Mig-23 Flogger in The Middle East [PDF]

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CONTENTS

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Chapter 1: A Hands-Off Interceptor

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Glossary and Abbreviations

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Introduction and Acknowledgments

Chapter 4: Third Generation

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Chapter 5: Ultimate Tests

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Chapter 6: The Curtain Falls

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Cyprus Lebanon Israel

Syria Iraq

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Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

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Egypt

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air bases in Iran.

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Oman

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1 MiG-23 relevant air bases in Iraq, and major

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List of Maps

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Kuwait

Bibliography 67 Notes 68

Iran

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Chapter 3: Second Generation

Turkey

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Chapter 2: A Handful to Fly

2 The CAP-stations between Ahwaz and Dezful, and east of Ahwaz.

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3 Primary areas of operations of Israel and Syria in 1982.

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4 The approximate route taken by the two MiG-23s

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Yemen

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that shot down an IRIAF F-14A on 11 August 1984. 37 5 Major MiG-23 related bases in (northern) Libya of the late 1980s.

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Helion & Company Limited Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre Budbrooke Road Warwick CV34 5WE England Tel. 01926 499 619 Fax 0121 711 4075 Email: [email protected] Website: www.helion.co.uk Twitter: @helionbooks Visit our blog http://blog.helion.co.uk/ Published by Helion & Company 2018 Designed and typeset by Mach 3 Solutions Ltd (www.mach3solutions.co.uk) Cover designed by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk) Printed by Henry Ling Limited, Dorchester, Dorset Text © Tom Cooper 2018 Images © as individually credited Colour profiles © Tom Cooper 2018 Maps © Tom Cooper 2018 ISBN ISBN 978-1-914059-76-6 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion & Company Limited. For details of other military history titles published by Helion & Company Limited contact the above address, or visit our website: http://www.helion.co.uk. We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authors.

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

Cover Image

Note

A plane captain – chief technician responsible for the maintenance of the aircraft – saluting a pilot before a training sortie, in late 1974. The aircraft in the rear is one of eight MiG-23MS’ operated by No. 47 Squadron Egyptian Air Force from Marsa Matruh AB, in 1974-1976. (Tom Cooper Collection)

In order to simplify the use of this book, all names, locations and geographic designations are as provided in The Times World Atlas, or other traditionally accepted major sources of reference, as of the time of described events. Similarly, Arabic names are romanised and transcripted rather than transliterated. For example: the definite article al- before words starting with ‘sun letters’ is given as pronounced instead of simply as al- (which is the usual practice for non-Arabic speakers in most English-language literature and media). Because ranges are measured in feet and nautical miles in international aeronautics, all the ranges and measurements cited in this book are provided in metric and imperial measurements.

Introduction and Acknowledgments Developed nearly 10 years too late, then rushed into service while still far from being complete, manufactured in immense numbers and widely exported, beloved by some, ridiculed by many, the MiG-23 is a fighter jet leaving hardly anybody emotionless. Usual narratives about the MiG-23-family start with lengthy explanations about the organisation of the aviation industry in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, also ‘Soviet Union’), and continue with detailed descriptions of research and development of different variants, their equipment and their technical specifications. In-depth coverage about experiences in the acquisition, handling and combat with this type is rarely provided. This is rather ironic considering the MiG-23 family had been manufactured in larger numbers than any other contemporary combat aircraft, and thus became one of the most prolific fighter jets of the 1970s and 1980s; indeed, that for nearly two decades, this type presented the type that was to beat for dozens of air forces around the World. Similarly, the number of books and articles offering a throughout study of the MiG-23 within its actual context – as a weapons system within an integrated air defence system – and then also providing an authoritative coverage of exactly how many and what variants of that family had been exported and deployed in exactly what conflicts in the Middle East, can be counted on fingers of one hand. Worst of all: already the air forces in which the MiG-23-family saw most combat ever – those of (in alphabetic order) Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria – are some of most misreported military services ever. Usually available sources of reference about these military forces are written without any consultation of first- or second-hand sources in the countries in question. Unsurprisingly, more of wildest guessing, rumours, supposition and prejudice about them have been published over the last four decades than about any other topic related to modernday military flying around the World. This has reached such proportions that the national markings applied on MiG-23s of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria are frequently misreported, while the aircraft delivered to them are discounted as ‘monkey models’ even by some of most respected military aviation analysts. Overall, most of the public perception of the operational service of 2

the MiG-23 family by air forces of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria is reminiscent of medieval maps and globes where territories unknown to researchers were left blank, perhaps marked as ‘Terra Incognita’, or decorated with all sorts of mythical monsters.1 The primary purpose of this book is to set at least some of the record straight. With the situation in the Middle East remaining the way it is, there are still sizeable gaps in related coverage, and this is unlikely to change any time soon. Nevertheless, meanwhile, it is possible to explain the Soviet military thinking that led to the development of the MiG-23 family and provide most important figures about variants exported to the five air forces in question. In this narrative, that part is kept as brief as possible: the core story of this book is the operational history of the MiG-23 family in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria between 1973 and 2018. Furthermore, the narrative and accompanying illustrations provide an extensive description of camouflage colours, serials, and markings applied on MiG-23s of these five air forces, their weapons configurations, and other related information. While my related research began back in the 1980s, it really came forward only in the last few years – and then thanks to the availability of the internet. I would like to express my deep and heartfelt gratitude to everybody who became involved over the time. Foremost are the officers and pilots of the Algerian Air Force (Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Jaza’eriya, QJJ), Egyptian Air Force (EAF), Iraqi Air Force (IrAF), Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF), and Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF). Those amongst them that I feel free to mention in public are Major-General Alwan Hassan al-Abossi (IrAF, ret.), Brigadier-General Ahmad Sadik (IrAF, ret.), Brigadier-General Faysal Abdul Mohsen (IrAF, ret.), LieutenantColonel Abdul Hassan (LAAF, ret.), Major Abdelmajid Tayari (LAAF, ret.), and Captain Mohammed F. al-Jassim (IrAF/IQAF). Even more numerous were active or former officers from Algeria, Libya and Syria: they have selflessly provided help and advice over the years, often under indescribable circumstances, and despite exposing themselves to repercussions from local governments. For reasons related to their safety and the safety of their families, we have agreed to reference to them in the form of code-names in this narrative. With their stories eventually forming the backbone

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

of this book, there is no way to express my gratitude to any of them in sufficient fashion. Furthermore, I would like to express my special thanks to a number of colleagues for their kind help. Foremost between them is Marcos ‘Pit’ Viniegra, from Venezuela, who – sadly – passed away in February 2018. His unique insights into the little-known aspects of Soviet military thinking have strongly influenced my related research and I am severely missing a good friend and our e-mail exchanges. Ali Tobchi from Iraq has helped immensely with details from his own documentation, translations from Arabic, and contacts with a number of former IrAF pilots and officers. Nour Bardai and Dr Abdallah Emran helped in similar fashion when it came to Egypt. Menno van der Wall from The Netherlands has helped with details on the Syrian order of battle; Martin Smisek, from the

Czech Republic, and Milos Sipos from Slovakia, have provided technical expertise and advice; Tomislav Mesaric from Croatia and Jeroen Nijemeijer from the Netherlands have helped me expand my understanding of Soviet-made intergraded air defence systems, and numbers of MiG-23s exported to the Middle East. Arnaud Delallande and Albert Grandolini from France, and Pit Weintert from Germany have helped with additional information and photographs. Scott Brown, Piotr Butowski, and Erwin Husmann have provided a number of exclusive photographs. Finally, I cannot express enough gratitude to Hicham Honeini, from Lebanon, for his endless patience while helping with the translations of various publications and documentation in Arabic, while David Nicolle from Great Britain, and Doug Dildy from the USA remain sources of encouragement and inspiration for my work, as well as additional information and photography.

Glossary and abbreviations AAA AAM AB AEW An ASCC ATMS AWACS BVR CFDAT

anti-aircraft artillery air-to-air missile air base airborne early warning Antonov (the design bureau led by Oleg Antonov) Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee automated tactical management system airborne early warning and control system beyond visual range Commandement de la Défense Aérienne du Territorire (Air Defence Command of Algeria, since 1986) CO commanding officer COIN counter-insurgency COMINT communications intelligence CRA Couverture radar atuomatisée (automatized network of early warning radars in Algeria) DDAT Défense Aérienne du Territoire (Territorial Air Defence, Algeria, 1979-1986) ECM electronic countermeasures ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures EAF Egyptian Air Force (official designation since 1972) ELINT electronic intelligence FLAF Free Libyan Air Force GP general-purpose (bomb) HE high-explosive IADS integrated air defence system IAP international airport IDF Israeli Defence Force IDF/AF Israeli Defence Force/Air Force IrAF Iraqi Air Force (official designation since 1958) Il Ilyushin (the design bureau led by Sergey Vladimirovich Ilyushin, also known as OKB-39) LAAF Libyan Arab Air Force LDAF Libyan Dawn Air Force LNA/AF Libyan National Army/Air Force

MiG

MRAAM NATO nav/attack OCU OTU POW PVO QJJ OKB RAF RHAW RJAF RSAF RWR SAD SAM SAR SIGINT STOL Sqn Su SyAAF SyAADF USAF USN USSR VG VTOL VVS

Mikoyan i Gurevich (the design bureau led by Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan and Mikhail Iosifovich Gurevich, also known as OKB-155 or MMZ ‘Zenit’) medium range air-to-air missile North Atlantic Treaty Organisation navigational and attack (avionics suite) Operational Conversion Unit Operational Training Unit prisoner of war Protivovozdushnaya Oborona Strany (Soviet Air Defence Force) Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Jaza’eriya (Algerian Air Force) Opytno-Konstrooktorskoye Byuro (design bureau) Royal Air Force (of the United Kingdom) radar homing and warning (system) Royal Jordanian Air Force Royal Saudi Air Force radar warning receiver Defence Companies (Syria, predecessors to the Republican Guards Division) surface-to-air missile search and rescue signals intelligence short takeoff and landing squadron Sukhoi (the design bureau led by Pavel Ossipovich Sukhoi, also known as OKB-51) Syrian Arab Air Force Syrian Arab Air Defence Force United States Air Force US Navy Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (also ‘Soviet Union’) variable geometry (wing) vertical takeoff and landing Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily (Soviet Air Force)

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

CHAPTER 1

A HANDS-OFF INTERCEPTOR In the late 1940s, the primary military threats for the existence of the USSR were British and US bombers equipped with freefall nuclear bombs. In the face of this threat, Soviet planners had given a very high priority to the creation of an effective air defence system, which in practice meant the coordinated development of radar networks, jet interceptors, anti-aircraft artillery and then surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Related systems were the responsibility of a specialised and independent branch of the Soviet military, the Protivovozdushnaya Oborona Strany (PVO, the Anti-Air Defence Troops, or Air Defence Command), established in 1941. The PVO reacted by rapidly bringing new types of equipment into service. Initially, radar equipment was in short supply, and it was only in 1950 that enough systems were deployed to provide coverage of most important sectors of airspace over the European part of the USSR. There remained major gaps, which meant that the Soviets had to expect that some British or US bombers would manage to reach their targets – such as major population centres – and obliterate these with nuclear bombs. The situation began to change when the Soviets obtained sufficient intelligence on a number of US- and British-made radars to launch the production of more advanced systems.2 With the help of these, and in combination with new types of fighter interceptors – such as the Mikoyan i Gurevich MiG-15, MiG-17, and then the radarequipped MiG-17P – the PVO managed to establish relatively complete coverage of the huge Soviet airspace by 1954.

Evolution of Soviet Air Defence Systems As Soviet industry continued turning out ever more advanced radar systems, and then manned-interceptors equipped with radars and air-to-air missiles, and then surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the idea was born to integrate the work of all of these into an integrated air defence system (IADS). The purpose of the IADS was not only to enable early warning of incoming threats, but to integrate the work of all the sensors and weapons – i.e. the work of the command, control and communication systems (socalled ‘C3’ systems) – under one authority, and thus enable the accomplishment of the air defence mission, ideally in the form of destroying enemy bombers before these could reach their targets. The first IADS in the USSR were created with the help of tactical management systems like Krab and ASURK-1, which integrated the work of units operating SAMs. They were followed by the emergence of the first automated tactical management system (ATMS) for operations of manned interceptors: the Vozdukh-1. The core of the Vozdukh-1 was two primitive computers: one of which tracked airborne targets, while the other served the purpose of computing interceptor vectors. 3 Using the Lasour data link protocol, Vozdukh-1 processed all the available targeting data to enable the computation of an optimal flight path for the Sukhoi Su-9 interceptor.4 Meanwhile, new threats appeared on the horizon in the form of supersonic bombers flying at very high – at so-called ‘dynamic’ 4

– altitudes (49,212ft/15,000 metres and higher). Some of these bombers were expected to be equipped with guided air-tosurface missiles (ASMs), which enabled them to deploy nuclear weapons from outside the range of Soviet air defences. Logically, operations against such targets required not only very fast but also long-ranged interceptors, directed along flight paths (or ‘intercept vectors’) based on fast and precise calculations; otherwise, the interceptor – whether a manned fighter jet custom-tailored for such operations, or a SAM – was likely to either be late, or miss the ideal position to intercept, or to run out of fuel while still approaching such a position. The first generation of manned interceptors integrated into PVO’s IADS with help of systems like Vozdukh-1 represented mere adaptations of available fighter jet designs, most of which came into being in reaction to experiences from the Korean War. Nearly all were certain to become hopelessly outclassed by bombers undergoing development in the late 1950s: this left the PVO with no choice but to develop an entirely new generation of fighter-interceptors. Contemporary threat perceptions resulted in two schools of thought about the design and equipment of the fighter-interceptor. One followed the path of developing ever bigger and heavier, more complex and thus ever more expensive aircraft that carried all the equipment necessary to complete their task. Driven by the pressure exercised by the military-industrial complex, but also the preferred tactics of its air forces, this path was followed by Western military thought. The other school of thought was emphasising flight performances over on-board equipment and envisaged the development of ground-based systems that would enable automatisation of interceptor operations. Lacking money and technical know-how to follow the first path, the Soviets opted for this, second variant. This way of thinking only required interceptor being equipped with the bare minimum of necessary avionics, because it was expected to be supported by an integrated and automatized ground-based air warfare system that provided all the necessary information required to accomplish the mission. This approach also became popular within the ranks of decisionmakers in the USSR because it was assumed to be more economic and ‘to the point’. The resulting air warfare system was expected to become sufficiently effective to require only one interceptor to be deployed against one target; the resulting manned interceptor was expected not to waste time and fuel by flying ‘combat air patrols’ (CAPs): it was to take-off only to intercept targets clearly defined by the IADS, fly the ideal interception course, destroy the target and return to base. Such an interceptor needed less avionics and less fuel, and it did not require being particularly manoeuvrable – all of which meant that its design could be kept smaller, lighter, and cheaper. Correspondingly, when planning for the 1960s, the Soviets went a step further and began working on the development of a fully automatic, computer-supported ATMS. This would depend

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

on custom-tailored, manned interceptors armed with big, hefty air-to-air missiles (AAMs), capable of destroying enemy bombers by a single blow, not only before these could reach their targets in the USSR, but on the periphery of Soviet airspace. Such fighterinterceptors were to act as an ‘extended arm’ of their IADS and would have the ability to be operated in the ‘hands off modus’: steered by remote control, with the pilot only monitoring the work of on-board systems. Amongst others, related research and development eventually led to the emergence of types like MiG25P and Sukhoi Su-15.

The Starfighter Threat Meanwhile, between 1958 and 1961, numerous members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – starting with West Germany, followed by Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy – all opted to buy the Lockheed F-104G Starfighter as the means of delivering the US-made B-43 tactical nuclear weapon. Norway, Turkey, Greece, Denmark and Spain made the same decision by 1965.5 Furthermore, the US Air Force (USAF) had introduced to service even more powerful Republic F-105 Thunderchief tactical bomber armed with nuclear weapons, and was starting the work on its successor, the General Dynamics F-111. The Soviets thus found themselves confronted not only with the requirement to protect their homeland from thousands of US- and British strategic bombers, but also their military forces – and those of their allies – deployed in Eastern Europe, from thousands of low-flying, fast tactical fighters equipped with nuclear bombs. The latter was the job of the Frontovaya Aviatsiya (Frontal Aviation, FA) – a branch of the Soviet Air Force (VoyennoVozdushnye Sily, VVS), responsible for battlefield air defence, close air support, and interdiction. When facing this new threat, the FA reached back upon a solution similar to that of the PVO: it launched work on integrating its units deployed in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR, also ‘East Germany’), Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and – from 1968 – Czechoslovakia. In order to increase the capabilities of the resulting IADS, these were required to integrate the work of not only the usual mix of early warning radar stations, manned interceptors, and SAMs, but also that of communication-intelligence- (COMINT), electronicintelligence- (ELINT), and signals-intelligence- (SIGINT) stations, stations for electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). One of the results of the related efforts was the emergence of the much improved Vozdukh-1M ATMS.

Requirement The ‘armed arm’ of the Soviet Frontal Aviation’s ATMS in Eastern Europe of the early 1960s was the MiG-21. Although a brandnew design only about to enter service in significant numbers, this was already known to be much too slow and too shortranged to catch any future threats such as low-flying F-104s or F-105s, and to be offering no space for growth in regards of its onboard sensors. Correspondingly, in 1963, the Opytno-Konstrooktorskoye Byuro (design bureau, OKB) of Mikoyan i Gurevich was ordered to launch the development of a new tactical interceptor. Designated

the MiG-23, this interceptor was expected to emphasise speed – in climb – but in level flight too. This was necessary to enable it to catch low-flying F-104s and F-105s, but also to enable it to dictate or decline an engagement by virtue of its higher speed. Furthermore, the new tactical interceptor was to have a much better range than the MiG-21, it would have to suit large-scale production, and have the capability to be maintained and operated under austere conditions. Foremost, the MiG-23 was to be equipped with the Sapfir-23 (Sapphire-23) radar and the appropriately designated S-23 weapons system. The driving idea behind the S-23 was that of providing the ATMS like Vozdukh-1 – and thus the IADS of the PVO and the FA – with the dependable capability to reach out, look down, detect, track and combat low-flying fighter-bombers against the ground clutter. Alternatively, because of limitations of the contemporary radar technology, the system was envisaged to include an infra-red search and track (IRST) system, designated the TP-23, theoretically capable of detecting the ‘heat signature’ of low-flying fighter-bombers. Because manoeuvring air combat, including the use of shortrange weapons like cannons or unguided rockets, was not only time- and fuel-consuming, but also offered no prospect of 100% certain destruction of the target, the primary weapon of the S-23 were to become R-23 guided air-to-air missiles (ASCC-code AA-7 Apex). Developed by the Bisnovat OKB, these were envisaged to carry a hefty warhead of 25kg (55lbs) over the range of up to 20 or more kilometres [10.8nm]. For same reasons the S-23 weapons system included an IRST, they were planned to be available in two variants: one including the semi-active radar homing (SARH) system, the other the IR-homing system.

Izdeliye-23 As of 1963, the MiG OKB was a design bureau with history reaching back to the late 1930s, with highly experienced staff, and a reputation of developing excellent high-altitude interceptors. Unsurprisingly, MiG had already been working on a MiG-21 variant with a bigger nose – to make space for advanced radar – since 1961. While retaining most of the fuselage and wing of its predecessor, the resulting Ye-8 had its intake moved below the fuselage. However, one of only two prototypes that were constructed had crashed after 40 test-flights, in autumn 1962, and thus when the order for the development of the MiG-23 came, in December 1963, the bureau opted for a much bigger airframe with intakes on the sides of the fuselage. The related technical solutions were barely complete when, in 1964, the leadership of the Soviet air force imposed an entirely new requirement: concerned by the threat of tactical nuclear weapons that could be unleashed by NATO’s F-104s upon its air bases (ABs) in Eastern Europe, it demanded the new interceptor to include a short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability. The MiG OKB reacted to the new requirement by offering two solutions: one included lift-engines, the other a wing of variable geometry. The first was the Izdeliye 23-01, a very streamlined design with the delta-wing planform of the MiG-21, but with a big radar nose in the front, F-104-like intakes on the side, and a pair of turbojet lift-engines necessary for its STOL performance. First flown in 1967, it offered a sound level of performance, but 5

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

also massive penalties in terms of extra weight and space taken by the lift engines. The second design, Izdeliye-23-11, was first flown in 1967, too. It was as streamlined as that of the Izdeliye-23-01, but greatly benefitted from two highly publicised developments of US origin: the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II’s VG-intakes, and the F-111’s ‘swing wing’ design, from which it inherited not only an identical structure, but also the same 16-degree, 45-degree, and 72-degree wing sweep positions. The latter three were selected by the pilot according to the flight regime, with the result of generating more lift when swept fully forward, at low speeds, while producing less drag when moved fully aft, at high speeds. Additionally, as their trailing edges retracted into the fuselage at high speeds, the wing-load increased while the drag reduced, resulting in a more comfortable low-level, high-speed ride. An aircraft with such wing was expected to become capable of operating at very high speeds at low levels over increased ranges, while offering a stable weapons platform at reasonable weapons loads. On the negative side, it sacrificed manoeuvrability, which was nowhere near being comparable to that of the MiG-21. However, just like various weaknesses of its prospective weapons system and avionics, that aspect was considered ‘unimportant’: the MiG-23 was not expected to ‘waste time and fuel’ with dogfights, but to operate under remote-control of ATMS like Vozdukh-1 and to deliver sudden, slash attacks by its MRAAMs, then distance if necessary before turning back to re-engage in a similar fashion, and then to disengage and return to base. Considering all the advantages of the VG-equipped Izdeliye-23-11 it is unsurprising that this design won the day. The Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee (ASCC) of NATO assigned the code-name ‘Flogger’ to this variant.

Wearisome Development Subsequent development of the MiG-23 experienced a series of massive postponements. Not only that the work on the S-23 weapons system lagged badly behind the work on the airframe and the engine, or that this system then proved chronically unreliable, but the new fighter proved tricky to fly and prone to technical malfunctions. By 1969, after six years of development, no durable solutions were in sight, yet the air force was in a rush to get a replacement for the MiG-21, while its top generals, as

well as Soviet political leadership, saw themselves unable to afford wasting even more money and time without delivering results. Correspondingly, while knowing that the MiG-23 was not yet ready for operational service, they ordered Factory No. 30 outside Moscow to launch the production of a ‘pre-production series’ of aircraft designated Izdeliye-23-11S, or MiG-23S, in May of the same year. Rushed into trial service with the VVS testing facility at Lipetsk, and the 116th Istrebitelniy Aviatsionniy Polk (IAP, Fighter Aviation Regiment), the MiG-23S was an incomplete variant expected to serve as tool of ‘learning by doing’, help familiarise ground- and flying-crews with this new, theoretically powerful fighter-interceptor, and help develop the support infra-structure and maintenance schedules and tactics. Unsurprisingly, only four out of some 50-60 fighter-interceptors of this version were ever equipped with the S-23 weapons system, and none with the TP-23 IRST. Furthermore, the variant suffered from numerous problems related to an immature design and poor manufacturing quality. Often interrupted, the process of its testing and further development went on for four additional years, until it resulted in the emergence of the first ‘true’ operational variant, MiG-23 (without suffix, and also known as MiG-23 Tip 23-11), and then the two-seat conversion trainer, Izdeliye-23-51, or MiG-23UB, production of which was launched in 1971 and 1972, respectively. Still insufficiently tested and suffering from additional problems, the new versions were rushed into service as fast as they could be rolled out from factories: the MiG-23UBs because they enabled conversion training of additional pilots to what was meanwhile renowned as a troublesome type, and the MiG-23s because that was the first variant actually equipped with the S-23 weapons system. The limits of MiG-23’s success can be measured by the fact that, although issued to two regiments of the FA, this variant was quickly replaced by another one, Izdeliye-23-11M, or MiG-23M. Equipped with a new engine, a re-designed wing and many other refinements, the MiG-23M became the ‘first definite’ production variant. Actually, it was the first without major limitations with regards to flying operations, and to serve as the basis for a number of additional variants in what was rapidly becoming an entire family of combat aircraft based on the same design – including several designed with export in mind.

First prototype of the Izdeliye-23-11. It’s notable that it could carry four R-23 missiles: two on underwing pylons, as visible on this photograph, and two semi-recessed between lower sides of the intakes and the lower fuselage. (TASS)

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MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Another still from a video showing one of early MiG-23Ms, painted in light grey overall, and ‘armed’ with a training version of the R-23T (ASCC code AA-7B Apex-B). This IR-homing variant was usually – though not exclusively – installed on the port (left) underwing pylon. (VVS)

Egyptian Influence By 1972, multiple Soviet customers abroad were demanding deliveries of more advanced fighter-interceptors and fighterbombers than currently available in the form of MiG-21s and Sukhoi Su-7s. Foremost amongst these was Egypt. The country was the biggest customer for Soviet-made arms in the Middle East: it had suffered a catastrophic defeat at the hands of Israel during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and then initiated the so-called War of Attrition, fought 1967-1970, in an attempt to force Israel into making concessions. In the course of the latter conflict, the EAF realised that it was out of condition to seriously challenge the technological superiority of the Israeli Defence Force/Air Force (IDF/AF), created by the deliveries of latest high technology from the USA. Not only the availability of growing numbers of F-4E Phantom II, AIM-9D Sidewinder and AIM-7E Sparrow air-to-air missiles, but also an entire IADS – including advanced COMINT/SIGINT/ELINT – and ECM/ ECCM-systems – made the IDF/AF capable of exercising aerial dominance deep inside the Egyptian airspace west of the Suez Canal. By February 1970, the EAF was unable to cope with this problem, and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser requested deliveries of advanced weaponry from the USSR and a Soviet military intervention. Moscow reacted positively: it not only delivered advanced SAMs and MiG-21s, but also launched Operation Kavkaz, including the deployment of a typical ‘IADS cell’ of the PVO – a regiment with three squadrons of MiG-21s and a division with three brigades equipped with SAMs – to Egypt. By the summer of 1970, and in cooperation with PVO forces deployed in the country, the Air Defence Command (ADC) of Egypt wrestled the control of the skies west of Suez from the Israelis, and successfully pushed its SAM-sites along the Canal. Nasser suddenly died in September 1970. Following a brief period of unsuccessful attempts to re-open negotiations with Israel, the new Egyptian president, Anwar el-Sadat, was forced into a realisation that Egypt would have to fight another war. For this purpose, his military required parity with Israel in terms of arms. Correspondingly, while visiting Moscow in March 1971, Sadat pushed for deliveries of arms considered necessary to

enable a neutralisation of the superior Israeli air power. Amongst the types the Egyptians demanded for this purpose was the MiG-23. Convinced it bore responsibility for provoking the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, curious to never repeat that mistake, and to maintain status quo instead, Moscow turned this request down. However, the Egyptians continued pushing and, on 21 September 1971 the Soviets for the first time signalled their preparedness to deliver 20 MiG-23s to Egypt.6 In the light of preparation for such a delivery, the Soviet leadership issued two orders: one was for the VVS to ready a squadron of MiG-23Ms for deployment in Egypt, in order to test the new type under local conditions. Another was for the MiG OKB to design an export variant of the MiG-23. At least the former decision came much too late; repeated Soviet refusals to provide most of the arms they had agreed to deliver at earlier times disillusioned the government in Cairo to a point where they had concluded that the Soviet military presence in the country was impeding Egyptian interests. On 16 July 1972, president Sadat ordered all of the 970 Soviet advisors, and around 7,000 other military personnel, to leave Egypt by the end of the month.7

A still from a video showing several early MiG-23Ms. Note the mix of radomes painted in white and grey on diverse aircraft, and a mix of launch-rails for several air-to-air missiles, that were still undergoing testing in the early 1970s, including R-13M (ASCC-code AA-2D Atoll, under the fuselage), R-60 (ASCC-code AA-8 Aphid, on underwing pylons) and – on the aircraft in the background – R-23s. (VVS)

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Emergence of the Family The expulsion of the Soviet military did not end relations between Cairo and Moscow. Through Syrian mediation the USSR struck another arms deal with Egypt in October 1972, envisaging delivery of one squadron of MiG-23s during the final quarter of 1973. A related contract was signed in Cairo, in February 1973, and Egyptian pilots and ground personnel travelled to the Soviet Union for conversion training in May and June of the same year.8 Correspondingly, the MiG OKB continued the work on developing an export variant of the MiG-23M. Because this was a brand-new type only entering the service with the PVO and FA, and the production of S-23 weapons systems was still lagging behind Soviet requirements, and considering the shaky nature of relations between Cairo and Moscow, a decision was taken to base the export variant on the airframe of the MiG-23M, but equip it with the weapons system of the MiG-21S. The resulting Izdeliye-23MS, or MiG-23MS, had the RP-22SM pulse radar as the core of its weapons system. This had a maximum detection range of 18km (9.8nm) and tracking range of 11km (6nm). Its primary armament consisted of up to four R-3S (ASCC code AA-2 Atoll-A) AAMs – rather poor first-generation weapons with a range of only 7km (3.8nm), a narrow engagement envelope, and incapable of tracking targets that manoeuvred at accelerations higher than 2.5gs. As installed in the MiG-23MS, the RP-22SM lacked any ECM-resistance, but could deploy R-3R (ASCC code AA-2C Atoll) SARH missiles in tail-chase engagements.9 The other variant prepared for export eventually became known as the Izdeliye-32-24B, or MiG-23BN. Originally based on the VVS requirement for a supersonic attack fighter, capable of evading enemy air defences by the virtue of its speed at low altitudes, and suitable to replace all the existing improvisations like groundattack variants of MiG-15, MiG-17, and Su-7, its development was initially run independently to that of the Izdeliye-23.10 Only in 1967 was the decision taken to adapt the airframe of the emerging MiG-23 interceptor for this purpose. The resulting MiG-23B had a re-designed, downward-pointed nose, necessary to improve the pilot’s forward view, and the Sokol-23S weapons system, custom tailored for pre-programmed operations at low altitude, and for delivery of nuclear bombs in so-called ‘toss’ manoeuvres. Alternatively, it could take two Kh-23M ASMs, guided by the Delta-N system installed in a bullet-shaped fairing on the leading edge of the starboard wing glove. The prototype of the MiG-23B

One of about 500 MiG-23Ms in service with the VVS of the 1970s. (US DoD) 8

was first-flown in 1971, and – following relatively successful trials – a small pre-series batch of 24 was assembled. As the demands of export customers increased in intensity, a decision was taken to develop an export variant. Because the production of the engines that powered the MiG-23B was lagging behind requirements, and that item was still considered too sensitive for export, the resulting MiG-23BN was a ‘hybrid’. It was equipped with the same engine that powered the MiG-23MS, it lacked the capability to deploy nuclear weapons, and it had a different IFF-system, but otherwise retained the full avionics suite, including the automatic nav/attack platform and Kh-23 compatibility. The only other major difference was of internal nature: while fiercely demanded by multiple export customers, its advanced self-protection suite – centred on the SPS-141 ECMsystem – was not installed on most of MiG-23BNs delivered before the late 1970s. The third variant prepared for export was the MiG-23UB twoseater. While envisaged as a conversion trainer, and lacking any radar, this was combat capable in so far that it could be armed with up to four R-3S AAMs, general-purpose bombs and unguided rockets. Additional variants were to follow only years later (the full list of those known to have been exported to the Middle East is provided in Table 1), however, they all had one point in common: none was ‘downgraded’ for export to a degree this was the case with MiG-23MS and MiG-23BNs. On the contrary, many of the MiG-23MFs, MiG-23MLs, and MiG-23MLDs exported in the 1980s, were either second-hand aircraft from VVS stocks, or actually equipped with the same weapons systems as versions made for Soviet service, although differing in regards of their IFF-systems, and – of course – always lacking compatibility with nuclear weapons.

