, p. 197. >5DCC, V, 140. >6Vaud.,I, p. 199. >’MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. ^Hbid. ^Hbid. 2«NC, XVIII, 218. 2'MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^'^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 3°Vaud. I, 204. 3>DCC, V, 161. 32DCB, V, 45-46. 33MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. 34NC, XVIII, 215-216. 35DCC, V, 153-154. 36Vaud.,I, 186-187. ^''Marshal Etienne-Jacques-Joseph Alexander Macdonald, The Recollections o f Marshall Macdonald (edited by Camille Rousset, translated by Stephen Louis Simeon, Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1893), p. 134. ^Hbid., p. 136. 39DCB, V, 44. '•oVaud., I, 188. 4'MSP, Box #23. -•^Vaud., I, 188. 43MSP, Box #23.

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THE TURNING POINT '‘'‘DCC, V, 148-149. ^^Ibid., p. 149. p. 140. ^'^Ibid., pp. 150-152. ^Hbid., pp. 151-152. ^'^Ibid., pp. 156-157. ^nbid., pp. 152-143. 5>/6irf.,pp. 157-160.

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CHAPTER VII Battle on the Piave

On April 28,1809, the rival armies faced each other along the Adige-Alpone line. The main body of each army was massed along a two mile front between Arcole to the south and the Alps to the north. The bulk of Eugene’s forces were around Caldiero with Macdonald’s corps on the right between Caldiero and the Adige, the reserve corps was in Caldiero, and Grenier’s Corps on the left between the town and the mountains. Farther to the north were detachments of Serras’ division at Colognola, and north of that village was the 1st Italian Infantry Regiment behind the Tremegana Creek at Illasi and Cazzao. Other detached units held fortified posts along the Adige. Meanwhile, John’s main body was concentrated around Villanuova with flanking units on his left at Montagnano opposite Legnago, and on his right around Soave and Monte-Bastia opposite the French at Illasi and Cazzano. As John surveyed the enemy masses before him he realized that he did not have the strength to drive across the Alpone towards Verona. His only hope of renewing his advance was by receiving help from Chasteler either by direct reinforcement or by Chasteler turning Eugene’s left flank. But John’s hopes of help from Chasteler would be fruitless, for Marshall Lefebvre’s advance from the Danube into the Tyrol would draw Chasteler northward away from Italy. John could therefore do little but wait on events. Eugene, on the other hand, was completing the reorganization of his army and was preparing his own offensive. The formation of the army corps and restructuring of the Italian divisions would occupy the next two days. If Sacile had taught Eugene one thing, it was not to attack without prior concentration, and so Eugene wanted to attack with as many troops as possible. Since pressure was easing against Baraguey d’Hilliers, Eugene planned to move Baraguey and half his corps out of Rivoli to reinforce the main body at Caldiero. Consequently, Eugene expected to launch his offensive on May 2. Along with the creation of the army corps was the formation of an army artillery reserve. Such a force had not yet existed because of the absence of a competent officer to lead it. An expert artillery commander arrived on May 1, General of Division Count Jean-Barthelemot Sorbier.^ Sorbier had originally served in the French Royal Corps of Artillery before the Revolution and had commanded the artillery for Hoche in 1797 and for Davout in 1805. With Sorbier’s arrival, guns were drawn from the different infantry divisions and joined with the artillery of the Royal Guard to form an army artillery reserve.^ The previous absence of an artillery commander was symptomatic of a problem plaguing Eugene’s army throughout the campaign: a lack of officers at all levels of command. When the war was started in April, Eugene lacked one corps commander, two divisional generals, commanders for Venice and the army artillery, and 140 line officers from lieutenant through colonel.'* The lack of officers was made worse by the losses of Sacile. The “cult of glory” had a strong tradition in the Napoleonic armies and officers, from general on down, were expected to “lead” their troops in the fullest sense of the word. Because of the presence of the many conscripts in the army, it became even more

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE necessary for the officers to lead by example. The high levels of personal leadership at Sacile resulted in high casualties among the officer corps. Six generals alone had been wounded at Sacile and the losses among regimental and battalion commanders were so severe that as of May 1 many battalions were being commanded by captains.^ Hence, the reorganization of the army included a reshuffling of officers at all levels of command and explains why Eugene needed several days to reorganize behind the Alpone. However, the casualties among the officer corps had one positive result. It opened the way for promotion, to the junior grades at least, from the ranks. The practice of promotion by merit in the Napoleonic armies was a comparatively new one, and was never matched in the other armies of Europe. The prospect of promotion from the ranks made the army a vehicle of social mobility and in so doing offered the promise of a better life, at least for those who survived. The enhanced prospects of promotion for both French and Italian soldiers truly gave them an added incentive to fight. So, in spite of the high casualties among the officer corps, the two traditions of promotion by merit and the high standards of personal leadership aided in the recovery of Eugene’s army. The junior officers would prove capable of leading battalions rather than companies and the combination of the two traditions created the famous elan of the Napoleonic armies. It was in part for these reasons that Eugene’s army recovered from Sacile. For the upcoming offensive Eugene knew that he would need a unit that could move quickly and engage the enemy until the rest of the army could arrive on the battlefield. So Eugene decided to organize a special advance guard brigade combining the three arms of infantry, cavalry and artillery. The core of this force would consist of three special battalions each made up of elite voltigeur companies drawn from the regular battalions.^ Attached to this force would be a squadron of light cavalry and two guns.^ Eugene had first formed an advance guard at Pordenone under Sahuc, with unfortunate results. Eugene needed someone who could command with more vigilance than Sahuc, so he chose a newly promoted General of Brigade, Armand-Louis Debruc, a man seventeen years younger than Sahuc, to command the new unit. With the organization of the army corps, artillery, and advance guard progressing, Eugene could turn to the question, where to attack? Since John’s army was massed opposite Eugene it would be impossible to use the strategy of the central position. A manoeuvre sur les derrières would be more appropriate. Eugene could send either a portion or the bulk of his army southwards, cross the Adige at Legnago, and roll up John’s strategic left. But to do so Eugene would have to weaken his force at Caldiero, thereby giving John an opportunity to break through towards Verona, isolating Baraguey. Besides, a turning movement against John’s left would cause a division of Eugene’s army, something he wanted to avoid after his experience at Sacile. Turning John’s right seemed to be a far more attractive alternative. An offensive across the upper Alpone from Illasi to Montebello would outflank John’s right and cut him off from the Tyrol and the main road to Vicenza. In so doing, John would be forced southward where he could be hemmed in and destroyed against the Venetian defenses. Such a plan would enable Eugene to keep his several army corps in close proximity to each other, avoid dispersion, and would prevent a junction between John and Chasteler. Having decided on turning John’s right, Eugene planned to use two of his army corps to frontally pin John’s army around Villanouva while a third corps swept across the upper Alpone, then turn south and east towards Villanouva and Montebello. The target

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE date for the attack would be May 2, but Eugene first wanted to launch a reconnaissance in force on April 29 as a preliminry operation before the major offensive.® There were several reasons for such a move. First, Eugene was a fighting general and wanted to maintain an active defense prior to his own offensive. Second, his army had been retreating ever since April 10, and a few minor successes against the Austrian outposts would further raise the morale of the army. Finally, Eugene although cautious after Sacile, wanted to test the Austrian reactions and learn more about their positions. The operation was carried out as planned. While the corps of Grenier and Macdonald kept the Austrians occupied before Soave and Villanouva, seven battalions from the reserve corps, spearheaded by the grenadiers of the Royal Guard, swept the Austrians from Monte-Bastia.^ The Viceroy was quite satisfied with this action. Except for the combat at Ospitaletto, this was the first success that his army had won. The comparative ease of this victory indicated to him that he was on the proper track regarding a turning movement of John’s strategic right. With Fontanelli’s division moving towards Caldiero, Eugene would soon have 45,000 troops, the largest force he had ever commanded, to put his offensive plan into effect. Unfortunately, Eugene’s big battle would not take place for another week. For just as Napoleon had predicted, the news of his own victory in Bavaria would force an Austrian withdrawal in Italy. John’s evacuation from the Adige-Alpone began before May 1. John had received the first news of Charles’ defeat at Eckmiihl and subsequent retreat on April 27. Orders arrived from Charles on April 29 giving John considerable latitude. He could continue his own offensive, but was to hold what he had in Italy, as well as the Tyrol, and protect the approaches to Carinthia and Carniola until Charles could return to the offensive. However, these orders were modified to allow John to use his army as he saw fit." However, Charles’ orders to hold Italy and the Tyrol were impossible to execute. Charles himself, when commanding in Italy in 1805, found his position there rendered untenable by Napoleon’s victory at Ulm. In 1805, Archduke John was unable with 40,000 troops to hold the Tyrol against Augereau, Ney and Marmont. Now he was being asked to hold a much larger area with roughly the same number of troops.'^ John had the sense to realize that it was impossible to hold Italy against Eugene’s larger army and that if he moved directly northward into the Tyrol, he would uncover Carniola and might be isolated in the Tyrol as he was in 1805. John sensibly decided to withdraw before disaster struck. Since his orders gave him flexibility he decided to fall back behind the successive river barriers of the Brenta, Piave and Livenza, outdistancing Eugene and allowing time for his rear echelon troops to withdraw. A portion of the army would move back into Carniola to cover the raising of the Croatian Feudal Ban. The rest of the army would ascend the Tagliamento moving north into Carinthia from where John could march on Vienna from the south, and draw upon reinforcements from Hungary.'^ However, Eugene’s newly occupied position around Monte-Bastia posed a potential threat to John’s withdrawal. John wanted to retreat via the main road from Villanouva to Vicenza. But with Eugene holding Monte-Bastia, the French were in a good position to swiftly outflank Soave and Villanouva and cut the road by turning John’s right flank. Such an attack, especially at the moment of retreating, could lead to disaster. So John decided to regain his position around Monte-Bastia. Such an operation would reduce the danger to his own right flank and temporarily keep Eugene off balance thus giving the

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE Austrians more time to evacute the area. John counter-attacked on April 30 with eleven battalions and succeeded in driving the weaker French forces from the area of Monte-Bastia.''* This done, John’s retreat could begin. The combats around Monte-Bastia have been criticized by both Pelet and by Petre. Both authors claimed that the fighting at Monte-Bastia was a useless exercise brought on by the inexperience of the rival commanders. However, the operations of April 29 and April 30 were limited engagements designed to achieve limited ends. For Eugene the fighting on April 29 was designed to feel out the Austrian positions and improve the morale of his army; for John the combat on the 30th was to cover his own withdrawal. Both succeeded in their aims, and their operations could not be considered useless. The fact that John, for example, successfully evacuated the Adige-Alpone after driving the French back, is proof of the validity of his actions. Petre has been most severe in criticising the entire course of Eugene’s operations along the Adige-Alpone as indecisive and cautious. To achieve anything decisive along the Adige-Alpone, Petre believed that a “Napoleon not a Eugene”'^ was needed. Petre envisioned some sort of “Napoleonic” sweep via Arcole or Legnago against John’s strategic left as Napoleon had done against Alvitzy in 1796; Petre’s criticism of Eugene, however, is unfair because he disregards Eugene’s planned offensive against John’s strategic right. This plan was “Napoleonic” in scope and might have succeeded had John not withdrawn before the blow fell. John’s retreat from the Adige-Alpone began after midnight on May 1. To delay the French, the bridges over the Alpone were destroyed. John’s main body headed for Citadella behind the Brenta. There it would wait for the arrival of the blockading corps from Venice. Frimont would cover the withdrawal with a mixed force acting as rear guard. By May 2 John’s main body was behind the Brenta, at Citadella, with a detached brigade at Bassano. Frimont was at Montebello with orders to fight a delaying action.'^ The French pursuit across the Alpone would be delayed for one day in order to repair the bridges over the Alpone. With John moving east to Citadella, an immediate manoeuvre sur les derrières was no longer feasible; to do so Eugene would have to swing too far into the mountains and would miss John completely. However, since John was moving eastwards, he was widening the gap between himself and Chasteler, ending any threat to Verona. Consequently Eugene now felt safe enough to detach part of his army to operate against John’s strategic left. Before crossing the Alpone, Eugene sent Durutte’s division southward to Legnago where it would cross the Adige, advance over the Brenta near Padua, and link up with the troops who were to sortie from Venice. Once joined, Durutte would cover the movement of supplies from Venice, and create a threat to John’s southern flank. Leaving Severoli’s depleted division to secure the “Quadrilateral”, Eugene began to cross the Alpone after midnight on May 2. By 5:00 a.m. the Viceroy’s advance guard was in action against Frimont at Montebello. With the main body still behind, Debruc’s forces were at a disadvantage. Frimont succeeded in holding off the French and safely withdrew behind the Brenta destroying the bridges after him. General Debruc was wounded in this action and was succeeded in command by Colonel Renaud of the 30th Dragoons.'^ By May 3 Eugene’s army had reached the banks of the Brenta opposite the Austrians who were holding Citadella. Viceregal headquarters was set up in Vicenza. It was time for Eugene to take stock of the situation and plan his next move.

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE The seeds of the Battle on the Piave were planted on May 2-3. Napoleon has been lauded for his ability to predict the movements as of his opponents and the eventual site of battle. The story of his prediction for the location of the Battle of Marengo has become a legend. Eugene displayed the same ability, by adequately studying the military situation and intelligence reports, and predicted that the site of the next big battle would be east of the Piave.'® Eugene did not expect to fight along the Brenta, since Durutte’s crossing of the lower portion of the river would render John’s position untenable. Furthermore, with the bridges broken to his immediate front, Eugene did not think he could cross the river in time to catch John. But the Viceroy was not afraid that John would escape. Unlike the French, the Austrians had never freed themselves from complete dependence on magazines and supply trains. Consequently, the existence of a large Austrian supply train slowed their movements during both the advance and the retreat. The more John fell back along his line of communication, the more he would be joined by transports, troops, sick and wounded, all of which would adversely affect the pace of John’s withdrawal. Eugene calculated that the existence of such impediments would reduce John’s speed to such an extent, that Eugene would catch up and destroy him somewhere east of the P iave.S o on May 3, Eugene began preparation for a major concentration of his army on the banks of the Piave, ready to launch an all out pursuit. For Eugene’s plan to succeed the advance guard would have to be strengthened. What was needed was a large swift moving force that could catch up with the enemy and force him to turn and fight. The current brigade under Renaud was simply too small for such a role and plans were made to increase the advance guard to divisional strength, 4-5,000.20 Next, a general concentration for battle was to be made along the Piave. Eugene’s main body was to eventually cross the Brenta, and advance eastward along the main road towards Treviso and from there move to the Piave. Durutte’s division, once having reached Mestre thereby relieving Venice, was to be heavily reinforced from the Venetian garrison. Eight battalions were to be transferred from Barbou’s command once the junction between the two was made.^' Barbou would remain in Venice with only a skeleton of his once large division. Reinforced, Durutte was to take a large supply convoy northward to Treviso where he would rejoin Eugene’s army. The supply convoy from Venice contained enough biscuits and rice to feed the army for four days.22 It was common practice in Napoleon’s armies to forage for supplies while on campaign. Rations were only issued to the troops in anticipation of a battle to insure that as many troops as possible would be with their units rather than absent in order to find food. The supply convoy from Venice was specifically organized to feed the army during its advance east of the Piave and provides additional proof that Eugene planned to intercept John east of that river. With plans for the concentration on the Piave completed, Eugene then turned his attention to the more distant formations of his army, Rusca’s division and Marmont’s corps. Rusca’s division would serve to cover Eugene’s strategic left and act as a wedge to keep Chasteler and John separate. Consequently, Rusca was ordered to move north and reoccupy Trent. From there he was to move eastwards towards Feltre securing the upper Piave.2^ Until now, the Viceroy had been too distant from Marmont to be concerned with joint operations. But since he was now advancing eastward, the time had come to concert the movement of his army and Marmont’s corps. On May 3, Eugene sent a message to

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE Marmont informing him of his own advance and ordered him to move north and “vigorously attack the enemy”.^"^ Eugene was already looking forward to an eventual junction with Marmont in Carniola, trapping the Austrian forces there by a manoeuvre sur les derrières}^ Both armies were in motion after midnight of May 5. John had held on the Brenta only to insure the safe withdrawal of the blockading corps, from Venice to Treviso. Certain of its withdrawal, and knowing that Durutte had crossed the lower Brenta, he then divided his main body into two columns. The IX Corps would withdraw to the Piave via Asolo and Vidor, while the VIII Corps would stay on the main road to Treviso, joining the force from Venice, and then retire behind the Piave at Priula. There the separate corps of the army would reunite behind the banks of the Piave at Conegliano. The withdrawal from the Brenta would be covered by Schmidt’s brigade at Bassano, and Frimont’s division which was to withdraw successively from Citadella, Castel-Franco, and on towards the Piave and Conegliano. As John withdrew, Eugene began his crossing of the Brenta. Renaud’s advance guard began crossing the different arms of the Brenta by using boats and utilizing some fords. They were across by dawn, meeting only light resistance. Behind Renaud, Eugene’s engineers were at work repairing the bridge. Serras had been sent northward to demonstrate before Bassano, and if possible sieze the bridge there which had not been destroyed but was guarded by Schmidt’s brigade. The operation went smoothly and by evening Eugene’s main body was encamped at Castle-Franco. After having driven Schmidt from Bassano towards the upper Piave, Serras had reached Asolo. Durutte meanwhile, had reached the outskirts of Treviso. Treviso was abandoned after midnight by the Austrians who left behind large numbers of sick, wounded and supplies, all of which fell to Durutte’s troops. By the evening of May 6 all of the Austrian forces were over the Piave, burning the bridges behind them. Eugene’s cavalry patrols reached the right bank between Narvese and Ponte-di-Piave that evening, too late to secure the bridges. The rest of the French army would reach the river by the morning of May 7. Napoleon’s dispatch of April 30, in which he threatened to relieve Eugene of command, arrived at Viceregal headquarters on May 6.^^ The reason that Eugene did not follow Napoleon’s advice and send for Murat, was the fact that Eugene fully expected to win a decisive battle very soon. If Eugene’s expectations would prove correct, he knew he would keep command of his army. The time for implementing Eugene’s plan of hurling his army in a concentrated mass over the Piave and attacking the Austrians had arrived. The days of May 6 and May 7 were spent in preparation. The role of the advance guard would be vital, for Eugene wanted a force large enough to catch and pin the enemy until the rest of the army arrived. As planned, the advance guard was increased to divisional strength. This new light division consisted of six voltigeur battalions, a full regiment of light cavalry (the 9th Chasseurs), and four guns.^^ Most important, the advance guard would need a bold commander who could think quickly in the style of Napoleon’s own advance guard commander. Marshal Jean Lannes. Eugene chose the dashing Dessaix for the new command. Eugene’s choice was a good one. Dessaix served well as one of Broussier’s brigadiers, and would prove to have a fine tactical sense. Dessaix’s performance would win him a promotion at the close of the campaign.

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE With Schmidt’s brigade still holding the upper Piave and so out of effective supporting range, John had about 30,000 near Conegliano.^® Eugene had six infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, the advance guard and the Royal Guard for an estimated total of 45-48,000.^® This gave Eugene a definite numerical superiority and one that would insure victory, so long as his army could cross the river intact. Any river crossing could prove dangerous with an enemy army close by, for if the Austrians attacked while only a fraction of the French were across, disaster would result. Eugene had to know if he would have sufficient time to secure a bridgehead and deploy his army on the left bank before John could mount an effective counter attack. Thus Eugene had to learn the exact location of John’s army to judge if he would have enough time to establish his army across the Piave. So on May 7, while fords were located, and rafts and pontoons collected for the crossing, the Viceroy ordered the 8th Chasseurs to ford the river and reconnoiter the area north and east of the Piave.^° The Piave runs in a general direction from northwest to southeast, from the Alps to the Gulf of Venice. However, the river does curve along its course, and it actually runs from west to east along the 13 mile stretch from Narvese to Ponte-di-Piave. It was along this sector that the two armies faced each other. The river in this area is interspaced by a series of small islands, and narrows at certain points to a distance of 350 yards. Three fords were located, one at Narvese, a second four and a half miles down stream at Priula, while a third was two and a half miles further east of San-Nichiol. However, the river tended to rise during the day and so it could only be forded in the morning. So Eugene planned to build a pontoon bridge at Priula, the narrowest point of the river, in order to continue the crossing after 12:00 p.m. The terrain beyond the Piave towards Conegliano is flat, interspaced by dikes, irrigation ditches, and streams. A series of hamlets lie parallel to the river ranging from one half of a mile to one and one half miles from the eastern bank. The hamlets running from left to right are named Susignano, Barco, La Mandra, Campana, Grave, San-Michele, Cimadolmo, Roradelle, and Ponte-di-Piave. A section of a small stream, the Piaviasella, runs through Mandra and Campana. A dike is located a quarter of a mile south of the stream and covers the southern approaches to Mandra and Campana. The Piaviasella bends further upstream where it protects the southern approaches to the village of Tezza which is located about a mile north of San-Michele. Two primary roads run perpendicular from the left bank. The first goes through Barco to Susignano then north to Conegliano. The other runs from Priula through Campana to Bocco di Strada then curves northwest to Conegliano. Bocca di Strada is about three miles from Priula and Conegliano about six. The French chasseurs crossed the ford at San-Nichiol during the morning of May 7, and moved north and west. The river bank was lightly held. John’s army was drawn up in a line roughly parallel with the river between the villages of Susignano and Bocca di Strada, with the VIII Corps near the former village, the IX Corps near the latter. After locating John’s army, the chasseurs recrossed the river without incident. The Austrians were poorly positioned to cover all three fords. Narvese was protected well enough with the VIII Corps only one and a half miles away. But the ford at Priula was three miles from IX Corps and San Nichiol and was five miles away. The VIII Corps would have to march eight miles to reach San Nichiol. Hence, it would take several hours for the Austrians to effectively attack any French force crossing at Priula and San Nichiol.

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE John clearly was not planning to dispute the line of Piave. If he was his troops should have been closer to the river, deployed among the hamlets from Barco to San Michele. But John’s main concern was to cover the roads to Conegliano to insure the safe withdrawal of his transports and supplies to the Livenza. His only response to Eugene’s reconnaissance was to send a battalion to guard each ford and deploy one cavalry regiment along the river bank. John evidently felt secure from attack. He no doubt knew about the rise of the river during the day and so did not think that Eugene would attempt a river crossing with the Austrian army still in the vicinity. The fact that John has successfully evaded Eugene on the Alpone and the Brenta may have contributed to John’s false sense of security. After receiving the reports from his cavalry, Eugene made his final plans. The San Nichiol ford offered the safest place to cross being the ford farthest from John’s army. However, time was an important factor since Eugene had to get 45,000 troops across before the river rose. It would take too long to get so many men over at one crossing point. The ford at Narvese was too close to the Austrians, but that at Priula might serve as a second crossing point. The course of the river at Priula had formed a small tongue of land on the left bank. After crossing the river, the advance force could deploy at the base of the tongue with its flanks resting on the river, and would still have sufficient room in the rear to mass more troops for a later advance. Furthermore, a force crossing at Priula would keep the Austrians occupied, allowing other troops to safely cross at San Nichiol from where they could threaten the Austrian left. So it was decided that the army would cross at Priula and San Nichiol. For the crossing at San Nichiol, Eugene chose Grenier’s corps (the cavalry divisions of Grouchy, Sahuc and Pully and the infantry divisions of Abbé and Durutte). Dessaix’s light division, followed by Macdonald’s corps, (the infantry divisions of Broussier and Lamarque), and later Baraguey’s corps (Fontanelli’s division), would cross at Priula. The Royal Guard was to be kept in reserve to be directed where needed. Serras’ division was to make a feint at Narvese in the hope of tying down at least part of the Austrian VIII Corps during the crossing. Since Priula was closer to the Austrians than San Nichiol, a heavy enemy attack at the former ford was likely. So Sorbier would mass a battery of artillery at the right bank of Priula to cover Dessaix’s assault. Once the fording operation had begun, a pontoon bridge was to be constructed at Priula, ready to use when the water became too deep to ford. The river crossing was to begin at dawn on May 8. The attack began on time.^' Sorbier’s guns opened fire against the lone Austrian battalion on the far bank. The Austrians were soon driven back and Dessaix’s infantry waded into the water. Meanwhile, the French cavalry began to cross at San Nichiol, and Serras initiated his feint at Narvese. The firing at Priula raised the alarm in John’s camp and the army was called to arms. It soon became apparent that the French were crossing the Piave in force. John had three possible courses of action, none of which were particularly attractive. First, John could hold his position, allowing Eugene’s numerically superior army to cross the river and overwhelm him. Second, John could continue his retreat towards Sacile. However, as Eugene had predicted, John’s army included a large and cumbersome supply train which the Austrians were loath to loose. Even without a supply train it would take the Austrians the better part of the day to reach the Livenza. With Eugene now crossing the Piave there was no natural obstacle separating the two armies who were but three to four miles

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General Sorbier

General Durutte

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE apart. An adequate Austrian rear guard would have to number at least 4,000, and with Eugene’s massive superiority in cavalry, there was every likelihood that the rear guard would be overwhelmed. John would either be forced to turn to support his rear guard, or because of a hot pursuit by Eugene, his main body would be intercepted somewhere in the open plain between the Piaveand the Livenza. If John had a greater interval between himself and Eugene, an orderly and safe retreat might have been feasible, but with the French light infantry and cavalry crossing the river in such close proximity, the chances of avoiding combat west of the Livenza seemed very remote. The only other choice for John was to counter-attack and drive Eugene’s army back over the river before the French lodgement had become too strong. Since the water level would rise, there was a real chance that a portion of Eugene’s army could be trapped with its back to the swollen river. Under the circumstances, this was the wisest move and the one that John followed. Speed was essential if the French build-up was to be retarded. It would take several hours for John’s entire army to receive orders and methodically advance to the Piave in line of battle, too long a time to delay the French. In order to stall them and gain time to deploy his own army, John had to attack in a piecemeal fashion. The cavalry would attack immediately, supported by artillery. The infantry would follow as fast as they could. John was evidently unaware that the bulk of the French cavalry was crossing at SanNichiol for he sent but one light cavalry regiment and Kalnassy’s infantry brigade towards that ford, while massing the bulk of his cavalry, five regiments, against Dessaix. It would have been better instead for the bulk of the cavalry to have been sent to the San Nichiol ford where it might have succeeded in throwing back the French cavalry before they had crossed in strength. By sending a predominately infantry force, and a weak one at that, to his left, John insured the safe crossing of Grenier’s corps, and by sending the bulk of his cavalry towards Priula, John prepared the way for the effective destruction of his own cavalry corps. In the course of one hour, Dessaix had his entire division over the river and had drawn up his forces across the base of the tongue to cover the crossing of Macdonald’s corps. Meanwhile Eugene’s engineers were furiously working to establish a bridge at Priula. At this point the Austrian cavalry arrived. The Austrian cavalry corps was commanded by Fieldmarshall Lieutenant Wolfskehl, and was supported with a battery of 24 guns under Majorgeneral Resiner. This force deployed 800 yards from Dessaix’s front. The Austrian guns opened fire agaist Dessaix’s infantry, but at such a range it would take some time for roundshot to destroy Dessaix’s division. So after a brief bombardment, Wolfskehl’s 3,000 cavalry charged the French hoping to drive them into the river. But Dessaix, in command of crack troops, was ready to receive them. His infantry quickly formed into squares, two ranks deep,^^ with his guns at the corners of the squares, and his cavalry posted in a supporting position in the rear. The Austrian charge broke against the concentrated fire of Dessaix’s troops. The Austrian cavalry then withdrew and reformed behind Reisner’s guns which had resumed their long range bombardment of Dessaix’s troops. Meanwhile, at San Nichiol, Sahuc and Pully had driven off the Austrian covering force and had safely crossed the river, when John’s sixth cavalry regiment followed by Kalnassy’s infantry appeared. For the Austrians it was too little and too late. The French cavalry promptly charged, routed the Austrian cavalry and forced Kalnassy’s infantry

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE back to the village of Cimadolmo. With the bridgehead secure, Sahuc and Pully remained near the ford until Grouchy’s division had crossed. Once over, Grouchy remained to protect the crossing of Grenier’s infantry while Sahuc and Pully galloped off to support Dessaix. Eugene was most concerned with securing and enlarging Dessaix’s bridehead in order to deploy Macdonald’s corps. Any advance to do so would be difficult unless the Austrian battery could be neutralized. So during the morning priority was given to bringing the combined artillery of Lamarque’s and Broussier’s divisions, totaling twenty guns, over the Piave. These guns were joined with the four from Dessaix’s division and were formed into a large battery in front of the light division. The guns began a counter bombardment against the Austrian artillery and cavalry. By 10:00 a.m. the divisions of Sahuc and Pully had reached Dessaix’s sector and had taken up position on the flanks of Dessaix’s command. Sahuc went to Dessaix’s left and Pully formed up on Dessaix’s right. Eugene now had an effective combined force at the Priula bridgehead. Among the elements that make a good, if not a great military commander is a proper sense of timing, the ability to know exactly when and where to strike. Eugene’s sense of timing had been wrong at Sacile, but now it would prove to be correct. The Viceroy had wanted to strike a decisive blow against the Austrians since the beginning of the war, and now he would get the chance to do just that. Wolfskehl’s cavalry was sitting before him, supported only by the artillery. Although the Austrian infantry could be seen approaching in the distance, it was not yet close enough to support the cavalry. It was vital for Eugene to destroy the Austrian cavalry before the infantry could arrive and launch a combined atttack against his troops. With relish, Eugene planned a decisive attack combining both fire and shock. The massed battery in front of Dessaix’s infantry was ordered to redouble its cannonade to frontally occupy the Austrians and spread confusion in their ranks. Meanwhile, the cavalry divisions of Sahuc and Pully were to sweep around both flanks of Wolfskehl’s force, evading the Austrian guns, and charge into the flanks and rear of the Austrian cavalry. The operation was performed with precision. At 10:30 a.m. the fire from the guns intensified while the cavalry trumpets sounded the charge. The French artillery barrage ceased just as the French cavalry smashed into the Austrian horsemen. Thrown into confusion by the artillery bombardment and perhaps blinded by the smoke from their own guns, the Austrians were unprepared to meet the French charge. Rushing into the melée, Wolfskehl was killed in a sabre duel with a French dragoon. Majorgeneral Hager, Wolfskehl’s second in command, was captured. Leaderless and hemmed in on two sides by superior numbers, the Austrian cavalry broke and was driven from the field. Sweeping into the rear of the Austrian battery, the French cavalry unmercifully sabred the gunners, captured 14 guns, and fatally wounded the artillery commander, Reisner.^'^ After taking the guns, Sahuc and Pully reformed their divisions and set out in pursuit of the flying Austrian cavalry. Moving northwards, the French advanced on the villages of Mandra and Campana where they encountered large bodies of Austrian infantry to their front and flanks. The VIII Corps was deploying to the west of the PriulaConegliano road, and the IX Corps to the east of the road. Directly north of Campana was the Austrian army’s final reserve, Kleinmayer’s brigade composed of grenadiers drawn from the line regiments and two battalions of Croatian infantry. Wisely deciding

BATTLE ON THE PIAVE not to charge the Austrian infantry without support and fearful of being surrounded, Sahuc and Pully decided to fall back to their own infantry supports. The charge of Eugene’s cavalry was the most decisive event of the battle. The destruction of Wolfskehl’s force removed any pressure against Dessaix, and the French build up continued unmolested. But more important was the fact that with the Austrian cavalry swept from the field, the French now had a monopoly on mobility which would adversely affect all of John’s movements. Without their own cavalry to support them, the Austrian infantry would be forced to remain in battalion squares or in smaller two company masses to ward off any threatened French cavalry charge. But such Austrian formations would slow their rate of march, and provide excellent targets for French artillery and musketry. Moreover, if the mobile French cavalry could outflank John’s battle line, the French could sweep into John’s rear, wreck supplies and cut the Austrian line of retreat. So any further Austrian advance, unsupported by cavalry, would prove disastrous. Out of necessity, the Austrians would now have to remain on the defensive. Realizing this, John tried to neutralize the French cavalry by occupying defensive positions behind obstacles from where he hoped he could hold out until nightfall, and then retreat to the Livenza. To this end John deployed his infantry in a long arc with his right, VIII Corps, and center, IX Corps, behind the dike. His left consisting of Kalnassy’s brigade held the villages of San-Michele and Cimadolmo. Such a deploy­ ment sealed off the French lodgement area and protected his troops from any cavalry charge. Eugene would have to rely on his infantry to cross the dike or seize the villages. However, by extending his line to prevent being outflanked, John was forced to commit seven of his eight infantry brigades to the front line. Consequently, John’s battle line was very thin. His only reserve was Kleinmayer’s brigade which was posted behind his center at Campana. With so few reserves, a French breakthrough would be difficult to stop, especially if the villages of San-Michele and Cimadolmo, far on the left, fell to the French. However, John’s plan of holding behind the dike and in the villages might have succeeded. He knew that the Piave was rising and it would increasingly hamper Eugene’s crossing. The water level had been rising throughout the day, and so had the speed of the current. By mid-afternoon the fords could no longer be used. The rising and swift torrent also prevented the completion of the Priula bridge. The rafts and pontoons destined for the bridge were converted to ferries, but by 3:00 p.m. the current was so strong that even the ferrying operation was halted. The river crossing could not continue until the water level had fallen again after midnight. Eugene would have to make do with the forces already across. By this time the divisions of Lamarque, Broussier, Abbé and several battalions of Durutte’s division had all crqssed to join Dessaix, Sahuc, Pully and Grouchy, giving Eugene a force of 27-30,000 men facing John. Perceiving John’s extended line, Eugene realized he had numerical parity and a qualitiative and tactical superiority against John. The French had a combined infantry, artillery, and cavalry force against John’s infantry and artillery. The Viceroy’s forces were at the base of John’s arc and could use the tactics of interior lines to concentrate numerically superior forces against John’s over extended units. Realizing all of these factors Eugene decided to attack. With the Austrians holding their defensive positions behind the dike and the villages, there was ample room for Eugene to deploy his army. The divisions of Dessaix and Sahuc would form the left wing of the army and would face the three infantry brigades of the VIII Corps west of the Priula-Conegliano road. Macdonald’s corps, consisting of the

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General Lamarque

General Grouchy

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE divisions of Lamarque and Broussier, plus a regiment from Durutte’s division, would form the center of the line opposite the three brigades of IX Corps, which were east of the road. Grenier’s corps, consisting of Abbé’s infantry division and the dragoon divisions of Pully and Grouchy, would form Eugene’s right, opposite the villages of San Michele and Cimadolmo facing Kalnassy’s lone brigade. Eugene’s battle plan was as follows and conforms to the archetypical Napoleonic battle. Grenier’s corps would act as the masse de manoeuvre and Macdonald’s corps as the masse de rupture. Grenier’s infantry was to attack San Michele and Cimadolmo where the Austrians were weakest. After clearing the villages, his combined infantry and cavalry force would seek to turn John’s left, forcing the Austrians either to withdraw or weaken their center to reinforce their left. Once the turning movement began, Macdonald’s corps, preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, would smash through the weakened or disorganized center of IX Corps. Meanwhile, on the left, Dessaix and Sahuc would engage and pin the VIII Corps. Grenier’s attack began at 4:00 p.m. Abbé’s division, formed in attack columns, advanced in echelons from the right. The Austrians outnumbered two to one, put up a spirited fight but were driven back suffering 1,200 casualties.^^ The remnants of Kalnassy’s brigade fell back to the village of Tezze, behind the Piavisella stream. With John’s left falling back, the time had come for Macdonald’s breakthrough. Eugene ordered his 24 gun battery to line up wheel to wheel in front of Macdonald’s infantry. The French guns opened up a concentrated bombardment against the center of IX Corps. Perceiving disruption in the enemy ranks, Macdonald was ordered to charge with the bayonet. Macdonald’s troops smashed through the leading Austrian units. John’s only hope to close the breech was to send in Kleinmayer’s brigade against Macdonald. However, Kleinmayer’s grenadiers were overwhelmed by superior num­ bers, and the entire Austrian center was driven behind the Piavisella. The VIII Corps was forced to conform to the withdrawal of the IX Corps and fell back towards La Mandra and Barco, hotly pursued by Dessaix and Sahuc. Sensing victory, Eugene would not allow the Austrians to consolidate behind the Piavisella, and ordered the attack to continue all along the front. Dessaix and Sahuc stormed Barco then drove up the road taking Susignano. Macdonald carried Campana and advanced on Bocca di Strada. Grenier’s march on Tezze had been slowed by the irrigation ditches around the village, but Tezze was eventually taken, after which Grenier released Pully’s cavalry to sweep north and west towards Bocca di Strada. John’s army was completely shattered by this final attack, and the Austrians were streaming into Conegliano in complete flight. At this point it was 8:30 p.m. and Eugene ordered a halt, with the army holding a line from Susignano to Vazzola. A victory had been won, and although the opportunity to drive straight into Conegliano was tempting, Eugene did not want to jeopardize his victory by risking the confusion of a night battle. Even Napoleon himself avoided fighting at night whenever possible. Besides, Eugene’s troops were tired, a third of his army was still on the opposite bank of the Piave, and several Austrian units, among them Schmidt’s brigade, were unaccounted for and could surprise the French in the darkness. It was far better to wait until morning to continue the pursuit. John’s army, in complete disorder, retreated throughout the night towards the Livenza. The Austrian army reached Sacile at daybreak and it was only then that some sort of order was re-established. Frimont again organized a rear guard to hold Sacile while the rest of the army continued its retreat to the Tagliamento.