Table 1: MiG-23 Variants exported to the Middle East, 1973-2008 MiG OKB Designation Izdeliye-23MS Izdeliye-23-51 Izdeliye-32-24B

Official Designation MiG-23MS MiG-23UB MiG-23BN

ASCC-Code Customers

Izdeliye-23-11B Izdeliye-23-12A Izdeliye-23-18 Izdeliye-23-22B

MiG-23MF MiG-23ML MiG-23ML MiG-23MLD

Flogger-B Flogger-G Flogger-G Flogger-K

Flogger-E Flogger-C Flogger-H

Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria Iraq, Libya, Syria Libya, Syria Syria

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

This MiG-23MLD of the VVS was intercepted by USN’s fighters off the coast of Vietnam, in 1986. About 560 MiG-23ML/MLAs have been upgraded to this standard by 1982: additional examples were subsequently manufactured for export. (USN)

Conclusions As described above, interceptor variants of the MiG-23 were originally designed with a very clear task on hand: interception operations supported by ATMS within the frame of a clearlydefined IADS, which was providing all of the necessary support. As such, and although equipped with a reasonably advanced radar, IRST, and – except for the MiG-23MS – with MRAAMs, its interceptor variants received a rather rudimentary avionics outfit. More was not necessary, because the type was not envisaged to operate autonomously and depend on its on-board systems only: with help of the ATMS, the IADS was planned to provide the pilot with enough situational awareness necessary to bring its weapons system into a position from which it could effectively combat one target. Indeed, the Soviet military theoreticians – people who dictated the development of the MiG-23 in the 1960s – went so far in this regards, that they began considering this, and other of their interceptor types developed around the same time, as what can only be described as ‘remotely-controlled, manned missiles, equipped with a radar and air-to-air missiles’: weapons that – thanks to the availability of data-link protocols like Lasour – could be deployed by remote control from the ground, and in which the pilot served only the purpose of executing the take-off and landing, and monitoring the work of on-board systems during the mission. Therefore, the MiG-23 was ill-equipped and ill-suited for anything else: as we are to see, even its most advanced variants could never provide the pilot with situational awareness similar to that provided to contemporary Western types. However, the MiG-23 had entered service around the time experiences from air wars in Middle East and South East Asia – including the importance of manoeuvring combat – became available. The US Navy (USN) was the quickest to react: in the late 1960s, it began training its fighter-pilots in manoeuvring combat (or ‘dogfight’); emphasising deployment of short-range missiles or cannon, and it placed an order for a corresponding fighter-interceptor – resulting in the Grumman F-14 Tomcat. The US Air Force (USAF) followed this pattern, resulting in the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. However, because of its prolonged development, the MiG-23 entered operational service years too late. Certainly enough, F-104 Starfighters and F-4 Phantom IIs had still dominated most of NATO’s fighter fleet of the 1970s and early 1980s. However, the F-14 and the F-15 – followed by the General Dynamics F-16 that appeared in the mid1970s – were much more advanced and far more flexible types, developed on the basis of not only superior technology, but also on

the basis of far more realistic requirements and threat perceptions than the MiG-23. The VVS did attempt to react to these so-called ‘teen fighters’ through introducing various modifications on its Floggers, however, during the flight-testing its pilots could not but conclude that the type was entirely unsuitable for manoeuvring air combat. While in possession of superior acceleration and climbing capabilities in comparison to the MiG-21 for example, whenever it missed its target during the first attack, it possessed next to no capability of quickly turning around in horizontal or vertical axis and re-attacking. Furthermore, the US designs in question were about to enter service while supported by far more advanced air warfare systems than anything the Soviets could offer. This included airborne early warning (AEW) and airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) like the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye and Boeing E-3 Sentry, respectively, COMINT/ ELINT/SIGINT-platforms like the Boeing RC-135, and aircraft for electronic countermeasures like the Grumman EA-6B Prowler or General Dynamics-Grumman EF-111A. Unsurprisingly, when the Soviets then exported MiG-23s to the Middle East in the 1970s, and these were deployed without support of an advanced IADS, or only with support of obsolete IADS, it turned out that the theory and reality are two different pairs of shoes. Like similar systems of Western origin, the Vozdukh1M proved highly successful during exercises, but expensive in acquisition. While enabling the integration of multiple divisions

A view from front and below at one of the first MiG-23MS to be delivered to Egypt in mid-1974. There are four launch rails for R-3S missiles. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

9

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

at corps level, its price was so prohibitive that even as of 1971 only three such systems were operational in all of the PVO. Certainly enough, the system was exported to selected customers in the late 1960s and early 1970s: however, the Soviets proved inconsistent in their export policy, in turn causing their foreign customers to prove inconsistent in the use of that and other of Soviet-made ATMS. Interviewed on condition of anonymity, a former officer of an air defence force equipped almost entirely with Soviet-made air defence systems as of the 1970s and 1980s, commented: ‘The Soviet politics of arms exports and our politics of arms acquisition were very different from what they are nowadays. Generally, we had very little insight into what the Soviets actually had in production, and thus often did not know what we could or had to buy in order for Soviet weapons systems to work. In turn, the Soviets have frequently delivered whatever they were ready to deliver, not what we have ordered. For example, we would order eight P-15 early warning radars, for which we had fully-qualified crews. However, the Soviets would then deliver six P-15s and two P-15Ms, in turn prompting us to request them to train our crews in operations of the P-15Ms, request the supplies of associated spares and so on – all of which was extending our dependability on their advice, while causing us extra costs. Indeed, even once we did find out and then placed the orders for such Soviet-made ATMS, and these were delivered, we had to realise that 80% of our ground control officers were trained somewhere else but in the USSR, and thus could not use such equipment – at

Banking left, this MiG-23MS built for Egypt has nicely exposed details of its camouflage pattern and national insignia as applied on its top surfaces. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

least not without lengthy, comprehensive, and expensive retraining. Coupled with the experience that we could integrate our air defences without such systems, this resulted in conclusion that such expensive equipment was unnecessary.11

The bottom line is that for most of their operational service in the Middle East, MiG-23s were flown into combat without the support of the automated tactical management system and the IADS within which it was designed and equipped to be operated. Nevertheless, this fact remains almost entirely ignored until this very day and is next to never considered when this type’s combat experiences are discussed.

CHAPTER 2

A HANDFUL TO FLY During the first few years of its operations in the Middle East, the MiG-23 suffered from multiple problems related to its incomplete flight-testing and poor manufacturing quality. Indeed, upon entering service in Syria, it not only showed a full spectrum of technical insufficiencies well-known since earlier times, but further suffered from being supported by a very limited IADS. Nevertheless, due to urgent demand, production and export to other customers continued at an unprecedented pace: between 1973 and 1978, at least 250 MiG-23s of three major variants had entered service with five air forces in the Middle East.

The Spoiled Syrian Introduction Contrary to what might be expected, and despite the concentrated Egyptian drive to get the new Soviet fighter-interceptor, the MiG23 entered operational service in Syria. Whether it was in this country that the family was baptised in fire, remains unknown. There is still some uncertainty regarding the exact date of delivery of the first MiG-23s to the SyAAF. According to the version provided by one of the Syrian MiG-23 pilots, the first two MiG-23MS and the first two MiG-23UBs arrived mid-way through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and no less than 20 aircraft were delivered by November of the same year. Indeed, 10

the same source went on to provide a detailed narrative about what could have been the first air combat involving SyAAF’s MiG-23s, supposedly taking place during the so-called ‘War of Continuation’, fought in April and May 1974.12 One of the consequences of an oppressive regime ruling for decades with help of terror, mass-murder and corruption, is that even the bearers of the highest military decorations for courage that such a government might provide – like the Hero of the Syrian Arabic Republic Medal (comparable to the Hero of the Soviet Union in the former USSR, or the Victoria Cross in Great Britain) – are anything other than dependable sources. Indeed, the very nature of regimes like that of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad (former Meteor and MiG-17-pilot), and his son, Bashar al-Assad, is that careers of military officers serving them are dictated by their loyalty, instead by their merits. That is why it happens that such, and similar, decorations are often given to pilots known to have claimed for themselves aerial victories actually scored by other members of their formations, who were then shot down and killed in combat. Probably the worst example known in Syria is the (officially) ‘most successful and highest-decorated MiG-21 pilot of the October 1973 War’, who turned out to have ‘earned’ his decorations for virtually marrying the daughter of the

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

contemporary Chief-of-Staff, SyAAF. With hindsight, it is easy to conclude that the early service history of the MiG-23 family was strongly influenced by such and similar characters. Meanwhile it is almost certain that the Soviets began delivering the MiG-23MS to Syria starting in April 1974 only. The first to arrive should have been a batch of 16 MiG-23MS and four MiG-23UBs, which were evenly distributed between two units: Nos. 67 and 77 Squadrons, based at as-Se’en AB (better known as ‘Tsaykal’ in the West). The second batch apparently reached Syria during May of 1974 and included at least 13 MiG-23BNs. The resulting three units were grouped within the 17th FighterBomber Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hicham Karmi – a little-known, yet truly ‘leading’ Syrian fighter-bomberpilot and instructor.13 Although the SyAAF assigned some of its best and most experienced fighter pilots to the 17th Fighter-Bomber Brigade, the first phase of their conversion training proved anything other than successful. The combination of poor manufacturing quality and technical unreliability of the aircraft, lack of suitable technical documentation, but also the unprofessionalism, pride and overconfidence of the involved pilots, and the mutual distrust between Syrian and Soviet officers, could all have contributed to a loss of at least four MiG-23s in different accidents within 15 days from start of their operations in Syria. Up to 13 out of the first 41 MiG-23MS, MiG-23BNs, and MiG-23UBs delivered to Syria were written off by the end of 1974. Amongst the fatalities was Major Hassan Saleh Abboud – another of the highly-decorated MiG-21-pilots from the October 1973 War with Israel – who was killed while flying a MiG-23 on 17 April 1974. Up to four Soviet instructors involved were killed or injured in MiG-23 related accidents too. Reportedly, the situation reached such proportions, that the story is that the surviving Soviet instructors had filed a report to Moscow concluding with the observation, ‘…there is simply no other way of helping Syrians operate MiG-23s, but to fly these for them’. Syrian sources indicate that it was only after the 14th accident, sometime in 1975, that the crucial reason for most of issues was found and ‘the problem’ with Syrian MiG-23 sorted out.14

Syrian IADS It might appear unusual to discuss an integrated air defence system in a book detailing the operational history of a fighter jet. However, for reasons described in Chapter 1, there is no way around this issue when it comes to the MiG-23. The IADS into which the Syrian MiG-23s were integrated was anything other than ideal. Certainly enough, this system was at least reasonably well-equipped, run by Soviet-trained personnel, and assisted by up to 3,000 Soviet advisors present in the country. However, most officers and other ranks of the service that operated that system – the Syrian Arab Air Defence Force (SyAADF) – lacked the experience, technical expertise, discipline and patience to use it to its full capabilities. The reason was not only the influence of officers appointed to their positions for loyalty to Assad: jumpstarted with Soviet assistance only in May 1973, the SyAADF was the youngest branch of the Syrian military.15 Working feverishly, the Soviets trained enough personnel and delivered enough equipment to establish 49 battalions equipped

A still from a video showing the MiG-23MS serial number 1614, from the first batch delivered to Syria, inside a hardened aircraft shelter at as-Se’en AB. Note the absence of roundels: since it was re-established in 1961, the SyAAF introduced the tradition of not applying any on the fuselages of its combat aircraft. (Tom Cooper Collection)

MiG-23BN serial 1655 belonged to the first batch of this variant delivered to Syria in 1974. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Another MiG-23BN from the first batch to arrive in Syria was the serial number 1661. It is the same camouflage pattern as applied on MiG23MS and application of the serial in an entirely different position than on 1655. (Tom Cooper Collection)

with SAMs (each battalion operated one SAM site): 36 of these took part in the October 1973 War with Israel. These units, plus those equipped with anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), were combined with six P-14 and P-14F early warning radars, and integrated with the help of two ASURK-1ME systems, while their cooperation with fighter-interceptors was coordinated with the help of two Vozdukh-1ME systems. A cross-examination of information provided by Syrian sources, with that provided by East European sources has shown that the computers of the two Vozdukh-1MEs in question were significantly downgraded. Instead of each being capable of simultaneously tracking 62 targets, and engaging 31 of these, each Syrian system was capable of simultaneously tracking up to 24 targets, and engaging 12 of these. Combined, the two systems could thus simultaneously track only a total of 48 targets, and coordinate engagements of 24 of these.16 11

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

Whether by accident or design, during the October 1973 War the IDF/AF introduced the practice of operating in multiple big formations: some of its strikes against targets in the Damascus area included up to six formations, each including between 7 and 18 aircraft, and each approaching from an entirely different direction. Every such operation was supported by massive volumes of ECM emitted from ground stations and from helicopters airborne over Israel, and by multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that served as decoys, while attacking aircraft were equipped with so-called ‘jamming pods’: ECM-systems installed inside containers carried under the fuselage of Israeli fighter-bombers. Unsurprising result was that the IADS operated by the SyAADF was regularly overwhelmed during that conflict: its primitive computers could not simultaneously track all the targets the radars connected to them had detected. While such problems could – potentially – be solved through deliveries of a more advanced ATMS, Moscow refused to help before the early 1980s; by which time it was too late. At least as important was the geo-strategic situation in which the Syrians had found themselves due to the loss of the June 1967 War with Israel. During that conflict, Israel established itself in possession of dominating peaks on the Golan Heights in southwestern Syria. These were promptly exploited for construction of numerous early warning radar stations, and COMINT/ELINT/ SIGINT stations, all of which provided an excellent insight into the Syrian airspace as far as the T-4 AB (also ‘Tiyas’), in central Syria, nearly 300km (161nm) from the Golan Heights. On the contrary: the work of the SyAADF’s IADS was strongly disturbed by mountain chains of Lebanon and the very same peaks on the Golan Heights atop of which the Israelis had constructed their early warning stations.

Civil War in Lebanon In April 1975, a civil war erupted in Lebanon, initially pitting militants of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) against diverse Christian militias, but eventually causing deep rifts within the Lebanese government and the military. Israel – which had conducted periodic air and commando strikes against the PLO in Lebanon since 1970 and was interested in securing the aquifers of the Litani River region in south Lebanon – then launched the idea of creating a Christian Maronite ‘buffer’ state to cut off the PLO from its northern border. As the fighting spread, and following multiple massacres of civilians, Damascus brokered a truce between the two sides, while deploying units of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) to bring the PLO under control and prevent the disintegration of Lebanon.17 The violence continued to escalate and in March 1976, the Lebanese President officially requested a Syrian military intervention. This request was followed by an authorisation of the Arab League for Syria to deploy a peace-keeping force in the country. Moscow strongly disagreed with this deployment and suspended all arms deliveries to Syria. Correspondingly, the further build-up of the Syrian MiG-23 fleet was not only marred by the incompatibility of the type with Syrian pilots and ground crews, and generally poor mechanical reliability of the aircraft, but also the Soviet arms embargo. Because of this, the activity of the 12

SyAAF in support of Syrian troops inside Lebanon in 1975 and 1976 was limited to occasional helicopter sorties, and very few air strikes by MiG-21s.18 Furthermore, contrary to the 1960s and early 1970s, when its economy was experiencing a rapid growth, a combination of inefficiency, mismanagement and favouritism within the regime, chronic socio-economic problems, and the costly military intervention in Lebanon resulted in a major economic crisis in 1976. As the emerging class of senior military officers and entrepreneurs became involved in large-scale smuggling operations via the neighbouring country, the deployment of Syrian troops against the PLO caused rifts within lower ranks of the military. This included numerous naturalised Palestinians: people that volunteered to serve, defend Syria and fight Israel, but not to combat the PLO. Unsurprisingly, in protest over Damascus’ involvement against the Palestinians in Lebanon – defacto on the side of Israel – on 14 June 1976, Lieutenant Mahmoud Musleh Yasin, a Palestinian serving with the SyAAF, defected to Iraq flying a MiG-23MS.19

A Short Stint in Egypt During, or immediately after, the October 1973 War, Cairo repeated its requests for deliveries of MiG-23s. Not only had Moscow considered supporting Syria a priority, but after rolling out the aircraft ordered by the SyAAF, the Factory No. 30 took some time to manufacture those for Egypt. Thus, it was only through the mediation by the Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, and in the second half of 1974, that eight MiG23MS, eight MiG-23BNs and four MiG-23UBs were delivered to Cairo West air base. The new aircraft were all concentrated within the same unit – No. 47 Squadron, EAF – but saw only a brief service life, marred by similar technical issues as those experienced before and after by other users of this type – and, by the rapid cooling of relations between Cairo and Moscow. Furthermore, the fleet was greatly weakened in a mass-crash that occurred on an unknown date, and is said to have developed as follows. Two pairs of jets were about to take-off from their home-base at Marsa Matruh. The front pair rolled down the runway, followed closely by the rear pair. All four jets were moving at high speed when the engine of the MiG-23 Number 4 (second in the rear pair) caught fire. Shocked by what he saw, the ground controller called on the radio, ‘Oh! Number 2, eject, eject, eject: your engine caught fire!’ Thinking it was his engine that was on fire, the Number 2 pilot in the formation – the wingman in the front pair – promptly ejected. His abandoned aircraft then collided with Number 3 as this was taking-off, and both crashed next to Number 4, at the end of the runway. Finally, the Number 1 of the formation was ordered to return to the base: that MiG-23 crashed while trying to land on the runway full of debris from the other three crashes. Although all four involved pilots survived, this catastrophe sealed the fate of the MiG-23 in Egypt. With the EAF already in the process of acquiring large numbers of Dassault Mirage 5s from France (all of which were sponsored by Saudi Arabia), and not keen to continue buying troublesome MiG-23s, the type became surplus. After less than two years in service, the entire fleet was placed in storage in 1976.

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A beautiful study of the MiG-23MS 9507, as seen while undergoing maintenance at Marsa Matruh AB in 1974. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

Pair of No. 47 Squadron’s MiG23MS’ in flight over the pyramids of Gizeh in October 1974. In front is serial number 9509, while wingman flew the serial number 9507. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

MiG-23MS serial number 9502 seen while landing at Marsa Matruh in late 1974. Note the application of very large roundels on intakes, and slightly smaller on top wing surfaces. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

The first MiG-23UB to enter service with the EAF received the serial

A MiG-23BN leading a MiG-23UB and a pair of MiG-23MS during the

number 9591. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

parade over Cairo in October 1974. (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

Certainly enough that was not the end of the story of Egyptian MiG-23s. With Egypt establishing good ties to the People’s Republic of China and then the USA, Cairo was swift in yielding the biggest possible profits from aircraft it did not need. Two MiG-23MS, two MiG-23BNs and two MiG-23Us (together with

10 MiG-21MFs and 10 AS-5 air-to-surface missiles) were sold to China in 1978. Shortly after, a similar agreement was reached with Washington, this time for the sale of the remaining MiG-23MS and MiG-23BNs to the Foreign Technology Division – a department of the USAF responsible for evaluating enemy equipment.20 13

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

Shock in Iraq Intending to replace the remaining Hawker Hunters of British origin, and obsolete MiG-17Fs, Iraq placed an order for MiG-23MS interceptors and MiG-23BNs in early 1973. Correspondingly, a large group of pilots and ground crews – including most of the personnel from No. 29 Squadron, IrAF – was undergoing conversion courses at Lugovaya Training Centre, near Frunze in the USSR, when the October 1973 War erupted.21 Contrary to the Egyptians and Syrians, the Iraqis were convinced to place their orders by Soviets advertising the MiG-23MS as a sort of ‘singleengined F-14’. Unsurprisingly, the Iraqi pilots and officers involved experienced a nasty surprise as soon as they arrived in the USSR: none of them had fewer than 1,500 hours on fast jets, yet their Soviet instructors insisted on treating them as inexperienced cadets. Out of six months of training, more than four were spent on the ground: the actual flying time was minimal, and pilots were neither trained to fly MiG-23s in combat, nor to deploy its weapons.22 What followed once the first 18 MiG-23MS and 2 MiG-23UBs arrived by ship to the port of Basra, and were then assembled at Wahda AB, was an outright shock: the Soviets failed to provide any kind of technical documentation or flight manuals. Left without a choice, the Iraqis ran the flight testing on their own. Before long, this had revealed that the Soviets had never taught them about aerodynamic limitations of the MiG-23. On the contrary, accustomed to such vice-free aircraft as the Hunter, MiG-17 and MiG-21, pilots found themselves forced to cope with what one of them described as an ‘ungainly technological catastrophe’. Another nasty surprise was the poor avionics outfit: while the Iraqis knew that the Soviets had a number of much more advanced air-to-air missiles under development, MiG-23MSs were still equipped with nearly useless R-3Ss. Similarly, knowing this is only capable of warning of lock-ons from very short ranges, they severely criticised

A pair of R-13M missiles: exported to the Middle East starting in 1978, these represented the first significant improvement for MiG-23MS in service in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. (Photo by Piotr Butowski) 14

the SPO-3 Sirena-3 RWR system, which subsequently proved as incapable of detecting emissions from pulse Doppler radars too. The first unit equipped with the type, the newly-established No. 39 Squadron, was declared operational only in 1976.23 Nevertheless, the acquisition process was continued and during the same year the No. 29 Squadron was re-equipped with MiG23BNs and home-based at the newly-constructed Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB, outside an-Nassiriyah. The plan to do the same with No. 7 Squadron was abandoned when it turned out that the jets arrived without the SPS-141 ECM-system, although the IrAF paid for such an installation. It was only after extensive negotiations with Moscow that the IrAF then accepted another batch of about 24 MiG-23BNs. Most of these were assigned to the newly-established No. 49 Squadron, based at Abu Ubaida AB, outside al-Kut. It took the IrAF literally years of ‘learning by doing’, and not a few fierce discussions with Soviet representatives in Baghdad, and then a lot of hard work to start improving the technical condition and availability of their MiG-23 fleet. At least 12 MiG23s of all variants (including several MiG-23UBs) were written off in different accidents by 1978, when the technicians of No. 39 Squadron introduced the first significant modification on their aircraft. This consisted of adapting underwing stations for deployment of R-13M air-to-air missiles: as ironic as it might sound, around the same time they were delivering MiG-23MS equipped with obsolete R-3S to Iraq, the Soviets started delivering the MiG-21bis equipped with R-13Ms, too. Not wasting their time with questioning the logic behind such behaviour, the Iraqis then attempted to install new missiles on all four stations. However, trial firings of R-13Ms caused at least two engine malfunctions: the new missile was quite smoky, and the engine tended to surge whenever ingesting smoke. Correspondingly, the installation was approved only for underwing pylons.

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

While it is still unknown if the IrAF ever acquired any of the Vozdukh-1ME systems, it is certain that the tactics developed by pilots of No. 39 Squadron did not follow any kind of Soviet advice. Instead of limiting themselves to operating strictly to directions from the ground control, they trained to fly CAPs and acquire their targets either with the help of their own radar or visually. Nevertheless, the MiG-23 family was never to prove as popular in service in Iraq or in Syria as various variants of Sukhoi Su-20 and Su-22 that entered service around the same time.

A poor, but extremely rare photograph of an early MiG-23MS of No. 39 Squadron. Barely recognisable is the crest of that squadron applied on the intake (see Colour Section for details). (Ali Tobchi Collection)

Pilots of No. 39 Squadron with one of at least three MiG-23UBs assigned to that unit in the 1970s. Known serials were 1274, 1275 and 1276. (Farzin Nadimi Collection)

This low-resolution photograph scanned from an Iraqi military publication from the 1980s, is of particular interest for showing the rather unusual fashion in which national insignia was applied on top and bottom wing surfaces: applied while the aircraft was parked on the ground, with its wings fully swept back, the national insignias appeared as ‘pointing inboard’ whenever the wings were in their fully open position. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Trial and Error in Libya Libya became the fourth major customer for the MiG-23 in the Middle East. The government of Libyan leader Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qaddhafi, who established himself in power following a coup of 1969, was initially acquiring most of its armament from France, Italy, and the USA. However, when – in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War – Qaddhafi and his top commanders decided to build-up a ‘million-man army’ – they were forced to conclude that there was only one party capable and ready of providing the necessary arms and equipment: the Soviet Union. Correspondingly, the administration in Tripoli took care to establish military-related ties to Moscow and – while all the time carefully avoiding any kind of Soviet political influence – placed several huge orders for aircraft and other heavy weapons. Amongst these were 54 MiG-23MS interceptors, 35-38 MiG23BN fighter-bombers, and 15 MiG-23UB conversion trainers. The principal hub for MiG-23 operations in Libya became the Benina AB, outside Benghazi, and the first unit declared operational on the type became No. 1060 Squadron, equipped with MiG-23MS in 1976. This was followed by the first unit declared operational on MiG-23BNs: No. 1070 Squadron.24 In addition to purchasing combat aircraft, Tripoli requested the USSR to help establish an IADS covering the entire Libyan coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The development of the same took most of the remaining 1970s and all of the 1980s, but was never entirely completed: indeed, while delivering at least three ASURK-1ME systems for integration of SAM-units quite early, the Soviets took their time with delivering any ATMS to Libya. The principal reason was that the Libyan leadership was forced to realise that its planning was overoptimistic: it proved nearly impossible to find, recruit and train all the necessary personnel. As of the mid-1970s, the LAAF was still a relatively small service, consisting of few dozens of US-trained pilots, several large groups of pilots trained in Yugoslavia, or at the Air Force Academy in Misurata according to Yugoslav and Pakistani training plans, and additional pilots trained in Egypt, France, Romania, the USSR and elsewhere abroad. This resulted in Libyan pilots not only receiving very diverse levels of qualifications and skills but also flying in several different languages, including English, French, and Russian. Another language – Arabic – was added when the LAAF invited Syria to deploy 40 pilots and more than 200 technicians, led by Colonel Hicham Karmi, to man two of its MiG-23MS squadrons based at Benina AB, outside Benghazi, in 1978. Meanwhile, and to their great disappointment, the Libyans realised that the quality of training provided by the Soviets was well below expected levels. Combined with the usual set of extensive problems related to introducing MiG-23MS and MiG23BNs to service, this resulted in significant tensions between Tripoli and Moscow. Abdul Hassan, one of the earliest Libyan MiG-23 pilots, recalled as follows – in turn summarising all the ordeals his colleagues in Egypt, Iraq and Syria went through, too: ‘The Soviets announced the MiG-23 to us as outmatching everything, their own MiG-21, French Mirage, US-made F-4 Phantom II and even the F-14 Tomcat, but delivered only the variant equipped with the weapons system and avionics of the MiG-21. We expected a lot from it but were greatly 15

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

disappointed during our conversion courses. Essentially, the MiG-23 proved very complex in maintenance and operations. The wing moving mechanism could set the wing to three preprogrammed positions: 16 degrees for slow speed, 45 degrees for combat, and 72 degrees for high-speed flying. Each of these settings changed the flight characteristics dramatically. It was like flying three different aircraft. To fly the MiG-23 you had to be able to fly it well in all three set-ups. The wing moving mechanism was troublesome to maintain. It was made of one big piece of steel, the manufacturing quality of which was poor and it was easy to damage by flying too fast at high speeds and low level. Such flying could also easily damage the cockpit hood, which had to be frequently replaced. We lost several pilots in crashes caused by failures of wing moving mechanisms (and a few to failures of the cockpit hood). Several crashed during practice strafing runs. From that time onwards, our technicians always had an eye on that mechanism. The next problem was manoeuvring the aircraft in air combat. In manoeuvre, the MiG-23MS and the MiG-23UB had a big problem at a high angle-of-attack (AoA). They were easy to fly outside the envelope and prone to flat spin if pulled above the limit of 24 degrees. There was no AoA-limiter. While flying tight manoeuvres, the pilot had to carefully watch the AoA indicator instead of the target – which was further problematic alone because of very poor visibility out of the cockpit, limited by heavy framing. Another weak spot was the engine. Once the wings of a MiG23MS were fully swept back, its acceleration was exceptional. Retrimming the plane was no problem but adjusting power was, because of the engine. The R-29 could accelerate to the point of disintegration, but could not decelerate under the pilot’s control. Above Mach 1, there was no response to the throttle, but the pilot had to let the engine decelerate on its own. Combined, all these problems made the MiG-23 very dangerous to fly for our inexperienced pilots. We lost pilots trying to land MiG-23UBs alone because they forgot to move their wings forward, to the minimum position. The weapons system was also a problem. It included only the old and unreliable R-3S air-to-air missiles. What amazed us was that at the time the Soviets were delivering much more advanced R-13M missiles together with MiG-21bis to us. We decided to re-wire our MiG-23MS to match them with R-13Ms. During the test-firing of this weapon another catastrophe occurred. When fired from one of the hardpoints under the fuselage, the smoke from R-13M entered the engine and caused it to malfunction. The plane fell into the spin and our test pilot barely survived. This experience forced us to modify only underwing hardpoints to carry R-13Ms.’

wing moving mechanism, others due to engine failures, and there were pilot errors too. Once the problems were solved, this variant turned into a true workhorse and could be flown intensively. Like other MiG-23 variants, the MiG-23BN came with capability to deploy the Kh-23 guided missile. Unlike MiG-23MSs, it did not need to carry the Delta guidance pod; it had this installed in the right wing root. However, the Kh23 was a big disappointment, very unreliable and thus seldom used. Instead, we always armed our MiG-23BNs with bombs like FAB-250 and -500, OFAB-100, ZAB-350 and -500 napalm bombs, UB-16-57 pods for unguided 57mm rockets and others.’

Another of the early Libyan MiG-23 pilots was Hazem al-Bajigni, who described the episode that caused such a frustration within the LAAF that its cooperation with the Soviets nearly collapsed: ‘I was sent to the USSR in 1976 for a conversion course on MiG-23BN, together with ten other pilots. Due to a disagreement over the nature of our program things did not go well, and we returned a few months later. Hardly back from the Soviet Union, I then experienced a very nasty accident in a MiG-23UB. We lost the hydraulic system and Natasha (vocal alarm system) was blurting all sorts of warnings. I ejected my Russian instructor and me at high, negative g-forces and we were both blinded for three days. We were rescued by some Bedouins that put us in a Toyota Land Cruiser and subsequently I was sent to West Germany for medical treatment.