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE Eugene had won the victory that he had sought. Eugene’s correspondence and other witnesses reported that the Austrians suffered 2,000 killed and 3,000 captured,or one sixth of John’s army. However, further Austrian wounded and stragglers fell into Eugene’s hands over the next several days, which probably added 2,000 more casualties as a direct result of John’s defeat. The spoils of victory included 14 guns and 30 caissons and a great number of other vehicles and horses,^’ all of which would be used to move and support Eugene’s army. Estimates of Eugene’s losses range from 700^^ to 2,000.^^ Considering the length of combat and the strength of the rival forces, the latter estimate may be closer to the mark. Although as always, the actual casualty count is difficult to gauge, the impact of the battle on the two armies is not. The Battle on the Piave broke the offensive power of John’s army. The Austrian Army of Italy would never again mount an offensive against Eugene. John’s army was reduced to fighting only rear guard actions, or to act as a target for French attacks for the rest of the campaign. The only other time that Eugene’s and John’s army would meet in a pitched battle would be at Raab where the Austrians would fight a purely defensive action. The losses that the Austrians suffered during and after the battle would guarantee the success of Eugene’s later campaign in Carinthia and Styria. Finally, the Viceroy’s victory insured his continued position as Commander-inChief. Eugene’s conduct at the battle on the Piave serves as a contrast to his first outing at Sacile. His direction of the latter was marked by a certain amount of recklessness by engaging a numerically superior force with his army not fully concentrated. On the Piave however, Eugene, learning from his mistakes, had his entire army concentrated, ready for battle. The river crossing itself was carefully planned and carried out only after a thorough reconnaissance had been made, giving Eugene a good estimate as to his chances for successfully crossing the river before John could effectively retaliate. Events proved Eugene’s analysis of the situation to be correct. At no time was his army ever really in danger of being thrown back into the Piave, and although only two thirds of his army was able to cross, it proved sufficient to do the job. Eugene’s sense of timing concerning the decisive cavalry charge has been noted. And the Viceroy’s entire handling of Grenier’s and Macdonald’s corps, as well as his use of the three arms of artillery, cavalry, and infantry to break John’s army, exhibits a fine knowledge of Napoleonic grand tactics. The contrast between Eugene’s defeat at Sacile and his victory on the Piave raises the question of Macdonald’s role. Did his presence have a major influence on Eugene’s conduct, and was the Piave really Macdonald’s rather than Eugene’s victory? Macdonald, in his memoirs presented the view that it was really he who was in command. Macdonald’s account claimed that the Austrian army was severely pressing the French and that Eugene, on the verge of panic, was ready to retreat back across the river. The army was only saved by his intervention. Macdonald claims that he managed to rally the army and turn defeat into victory. Other evidence, however, does not support Macdonald’s story. First, Macdonald had only his own corps under his command. Grenier and Dessaix as well as the cavalry commanders reported directly to Eugene, not Macdonald. Secondly, there are two independent eyewitness reports of the battle. One report was sent directly to Grand Marshal Duroc by Cafferelli.'*' The other to the French War Minister by a Captain Zoepffel.'*^ Neither report even mentioned Macdonald. According to both men, it was Eugene who was in complete command of the battle.

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE Thirdly, there are certain similar patterns which emerge in a study of Sacile, the Piave, and Eugene’s later battles. In most cases Eugene always sought to tactically outflank the opposing army. He tried to do so at Sacile and failed, but he succeeded on the Piave. This pattern of operations proves the existence of a certain philosophy of war on Eugene’s part, a philosophy already apparent before Macdonald arrived in Italy. Finally, all of Eugene’s later battles, save for Wagram, were fought and won without Macdonald’s presence. It is highly unlikely that the few weeks of personal contact that Eugene and Macdonald had could have produced such a dramatic change in Eugene’s character. After the campaign of 1809, the careers of Eugene and Macdonald moved along different paths, Eugene’s to continued victories while Macdonald’s to frequent defeats."*^ Eugene’s entire handling of military operations, from April 28-May 8 inclusive, has been severely criticised by General Pelet, a leader of the anti-Eugene group of military historians. In particular, Pelet argues that the inexperienced Eugene delayed too long to start his offensive over the Adige-Alpone allowing John to escape. Once begun, the pursuit of John’s army was far too slow. Pelet believes that John would have never been defeated on the Piave if the inexperienced Austrian commander had not foolishly turned to fight. Admittedly, Eugene’s delay in opening his offensive was perhaps too long, but his recent defeat at Sacile had made him understandably cautious. But what Pelet and other nineteenth century critics of this Italian campaign have failed to realize was the effect logistics had on the movements of both armies. The key to understanding the genesis of the Battle on the Piave was the existence and importance of John’s supply train. The Austrian army was dependent on magazines and supplies and could not afford to abandon its transports.'*'* John needed the wagons to suppy his army until he had reached his bases back in Austria. As the dispatches of May 3 reveal, Eugene knew this and realized that the existence of the supply trains would slow John’s march and enable the Austrians to be intercepted. Events proved Eugene to be correct, and his ability to predict the course of events shows the Viceroy to be as strategically adept as any of Napoleon’s marshals.'*^ The reason that John fought on the Piave was not out of incompetence, but because Eugene was pressing him closely, and he had to make a stand to save his supply train. If one can accuse John of making any tactical errors during the battle on the Piave, it was in positioning his army too far from the river. Eugene’s reconnaissance on May 7 should have warned him of an impending French attack. But John felt safe, secure in the knowledge that the river would rise and that Eugene would not hazard a crossing. Had John advanced to the Piavisella on the night of May 7 he would have been in a good position to hurl back Dessaix’s division at Priula, and the French cavalry as well. But once the crossing began, there was little John could do but turn and fight. The defeat on the Piave had greater significance for the course of operations in Italy than did Eugene’s loss at Sacile. Eugene himself, as did Napoleon, had access to greater manpower resources than did the Austrians and so could more easily recover from an initial defeat. John, with far more limited manpower resources, would never be able to effectively replace what he had lost. Thus, the offensive power of John’ army was broken on the Piave. When the Austrian army was reassembled at Sacile on May 9, it was a far different force from that which had won a victory there just three weeks before. Weakened materially and morally from a week of retreat and defeat, John’s army was

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE no longer capable of offering effective resistance to Eugene anywhere in Italy. John’s only hope was to reach the protection of the Austrian Alps. Eugene had won his victory. The question was now, how to exploit it. NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 'Vaud; I, 186-187. 2MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. ^The number of guns would fluctuate throughout the campaign. “DCC, IV, 424. 5DCC, V, 162. ^Drawing elite companies into special units had been a common practice in European armies for some time. Rochambeau, for example, had done so in America in 1781 and Napoleon had formed an elite division of grenadiers under Oudinot in 1805. Similar practices are found in the Austrian army. Archduke John for example, had formed a special reserve brigade of grenadiers under Kleinmayer durig the 1809 Italian campaign. ’Vaud,, I, 216-217. «DCC, V, 161. ^Ibid., 161. ‘‘^My estimate is based on assuming 6,000 per infantry division and 3,000 per cavalry division. "Vaud., 1,210. '^Included in this estimate are the forces of Chasteler and Jellachich both operating in the Tyrol. '^Pelet, III, 188-190. ''‘Vaud., 1,212. '^Petre, 300. ‘6Vaud.,I,217. '^DCC, V, 164-165. ^Hbid., 165. ^^Ibid., 165. 166. 2>/èzW., 166. ^^Ibid., 165. 23/6/W., 163. 24MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. 2^In Napoleon’s “Note” of January 1809, such an operation had been called for in which, using Palmanova as a base, Eugene would strike through the mountain passes towards Laibach, while Marmont would advance from the south. 26DCG, V, 176. 2^Ibid., 184-189. 2*My own estimate is based on assuming 500 per battalion, 6 battalions per brigade, and about 600 for a cavalry regiment. John had with him 8 infantry brigades and six regiments of cavalry. 2^See note #10. 30Vaud., I, 229-230.

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BATTLE ON THE PIAVE ^'The following account of the Battle on the Piave is based on reports by Eugene, Caffarelli, and Zoepffel, all eyewitness, and by the French war Minister Clarke all found in Du Casse, V, pp. 177-179,184-189,197-200; plus the accounts of Vaudoncurt, Volume I, pp. 233-245, and Pelet Volume III, pp. 196-207. 32Vaud., I, 23-239. 33DCC, V, 188. 179. 35DCC, V, 187-188. V, 199-200. 37Vaud., I, 243. 38DCC, V, 197-198. 39Vaud., I, 244. '‘«Macdonald, 142-143. '»'DCC, V, 178-181. 42DCC,V, 198-200. ‘^Rather than learning from Macdonald, Macdonald later in his career may have sought to emulate Eugene. In 1813, Macdonald commanding the Army of the Bober, was pursuing Blücher’s Army of Silesia. Perhaps remembering the Piave, Macdonald tried to cross the swollen Katzbach. While he was crossing the river, Bliicher turned on him and smashed his army. '‘‘The existence of a long supply train influenced the movements of Archduke Charles’ main army after the Battle of Wagram. See Petre, p. 386. '‘^Interestingly, Macdonald offers no explanation as to why John fought on the Piave.

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CHAPTER VIII PURSUIT INTO AUSTRIA

The pursuit of John’s army began at dawn on May 9 when Eugene’s army moved into Conegliano. From there, Grouchy, commanding all three cavalry divisions, was sent out after the retreating Austrians. The infantry of Dessaix and Abbé followed the cavalry, while Macdonald’s corps remained in Conegliano. The rest of the morning was spent in erecting a bridge at Priula and bringing the remainder of Eugene’s army over the Piave. Once that was done, the entire army was sent marching to the Livenza. The magnitude of the victory on the Piave became more apparent throughout the day. Reports reaching Eugene spoke of the disordered state of the Austrian army. Eugene wrote jubilantly that, “The field of battle is covered with enemy dead.”' More enemy prisoners were taken on May 9, increasing the margin of Eugene’s victory.^ Eugene had planned to drive eastwards to make an eventual junction at Laibach with Marmont. However, his plans changed on May 9, upon receipt of new orders from Napoleon. The Emperor’s letter, dated May 1, accurately predicted that his own victory at Eckmühl and subsequent advance on Vienna would force a retrograde movement by John. Napoleon ordered a vigorous pursuit of John (something Eugene was already doing). Napoleon was also planning a massive concentration of all his forces near Vienna, where a decisive blow could be struck against Charles’ main army. To this end Napoleon wanted Eugene’s army to reinforce his own, and provide security against any interfer­ ence from enemy forces in the Tyrol or Hungary. Consequently, Eugene was ordered to invade Carinthia via Villach and link up with Napoleon’s army at Bruck.^ The major invasion routes into Carinthia lay between the Tagliamento and Isonzo river valleys, and so Eugene could continue on his present eastward course until reaching the Tagliamento. Grouchy and Dessaix caught up with Frimont’s rear guard at Sacile late in the afternoon of May 9. The Austrians were easily driven from the town and they continued their retreat to Valvasone. From there they turned northeastwards, crossing the Tagliamento at Spilembergo, and followed the route of John’s main body, rejoining it at Saint Daniel, by May 10. Eugene’s forces caught up with Frimont at Saint Daniel the following day, The speedof Eugene’s pursuit isolated the remnants of Kalnassy’s brigade. Kalnassy had held the left wing of John’s army on the Piave, and had been driven away from the main body by Grenier. While John’s army crossed the Livenza at Sacile, Kalnassy was forced to cross further south at Brugnera, hoping to rejoin John by moving north to Pordenone or Valvasone. However, Grouchy’s cavalry was moving too fast and reached both towns before Kalnassy. Valvasone commanded the main road leading up the Tagliamento, and Kalnassy realized that it was impossible to rejoin John. His only hope to reach safety was- to continue eastward to the Isonzo. After crossing the Tagliamento on May 11 at Spilembergo, Eugene sent Grouchy with the bulk of the cavalry towards Udine and Palmanova, while the rest of the army

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PURSUIT INTO AUSTRIA turned north to attack John at Saint Daniel. Dessaix’s division reached the vicinity of Saint Daniel at 3:00 p.m. and found Frimont holding a defensive position near the town with 4,000 men. The rest of John’s army had already left for Osoppo. Eugene ordered Dessaix to attack at once to pin down the Austrians until Grenier’s corps arrived to deliver the coup de grace. Dessaix deployed four battalions to pin the Austrians in front while his two other battalions were sent to turn each flank. This double envelopment succeeded. The flanking battalions were apparently hidden by the terrain until they were almost in Frimont’s rear. Perceiving that his position was no longer tenable, Frimont prepared to withdraw. However, the attempt to retreat under fire while threatened on both flanks threw the Austrians into confusion. Displaying that same sense of timing that had served so well on the Piave, Eugene ordered the four center battalions to charge with the bayonet. Sweeping forward under the personal leadership of Eugene, the voltigeurs broke the Austrian line and sent them reeling towards Venzone. Eugene then unleashed his cavalry (the 9th Chasseurs and 23rd Dragoons), who charged into the fleeing Austrians'* inflicting severe casualties. The combat at Saint Daniel lasted two hours. As usual, casualties are difficult to determine; however, both French and Austrian sources claim that Frimont’s command had suffered a severe mauling. The estimates of Austrian losses range from 1,900-2,100 and for the French 200-800.^ Frimont managed to rally the remnants of his forces at Venzone, but was pushed out of that town by Dessaix the following morning. Frimont then picked up the Austrian blockading force at Osoppo and followed John’s retreating army up the river valley of the Fella, destroying the bridges over the river behind him. In all, John’s Austrian forces that recrossed the Carinthian frontier numbered only 18-19,000 troops.^ The only Austrian forces left in Italy were the brigades under Zach (which had been blockading Palmanova) and Kalnassy; together they had recrossed the Isonzo and were back into Carniola by May 13. John’s Italian campaign had ended in failure. In the course of four weeks the main body of John’s army (VIII and IX Corps) had been reduced by 50%. The purpose of the campaign was to destroy Eugene’s army; the best chance to do so occurred at Sacile, but John was not able to fully exploit his victory. The problem of confronting a growing French army in Italy was symptomatic of the difficulties the Austrians faced throughout the war; the Napoleonic Empire had greater manpower resources than the Austrian Empire. The only real chance for an Austrian victory lay in a quick strike against the French before those greater resources could be fully mobilized. But by the end of April, the Austrian armies were in retreat and on the defensive. John’s primary function now was to protect as much Austrian territory as possible in order to mobilize what manpower resources remained in Croatia, southern Austria and Hungary. The task seemed difficult. If John kept the bulk of his forces around Tarvis, then Carniola would be overrun. The two weak brigades of Zach and Kalnassy were considered inadequate to hold the Isonzo. Reinforcements would have to be sent to Carniola if that province was to be secure while the Croatian Feudal Ban was raised. The reinforcements for Carniola would have to come from John’s army, so the IX Corps under Ignatius Giulay was sent there. Giulay was to take command of all other forces in the province as well (the brigades of Zach, Kalnassy and Stoichewich’s brigade in Dalmatia). Giulay’s reinforcements were meager. The once proud IX Corps now