Eventually, training of Libyan pilots in the USSR was discontinued in 1977, by when the LAAF was insisting the Soviets to rectify all technical issues with the aircraft, as recalled by Hussein: ‘We insisted the Soviets correct all the problems and repair our MiG-23s. We paid them millions for aircraft that were poorly manufactured and that malfunctioned all the time. They put all the blame upon us. They said our technicians were lazy and did not follow the prescribed maintenance routines, our pilots could not fly and were ejecting from their aircraft at the first sign of problems, and many, many other things. At the same time they would not even provide us with spares, tools and technical documentation to maintain our aircraft’

Early Libyan experiences with MiG-23BNs were not much different, as explained by Hassan:

Despite protracted ‘negotiations’ (not a few of which ended on the brink of fist-fights) no solution for the issue was found. With average operational rates for MiG-23s dropping to less than 40%, the LAAF found itself preoccupied spending years introducing an expensive type of combat aircraft to service, which – in the opinion of many of its officers – was simply not worth the money. Eventually, the Libyans turned to entirely unexpected parties for help, as recalled by Bajigni:

‘The MiG-23BN was a dedicated ground-attack variant, designed for fast and straight flying at low altitude, where it offered a smooth ride. Early on we experienced the same maintenance problems as with MiG-23MSs and lost a number of pilots and aircraft. Some crashed due to failures of the

‘With no end of problems with MiG-23 in sight, we felt forced to hire a few experienced American and Pakistani pilots to test-fly our MiG-23s and to help re-write their flight manuals. Of course, the Russians were furiously mad when they heard about this.’25

16

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

One of the first MiG-23MSs (serial 712) as seen at Ukba Ibn Nafi AB (later Mitiga) in 1976. It’s notable that launch rails for R-3S air-to-air missiles, are installed on underwing pylons and under the fuselage. Another example can be seen in the background. (Tom Cooper Collection)

On the same occasion, the same photographer took this photograph, showing one of first few MiG-23UBs to become operational with the LAAF. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Late in the Game: Algeria Contrary to what might be expected for a country ‘renowned’ as a ‘traditional Soviet customer’ ever since its independence in 1962, Algeria did not follow in the fashion of Egyptian, Iraqi, Libyan, or Syrian orders for MiG-23s. Certainly enough, in the light of experiences of its military deployed in Egypt during the October 1973 War, but also concerned over tensions with Morocco, in 1974 the government in Algiers came to the decision to significantly upgrade its armed forces. However, related intentions were signalled foremost in direction of the West. Amongst others, commander of the QJJ, Colonel Hamid Abdelli – described as ‘modern and imaginative leader’ even by US intelligence assessments – expressed interest in the acquisition of the British Aerospace Hawk jet trainers and Hawker Siddeley Harrier V/ STOL fighter-bombers.26 After studying related offers for some time, the Algerians concluded that most of aircraft of Western origin were not only very expensive, but much too complex for the abilities of available personnel. Therefore, Algiers decided to wait until the QJJ would be better developed, and meanwhile turned back to Moscow. In 1975, a new arms deal was signed with the USSR, stipulating – amongst others – an acquisition of 40 MiG-23BNs. The first six fighterbombers arrived in 1976: this type entered service with the Laghouat AB based 27 and 28 Escadron de Attaque/Bombardier (Attack/ Bomber Squadrons), replacing antiquated Ilyushin Il-28 bombers.27

Another of the early Libyan MiG-23MSs, complete with four launch rails for R-3S missiles. Note the position of the front roundel, low on the forward fuselage below the cockpit. (Tom Cooper Collection)

It’s notable that the Algerians refused to buy any MiG-23MSs – for multiple reasons. Their first priority was to replace remaining Sukhoi Su-7s, which were worn out after their deployment to Egypt in 1973-1974. Furthermore, by the time they began considering the purchase of MiG-23MSs, the Algerians had learned about all the possible ‘teething problems’ with this version, experienced by other customers in the Middle East. Finally, the Algerian military spent much of the 1960s and 1970s with building-up units that would be deployed to Egypt in the case of another war with Israel, and thus ignored the necessity to build-up air defences of their own homeland. Correspondingly, although the QJJ did buy two battalions of SA-75M Dvina (ASCC code SA-2 Guideline) in 1967, these were never pressed in service: both SA-2 systems were in poor condition already by 1975, and subsequently withdrawn from use, their equipment ending as decoys near the Tindouf AB.28 A new effort to establish an Algerian IADS was launched only in 1978, and in reaction to a Moroccan order for Dassault Mirage F.1s in France, when Algiers requested the delivery of 16 MiG23M interceptors – in addition to 4 S-125M and 8 S-125M1A Pechora (ASCC-code SA-3 Goa) SAM-systems. This time, it was the Soviets who proved reluctant to deliver. Indeed, it world take four years of intensive and though negotiations until the related contract was signed.29

A pair of Algerian MiG-23BN – serials 383 and 388 – as presented in the public for the first time during the Independence Day parade in Algiers, on 1 November 1979. The aircraft with serials 372 and 389 participated in the same overflight.30 (Tom Cooper Collection)

17

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

Turbulent 1970s Overall, the MiG-23 family thus entered service with five air forces in the Middle East (and northern Africa) of the 1970s. Still undergoing testing and development in the USSR, prematurely rushed into production, often equipped in a rather random fashion, MiG-23MSs, MiG-23BNs, and MiG-23UBs were delivered without the necessary technical documentation, without the necessary manuals, and with their future pilots and ground crews receiving only a bare minimum of training. The air forces operating them thus experienced not only the usual set of problems experienced with every immature design, but also problems caused by the poor quality of manufacturing. Furthermore, the interceptor variant is known to have been integrated into the local IADS and supported by an ATMS only in Syria. Unsurprisingly, the type caused incredible problems and what could even be described as ‘severe losses’ to at least four of the air forces in question, and was out of service in at least one case before very long. It took most of the 1970s, plenty of additional testing and development, a lot of hard work and training – all of which caused significant extra costs – for the Algerians, Iraqis, Libyans and Syrians to turn their MiG-23s into effective weapons. Indeed, it was to take an entirely new generation of MiG-23 variants for the type to become popular in these services.

Table 2: Summary of MiG-23 Deliveries to Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, 1973-1978 Country Number of Aircraft Algeria 40 Egypt 8 8 4 Iraq 18 36-40 Libya 54 35-38 15 Syria 16 13 4

Variant MiG-23BN MiG-23MS MiG-23BN MiG-23UB MiG-23MS MiG-23BN MiG-23MS MiG-23BN MiG-23UB MiG-23MS MiG-23BN MiG-23UB

Period of Delivery 1976-1978 1974 1974 1974 1974-1975 1976-1978 1975-1978 1975-1978 1975-1978 1973-1974 1974 1973-1974

Units 27 & 28 Squadrons 47 Squadron 39 Squadron 29 & 49 Squadrons 1040 & 1060 Squadrons 1050 & 1070 Squadrons diverse units 67 Squadron 77 Squadron

Four of Egypt’s eight MiG-23BNs, as seen during the fly-past over Cairo in October 1975. (Tom Cooper Collection)

CHAPTER 3

SECOND GENERATION As the 1970s turned into 1980s, and the MiG-23 family began to mature, the type became involved in multiple conflicts around the Middle East. The first of these was the protracted War between Iran and Iraq, where Iraqi MiG-23s saw intensive action against some of the most advanced contemporary fighter-bombers of US-design. Meanwhile, Libya became involved in diverse, lowintensity conflicts around its borders – some of which pitted its MiG-23s against F-14 Tomcats of the US Navy over the Mediterranean Sea. The third big war was the one in Lebanon, where Syrian MiG-23s saw action against local parties and then the Israeli air force.

Enter the MiG-23MF Concerned by the increasing instability of his regime, and with promises of Saudi financing in the background, Hafez al-Assad travelled to Moscow in April 1977, accompanied by his Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Mustafa Tlass, and a big military delegation. In the course of meetings with the Soviet leadership, the two parties found a number of compromises: in exchange for Syrian agreement to support the Soviet-backed PLO, but also the repetition of the Soviet statement that Israel has a right to an independent state and secure existence, the USSR granted generous economic aid and promised to bolster the Syrian military. One of most obvious results of this summit was a contract stipulating delivery of between 28 and 30 MiG-23MF interceptors (Izdeliye18

23-11B), starting in 1978. 31 Two further agreements envisaged deliveries of 18 additional MiG-23BNs – this time equipped with the SPS-141 ECM-system – in 1979, and 18 in 1980. 32 Although the aircraft delivered to Syria were second-hand, overhauled, former MiG-23Ms of the VVS or the PVO, the Soviet agreement to export MiG-23MFs to Syria was a major break-through: it was the first time ever that the USSR showed readiness to deliver an advanced weapons system de-facto equipped to same standard as that used by its own military, to a customer outside Eastern Europe. The reason for this was the fact that the MiG-23MF was essentially the same as the MiG-23M: although designated S-23E, its weapons system was the same as the S-23, and its primary armament consisted of the same R-23 MRAAMs operated by the VVS. These could only be deployed against targets underway at altitudes above 1000 metres (3,280ft), but had an effective engagement range of between 15km (8nm; for IR variant, R-23T) and 25 kilometres (13.5nm; for SARH variant, R-23R, ASCC code AA-7A Apex-A). The centrepiece of the S-23E weapons system was the Sapfir-23D-III – an analogue, pulse radar. This utilised the – rather unreliable – ‘envelope detection’ technique to detect objects flying low over the ground: thanks to about 40 analogue filters used to suppress the ground clutter, it was capable of projecting only radar echoes from moving targets on the ASP23D sight in the cockpit. Certainly enough, in a look-down

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

mode, or in a tail-chase type of engagement, the Sapfir-23D-III was extremely limited, having a detection range of barely 10-20 kilometres (5.3-10.6nm), respectively. It was already renowned as notoriously unreliable and its proper function was heavily dependent on constant fine-tuning of its AVM-23 analogue computer. Furthermore, it proved effective only over relatively flat terrain. However, by having a maximum detection range of about 45km (24nm) for fighter-sized targets at medium or high altitudes, in combination with R-23s, and if deployed with full support of a well-developed IADS – as already available in Syria – it was expected to prove at least a match for the F-15A/B Eagle, and superior to the F-16A/B Fighting Falcon, which the USA were in the process of delivering to Israel. Availability of additional aircraft enabled the SyAAF to completely reorganize its MiG-23 units, as described in Table 3. 33

Table 3: SyAAF MiG-23 Units, 1978-198234 Brigade

Squadron

Base

Variant

17th Fighter-Bomber 67 Brigade

as-Se’en

MiG-23MS

77

as-Se’en

MiG-23BN

as-Se’en

MiG-23BN

34th Fighter-Bomber 97 Brigade

95

an-Nassiriyah

MiG-23BN

98

an-Nassiriyah

MiG-23BN

96

an-Nassiriyah

Su-22M

14th Fighter-Bomber 78 Brigade

Abu ad-Duhor

MiG-23MF

A MiG-23M of the VVS banking away from a NATO aircraft it intercepted over the Baltic, in the early 1980s, and thus showing its armament consisting of R-23 and R-60 AAMs. The Syrian air force should have received ‘essentially the same’ variant in 1978-1982. (US DoD)

First Years of the Iran-Iraq War Iraqi MiG-23 units were facing a very similar set of problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In reaction to several Israeli reconnaissance sorties over western Iraq, No. 39 Squadron – meanwhile reinforced through the acquisition of an additional batch of aircraft to replace its early losses – was re-deployed from Rashid AB to al-Wallid AB (better known in the West as ‘H-3’), in late 1978. In a matter of weeks, the squadron would have its first encounter with one of the IDF/AF’s aircraft. Indeed, some related reports seem to have caused rumours about an Iraqi MiG23 actually scoring a kill against an Israeli F-15. However, no evidence was ever provided of something of this kind actually happening. 35 The two MiG-23BN units continued working up, despite persistent problems with hydraulic systems and engines of their aircraft. Related problems caused the loss of the commanding

A close-up view of the R-23T (top) and R-23R air-to-air missiles (ASCC codes AA-7A and AA-7B, respectively), which represented the primary armament of the MiG-23M/MF variants. (Photo by Piotr Butowski) 19

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

officer (CO) of the No. 29 Squadron, Table 4: Known IrAF MiG-23 Sorties of 22 September 198036 Lieutenant-Colonel Kazem, when his MiGUnit Base Sorties Target & Results 23BN crashed on take-off from Ali Ibn Abu 1st Wave time on target: 1200-1230 hrs Talib AB, due to engine malfunction, in No. 29 Squadron Ali Ibn Abu Talib 5 Dezful, TFB.4/Vahdati; hits on the runway 1979. The unit lost another jet under similar No. 29 Squadron Ali Ibn Abu Talib 3 Dezful, highway strip; hits on the runway circumstances during the same year, when the No. 29 Squadron Ali Ibn Abu Talib 2 Ahwaz Airport; hits on the runway aircraft flown by 1st Lt Najib Kubaisy crashed No. 29 Squadron Ali Ibn Abu Talib 5 Masjed Soleiman, IRIAA Base; hits on the close to his home-base. runway In summer 1980, No. 39 Squadron moved No. 39 Squadron Abu Ubaida 11 Kermanshah, IRIAA Base; hits on the runway and parked aircraft and helicopters again, this time to Tammuz AB, near No. 49 Squadron Abu Ubaida 5 Islamabad Airport; attack aborted due to low Habbaniyah. The reason was that Iraq was clouds in the process of preparing for the invasion 2nd Wave time on target: 1230-1300 hrs of Iran, and the IrAF thus sought to reinforce No. 29 Squadron Ali Ibn Abu Talib 9 Dezful, TFB.4/Vahdati; hits on the runway the defences of Baghdad. The invasion was and parked aircraft preceded by nearly two months of border No. 49 Squadron Abu Ubaida 6 Kermanshah, IRIAA Base; aborted due to clashes, which saw little action by Iraqi MiGlow clouds 23s. Furthermore, during that period, at No. 49 Squadron Abu Ubaida 6 Hamedan, TFB.3/Nojeh; hits on the runway least one of the MiG-23BN units suffered a and parked aircraft series of minor mishaps, prompting the Air 3rd Wave time on target: 1650-1710 hrs Force Intelligence Directorate to suspect No. 39 Squadron Abu Ubaida 7 Kermanshah, IRIAA Base; hits on the runway members of the Islamic Da’awa Party – an and air defences; reported runway-repair works illegal movement of the Iraqi Shi’a – of No. 39 Squadron Abu Ubaida 6 Kermanshah, IRIAA Base; hits on the runway sabotage. A lengthy investigation produced No. 49 Squadron Abu Ubaida 5 target and results unclear no results: there was merely a guess that one of technicians had tampered with the dials of fuel indicators on several MiGs, possibly Iranian time), on 22 September 1980, at least a third were flown causing their loss early during the war with Iran. by MiG-23BNs, as summarised in Table 4. Knowing that the Whatever was the case, it is certain that all three available units Iranian air bases were well-hardened, Iraqi commanders ordered – No. 29 and No. 49 Squadrons with MiG-23BNs, and No. 39 their pilots to concentrate on bombing runways, aiming to render Squadron with MiG-23MS – participated in the war with Iran these useless for 24-48 hours. Principal targets of Iraqi MiG-23 from its first day, and then with all available aircraft. Indeed, units were the huge base of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army out of 192 sorties known to have been flown by the IrAF in Aviation (IRIAA) in Kermanshah, the Tactical Fighter Base 4 of the opening strike on 10 Iranian air bases, airfields and military the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) in Dezful, and air bases, between 1200 and 1300 hours Iraqi time (1300-1400 hours defences in the latter area.

Map 1  MiG-23 relevant air bases in Iraq, and major air bases in Iran. (Map by Tom Cooper) 20

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A pilot from No. 29 Squadron climbing into his bombed-up MiG-23BN. See the window for the laser range-finder and the forward antenna of the RSBN navigational system, directly underneath the nose. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Unlucky MiG-23s Operations of Iraqi MiG-23s early during the Iran-Iraq War differed strongly depending on their variants. After launching three air strikes on the IRIAA’s base in Kermanshah, on 22 September, No. 39 Squadron continued flying ground attacks. During the first two months of the war, its MiG-23MSs were rarely scrambled in reaction to Iranian air strikes against targets in the vicinity of Baghdad. The Iraqi’s own integrated air defence system – the French-designed ‘Kari’ – was still under construction. Unsurprisingly, when the IRIAF launched a systematic and sustained aerial offensive against the Iraqi oil industry, the Iraqis proved unable to detect low flying F-4E Phantom IIs in time and MiG-23s were regularly scrambled much too late, if at all. Once airborne, pilots were limited to the use of their radar and visual observation, which greatly limited their effectiveness. Nevertheless, it was an Iraqi MiG-23MS pilot that scored the first ever confirmed aerial victory for this type in the Middle East. This happened on the morning of 23 September 1980, in the course of the major IRIAF counter-air offensive on Iraqi air bases that included about 140 fighter-bombers. One of the Iranian formations consisted of Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighterbombers tasked with attacking the Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB. The Tiger IIs had reached their target unmolested and bombed the runway, but lost at least two aircraft to the Iraqi SAMs. Finally, a pair of MiG-23MSs scrambled from Abu Ubaida AB caught up with the survivors as these were about to reach the Iranian border, and Captain Kamal al-Barazanji shot down one using an R-13M missile. The Iranian pilot was killed, while Barazanji thus not only scored the historic first for the No. 39 Squadron, but also the first ever aerial victory with MiG-23 against a Western-made fighter. 37 The two MiG-23BN units experienced a number of losses later the same day. The No. 29 Squadron lost its commander, Major Rashid as-Saydo’on, to Iranian interceptors, and Major Jabbar Hammad ad-Dulaymi (who used to fly Hunters during the October 1973 War with Israel) to Iranian air defences, both in the Dezful area. The No. 49 Squadron accomplished its task of bombing TFB.4, but then lost the aircraft flown by pilot Mohammed Jafar Hassan: on the flight back to Iraq, he diverted to Wahda, but was shot down by SAMs of the 148th Missile

One of the early Iraqi MiG-23BNs was this example, serial number 1428. It was not only missing the SPS-141 ECM-system (antennas of which would otherwise be visible low on the forward fuselage, directly below the cockpit), but also missing the housing for the Delta guidance pod for Kh-23 guided missiles, next to the starboard (right) underwing pylon. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Brigade. Another pilot lost early during the war with Iran was the CO of No. 29 Squadron, Lieutenant-Colonel Fayez: he was captured by the Iranians alive, probably on 27 September 1980, and subsequently paraded on their national TV. In the light of its early experiences, in late October 1980 the IrAF began deploying temporary detachments of two MiG-23MSs to air bases closer to the frontline, including Firnas AB (Mosul) in the north, or Wahda AB (former RAF Shoibiyah, near Basra) in the south. Because the problem with timely detection of incoming Iranian low-altitude air strikes persisted, this measure proved fruitless: therefore, No. 39 Squadron had changed its tactics again and began flying CAPs along the frontlines. Such operations had quickly shown how ill-suited the MiG-23MS was for autonomous operations: because its SPO-3 RWR was still incapable of detecting emissions by pulse Doppler radars, the jet flown by 1st Lieutenant Hamid Mohammed Fathi was shot down and the pilot killed by Iranian F-14s without the Iraqis ever detecting the presence of the powerful Iranian interceptor. Furthermore, Major Ma’an alAwsi’s aircraft was hit by ground fire when the pair he had led was vectored to intercept several Iranian helicopters underway over the Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab area. A seasoned veteran of the October 1973 War, Awsi attempted to make an emergency landing on a highway east of Baqoubeh, but was killed in the process. The third loss followed on 27 November 1980, when a pair of MiG-23MSs was scrambled from Wahda in response to the Iranian Operation Morvarid – an attack on Iraqi off-shore oil separation plants and loading rigs in the northern Persian Gulf. While still approaching the combat zone, the MiGs were intercepted by at least one F-4E and the jet flown by 1st Lieutenant Mahmoud was shot down into the sea, killing the pilot. No. 49 Squadron suffered the loss of two of its younger pilots on 16 October 1980, during another attack on TFB.4. This time, 1st Lieutenant Nizar Aziz at-Tai was shot down by F-14s, while the aircraft flown by 1st Lieutenant Faris Abdul Latif was shot down by Iranian air defences while exiting the target area. Undeterred, pilots of No. 39 Squadron continued trying. They began coordinating their operations with those of an Antonov An26B transport, equipped as an airborne COMINT/SIGINT and command post, and nick-named Qamar. This combination bore 21

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

fruit for the first time on 14 November 1980, when a pair of MiG-23MS intercepted and shot down an F-5E from a formation of four underway at low altitude in the direction of Mosul. Over a month later, on 19 December 1980, Iraqi MiG23MSs scored their third kill when they intercepted a pair of F-5Es shortly after they had attacked a power plant outside Dibbs, in north-eastern Iraq. The Iraqis approached from the front with too high speed and missed their targets, but then zoomed up to re-attack from behind, and – following a short pursuit – shot down one of the Tiger IIs using R-13M missiles. In April 1981, two MiG23MSs may have been forward deployed to Wahda AB, with the order to fly a special operation: an attack on F-14As of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) that patrolled the skies between the port of Bandar-e Khomeini, in the northern Persian Gulf, the Island of Khark, and the port of Bushehr. The IRIAF’s CAP-station in question was of strategic importance: from that position, its Tomcats controlled not only the airspace over the short Iraqi coast: they were providing top cover for convoys of Iranian merchant ships (so-called ‘caravans’) hauling reinforcements from ports in southern Iran, while also protecting the export of crude oil from Khark by the means of the very and ultra large crude carriers (V/ ULCCs) – or ‘supertankers’. It is at least distantly possible that No. 39 Squadron might have launched its first and only attempt of this kind on 14 April 1981 – apparently with support from a ground-based ECM-station, though with unclear results. According to one of several versions of events provided by Iranian sources, two MiG-23MSs provoked an air combat with a pair of F-14As in the course of which one MiG was shot down by 20mm cannon fire, only for an F-14 to be hit by either the Iraqi wingman, or an Iranian MIM-23B I-HAWK SAM in return. However, none of the available Iraqi sources can confirm any such action. Certain is only that an Iranian F-14 pilot was laid to rest on 20 April 1981, after the fatal crash of his Tomcat.

Iraqi MiG-23BN Operations Meanwhile, MiG-23BNs of No. 29 and No. 49 Squadrons were busy supporting the advance of Iraqi ground forces into the Khuzestan province of south-western Iran. No. 29 Squadron suffered two additional losses in related operations during December 1980. At an unknown date early in that month, the aircraft flown by 1st Lieutenant Farid Rashid Helmy was shot down and the pilot killed during an air strike on TFB.3, while Major Ma’an Abdul Razzaq al-Awsi was killed after ejecting much 22

An Iraqi pilot proudly posing next to his MiG-23MS in 1980 or 1981. It’s notable that the aircraft was already modified to carry R-13M missiles on underwing hardpoints. (Tom Cooper Collection)

The Iraqi military censor has blotted out the serial number from what is otherwise the best available photograph of any MiG-23MS operated by the IrAF in the early 1980s. Note the underwing rail for R-13M missiles: stations below the fuselage remained ‘reserved’ for launch rails for older R-3S missiles. (Farzin Nadimi Collection)

too late from his badly damaged fighter-bomber on 6 December 1980. By the end of the year, the number of written-off MiG23BNs increased to nearly a dozen. Amongst the pilots lost was Major Jassem Mahdi Qalaf al-Jabouri from No. 49 Squadron. This veteran of the October 1973 War (during which he flew MiG-17s) was shot down over the Sumar area on 24 November 1980, ejected safely and was captured by the Iranians – but never returned. Fawzy Barzinji, one of officers of No. 49 Squadron, later summarised the tactics of the two Iraqi MiG-23BN units as follows: ‘In late 1980, No. 49 Squadron was commanded by LieutenantColonel Ibrahim Gharaibeh, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin. I served as liaison officer at an-Nassiriyah AB. My job was to

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

coordinate our operations with headquarters of army corps, follow and constantly update the movement of our and enemy ground units, brief our pilots about the situation on the front and enemy air defences, coordinate the time and entry points for our jets into the combat zone, and coordinate the work of our air defences. Our jets flew two types of combat sorties, including pre-planned interdiction strikes, and quick-reaction strikes. Pre-planned attacks were based on orders from the High Command, transmitted via telefax to the squadron commander well in advance, carefully planned and briefed with pilots. Quick reaction strikes were usually flown on calls from corps commands, sometimes on calls from division commanders too, and then launched on short notice.’38

Under fierce pressure of their public, the Iranians then launched their first big counteroffensive, Operation Hawizah, on 6 January 1981. Barzinji recalled how No. 49 Squadron experienced the following action: ‘Around the noon of 6 January 1981, the telephone rang in my office: I received an order for a quick-reaction strike at specific coordinates on the frontline of the III Corps. I checked these coordinates on my map, and found out that we were to support the 9th Armoured Division…I made a call to the commander of No. 49 Squadron and told him to immediately gather all of his pilots for a CAS strike. The squadron commander meanwhile ordered his engineering section to arm all the available aircraft with four UB-16-57 rocket pods for S-5K rockets. Then we briefed the pilots for this mission. One of the youngsters told me that he had never flown a CAS sortie before, and asked how to recognize our tanks from enemy tanks. I advised him to search for direction in which their cannons are pointing: cannons on our tanks were firing in eastern direction. The battle went on. On 7 January, it was the turn of MiG21s from No. 14 Squadron to fly. Our MiG-23s flew again on 8 January 1981: they hit a battery of US-made 175mm artillery pieces, causing heavy losses.’

Forward deployed at Wahda AB, the MiG-23MSs from No. 39 Squadron joined the action and the CO of that unit quickly claimed two Iranian helicopters as shot down by the GSh-23 internal cannon of his jet. However, the activity of the IrAF’s fighter-bombers prompted the IRIAF into action, and on 9 January 1981 F-14 Tomcats shot down two MiG-23BNs over the Hawizah area, using AIM-54 Phoenix missiles.

Unknown Iraqi MiG-23MFs Seeking to establish good relations with the new government in Tehran, perhaps even win it as a new ally, Moscow was not the least pleased with the Iraqi invasion of Iran: the Soviet leadership was concerned about the possibility of Tehran re-establishing a friendly relationship with Washington. Therefore, the Soviets imposed an embargo on arms exports to Iraq, and influenced the Czechoslovak government to do the same, thus making it impossible for the IrAF to replace heavy losses of its MiG-23 units in late 1980. No matter how much weakened, Nos. 29, 39

and 49 Squadrons continued flying and fighting with whatever was still on hand, because the Iranians were launching additional counteroffensives. On 24 September 1982, the Iranians launched their operation Samene-al-Aeme, with the aim of lifting the siege of Abadan through destroying the Iraqi-controlled bridgehead on the Karun River. Aerial action was very intensive during this campaign, and the IrAF lost additional MiG-23BNs while trying to stem the Iranian advance: no less than three were claimed shot down by IRIAF F-14As on 27 September 1981 alone, and another three days later. In an attempt to provide top cover for its fighter-bombers, the High Command IrAF ordered a forward deployment of ten MiG23MSs to Wahda AB. Barely having arrived there, they found themselves confronted with dozens of F-4Es, F-5Es, and F-14As, because the Iranians were in the process of preparing their next big counteroffensive in Khuzestan, Operation Tarigh al-Qods. Fortunately for the pilots from No. 39 Squadron, it was around this time that the IrAF finally began receiving Dassault Mirage F.1EQ interceptors from France. Furthermore, the decision was taken to rush into combat five MiG-23MFs: these were delivered before the Soviet embargo of September 1980, but their crews completed their conversion training only in the summer of 1981, due to the Soviet refusal to support their conversion training. The Iraqi MiG-23MFs thus entered service with the newly-established No. 67 Squadron – commanded by Major Shihab Ahmed – in quite an incomplete condition: made operational with the help of learning-by-doing, their Sapfir-23D radars proved unreliable. However, they offered a significant improvement over the MiG23MS by the virtue of their semi-active radar homing R-23Rs, and arrived together with a sizeable batch of R-60MK advanced short-range missiles that accompanied them.

Giraffes The Mirages were blooded on 15 November 1981 – and then in a spectacular fashion: after approaching at a very low level, they managed to shoot down two F-14As on a high-altitude CAPstation north-east of Ahwaz, using French-made Matra Super 530F-1 MRAAMs. This tactic became known as ‘Giraffe’ for its flight profile. The loss of two F-14As was a severe shock for the IRIAF. Already feeling heavy losses of the first three months of the war, Iranian morale was shattered by the realisation that even their vaunted Tomcats were now vulnerable. Determined to recover their position of aerial dominance over the battlefield – urgently necessary in order to force the Iraqis out of Khuzestan – the Deputy Operations IRIAF, Lieutenant-Colonel Hashem Alle-Agha, a seasoned F-14 pilot, devised a counter-strike. Although risky, the plan worked better than anyone expected: it included a complete ban on all other aerial activity of Iranian aircraft and helicopters over this section of the battlefield, bar interceptors of the IRIAF. While leaving the Iranian ground forces exposed to Iraqi air strikes, and without helicopter support that already proved of crucial importance, this measure enabled Iranian F-14crews to operate free of the usual problems with sorting out their own from enemy aircraft: anything else that was flying over Khuzestan during the following days was considered ‘hostile’ and a ‘target’. The only other aircraft cooperating with Tomcats were pairs of F-5Es from TFB.4 that flew low-altitude barrier combat 23

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

air patrols (BARCAPs): their task was to block the approach of any Iraqi MiGs or Mirages that attempted to sneak upon high-flying Tomcats. Meanwhile, the successful tactics of Iraqi Mirage-pilots encouraged the pilots of Nos. 39 and 67 Squadrons (the latter was officially declared operational only in July 1982) to attempt repeating the exercise – initially in cooperation with F.1EQs, and later on their own. Both sides were thus only waiting for a suitable opportunity. On 25 November 1981, a pair of F-14As was deployed on the same CAP-station occupied by the pair that were shot down ten days earlier. At a pre-determined point in time, their crews made a fake radio call, announcing they were short of fuel and about to return to base. A few minutes later, the pilots of two low-flying F-5Es visually acquired a pair of Iraqi MiG-23MFs approaching the area below the CAP-station of the F-14s in a tight formation at a very low altitude. The Tigers were much too slow to follow the MiGs, but their warning was sufficient. The Tomcats flew a so-called ‘split S’, a vertical descending manoeuvre: the lead F-14 then acquired one of the low-flying MiGs with its AWG-9 radar, set up an attack and launched an AIM-54 Phoenix missile before executing another vertical separation manoeuvre, known as the ‘F-pole’: in this fashion the Tomcat flew down and to the side of the incoming enemy, while still keeping its radar pointed on the target in order to provide course corrections for the Phoenix missile. Converted from hunters into a prey in a matter of few seconds, the two Iraqis reacted by each firing one R-23R. It was too late: out of three missiles that were airborne, the Phoenix was not only the first fired, but also the fastest: it blotted out the lead MiG23MF, and smashed its debris against the other Iraqi fighter. One of the Iraqi pilots was killed, while the other was captured by the Iranians. Without guidance from the Sapfir-23D-III radar, both of the R-23s missed their target. Worse yet: with MiG-23MFs out of the way, the IRIAF’s Tomcats had a field day: by sunset of 25

Iraqi MiG-23MFs did not score many, but they scored several crucial aerial victories in the war with Iran. Every such instance was proudly commemorated through application of so-called ‘kill markings’ – in form of IRIAF roundels – usually applied on the left side of the forward fuselage. (via Ali Tobchi)

November 1981, their pilots claimed five additional kills against MiG-23BNs and Su-22s, effectively sweeping the skies free of the Iraqi air forces. Because of the urgency of the situation on the ground, the IrAF could not give up. Five days later, it deployed a formation each of Mirage F.1EQs, MiG-23MS and MiG-23MFs to try again. Supported by the F-5E-BARCAP, the F-14s detected approaching Mirages early, forcing them to abort their attack, then fired a total of four AIM-54s to claim three MiG-23s, and finally guided the F-5E into a pursuit of the retreating Iraqi survivor. Similarly, on 2 December 1981, the approaching Iraqis were detected again, and this time one of the MiG-23MS involved was shot down, and its pilot captured by Iranian ground forces. The first round of clashes between the new generation of MiG23s in Iraqi service, and their US-made opponents operated by the Iranians thus ended in a clear defeat. As 1981 turned into 1982, little did anybody involved know how much longer, and how much bloodier was the Iran-Iraq War going to get.

Map 2  The CAP-stations between Ahwaz and Dezful, and east of Ahwaz, maintained by IRIAF’s F-14s every day in the period 1980-1982. Also shown are some of routes used by Iraqi MiG-23s to approach for ‘Giraffe’ operations. (Diagram by Tom Cooper)

24

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A diagram illustrating the flight profile of the IrAF’s MiG-23MS/MFs for ‘Giraffe’ tactics. (Diagram by Tom Cooper)

Duels in the Air For many of the IrAF’s veterans of the war with Iran, 1982 was the hardest year of the entire campaign. In February and April, the Iranian ground forces broke the back of the Iraqi Army in Khuzestan: an equivalent of five Iraqi divisions were destroyed and most of their equipment captured. The High Command in Baghdad threw the battered IrAF into the battle as a fire-brigade, deploying it into ground attacks on advancing Iranian forces. The result were additional losses, principally caused by a new Iranian invention: a combination of F-14A interceptors with MIM-23B I-HAWK SAM-sites. Meanwhile in the process of acquiring additional Mirage F.1EQs, and knowing that the IRIAF was out of position to replace its losses, the IrAF’s interceptor-units sought to refine their tactics of Giraffe-attacks, keep enemy interceptors preoccupied with the battle for their own survival, and to impose attrition upon Iranian units equipped with F-4Es and F-14As. The result was an outright battle for aerial supremacy in the sky above Khuzestan that was to last for nearly two years, and result in over 50 air battles. Principal areas over which these battles were fought were the Mandali-Baghdad axis, the Ahwaz-Dezful axis, and Bubiyan Island in Kuwait – i.e. the areas roughly west of three primary CAP-stations maintained by IRIAF’s interceptors during this phase of the war. On 15 February 1982, four MiG-23BN about to attack Iranian ground forces in the Shoush area were intercepted by F-14s, and two claimed as shot down. On 11th March, the MiG-23BN flown by 1st Lieutenant Abdul Hassan Abbas Abdulhusseini was shot down by MIM-23Bs in the Fakkeh area. Five days later, No. 39 Squadron’s attempt to run a Giraffe-operation was spoiled by a pair of F-4Es that flew the BARCAP for F-14As. In the ensuing dogfight, each side lost one fighter-interceptor. Obviously, the IrAF was struggling in the contest for air superiority over the battlefield – and the IRIAF was out in force. During the Iranian offensive that became known as Operation Bayt ol-Moghaddas, run in April and May 1982, the tactics of combining F-14s with MIM-23B I-HAWK SAM-sites was developed to perfection – with murderous consequences for Iraqi MiG-23BN units in particular. Three of these were claimed shot down by SAMs on 11 May 1982; a day later, F-14s claimed four MiG-23s as shot

A still from a pre-war video, showing a pair of IrAF MiG-23BN in the process of releasing salvoes of FAB-100 bombs. (Tom Cooper Collection)

down west of the Karun River; and on 18 May 1982, the Iranian I-HAWKs claimed no fewer than nine Iraqi fighter-bombers as shot down, including one MiG-23BN. No. 67 Squadron avenged at least some of these losses when Major Muwaffaq claimed an F-4E in a clash high above the Howeyzeh Marsh, on 12 July 1982. The IRIAF might have lost a Phantom II on this date, but no details are available. Meanwhile, disappointed by rather unfriendly reactions from Tehran, the Soviets re-launched arms deliveries to Iraq. Amongst others, they delivered up to 18 additional MiG-23MFs. Thanks to this reinforcement, No. 67 Squadron was declared fully operational in June 1982: although this unit never became as successful as those operating Mirages, some of its officers soon felt superior even to their colleagues flying the French-made interceptors. Iraqi fighter-bomber units were reinforced too, through the addition of 18 new MiG-23BNs, finally equipped with the SPS-141 ECMsystem: these were evenly distributed between Nos. 29 and 49 Squadrons.

Of Floggers and DC-9s While the Iran-Iraq War was in the process of reaching its culmination, and the situation in Lebanon was heating up, the LAAF’s MiG-23s slowly matured into operational combat aircraft. To some consternation of Libyan pilots and officers, their fleet remained de-facto split into two, during the early 1980s, as recalled by Hazem Bajigni: 25

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

‘… [there have been] two MiG-23MS squadrons at Benina, exclusively manned by Syrians. We could not fly with them because they used Arabic language while flying, while we used English. So, we flew in the morning and they in the afternoons and evenings. They had their own way of life too, so we did not mix much with them, though I did some socializing with their squadron leader, mainly out of curiosity.’

One of the Syrian pilots deployed at Benina AB became involved in an accident that subsequently provoked an incredible amount of legends and myths in Italy in particular. On 18 July 1980, at 0945 hrs local time, Captain Ezzedin Fadhil Khalil – a Syrian of Palestinian origin – took off for a routine training flight from Benina AB, as a lead in a pair of aircraft. Initially, the small formation flew in the direction of Marsa al-Burayqah (better known as ‘Marsa el-Brega’ in the West). Thirteen minutes into the flight, when reaching point A on the enclosed map, the two MiGs turned in an eastern direction while climbing to an altitude of 9,500m (31,168ft), before turning east (point B) and climbing to an altitude of 10,000m (32,808ft). As the two Syrians continued climbing to 12,000m (39,370ft), they turned to a course of 330˚ – instead of the expected 305°. Immediately afterwards, all contact with Khalil was lost. The wingman followed the flight lead until about 60km (37¼ miles) north of Benina. Left with only 1,400 litres (3,086.4lbs) of fuel in his tanks, he then decided to return to base. Khalil’s MiG was last tracked by Libyan radars while flying along the same course about 300km (186nm) north of Benina AB, still underway at an altitude of 12,000m. Libyan authorities launched a SAR operation in an area between 300 and 400km north of Benghazi, but found nothing. Set on auto-pilot, Khalil’s MiG-23MS – serial number 6950, since known to have been made on 30 November 1976, and delivered to Libya on 27 August 1977 – continued all the way to southern Italy. Upon running out of fuel, it crashed on Mount Sila, in Calabria. Two weeks earlier, late in the evening of 27 June 1980 a Douglas DC-9-15 airliner (registration I-TIGI) operated by Italian company Itavia Airlines on a Flight Number 870, on a route from Guglielmo Marconi Airport in Bologna, to Palermo International on Sicily, crashed into the Tyrrhenian Sea, taking with it 81 crewmembers

and passengers. Because the related investigation was mired by an unusual series of mishaps and not a few controversies, and ever since the Italian authorities discovered the wreckage of Khalil’s aircraft together with the body of its pilot, there have been no end of legends about the involvement of this MiG-23MS in some sort of an air combat with Italian, or US, or French interceptors, one of which could then have shot down the DC-9. In the minds of most of the Italians involved, this idea did not change even though an independent investigation concluded that the airliner was actually caused to crash by a bomb planted near the rear toilet. On the contrary, from the standpoint of LAAF pilots and officers, there was never any doubt about the reason for the loss of Khalil and his MiG-23MS, as summarised by Baijigni: ‘Khalil was a young pilot on a regular training mission. His aircraft was unarmed and carried no extra fuel tanks. He had got a new breathing mask that day. Our subsequent investigation had shown that this mask was a too big. When he climbed to an altitude above 5,000 metres [16404ft], he forgot to activate 100% oxygen and went into hypoxia. His wingman called him several times, but Khalil was not responsive. His head slumped down when he was last seen and all efforts to communicate with him failed. His MiG, set to semi-autopilot (activated by a green button on the control stick) was set at ‘straight and level’ mode, so it just went on. Eventually, it crashed in Italy after running out of fuel. The crash report we’ve got from the Italian authorities did not indicate any kind of collision or combat damage of any kind.’

Khalil’s body was returned to Libya with full military honours (at Italian expense; the Libyans refused to pay for his transportation from Rome to Tripoli), followed by the wreckage of his aircraft – minus ARK-15 radio compass, which was handed over to US intelligence services upon their explicit request (in turn causing some protests from Libya). Following an investigation, several Italian judges excluded any possibility of Khalil becoming involved in any kind of air combat, or even in any kind of interception of the Douglas DC-9 of Itavia that crashed into the Tyrrhenian Sea on 27 June 1980.

Some wreckage of Ezzedin Fadhil Khalil’s MiG-23MS (serial 6950) was stored inside the same hangar with wreckage of the Itavia DC-9, recovered from the bottom of the Tyrrhenian Sea. Despite countless legends, the accident that killed the Syrian pilot of Palestinian origin who served with the LAAF, and the terrorist attack on the Italian airliner stood in no relation to each other. (Pit Weinert Collection)

26

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Defections and First Combat Experiences The rest of LAAF’s MiG-23-fleet continued its work-ups, as summarised by Bajigni: ‘After recovering from my injuries suffered during an incident in 1977, I did a short stint at Sebha AB, where I flew SF.260s. By 1979 I was back to Benina AB and the next year I was assigned to fly MiG-23BNs with No. 1070 Squadron from al-Abraq AB, west of Tobruk, which was actually still under construction. The other two MiG-23BN units of the LAAF – No. 1050 and No. 1060 – were still at Benina.’

Meanwhile, Libya was ripe with all sorts of rumours about coup attempts against Muamar el-Qaddhafi. One of these was supposedly plotted by 19 military officers during the fall of 1980. Before long, Hazem al-Bajigni found himself accused of indenting to steal a Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport and fly the plotters out of the country. Facing absurd and unsupported allegations, the MiG-23BN pilot was left without a choice: ‘I fled to Crete on 11 February 1981. My defection was marred by technical problems and fiascos with the NATO Southern Command. Early on after taking off from Benina AB, I made a mistake. While escaping from Libya, I flew much too fast at much too low an altitude. A MiG-23 can sweep its wings to fly faster, but there is a limit of what the aircraft structure can support. If it is flown too fast with wings fully swept back while underway at low altitude, the swivelling mechanism would be damaged and the wings could not be moved forward. While flying away from Libya I accelerated to Mach 1.5 while underway at less than 100 feet (30m). This caused structural damage. I was planning to land at Iraklion AB, on Crete. But, arriving there, I found it covered by clouds. I circled several times flying low, right over the top of buildings, simply trying to get some attention. All the time I used the international frequency of 121.50MHz, calling for help. But, there was no answer (NATO was later very embarrassed about this). There were a few military jets flying in that general area, some looked like A-6s, but I could not intercept them to communicate with their crews because of my damaged wings. It’s a long story, but eventually I got the wings to go forward to the landing configuration and ended up crash landing into the bushes at a remote site. This turned out to be the old, disused airfield of Maleme, famous from the times of World War II. I attempted to eject while doing so, but my seat did not work. Once outside of the aircraft I found myself all alone with nobody around. This was another hardto-believe blunder by the local NATO force.’

Against the US Navy Although the wreckage of al-Bajigni’s aircraft was returned to Libya three days later, tensions in the airspace along the northern Libyan borders remained high all through 1981. Even more so once the US Navy announced its ‘Freedom of Navigation Operation’ (FON) in the Gulf of Syrte, all of which had been declared as Libyan territorial waters. Run on 18 and 19 August

A Libyan MiG-23MS (serial 9082) as seen following modification of its underwing pylons for deployment of R-13M air-to-air missiles, in 19801981. Notably, this aircraft is wearing no national insignia, which – following the short but fierce war with Egypt, in July 1977 – was applied in form of big green roundels and fin-flashes. (USN)

Libyan pilot with his MiG-23MS, in early 1980s. It’s notable that although flying Soviet-made aircraft, most of the LAAF’s pilots wore orange flight-suits. (Pit Weinert Collection)

1981, this operation included the deployment of two aircraft carriers of the US Navy off the coast of Libya: the USS Forestall (CV-59), still equipped with older F-4E Phantom IIs, and the nuclear-powered USS Nimitz (CVN-69), having two squadrons of F-14A Tomcats embarked. Libyan and Syrian MiG-23MSs flew intensively during these two days, and up to 20 of their pairs were intercepted by USN fighters. However, contrary to their colleagues from units equipped with Mirages, MiG-25s and Su20/22s, they are not known to have been involved in any ‘hot’ engagements. Furthermore, soon after nearly clashing with a pair of MiG-25s, early on the morning of 19 August 1981, the Tomcats were attacked by a pair of Su-22, and promptly shot down both of the offending Sukhois. A few hours later, the US Navy declared its exercise completed, and withdrew from the area. The opportunity for Libyan MiG-23s to see more action was thus over. Elsewhere in 1981, LAAF MiG-23MSs and MiG-23BNs were blooded in the course of the war in Chad. The northern part of that country – the so-called ‘Aouzou Strip’ – had been annexed 27

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

by Libya in 1973. Subsequently, Tripoli became involved in a long and bitter civil war fought between multiple factions: while some Northern Chadian factions were supported by Libya, Southerners were supported by France, and – later on – by the USA. Very little specific detail about the involvement of MiG23s in these operations is known. 39 Usually forward deployed at Tanoua AB, constructed at the border between Libya and Chad – they were almost exclusively flying ground attack sorties.40 While having no IADS deployed inside the country, and thus no Vozdukh-1 ATMS, the LAAF took care to support its MiG23s with help of navigational systems like NPO, RSBN (similar to the TACAN), and the PRMG (similar to the ILS). A retired Libyan air defence officer described the work of these systems as follows:

‘The NPO allowed us to guide our fighters even if our radars were unable to detect them. The MiG-23 emitted a signal similar to that of its IFF-system. On our display, instead of having a mark over the echo, it would show a mark without an echo. The problem was that if we could not detect our fighter, we could not detect the enemy either. Thus, instead of using it for interceptor operations, we applied the NPO foremost whenever one of our aircraft had lost its direction. On the contrary, the RSBN proved a very useful system. It permitted us to bring a fighter – or an entire formation of fighters – from point A to point B without the intervention of the pilot or the ground control. Our interceptor-pilots appreciated this function greatly, especially during long transfer flights between different bases. For example, with help of the RSBN, we were able to fly an entire squadron from Tripoli to Misurata and then to Benina.’

One of up to 20 LAAF MiG-23MSs intercepted by USN fighters on 18 August 1981, wearing the serial number 8702. It’s notable that it was not re-wired for deployment of R-13M missiles as of 19 August 1981, and the large number of maintenance instructions applied in white around the airframe. These were stencilled partially in English and partially in Russian. (USN)

Bottom view of a LAAF MiG-23MS intercepted on 18 August 1981. Of interest are semi-deployed air brakes, dimensions and placement of national insignia, armament consisting of two R-13M and two R-3S missiles, and various other details along the bottom fuselage. (USN)

For comparison, this R-13M-armed MiG-23MS (serial number 4714) was photographed in February 1986, while intercepted north of Benina AB – the major hub of Libyan MiG-23-operations. (USN)

28

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Return of the Soviets During the late 1970s, a deep economic crisis caused popular unrest in Syria, which gradually evolved into a low-intensity insurgency that targeted prominent military officers and government servants. Preoccupation with related affairs left the Syrian government out of condition to oppose the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Operation Litani, launched in March 1978. Although the IDF subsequently withdrew and the area between Litani and the Israeli border was secured by a peace-keeping force of the United Nations (UN), the Palestinian militants were soon back in force, and re-occupied most of their bases. Indeed, emboldened by the continued unrest and then the ‘Islamic’ revolution in Iran, the Moslem Brotherhood of Syria began provoking protests and revolts, and then intensified the campaign of assassinations in 1978-1979. By 1980, nearly all Syrian cities were paralysed by weeks-long strikes and protests, some of which developed into pitched battles with security forces. All the known Soviet bases were regularly shelled – and several Soviet advisors killed. The Assad regime reacted with brutal repression, arrests, detention, torture and murder of hundreds, and – often random – massacres of civilians. When this provoked an outright uprising in Aleppo, the economic hub of the country, Hafez al-Assad reacted by deploying trusted units staffed by loyalists from Lattakia and northern Hama, including the 3rd Armoured Division and Defence Companies (Saraya ad-Difa, SAD), commanded by Hafez’s brother Rifa’at al-Assad, supported by tanks and helicopters. Mechanised units sealed off entire districts, which were then indiscriminately shelled and raided house-by-house: in the case of resistance, hundreds of randomly arrested civilians were summarily executed. Similar practices were applied in Hama and Dera’a, few weeks later, with results of hundreds of killed and thousands – whether Moslem Brothers or not – detained.41 The Moslem Brotherhood launched an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Assad, on 26 June 1980, in retaliation for which the regime’s security services massacred over 1,000 inmates of the notorious prison in Palmyra – in turn prompting another series of attacks by insurgents. The latter prompted much of the Brotherhood into further radicalisation – which in turn facilitated its downfall: although Syrian Sunnis – the majority of the Syrian population until today – are relatively conservative, they never showed much sympathy for extremist Islamic ideology. The insurgency in Syria further intensified until a series of attacks on Soviet bases forced the Chief Military Adviser in Syria, Lieutenant-General B. Budakov, to order a withdrawal of all of his instructors from their positions within the Syrian military to one base in Damascus.42 Through this period, the Israelis intensified their campaign of air strikes on Palestinian bases in Lebanon, and then began enticing the SyAAF into air battles. In June 1979, the IDF/AF ambushed and shot down five MiG-21s; on 24 September 1979 another four, without suffering any losses in return. In the course of the latter engagement, fought around 1447 hrs local time, the SyAAF attempted to catch a pair of McDonnell Douglas RF-4E of the IDF/AF and sandwich these between a four-ship of MiG-21s and a pair of MiG-23MS. While the MiG-21s clashed with Eagles, about 10km south-east of Beirut, and despite strong jamming of

their communication with the ground control, the MiG-23MS came close enough to the RF-4E to fire three R-3S missiles. All of these missed. By scoring eight of the nine kills during these two engagements, the F-15 had proven themselves as vastly superior to MiG-21s and to MiG-23MS.43 Only then, and in the course of another of Assad’s visits to Moscow, did the Soviet leadership react to Assad’s requests for help. Seriously concerned about the weakened position of the regime in Damascus, and anxious to ‘prevent another Afghanistan’, in October 1980 Moscow signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that, amongst other points, stipulated closer cooperation between the Soviet and the Syrian militaries, and a deployment of up to 4,000 Soviet military advisors.44

‘The Events’ in Syria of 1980-1982 The new Soviet advisory group in Syria included a large group of air defence specialists. With its commander, Lieutenant-General Sokolov (a veteran of World War II), were Lieutenant-General Babenko (former deputy of the Baku Air Defence District of the PVO) and Major-General Ulchenko, in addition to numerous SAM-specialists – and Viktor Babich, one of most prominent theoreticians of aerial warfare in the former Soviet Union.45 On their advice, the SyAADF was re-organized into two mixed air defence divisions, including fighter-interceptor units and SAMbrigades, all tightly integrated into an IADS, and including at least two ATMS. Furthermore, a group of 10-12 advisors was assigned to every fighter-bomber brigade. Their task – complicated by the lack of any kind of reliable data on the F-16A, for example – was to improve the training of Syrian pilots, develop new tactics, and plan future operations accordingly. Amongst others, they concluded that the MiG-23 had no serious chance in 1-v-1 combat against the F-15, and that the US-made fighter had to be fought by groups of MiGs along pre-planned, well-rehearsed scenarios, with the help of flying at low altitudes and use of terrain masking.46 While renowned for their traditions of welcoming the guest, many of Syrians – including many officers – generally opposed the increased presence of ‘Communist troops’ in the country. Unsurprisingly, the campaign of assassinations soon transformed into an inter-ethnic and inter-religious war between the Sunni majority and the representatives of the regime and its security services – in the course of which the Moslem Brotherhood killed the Chief-of-Staff SyAAF & SyAADF, Major-General Mamdouh Hamdi Abazza, in 1981.47 Meanwhile, the IDF/AF continued provoking air combats and ambushing Syrian aircraft underway over Lebanon. In the course of several air combats fought between February and June 1981, its fighters claimed the downing of two MiG-21s and two MiG25s. In return, the SyAAF launched only one, semi-successful operation: on 26 April 1981, a pair of MiG-23MS distracted Israeli interceptors long enough to enable another pair of MiG23MS to sneak up on a pair of A-4s over Sidon, and claim both of them shot down. The Israelis not only denied any losses, but two days later retaliated by claiming two Syrian helicopters shot down near the town of Zahle.48 Keen to protect its troops and interests in Lebanon, but feeling vulnerable, the Assad regime was left without a choice but to deploy about a dozen SAM-sites in the Beka’a Valley.49 29

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

Meant as a warning for Israel not to intervene and expand the scope of the conflict, the deployment of Syrian SAMs inside Lebanon caused the first ‘missile crisis’ between Israel and Syria. Intended as a demonstration of force, it proved effective primarily due to an intervention from Washington, which stopped an Israeli attack only minutes before this was launched. Foremost, this action was actually a farce: because the Soviets had strictly forbidden deployment of any kind of more advanced systems inside Lebanon, the SyAADF’s SAM-sites had to be integrated with help of one Vektor-2VE system, which then had to be connected to the existing IADS in Syria. Measured by Soviet standards, the Vektor2VE was still a reasonably modern system. Introduced to service in the USSR in 1973, it was capable of simultaneously tracking 40 targets, and controlling the work of 14 SAM-sites and 6 manned interceptors (whether MiG-21s or MiG-23s) within a range of 250 kilometres. Nevertheless, according to sources in Syria and Algeria, its combination with the two Vozdukh-1ME systems already in service with the SyAADF should have been a rather clumsy solution – even more so because of the terrain in Lebanon. Furthermore, when the missile crisis of 1981 was over, the Israelis were given all the time necessary to amass tactical intelligence, and carefully develop a plan for their future actions against the Syrians in Lebanon. Indeed, this should have been one of crucial reasons for the disaster of 1982.50 To add salt to the injury, in December 1981 Israel officially annexed the Golan Heights. While this prompted Damascus to further reinforce its military build-up and invite 2,000 additional Soviet advisors into the country, it also caused a widespread

dissent over the lack of counter-action by the Assad Regime. Combined with the government’s cooperation with Iran and continuous insurgency, this deepened the already existing rifts within the military: by early 1982, dozens of Sunni officers – including numerous SyAAF pilots – began plotting a coup. This was to be opened by air strikes against the Building of the Central Committee of the Ba’ath Party in Damascus and the Presidential Palace, and take place in coordination with a popular uprising in Hama, which the Moslem Brotherhood hoped would spark a nation-wide uprising. The plot was uncovered by the notorious Air Force Intelligence before it could be launched, in late January 1982. Thousands of officers involved were arrested and dozens summarily executed. Because the regime went to great extents to keep this affair secret, plotters of the uprising in Hama failed to find out on time. Instead, they launched their operation on 2 February 1982, and rapidly pushed security forces out of the city. The Assad Regime reacted with an unprecedented campaign of terror: it deployed its most loyal ground units – including the 47th Armoured and the 21st Mechanised Brigades of the 3rd Division, and the SADs – all under the command of Hafez al-Assad’s cousin MajorGeneral Shafiq Fayid – to besiege and fiercely shell Hama for nearly a month, before launching an all-out assault, destroying at least a third of the city and killing around 20,000 people, mostly civilians.51 Although the regime thus managed to break the insurrection within its military and the population, its attitude towards the Sunni majority of the population subsequently hardened by an

Map 3  Primary areas of operations of Israel and Syria in 1982. Obvious is that the Israelis exploited the geography of Lebanon to their fullest: the Lebanese mountains made it extremely hard for the Syrian IADS to follow developments in the sky over the eastern Mediterranean. Combined with massive volumes of electronic countermeasures deployed by the IDF/AF, this made it nearly impossible for the Syrian ground control to support operations of its interceptors. (Map by Tom Cooper) 30

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

order of magnitude. A series of purges resulted in hundreds of Syrian Sunni and Palestinian officers being forced to leave their service: many of those that continued to serve were concentrated within what were de-facto ‘punishment units’. The majority of pilots whose loyalties were suspected by the regime were concentrated within the units equipped with MiG-23BN fighterbombers.52

Syrian Weaknesses In spring 1982, Israel re-launched its air strikes on positions of diverse Palestinian militant groups in Lebanon. During such operations, the IDF/AF fine-tuned an entirely new integrated aerial warfare system, based on the latest high-technology imported from the USA. The centrepiece of this system were E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft. This was developed with the intention of being integrated into the Naval Tactical Data System of the US Navy right from the start, and was equipped with improved AN/APS-139 radar and digital electronics that enabled it to simultaneously detect and track up to 600 targets over a range of 402km (250nm). Furthermore, it was capable of transferring its radar picture in real time with help of the Link-4A data-link to other aircraft and ground bases.53 Israel acquired four E-2Cs only in 1981, but these were fully operational by the end of the same year. Furthermore, they were supported by at least three Boeing 707-300 transports reconfigured as airborne COMINT/ELINT/SIGINTstations and command posts, and equipped for electronic warfare purposes; by two Grumman OV-1 Mohawk ELINT-aircraft, and by several Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Seascan maritime patrol aircraft (Israeli-assembled Rockwell 1124 Westwind). Combined with additional systems deployed by ground stations, and further supported by two squadrons operating UAVs, these four types alone were clearly out-computing the entire Soviet-made IADS installed in Syria, not to mention the limited IADS the SyAADF established in Lebanon – which was further hampered by the local terrain. Indeed, because the Syrian SAMs were deployed within a narrow valley, their positions were already well-known to the Israelis the since spring of 1981 and actually posed relatively little challenge. Similar was true of the recently-delivered Syrian MiG-23MFs – because these were relatively few in numbers, and heavily dependent on support of the ground-based IADS.

Lebanon, 1982 Following seven waves of air strikes against the PLO’s command structure in Beirut and vicinity, the Israelis invaded Lebanon in the late morning of 6 June 1982. While initially concentrating on bombing the Palestinians, the IDF/AF kept a watchful eye on the activity of the SyAAF and the SyAADF. Indeed, at least three of its Ryan BQM-34 Firebee UAVs involved in monitoring Syrian air bases were intercepted by Syrian fighters that day. Two escaped, but one was shot down by a pair of MiG-23MFs.54 Knowing its military was actually in tatters, and air defences equipped with systems already obsolete ten years earlier, the regime in Damascus refused to be drawn into battle. Correspondingly, all of its interceptors remained within Syrian airspace, which in turn was declared ‘off limits’ for the IDF/AF. This started to change on 7 June, when the IDF/AF for the first time bombed Syrian positions in south-eastern Lebanon. This

time the SyAADF reacted by scrambling four MiG-23MFs from as-Se’en AB. Underway at low altitude in order to avoid – or at least postpone – detection by the Israelis, the four fighters initially maintained a very tight formation until entering the Lebanese airspace. Then the front pair descended low between the hills, while the rear pair entered a climb, to act as bait. However, their formation was already detected while still rolling down the runway and the Israelis set up an ambush for it. While the Boeing 707 jammed their communications with the ground control, defacto blinding MiG-pilots, the low flying Floggers were caught by F-16s, and the high-flying pair flew into a ‘wall’ of four F-15As. By the time the Syrian formation managed to extricate itself from this predicament, one MiG-23MF was shot down.55 Similar situations developed on 8 June 1982, when the SyAAF scrambled multiple MiG-23MF-formations in reaction to dozens of IDF/AF fighter-bombers that were underway over Lebanon. While claiming the downing two F-16s, the Soviets later admitted the loss of at least two MiG-23MFs. Worse yet, three out of eight MiG-23BNs launched to attack Israeli ground forces that were approaching the town of Jezzine, were shot down and one of their pilots captured. Finally, one of the Israeli air strikes hit the communication station of the Syrian military about 10km (5.3nm) south of Beirut, blinding the IADS deployed in Lebanon.56 However, nothing was to prepare the Syrians and their Soviet advisers for what came on the next day. During the morning of 9 June 1982, despite fierce resistance in several of Palestinian camps along the coast, the Israeli ground forces pushed all the way up to Damour on the coast, and Ein Zehalta in southern central Lebanon. In this fashion, they began outflanking the Syrian Army units deployed in the Beka’a Valley, further east. Curious to test their new arms and avenge their losses to SyAADF’s SAMs from the October 1973 War, they initiated a major onslaught on Syrian military forces deployed in central and eastern Lebanon. First in turn was the SyAADF’s integrated air defence system, which was tackled by the means of Operation Mole Cricket-19. By deploying UAVs, the Israelis provoked Syrian SAMs to open fire: these sites were then blasted by a combination of air- and ground-launched anti-radar missiles, guided bombs, artillery barrages and ballistic missiles. Finally, known Syrian SAM-sites were attacked by fighter-bombers that principally deployed cluster bomb units (CBUs) and general-purpose, high-explosive bombs. Overall, in about 110 minutes, the Israelis claimed to have knocked out 15 out of 19 Syrian SAM-sites.57 This time, Damascus reacted by scrambling about a dozen MiG-formations from air bases as distant as Abu ad-Duhor in the north, Hama, Shayrat in the centre, and an-Nassiriyah and as-Se’en in southern Syria. Obviously, these could neither all reach the Lebanese skies at the same time, nor could the – already badly-damaged – Syrian IADS there support as many of them all at once. Moreover, keen to retain control of the battle and thus the initiative, and to avoid ‘blue-on-blue’ engagements, the Israeli controllers deployed their fighters in small formations, one after the other. Therefore, and contrary to many of legends circulated in the public ever since, there followed no single, massive, swirling, ‘Battle-of-Britain-style’ furball including up to 90 Israeli and at least 60 Syrian fighter jets. Instead, the Israelis attacked one Syrian formation after the other, causing a series of short encounters 31

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

between small formations of aircraft moving low between the Lebanese hills at very high speeds. The Syrian plan to deploy their interceptors in systematic fashion fell apart: massive volumes of jamming of their communication frequencies and data-links made any kind of a controlled air battle virtually impossible. In a matter of about 90 minutes, IDF/AF initially claimed 29 kills for no loss, and subsequently revised this to 22-24 – including four MiG-23MFs and two MiG-23MS. While the initial Syrian claim was for 26 Israeli aircraft in exchange for 16 own losses, diverse Russian sources usually stress six aerial victories supposedly scored by SyAAF’s MiG-23s. Until this day, no evidence has become available for more than one F-15B damaged by a single R-60M fired by one of the Syrian MiG-21s.58 In disbelief over its own heavy losses, but confronted with the Israeli tanks approaching points only 40km (21.5nm) away from downtown Damascus, the SyAAF continued operating over Lebanon on 10 June 1982. With too little time to properly study what had happened on the previous day, and no means to counter the loss of early warning radars or massive jamming of its communication systems, its commanders were sending their pilots to face exactly the same type of calamities as on the day before – with unsurprising results: officially Damascus admitted losing five MiG-21s, two MiG-23s and six helicopters on 10 June; the Soviets reported 10 aerial victories for 22 losses, ‘mostly MiG-21s’. However, most Syrian losses on that day were suffered by their fighter-bombers: MiG-23BNs were rushed into successive attacks on IDF columns that were approaching the highway connecting Beirut with Damascus. Lacking support from their own IADS, escorted by interceptors the pilots of which had no situational awareness, and underway at critically low altitudes deep along Lebanese valleys, they were exposed to multiple threats: no fewer than 7 MiG-23BN pilots from the as-Se’en-based 17th FighterBomber Brigade were shot down. The Soviets subsequently declared the MiG-23BNs from Nassiriyah to have been ‘more successful’ – because they lost ‘only’ one jet in the course of ten sorties. Cold fact is that, because of Israeli interceptors, fewer than half of them had reached their targets.59 The fighting reached its climax on 11 June, when the Syrian Arab Army – continuously pounded by the Israelis from the air and the ground – did its utmost to stop the Israelis short of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Due to severe pressure from Washington to stop fighting, the IDF/AF was in a rush to improve its positions, but eventually failed to reach the Beirut-Damascus highway by the cease-fire at 1150 hrs local time. Nevertheless, in the air the Israelis continued systematically ambushing incoming Syrian formations, ultimately claiming further 18 SyAAF fighters. The last known related communiqué released by Damascus (on 17 June 1982) did not specify figures for that day: it admitted a total loss of 60 fighter jets and ‘less than 30 SAM-sites’ in exchange for downing 58 Israeli fighters and helicopters between 6 and 11 June 1982. Subsequent Soviet publications usually list 23 Israeli fighters – including three F-4Es – as shot down on 11 June, in exchange for 27 Syrian jets, including two MiG-23MS.60 While the Israelis published at least half a dozen related guncamera videos over the time, as in most of the cases from this campaign neither side really provided significant amounts of evidence in support of its claims. Still, Soviet reports that the 32

Syrian MiG-23 interceptors should have shot down at least five F-15s and six F-16s between 6 and 11 June can only be assessed as blatant misinformation. With the exception of about a dozen jets that fell into the Mediterranean Sea, the majority of downed aircraft crashed into central or northern Lebanon, and their wreckage should have been within reach of the Syrians or their Soviet advisors. However, except for rumours about supposed recovery of the wreckage of an F-16A, sometime in 1983, the Soviets never managed to provide a single piece of empiric evidence for any of the claimed successes. On the contrary: once the regime in Damascus fell silent, military commentators in Moscow – obviously embarrassed by what has happened to the ‘Soviet arms’ – launched a propaganda campaign aimed to coverup a defeat and misdeclare it into a victory. This is the pattern along which nearly everything known about the actions of the SyAAF during this campaign has been reported ever since.61 Actual summaries collected from unofficial Syrian sources over the years are nothing short of tragic: in at least 958 sorties flown (of which only some 42 were by fighter-bombers, including 32 by MiG-23s), the SyAAF credited its pilots with a total of 24 aerial victories. In turn, it was forced to write off at least 4 MiG-23MS, 6 MiG-23MFs, and 14 MiG-23BNs. No fewer than 27 pilots were killed, 18 wounded, and one captured.62

There are remarkably few photographs and videos showing Syrian MiG-23s from the 1980s, which is rather strange for a force that should have – according to nearly all of the available Soviet and Russian publications – ‘won’ the air war over Lebanon in 1982. This is a still from a video showing a MiG-23BN armed with four UB-16-57 pods for unguided 57mm S-5 rockets. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Fin of the SyAAF MiG-23BN with serial number 2407: this aircraft belonged to the batch delivered in 1979-1980, and was probably shot down over Lebanon on 10 June 1982. Note the rather ‘irregular’ application of the fin flash. (Tom Cooper Collection)

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CHAPTER 4

THIRD GENERATION Ironically, only the mass of negative experiences from conflicts of the early 1980s, followed by a mass of complaints from nearly all of MiG-23 users in the Middle East, had prompted the Soviets into the decision to start exporting advanced variants of the MiG23-interceptor. With hindsight, it is easy to conclude that – with one exception – all of these had entered service much too late to restore the type’s tarnished reputation, or even change the fate of some of their customers.