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PURSUIT INTO AUSTRIA consisted of just 5,000 troops (Gavassini’s infantry brigade, and a cavalry brigade under Spleny).^ With the detachment of the IX Corps, only Albert Giulay’s VIII Corps consisting of 13,000 regulars, plus some Landwehr, remained to defend Carinthia. This force was too demoralized by its recent defeats and was too small to make a successful defense, since Eugene could be expected to send 30-40,000 troops into Carinthia. Rather than fight for the frontier, John planned to fall back first to Klagenfurt and then to Graz, where he could cover the mobilization of the Hungarian Insurrection, gain reinforcements and maintain contact with Croatia. John also ordered Jellachich and Chasteler to march out of the Tyrol to join him at Klagenfurt, thereby reinforcing his own army with an additional 10-15,000 regular troops. Only a covering force would be left around Tarvis to delay Eugene’s advance while the rest of the army withdrew to the east. The town of Tarvis commanded the main exit from the Carnic Alps leading to the Drave River valley, Villach, and Klagenfurt, a route Eugene had to take to reach Bruck. There were two chief axes of advance from eastern Venetia to Tarvis: one route was up the river valleys of the Tagliamento and the Fella via Osoppo, Ponteba, and Malborghetto; the other was up the Isonzo via Coporetto and Predil. Tarvis itself was fortified, and the major western and southern approaches were defended by forts at Malborghetto and Predil respectively. Although Eugene knew that he had a comfortable numerical superiority over his opponent, the terrain leading into Carinthia was characterized by narrow river valleys and mountain passes which would favor the defending Austrians. A numerically weaker force could effectively hold up a larger one in a narrow valley by anchoring its flanks on the mountains. In such limited confines the numerically superior force would be unable to extend its front, and could only mount a direct frontal assault, so that the rival forces would be evenly matched at the point of contact. Eugene was not certain if John would fight to hold the Alpine passes or not. If he did, the Viceroy would want to avoid being blocked along just one of the narrow routes to Tarvis. It would be better for Eugene to attack on a broader front along both routes to Tarvis. Such a procedure would force the Austrians to stretch their own weaker forces to defend both routes. Thus Eugene could bring his numerically greater forces to bear against the enemy, and could more easily achieve a breakthrough against a weaker opponent forced to defend several avenues of approach. Therefore, Eugene would divide his army into several columns. Rusca’s division was already detached on the upper Piave. He was ordered to continue to advance up that river into the Carnic Alps and then turn eastward to eventually threaten Tarvis by way of the Gailitz River valley. Eugene himself would take another column via Osoppo and Malborghetto to Tarvis. Although Eugene’s army would march in separate columns, he was convinced that a too-equal division of his army could allow the Austrians to defeat his separate columns in detail, for by holding Tarvis the Austrians could operate on interior lines and concentrate successively against each column. So to insure a definite numerical superiority along his own route of march, Eugene’s column would be the strongest. Moreover, there was a series of mountain tracks above Osoppo in which the Viceroy’s forces could infiltrate behind any Austrian position. Eugene’s column would consist of Grenier’s corps comprised of the infantry divisions of Durutte and Pacthod.® This column would also include Baraguey’s corps (now containing but one division, Fontanelli’s), the Royal Guard, the cavalry divisions of Sahuc and Grouchy, the latter 101

PURSUIT INTO AUSTRIA being recalled from his mission near Udine, Sorbier’s artillery, and Dessaix’s division. In all Eugene’s column would total 25,000. Serras’ division made up another column, taking the route up the Isonzo towards Predil. In so doing it would, Eugene hoped, compel the Austrians to divide their forces around Tarvis. The combined columns of Rusca, Eugene, and Serras would total 36,000.^ Macdonald’s corps would have a different assignment. Eugene knew that the Croatian Feudal ban was being mobilized and that such a force based in Carniola could threaten his strategic right while he advanced into Carinthia. Throughout the campaign, Eugene had always shown a healthy and sometimes exaggerted concern for his strategic flanks; his earlier worries over Chasteler in the Tyrol are a case in point. Eugene was also responsible for Marmont’s corps, and had not received any word as to its fate. Eugene knew that Marmont was faced by an Austrian force and that the French general might need his help. Therefore, Macdonald, with the infantry divisions of Lamarque and Broussier and Pully’s cavalry division, was ordered to invade Carniola and seize the Austrian military base at Laibach. From there Macdonald was either to support Marmont, or move north to protect Eugene’s strategic right. The territory east of the Isonzo was mountainous, and the main road to Laibach from Palmonova was defended by a fort at Prawald. Eugene thought that some special elite troops might be needed in Carniola, so three voltigeur battalions were detached from Dessaix’s command to reinforce Macdonald. In all, Macdonald’s corps totaled 14,000. (To take up for the loss of the voltigeurs, Dessaix’s division would be reinforced by six regular battalions of the 22nd and 24th lègère regiments). On May 13, Eugene’s column advanced towards the Austrian frontier and was soon halted by the broken bridges over the Fella, between Venzone and Ponteba. Although Eugene’s infantry could get across the river on rafts, those vessels were too small and light to accommodate most of the artillery and cavalry. Eugene’s engineers calculated that it would take 1,200 workmen at least five days to rebuild the bridges. Eugene was unwilling to suffer such a delay and wanted to reach Tarvis before the Austrians could consolidate their positions. Therefore, he ordered the cavalry and artillery, save for a few light guns and howitzers, to make a retrograde march back down to Tagliamento to Saint Daniel and from there follow Serras’ division up the Isonzo. The rest of Eugene’s column would continue toward Malborghetto. *' Eugene was not the only one having trouble moving his guns; Rusca was in similar difficulty. The upper Piave was being defended by Schmidt’s brigade, which had been on detached service since the Austrians evacuated the Brenta. Schmidt had been methodically destroying bridges and cutting down trees as he withdrew up the Piave, to delay Rusca’s advance. Eventually, the road became impassable to wheeled vehicles, and Rusca realized that he would have to leave his artillery behind if he wanted to advance further. This he was not prepared to do, so he too was forced to make a detour. Rusca marched down the Piave to Ceneda, then on to Pordenone to follow Eugene’s column^.'^ The Austrian force protecting the Carinthian frontier consisted of 6,000 troops around Tarvis.'^ Some regulars, Croatian light infantry, and Landwehrh&Xétht frontier forts at Malborghetto and Predil. The advance units of Eugene’s and Serras’ columns reached the outskirts of those two places by May 15 . The fort at Malborghetto consisted of two stone towers and two blockhouses, surrounded by a ditch and palisade; it contained a garrison of 650 men and 10 guns.''^ 102

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PURSUIT INTO AUSTRIA The fort commanded the main road to the west of Tarvis, but it was possible for infantry to get behind the fort using mountain tracks that flanked the main roads. Malborghetto seemed imposing enough to Eugene to cause him to hold back from an immediate frontal assault on a narrow front. Instead, the fort would be isolated and attacked from all sides with artillery support. During May 15 and 16, Dessaix’s and Fontanelli’s divisions, using the mountain trails, bypassed Malborghetto and cut the main road at Saffnitz between Malborghetto and Tarvis. From there they moved towards Tarvis with orders to block any attempt to relieve Malborghetto. Several battalions had also been detached from Fontanelli’s division and were sent further south, via other small mountain roads towards Rabil, a village on the main road between Tarvis and Predil. The job of taking Malborghetto was given to Grenier’s corps. Pacthod’s division had followed Fontanelli around the fort and was in position to attack Malborghetto from the east on the morning of May 17. Pacthod’s attack was to coincide with Durutte’s, who would attack from the west. Durutte’s assault would be supported by six guns that had remained with Eugene’s column. The French artillery opened fire at 9:30 a.m. After a short bombardment, 8,000 troops of the two divisions stormed the fort. It was all over in thirty minutes; 300 Austrians were killed, 350 were captured, at a cost of 80 Frenchmen.'^ The spoils of victory found in the fort included thirteen guns and enough provisions to feed a division for a week.'^ After securing Malborghetto, Eugene marched swiftly towards Tarvis. Albert Giulay was at Tarvis with 6,000 troops.'* After fighting several skirmishes on the 16th with Dessaix and Fontanelli, Giulay evacuated Tarvis and took up a defensive position in a line of redoubts and redans that had been erected east of the town and along the banks of the Schlitza and Gailitz streams. This defensive line included twenty-four guns of which only ten had been emplaced. Eugene joined the blocking force at Tarvis by mid-day and promptly organized an attack against Giulay. One of Fontanelli’s brigades had already crossed the Schlitza south of Giulay’s position, threatening the left flank of the Austrian line. Eugene decided to exploit this situation; Dessaix would frontally pin Giulay while Fontanelli would attack and roll up Giulay’s left. The operation was carried out with precision and 'elan, especially on the part of Fontanelli’s troops. The men of the Second Italian Division had barely been engaged so far and were anxious to show what they could do. The redoubt which served to anchor Giulay’s left was taken by storm. The Italians then swept up the line attacking the redans from their unfortified rear. Dessiax’s forces had supported Fontanelli by attacking Giulay’s front. At this point the leading elements of Grenier’s corps arrived and marched north of Tarvis opposite Giulay’s right. Several battalions of Grenier’s corps managed to outflank the Austrian position and cut the main road to Villach. Under heavy pressure, and fearing that Fontanelli would soon cut his remaining line of retreat eastward to Weissinfels, Giulay ordered a retreat which quickly disintegrated into a rout. The Austrians suffered 3,000 casualties and lost seventeen guns, while the French suffered 300 casualties.'^ Eugene wanted to pursue the beaten Austrians but was unable to do so. Most of the French cavalry and artillery was still making their detour up the Isonzo and would not

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MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. 2DCC, V, 184. Hbid., p. 161. ^Ibid., pp. 190-192. ^French estimates are in DCC, V, 190-192, and the Austrian figures are found in Dr. Gaston Bodart, Molitür-Historisuhes Kreigs-Lexicon, (C.W. Stein, Wein und Leipzig; 1908), p. 402. «Vaud, I, 264. ^Ibid., 259-261. ^General of Division Baron Michel-Marie Pacthod had just arrived to take over Grenier’s former division which was being temporarily commanded by Abbé, one of that divisions brigadiers. With the arrival of Pacthod, Abbé returned to commandig a brigade in the division. ^My own estimate based on 5-6,000 per infantry division and 1-2,000 per cavalry division. loVaud., I, 276. "DCC, V, 196-197. '2Vaud., I, 257-259. ^^Ibid., p. 274. '^DCC, V, 203-204. '^In this instance Malborghetto played a role similar to that of Fort Bard, which delayed, but did not halt, Napoleon’s advance into Italy in 1800. '^Vaud, I, 242. ^’’Ibid., I, p.242. •»DCC,V, 209-213. ^^Ibid., pp. 212-214. 2°Vaud, I, 287-288. 2'DDC, V. 214-215. ^^Ibid.,pp. 214-215. 23/6jW.. p. 217. 24Vaud, I, 298-300. 25DCC, V,217. ^^Ibid., p. 217. ^'^Ibid., p. 181. 2*Lieutenant L. Loy, La Campaigne de Styrie en 1809 (Paris: Libraire Militarie, R. Chapelot et Cie, Paris, 1908), p. 15. 2^The Second Italian Division was now commanded by Severoli, who had just rejoined the army; Fontanelli was given overall command of the Royal Guard. ^“The account of the Battle of Saint Michel is based on information in MSP, Box §21, L.B. 09; DCC, V, 228-232; Vaud, I, 303-309; Pelet, III, 242-243, and Loy, pp. 9-17, which includes a report by General Vignolle, a member of Eugene’s staff. 31MSP, Box #27, L.B. 09. 32Vaud, I, 308. m id . 3^DCC, V, 237. m id .

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PURSUIT INTO AUSTRIA ^^Loy, pp. 49-50. 3’Vaud, I, 254-255. ^Hbid., pp. 293-296. ^^Macdonald, p. 152. '’oPelet, III, 239. ^>DCC, V, 233-234. ^2?elet, III, 207-210, and 212. '’^Petre, p. 309. “^NC, XVIII, 81. '’^Vaud, I, 263. ^^DCC, IV, 413. V, pp. 181-182. ^^Ibid.,pp. 232-233. ^^Ibid., p. 242. ^^Ibid., pp. 234-235.

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General Pacthod

General Seras

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CHAPTER IX Campaign in Hungary

The two chief military antagonists of the war, Napoleon and Archduke Charles, faced each other across the Danube in the vicinity of Vienna, each with about 130,000 men. For the French, the overall strategic objective was the destruction of Charles’ army. Napoleon had already made an attempt to do so and was defeated in May at the Battle of Aspern-Essling. However, the French Emperor was planning a second transDanubian offensive. To insure victory, Napoleon wanted to reinforce his own army with the 30-40,000 troops of Eugene’s army to achieve a numerical superiority at the decisive point. If Eugene joined Napoleon operating south of the Danube which could disrupt these lines in an offensive north of the Danube, it would mean denuding the area south of that river of imperial troops, and risk uncovering both armies’ line of communication. Napoleon’s line of communication ran west along the Danube’s southern bank from Vienna towards Bavaria and Strasbourg, while Eugene’s ran southward from Vienna towards Klagenfurt and Osoppo. There were still enemy forces operating south of the Danube which could disrupt these lines of communication. Chasteler’s division was still in the Tyrol as were the Tyrolean partisans. But these were being countered by Lefebvre’s VII Corps. Archduke John’s army in Hungary, however, posed a far greater threat. Since leaving Graz and moving toward Kormend behind the Raab River, John’s army had slowly been growing in strength. With the survivors from Italy serving as a nucleus, John had been reinforced with both regular Austrian units and Landwehr, raising his troop strength around Kormend to about 20,000.* Eighty miles north of Kormend was the fortress city of Raab at the confluence of the Raab, Rabnitz, and Little Danube Rivers. It was there that about 10,000^ largely untrained levies of the Hungarian Insurrection had been gathered under the leadership of Archduke Joseph, the Prince Palatine of Hungary. About 100 miles to the south of John’s position was Ignatius Giulay’s IX Corps at Agram on the Save River with an additional 8,000 troops.^ All of these three groups at Raab, Kormend, and Agram were under John’s overall command and totaled approximately 38,000. By themselves these three separate bodies did not constitute a major threat, but they could, if they were united into a single mass and flung against Napoleon’s strategic right flank and rear, and jeopardize Napoleon’s offensive against Charles. What caused Napoleon further concern was that by holding the Danube River crossings at Pressburg, Raab, and Komorn, John could bring all of his forces north to reinforce Charles and nullify any numerical superiority made by Eugene’s reinforcement of Napoleon’s army. Even if John’s forces moved north of the Danube, they could still pose a threat southward by launching sorties south of the Danube by way of Pressburg, Raab, or Komorn. Consequently, Napoleon wanted to neutralize the Austrian forces in Hungary and seize control of the river crossings as a prelude to his own attack against Charles.

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY These operations were entrusted to Davout and Eugene. Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout’s crack III Corps had the easier task, to capture the fortified bridgehead opposite Pressburg. The more difficult operation, that of neutralizing John’s army and securing the crossings at Raab and Komorn, was given to Eugene. Napoleon’s choice of Eugene proves that he had confidence in his stepson’s abilities as a military commander. In spite of his early defeat at Sacile, Eugene had produced impressive victories in Italy and Austria. It would have been just as easy for Napoleon to have sent Davout to the Raab and Eugene to Pressburg but by assigning the more difficult Raab operation to Eugene, the Emperor showed that he considered the Viceroy to be the equal of his marshals. After leaving his army at Bruck, Eugene spent two days with Napoleon at Vienna discussing the upcoming operation. The campaign was discussed in only general terms in which Napoleon stressed several factors: the importance of Eugene’s being able to countermarch quickly to Vienna for the decisive battle with Charles, the capture of the town of Raab, and the neutralization of John’s army either by destroying it in battle or by driving that army far enough away to prevent it from interfering in Napoleon’s own battle. What was impressed most upon Eugene at this conference was the fact that his campaign was to be totally subject to Napoleon’s larger strategic goals and that he should always be ready to conform his own movements to Napoleon’s higher goal, the destruction of Charles’ army. Consequently, the entire strategic direction of the Hungarian campaign was under Napoleon’s direct control. This would be facilitated by the proximity of the Hungarian front, which would be but twenty-four to forty-eight hours riding time from Imperial headquarters. Thus, Napoleon would be able to transmit orders to Eugene much more quickly than when the Viceroy was in Italy, and so the Emperor could keep Eugene on a tighter leash. Eugene left Vienna on June 2 and rejoined his army at Neustadt to where it had been moved in order to be closer to Napoleon’s army. At Neustadt were the corps of Grouchy, Grenier, Baraguey d’Hilliers, and the Royal Guard, 26,000 troops in all.'' Macdonald’s corps was still at Graz, and Marmont was moving on Laibach. Rusca’s division was still holding Klagenfurt. In preparation for his advance on Hungary, Eugene was ordered to move to Oedenburg, which was reached on June 5. Napoleon considered Eugene’s army at Oedenburg to be too weak for its mission and so placed Lauriston’s ad-hoc division, which had been screening Eugene’s army to the northeast, under the Viceroy’s command. General of Division Count Jacques Lauriston, one of Napoleon’s Aide-decamps, commanded a mixed force consisting of a brigade of Badenese infantry and a light cavalry brigade under General of Brigade Pierre Davis, the Baron ColbertChabanais. The addition of Lauriston’s forces brought Eugene’s effective strength to a total of 30,000.^ Napoleon wanted to include Macdonald’s corps in Eugene’s campaign, but the Emperor also wanted to capture the citadel at Graz. So, Macdonald was to leave Broussier’s division to besiege the fortress while he marched to join Eugene with the 7,000^ troops of Lamarque’s and Pully’s divisions. Neither Napoleon nor Eugene knew of the exact location of John’s army. The Austrians were last reported to be in the vicinity of Kormend, but it was not known if they were still there. Consequently, Napoleon was uncertain as to the direction in which Eugene should march. Therefore, the Emperor decided to keep Eugene around Oedenburg until John’s army could be found. Reconnaissance patrols were sent by Colbert and Pully to scout the banks of the Raab River.

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY On June 5, Colbert’s troopers had captured an Austrian soldier and sent him to Viceregal headquarters. The prisoner reported that only a rear guard was at Kormend, and that John’s main body was moving towards Raab to join with Archduke Joseph.’ Since Eugene was under Napoleon’s strategic direction, he could not act on this information without consulting Napoleon. Eugene, however, could make suggestions. The Viceroy proposed that if this information could be confirmed, he would march directly eastwards on Raab with the corps of Grouchy and Grenier and intercept John enroute, while the rest of his army would protect his and Napoleon’s flank and rear.* Eugene’s proposal is interesting in that it reveals his çwn understanding of Napoleon’s system of war. Eugene knew that John’s army should be destroyed as quickly as possible. In a letter to Napoleon, he pointed out that if he marched southeast on Kormend, he would only be striking thin air if John was already moving north.^ But by moving immediately eastwards to Raab, Eugene hoped to interpose his army between John and Joseph, secure a strategic central position, and use interior lines to defeat both in detail. Furthermore, Raab was closer to Vienna than Kormend, and Eugene could counter­ march to Vienna more quickly from Raab should Napoleon need him. Eugene’s thinking was also a product of his past experiences in May. His plan to intercept John on the march would be a repetition, on a larger scale, of his destruction of Jellachich at Saint Michael. Eugene had also been chasing and defeating Austrians for over a month; his succession of victories in May had restored his previous contempt for the Austrians and caused him now to underrate their military prowess. This was perhaps the real flaw in Eugene’s plan, for he expected to take only 17,000 troops with him to Raab. Such a force would be inferior in numbers to the column marching from Kormend. Napoleon considered Eugene’s plan too reckless, vetoed it, and sent him his own thoughts in a letter dated June 6: First of all, you must march assembled and concentrated. I don’t believe that Serras, Durutte, and Grouchy’s five cavalry regiments are sufficient. Baraguey d’Hilliers’ corps and the Royal Guard should be with you so that you will have 30,000 men at hand marching united in such a way as tô be assembled on the field in three hours time.*® Evidently Napoleon considered Eugene’s proposal a product of Eugene’s recent Austrian campaign; so he sought to point out the difference between Eugene’s last campaign and the present one, and to outline his own plans for operations in Hungary. In the plains of Hungary, one must maneuver differently than in the gorges of Carinthia and Styria. In Carinthia and Styria, if one overtakes the enemy at a point of interception as at Saint Michael for example, the enemy column is destroyed. But in Hungary, on the contrary, as soon as one occupies one point, the enemy will quickly move to another. Suppose that the enemy is moving on Raab, and that you arrive there before him, the enemy, learning of it enroute, will change direction and march on Pesth [Budapest]. What would the enemy do in this situation? Should he abandon Styria, Carinthia, Giulay’s corps and all the south of Hungary, uncover Pesth before the movements of Macdonald and Marmont in order to cross to the left bank of the Danube? Or should he, to the contrary, serve as a nucleus to unite all of the Hungarian Insurrection, rally the troops who have fled before Marmont, interrupt your communications with Laibach, and cover Pesth, which is after all, the capital of Hungary. In this last case it would seem possible that the enemy would maneuver on Kormend behind the Raab River, interrupt communications from Graz to Laibach, and still hold himself ready to cover Pesth. Then your movement on Raab would take you away from him, and would give the enemy the idea (for he, unlike us, is in familiar surroundings

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY and is better informed) of attacking and overthrowing Macdonald. I think therefore that a movement on to Stein am Anger and Kormend, or from Güns to Savar would be wise, if you haven’t any other information than what I have at this moment. As for me, it does hot appear to be yet proven whether the enemy is retiring on Komorn or on Raab. I think he will remain in observation, and will act according to the maneuvers we make against him, always keeping open his retreat on Pesth, and that if he retires on Raab, it would be better to outflank him on his left, than on his right, for by this means you would pass the river [the Raab] towards Sarvar, and would throw him into the Danube; for at Komorn as well as at Raab, he requires at least three days to cross the Danube; and finally, by this maneuver, you protect General Macdonald and General Marmont, and you can unite with them.*' Two elements stand out from these instructions. First, Napoleon envisioned one of his famous manoeuvres sur les derrières against John’s strategic left via Kormend. Second, any such movement would be limited by Napoleon’s concern about John’s turning his own strategic right. This concern which had kept Eugene’s army close to Napoleon’s during the first few days of June, was no doubt discussed at Vienna, and appears in Napoleon’s correspondence as early as June 4. Napoleon’s desire to keep Eugene nearby to cover his flank and rear would limit the depth of Eugene’s strategic turning maneuver against John’s left. Hence, Eugene might strike John’s flank but would not be able to drive into his rear which was the real object of a manoeuvre sur les derrières. By so limiting the strategic vista of Eugene’s campaign, Napoleon would help insure the escape of a large portion of John’s army. In the June 6 letter, Napoleon also informed Eugene that he would be reinforced with the light cavalry division under General of Division Baron Louis Montbrun, and that Eugene was to take his army from Oedenburg to Güns in preparation for a drive on Kormend via Sarvar.'^ The success of Eugene’s campaign was important to Napoleon. Although the Emperor had confidence in Eugene’s abilities, his confidence was tempered, to a point, by Eugene’s defeat at Sacile and by what he considered to be Eugene’s careless division of his army during the pursuit from the Piave.* ^Eugene’s own plan to drive directly on Raab was the final element in making the Emperor believe that there was room for improvement in Eugene’s performance as a general, and that his stepson was in need of further instruction on the art of war. It was at his juncture that Napoleon wrote his critique of Eugene’s Italian and Carinthian campaigns, and in so doing hoped that Eugene would avoid repeating his past mistakes. Most important to Napoleon was to march in readiness to fight concentrated and with combined arms. He stressed this to Eugene in a letter dated June 7: One must march assembled and not in small packets. Here is a general principle of war. A corps of 25-30,000 men cannot be isolated; well handled it can fight or evade battle and maneuver according to circumstances without getting into trouble, because it cannot be forced into an engagement, and finally it can fight for a very long time. A division of 9-12,000 men can be left isolated without inconvenience for an hour; it can contain a more numerous enemy, and can give time for the rest of the army to arrive. Thus it is useful to form an advance guard of not less than 9,000 while placing the infantry well assembled and located at most an hour’s distance from the army.*'* Napoleon used Eugene’s defeat at Pordenone, the day before Sacile, to illustrate the use of divisional size units: You lost the 35th Regiment because you forgot this principle, and formed a rear guard composed of a single infantry regiment which was turned. If it had 119

CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY been composed of four regiments they would have formed such a mass of resistance that the army would have arrived in time to save them.*^ The Emperor then specifically turned to discuss grand tactical operations in Hungary: Generally, in open country, the cavalry must be alone, unless it is either a question of a bridge, defile, or a given position, for the cavalry must be able to withdraw before the enemy infantry can arrive. Today you enter into regular operations. You must march with an advance guard composed of a lot of cavalry, a dozen guns, and a good division of infantry. The rest of your corps must bivouac one hour in the rear, the light cavalry covering as much as possible. You must think as Colonel Nugent,*^ who directs Archduke John. As soon as he sees you marching on one side, and Macdonald on the other, he will march against you, and since he has the advantage of knowing the people and the countryside, he will march assembled without scouting with his light cavalry, and will doubtlessly fall upon you. Consequently, it is necessary for you to well organize your order of march. The artillery should be with the divisions, each at its own post on the march as well as in the bivouac and in bivouac as in wartime, in such a manner to take up arms at daybreak. It is not impossible that John has chosen a good position and will wait for you. In that case, I recommend to you to reconnoiter thoroughly and establish your system before attacking. A forward movement without a strong combination [of all arms] can only be successful when the enemy is retreating, but it is never successful when the enemy is in position and has decided to defend himself; then it is a system and a combination which wins a battle ... The distance from your advance guard to your artillery park must not be more than three or four leagues. You must attend to your artillery, so that when you have decided to make your attack, support it with a battery of 30-36 guns, nothing can resist it, whereas the same number of guns disseminated along the line will not give you the same results.'"^ Although this letter was sent to instruct Eugene, Napoleon’s thoughts were largely superfluous since Eugene, out of his own experiences and necessities, had already done what Napoleon recommended. In Italy Eugene had organized an advance guard of divisional strength under Dessaix designed to engage the enemy until the main body of a French army arrived; Serras’ division performed a similar function at Saint Michael. Artillery was used in relatively large concentrations at the Piave, Saint Daniel, and Saint Michael. Finally, almost all of Eugene’s victories had been won by tactical combinations of the three arms of artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Napoleon’s June 7 letter has been used by Petre to reinforce the theory that Eugene was inexperienced if not incompetent in waging war. However, what is important about this letter is what Napoleon did not say; there were no tactical criticisms of any of Eugene’s victories. The only complaint made by Napoleon on Eugene’s Carinthain campaign was on strategic, not tactical, grounds. Petre misses this important point. Napoleon’s comments on the Italian and Austrian campaigns were made to improve the performance of an already successful general. Had the Emperor considered Eugene unfit for command, he would have sent someone else to deal with John. The two letters of June 6 and 7 also provide further evidence that Napoleon was willing to train a subordinate in his system of war. The two letters contain the Emperor’s thoughts on the use of the manoeuvre sur les derrières, as well as the grand tactical use of army corps and divisions; combined with his “Notes” on the defense of Italy, they provide a practical guide to Napoleon’s system of war. Rather than hide the basis for his own successes in war, Napoleon was quite willing to share them with his subordinate, Eugene. 120

CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY One point that should be noted is that both Napoleon and Eugene expected Marmont to be in supporting distance within a week. His army corps had reached Laibach by June 3, and it was not unreasonable to hope that Marmont could be at Graz or even Kormend by June 10. However, Marmont would be delayed by the threatening movements of Giulay’s IX Corps and Chasteler’s division. Consequently, Marmont would not actually join the main French armies until the end of June, and so would not have any real part in Eugene’s campaign. On June 6, information began to pour into both Imperial and Viceregal headquarters concerning the location of the major Austrian units south of the Danube. It was confirmed that Chasteler was moving down the valley of the Drave, threatening Villach and Klagenfurt.'* Rusca was at the latter place and could be hoped to deal with him. Eugene received news that his previous information concerning John’s movements was wrong. The Archduke’s main body was at Kormend, with other units at Saint Gothard and Furstenfeld.'^ Giulay’s corps, joined by the remnants of the Austrian forces from Dalmatia, was moving north from the Drave River. All evidence pointed to a general concentration of these three groups at Kormend. Eugene estimated that if Chasteler could by-pass Rusca, he could arrive at Kormend between June 10 and June 12, while Giulay could be there on June 15 or 16. Relying on the strategic direction imposed by Napoleon’s June 6 letter, Eugene planned to attack John with superior forces before Chasteler and Giulay could arrive.^® A concentration of over 40,000 men was ordered to take place in the area between Sarvar and Kormend by June 9. Eugene marched out from Güns for Sarvar with Lauriston’s division as an advance guard, followed by the corps of Grouchy,^' Grenier, and Baraguey. Macdonald was ordered to leave one division (Broussier’s) at Graz to continue the siege of the citadel, and to march with the rest of his corps (Lamarque and Pully) towards Kormend. Marmont was to hold himself in readiness to deal with either Chasteler or Giulay depending on circumstances.^^ However, the hoped-for battle at Kormend did not take place. Realizing that he was outnumbered, John evacuated his positions upon learning of Eugene’s advance, and moved northeast towards Papa from where he could continue towards Raab and Joseph’s Hungarian levies. The Viceroy reached Sarvar on June 9, but Macdonald was nowhere to be found. Macdonald received his orders to march only on June 9 and so could not reach Kormend until late the following day. In the meanwhile, Eugene had also lost contact with John. Following Napoleon’s instructions about advance guards, the Viceroy organized such a force to find the enemy. Grouchy would command the advance guard consisting of the cavalry divisions of Guerin and Montbrun, the latter being reinforced by Colbert, and the infantry divisions of Serras and Lauriston. Grouchy crossed the Raab at Sarvar' and probed to the east below Papa. Meanwhile, Chasteler, whose presence in the Tyrol had influenced Eugene’s operations in Italy, would also affect the fate of the Hungarian campaign. Chasteler emerged from the Tyrol with 4-5,000^^ troops and attacked Rusca at Klagenfurt on June 8. Rusca held the town but was unable to prevent Chasteler from by-passing Klagenfurt and continuing eastward down the Drave to join with Giulay. The passage of Chasteler’s division had for a time disrupted communications with Italy, and Napoleon was worried that the combined forces of Chasteler and Giulay would return to threaten the rear of his own army. To prevent such an occurrence, 121

CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY Marmont was ordered to reinforce Broussier at Graz. Such a force would have been strong enough to deal with Chasteler and Giulay, but Napoleon was so sensitive about any threat to his lines of communication that he ordered Eugene not to heavily engage Macdonald’s corps lest that general’s troops be needed to face Chasteler and Giulay. Napoleon’s order put Eugene in a quandry as to the use of Macdonald’s corps. He knew that his own operation was part of Napoleon’s grand strategic design to win the war, and he knew from his past conversations and correspondence that Napoleon was much concerned about any disruption of his communications. If Eugene chose to use all of his forces at maximum capacity to destroy John, he might win a battle at the cost of upsetting the Emperor’s other plans and jeopardize the larger goal of ultimate victory. The result was that Eugene would leave Macdonald in the rear ready to move at the Emperor’s call. Macdonald’s troops would support Eugene in case of a reverse, but the Viceroy felt constrained from using them in an offensive manner. This stricture concerning Macdonald’s corps would insure that Eugene’s victory over John on June 14 would be incomplete. Grouchy found John’s army, which was moving north towards Papa, on June 11 His prey located, Eugene sent his whole army in motion. Speed was of the essence since Eugene wanted to destroy John befôre he could combine with the troops of the Hungarian Insurrection at Raab. Grenier and Baraguey marched northeast from Sarvar to join Grouchy before Papa on June 12. Macdonald, who had now reached Kormend, was ordered to cross the Raab and its tributary the Marczal, and turn north to follow the army towards Papa. Eugene did not expect Macdonald to join him until June 13, but with the rest of his army closing on Papa, he considered he had enough troops to beat John.^^ Napoleon was right about John’s being familiar with the territory and Eugene’s whereabouts. Early on June 12, John left a rear guard at Papa and headed north towards Raab before Eugene’s army arrived. Grouchy’s cavalry arrived in front of Papa early in the afternoon. Under the direct orders of the Viceroy, the massed French squadrons smashed right through the screening Austrian cavalry and stormed into the town. Most of the rear guard fell or was captured by the charging French horsemen.^’^ However, John and his main body had managed to get away. Eugene was furious that his adversary had escaped. Intelligence reports conflicted as to whether John was heading for Raab or Komorn. Raab was closer to Vienna, and Eugene, influenced by Napoleon’s instructions not to move too deeply into Hungary, decided to move on Raab rather than Komorn. The town of Raab is approximately twenty-five miles north of Papa, and is located at the confluence of the Raab River which runs from south to north, the Little Danube River which flows from west to east, and the Rabnitz River which runs parallel to the Little Danube. To the east of the town, between the Little Danube’s southern bank and the Raab’s eastern bank, was an entrenched camp where Archduke Joseph’s troops of the Hungarian Insurrection were gathered. Raab itself was a major road junction for the routes running along the banks of the Raab and Little Danube Rivers. Three to four miles south of the city is a long ridge which runs perpendicular to the main highway on the Raab’s eastern bank. The ridge, known as the Csanak Heights, begins about two-thirds of a mile from the river bank and extends two miles to the east. The village of Csanak is along the northeastern slope of the ridge.

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY Two and a half miles north and east of the Csanak Heights is a large plateau called the Szabadhegy Heights, whose north-eastern face is a mile and half from the town of Raab. The village of Szabadhegy is located on and around the western half of the plateau. In front of the center of the southern face of the plateau, located on a slight rise of ground, is the Kismegyer farmhouse. The farmhouse was surrounded by a high and thick stone wall. Three hundred yards due east of the farmhouse is a steep mound topped by a stone chapel. A mile and a half further east is the Pansza marsh, from which the Pansza brook flows in front of the mound, farmhouse, and the plateau, to empty into the Raab River. John arrived at Raab on June 13 with thirty-five battalions and twenty-eight squadrons^» totaling 17,500 infantry and 2,900 cavalry.A t the entrenched camp next to Raab, Archduke Joseph had assembled thirteen battalions and thirty-eight squadrons 30numbering 6,500 infantry and 3,800 cavalry.T he combined forces now under John’s overall command totaled 30,600. Only half of the troops were regulars, the rest of the army consisting of Landwehr and Hungarian levies who were imperfectly trained and armed; this was particularly true of the Hungarians. Upon his arrival at Raab, John received orders from Archduke Charles commanding him to send 8,000 of his troops to Pressburg, which was being threatened by Marshal Davout.^2 John was to base the rest of his army at Raab and Komorn to harrass Eugene, to try to keep the Viceroy as far away from Napoleon as possible; after this John was to move to the north bank of the Danube and join Charles above V ienna.John was not too happy with these orders, especially over the prospect of losing his status as an independent commander by uniting with Charles. While John was considering these orders, Eugene’s vanguard was seen approaching from the southwest. John had the option to cross the Little Danube at Raab or Komorn, but he chose instead to stay on the southern bank of the river and fight. John had fought two major engagements against Eugene at Sacile and the Piave; he had won at Sacile. Now for the first time since the Battle on the Piave, John could meet Eugene with a force approaching numerical parity. However, because of the large numbers of “green” Landwehr and Hungarian levies in John’s army, he did suffer from a qualitative inferiority compared to Eugene’s troops. John had received large amounts of new artillery which, he hoped, in conjunction with a proper use of terrain would compensate for his qualitative inferiority. Both the Csanak and the Szabadhegy positions could provide the natural basis for a strong defense upon which Eugene’s army could be broken in an assault against either of the two heights. If so, a victory over the French would enable John to regain contact with Giulay and Chasteler and, he hoped, allow him to continue to operate south of the Danube, largely independent of Charles’s control. , Evidently, John decided to base his defense along the Csanak Heights. Four Austrian biattalions were already around the heights, and John wanted to occupy that place in force before Eugene; but it was Eugene who got there first. The Viceroy, riding with Grouchy’s cavalry corps, swept the Austrian infantry from the area and seized the ridge.^^ At this point, a strong enemy force, consisting of six cavalry regiments, an infantry brigade, and fifteen guns, could be seen advancing from the north.3^ Eugene ordered Grouchy to charge the oncoming Austrians to delay their advance until Eugene’s own approaching infantry and artillery could occupy and secure the Csanak Heights.