Operation Kavkaz-2 The calm in Lebanon after the cease-fire of 11 June 1982 was not to last long. After both sides regrouped their forces, the IDF relaunched its advance over the Beirut-Damascus highway, two weeks later, and encircled Beirut, initiating a two-month siege in the course of which thousands were killed by incendiary and cluster bombers. The Israelis also resumed their bombing of Syrian positions, prompting the SyAAF to hit back in fashion, only to lose two additional MiG-23BNs to F-15s, on 24 June 1982. The siege of Beirut went on: the Israelis cut off the water and supplies and constantly bombed and shelled the southern part of the city. On 24 July, one of their RF-4Es was shot down by newlydeployed 9K33 Osa (ASCC-code SA-8 Gecko) of the SyAADF, and in a follow-up attack to hit the site and the wreckage of the downed reconnaissance fighter eleven Soviet advisors involved in dismantling the latter were killed.63 The Syrians and PLO agreed to withdraw after a final 15-hour bombardment, but the fighting went on until a Multi-National Force (MNF) was deployed to separate belligerents and stabilise the situation. French paratroopers arrived first, followed by US Marines, the British and Italians, and soon found themselves at odds with multiple parties involved: on 22 September 1982, eight Dassault Super Etendard fighters from the carrier Foch (R99) attacked Syrian positions for the first time. Finally realising the severity of the Syrian situation, and recognising E-2Cs as one of primary reasons for the Israeli aerial superiority, on 28 September 1982, Soviet Leadership ordered the deployment of two (later increased to three) anti-aircraft regiments of the Moscow District of the PVO equipped with S-200VE Vega (ASCC-code SA-5 Gammon) long-range SAMsystems to Syria. The idea was to deploy SA-5s to at least keep the Hawkeyes at distance, and thus enable some freedom of operations for the SyAAF. Furthermore, the Soviet government granted the permission for Syria to buy 50 MiG-23ML interceptors, together with an additional batch of MiG-23BNs. Thus began the Operation Kavkaz-2 that finally resulted in deliveries of MiG-23s with performances originally promised nearly ten years earlier.64 Due to the Soviets cheating upon their foreign customers by using the same designations for two or more different versions, but also to inconsistencies in related reporting, there is still significant controversy over the exact variant of the ‘MiG-23ML’ delivered to Syria in 1982-1983. The first batch (known serials are in the range 2750-2755) were MiG-23MLs, Izdeliye-23-12A, equipped with

the Sapfir-23ML radar. The second and third batches (known serials were in range 2762-2799) were MiG-23MLDs, Izdeliye23-22B, equipped with the Sapfir-23MLA-II radar. The latter system was significantly improved: it had a maximum detection range for bomber-sized targets of 65km (35nm) and, through the incorporation of 120 Doppler filter-channels, it received a true look-down/shoot-down functionality, although its range in the two corresponding working modes was greatly reduced – to only some 11km (6nm). The MPKh mode was useful for detection over mountainous terrain, while the PSTz mode was designed for better discretion of targets underway at very low altitudes. Foremost, the Sapfir-23MLA-II radar had a useful dogfighting mode, in which the radar locked semi-automatically on to the first target to enter its envelope at ranges out to 9km (5nm). This mode was of particular importance because the MiG-23ML was probably the finest fighter-interceptor variant of this family: it had a lighter fuselage and a shorter, lighter fin, new landing gear, and an uprated engine that made it not only safer to fly, but also much more manoeuvrable. Moreover, it received a fourth wing-setting of 33 degrees, which was found more suitable for air combat manoeuvring. Nevertheless, the Sapfir-23MLA-II had its negative sides, too: it was specialised for interception of targets approaching it, and lacked the capability to track targets in a tail-chase. Correspondingly, the TP-23 IRST system became more important than ever before. Furthermore, while capable of tracking up to six targets simultaneously, the Sapfir-23MLA-II still presented all of its data on the HUD in front of the pilot. Thus, as soon as the pilot locked-on one of the targets, the others would disappear, making it easy to lose situational awareness. At least as troublesome was the reliability, related to its primitive computer: the Sapfir-23MLA-II tended to malfunction shortly after achieving a lock-on. Finally, Syrian MiG-23MLs were initially delivered still armed with R-23 instead with R-24 missiles (ASCC code AA-7C for SARH-variant and AA-7D for IR-homing variant), and equipped with the SPO10 RWR, meanwhile known to be insufficient.65 The MiG-23MLs first entered service with No. 67 Squadron, which was declared operational in August 1983 – right on time to see the Israelis starting a gradual withdrawal from the Beirut area. The Israeli withdrawal was closely monitored by an emerging power in Lebanon: the Iran-supported Hezbollah. On 23 October, the US and French MNF forces in the Lebanese capital were almost simultaneously hit by bombing attacks launched by the group ‘Islamic Jihad’ – a front of the Hezbollah – during which 239 US Marines and 58 French paras were killed. Recognising the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as the culprit, the French retaliated on 17 November by deploying 14 Super Etendards from the aircraft carrier Clemenceau (R98) to bomb an Iranian base in Baalbek in retaliation. The Syrians and Soviets fired multiple SAMs in return, claiming at least two of French fighter-bombers as shot down. As tensions continued to rise, the Syrians and Soviets continued firing missiles and 33

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

attempted to intercept a pair of F-14As from USN’s VF-32 that were underway over Lebanon on a reconnaissance sortie, on 3 December 1983. The following day, 28 attack aircraft from the carriers USS Independence (CV-62) and USS John F Kennedy (CV67) attacked Syrian positions on the highway connecting Beirut with Damascus. Once again, Syrian and Soviet SAM-crews fired back by all the means available – to a degree where the Soviets subsequently claimed the downing of no less than nine US aircraft, including an E-2C Hawkeye by SA-5 from a range of 190km (102.5nm). Actually, one Grumman A-6E Intruder and one LTV A-7 Corsair II were shot down, and another Corsair damaged severely enough to be written off: one of the Intrudercrew was killed, while other ended in captivity in Syria.66 Overall, the introduction of the MiG-23ML in Syria seems to have resulted in no significant success. On the contrary, SyAAF’s MiG-23 remained unsuccessful for a while longer. During another round of tensions with Israel, on 19 November 1985, four MiG-23MLs were sent from two different directions on a mission to attack a pair of F-15As on a CAP over Lebanon. Mimicking the Iraqi Giraffe tactics, the pair flown by Major Riyadh Hindawy and Captain Mohammed managed to get underneath the Eagles, before being ordered into a fast climb. However, due to a mistake by their ground controller, both MiGs were vectored a few degrees off course: they ended in front of the F-15s, instead of behind them – and both were promptly shot down. The two Syrians ejected safely, and were subsequently returned to Damascus. Exactly as back in April 1981, Damascus reacted with an outcry and deployment of its SAMs into Lebanon, sparking the second ‘missile crisis’. This ended through a combination of US pressure and Israeli threats in early 1986: with this, the times of IsraeliSyrian air battles over Lebanon were over.67

R-24 for R-23 Around the same time it granted permission for deliveries of MiG23MLs to Syria, Moscow arrived at a similar decision with regards to Iraq. The IrAF scrambled to exploit this opportunity, placed an order for at least 64 Izdeliye-23-12A aircraft, and promptly sent

a group of hand-picked pilots from Nos. 39 and 67 Squadrons for conversion training to Lugovaya. Sixteen aircraft of this variant first entered service with newly-established unit, No. 73 Squadron, based at Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB, and officially declared operational in July 1984. The second batch entered service with No. 63 Squadron by 1985: this unit was based at al-Bakr AB, north of Baghdad (better known in the West as ‘Balad’).68 Such reinforcements were most welcome also because No. 39 Squadron had experienced several mishaps in 1983. In one of these, it lost two jets – and 1st Lieutenant Muwaffaq Mohammed Yasin – in a collision on take-off from Tammuz AB, when one of pilots was blinded by low sun. In another, an unknown Iraqi pilot defected with his MiG-23MS to Iran, and landed this safely at TFB.3, outside Hamedan. Astounded by this arrival, the Iranians forgot to remove the aircraft on time: less than an hour later, it was destroyed in an air strike flown by Iraqi Su-22s. Subsequently, No. 39 Squadron was converted into the No. 59 Operational Conversion Unit, and for the rest of its existence served as a training asset for future Iraqi MiG-23-pilots.69 It is very likely that such experiences prompted Saddam Hussein to order a major restructuring of the IrAF, and appoint MajorGeneral Hameed Sha’aban as its Chief-of-Staff. This highlyexperienced fighter-pilot was firmly convinced that an aggressive deployment of the air force could force the Iranians onto their knees. He not only ordered the deployment of Mirage F.1EQs as fighter-bombers, but also additional and more aggressive Giraffe operations than ever before. Furthermore, Sha’ban began encouraging engineers working for Technical Department of the IrAF to introduce modifications to the available equipment. One of the first measures introduced was the replacement of R-23 missiles of their MiG-23MFs – which the Iraqis concluded were unsatisfactory – by R-24s. Following extensive testing, the Iraqis realised that such an adaptation was possible, although it required fine-tuning the AVM-23 mission computer of the older variant and application of the APU-23M1E launch rails from the MiG23ML (in place of older APU-23Ms). The resulting MiG-23MFs armed with R-24s were to see their first combat in 1984.

Crew of one of Soviet SA-5 SAM-site deployed in Syria, assigned to the 231st Air Defence Regiment PVO, in early 1983. (Union of Veteran Soldiers that served in Syria)

34

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The R-24R air-to-air missile as seen on a Soviet MiG-23MLD. According to reports from multiple Iraqi and Libyan MiG-23 pilots, this was the best weapon ever installed on interceptor variants from that family. (Photo by Piotr Butowski)

Recce Parties The scenario into which the modified Iraqi MiG-23MFs were deployed was that of Baghdad expecting another major Iranian offensive. Ever since the start of the war, such operations were usually preceded by several sorties of RF-4E Phantom II reconnaissance fighters of the IRIAF. Indeed, the activity of these was higher in 1983 and 1984 than ever before. Intercepting such fast-flying aircraft as RF-4Es was one of tasks for which the MiG23 was originally designed – even more so because the Frenchconstructed integrated air defence system for Iraq, code-named Kari, was meanwhile largely complete. Headquartered at the Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) in Baghdad, it was organized into four geographically-distributed sectors, at the heart of each was an air battle management sector operations centre (SOC) and up to five intercept operations centres (IOCs). These command posts controlled more than 70 radar units, more than 600 visual observation posts, and the Unit 128 – a dedicated SIGINT- and electronic warfare unit. Well-integrated, and highly-automatized, Kari enabled the commanders at ADOC in Baghdad to control the air battle over any piece of Iraqi airspace at any time of the day. Iraqi MiG-23s could now finally be deployed to their full capability, with support of exactly the kind of an IADS within which they were originally designed to operate. Unsurprisingly, MiG-23MFs were scrambled more often than ever before – especially in reaction to the Iranian RF-4Es. However, flown by some of best-trained crews the IRIAF could offer, and always escorted by a pair of F-14s up to the border, the reconnaissance Phantoms proved exceptionally hard to catch. For example, on 1 January 1984, Captain Aqeel Abdul-Hussein Hassan from No. 67 Squadron was shot down and killed by an F-14A that was escorting an RF-4E.70 Slightly over three weeks later, in late January 1984, early warning radars of the IrAF detected the approach of what the IrAF tended to term a ‘reconnaissance party’ (or ‘recce party’): a single RF-4E, escorted by two F-14As, in direction of the Iraqi border. A pair of MiG-23MFs was scrambled from Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB, ordered to accelerate to Mach 1 and climb to an altitude of 11,000m. Simultaneously, a pair of MiG-21bis was vectored

A still from a video showing the MiG-23MS flown to TFB.3 by a defecting Iraqi pilot at an unknown date in 1983. Shortly after, this aircraft was destroyed by an Iraqi air strike. (Tom Cooper Collection)

into a position south of the town of Qurna, while a MiG-25PDS was scrambled from Wahda AB. The Iranians meanwhile split their formation in usual fashion: the F-14As entered an orbit over Susangerd and Khorramshahr, while the RF-4E started its supersonic photographic run, beginning from Qurna and along the Baghdad-Basra highway in northern direction. Launched on time, the two MiG-23MFs approached as the Phantom II made a right turn over Qurna. The lead Iraqi pilot, Captain Mahmoud, approached to a range of 40km (21.6nm), switched his radar on and established a solid lock-on. Cutting the distance to 20km (10.8nm) he fired his first R-24R.71 Warned by his RHAW, the Iranian pilot broke hard left and down – which brought him on a collision course with two MiG-21s. The Phantom therefore continued its left turn, but while thus avoiding the R-24R, it exposed its hot exhausts to Captain Mahmoud’s MiG-23. The Iraqi selected his second missile – an IR-homing R-24T – and fired again. Seconds later, the missile exploded near the reccebird, just as this was crossing back into Iranian airspace. Thick black smoke poured from the Phantom as it was seen for the last time.72 Few months later, in June 1984, Captain Abdul Rahman alObeidi flew a similar interception on a MiG-23MF: ‘I was scrambled with Captain Jabbar as leader from Ali Ibn Abu Talib from an-Nassiriyah AB, ordered to accelerate to Mach 1 and fly in direction of 60°. The ground controller 35

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announced that our target would be an Iranian reconnaissance aircraft, underway at an altitude of 10,000m [32808ft], about 200 kilometres [108nm] in front of us. As we reached the speed of Mach 1.5 and an altitude of 7,000m, the range decreased to 150 kilometres [81nm]. We jettisoned drop tanks, made a slight turn to a course of 72° and continued accelerating and climbing. By the time the range to target was 60 kilometres [32.4nm], the ground control announced the enemy was about to complete its mission and turning in northern direction. We had to hurry up! When the range decreased to 30 kilometres [16.2nm], we were at 10,500 metres altitude [34,448ft]. I established a lock-on and fired a single R-24R missile. I followed the smoke trail of the missile, and then saw it detonating in a fireball: the enemy was hit and then I saw it going down in flames, releasing a thick trail of smoke. With our job done, we took the course of 235°, straight back for anNassiriyah. The entire mission lasted 11 minutes.’73

Although both Iraqi pilots were credited with confirmed kills, none of them was actually successful: while badly damaged, both RF-4Es limped back to TFB.4 for successful emergency landings, and were subsequently repaired.74

Sudden Death On 9 August 1984, Iraqi Military Intelligence got wind about an Iranian convoy of merchant ships hauling reinforcements and supplies (known as a ‘caravan’ to the Iranians and the Iraqis) being underway from Hormuz Straits towards Bandar-e Khomeini. This report prompted two days of intensive preparations for the coming operation. For the purpose of attacking the Iranian

Pilot from No. 67 Squadron, IrAF with his mount – a fully armed MiG23MF. Although their colleagues flying fighter-bombers were suffering significant losses, pilots of Iraqi MiG-23 interceptor units saw them slowly gaining the upper hand in clashes with Iranian fighters during the second half of 1982. (via Ali Tobchi)

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‘caravan’ in August 1984, the 3rd ‘South’ SOC, commanded by Brigadier-General Safa, was reinforced through the deployment of a detachment from Unit 128 and six MiG-23MFs and MiG23MLs forward deployed at Wahda AB.75 Early on the morning of 11 August, Iraqi naval radars positioned on the Faw Peninsula detected the approach of the Iranian ‘caravan’, and the IrAF was immediately ordered to launch its attack on the Iranian F-14s. The first two pairs of MiG-23MFs from No. 63 Squadron were unsuccessful: both were detected while still approaching at a very low altitude over the northern Persian Gulf, and thus forced to abort their mission. Indeed, the second pair was caught by the F-14s they intended to intercept, and one was claimed as shot down, by a Sidewinder, into the waters of the Persian Gulf following a short pursuit. Determined to remove the F-14s, the IrAF countered by launching a third pair – two MiG-23MLs from No. 73 Squadron – about an hour later. This time, the ground control timed their approach more carefully, and the MiGs thus approached the Tomcats as these were on the southern leg of their race-track pattern. At the desired point in time, Brigadier-General Safa ordered both MiGs into a climb: ‘Giraffe, giraffe, giraffe!’ Engaging afterburners and pulling their sticks into their stomachs, the two MiGs skyrocketed into a climb to 7,000 metres (22,965ft) – and then levelled out, only to realise there was a mistake: because of the gap caused by the time that lapses while radar emissions had reached the Iranian F-14s and then returned in form of echoes; the time the radar processors required to process the signals and present them on displays; and the time the Iraqi ground controllers needed to understand the information and for Safa to issue corresponding orders; the two MiGs climbed in the wrong direction, and ended in wrong position for their attack. The leader was almost 3,000 metres (3,280 yards) line abreast with the Tomcats, his wingman barely 600 metres (656 yards/1968ft) behind them – much too close to engage with missiles. Realising there was an F-14 in front of him, the excited younger wingman, 1st Lieutenant Hussam Abdul Rahman, yelled into his radio, ‘Fouuurrrrrrteeeeeeen!’ Puzzled by this message, Safa first thought that Rahman’s aircraft has been hit. After enquiring, he ordered the pilot to calm down, and decrease his velocity in order to fall back behind the minimal range for R-60MK missiles. Within seconds, one was ready: Rahman squeezed the trigger and the missile flashed away – straight into the right engine of the Iranian Tomcat.76 To the good luck of the two Iraqi MiG-pilots, following the earlier engagement, the F-14 crews were now preoccupied checking each other’s aircraft during those crucial seconds, and their ground control failed to warn them in time. The lead Tomcat thus received a direct hit, forcing the crew to eject. Although landing safely in the sea, the pilot – Colonel Hashem All-eAgha – was never found. His RIO, 1st Lieutenant Mohammad Rostampour, was rescued by a helicopter. For the two MiGs, the combat was not yet over. Even as they made a turn around the falling Tomcat, and sighted the ejection of one of its crew, an F-4E from a CAP-station over Khark was vectored into the area. As soon as their radars detected this movement, and considering the two MiG-23MLs still had enough fuel, Brigadier-General Safa ordered them to turn around and attack again. Approaching to a distance of 30km, the lead MiG23ML achieved a lock-on and, when the range was down to 25km,

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Overview of national markings as applied on MiG-23s in service in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria, since 1973. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

The first MiG-23s at least ‘probably prepared for deployment’ in the Middle East, even if not exported to one of the local customers, seem to have been MiG-23Ms delivered to the 2nd Squadron of the 32nd Guards Interceptor Aviation Regiment of the VVS, in mid-1972. As far as is known, the aircraft in question have received different variants of the camouflage pattern depicted here, actually standardised for application on MiG-21M/MFs exported to the Middle East and Africa around the same time. This consisted of beige BS381C/388 and olive or dark green on top surfaces and sides. The exact colour applied on the undersides is unclear but seems to have included light admiralty grey on forward parts of the underfuselage, and a light grey on the rear, as shown on this artwork. The few available photographs are showing them equipped with launch rails for R-13Ms or armed with four UB-16-57 pods. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

In April 1974, the SyAAF received a total of at least 16 MiG-23MS interceptors. All were camouflaged in the standardised pattern for export aircraft, consisting of beige BS381C/388, dark brown BS381C/411 or 450 (similar to FS20095), and olive green BS381C/298 (similar to FS34098) on the upper surfaces, light admiralty grey BS381C/697 (FS35622) on the lower surfaces of the front fuselage, and aft underfuselage painted in an unknown shade of grey. Dielectric panels were painted either in white or medium grey (FS26152). In 1982, Libya donated about a dozen additional MiG-23MS, painted in the same fashion. Known serial numbers applied on this variant in Syria were in the range 1600-1627. During the first years of their service, these aircraft were compatible with older R-3S AAMs only. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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Egyptian MiG-23MS received the same camouflage pattern as those delivered to Syria slightly earlier. Contrary to Syrian examples – which never received any kind of roundels on their fuselage – they were marked with big roundels applied on intakes. Known serials for Egyptian MiG-23MS were in the range 9501-9509 (9501 is known to have been sold to China). (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

With dozens of Libyan MiG-23MS photographed on different occasions since 1976, they are probably the best known of all aircraft of this variant ever exported. All wore the same camouflage pattern as applied on MiG-23MS and MiG-23BNs exported in the 1970s, in beige, dark brown and olive green on upper surfaces and sides, and light admiralty grey on undersurfaces. Their serials were initially applied in three Arabic digits on the fin below the fin flash only. Units staffed by Syrian personnel retained this practice at the latter time, although most of the aircraft received four-digit serials applied in European style – below the fin-flash and on the forward fuselage too, by 1981. Shown here is the example with serial number 027, and with markings in use by the LAAF until 1977. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Based on quite an unclear still from a video showing the “personal” mount of the CO No.39 Squadron as of around early 1981, this artwork depicts one of 18 MiG-23MS originally delivered to Iraq. Camouflage colours were the same as used on all the MiG-23MS and MiG-23BNs exported during the 1970s, and they were applied along exactly the same pattern – although with slight deviations on the sides of the aircraft, and even more so on top surfaces. Serial number remains unconfirmed: in period 1931-1988, these were applied in the order of the aircrafts’ delivery to Iraq, and thus with no or only short sequences for aircraft of the same type. What is certain is that this MiG-23MS wore the unit insignia – in form of the crest of No. 39 Squadron, IrAF – on the left intake. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The first batch of MiG-23BNs delivered to Syria in 1974 is known to have included at least 13, possibly up to 16 aircraft, and to have received serials in the range 1650-1662. The second batch received serials in the range 1663-1678, of which the first three might have been originally applied on the last three aircraft of the first batch, but written off before 1979. As illustrated in the main artwork, no roundels were ever applied anywhere on the fuselage; very big roundels were applied on top and bottom surfaces of the wing, while serials were applied in rather diverse positions on the forward fuselage and near the top of the fin. Like the third batch – which received serials in the range 2400-2417 – the MiG-23BNs of the second batch were all equipped with the SPS-141 ECM-system, recognizable by blisters low on the forward fuselage, below the front part of the cockpit. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Very little is known about the service history of eight MiG-23BNs of No. 47 Squadron, EAF, except that the few available photographs show them wearing the same camouflage pattern as applied on Iraqi and Syrian examples around the same time. Notable are the big size of their serial numbers – which were in the range 9551-9558 (the two Egyptian MiG-23UBs wore serials 9592 and 9594) – big roundels on intakes, and smaller roundels on top and bottom wing surfaces. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

The first batch of MiG-23BNs delivered to Iraq wore the same standardised camouflage pattern. Like on all IrAF MiG-23s, the fin flash was usually applied with significant inclination: remaining national insignia was applied in six positions, with that on top wing surfaces pointed ‘straight ahead’ when the aircraft was parked with wings swept fully back. This example is shown loaded with a total of 16 FAB-100M-54 general-purpose bombs carried in pairs on MBD3-U6-68 multiple ejector racks, as deployed frequently against Iranian troop concentrations. Insets show the Chilean-made Cardoen CB-500 and the South African-made CB.470 CBUs deployed by this type during later years of the war with Iran (lower left corner), and the original crest of No. 29 Squadron IrAF. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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This reconstruction of one of 18 MiG-23MFs delivered in 1979 is based on several photographs showing different parts of diverse aircraft. The camouflage pattern appears to have been the same as applied on MiG-23MS and MiG-23BNs exported to the Middle East at earlier times. It is possible that it included slightly darker shades of brown and green colours than depicted here. Known serials were in the range 2651 to 2677. Syrian MiG-23MFs were originally delivered armed with R-13M missiles, instead of R-60MKs. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Though an Iraqi MiG-23MF is known to have worn this serial number in the late 1980s, and there was also an MF with a kill marking commemorating an aerial victory claimed against an IRIAF F-14A in summer 1983, this artwork is actually a reconstruction based on several poor photographs of various MFs. The camouflage pattern is still easy to recognize as standard for export aircraft, even if the form of the green splotch around the cockpit was rather unusual. Iraqi MiG-23MFs may have been armed with R-60MKs since their delivery, while their R-23s (illustrated here is an R-23T) were replaced by R-24R/Ts by 1984. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Libyan MiG-23MFs were all second-hand aircraft delivered from the stocks of the VVS and the PVO. Although overhauled before delivery, most of them thus originally wore diverse ‘European style’ camouflage patterns in tan, grey-green and dark green, and the few available photographs all show them armed with R-23Rs and R-13Ms. While their armament was modified through the introduction of R-24R/Ts and R-60MKs, their camouflage pattern was altered only during overhauls in Russia in the mid-2000s. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

For the first few years of their service in Algeria, MiG-23BNs used to wear the standard camouflage pattern, three-digit serials (known examples are 372, 383, 388, 389 and 394, applied as shown in inset), and fin flashes – in addition to roundels applied in four positions. In the mid-1980s, the QJJ introduced a coding system instead of serials, and the practice of applying the ‘last four’ of the construction number instead of fin flashes. Codes of its MiG-23BNs received the prefix ‘FM-‘ (known are examples FM-13, FM-14, FM-17, FM-24, FM-46, FM-52, FM-64, FM-72, FM-76, FM-87, FM-97, FM-98), while the aircraft shown on the main illustration here has received the construction number 9841 on the fin. Notable is the thin, green-whitegreen outline of its roundels, which was also a standard until the mid-1980s. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

In the course of their overhauls, starting in the late 1980s and through 1990s, the Algerian MiG-23BNs were painted in this original camouflage pattern, consisting of beige and brown. Roundels – meanwhile outlined in black – were still applied in four positions, while codes were applied on the front fuselage, the top surface of the starboard, and bottom surface of the port wing. During the 1990s, Algeria began purchasing quantities of armament from South Africa. Such included copies of US-designed Mk.81 (125kg) and Mk.82 (250kg) bombs, illustrated here. The latter were frequently equipped with South African-made Jupiter fuses. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

A reconstruction of a MiG-23MF coded as FP-26, as operated by the Ouragla-based 14th and then 140th Squadron, QJJ, in the late 1980s. As delivered, Algerian MiG-23MFs used to wear the standard camouflage pattern applied on most Floggers delivered to the Middle East. They never received any three-digit serials, but were coded since their service entry (known codes were FP-11, FP-26, FP-27, FP-43, FP-82, FP-83, FP-85/0107, FP-92). Similarly, they never wore fin flashes, but only the last four digits of their construction numbers. Codes are repeated – in the same size – on the top surface of the starboard, and undersurface of the port wing. As far as is known, their standard armament always consisted of R-23R/Ts and R-60MKs. As shown here, in QJJ’s service, R-23Rs were frequently installed on the port underwing hardpoint, instead on the starboard, as usual. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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The first batch of 18 MiG-23MLs delivered to Iraq received the same standard camouflage pattern as usual, and four-digit serial numbers in the range 2554-2671. Sadly, original serial numbers of two subsequent batches remain unknown. In 1988, the IrAF switched to a five-digit serialling system. Within this the first two figures denoted the type (‘23’ for MiG-23), the third the variant, and the last two individual aircraft. Correspondingly, survivors from the batch with serials 2554-2671 were re-serialled as 23254-23271. This example, 2560, was decorated with two kill markings (including one for the F-14A shot down on 11 August 1984). This MiG-23ML ended its days in former Yugoslavia, meanwhile re-serialled as 23260. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

The MiG-23ML serial number 23298 belonged to the final batch of this variant delivered to Iraq (their serials went up to at least 23314), and was operated by the short-lived No. 93 Squadron. As well as receiving new, five-digit serials, in 1988-1989 a number of Iraqi MiG-23MLs were modified to carry French-made Remora ECM-pods, had received antennas of the SPO-15 RWR system on the top of their fin, and ASO-2 chaff and flare dispensers on the top of their fuselage. The aircraft is illustrated with an R-24R missile under its port wing: while carrying IR-homing R-24Ts on that station was more frequent, it was not exclusive. Inset is shown the insignia of No. 93 Squadron. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

This is a reconstruction of the MiG-23MLD flown by Abdelmajid Tayari from Benina-based No. 1024 Squadron, during his dogfight with two F-14As of the US Navy, on 13 February 1986. Except for its standard camouflage pattern, notable is the new position of the roundel applied on the intake instead on the forward fuselage, like on earlier variants. Tayari’s MiG-23MLD was also equipped with the APU-60-2 pod with two R-60MKs under each of two underfuselage hardpoints on that occasion. Serial number 6112, was applied in similar size and positions as on most the MiG-23MLDs from the first batch delivered to Libya (including aircraft with serials 5397, 6117, 6130, 6148, 6172 or 6451): genuine MLDs had received serials nearly twice as large on their front fuselage. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Libyan Dawn Air Force is still operating two MiG-23MLDs. Since they were overhauled by a team contracted from the Ukraine, in 2014-2015, both aircraft – serials 117 and 474 – are painted as shown here: only 117 wears the ‘flaming lion’ insignia on the forward fuselage, while 474’s radome is painted in black. Since several aircraft and helicopters of the LDAF were shot down by MiGs operated by the LNA/AF, in late 2014 and early 2015, both of LDAF’s Floggers are standing quick reaction alert at Misurata AB, fully armed with a pair of R-24s and R-60MKs each. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

One of only a handful of MiG-23MFs remaining operational in Syria as of August 2017, was this example, wearing the serial number 2671. Together with the serial number 2676, it served at Dmeyr AB. Three other MiG-23MFs – serials 2657, 2661 and 2667 – were operational at Hama as of that time; 2677 was captured by insurgents at Abu ad-Duhor AB in early 2015, while 26x4 served as training tool and was eventually abandoned at Kweres AB, as of 2012. This aircraft is shown as armed with Kh-23M guided missiles (and the associated Delta guidance pod, always carried on the starboard underfuselage hardpoint), which were deployed to strike several insurgent headquarters during the second half of 2013. Inset is shown the insignia of The Works at Nayrab, applied on every aircraft (and helicopter) overhauled by that facility. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Gauging by known serial numbers (4000-4005) and known losses, less than a dozen MiG-23MLDs acquired by Syria from Belarus in 2008 were overhauled by The Works and pressed into service. All the aircraft in question have received the same camouflage pattern in orange sand and blue green, although this is often badly worn out due to heavy use, but also the influence of the elements. Fin flashes applied on them are smaller and less inclined than those applied on earlier variants, while roundels are worn in four positions and closer to the fin-tips than usual. Although frequently deployed as fighter-bombers, armed with B-8M pods for unguided rockets, diverse bombs or Kh-23M guided missiles, at least one MiG-23MLD at Hama and Khekhleh ABs is always standing quick reaction alert, armed with R-24Rs and R-60s. Notable is that the latter are frequently carried on APU-60-2 pods with dual rails, although only one of these is regularly used. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

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A fourship of Egyptian MiG-23MS involved in a military parade in Cairo in October 1974. All wore essentially the same standard camouflage pattern that saw wide use – even if with diverse variations – on MiG-23s exported to the Middle East. This consisted of beige (BS381C/388), dark brown (BS381C/BS411) or BS450 (similar to FS20095), and olive green (BS381C/298, similar to FS34098), on the upper surfaces, light admiralty grey (FS381C/697) on the lower surfaces. Dielectric panels were painted either in white or medium grey (FS26152). (Dr Abdallah Emran Collection)

A beautiful study of a LAAF MiG-23MS serial number 4711, as intercepted over the Gulf of Syrte in February 1986. Notable is that the rear underfuselage was pained in a grey shade significantly darker than the light admiralty grey usually applied on undersurfaces of the MiG-23s exported to the Middle East. The last three of the serial were repeated in Arabic digits on the fin, probably indicating that this aircraft was operated by one of the Syrian-staffed squadrons based at Benina AB. (Tom Cooper Collection)

The second MiG-23MLD operated by the Libyan Dawn Air Force is this example, serialled 474. In addition to air defence, it is frequently deployed for ground strikes, usually armed with S-24 heavy unguided rockets. (Arnaud Delalande Collection)

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MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

fired one R-24R. The Phantom reacted with a hard turn and the subsequent analysis of the gun-camera film from that engagement has shown the Iraqi missile did attempt to follow this manoeuvre, but missed by between two and three kilometres [1-1.6nm]. As the Iranian fighter exposed its hot exhausts to the Iraqis, Rahman acquired him with the IRST and fired a single R-24T. This missile guided well, but eventually failed to reach the Phantom that accelerated away. While Radio Baghdad subsequently exaggerated by reporting the downing of ‘three Iranian Tomcats into the sea off Bushehr’, there was little doubt that the two MiG-pilots had accomplished their mission successfully.