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY Grouchy launched a series of well-directed charges against the advancing Austrians. The enemy cavalry was driven off, but the infantry, which kept themselves in squares and supported by their guns, managed to advance slowly. But the French cavalry had done their job, for the infantry of Lauriston and Durutte plus Sorbier’s artillery managed to secure the heights before the Austrians could arrive. John wanted Eugene to attack him in a strong position, not the other way around. The Archduke did not think his army, with its many raw troops, was capable of mounting a major assault to capture the Csanak Heights. So John recalled his attack force and decided to make his stand based on the Szabadhegy Heights. The Szabadhegy position was in many ways superior for a defensive battle to the Csanak Heights. The Szabadhegy plateau commanded all of the southern and western approaches to Raab. The circular shape of the plateau insured that an attack from any direction would have to move uphill, and the plateau was wide enough to allow for the easy deployment of large masses of troops. The village of Szabadhegy, located on the western half of the plateau, would favor the defenders who could use the houses to provide cover. The southern approach to the plateau was protected by the Kismegyer farmhouse and the chapel mound; both of those places could serve as strong points to break-up any enemy attack, just as Hougoumont and La Haye-Sainte would later do at Waterloo. John hoped that Eugene would attack these strong points and get bogged down among them, after which the French would be thrown back by his infantry massed on the plateau. John would use his cavalry to cover the intervals between the plateau and the Raab River to his right, and between the plateau and the Pansza marsh to his left. It was already late in the day, and the rest of the afternoon and evening of June 13 was spent in preparation for the upcoming battle. John sought to occupy his chosen position and amalgamate his Austrian and Hungarian units. In John’s army, the old corps structure had disappeared. The Austrian regular and Landwehr units had been combined into divisions of two to three brigades each. There were now three infantry divisions commanded respectively by Jellachich, Colloredo, and Marziany. During the 13th, eight of the Hungarian battalions from the entrenched camp were brought over to reinforce the divisions of Jellachich and Colloredo on the plateau. In all John would have forty-three battalions massed on the plateau, and sixty-six squadrons protecting his flanks. Jellachich’s division would hold the western or right half of the plateau which included the village of Szabadhegy on the plateau and its slopes, as well as the nearby bridge over the Pansza brook. Colloredo would hold the eastern or left half of the plateau, as well as the farmhouse and the mound. Marziany’s division would be held in reserve behind the other two divisions. On John’s left between the mound and the Pansza marsh would be located forty squadrons, most of which were Hungarian, under Archduke Joseph and General Major Meczery. (Meczery was the actual commander of the left wing; Joseph was merely a figurehead.) Frimont would hold the ground between Szabadhegy and the Raab with twenty-six squadrons consisting of both Hungarian and Austrian troops. The entire front from the marsh to the Raab would be well garnished with artillery. On the opposite bank of the Raab River was the entrenched camp held by five battalions and six squadrons, all Hungarian, under General Major Mezko. It would be Mazko’s job, once Eugene advanced against the plateau, to threaten Eugene’s left and rear.^*

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY Eugene was not certain whether John would attack him the following day and so spent the rest of the 13th positioning his army on and around the Csanak Heights with his left resting on the Raab River. The Viceroy’s entire army was now present on the field, save for Macdonald’s corps which had just reached Papa. Orders were sent to Macdonald to march to the Csanak Heights as soon as possible. There was some trouble in locating the person of Macdonald. That general had retired for the night in a house outside the town. By the time Macdonald was found, it was already after midnight. It would take some time to get the corps on the road. Pully’s division, being mounted, managed to join Eugene before dawn and brought Eugene’s total troop strength to 33,000'*° but Macdonald, accompanying Lamarque’s infantry, would not arrive until 4:00 p.m. when the battle was all but over. As the morning of June 14 wore on, it became apparent to Eugene that John was not going to attack. Eugene knew that John’s army posed a threat to Napoleon’s plans, and if he could destroy that army by battle he could ease the situation for the Emperor, and pave the way for the climactic trans-Danuban offensive against Charles. Thus, Eugene decided to attack and destroy John. Eugene believed himself to be outnumbered (he thought John had 40,000 troops),'*' but he knew that one-third to one-half of John’s army consisted of raw troops and untried levies, and that the battle power of John’s army was nowhere near what it had been in Italy. Furthermore, Eugene believed that his existing army could beat John’s, and that it could be done without using Macdonald’s corps. The Viceroy was under orders not to engage Macdonald’s troops heavily and, as the afternoon approached, Eugene feared that John might withdraw if he delayed any further. So the Viceroy decided to begin the battle without waiting for the arrival of Lamarque’s division. Surveying the Austrian positions, Eugene decided to turn John’s left and throw him into the Danube, just as Napoleon hoped he would do.'*^ The best method to achieve such a result, especially for an army either equal or inferior in numbers to its opponent, is by the oblique order of attack. Eugene had used the oblique order at Sacile. The oblique order of battle called for an army to be divided into an attack wing, which would advance its tactical units in succession, and a passive wing, which would merely protect the flank of the attack wing. The right flank of Eugene’s army would serve as the attack wing and would consist of the corps of Grouchy and Grenier. Grouchy’s two cavalry divisions under Guerin and Montbrun would begin the advance, attack Meczery’s cavalry between the marsh and the mound, and then pivot inwards towards the eastern face of the plateau. Grenier’s corps would march to the left and a little behind Grouchy’s cavalry. Serras’ division of Grenier’s corps would attack the mound and the farmhouse; Durutte’s division, the other half of Grenier’s corps, would support Serras on the left. Once Grenier had taken his objectives, he would storm the plateau in combination with Grouchy and roll up John’s line from left to right.'*^ The corps of Baraguey d’Hilliers would form the left and passive wing of the army and consisted of the divisions of Severoli, Sahuc, and Lauriston. Severoli would face Szabadhegy village and cover the left flank of Durutte’s division. Lauriston would form the army’s extreme left flank and would confront the entrenched camp and the town of Raab. Sahuc’s cavalry would link the other two divisions and would face Jellachich’s horsemen across the Pansza brook.'*'*

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY The army’s reserve would be under Eugene’s personal command and would be stationed in the rear of Grenier’s corps. The forces of the reserve consisted of Pacthod’s infantry division, Fontanelli’s Royal Guard, and Pully’s dragoon division.'*^ At noon Eugene’s army advanced to the attack, moving in echelons from the right.'*^ Each infantry division was deployed in two lines of battalion columns, supported by artillery, and was covered by a thick cloud of tirailleurs. Eugene’s attack promptly bogged down. The Pansa brook and its marshy banks soon disrupted the alignment of the French formations by slowing the pace of Grouchy’s cavalry and Serras’ infantry so that it was actually Durutte’s division that was the first to become engaged between the farmhouse and the outskirts of Szabadhegy. Serras finally got across the brook and became involved in a fierce fight around the farmhouse and the mound. Grouchy’s cavalry was completely stalled around the brook and under heavy fire from the Austrian guns. The blunting of his attack wing forced Eugene to alter his battle plan. The key factor for an oblique attack to succeed is for the attack wing to keep moving forward so that the initiative is maintained and the enemy is kept off balance. If the attack wing is stalled, the enemy is free to maneuver and can regain the initiative by moving his reserves where he wants to. This is what happened to Eugene at Sacile, and he did not want John to mount a counterattack of his own. Learning from past experience, Eugene issued revised orders. Rather than try to reinforce a stalled attack wing as he did at Sacile, the Viceroy decided to change the emphasis of his attack from an oblique to a “Napoleonic” battle plan. Severoli’s division was ordered to take post on Durutte’s left, and with the other two infantry divisions of Durutte and Serras would form a masse primaire and mount a full-scale parallel assault against the village of Szabadhegy, the farmhouse, and the mound. The purpose of this assault was to induce John into a battle of attrition in which he would be forced to commit his reserves. Meanwhile, Grouchy’s corps would form the masse de manoeuvre, which would continue its advance, drive back Meczery’s cavalry, and turn John’s left. This turning movement would force John either to commit what was left of his reserves or detach units from his center to cover his left. In either case, the Austrian troops on and around the plateau would be stretched to the limit, at which time Eugene would send in his masse de rupture, Pacthod and Fonantelli, to shatter the Austrian line. Although there would be some variation from this scenario, the battle generally followed this plan. The three infantry divisions pressed their attack under heavy fire from Austrian guns and muskets. Grouchy’s cavalry at last negotiated the Pansza brook and was promptly charged by Meczery’s cavalry. The rival horsemen charged and countercharged each other, but the French horse artillery batteries'*^ enabled Grouchy to gain the upper hand. By combining fire and shock. Grouchy drove back the Austrian cavalry unmasking the left flank of Colloredo’s infantry division. Guerin was sent to follow Meczery’s cavalry to keep them at bay, and Montbrun was directed against Colloredo’s left flank. This threat to his left forced Colloredo to evacuate the mound and bend back his line to face Montbrun. John also sent some units from Marziany’s division to the eastern face of the plateau to ward off Montbrun. With the mound taken. Serras directed most of his energies to capturing the farmhouse, while Severoli and Durutte advanced up the slope of the plateau against Jellachich’s troops in Szabadhegy. John no doubt had remembered Sacile as well as Eugene. Just as Eugene’s attack had become stalled around Porcia at Sacile, his assault was now halted at Kismegyer

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY farmhouse. If Colloredo could continue to hold off Serras and Montbrun, John could counterattack Eugene’s left-center which had now reached the crest of the plateau. Jellachich was reinforced with three battalions from the reserve division and with three more from Colloredo. With these troops in the front ranks, Jellachich launched a fierce bayonet charge that swept Severoli and Durutte off the crest and back towards the Pansza brook. This was the climax of the battle, and had John supported this attack with all of his reserves he might have broken through. However, the second line of Severoli’s Italians managed to contain the assault. Eugene ordered up Pacthod’s fresh division to attack Jellachich, after which he personally rallied the troops of Severoli and Durutte, and led them back into the fight. The three divisions of Pacthod, Severoli, and Durutte hurled back Jellachich’s forces and stormed the crest of the plateau. By this time Serras had taken the farmhouse and was driving Colloredo’s weak and exhausted troops up the slope of the plateau. John still had the ten fresh battalions of Marziany’s division but this represented his last infantry reserve. Since the French were now on the plateau in force, John’s left flank was threatened and the troops of Jellachich and Colloredo were largely spent. Eugene still had the Royal Guard in reserve, and another infantry division, Lamarque’s, could be seen approaching in the distance. If Marziany was committed to an attack and was repulsed, there would be nothing left to cover the retreat, and John’s entire army would be lost. Deciding that discretion was the better part of valor, John used Marziany’s division and as much cavalry as he could muster to cover the retreat of his army to Komorn. Marziany managed to hold back the French while the troops of Jellachich and Colloredo streamed past them in retreat. Some of Frimont’s cavalry withdrew into Raab while the rest fell back eastward to support Marziany. Sahuc and Pully were sent to follow Frimont while Lauriston closed in on the suburbs of Raab. Frimont’s cavalry was eventually driven off and Sahuc’s horsemen closed in on Marziany’s infantry. Several infantry squares were broken, and Marziany himself was captured. However, the coordination of the French pursuit slackened. Grouchy did not have command over Sahuc and Pully, and many divisional and regimental commanders did not keep a tight enough control over their troopers. The result was that by the time the French cavalry got itself sorted out night was falling and John’s army along with the bulk of the rear guard managed to escape. While the French army followed John’s retreating forces, the Hungarian units on the left bank of the Raab abandoned their camp. Some of the Hungarians went into Raab to garrison the town while the rest moved south down the left bank of the river towards Sarvar to raid Eugene’s communications. This effort would prove to be merely a nuisance, since Eugene would soon have a new line of communications running along the southern banks of the Rabnitz and Danube Rivers to Vienna. John’s army continued to retreat eastward throughout the night. Upon reaching Komorn the following morning, John crossed to the north bank of the Danube leaving a strong garrison holding the bridge at Komorn. The Battle of Raab cost the Austrians 6,000 casualities, three guns, two colors, and General Marziany."^^ French casualties totaled 2,500; among the wounded was General Severoli.'*^ Generals Baraguey d’Hilliers, Grenier, Durutte, Serras, Dessaix, and General of Brigade Bonfanti all had horses shot out from under them.^*’

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY Eugene had won a partial tactical victory leading to an incomplete strategic success. John had suffered damage; he retreated to the north bank of the Danube and was separated from Giulay and Chasteler, but his army was not destroyed. After a period of increasing military competence during the advance from the Adige to the Raab, Eugene’s powers as a general seem to have diminished in this most recent battle. At a glance, Eugene chose to attack with but three (Grenier, Grouchy, and Baraguey) of his four corps, and committed them to a frontal attack combined with a tactical flanking maneuver on the right that never succeeded in trapping John. Why did Eugene not use his fourth corps, Macdonald’s, in an independent strategic turning movement that would entrap John’s army? The reason for this apparent ill use of Macdonald’s corps was Napoleon’s order not to heavily engage Macdonald’s troops. If Macdonald, who was well placed to envelop John at Papa had been sent on a strategic turning movement, he could not have been easily recalled should Napoleon suddenly want Macdonald to march back to Graz to help Broussier and Marmont. The dispatch of one of the other army corps around John’s flank was not feasible either. All three corps were already concentrated around Csanak, and to redirect one of them to an eastward sweep around John would have caused confusion. Besides, if another corps had been sent on such a mission, then Macdonald would have been needed to help engage the Austrians while the manoeuvre sur les derrières was being executed. So Eugene was compelled by Napoleon’s orders to use Macdonald’s troops in a limited fashion. Without the full use of his entire army, the Viceroy had little choice but to adopt the battle plan that was used at Raab, and any criticism of Eugene’s failure to destroy John by a strategic envelopment must be made against Napoleon and not Eugene. Eugene’s tactical direction of the battle was good and showed that Eugene had learned from past mistakes. At Raab Eugene did not want to suffer another defeat because his attack wing became stalled at the mound and farmhouse. Rather than try to reinforce the stalled wing, as he did at Sacile, Eugene altered his tactical dispositions to extend pressure against the enemy’s front, and he did so without disrupting the positions of his own army. Eugene maintained the initiative almost throughout the entire battle; he kept his reserves in hand. He adequately read his opponent’s positions and employed the masse primaire, the masse de manoeuvre and the masse de rupture to the fullest tactical advantage. Napoleon seemed to be pleased with Eugene’s conduct of the battle. The only criticism that the Emperor made was of the deployment of Eugene’s artillery. Napoleon wrote that Eugene should have placed twenty-five guns at the head of Serras’ division to blast through Colloredo’s troops;^^ this seems to be a minor point. There were ten to twelve guns attached to each of Eugene’s divisions, and evidently Eugene and Sorbier thought them to be sufficient. The Viceroy was familiar with the Napoleonic practice of concentrating artillery at the decisive point, but at Raab he was concerned about the havoc that the Austrian guns would cause against his own troops. To increase Serras’ artillery compliment meant taking guns from someone else. So, Eugene preferred that each division keep its own integral artillery to provide counterbattery fire to protect his infantry and cavalry. The fire provided by the divisional artillery was most useful when Eugene altered his deployment from an oblique to a parallel order, for in a battle of attrition each division needed support. The divisional artillery also played a vital role in driving back Meczery’s cavalry and Jellachich’s forces during their counterattack. The only major criticism that can be made about Eugene’s conduct was in his failure to carry out a pursuit à l’outrance once John’s army was in retreat. A pursuit, if pressed