A still from a Soviet documentary showing the firing of an R-60 air-toair missile from a MiG-23M. (Tom Cooper Collection)

The Fall of Faw According to most of the Iraqi fighter-pilots interviewed, following All-e-Agha’s death, the IRIAF F-14 fleet was never again operated as effectively as in the first four years of the war. Not only because of All-e-Agha’s death, but due to the general exhaustion of its pilots, ground crews and remaining aircraft, the IRIAF subsequently withdrew from the frontlines of the Iran-Iraq War. Instead, it concentrated on defending strategically important installations deeper inside Iran. The IrAF found itself in a position to launch not only air strikes against selected targets in western Iran, but also on aircraft underway up to 150km [80nm] deep inside Iranian airspace. A good example of Iraqi operations into Iranian airspace was the attack on the major early warning radar site of the IRIAF, on Mount Subashi, flown by MiG-23BNs and Su-22s on 21 March 1985. When two F-4Es were scrambled from TFB.3 to intercept, they became entangled in an air combat with a pair of MiG-23MLs. The Phantoms shot one of the MiGs down, but were in turn hit by a pair of Iraqi MiG-25s that attacked unseen: fired from a range of more than 20km [10.8nm] the hefty R-40R hit the front cockpit of the lead F-4E, instantly killing the pilot, and badly injuring the RIO, who barely managed to eject.

Sadly, photographs of Iraqi MiG-23MFs remain elusive: one of few examples photographed at a later date was found by US troops at Bakr AB in April 2003. The aircraft in question wore the post-1988 serial number 23126, and its original camouflage pattern. As of 1984, Iraqi MiG-23MF wore four-digit serials in unknown range. (Photo by Scott Brown)

Map 4  The approximate route taken by the two MiG-23s that shot down an IRIAF F-14A on 11 August 1984. It’s notable that the Iraqi interceptors and fighter-bombers regularly flew through the Kuwaiti airspace whenever entering the northern Persian Gulf. (Map by Tom Cooper)

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In February 1986, the Iranians launched their most successful offensive of this war, Operation Val Fajr-8. Their ground forces crossed the Shatt al-Arab south of Ahwaz and captured most of the Faw Peninsula, threatening Basra from the south. The loss of Faw was a terrible blow for the entire Iraqi military: not only that the country has thus lost its sea coast, or that all the massive counterattacks failed to dislodge the Iranians from their newlyestablished positions: the IrAF has lost a number of forwarddeployed radar stations, and thus an insight into what was going on over the northern Persian Gulf. Correspondingly, the reaction of the Iraqi air force was vicious: it began launching intense air strikes on the Iranian troops at Faw, but also on an entire fleet of small vessels used to re-supply these, as well as interdicting bases deeper behind the frontline. With the battlefield almost directly opposite to the Iranian city of Ahwaz, IRIAF’s air defences were present in force and the IrAF quickly lost about 20 combat aircraft. The IrAF countered by flying in larger formations and adding ever additional combat-support aircraft to formations of its fighter bombers. For example, even a CAS mission by between six and eight MiG-23BNs was usually protected by three Su-22s armed with Kh-28 (ASCC-code AS-9 Kyle) anti-radar missiles, a pair of Mirage F.1EQs equipped with French-made Caiman ECMpods, and a pair of MiG-23MFs or MiG-23MLs as top cover. Certainly enough, such precautions could not prevent losses from accidents. For example, on 28 March 1986, the MiG-23BN flown by Captain Hatim Ali al-Fahdawi from No. 49 Squadron was lost while attacking Iranian positions in Ahwaz area, when bomblets from one of four Chilean-made Cardoen CBUs collided with his aircraft. Nevertheless, these tactics proved its value, prompting the Iraqis to start combining multiple such formations to interdict major Iranian communications behind the frontline. For example, 10-12 MiG-23BNs from Abu Ubaida AB, protected by up to 10 MiG-23MF/MLs, Mirage F.1EQs and Su-22s, would hit the city of Dezful in coordination with 10-12 Su-22s from al-Bakr AB or 10-12 Su-22s from Wahda AB – all of which were protected in similar fashion. Although theoretically ideal targets for IRIAF F-14s, such formations proved an unsolvable problem for the IRIAF. Not only that the Iraqis had carefully studied gaps in the Iranian early warning radar network, or operated at low altitudes and thus avoided early detection, but they also went to great extents to track the operations of Iranian F-14s. Combined with depleted stocks of AIM-54s – which made IRIAF Tomcat-crews much less ‘trigger-happy’ than in earlier times – this meant that the Iraqi strike packages usually reached their targets entirely unmolested. This was to have far-reaching consequences in the long term: as soon as Major-General Hameed Sha’aban realised the new situation, he ordered his force into an all-out onslaught on the economy of western Iran.

A Kill by Mistake Although most of Iraqi sources maintain that the Iranian F-14A never proved particularly effective, and never had much success during the Iran-Iraq War, or at least that the IRIAF’s Tomcatfleet never operated as well as before All-e-Agha’s death, crossexamination of available data leaves little doubt about the fact that the powerful interceptor made by Grumman remained a major 38

Like those of Iraqi MiG-23MFs, photographs of Iraqi MiG-23BNs from the second half of the war with Iran are very rare. This example equipped with the SPS-141 ECM-system (notice the blister on the lower front fuselage, below the cockpit) was found by US troops in March 2003, at which time it was still showing its original camouflage pattern – even though already wearing a post-1988 serial 23173. (via Tom Cooper)

threat. Unsurprisingly, already during the battle for Faw, the IrAF – in cooperation with the government in Baghdad – initiated a multi-prong effort to curb the activity of the Iranian Tomcats. Except for acquiring Remora ECM-pods from France, the IrAF requested more advanced RWR/RHAW-systems from France and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, during a meeting with diplomats from Arab states in the lower Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein announced that several Iranian F-14 pilots were about to defect to Iraq. With the Iranian intelligence services being well-present in countries like Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, it did not take long for Tehran to get wind of this statement, and repeatedly ground many of its Tomcat-pilots during that year. The latter story actually had some basis, because Iraqi military intelligence had, since 1982, been trying to establish contact with diverse IRIAF pilots and convince them to defect. This operation was run via telephone calls, routed via Turkey, during which the callers had addressed targeted pilots in English. The Iraqis achieved their first success on 27 August 1984, when Major Rahman Ghanat Pishnee defected with an F-4E from TFB.6 (Bushehr) to Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB. The Phantom II was carefully inspected but never test-flown: subsequently, it was parked inside a hangar where it was destroyed by US bombs, in January 1991.77 Emboldened, the Iraqi Military Intelligence continued trying and eventually established contact with Captain Ahmed Moradi Talebi, an F-14-pilot based at TFB.8 (Esfahan). In spring 1986, Moradi requested permission for a family vacation outside Iran. This was granted, and in August the same year he travelled with his wife to Germany. Moradi returned without his wife, late the same month but – surprisingly enough – was granted permission to continue service. What the Iranian counterintelligence did not know was that by that point in time he had been in contact with the Iraqis and his defection was planned for 3 September 1986. In order to be recognized as a defector, Moradi was to fly his Tomcat along a very specific route, at a specific speed and altitude. The Iran-Iraq War was fought under some of the harshest weather conditions ever. Simmering heat often resulted in temperatures exceeding 48°C (120°F) during the summer. Correspondingly, both sides limited their activity from late morning until late afternoon. Next to nobody flew between 1100

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in the morning and 1600 in the afternoon. In the evenings, the Iraqis tended to launch air raids targeting tankers hauling Iranian crude from Khark Island. Thus around 1530 in the afternoon every day, a pair of F-14s launched from Esfahan and flew a combat air patrol near Bushehr. One of the pilots selected to fly the afternoon patrol on 2 September 1986 was Talebi. After two Tomcats aborted prior to takeoff, he took off in a third aircraft, which was armed with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles only. Once airborne, Moradi topped his fuel tanks from a tanker aircraft, and then turned west – in the direction of Iraq. The officer assigned the responsibility to receive Moradi’s defection was Ahmad Sadik. He was present at the ADOC but did not expect the Iranian to defect on 2 September 1986. He recalled the drama that unfolded that afternoon:

Saddam Hussein with pilots from No. 73 Squadron during their forward deployment at Wahda AB in the mid-1980s. In the rear is the MiG-23ML with serial number 5265. Such four-digit serials were in use until 1988, when five-digit serials were introduced instead, and this aircraft became 23265. (via Ali Tobchi)

‘I entered the main hall and took a look at the huge screen in its centre. There I could see the track of an Iranian aircraft moving west from Esfahan, approaching the Iraqi border via Khoramabad, and then turning southwest toward al-Kut. The officer on duty scrambled a pair of MiG-23MLs from al-Bakr AB and the Kari system promptly calculated their interception point near the town of Numanya, well inside Iraq.’

Thus ended the story of an attempted defection by an Iranian F-14 pilot to Iraq. Launched a day earlier than agreed with the Iraqis, it was spoiled when the Tomcat was shot down by two MiG-23MLs – by mistake.

Karbala-5 Shortly after taking a smooth right turn, the two MiG-23MLs from No. 63 Squadron rolled out barely 15 kilometres (8nm) behind the Tomcat, meanwhile underway well inside the Iraqi airspace. The leader of the Iraqi pair then lost his radar to a malfunction: he had no choice but to advise his wingman to take over. The young lieutenant acquired a lock-on and fired a single R-24T. The hefty weapon detonated below the F-14A, setting it on fire, and forcing the crew to eject. Meanwhile, the two MiGs were critically short on fuel. They approached only close enough to identify and report the type of downed aircraft before breaking away. It was only at that point in time that Sadik realised what was going on: the Iraqis just missed a golden opportunity to get a fully intact F-14A Tomcat into their hands. Of course, the Iranian crew was captured and extensively interrogated. Moradi even took a flight manual with him. However, nearly all of the information he provided was already known to the Iraqis. Furthermore, the Tomcat was completely destroyed in the crash, as recalled by Sadik, who inspected the wreckage on the next day: ‘To my great disappointment, the front part of the aircraft was completely destroyed. There was not a single piece of the radar or cockpit to recover. The only weapon we could find was the M61A1 Vulcan cannon. It was completely ruined, badly twisted and burned. The two engines were relatively complete, but both were old and of no intelligence value for us. Eventually, we learned nothing from the wreckage, except that some parts of the airframe wore US serial numbers, and others were of unidentifiable origin.’

At midnight of 8 January 1987, a strike force of 35,000 infantrymen of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) took the Iraqis by surprise, crossed the southern portion of the Fish Lake, and captured the village of Duaiji, less than 15 kilometres (8nm) east of Basra. Thus began the Operation Karbala-5, probably the bloodiest, and certainly the most ferocious battle of the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqis reacted by deploying a mass of reinforcements, and stopped the initial Iranian advance at their second defence line. However, on 19 January, the IRGC launched the second phase of its offensive and breached the third line of Iraqi defences. In reaction, the IrAF was thrown into an all-out attack on the Iranians, often flying up to 400 combat sorties a day. At its own insistence, the IRGC ran the Operation Karbala-5 without much support from the regular Iranian military. Nevertheless, the IRIAF did launch several high-altitude air strikes. One of these was flown on 17 January 1987, and caused a vicious clash with Iraqi interceptors. Underway at an altitude of 10,000 metres (32,808ft), a formation of four F-4Es from TFB.3, escorted by a pair of F-14As, was about to hit the HQ of the Iraqi IV Corps. As usual, the Tomcats scanned the skies in front of them with their powerful AWG-9s, while Phantoms provided protection from Iraqi SAMs with help of their ECM-pods. The IrAF reacted by scrambling multiple interceptors, including two pairs each of MiG-23MLs and Mirage F.1s, and at least one MiG-25PDS. When all of these formations entered the same area, the result was one of biggest missile shootouts of this war, including the firing of at least two AIM-54As, up to four Super 530F-1s, three or four R-24s, and at least one 39

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R-40. The Iranians claimed at least one Mirage as shot down, adding a MiG-23 as a ‘possible’. In return, one of the Iraqi missiles proximity fused under one of the Tomcats involved. Badly damaged, the F-14A made a lazy turn east, the crew struggling to keep it airborne until they were able to eject over the Iranian side of the battlefield. However, once on the ground, both Iranians were murdered by local civilians, who thought they were be Iraqis. The IrAF eventually credited this kill to the MiG-25PDSpilot, Captain Adnan Sae’ed.78 Only six days later, on 23 January 1987, in the course of another attack in similar fashion, the crew of an F-14A claimed an Iraqi MiG-23 as shot down. Although Iranian TV showed the wreckage of the MiG and the body of its pilot, the same evening, the IrAF denied any such losses. The carnage on the battlefield during this period was immense, and IrAF’s MiG-23BN units suffered accordingly. No. 49 Squadron lost one of its fighter-bombers and its pilot – 1st Lieutenant Hassan Fleih al-Qawqaz – to Iranian MIM-23B I-HAWKs early during the battle. On 23 January 1987, 1st Lieutenant Abdul Mohammed Fahd an-Nadawi and Hassan Fleih al-Qawqaz was shot down by another I-HAWK and killed. Four days later, 1st Lieutenant Ali Rahman Gheydan was shot down by ZU-23-2 flak while Captain Yassin Abdul-Rahman Yassin was shot down by a British-made Rapier SAM. Both pilots were killed. Finally, the MiG-23BN flown by 1st Lieutenant Mohammad Jassem atTikriti was hit by flak at an unknown date in early March 1987: he escaped imprisonment by flying his badly damaged aircraft back over Iraqi-controlled territory before ejecting. The fighting during this period was not limited to the battlefields in the vicinity of Basra, nor were the Iraqi interceptors winning every single clash. Emboldened by their freedom of operations, some of their pilots became too bold. On 17 February 1987, a pair of MiG-23MLs from No. 63 squadron was scrambled to intercept a pair of IRIAF F-5Es. The MiGs attacked their targets low over Lake Orumiyeh, but missed on their first pass, and then made a mistake of engaging nimble Tiger IIs in a dogfight. After several turns, the Iraqi wingman was shot down: the leader managed to escape solely by the virtue of MiG-23’s legendary acceleration. When, in the aftermath of Karbala-5, the IRIAF attempted to maintain pressure by additional air strikes on Iraqi ground forces east of Basra, the IrAF hit back in full force. On 13 April 1987, it deployed four squadrons of fighter-bombers – including MiG23BNs from No. 29 Squadron – protected by aircraft for stand-

A MiG-23BN streaking low over Iranian frontlines near Dezful in March 1987. (Farzin Nadimi Collection)

40

A pilot from No. 29 Squadron, with that unit’s new crest, introduced in the mid-1980s. (Pit Weinert Collection)

off jamming, and about a dozen fighter-interceptors for an all-out strike on the TFB.4. While the well-hardened air base survived most of the bombs dropped on it in relatively intact condition, the Iraqis damaged two F-5Es, one DHC L-20B, and two Beech F33 Bonanzas on the ground, destroyed the building of the Fire Department and killed a number of fire-fighters and civilians. Subsequently, the IRIAF felt forced to temporarily evacuate this crucial installation.

Iraqi Aerial Offensive After successfully repelling Operation Karbala-5, the IrAF returned to its strategic campaign of targeting economic centres in western Iran with large formations of aircraft. One of the primary targets became the Iranian railway network, military bases, and storage sites, but the list was soon expanded to include major pipelines connecting oilfields in Khuzestan with the loading terminal at Khark Island. By mid-1987, the involved fighter-bombers were escorted by MiG-23MLs of the No. 93 Squadron – the third and final IrAF unit equipped with the aircraft from the last batch of this variant, and based at al-Bakr AB. Furthermore, No. 59 Squadron was meanwhile reinforced through the acquisition of an additional batch of MiG-23UBs. The IrAF continued delivering heavy blows against the Iranian economy through the rest of 1987 and into 1988. In January and February of that year, its Mirages raided oil installations at Lavan, Khark, the oil tank farm in Genaveh, and the Rey refinery outside Tehran. In March, MiG-23BNs, Su-22s, and Su-25 flew several strikes against targets in the Kermanshah area, causing immense damage. Between 17 March and 4 April 1988, the Mirages raided the oil refinery of Shiraz, and the loading berths at Lavan Island, while the liquid gas and oil storage complex at Mahshahr was heavily hit by repeated air strikes of MiG-23BN, Su-22 and Su25 units. After supporting the liberation of the Faw Peninsula, in April, and then Iraqi counteroffensives in the Howeyzeh Marsh, in May, the IrAF returned to the business of striking the Iranian

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economy in June 1988. By that time, the Iraqis were not only in full swing, but in possession of total air superiority over western Iran. Iraqi fighters roamed all over, striking whatever they could, encountering only sporadic resistance from the battered IRIAF. Nevertheless, a MiG-23ML from No. 93 Squadron, flown by Captain Abbas Jaber Omran al-Mafraji, was lost to unknown cause over the Shahabad area, in western Iran, on 25 July 1988. Three days later, No. 49 Squadron suffered its last loss of the war, when the MiG-23BN flown by Major Mohammed Adham Sayd – a former MiG-23MS pilot – was shot down by an I-HAWK over the Dezful area, and its pilot killed. The last strike deep into Iran was launched on 4 August 1988, when a full squadron of MiG-23BNs bombed the turbinePilots of No. 49 Squadron in front of their unit’s offices, at Abu Ubaida AB outside al-Kut, in the manufacturing works near the Tabge mid-1980s. (via Ali Tobchi) Fani oil-pumping station. The war between Iran and Iraq ended through an UN- variants: alone the number of pilots known to have been killed mediated cease-fire, two weeks later. In almost exactly eight years while flying MiG-23MS and MiG-23MF variants are twice as of fighting, IrAF’s MiG-23 pilots have claimed about 20 aerial high. As subsequent experiences were to show, some Iraqi officers victories. Cross-examination with data from Iranian sources has had doctored their reports for various reasons – especially in the confirmed two against F-14As, at least three against F-4Es, and case of aircraft shot down by own air defences, or written-off due two against F-5Es. In return, and at least according to its own to combat damage after returning to base. In addition to the lack post-war studies, the IrAF lost a total of 38 MiG-23BNs, 3 MiG- of documentation about the exact number of MiG-23s exported 23MS, 1 MiG-23MF, and 1 MiG-23ML.79 Unsurprisingly, all of to Iraq, this is the primary reason for the exact number of IrAF the interviewed Iraqi pilots repeated these figures. However, there MiG-23MS, MiG-23MFs, and MiG-23MLs lost in this war is a big question mark especially over the losses of interceptor remaining unknown to this day.

CHAPTER 5

ULTIMATE TESTS During the late 1980s and early 1990s, advanced variants of the MiG-23 had formed the backbone of fighter-interceptor fleets of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Except in the case of Syria, they were usually flown by an entirely new generation of pilots – and saw some of the most intensive action ever experienced by this type. The period thus proved something like the ultimate test for much of the MiG-23 family.

MiG-23MFs in Libya At the first glance, the LAAF of the mid-1980s was still f lying similar aircraft to those back in 1980-1981. The actual situation was dramatically different. Although Libya did acquire another batch of MiG-23UBs in the early 1980s, the number of remaining MiG-23MS had decreased significantly because of the many accidents with them in the 1970s, and because about a dozen were donated to Syria to replace losses from 1982. Actually, the Libyan MiG-23 f leet underwent a major

transformation. In 1984, No. 1060 Squadron was re-equipped with about 20 MiG-23MFs – all of which were second-hand MiG-23Ms from V VS stocks, overhauled before delivery, and initially lacking compatibility with R-60MK missiles – before re-deploying to al-Bumbah AB, west of Tobruk. One of the pilots to convert to this variant was Ali Thani, who proved not particularly pleased with his new mount: ‘Soviets were full of praise for their new R-23 missile, especially its infra-red homing variant, which was said to possess advanced capabilities of countering infrared decoys. Actually, this weapon proved a big failure and we replaced it as soon as the R-24 arrived, together with MiG-23MLs, in 1985. The R-24 missile was a major improvement in comparison to the R-23. It was much more reliable and had a higher probability of a hit…Our MiG-23MFs were equipped with S-23E radar and TP-23 IRST. The Soviets told us the 41

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Photographs of LAAF MiG-23MFs from the 1980s and 1990s remain as rare as snake’s sweat – which is a pity, because at least half of them arrived in Libya still painted in ‘European’-style camouflage patterns, largely consisting of green colours, and a few had had their radomes painted in white. This row of MiG-23MFs was photographed at Misurata in 2011, and shows examples still wearing their original colours, but also a few overhauled in the mid-2000s. (Pit Weinert Collection)

radar could detect targets out to 60km away, but we could seldom detect American fighters at further than 40-45km. Detection range very much depended on good work of electronics-specialists in our squadron: the S-23E required lots of expert tuning. Some specialists were better, others not, and thus detection ranges often varied from aircraft to aircraft, sometimes by up to 10km. In engagements with Americans, the S-23E proved capable of detecting targets at longer ranges than Cyrano radars of our Mirages, but was also severely vulnerable to electronic countermeasures. Foremost, it proved prone to malfunctions.’80

units: the Mitiga-based No. 1023 Squadron, and the Benina-based No. 1024 Squadron. Interestingly, the former consisted of Libyan pilots that underwent at least their basic training abroad; in contrast, the latter consisted of pilots trained entirely in Libya. Furthermore, all of pilots of those two units – and thus of Libyan MiG-23ML/ MLDs – had undergone tactical training provided in Libya, provided by Libyan instructors. One of them was Abdelmajid Tayari: ‘I graduated form Misurata Air Academy in 1981, as the first in my class. Then I underwent a 10-month course to become a pilot instructor, and served in that function until late 1984. In 1985, I was assigned to No. 1024 Squadron and selected to convert to MiG-23MLs. Our conversion was supported

The MiG-23MLD Farce At least as important was the Libyan acquisition of more advanced MiG-23s, in the period 1984-1985. The story of that sale was characteristic of how the Soviets treated their export customers even at the time that their economy was ever more dependent on income from arms sales. Signed in 1984, the original contract stipulating the order for 48 aircraft emphasised the delivery of the most advanced variant available, the MiG-23MLD. Aware of the possibility of confronting the USA again, the LAAF was very keen to acquire and operate this new version. Correspondingly, a selected group of pilots from diverse units was sent for a conversion course at Lugovaya. After completing the ground course, the Libyans started their flying training. In the course of the same, they saw an even more advanced variant landing at the same air base – and immediately being hidden in the nearest hangar by the Soviet ground personnel. This raised suspicions. During the following night, two of the Libyan pilots managed to sneak inside that hangar and see the aircraft from close-up: it was visibly different to the ‘MiG-23MLD’ about to be delivered to Libya. Informed about this, the CO of the Libyan delegation brought the decision to stop the conversion course and everybody returned to Libya.81 Following the – meanwhile usual – exchange of accusations between Tripoli and Moscow an agreement was found to deliver the first batch in the form of aircraft similar to Syrian MiG-23MLs (Izdeliye-23-12) upgraded to MiG-23MLD standard (Izdeliye23-19B), while the second followed in the form of the ‘MiG23MLD(export)’ (Izdeliye-23-22B). To all of the involved Libyan pilots, there was no difference and they designated both variants as MiG-23MLDs.82 To operate the new variant, the LAAF created two 42

Abdelmajid Tayari (left) with a colleague from No. 1024 Squadron, in front of the MiG-23ML serial number 6112, at Benina AB in 1986. (Tom Cooper Collection)

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by one or two Soviet pilots and engineers assigned to each of our units. However, contrary to our Mirage-pilots, who were all trained by the Pakistanis, I underwent conversion training and tactical training on the MiG-23 under the tutelage of two Libyan MiG-23 pilots, who were also graduates from Misurata: Captain Monsef Shabaan and Captain Hadi Shawish. Conducted within every one of our squadrons, our tactical training was based upon or at least similar to Western tactical programs.’83

This ‘new generation’ of Libyan pilots was soon to see action under near-war circumstances – and then against the US Navy.

Attain Document II Following a series of terrorist attacks on US and Israeli citizens and interests in Europe and the Middle East, in 1985, the USA launched preparations for a war with Libya. Through January 1986, the US Navy concentrated a large task force in the central Mediterranean within the frame of Operation Attain Document I. Initially having only the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV-60) available, the Americans were reluctant to launch an all-out attack: instead, they tested reaction times of the Libyan air defences. Following a break of several weeks, the US Navy returned to the waters off Libya on 12 February 1986, to run Operation Attain Document II. This four-day exercise was to see the American aircraft approaching close to, but not penetrating the Libyan-claimed airspace: US Navy commanders wanted to expose their pilots to ‘genuine’ MiGs, to ‘enemy equipment’ they had been studying for years, and to practice operating against these. Like in 1981, F-14A Tomcats from VF-74 and VF-102 – both embarked on board the USS Saratoga – were usually armed with AIM-7 Sparrows and AIM-9 Sidewinders, in addition to their internal 20mm cannons. They acted as primary interceptors. Furthermore, the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) arrived off Libya carrying four squadrons of brandnew McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A Hornets. These multi-role fighters were armed with AIM-7 Sparrows, AIM-9 Sidewinders, and a 20mm cannon too: while smaller and slower than F-14As, they proved much more manoeuvrable. Both types were always

A group of Syrian pilots was still serving in Libya as of 1986, and flying MiG-23MS from Benina AB, including this example – serial number 8705. (via Pit Weinert)

supported by Grumman E-2C Hawkeye: these AEW aircraft excelled at picking-up LAAF fighters almost as soon as these became airborne, and providing F-14 and F/A-18A crews with superior situational awareness. Actually, different LAAF units had different specialisations. For example, pilots from No. 1023 Squadron (and those trained on Mirages), almost exclusively trained air combat by day; those of No. 1024 Squadron were additionally trained in operating by night and in adverse weather too. In contrast, the MiG-23MF equipped No. 1060 Squadron still consisted of pilots trained abroad – and were experiencing their own problems, despite showing significant signs of improvement, as recalled by Abdoul Hassan: ‘It was the same as in 1981. We would receive the order to look for one target, flew there – and found nothing. Then two F-14s would appear behind us. Although Soviets told us the MiG-23 could outturn the F-14 at [a] certain speed, this proved impossible. We could not outmanoeuvre them and decided to return to our base … We depended on the GCI, but our ground controllers were not good. With most of [the] engagements taking place well away from our coast, our GCI always needed 10-15 seconds to react to every American move. At a speed of 500knots, we were travelling over 50km in less than three minutes, approaching our American opponents at a combined speed in excess of Mach 1.5 – all the time distancing ever further away from our ground radars. This meant that the reaction time of our GCI was getting ever longer the more the distance to [the] Americans decreased. Nearly always the GCI ordered us to activate our radars much too late, when we were less than 10km from [the] Americans. By that time, Tomcats were already manoeuvring around us, achieving positions of advantage. In another case I was scrambled to intercept two American aircraft operating inside our airspace. As I was approaching my target, I passed two MiG-23s that were returning from a similar mission and their leader informed me about [the] presence of two Tomcats. [A] minute later I briefly saw the Americans and manoeuvred to intercept but it was an ambush: two others appeared behind me.’84

At least one of the Syrians flying MiG-23MS in Libya of February 1986, claims to have obtained a favourable position behind an F-14A of the USN: while the identity of the aircraft in the crosshairs cannot be definitely confirmed, provided it was authentic, this photograph would indicate significant improvement in the efficiency of even older variants of Libyan MiG-23s of the time. (via Pit Weinert)

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Another former Libyan MiG-23 pilot recalled the results of a similar effort in which he had got involved: ‘We attempted to lure Tomcats south of the Line of Death, to surprise them and establish numerical superiority in the engagement zone. Our aim was to deploy six widely separated MiG-23s to isolate a pair of Tomcats underway inside Libyan airspace. It didn’t work: the Americans deployed strong jamming, our GCI got confused, and our fuel reserves proved insufficient.’85

Abdel-Majid Tayari confirmed the massive volume of electronic countermeasures deployed by the USN during these days as follows: ‘A pair of MiG-23MLDs was scrambled. I was on cockpitstandby, and listening to all the radio traffic. The controller was guiding them to the target, but it was a false target: the formation leader found nothing. When controller criticised the pilot, the leader proposed the controller to guide him to collide with the target. The controller did so – and nothing happened.’

The Best Dogfight Ever Equipped with MiG-23MLs, the Mitiga-based No. 1023 was more successful in its first encounter with the Americans, as recalled by Abdelmajid Tayari: ‘During the afternoon of 12 February 1986, three MiG23MLDs from No. 1023 Squadron had engaged a pair of F/A-18 Hornets over the international waters, north-east of Tripoli. They clearly outflew the Americans and ended in advantageous position, at their “6 o’clock”. Hornets were forced to disengage and run away. After that we were all excited about our new mounts and looking forward for further engagements.’

Tayari received the opportunity to prove his skills on the following morning – when he exploited new capabilities of his mount to its fullest: On 13 February 1986, I was scrambled as leader of a pair of MiG-23MLDs to intercept a pair of F-14s underway about 170 kilometres [92nm] north-west of Benina. Each of our aircraft was armed with one R-24R, one R-24T, four R-60MKs and a full load of ammunition for 23mm cannon. Prior to take-off, I was briefed to expect four Tomcats: two at medium altitude, and clearly visible on our radar, and two at low altitude, invisible to our radars, and waiting to sandwich us. The GCI vectored us to intercept the pair flying at medium altitude, and we approached head-on. My wingman and me were underway at an altitude of 3,000 meters [9,842ft]: Tomcats were slightly higher, at 4,000 metres [13123ft]. I obtained a radar contact from about 45 kilometres range [29nm] and requested a clearance to engage. The GCI took some time to react, but then cleared me when I 44

was having a visual contact – at a range of about 25 kilometres [13.5nm]. At the moment, the bogies stopped closing in: I maintained radar contact with them, and had my R-24R missiles ready to fire, they were almost within the range of my R-24R, but they turned away. Suddenly, the GCI shouted on the radio: “Two bogies at your 6 o’clock!” I turned my head around to check, and surely enough: two F-14s were zooming up, some 1.5-2 kilometres (0.8-1nm) behind us. I ordered my Number 2 into a full afterburner, and broke hard left. My speed was still high as I turned left, nose down, 800-900 km/h [431-495kts], pulling 5-6gs towards the target, intending to force them into failing to track at my 6 o’clock. My reverse maneuver was so hard that my Number 2 overshot, while I reduced the distance between the F-14s behind me to nil. No doubt, the Americans were surprised: they didn’t expect that hard a manoeuvre, and were not ready for my reaction. By the time they woke up, they lost their advantage while my Number 2 turned back and placed himself in an advantageous position behind the Tomcats and me. But, they were highly qualified: they knew what to do. As I continued turning hard towards the two Tomcats, my eyes focused at their rears until I’ve got what I wanted! I noticed the Tomcats shifting outwards, and then I rolled out, pulled my nose hard up, pulling 7gs, with throttle on idle. I executed a high-g barrel roll, during which my speed decreased very fast, down to 350 km/h [189kts]. Then I pushed my throttle to full dry power while my aircraft went through the vertical and pointed at the Tomcats while still inverted. Both Tomcat crews were fantastic: they followed the manoeuvre and we met at the top, within 30 metres (30 yards/98ft) of each other, much too close for comfort! I discontinued the barrel roll and went for scissor manoeuvre (or ‘low speed yo-yo’): I knew I had the advantage because of MiG-23MLD’s better performance in this position. Thus we began the scissor turns towards each other, at very low speed: this was below 300km/h [160kts], still full dry power, maximum angle of attack. The ‘stick-shaker’ in my stick began to operate, informing me that my aircraft was at the edge of a stall and spin. I was between two F-14s, only two metres lower, almost line abreast. Our position was equal, except that my Number 2 was behind and above all of us, in a good position to hit the Americans if that would be necessary. Only our controller was screaming on the radio, ordering us to disengage and turn back to base. I replied, “not yet… not at this stage!” The F-14 pilots were certainly surprised by the low speed handling and high angle of attack of my MiG-23MLD. And, certainly enough, my speed was meanwhile down to 230 km/h [124kts]! Mind, according to the flight manual, the minimal manoeuvring speed for MiG-23MLD with wing position 45 is 450km/h [242kts]! During the second scissor, I noticed that the lead F-14 attempted to engage afterburners. That was a very dangerous undertaking at that speed and attitude: a big white balloon went out of one of his engine nozzles, meaning there was more fuel than air in his combustion chamber. That was a good sign for me: he was facing the risk of an engine surge just to get few extra knots of speed.

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Now it was the question of one of us forcing the opponent to put his nose down first. At that point in time, I knew the MiG-23MLD had two advantages over the F-14: it is lighter, which means it has less inertia, and its thrust-to-weight ratio is higher. Thus, I continued through the third, and then the fourth scissors. The situation remained very critical: it was really a risky challenge between five men in three aircraft, and until now I have special respect for these F-14-pilots. After the fourth scissor, I got what I want: the Tomcats couldn’t maintain their position any more and decided to put their noses down. I was as happy as I was never before – but my happiness didn’t last for long. They both made an incredible manoeuvre, which remains in my memory until this very day. Imagine, they put the nose down, right bank with full rudder at very low speed, then turned almost in place, head-on towards me, barely 100 metres [109 yards] away and below my aircraft! I did not take the risk of flying the same manoeuvre, but followed them nevertheless: I pushed my aircraft hard down, picked some speed, then smoothly banked right, and checked my fuel indicator for the first time since start of this engagement. My fuel was down to 1700 litres, which at this distance from Benina was too little. I was in serious trouble now. While still diving, I saw two other F-14s closing at very high speed, coming to support their other pair. They passed about 50 metres below my nose. I called my wingman to rejoin, levelled my aircraft, put the wings into 16 degrees position and turned in direction of my base while maintaining the best cruise speed to extend my range. The Tomcats took the advantage to fly behind me at some distance. Then they turned back before we entered Libyan airspace again. I’ve just had the best dogfight of my life!

Almost simultaneously, LAAF MiG-23s on temporary deployment at Tanoua AB in southern Libya had had their piece of the action. Precise details of what exactly happened at some point – apparently in February 1986 – remain evasive. However, there is circumstantial evidence that one of the Libyan MiG-23 pilots underway over northern Chad in February 1986, had successfully intercepted and shot down an unknown type of a light transport aircraft. The latter was operated by a group of foreign mercenaries recruited by the French General Directorate for External Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, DGSE). Armed with weapons the DGSE purchased from Poland, the mercenaries were involved in leading the attack of the Chadian government forces on Oum Chalouba, on 13 and 14 February 1986. They not only suffered heavy losses during the fighting on the ground, but also lost a French pilot, whose aircraft was shot down by the Libyans. Should the reports in question ever be confirmed, this would represent a confirmation for the sole air-to-air victory ever scored by the Libyan Arab Air Force, and the only one for its MiG-23s.86

The Night of the Boats The excitement about Operation Attain Document II and developments in Chad of February 1986 barely cooled down,

This photograph was taken clandestinely from the cockpit of a transport aircraft that landed at Mitiga AB, in early 1986 and shows one of first Libyan MiG-23MLs seen by Westerners. (Albert Grandolini Collection)

Another photograph taken at the same opportunity shows this MiG23ML, obviously painted in standard camouflage pattern applied on nearly all MiG-23s exported to the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. (Albert Grandolini Collection)

when the US Navy returned to the coast of Libya for the Operation Attain Document III – this time with the intention of not only operating its aircraft, but also its warships within the airspace and the waters of the Gulf of Syrte claimed by the Libyans. Furthermore, the planning for Operation Attain Document III included several contingency plans for the case of an ‘aggressive’ Libyan response. One of these, Operation Prairie Fire, envisaged attacks at limited scale against Libyan air defences and warships of the Libyan navy. Correspondingly, the US Navy concentrated no less than three aircraft carriers off Libya: in addition to USS Coral Sea and USS Saratoga, it added the USS America (CV-66). These had a total of 48 F-14A Tomcats and 48 F/A-18 Hornets, supported by 12 E-2C Hawkeye AEW-aircraft and 12 Grumman EA-6B Prowler aircraft for electronic countermeasures embarked. Initiated on 24 March 1986, the Operation Attain Document III promptly provoked an ‘aggressive’ Libyan response: when several F-14As entered the airspace over the Gulf of Syrte, the LAAF scrambled MiG-25s with the order for these to shoot down the Americans. Not aware of Libyan intentions, but guided by E-2Cs, US Navy Tomcats outmanoeuvred the big Foxbats early during this engagement, never offering them the opportunity to open fire. Both MiGs reacted by hard turns, trying to shake off their opponents. Eventually, the leader of the F-14A pair requested permission to open fire. This arrived much too late: by the time, both Foxbats were on the way back to their base. Nevertheless, shortly after, the Libyan S-200 (ASCC-code SA-5 Gammon) 45

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Map 5  Major MiG-23 related bases in (northern) Libya of the late 1980s. (Map by Tom Cooper)

SAM-site near Syrte fired three V-880E missiles at Tomcats underway over the Gulf of Syrte. US Navy pilots evaded quite easily. The Americans had now got the provocation they desired, and prepared a corresponding response. Assuming that the LAAF was never active by night, they decided to operate only after the sunset. During the following night – which became known as ‘The Night of the Boats’ within circles of US Navy pilots – they twice attacked the 5N62V (ASCC code Square Pair) radar of the SA-5 SAM-site at Syrte, and then sunk two and badly damaged at least one fast missile craft of the Libyan Navy.87 Curiously, all the known US reports about this action stress that there was absolutely no activity by LAAF interceptors during the night from 24 to 25 March 1986. Indeed, reports surfaced along which the Libyan commanders have grounded their air force, out of fear this would be defeated by the USN. Ali Thani commented with some bitterness: ‘Our top commanders were all trained in the USA and France. The Americans and the French have taught them the spirit of defeatism: they taught them that we could neither fight, nor win. That Libyan staff then served as heads of our air force: they were the decision makers. As of 1985-1986, the head of Libyan air defences was General Arrefi, who came from the army. His only aviation-related experience was that of flying a Cessna in the Sebha Aviation Club. Chief-of-Staff of the LAAF, and thus commander of the air force, was General Sallah al-Furjani, a former transport pilot. Like all our previous commanders and all of their staff, he was convinced that all the Soviet equipment was rubbish. He never tried to study our Soviet-made equipment and thus had no idea how to use it in combat: instead, he remained struck at the level of F-5As and Mirage 5s, which were all a full generation behind. Foremost, he was a defeatist: he did not dare challenging the Americans, and expected them to defeat us easily. Because of this, we were held back when we should have fought, we often received controversial orders, and our superior commanders generally behaved unpredictably. I’m sorry to say that for my superiors, I’m bleeding inside, but they were defeatists that didn’t trust us.’88 46

Abdelmajid Tayari’s commentary was slightly different: ‘Our commanders have concluded that we must minimise our losses as much as we could. That’s the tactics they applied – in 1986, and again in 2011.’

When asked if he had ever heard that some of the USN’s pilots were calling the tower of Benina AB challenging the LAAF to scramble and engage in combat, he replied: ‘… I have never heard of such a call, but make no mistake: if we would have ever received it, there would have been a big fight between Libyan pilots to go – and I would have been the first to scramble.’

El Dorado Canyon: Air Strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi Following apparent success of Attain Document III and Prairie Fire, the US Navy withdrew its aircraft carriers away from Libya. The USS Saratoga, for example, had ended her scheduled, sixmonth cruise and returned back to the USA. However, only a few weeks later, a discotheque in West Berlin frequented by US military personnel was hit by a terrorist attack, and two US servicemen killed. This time, British and US intelligence services followed a trail that led straight to Tripoli, and Washington took the decision to retaliate in the form of air strikes on selected targets in Libya: those in the Tripoli area were to be hit by General Dynamics F-111F fighter-bombers launched from US bases in Great Britain, while those in the Benghazi area were to be hit by fighter-bombers from aircraft carriers USS America and USS Coral Sea.89 The Operation El Dorado Canyon was initiated late in the afternoon of 14 April 1986, and resulted in the involved aircraft reaching their targets around 0200 hrs in the morning of 15 April. As during Operations Attain Document II and Prairie Fire, the Americans subsequently reported that the LAAF did not fly that night. Actually, and although Major-General al-Furjani had ordered an evacuation of most of the training and transport aircraft to bases away from the coast, during the days prior to the US

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

attack, interceptor units like No. 1024 Squadron were still at their bases and ready. Moreover, they were active that night. Abdelmajid Tayari summarised his experiences as follows: ‘Four of us flew a combat air patrol north of Benina that night. My pair landed at 0100 hrs. The other pair landed at 0130 hrs. Our four MiG-23MLDs were then refuelled, and the other eight took over. Four were parked at the holding point of the Runway 33, the other four at the holding point of the Runway 15, all at Readiness State 1: this meant pilots were in their cockpits. My duty ended, and – as a married pilot – I had the permission to go home (only three or four of us in the entire squadron were married). At 0155, all of the pilots on cockpit readiness were suddenly ordered to exit their aircraft and take cover! They were not ordered to scramble, but to abandon their aircraft where these were parked. Some of the pilots were reluctant to do so, and did not complete leaving the aircraft by the time when the US attack on Benina had begun, precisely at 0200 hrs. Then the US Navy strike came: they used cluster bombs. They spread bomblets all over Benina AB: taxiway, parking area, all was full of unexploded bomblets. Our movement was very restricted for the rest of that night, and it took most of the following day to remove bomblets, majority of which failed to explode. We were expecting the US attack and my wife was ready to move together with our children – we had two boys and a daughter at the time – from our home to a safe place. While she was getting kids out of their beds, I run out to the roof and saw two A-7 Corsairs using their cannons to shoot the guards-hut at the entry gate. They killed the poor guard there. I have no clue why. Curiously, the US intelligence must have been based on the information from the 1970s. They did not know about our aircraft parked at the holding points: these were never attacked. They also did not know about our squadron building: they bombed the old building, abandoned years before. However, they did hit the two of four aircraft that were still refuelled on the main apron, and caused some injuries to our ground crews. The day after, I was the first to fly, leading a pair to a CAPstation to the east of Benina, over the coast.’

its lower-ranking officers learned not only to deploy their MiG23ML/MLDs effectively, but indeed kept them in high esteem. On the contrary, this variant earned itself immense popularity within the Libyan air force. This reached such proportions that when the Soviets offered MiG-29s, the LAAF turned this offer down: the Libyans assessed the radar and weapons system of the new fighter as very similar to that of the MiG-23MLD and offering no significant advantages. Furthermore, the MiG-29 was a gas-guzzler with two very smoky engines when accelerated to maximum dry power. Finally, its price was assessed as much too high.91 During 1987, MiG-23MLDs from No. 1023 were repeatedly deployed to as-Sara (better known in the West as ‘Ma’arten asSahra’) and Tanoua air bases in southern Libya, for operations over Chad. Abdelmajid Tayari summarised his experiences from his three-weeks-long tour of duty there as follows: ‘We were flying intercepts and reconnaissance. We expected air strikes on our air base, but these never came. When Wadi Doum was overrun, in April 1987, I flew escort for Il-76 transports that acted as airborne command posts for our attacks on that base. They were guiding and controlling all operations over that area. We flew at an altitude of 6,000 to 8,000 metres and navigated with help of the new system, RSBN. This was similar to the TACAN. Our air strikes were very intensive, lasting from early morning until the sunset.’

The LAAF remained very active over northern Chad for most of the second half of 1987, flying reconnaissance and air strikes at Zouar, Bardai, Gouro, Yebbi Bou, Zoumri and even Abéche, south of the 16th Parallel. In other cases, it attacked FANT units in the Aouzou area. Colonel Ali Thani, by then a seasoned veteran with several tours of duty in Chad, recalled his last mission flown on a MiG-23BN, on 8 October 1987: ‘A Su-22 flown by Captain Dia ad-Din was shot down by a MANPAD in the Aouzou area and I flew top cover for the Mi-8 underway to recover him. I found ad-Din’s crash site and flew an orbit overhead, but then my aircraft was hit too. I ejected and was recovered by the Mi-8; ad-Din was captured by Chadian troops.’

While making bombastic public announcements about a successful defence against the US strike, the word is that Qaddhafi had punished the LAAF by delaying the promotion of all officers by one year. Actually, such an order has already been issued in 1985, and because of an overflight by an SR-71 - it remains unclear if it was Qaddhafi who has issued it. Moreover, No. 1024 Squadron was disbanded, and its aircraft, pilots and ground personnel distributed between No. 1023 and No. 1060 Squadrons: one of the reasons was that the better-trained pilots of that unit, fullyqualified to operate by night, were necessary to bolster the defences of Tripoli. The squadron thus fell victim to its own success.90

From the Desert to the Mediterranean Sea Despite negative experiences from 15 April 1986, the LAAF subsequently remained faithful to the MiG-23. The reason was that

Unknown Libyan pilot with a MiG-23BN at Benina AB in the late 1980s. Libyan fighter-bombers continued flying combat operations over Chad until the end of that conflict in 1988. (Pit Weinert Collection)

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Final Clash: Air Battle of the Bay of Bumbah By 1988, Chadian forces, supported by US and French special forces, pushed the Libyans out of northern Chad, and then secured the Aouzou strip too, eventually forcing Qaddhafi to accept a cease-fire. With this, the LAAF re-directed its intention in the northern direction once again. Towards the end of that year, a crisis erupted over Libya’s project for development of weapons of mass destruction, and construction of related factories for chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. This affair was about to culminate when – apparently out of nothing – a pair of Libyan Floggers challenged a pair of F-14s on 4 January 1989. At 1150 local time, two MiG-23MFs of No. 1050 Squadron, flown by Captain Sa’ad al-Kreymi and 1st Lieutenant Jamal Founas, launched from al-Bumbah AB. The MiGs initially moved north-east, then east, but then turned north – in the direction of two F-14A Tomcats from VF-32 squadron of the US Navy, embarked on board USS John F Kennedy (CV-67), which was underway in the waters near Crete. The USN fighters turned south-west, away from the Libyans, but the latter then reacted with a sharp, 90 degrees turn in a northerly direction, thus initiating an engagement. Unknown to the LAAF, the USN had meanwhile introduced an entirely new set of Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for situations like those off the coast of Libya. Based on their experiences from March 1986 and the fact that the LAAF had meanwhile been equipped with advanced variants of MiG-23s and MiG25, the Americans granted permission for their pilots to consider themselves threatened by Libyans even if these did not open fire, but were approaching in a ‘threatening fashion’. Between April 1986 and January 1989, nothing of this kind happened: the Libyans meanwhile introduced the practice of turning away from USN F-14s as soon as these would ‘paint’ them with their radars. This time, it was different. After the two Libyan MiG-23MFs turned north, they accelerated from 796 to 833km/h (430 to 450 knots) and climbed to 2,743m (9,000ft), before turning north-west on a new collision-course with the two F-14s. Trying to determine what was going to happen next, the Tomcats turned back south and then south-east, but the Libyans followed each time. As the two formations approached to 56km (35 miles) apart – with the Tomcats meanwhile heading almost directly south and the Libyans directly north, approaching at a combined speed of over 1,852km/h (1,000 knots) – the E-2C Hawkeye that controlled the operations of the two Tomcats, called the F-14 crews to advise them that Libyan intentions were probably hostile and they were free to open fire in self defence even before the MiGs did so. Estimating that the Libyans were armed with Soviet-made R-23 or R-24 medium range air-to-air missiles with an effective range of about 19 kilometres (12 miles), the two F-14A crews decided to arm their missiles at a range of about 32 kilometres (20 miles). They also began to gradually descend in order to make themselves more difficult targets for the less sophisticated radars of LAAF MiG-23s. After trying to turn away from the Libyans for the fifth time, and with the range down to 19km, the two Tomcat crews decided to engage. The lead F-14A fired one AIM-7 at the lead MiG, followed by another a few seconds later launched from a range of 16km (10 miles). Both Sparrows appeared to guide at first and streaked towards their target, but as the LAAF pair turned 48

slightly left – in a north-westerly direction – both lost the lock-on and missed. The two F-14s then split, one turning hard right the other hard left, forcing the Libyans to concentrate on one of them: both MiGs turned into the USN wingman, prompting him to reverse his turn and bank left towards his opponents, now about 9.6km (6 miles) away. Not waiting any longer, the F-14A crew then fired its first Sparrow, head on, and the missile raced straight for its target, impacting one of the MiG’s intakes and causing it to explode in a huge fireball. The lead Tomcat meanwhile approached the Libyan wingman from behind. Trying to target it with a Sidewinder, its pilot could not get a good tone alert: after a few frantic seconds, he sorted out the problem with his switches, got a very strong tone and pulled the trigger. The Sidewinder hit the top side of the MiG, causing the pilot to eject. As they descended to the safety of a low altitude, both Tomcats distanced towards north, without waiting for two additional Libyan MiG23s that had meanwhile been scrambled from al-Bumbah AB. Exactly why the two MiGs of No. 1050 Squadron were scrambled and then vectored into a clash with the two F-14As in this fashion remains unclear to this day – and this not only to the Americans, but to all of the interviewed Libyan pilots, too! Certainly enough, Qaddhafi had left his ambassador to the UN accuse the USA of a ‘premeditated attack’ on ‘two unarmed ‘reconnaissance’ aircraft, and the furore over the shootingdown of the two MiGs then overshadowed the affair related to the Libyan chemical weapons. Certainly enough, Qaddhafi was lying: Kreymi’s and Founas’ MiG-23MFs were fully armed. Each carried a pair of R-24 and a pair of R-60 missiles, and the full load of ammunition for their internal 23mm cannon. However, according to official results of the LAAF’s investigation in this case, they were never supposed to fly towards the USN’s fighters. Indeed, the ground controller responsible for this flight subsequently stated that he had ordered the two MiGs away from US Navy’s fighters – and although it is clear that he must have continued re-directing them to a new intercept course each time the F-14s turned away.92 Finally, according to recollections of the involved Tomcatpilots of the USN, both Libyans ejected: their parachutes were last sighted while descending towards the sea. Indeed, according

A still from the video captured by the leader of the USN’s formation on 4 January 1989, showing the MiG-23MF flown by 1st Lieutenant Jamal Founas, seconds before it was shot down by a single Sidewinder. (USN)

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The exact appearance and serials of the two LAAF MiG-23MFs shot down by USN Tomcats on 4 January 1989 remain unknown. This MiG-23MS – serial 9075 – was discovered inside one of the hardened aircraft shelters of al-Bumbah AB in February 2011. Its presence is indicative of the No. 1050 Squadron retaining a few of the older aircraft – at least until its disbandment in 1996. (Pit Weinert Collection)

to the official statements from Washington, the Libyans subsequently failed to launch a search-and-rescue (SAR) operation for their recovery. However, according to the official version provided to all of the LAAF, the air force very much launched a SAR operation: the involved helicopters should then have been constantly harassed by fighters of the US Navy, until their crews abandoned the efforts to recover the downed pilots. Whichever way one turns it, both sides are responsible for letting Captain Sa’ad al-Kreymi and 1st Lieutenant Jamal Founas to drown in the Mediterranean Sea. The only positive aspect of this clash was that it was the final armed action in the undeclared war between USA and Libya for a while: over the next 22 years, all further disputes were negotiated by means of diplomacy and the international courts.

Algerians coming of Age During the early 1980s, the Algerian work on building up an IADS finally picked up some pace. New SAM-systems, acquired in 1979, were combined with early warning radars – including a number of Soviet-made P-18s and P-19s. In 1981, the resulting system came under the control of what was initially known as the Défense Aérienne du Territoire (Territorial Air Defence, DDAT), and was initially a service subordinated to the air force. Correspondingly,

The oldest known photograph of Algerian MiG-23MFs shows three examples (serials FP-43, FP-82 and FP-83) during a military parade in Algiers on 1 November 1984. (Tom Cooper Collection)

when 16 MiG-23MFs arrived in Algeria, in 1982, they entered service with the Ouragla-based 14th Squadron of the QJJ. Nevertheless, as the DDAT launched the work on constructing a fully integrated and automated network of early warning radars (locally designated the ‘Couverture radar automatisée’, CRA) – designed to provide timely warning and then support operations of QJJ’s interceptors and the army’s air defences – this unit was more closely cooperating with the air defence branch than with the air force. Under such circumstances, and supported by the DDAT, the 14th Squadron had found it easy to regularly re-deploy its MiG-23MFs to as distant air bases as those of Annaba, Oran, Tindouf and Bechar. In the period 1986-1988, the DDAT was further expanded and re-organised as the Commandement de la Défense Aérienne du Territoire (CFDAT). Still commanded by Major-General Laoudi Achour (who remained in charge until 2005), the CFDAT was officially established as an entirely independent branch of the

A poor but highly interesting view at the starboard side of the MiG23MF coded FP-11. It’s notable that not only the standard camouflage pattern, but also the application of the code on the top side of the starboard wing, and armament consisting of R-23R, and two R-60s installed on the APU-60-2 launch rail. (Ahmed N via Karim S)

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Algerian armed forces in 1988. While responsible for the control of all Algerian airspace, ever since it became independent from the air force and mobile air defence units of the Army, it assumed responsibility only for the defence of three strategically important installations.93 The attrition of the Algerian MiG-23MF fleet was minimal; fatal accidents rather rare. Nevertheless, one of the few losses that occurred in the 1980s remains mysterious. In 1985, a MiG23MF took off from Ouragla for a routine training flight – and disappeared. The entire search for the missing aircraft and its pilot remained unsuccessful. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in various rumours about its whereabouts: one version is that the pilot defected to Libya, another that he became a mercenary and flew its MiG somewhere else.94

Anticipating ‘Them’ Despite traditional tensions with Morocco – often related to the ongoing war in Western Sahara – the Algerian air force was never directly involved in the latter conflict. On the contrary, by the time its MiG-23MFs became operational, the government in Algiers began distancing itself from the insurgency in Western Sahara, although it still let it operate from bases on its soil. Thus, the closest the Algerian MiG-23MFs ever came to an airto-air action was during an affair in 1988. Three years earlier, the Israeli air force flew its famous long-range air strike on the PLO headquarters in Hammam Chott, outside the city of Tunis, killing about 70. To say that the Tunisians were furious about the Israeli attack would be an understatement. ‘Radhouen’, retired officer of the Tunisian armed forces takes over the story: ‘Because some did not know about the possibility to refuel in the air, they suggested the Israelis flew this attack from an aircraft carrier of the US Navy. Such fantasies quickly ruined our relations with the USA. At the time of the Israeli attack in 1985, we had only one civilian radar – and this was out of service. Mad about the USA, our air force considered the possibility of buying a Soviet air defence system. We sent a delegation to Algeria to study their equipment. The Algerians offered us to deploy one of their SA-3 SAM-sites to Tunis, on temporary basis. However, when they informed us about the limited capabilities of this system, we cancelled the idea.’95

‘Everybody was 100-percent sure, “they” [the Israelis; author’s note] would come to attack again! Therefore, we deployed one of our SA-6 sites nearby, and established a no-fly zone within circle of 20 kilometres around Club des Pins. A pair of MiG25s was flying a combat air patrol at high altitude, and a pair of MiG-21s or MiG-23s did so at medium altitude – every time top Palestinian representatives were meeting. Additional interceptors were on standing alert at their bases.’96

As expected, ‘they’ came. On 10 November 1988, Algerian earlywarning radars picked up a formation of suspect radar contacts approaching from the east: ‘One of our radars detected a number of contacts approaching from the east at medium level. Immediately, a pair each of MiG-23s and MiG-25s was scrambled to reinforce four MiGs that were already on CAP over Club des Pins. We did not vector them to intercept – the Israelis were still much too far away. Instead, pilots were advised to climb and take a position in front of incoming aircraft. Due to our activity, the Tunisians went on alert, too, and our radars then picked up two groups of aircraft – at the time and place there was no commercial or other military activity announced or expected.’

The tension in the skies and on the ground began to rise. Over the following minutes, additional Algerian and Tunisian radar stations turned on and began tracking the incoming formation: ‘It is only a guess, but I think they detected all this electromagnetic activity. They followed a radial course for a while, then turned back east. They were not afraid of us, or the Algerians. But, for their raid to succeed, they wanted to hit the PLO while suffering zero losses. When it became uncertain if they could manage such a feat, they decided to cancel their attack.’

Eventually, the Tunisian anger cooled down before any SAMs were acquired from Moscow. However, when the PLO decided to hold its next congress, Tunisia was clearly out of question: ‘Initially, the PLO wanted to hold its congress in Baghdad. The war with Iran was over and thus Iraq was considered safe enough. However, the Palestinians received a warning that Israel would attack, no matter where the congress took place. Therefore, they picked Algiers. This was considered outside the range.’

The Algerians went to great extents to protect the site of the congress, held at the Club des Pins Hotel, around 20 kilometres (10.8nm) west of Algiers, on the Mediterranean coast, as one of them recalled: 50

MiG-23MF serial FP-85 returning from a training sortie and streaming its braking parachute. It’s notable that the – relatively unusual – installation of the R-23R on the starboard underwing pylon. (Tom Cooper Collection)

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A beautiful study of the 14th Squadron’s MiG-23MF – serial FP-85 – rolling for take-off. Note the application of the ‘last four’ from its construction number (0107 in this case) on the centre of the fin, and armament – including R-23R and R-60 missiles. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Iraqi Modifications During the two years of peace that followed the end of the IranIraq War, in August 1988, the IrAF introduced a few upgrades to its MiG-23fleet. The first was visual in nature and related to the change of the serialling system from that based on application of serials in order of delivery of single airframes, to a five-digit system based on their type and variant. Essentially the same as that in use with the former Yugoslav air force, this system resulted in MiG-23UBs being re-serialled in the range 230xx; MiG23MS’ and MiG-23MFs in the range 231xx, and MiG-23MLs in the range 232xx. Meanwhile, different companies from the Iraqi defence sector had embarked on projects related to upgrading MiG-23MLs. The principal among these was aiming to address that variant’s significant weakness in regards of self-protection systems for electronic counter measures. Following successful deployment of the French-made Remora ECM-pod on Iraqi Mirages since 1986, the Iraqis decided to adapt the same pod on their MiG-23s. This application proved relatively simple because this pod came together with a pylon containing the necessary power-supply and cooling/heating systems: the principal modification thus required the addition of the necessary wiring and a control panel inside the cockpit. After a slight re-design of the pylon, Remoras were installed instead of the port underfuselage hardpoint for R-60 missiles on a handful of MiG-23MLs from No. 73 Squadron – including the example with serial number 23298. Another successful upgrade included the installation of the SPO-15 Beryoza RWRs and ASO-2 chaff and flare dispensers (as installed on Su-22M-4s) on numerous MiG-23MLs from No. 73 and No. 93 Squadrons. Less successful was the attempt to adapt MiG-23MLs for carriage of the famous French-made AM.39 Exocet anti-ship missiles: although the aircraft with serial number 23252 (from No. 73 Squadron) was modified to carry the hefty launch rail and the missile under the centreline, the installation of the unique powersupply for this weapon proved much too complex and this project was eventually abandoned. Finally, a few MiG-23BNs of No. 49 Squadron (known are serials 23163 and 23173) were modified through the addition of French-made in-flight refuelling probes

on the right side of the upper front fuselage, and the necessary plumbing. Currently, it remains unknown how far the related flight-testing went.