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY vigorously, could have led to the destruction of John’s army. In this instance Eugene failed to properly direct his cavalry. The only excuse that can be made was that Eugene had to look over his shoulder against any possible sortie from Raab, and that the valor of the Austrian rear guard managed to delay the French pursuit until Eugene thought it was too late in the day to charge after John’s main body. On a strategic level the entire campaign, from June 5 through June 14, was only partially successful in achieving the goals that Napoleon had wanted. Eugene succeeded in pushing John north of the Danube and separated him from Chasteler and Giulay, reducing the danger to Napoleon’s strategic left, and paving the way for Napoleon’s crossing of the Danube. But the French were unable to achieve their other goal of preventing John’s army from joining Charles, and in this respect, the campaign was a failure. The inability to destroy John’s army was the product of several factors. One was Napoleon’s strategic direction of Eugene’s army. By hoping to bring Eugene swiftly back to Vienna, Napoleon kept the Viceroy on a tight strategic leash and limited the depth of Eugene’s sweep beyond the Raab River. By keeping Eugene close to the Raab, Napoleon forced the Viceroy to advance against John’s strategic front rather than his rear, insuring that the line of retreat was always open for John. Another factor was the limits placed on the use of Macdonald’s corps by Napoleon which reduced the chances of Eugene’s winning a decisive tactical victory at Raab. Finally, there was Eugene’s own failure to pursue John vigorously after defeating him at Raab allowing him to escape over the Danube with his army still in being. It was with this army that John brought almost 13,000 troops to the Wagram battlefield on July 5. Fortunately, he arrived too late to save Charles from defeat. But John’s tardiness was not due to the generalship of Napoleon or Eugene, but rather to John’s own lack of enthusiasm to serve under Charles’ direct command. Had John arrived in time to attack the right flank of the French army, the Austrians might have had a chance to win that battle. It was luck, not genius, that delayed John’s march. The correspondence between Napoleon and Eugene provides useful information about the tutor-student relationship between the two men. Eugene was not the strategist that his stepfather was, and he needed some guidance concerning the strategic conduct of war. Eugene’s plan to march directly on Raab was poorly thought out and would have been a reckless venture. Napoleon rightly vetoed this plan and issued his own strategic directive on June 6 which incorporated his thoughts on securing one’s own lines of communication while threatening those of the enemy.^^ In this instance Napoleon’s instructions were valid and necessary. Napoleon’s instructions on grand tactics, however, were not really needed. The Emperor advised Eugene to march assembled and use tactical combinations in combat to avoid being beaten on the field. Eugene himself had independently come to the same conclusion after his defeat at Sacile as was proved by his tactical performance during May. The rest of the military operations conducted in June were not on the same scale as the Battle of Raab and were somewhat anti-climactic. The threat to Napoleon’s strategic flank and rear south of the Danube had diminished after June 14. John was north of the Danube, and Chasteler had left Giulay to try to threaten Eugene’s non-existent communications south of the Raab. With Napoleon more at ease about the Austrians south of the Danube, Eugene was given full tactical control of all of his forces, including the corps of Macdonald. Eugene

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY was ordered to capture Raab and destroy the fortified bridge at Komorn to prevent John from recrossing to the southern bank of the Danube. The Viceroy was also ordered to give the impression that he would soon march on Budapest in the hope that Austrian troops would move further east away from the main strategic target, Charles’ army.^'* General Lauriston, with his Badenese troops, was charged with the task of besieging and capturing the town of Raab. The siege of the city was carried out in an orderly manner, and the 3,500 man garrison surrendered to Lauriston on June 23 after a breach had been made in the walls.^^ While Lauriston was besieging Raab, Eugene was busy observing Chasteler to the south (for this he had been given another cavalry division under Antoine-Charles, the count of Lasalle), and trying to destroy the bridge at Komorn. Chasteler was kept at bay, but the destruction of the bridge could not be accomplished. Because of the need to protect the siege operation from Chasteler, Eugene was reluctant to move on Komorn in force. Several attempts were made to break the bridge at Komorn by floating windmills and heavily laden barges down the river, but to no avail. Napoleon considered sending Eugene’s army to Komorn in force to destroy the bridge, but he abandoned the idea. For by late June Napoleon was preparing his great offensive against Charles and would soon want Eugene’s army near Vienna; a major commitment of Eugene’s army at Komorn could delay that offensive. Davout had also failed to secure Pressburg, and Napoleon did not want to spend any more time trying to take that bridgehead either. The Emperor believed that with Raab now in French hands the town could be used to anchor his strategic right, and a small corps of observation could be kept there to contain any threat from Komorn or Pressburg. What had been happening at Graz? Giulay, with 15,000 troops,^’ half of which were irregulars, made a thrust against Graz on June 25. Giulay drove back Broussier and resupplied the Austrian garrison in the fort.^® Marmont, however, had finally moved into the area, and in concert with Broussier inflicted 2,000 casualties on the IX Corps and drove it southeast to Gnas.^^ So, by June 28 the Austrian forces in Hungary, particularly the forces under John and Giulay, had either been mauled or kept at bay. Napoleon now felt secure enough about his flank and rear south of the Danube to launch his grand attack against Charles. On June 29 orders went out from Imperial headquarters to recall most of the French legions from Hungary and Styria for the decisive battle.^° Eugene was ordered to leave Baraguey d’Hilliers along with the Badenese troops and Severoli’s division, to hold Raab and observe Komorn and Pressburg. Eugene was to march, on July 2, with the rest of the army to Ebersdorf just east of Vienna, there to mass with Napoleon’s army. Broussier and Marmont were ordered to evacuate Graz (the citadel was not taken) and join the army at Ebersdorf as well. Rusca was to maintain a blockade at Graz, hold Klagenfurt and Bruck, and guard communications with Italy. By July 4, except for Rusca’s division and Baraguey’s corps, the entire Army of Italy was at Ebersdorf ready to fight in the great Battle of Wagram which would bring victory to Napoleon. The Hungarian campaign was over, and so was Eugene’s role as an independent commander. At Ebersdorf the Army of Italy was merged with Napoleon’s Army of Germany for the approaching battle. For this Eugene would serve in the same capacity as any of the marshals, as a sector commander under Napoleon’s control.

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 'DCC, V, 379-380. 2Vaud., I, 349. ^Estimates for Giulay’s corps vary during June. In the early part of the month Eugene estimated Giulay to have from 7,000-8,000 DCC, V, 353-354. Vincent J. Esposito and John Robert Elting, A Military History and Atlas o f the Napoleonic Wars (Praeger, New York: 1964) p. 103, estimates Giulay had 19,000. Giulay was reinforced during June and by the end of the month had 15,000 of which a large proportion were of little military value. "•My own estimates based on 5,000 per infantry division, 2,000 per cavalry and 2,000 for the Royal Guard. 5DCC, V, 315. ^My estimates (see note #4). ’DCC, V, 329-330. ^Ibid., pp. 330-331. ^Ibid. ^nbid., p. 334. ^^Ibid., pp. 334-337. p. 315. ^^See Chapter VII. >^DCC, V, 341-342. ^^Ibid., pp. 342-343. ’^John’s chief of staff. 'T C C , V, 341-344. ^^Ibid., p. 338. ^^Ibid., p. 339. ^nbid., p. 338. ^’This corps consisted of Montbrun’s division and Grouchy’s former dragoon division now commanded by General of Brigade Francois Guerin d’Etoquigny. 22DCC, V, 345. ^^Ibid., p. 362. ^‘^Ibid., pp. 360-362. ^^Ibid., pp. 367-368. ^^Ibid., pp. 367-370. 2’Vaud., I, 342. ^Hbid., p. 349. ^^My own estimates based on 500 per battalion and 100 per squadron. 3°Vaud., I, 349. ^'See note #29. 32Vaud., I, 346. ^^Petre, p. 310. ^''Vaud., I, 349-350. 35DCC, V, 374-376. ^^The following account of the action around Csanak is based on DCC, V, 374-376, and Vaud., I, 343-344. 3’Vaud., I, 349.

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CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY ^Hbid.

^^Ibid., p. 345. ‘*°My estimates based on 5,000 per regular infantry division, 2,000 per cavalry division, 3,000 Badenese under Lauriston, and 2,000 with the Royal Guard. '"DCC, V, 377-378. '^^See Napoleon’s previous instructions on June 6, DCC, V, 334-337. '‘^Vaud., I, 352. ^^Ibid.

‘’^The following account of the Battle of Raab is based on MSP, #27. L.B. 09; DCC, V, 377-384; Vaud., I, 352-368; and Pelet, IV, 94-104. ‘^Two horse artillery batteries had been attached to each cavalry division. '*»DCC, V, 382-383. ^^bid., pp. 379-380. 50/6iW., p. 383. ^'See above, pp. 16-17. Du Casse in his biographical section, V, p. 368, and pp. 379-383 makes reference to these orders, but only in the context of refuting Macdonald’s and Thiers’s claims that Macdonald was free to move at will and that Macdonald arrived on the field to provide a major contribution to the victory at Raab. 52NC, XIX, 116. ^^See above, pp. 6-10. 54DCC, V, 406. ^^Bodart, 408. 56DCC, V, 444. ^'^Ibid., pp. 449-450. 5 * P e tr e , 3 1 6 .

^Hbid. 60DCC, V, 465-467.

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CHAPTER X Conclusion

The decisive battle that Napoleon had hoped for was fought north of Vienna at Wagram on July 4 and 5. Eugene’s army, consisting of the corps of Macdonald and Grenier, held the left center of the French line. Most of Eugene’s cavalry was assigned to Davout s III Corps, on the right flank for the battle. Marmont’s forces were newly designated as the XI Corps and they were placed in the army’s reserve under Napoleon. The course of the Battle of Wagram is well known, and so a tactical description is not necessary in this study. Furthermore, Eugene did not act as an independent commander in the battle but served, like any of the marshals, as a sector commander assigned specific grand tactical objectives. The forces under Eugene’s command fought valiantly during the two days of battle and succeeded in achieving their assigned goals. Archduke Charles retreated at the end of the second day, suffering 40,000-43,000 casualties; Napoleon’s losses totaled 34,000.' Immediately after the battle, Eugene was given the IX Corps under Lieutenant General Jean-Ebenezer Reynier and the VIII under Lieutenant General DominiqueJoseph Vandamme, the count of Unsebourg; as well as the corps of Macdonald, Grenier, and Baraguey. With these forces, Eugene was ordered to secure Napoleon’s flank and rear to the south and east, while Napoleon moved north in pursuit of Charles. Keeping most of his forces north of the Danube, Eugene pursued his old adversary, John, eastward across the March River, penetrating as far as Stamphen by July 13. These operations after Wagram were of minor importance. On July 10, at the request of the Archduke Charles, an armistice was signed ending all military operations. The terms included the Austrian evacuation of the Tyrol, Graz, Croatia, Bohemia and Moravia. The Austrian military forces were to withdraw to the eastern banks of the March and Raab Rivers. Although the final peace was not signed until October 14, Napoleon had won the war. Napoleon was pleased with the services rendered by Eugene’s army. The soldiers were praised in the bulletins, and there were honors and promotions for many especially Eugene’s generals. Most of the divisional commanders of the Army of Italy were made counts of the Empire in the months after Wagram, and so were Grenier and Baraguey d’Hilliers. Additionally, Macdonald and Marmont were both promoted to the rank of marshal. Dessaix, who had served so valiantly throughout the campaign was made a general of division on July 9, 1809. As for Eugene, the war had been a test for him as a military commander which he passed. Although Eugene was not granted a marshal’s baton, he retained and increased the Emperor’s confidence in him as a general. Eugene kept all of his extensive political and military posts. There was also continued talk that Eugene might win a throne in Italy or elsewhere. In the years after 1809, Eugene was increasingly given important military commands. In the months after the Austrian War, he conducted a counterinsurgent campaign that finally ended the simmering Tyrolean insurrection. In 1812 Eugene commanded the IV Army Corps invading Russia and was given command of the

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CONCLUSION remnants of the Grand Army during the last stages of its retreat. During the late winter and early spring of 1813, Eugene strove to hold Germany for Napoleon, and from the spring of 1813 to March 1814 Eugene skillfully defended the Kingdom of Italy against the Allies until Napoleon’s first abdication. The purpose of this study has been to examine the role of Prince Eugene as an independent military commander in his first outing as such in the War of 1809. It was written to make some sort of judgement on Eugene’s abilities as a general, to study the military relationship between Eugene and Napoleon, and to learn something of the operations and history of the “forgotten” Army of Italy. What can be said concerning Eugene as a military commander? He was ultimately successful, competent, and on occasion even brilliant. Eugene, however, was the commander of an army in a secondary theater of operations. As such, he had no role in formulating the grand strategy of the war, nor even, except in some circumstances, the strategic direction of his own army. The grand strategy of the war and the strategic direction of Eugene’s army were determined by Napoleon. It was Napoleon who decided that his armies should wait for Austria to make the first move. So by Napoleon’s orders, the Army of Italy was kept scattered throughout northern Italy and was not in position to meet Austria’s attack. However, the Emperor had anticipated an eventual Austrian invasion and expected Eugene, at least in the early stages, to conduct a defensive campaign. To this end, Napoleon sent his “Notes” on the defense of Italy to Eugene ordering him to wage a defensive campaign along the Adige-Alpone line. Once Eugene’s own offensive began, it was Napoleon who outlined the route the Army of Italy was to take from Tarvis to Bruck. Finally, the strategic direction of Eugene’s Hungarian campaign was fully controlled by Napoleon and was subordinated to the requirements of Napoleon’s grand strategic designs. Therefore Eugene’s role, in large part, was to function as the executor of the strategic orders issued by his superior. Warfare is a violent method used to achieve political ends. It is rare for any general to combine both ultimate political and military power in his own hands. Normally, generals in the field rarely get to make grand strategic policy, nor are they given a free hand to formulate their own campaign strategies. Many great captains have won their laurels as executors of the strategic policies of their superiors. Field commanders of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had to at least consult with their own military or political leaders regarding their plans of campaign. There were, of course, exceptions when geography or distances enabled a general to have a free hand. But as the modern age developed and the means of communication improved, generals had less indepen­ dence in strategic planning. So it was with Prince Eugene, and any judgement of his military abilities must be made in this light. As a strategic executor, Eugene carried out his strategic assignment after a shaky start. Eugene’s decision to stand and fight at Sacile was in flagrant violation of Napoleon’s strategic directions. Eugene fought at Sacile well to the east of the Adige-Alpone line and before his army was concentrated. Admittedly, his decision was based on the fact that he feared being caught between the enveloping forces of John and Chasteler. But the Adige-Alpone line and the terrain in the Rivoli-Chiusa area favored a defensive campaign, and Napoleon was willing to trade some space in Venetia for time. Eugene should have heeded his stepfather’s orders and withdrawn to the Adige-Alpone. The Viceroy’s defeat at Sacile was proof of the correctness of Napoleon’s strategic thinking.

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CONCLUSION After having learned his lesson at Sacile, Eugene became a strategic executor and strictly followed the Emperor’s commands. The Viceroy withdrew to the Adige-Alpone line, regrouped, and reorganized his army. In spite of their victory at Sacile, the Austrians did not have the strength to force the Adige-Alpone, nor did Chasteler have the ability or the inclination to turn Eugene’s strategic left. Once Eugene had his army assembled behind the Adige-Alpone, he had a larger force than his opponent, and the strategic initiative passed from the Austrians to the French. The Austrians were halted, and the rest of Italy was made secure. Eugene had therefore achieved his first strategic objective. Eugene’s function as a strategic executor was more pronounced during his Hungarian campaign. The route that his army was to take, its assigned objectives, and in the case of Macdonald’s corps, the function of his units, were all strictly directed by Napoleon. Eugene followed his stepfather’s orders thereby producing an incomplete strategic success. The town of Raab was taken, and John was forced back from Komorn and across the Danube, but his army was not destroyed. Eugene did what he was ordered to do. Since the Hungarian campaign was but a partial strategic success, the blame for its failures must fall on the one who conceived and directed the campaign, Napoleon, not Eugene. A tight rein on Eugene at Sacile would have avoided that defeat; a looser one in Hungary might have produced an important victory. However, from the time that Eugene advanced from the Adige, until the time that he reached Bruck, Eugene had an almost free hand to formulate strategy. The Emperor’s orders were broad but loose because of the geographical distance between the two headquarters, the time it took for orders to reach Italy, and the exigencies of war. Napoleon wanted Eugene to pursue and destroy John’s army if possible, and bring his army to Vienna via Carinthia and Styria. How this was to be done was left to the Viceroy, and so Eugene would have an opportunity to conceive as well as execute strategy. The goal of Napoleonic strategy was the destruction of the opposing army by battle; Eugene knew this. The defensive Adige-Alpone line, for example, was designed to provide a favorable strategic setting for the destruction of the Austrian army. Eugene was planning to use the Adige-Alpone as a base from which he would launch an offensive via Monte Bastia and Soave. But when John’s army withdrew before Eugene attacked, the Viceroy realized that he would have to find some way to force John to fight. In so doing, Eugene was able to devise a strategic plan of his own. Eugene learned that John’s baggage train would increase in proportion to each mile that he retreated and that the presence of this growing train would progressively slow the pace of the Austrian march. Consequently, Eugene calculated that he would be able to catch up with John somewhere east of the Piave and defeat him. To this end the Viceroy organized his special light division under Dessaix and ordered a concentration of his army along the Piave between Narvese and San Nichol. One of the most important aspects of being a successful strategist is to anticipate the movements and conditions of one’s opponent. Eugene was right about the slow pace of the Austrian army, and he was able to close with his enemy and defeat him just as he had predicted. The planning of the Piave operation marks a high point of Eugene’s role as a strategic conceiver. Eugene had a considerable amount of latitude in determining the strategic division of his army for the invasion of Austria. Napoleon had ordered the Viceroy to bring his army to Bruck by way of Tarvis, Villach, and Klagenfurt; how Eugene got to Tarvis was his own concern.

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CONCLUSION The Viceroy made a proper deployment of his troops for the invasion of Carinthia and Carniola. Eugene’s own column was kept numerically strong to insure that Malborghetto and Tarvis could be taken. Napoleon complained that Serras’ column was too weak, but this was not so. Serras’ mission was to force the Austrians to stretch their diminished forces across as wide a front as possible to allow Eugene to break through. Because of the nature of the terrain, any increase in the strength of Serras’ column would have been useless. On the other hand, it was necessary to allow Macdonald to have two infantry divisions. If Macdonald’s corps was not kept at full strength, he would not have been able so quickly to penetrate in Carniola, nor could he be assured of overawing Giulay. Eugene’s strategic planning for the Hungarian campaign was not at the same level with what he had done in May. His proposed operation towards Raab was poorly thought out. The troops that were designated to advance on Raab were too small in number to defeat the Austrians, and Napoleon was right to disapprove of the Viceroy’s plan. So, what can one conclude about Eugene the strategist? The Viceroy performed successfully, if not brilliantly, so long as he followed the directions of Napoleon. On the occasions when Eugene attempted to devise his own strategy, his performance was uneven. Eugene’s operations in May were strategically flawless, but his plans for Sacile and Raab were not. The function of a tactical commander is to develop an effective battle plan and marshal his forces in such a manner as to defeat an opponent as economically and decisively as possible. Eugene, as a tactican, had complete control of his army (save for the Battle of Raab), and so all of his defeats and victories were of his own making. Eugene’s first battle at Sacile was a tactical disaster, in which he committed just about every mistake that a field commander could make. Eugene’s decision to attack the Austrian left around Porcia, over broken ground, was a mistake. The nature of the terrain favored the Austrian defenders, nullifying any hope of a French victory in that sector. Porcia was not the tactical key that Eugene thought it was, and in the struggle to take that village, Eugene allowed half of his army to become engaged by but a third of a numerically superior enemy army. The Viceroy also exposed his left flank to an enemy counterattack. He failed to adequately consider his opponent’s positions, strengths, intentions, and perhaps worst of all, underrated his enemy’s capacities. The only thing that saved Eugene’s army from destruction at Sacile was Giulay’s poor handling of the IX Corps, and the lack of a determined pursuit by the Austrians. First and foremost, a general must maintain his composure under stress. The debacle at Sacile shook Eugene’s nerve for a time. But the young Prince was able to overcome the psychological impact of defeat and impose order and discipline first over himself and then over his army. The moral factot is perhaps the most important element in generalship. For without confidence in oneself, one cannot command others nor defeat an enemy. A rattled commander could not have cooly planned and executed the defeat of John’s army on the Piave as Eugene did. The Viceroy’s first victory was won over his own despair. Eugene’s triumph at the Battle on the Piave proves that he had regained his nerve. At that battle, the Viceroy displayed clear and calm judgement, an excellent sense of tactical timing, and the ability to combine the three arms with maximum effect. The crossing of the Piave was planned and conducted with cool deliberation and calculation. Once engaged with the Austrians on the far bank of the river, Eugene revealed another element crucial to a great commander, a sense of timing. By having such a faculty, a general knows exactly when and where to strike. Eugene chose just the right moment to

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CONCLUSION hurl his cavalry against Wolfskehl’s forces. This decisive charge swept the Austrian cavalry from the field and laid the foundation for Eugene’s greatest battlefield success in 1809. The ultimate defeat of the Austrians on the Piave was made possible by Eugene’s proper use of the three arms of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The great French cavalry charge, for example, was supported by artillery. The destruction of John’s battle line was achieved by the close cooperation of all three arms all of which were marshaled by Eugene. Eugene’s victory on the Piave was among the most decisive battles of the war. This tactical success produced a favorable strategic situation. On the Piave, 23 percent of the Austrian army was made hors de combat. With such losses, the offensive power of John’s army was destroyed, and there was no chance of the Austrians making any stand in Italy or even effectively defending the frontiers of Carinthia and Carniola. An all-out pursuit of a defeated enemy is necessary to complete and capitalize on any victory won in the field. The ability and the will to drive a beaten opponent into the ground is the mark of a great commander. In this instance, Eugene’s performance is uneven. Effective pursuits were carried out after his victories on the Piave, and at Saint Michael, but not after the Battle of Raab. An immediate pursuit of John after the Battle on the Piave was not possible because of the approach of night and the fact that a third of the French army was still on the wrong side of the river. Once the pursuit began on the following day, Eugene pressed John vigorously, isolating one enemy brigade from the main body, capturing a large number of prisoners, and insuring that John would not be able to make a stand anywhere in Italy. The speed of Eugene’s advance from the Piave to Tarvis closely followed the pace set by Napoleon in 1797 over the same ground. The Battle of Saint Michaél was a tactical masterpiece in which Eugene broke Jellachich’s division by an efficient combination of all three arms after which Eugene launched a pursuit à l’outrance to complete the destruction of Jellachich’s forces. In contrast, Eugene’s failure to vigorously pursue the beaten Austrians after the Battle of Raab was a definite error. If the Viceroy had sent his cavalry against John’s retreating main body, he could have perhaps destroyed John’s army and produced a triumphant conclusion to his Hungarian campaign. Tactical flexibility, the ability to effectively alter one’s dispositions in light of changing circumstances is a further mark of a great commander. Eugene displayed this quality at the Battle of Raab by refusing to reinforce failure. Seeing that his attack wing had become stalled, Eugene shifted the emphasis of his attack from a Frederician oblique maneuver stressing a decisive first strike on the right to a true Napoleonic battle which would build to a decisive crescendo. This change in his battle plan shows that Eugene had learned from his experience at Sacile where, much to his regret, he sought to reinforce a stalled attack wing. Finally, the task of a tactician is to inflict the maximum number of casualties upon an opponent, while minimizing the losses suffered by his own forces. The greater the favorable difference, the greater the general, especially if the success is achieved against equal or superior numbers. A comparison of casualties inflicted and received in the battles fought by Eugene is a good way to judge his tactical abilities and measure the extent of his victories. On the Piave, Eugene engaged 30,000 Austrians with 27-30,000 of his own troops. The Viceroy inflicted 7,000 casualties on the Austrians while suffering 2,000 himself. The Austrians lost 23 percent of their army on the Piave while the French lost but 6.6 percent. At Raab, 30,000 French fought 30,600 Austrians. The Austrians lost 6,000 men or 20 percent of their army, while Eugene had 2,500 casualties or 7.5

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CONCLUSION percent hors d’combat. Eugene concentrated 12,000 troops against 8,000 Austrians at Saint Michael. There the Austrians suffered 6,200 in killed, wounded, and captured, totaling no less than 75 percent of their forces; Eugene lost 600 men or 1.7 percent. Hence, of the two large-scale battles that Eugene won when facing an opponent of equal numerical strength, Eugene inflicted casualties on his opponent at a rate of one Frenchman for three Austrians. In Eugene’s victories at battles in which he had a numerical superiority, such as at Saint Michael, the casualty ratio was even more favorable. It is a sign of greatness for a general to produce a casualty ratio of 1:3. Few generals, of course, have been able to maintain such a rate throughout their careers; Eugene and Napoleon did not. The fact that Eugene was able to achieve such a ratio on the Piave and at Raab is a witness to his fine ability as a tactician and deserves comparison with Napoleon’s victories. Napoleon produced a 1:3 ratio at Austerlitz, Friedland, Eckmühl, and Dresden. His ratio for Wagram was far lower, 1:1.5, and the victories at Arcole, Rivoli, and Marengo were at a rate of 1:2. There was one element of a great commander that Eugene did not display; it was the ability to inflict casualties at a rate of 1:2 or 1:3 against opponents of greater numerical strength. Napoleon was able to do this, for example, at Austerlitz. Although Eugene’s succession of victories in 1809 were impressive, the Viceroy was unable to produce this margin of destruction. So, one can conclude that Eugene showed definite if uneven progress as a tactician from Sacile through Raab. In many, but not in all instances, the Viceroy displayed the qualities of an excellent field commander: composure, a fine sense of timing, the capacity to maneuver effectively in the field, flexibility of mind, and the ability to produce impressive victories. Eugene exhibited all of these elements with increasing regularity throughout the war. It is perhaps appropriate to compare Eugene’s performance as an independent military commander with that of his peers, the marshals, in order to make a final judgement on Eugene as a general. Of all of the Napoleonic marshals who had active military commands during the Napoleonic Wars, only Massena, Soult, Marmont, Suchet, Jourdan, Victor and Bessieres served as independent theater commanders against the armed forces of a major military power. Marshals Saint-Cyr, Murat, Ney, Macdonald, and jQudinot either commanded forces against minor powers such as Naples or briefly commanded multicorps units in sectors of the main theater under Napoleon’s direction. The rest ^ hardly ever commanded anything larger than an army corps. Andre Massena had great prestige and a glorious career as an independent army commander. His victories in Switzerland in 1799 saved the French Republic from invasion. During the Napoleonic Wars, he successfully defended Italy against Archduke Charles in 1805, and he commanded the troops invading Naples in 1806. Massena’s powers declined in Spain during his 1810-1811 campaign; it was the only campaign that he would lose. In spite of his failure in Spain, Massena was the best independent army commander that Napoleon had (Davout was never really given such an opportunity). None of the other marshals were able to match Massena’s record. Claude Victor, Auguste Marmont, Jean Jourdan, and Nicholas Soult were never able to defeat the British in Spain. Victor, Marmont, and Jourdan were beaten by the Duke of Wellington at Talavera, Salamanca, and Vitoria,.respectively, and Soult was eventually outgener­ aled by Wellington. Louis Suchet managed to defeat two British attempts to take

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CONCLUSION Catalonia, but these were minor affairs and he was defeated on more than one occasion by the Spanish. Jean Bessieres’ only claim to fame was his successful blockade of British forces at Walcheren. Save for Massena, none of the marshals were able to produce independent command victories on the same scale and with the same consistency as Eugene. So, what can one conclude about Eugene the general? He was far better at strategic execution than strategic conception. He excelled at tactics, and his conduct on the battlefield was competent and at times approached brilliance. If one measures his record with that of his contemporaries, one can state that next to Napoleon and Massena, Eugene was the finest independent field commander that France possessed during the period 1809-1815. This study has also attempted to examine the military relationship between Napoleon and Eugene. How did the Viceroy learn his trade in arms? Did Napoleon attempt to train his stepson in his system of war? The evidence clearly indicates that Eugene and his generals were familiar with the Napoleonic system of war on both tactical and strategic levels. Eugene had served long enough in the French army as a staff officer and troop commander to observe its operations and gain knowledge of its practices. Eugene’s own operations in May 1809 — such as the creation of Dessaix’s advance guard division and the tactical use of the masse primaire, the masse de manoeuvre, and the masse de rupture in battle — were all done without the arrival of any particular letter revealing the Emperor’s tactical precepts to an ignorant Eugene. Some strategic concepts were known as well. For example, the division and direction Eugene gave to his army during the advance from the Piave to Tarvis was an exact copy of Napoleon’s movements there in 1797; evidently Eugene had learned something while he was a staff officer. Napoleon’s instructions to Eugene served to embellish strategic and grand tactical concepts that had already been learned. The Emperor’s strategic directives were very necessary. The “Notes” on Italian defense were needed to provide guidance to a commander who was new to independent command in a specific theater, and they obviously helped save Eugene in April. Napoleon’s orders concerning Eugene’s plans for the Hungarian operation were also necessary; they were needed to correct the faulty strategic plans of the Viceroy. While Napoleon’s strategic instructions were needed, his tactical instructions were less helpful. The June letters to Eugene that contained the Emperor’s advice on the use of advance guards, army corps, and tactical combinations on the battlefield were superfluous; Eugene had used all of these elements during his operations in May. Whether Napoleon’s advice was needed or not, the content of his letters to his stepson, in particular his “Notes” on Italian defense, advice on the use of army corps, and his letters of June 6 and 7 prove that Napoleon attempted to teach at least one of his subordinates his system of warfare. His letters discussed variations on the manoeuvre sur les derrières, the strategy of the central position, strategic and tactical concentration at the decisive point, the use of army corps, and the employment of combined arms. Napoleon clearly did not try to hide his methods in order to keep control of his far-flung armies. If anything, the instructions sent to Eugene were symptomatic of Napoleon’s attempts to have his subordinates command his distant armies just as if he were there in person. To do so, Napoleon had to reveal his methods of war, not hide them. Therefore, the belief that Napoleon never attempted to train any of his subordinates in his system of war is a myth.

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CONCLUSION Finally, something must be said concerning the historiographical argument over Eugene’s abilities as a military commander. The evidence provided in this study demonstrates that Eugene was never as inept as the anti-Eugene school, PeletMacdonald-ThierS'Petre, would have us believe. Thiers and Petre relied heavily on Pelet and Macdonald to write their own books. Macdonald’s memoirs were prejudicial to Eugene, as the former wanted to discredit the Viceroy to glorify his own actions. Pelet’s work is not as critical of Eugene as is Macdonald’s, but Pelet, a protégé of Massena, did have a personal axe to grind. Pelet’s criticism of Eugene is based on the Viceroy’s obvious mistakes at Sacile as well as an imagined slowness in Eugene’s movements from the Adige to the Alps. Pelet considered the Battle on the Piave to be a product of the mistakes of both Eugene and John. He believed that John could have avoided combat on the Piave, and that Eugene should have vigorously pursued John right after the battle. Sadly, Pelet’s arguments are also the product of insufficient research. It is evident that Pelet did not study all of the correspondence between Napoleon and Eugene. (Since Pelet’s book was published in 1825, it is possible that he did not have access to all of the letters.) Had Pelet done so, he would have realized that the Battle on the Piave was no accident but was the result of careful planning by Eugene. Furthermore, Pelet is overly critical about the conduct of Eugene’s pursuit of John after the Battle on the Piave. He disregards the fact that night was falling and that a large part of Eugene’s army was still on the right bank of the Piave on the evening of May 8. Eugene’s delay until dawn on May 9 was justified. Pelet does not seem to notice that Eugene’s pursuit, which began on the 9th, was fast enough to isolate Kalnassey’s brigade, and that Eugene moved just as rapidly over the same ground as Napoleon did in 1797. Thiers and Petre relied on the works of Pelet and Macdonald; they should have examined more thoroughly the writings of Vaudoncourt and Du Casse. Thiers either did not read Vaudoncourt or, if he did, he rejected it in favor of Macdonald’s interpretation. Petre does not seem to have read either Vaudoncourt or Du Casse. Petre’s history treats Eugene’s campaigns as sideshows to Napoleon’s operations, and so Petre was unwilling to fully examine all the documentation on Eugene’s career. For Petre, what Pelet had written was enough. The military historians who are favorably disposed to Eugene, Vaudoncourt and Du Casse, are more accurate in their portrayal of the Viceroy’s military career. Vaudon­ court served under Eugene and was his friend. So his biography of him is of course biased. Du Casse, unlike the others, relied heavily on Vaudoncourt for his own work published in 1859. Therefore, such a study as this present one that examines the works of both schools of though is helpful in judging the two. The record of Eugene’s victories in 1809 proves that he was a good general. Save for his first defeat at Sacile, the Viceroy’s continually produced one victory after another. Such is the sign of a fine military commander. Such is Prince Eugene. NOTES TO CHAPTER X •Esposito, 104. ^I have not included Nicholas Davout because that marshal never really commanded an independent army. However, Davout was a brilliant tactician, and his victory at Auerstadt was among the greatest feats in the annals of the Marshalate.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Primary Sources A. Unpublished Documents Beauharnais Collection. Princeton Archives, Princeton University. B. Published Documents Beauharnais, Eugene de Mémoires et Correspondence Politique et Militaire du Prince Eugene, 10 vols. Edited by Andre Du Casse. Paris: Michel Levy Frères, 1859. (Included in this collection is a biography written by Andre Du Casse.) Napoleon I. La Correspondence de Napoleon 1er, 36 vols. Paris: H. Plon and J. Dumaine, 1867. C. Memoirs and Histories Bonaparte, Hortense de Beauharnais. The Memoirs o f Queen Hortense, 2 vols. Edited by Jean Hanoteau. New York; Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1928. Darnay, Baron. Notices Historiques sur S.A.R. Le Prince Eugene Vice-roi d’Italie, Paris: David, 1830. Jomini, Antoine H. The Life o f Napoleon, 4 vols. Translated by H.W. Halleck. New York; D. Van Nostrand, 1864. Macdonald, Marshal Etienne-Jacques-Joseph Alexander. The Recollections of Marshal Macdonald. Edited by Camille Rousset, translated by Stephen Louis Simeon. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893. Marbot, Baron de. The Memoirs o f Baron de Marbot. Translated by Arthur John Butler, London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1893. Massena, Marshal Andre. Memoires de Massena, 1 vols. Edited by General J.B.F. Koch. Paris: Paulin and Lechevalier, 1848-50. Marmont, Marshal A.F.L.V. Memoires du Maréchal Marmont Duc de Raguse, 9 vols. Paris: Perrotine, 1857. Pelet, Le General Jean-Jacques-Germain Memoires sur la Guerre de 1809, 4 vols. Paris: Roret, 1825. Vaudoncourt, Le General Frederic François, Le Baron de Histoire politique et militaire du Prince Eugene Napoleon, 2 vols. Paris: Libraire Universelle de P. Mongie, 1828. II. Secondary Sources Adalbert, Prinz von Bayern. Eugen Beauharnais, der Stiefsohn Napoleons, Munich; F. Bruckmann, 1940. Bernady, Françoise. Eugene de Beauharnais. Paris: Library Académique Perrin, 1973. Bodart, Gaston. Militàr-historisches Kreigs-Lexikon. Vienna and Leipzig: Stern, 1908. Bonnal, Henri G. La Manoeuvre de Landshut. Paris; Chapolot, 1905. Bowden, Scotty and Tarbox, Charlie. Armies on the Danube 1809. Arlington: Empire Games Press, 1980. Bruun, Geoffrey. Europe and the French Imperium. New York: Harper & Row, 1938/1965. Camon, General H. Quand et comment Napoleon a concu son Système de Bataille. Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1935. Cassi, Gellio. “Napoleon et la defense de ITtalie sur la Piave.” Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes, Vol. 19, July-August, 1923, pp. 5-23. (Includes a reprint of

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Prince Eugene at War: 1809 Book Design by Scott Bowden Dust Jacket by Ivor Janci Composed at Taylor Publishing Company in Times Roman Printed by Taylor Publishing Company on 70# TPC Matte Stock Bound by Taylor Publishing Company with standard TPC white endsheets

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