Sadly, only videos are available of various modifications applied on diverse Iraqi MiG-23MLs in the period 1988-1989. This still shows the MiG-23ML with serial number 23298, which was one of the aircraft modified to carry the French-made Remora ECM-pod. The front part of the latter is visible behind the R-60 missile and the drop tank. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Port-view of the MiG-23ML serial number 23298, showing the R-24 missile (foreground, top), and – in the lower left corner – the rear part of the Remora pod and its pylon. (Tom Cooper Collection)

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This still from a video is showing the AM.39 Exocet (and its big launch rail), as installed on MiG-23ML with serial number 23252. This adaptation proved unviable, primarily because the Exocet requires a very unusual power-supply system for powering-up prior to being fired, and this turned out much too cumbersome for installation into the MiG. (Tom Cooper Collection)

A close-up view of the AM.39-installation instead of the centreline pylon on the MiG-23ML with serial number 23252. (Tom Cooper Collection)

The Kuwait Business On 2 August 1990, following months-long tensions and fruitless negotiations, Iraq invaded Kuwait and – after only two days of fighting – annexed its neighbour, declaring it for its 16th Province. Thus began a conflict that was to shatter the fundaments of the Middle East as shaped during the 20th Century. For the purpose of supporting the assault on Kuwait, the IrAF prepared multiple units, including MiG-23BNs of Nos. 29 and 49 Squadrons, both of which were concentrated at Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB. On the Kuwaiti side, there was no serious planning for defence at all. Although tensions were increasing for months, the level of alertness of the armed forces were low. The Iraqi invasion had been launched at 0100 of 2 August 1990, with tanks and mechanised infantry of two divisions rolling over the border south of Safwan and then in the direction of Kuwait City. At dawn, both sides brought their air forces into action. Due to the chaos and a break-down in the chain of command of their armed forces, the only resistance the Kuwaitis had offered during the crucial first minutes of the air war was in form of a single MIM-23B I-HAWK SAM-site at Bubiyan Island, controlled by a US contractor. This detected the incoming wave of Iraqi MiG-23BNs and Su-22s, and fired at least two missiles. Two Iraqi fighters – including a MiG23BN from No. 49 Squadron – were shot down and their pilots killed. In reaction, the Su-22s from No. 109 Squadron, IrAF, fired a single Kh-25MP anti-radar missile (ASCC-code AS-10 Karen). The results of this attack remain unknown.97 The Iraqis had completed their operations in Kuwait by 5 August 1990. However, during the following days Baghdad found itself confronted with a powerful alliance led by the USA, which during the next six months deployed a huge concentration of military power in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Following months-long but fruitless negotiations, the UN authorised the US-led coalition to force the

52

Iraqi military out of Kuwait, and Washington issued an ultimatum to Baghdad, for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait by 16 January 1991. Prior to August 1990, the IrAF was planning to replace most of its MiG-23s and MiG-29s with different, custom-tailored variants of the Sukhoi Su-27 and Mirage 2000. When the UN imposed an arms embargo upon Iraq, on 4 August 1990, all such planning went out of the window. Furthermore, the IrAF was forced to operate without numerous aircraft it sent abroad for overhauls. Amongst these were ten MiG-23MLs undergoing refurbishment at the Zmaj Works, outside Zagreb, in what was then Yugoslavia.98 The Iraqi MiG-23 fleet was thus significantly depleted already before the fighting started, and not only due to the war with Iran. Nevertheless, there were still about 39 MiG23MLs (30-35 of these were operational on average), 14 MiG23MFs, 15 MiG-23MS, 38 MiG-23BNs, and 21 MiG-23UBs available. Organisation of the IrAF MiG-23 fleet as of January 1991 was as listed in Table 5.99 Like other Iraqi interceptors, IrAF MiG-23s were tightly integrated into the above-described Kari IADS. Developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the French, the Kari was designed to fight local powers – like Iran, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. Correspondingly, it could only simultaneously track and engage up to 40 targets in total. Foremost, the Kari was static and strongly centralised, and lacked the redundancy in regards of command nodes in particular. Down the primary threat axis in the coming war – in the direction of Saudi Arabia – it included only about a dozen old early warning radars. Unsurprisingly, the Iraqi IADS was to become hopelessly overwhelmed by the first hours of the coming war, and thus never capable of providing its MiG-23 pilots with the kind of support they required to operate their interceptors effectively.100

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Table 5: IrAF MiG-23 Units, 1990-1991 Squadron

Base

Variant

Notes

No. 29

Ali Ibn Abu Talib

MiG-23BN

No. 49

Ali Ibn Abu Talib

MiG-23BN

No. 59

Tammuz

MiG-23MS, MiG-23UB

2-3 MiG-23UBs were assigned to each of MiG-23BN/MF/ML squadrons

No. 63

Bakr

MiG-23ML

detachment at Sa’ad AB (H-2)

No. 67

Tammuz

MiG-23MF

CO Col Yassin Mohammed Ali

No. 73

Bakr

MiG-23ML

CO Col Muayyad Jurnah; detachment at Talha FOB

No. 93

Bakr

MiG-23ML

detachment at Firnas AB (Mosul)

Another MiG-23ML irreversibly lost due to the UN arms embargo from August 1990, was this example – serial number 23255 – which was undergoing overhaul in the former USSR at the time. (Tom Cooper Collection)

Taken inside one of hardened aircraft shelters at Bakr AB, in 1989 or 1990, and showing a group of officers and pilots from No. 93 Squadron, this photograph is of special interest because of the serial number of the MiG-23ML in the background. With 23314, this is the highest known serial for aircraft of this variant in service with the IrAF, and indicates delivery of as many as 64 to Iraq. (via Ali Tobchi)

Iraqi MiG-23BNs were amongst the aircraft that opened the invasion of Kuwait. One of the mounts of Nos. 29 or 49 Squadrons as of 1991 was this example (serial number 23166), captured almost intact in April 2003. (via Tom Cooper)

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Collapse of the Kari The US-led coalition launched its onslaught on Iraq – Operation Desert Storm – with helicopters of Task Force Normandy knocking out two frontline early warning radars near Ma’anya, in southern Iraq, at 0238 hrs of 17 January 1991. Twenty minutes later, ten Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth bombers demolished key command and control centres of the Kari IADS. Nevertheless, the nuclear-hardened ADOC in Baghdad survived intact and, after some disruptions in electrical power and communications, continued operating. This interruption was exploited by the first wave of McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle fighter-bombers to penetrate deep into the airspace over western Iraq entirely unmolested, and hit multiple targets in the area between H-2 and H-3/al-Wallid ABs. As the fighter-bombers retreated towards the south, a wave of F-15C MSIP-II interceptors entered the Iraqi airspace with intention of destroying any Iraqi interceptors that would follow the F-15Es. This activity prompted the commander of the Western (or 2nd) SOC IrAF to scramble multiple interceptors, starting with two MiG-23MLs and two Mirage F.1EQs from the Talha forward operating base (FOB). The first to go was the pair of MiG-23MLs from No. 73 Squadron, led by Captain Hassan. They barely got airborne when Hassan’s aircraft was hit by an AIM-7M Sparrow and crashed 14km (8nm) south of Talha. His wingman, followed by the two Mirage F.1EQs, then withdrew in the direction of Sa’ad AB. Because the USAF F-15C pilot never saw his opponent, because his non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) system of his F-15C – and that on the E-3 Sentry that supported him – has failed to ‘read’ the engine information of the Iraqi jet and thus proved unable to recognize its type, Hassan’s MiG-23ML was declared a ‘Mirage F.1’ by the Americans: that is how the first aerial victory of this war went down in history.101 Meanwhile, another MiG-23ML was scrambled from Bakr AB. Captain Waleed from No. 63 Squadron passed east of Baghdad before reaching his designated CAP-station, about 50km (27nm) south of the Iraqi capital. Once there, the ground control advised him of presence of one of the ‘stealth’ fighters in the same area: none of the radars supporting the Kari system could actually track the F-117A, but the Unit 128 has intercepted related communications and Brigadier-General an-Nua’ymee had issued the order an interception attempt to be undertaken. Ultimately, the Iraqis had no chance: the F-117A slipped unobserved past Waleed’s MiG-23ML. Only the operators of the Unit 128 experienced some satisfaction. Their jamming of US radio communications caused the controller on board an E-3 to panic: shocked by the strong noise in her earphones, she lost contact with the F-117A for a moment, and began screaming into the microphone, believing the stealth fighter was in peril. The next MiG-23ML that got airborne was scrambled from Dulu’ya FOB (better known as ‘Balad South-East’ in the West) – and then in reaction to reports about multiple US cruise missiles underway in direction of Tikrit and Bakr AB. Turning west immediately upon take-off, Captain Hussam from No. 63 Squadron was next informed to turn on his radar and expect a target approaching at low altitude. Following orders from the ground control, he carefully scanned the airspace in front of his radar, eventually detecting several targets at a range of only 54

10km (5.4nm). Selecting one of the two strongest echoes as his target, Hussam attempted to establish a lock-on, but his radar was promptly jammed by enemy ECM. With all of his additional attempts to establish a lock-on remaining unsuccessful, Hussam was vectored into a new interception of a target underway over Tharthar Lake. However, while attempting to achieve a lock-on, his radar was jammed again. Frustrated, Hussam described this to his controller, who ordered him back to Dulu’ya FOB. Underway there, the Iraqi pilot switched his weapons system to the ‘Phi zero mode’, in which his R-24T missile were no longer slaved to the aircraft’s radar, but fixed along the longitudinal axis of the MIG23 (so-called ‘boresight mode’). This degraded the probability of a kill, but it enabled engagements despite strongest electronic countermeasures. Shortly after, although getting low on fuel, Hussam was vectored into a new attack. This time, he achieved a lock-on and fired from a range of about 7km (3.8nm). Only a few seconds later, a big explosion lightened the night sky, turning into a huge ball of fire. An unidentifiable body then emerged from the fireball, trailing a small fire. Post-mission analysis concluded that Hussam probably fired at one of USAF’s F-111Fs, though with unknown results. A few hours later, an unknown MiG-23ML fired another R-24T under similar circumstances. Believed to have been another F-111F, the target came away once again. With this, the activity of Iraqi MiG-23s during the first night of this war was over. They had flown about a dozen sorties, but – due to the collapse of the Kari – were forced to operate on their own, with very little support from the IADS, and with next to no situational awareness. The results were unavoidable: one MiG23ML was shot down and its pilot killed, for no gains in return. It is thus not particularly surprising that no operations of IrAF MiG-23s are known to have been undertaken during the only attempt to launch something-like an aerial counter-offensive, on 19 January 1991. Based on intensive studies of the US and allied operations during the first two days, this included multiple interceptor operations, and resulted in several air combats and numerous SAM-ambushes, in the course of which the Iraqis claimed up to five US and allied aircraft as shot down, while losing six own fighters. Subsequently, Saddam Hussein, ‘began to lose confidence that Iraqi air defence forces could engage the enemy and live to fight another day’. Consequently, he sequestered the IrAF into its hardened aircraft shelters.102 Not willing to leave the IrAF alone, US planners reacted by issuing a series of attacks on all major Iraqi bases. Between 23 and 27 January, no less than 375 hardened aircraft shelters were targeted, and, inside them, more than 100 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed. On 26 January, this prompted Saddam Hussein to opt for the ‘Plan B’, and order an evacuation of the IrAF to Iran along an agreement reached between Baghdad and Tehran already in late August 1990. Due to the range limitations of most of the Iraqi fighters, this operation had to be undertaken in two steps: the first was the transfer of the aircraft from diverse bases around the country to Bakr, and the second their transfer to Iran. By the time No. 73 Squadron was to withdraw its last eight MiG-23MLs from Sa’ad to al-Bakr, the SOC West and the last local IOC were destroyed by US bombardment. Thus, the two four-ship formations launched on 26 January 1991 in a western

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A row of MiG-23MLs, MiG-23MFs and MiG-23UBs as found by US troops at Bakr AB in 2003 (in the foreground is the MiG-23ML with serial number 23273). Back in 1991, many Iraqi Floggers were concentrated at Bakr AB before they were to be flown to Iran. (Photo by Scott Brown)

A crop from a photograph released by the Iranian media, and showing one of the Iraqi Su-22s (left) and an Iraqi MiG-23 (right) that made emergency landings on a highway outside Hamedan, in western Iran, in late January 1991. (via Tom Cooper)

direction without any kind of support from the ground control. The two Iraqi formations flew with several minutes of separation: by the time the first reached al-Assad AB, it was already pursued by a four-ship of USAF F-15Cs. Upon detecting the second formation, the E-3 Sentry AWACS then re-routed the Eagles to intercept the second four-ship. This was meanwhile down to three aircraft, because one aborted shortly after take-off. The other three were flown by Major Shaker Rehan Hamood, with Captains Karim Hassan Rahel and Amer Hassan on his wings. Because of overcast, the F-15Cs maintained an altitude between 7,620 and 8,534 metres (25,000-28,000ft) until finding a big hole in the clouds, roughly halfway between H-1 and H-2. The Eagles dove and started firing AIM-7M Sparrows: taken by surprise, two Iraqi MiG-23MLs were shot down in quick succession. Hamood and Rahel were killed; Hassan outran his pursuers and reached al-Bakr AB as the only survivor.103

With this, the writing was on the wall for the IrAF: seven of its MiG-23BNs, four MiG-23UBs and four MiG-23MLs were flown to TFB.3 in Iran in the course of the following exodus. While most of these reached their destination safely – one MiG-23ML was shot down by Iranian air defences, and its pilot killed while approaching for landing – they were subsequently impounded by Tehran, and never returned to Iraq.104 Overall, due to the rapid collapse of the Kari IADS, the IrAF’s MiG-23 fleet experienced a tragic disaster during the war of 1991. At least three MiG-23MLs were shot down by US interceptors, while 11 others were destroyed on the ground, together with 2 MiG-23MFs, 2 MiG-23MS, and 8 MiG-23UBs. Ten other MiG23s were damaged, while between 7 and 14 were flown to Iran.105

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CHAPTER 6

THE CURTAIN FALLS During the 1990s, an ironic situation developed in regards of the remaining MiG-23s operated by Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria: while reaching the peak of their efficiency – and popularity amongst pilots and ground crews – they were rapidly reaching the state of block obsolescence too. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the type was widely exposed to Western intelligence services, and all the secrets of even its most advanced variants compromised. Moreover, the demise of the USSR resulted with the end of further development of the entire family: the few offers for diverse upgrades found no interest in the Middle East also because countries like Iraq and Syria were either unable to afford these, or showed no interest. On the contrary, ever larger segments of MiG-23 fleet were left to fell into disrepair. Algeria continued flying its MiG-23s until most of aircraft were worn out and had to be phased out of service in period 2005-2007. The Iraqi fleet of MiG-23s experienced its final demise during the US-led invasion of 2003. At least a part of the Libyan MiG-23 fleet was revamped and returned to service in the late 2000s, only to end largely destroyed during the revolution of 2011. Finally, the Syrian Floggers remained in service, and their number even increased through the acquisition of second-hand examples, in 2008. However, since 2011, they are deployed in one of dirtiest campaigns of aerial bombardment in history of air warfare.

The End in Algeria Contrary to what might be expected, the only conflict in which the QJJ’s MiG-23s were ever involved, was the brutal and bloody civil war that raged in Algeria from the late 1980s until the late 2000s. Although there was sporadic terrorist activity already in 1986, and the MiG-25Rs even flew a few related reconnaissance sorties during that year, the war began in earnest with riots that erupted on 5 October 1988. A day later, Algiers officially declared

the state of emergency and mobilised its military. A former officer of the QJJ related: ‘When the Algerian Army deployed to the streets, its units were full of poorly-trained conscripts, young men that had only a limited knowledge of military affairs, and no idea how to conduct vis-à-vis civilian protesters. In fact, most were more afraid of protesters than the other way around. Their deployment in reaction to the riots was a big mistake (to say at least), and resulted in many unnecessary deaths. The worst was the so-called “Bab el-Oued shooting”, in which as many as 35 young men were killed. Our High Command quickly learned its lesson and instead began imposing minimal educational levels for recruitment. Indeed, it began deploying students of military schools with at least two years of experience – in Algiers and other parts of the country. For example, The Higher School for Territorial Air Defence in Reghaia was assigned the mission of protecting all industrial zones between Algiers and Boumerdes, in November 1988.’106

Around the same time, the QJJ began introducing the wing structure. Correspondingly, the former 27th and 28th Attack Squadrons and their MiG-23BNs were integrated into the 4th Attack Wing, and re-designated as the 274th and 284th Attack Squadrons. MiG-23MFs continued serving with the 14th Squadron: this remained an independent unit, and was therefore re-designated as the 140th Squadron.107 Subsequently, the civil war heated up, and the Algerian MiG23BNs were deployed in combat for the first time. Precise details about their operations in the late 1980s, through 1990s, and 2000s, remain unknown. Known is only that MiG-23BNs were praised by their pilots as ‘high-quality dive bombers’, and that one was

A row of MiG-23BNs from the 4th Attack Wing, as seen in early 2000s. Note the armament with 250kg bombs of South African origin, based on the US design of the Mk.82. These weapons were deployed in large numbers during the civil war in Algeria. (Tom Cooper Collection)

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MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

flying Su-24MKs. Two years later, it was the turn of MiG-23MFs: at least nominally, 140th Squadron was integrated into the 3rd Air Defence Wing and re-equipped with MiG-29s. Actually, its crews were re-assigned to other squadrons of that unit in expectation of deliveries of MiG-29SMTs. When the related deal fell through because the Russians delivered old instead of newly-built aircraft, the squadron was officially disbanded, marking a definite end of MiG-23 operations in Algeria, in autumn 2008.

The End in Iraq Port view of the MiG-23BN coded as FM-17 (construction number 6037), fully bombed-up with a total of eight South African-made 250kg bombs. It’s notable that the camouflage pattern that remained unique for Algeria: maintenance stencils were applied in matt black. (Tom Cooper Collection)

In late 1991, the IrAF’s fleet of MiG-23MLs that survived the II Persian Gulf War was re-organized. The remaining 18 MiG23BNs were concentrated within the No. 49 Squadron; 17 remaining MiG-23MLs, 7 MiG-23MFs, and 3 MiG-23UBs into No. 73 Squadron, while No. 59 Squadron inherited all the 9 MiG23MS and 10 MiG-23UB that were still around. By the virtue of numbers still available, the MiG-23ML remained the backbone of the IrAF’s interceptor fleet. Correspondingly, when deciding to re-activate their fighter-fleet the Iraqis invested significant amount of their meagre remaining sources into improving the type. Amongst others, they re-launched the project of equipping surviving examples with Remora ECM-pods, SPO-15 Beryoza RWRs and ASO-2 chaff and flare dispensers. This configuration proved capable of jamming radars of US fighters sufficiently to prevent several Iraqi MiG-23MLs from being hit by AIM-7M Sparrows and AIM-120A AMRAAMs fired at them in 1999. Nevertheless, the Sapfir-23MLA-II continued suffering from its poor ECCM-capabilities and thus proved ill-suited even for the task of intercepting UAVs the US and Israeli air forces were regularly flying over Iraq. In one instance, an Iraqi MiG-23ML pilot attempted using the TP-23 and R-24T instead, and was more successful against an Israeli reconnaissance drone. In turn, a MiG-23ML that took off from Tammuz AB was lost in the course

written-off under unclear circumstances, and at an unknown date – though while flying an attack sortie.108 Algerian MiG-23MFs are not known to have flown any combat sorties during the civil war: in the 1980s, their pilots and ground crews were still preoccupied with training. Indeed, in 1990, a detachment from the 140th Squadron was re-deployed to BouSfer AB for dissimilar air combat manoeuvring training against MiG-21MFs and MiG-21bis from the 193rd Squadron – a unit considered the best of the QJJ as of the time. Unsurprisingly, the result was a catastrophe for MiG-23MFs: although a well-flown MiG-23MF is known of being able to outfly a MiG-21 in certain flight regimes, pilots from 140th Squadron never managed to do so. Certainly enough, following additional training, they did feel confident to invite the 193rd Squadron for a repeat of that exercise, few years later. However, by then the civil war was in full swing, and the air force never found an opportunity to organise a similar session again.109 In early 2000, the QJJ began retiring its MiG-21s from service. Correspondingly, remaining MiG23MFs of the 140th Squadron were split into three permanent detachments, in 2001-2002: one with four aircraft at Tindouf, another with eight MiG23MFs at Bechar, while two aircraft were regularly rotated between Annaba and Ouragla. When all the MiG-21s were withdrawn from service, in 2002, the unit was officially assigned to the 3rd Air Defence Wing, and re-designated as the 143rd Squadron.110 With the war against Islamic extremists nearing its end, and the QJJ in the process of negotiating the acquisition of much advanced fighterbombers from Russia, the writing was soon on the wall for the remaining Algerian MiG-23s: the last BNs were phased out in 2005, and their crews Top view of the MiG-23ML serial number 23273, as found at Bakr AB, in 2003. This was one either retired or re-assigned to units of the Iraqi Floggers modified through the addition of SPO-15 Beryoza ASO-2 chaff and flare dispensers (taken from Su-22M-4s). (Photo by Scott Brown)

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Sad remnants of the MiG-23MS with serial number 23105, as found at Tammuz AB, in 2003. Note the insignia of No. 59 Squadron, applied on the intake. (Tom Cooper Collection)

of an engagement with an F-14D of the US Navy on 9 September 1999. A combination of ECM emitted by Remora and a reverse turn caused the AIM-54C Phoenix missile to miss and hit the ground behind the Iraqi fighter. However, the pilot then made a mistake: critically short on fuel, he missed the runway on first attempt, then went for a second attempt and then run out of fuel. While gliding back to the runway his aircraft crashed.111 This was the last known action of an Iraqi MiG-23 ever: during the US-led invasion of 2003, the IrAF was grounded per orders from Saddam Hussein: its remaining Floggers were subsequently collected by US and allied troops as war trophies, or left to rot.

In-Flight Refuelling In Libya of the late 1980s and 1990s, the MiG-23 formed the backbone of the fighter-fleet. Remaining MiG-23MS were phased out and, starting in 1989, many were donated to Sudan (12 aircraft), and – later on – to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (3 MiG23MS and 1 MiG-23UB), Uganda, (at least 2 MiG-23MS), and Zimbabwe (3 MiG-23MS and 1 MiG-23UB). Out of concern over a possible US attack, the active fleet was widely dispersed. While the MiG-23MLD-equipped No. 1023 Squadron remained based at Mitiga, the – now MiG-23MLD-equipped – No. 1060 Squadron was the only unit that remained based at Benina AB, although this airfield remained the primary hub of Libyan MiG23 operations. Furthermore, the MiG-23MF-equipped No. 1050 Squadron remained at al-Bumbah AB, although the construction of this base was never completed. Finally, the MiG-23MLequipped No. 1060 Squadron and the MiG-23BN-equipped No. 1070 Squadron moved to al-Abraq AB, near Derna. These rearrangements – some of which were prompted by Gaddafi’s increased suspicion of his officers, especially in the wake of a wave of dissatisfaction that spread through the country after defeat in Chad – ultimately prevented the planned introduction of the wing-structure within the LAAF. Another project that was cancelled was related to a potentially significant effort to improve the range of LAAF MiG-23s. In 1987, the Libyan government contracted the West German company Intec Technical Trade und Logistic GmbH (ITTL) to develop and adapt IFR probes on different types of combat aircraft in Libyan service. Initially using IFR probes obtained from France to modify one MiG-23BN and one MiG-23UB from No. 1070 Squadron, ITTL then went a step further and developed IFR probes of indigenous design, which were installed on another MiG-23BN. Simultaneously, the West Germans converted one of the LAAF’s 58

Another Iraqi modification from the 1990s included the installation of SPO-15 RWRs taken from Su-22s (antenna with green housing). (Photo by Scott Brown)

C-130s to serve as a tanker aircraft through installing a refuelling system into the cargo hold and indigenous IFR pods on underwing pylons. Flight testing of the resulting KC-130H tanker showed that while Libyan Mirage F.1AD pilots experienced no major problems, their MiG-23 colleagues could barely control their aircraft at the rather slow cruising speed of the converted Hercules, which was only about 400km/h (215 knots). The decision was taken to install the same pods on LAAF Il-76s. The resulting conversion work, and flight testing including one Il-76 and two Mirage F.1ADs, was barely completed by the time that public uproar over the involvement of West German companies in support of Gaddafi resulted in the cancellation of all of related projects.

A still from a video showing the LAAF MiG-23UB with serial number 7715 trying (unsuccessfully) to connect with the drogue released by the sole Libyan KC-130H during testing in 1988. (Tom Cooper Collection)

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Dirty Game

Two Civil Wars113

Around 0800 hrs of 22 December 1992, the Boeing 727 of Libyan Arab Airlines, registered as 5A-DIA, underway on Flight 1103 from Benghazi to Tripoli, was approaching the Libyan capital. The ground control advised the crew per radio to hold its position at 1,067m (3,500ft) above the Papa Echo beacon, about 10 kilometres (5.4nm) from Tripoli International for three minutes, due to military traffic. The ‘military traffic’ in question was a MiG23UB of No. 1023 Squadron, crewed by Captain Abdelmajid Tayari and a novice pilot. Following the take-off from Mitiga AB, the ground control advised Tayari to climb, turn and head towards Papa Echo. Unaware of the airliner ahead of him, the seasoned fighter-pilot followed instructions of his ground controller to the dot and comma. Moments later, Tayari and the student in the front cockpit were shocked to sense a detonation on the underside or below their aircraft. A fire broke out. A friction of second later, they saw the big fin of the Boeing 727 right in front of them, already separated from the airliner – and then Tayari initiated an ejection. The airliner disintegrated while still on approach to Tripoli International, killing all 157 of its crew and passengers. Barely surviving this tragedy – Tayari suffered multiple fractures in his right hand during ejection – the crew of the MiG-23UB was shocked to find itself jailed in the hospital of Mitiga AB. The investigation of the Libyan authorities unfairly blamed them of either colliding with the Boeing 727, or opening fire and shooting it down: many of their superior officers and civilian servants wanted them hung on the Green Square in Tripoli. Following discharge from the military and years of jail, it took Abdelmajid Tayari a long time to speak out and challenge the official version of events. From his point of view, there is no doubt that the Flight 1103 either fell apart or was deliberately destroyed. His version of events, depicted above, is supported by several former officials. Amongst them is Ali Aujali, a senior Libyan diplomat who served udder Qaddhafi and, since 2011, under the National Transitional Council. Aujali claims that Qaddhafi ordered the flight to be shot down to demonstrate ‘negative effects of international sanctions’ – imposed on Libya after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1989: because of numerous embargos, Libyan Arab Airlines could not fly its planes safely, and thus the victims of the crash would we supposed to be presented as victims of ‘Western terrorism’. A bomb with a timer had been placed on board the Boeing 727: when this failed to detonate, Qaddhafi personally ordered the aircraft to be knocked out of the sky.112 The combination of sanctions and embargoes forced the LAAF to limit the activity of its fighters to an absolute minimum in the 1990s. Indeed, most of its fighter-bombers – including all of the MiG-23BNs – were stored. MiG-23MLs remained in service until 1999, when most were stored due to the need to undergo overhauls. However, during the same year, Tripoli admitted its involvement in several terrorist attacks of the 1980s, and paid compensations to its foreign victims. Correspondingly, sanctions were gradually removed, starting in 2001. During the following years, most of the remaining MiG-23MF and MiG-23MLDs were overhauled abroad: their return enabled the air force to reactivate three squadrons, including the No. 1023, No. 1060 and No. 1070.

On 12 February 2011, protesting erupted in Libya, sparking what became known as the ‘Libyan Crisis’, or the ‘I Libyan Civil War’. Over the following five days, an entire wave of protests spread in an eastern and then southern direction. The brutal reaction of the security forces then prompted an outright uprising in Benghazi, on 18-19 February, which spread to Tobruk. Most of the LAAF personnel at Benina and al-Abraq turned against the loyalists and supported the uprising. While none of about 20 MiG-23BNs ‘stored’ at these two bases for years was operational, two MiG23MLDs, one MiG-23MF and one MiG-23UBs were. Together with diverse other aircraft they were subsequently inherited by the Free Libyan Air Force (FLAF). The air base of the Air Force Academy at Misurata, where an entire squadron of MiG-23MFs was based, was overrun by protesters in late February. Although the regime regained control over this vital facility by 6 March, very few and only light aircraft were made operational again. Meanwhile, the Libyan armed forces fell apart, numerous pilots and officers defecting: two pilots flew their Mirage F.1EDs to Malta, while few others ejected over the parts of Libya controlled by the revolutionaries. After regrouping its remaining forces, the regime launched a major advance from Syrte along the coast, via Marsa al-Burayqah in direction of Benghazi. This was supported by air strikes of MiG-23s, Su-22s and Su-24s flown against Benina AB. The FLAF went into action on 16 March, when two of its MiG-23s reportedly attacked warships involved in transporting troops in the direction of Benghazi. Three vessels – none of which has been identified – were said to have been hit, including two reported as ‘sunk’ and one as ‘damaged’. The same two MiG-23s then flew an attack on Ghurdabiya/Syrte AB, a day later, supposedly cratering the runways there. In turn, four Su-22s bombed Benina AB and destroyed and damaged several civilian aircraft on the ground. Fighting culminated on 19 March 2011, when loyalist pilots apparently shot down a MiG-23ML over Benghazi. The pilot, colonel Fakhruddin Ali Ashour, ejected much too late and was killed. Only hours later, the Security Council of the UN imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, and authorised a military intervention of NATO members and several allied states. Run as Operation Odyssey Dawn, this enterprise forced the FLAF to stop its operations too. Nevertheless, a MiG-23ML armed with two UB32-57 and two UB-16-57 pods for unguided rockets did launch from Benina AB, on 9 April 2011, and was subsequently forced to return by NATO’s interceptors. Following the fall of the Qaddhafi regime, NATO offered the deployment of peace-keeping forces and help in establishing a new national military and police. However, provisional Libyan authorities turned such offers down. Instead, they embarked upon developing a democratic system of governance on their own. Tragically, related efforts were undermined by Turkey and Qatar, which bribed numerous members of the provisional government and parliament with the aim of preventing nation-wide elections, because local Islamists experienced defeats during several local elections. Combined with the failure to establish new armed forces, and the continuous presence of diverse militias that refused to disarm following the revolution, this resulted in the II Libyan War, which erupted in 2013 and is still going on as of early 2018. 59

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By January 2014, the FLAF was split into two. The personnel of units based in western parts of the country, foremost at Mitiga and Misurata ABs, sided with a group of powerful Misuratan militias, and became known as the Libyan Dawn Air Force (LDAF). This service is operated on behalf of the National Salvation Government, a wide coalition including the Moslem Brotherhood, which used to enjoy some support from Turkey and Qatar. It inherited at least two MiG-23MLs and a miscellany of other aircraft, most active of which were two Mirage F.1EDs.114 The LDAF struggled with a number of issues while attempting to obtain additional and more potent aircraft. In an attempt to solve some of these, it hired a group of Ukrainian technicians in late 2014, and these helped overhaul the two MiG-23MLDs, together with a number of R-24 and R-60MK missiles. Based in eastern Libya, the Libyan National Army/Air Force (LNA/AF) – which, meanwhile, consists of up to one third of Syrian Salafists – came under the control of General Qalifa Haftar, a self-appointed strongman supported by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. This force initially operated one MiG23ML and one MiG-23UB (No. 1060 Squadron), and two MiG23BNs (No. 1070 Squadron) in addition to a significant number of miscellaneous other aircraft. During 2014-2016, it had dozens of its cadets undergoing training at military educational facilities in Egypt, it received up to 20 MiG-21MFs from Egypt, and was reinforced through three overhauled MiG-23BNs, one MiG23ML and a MiG-23UB. However, it suffered severe attrition too: two MiG-23MLs and one MiG-23UB were lost in a series of crashes, usually together with their pilots. Both forces initially fought diverse other parties, foremost extremist Islamists – like those of the Libyan branch of the socalled Islamist State (IS, colloquially ‘Daesh’), established in early 2014 in Derna – but also militias operated by local strongmen, before finding themselves at odds with each other. In December 2014 for example, the LDAF was flying strikes against Islamists in the Hilal region, until the LNA/AF suddenly bombed Misurata AB, on 28 of the month. Two days later, a MiG-23ML of the LNA/AF shot down a LDAF helicopter that had attacked the as-Sidra Oil Terminal, and was then about to land at a military base near Syrte. On 31 December 2014, another Libyan Dawn aircraft was forced down under similar conditions, and the LDAF lost its third aircraft – a MiG-23UB (re-serialled as ‘01’) – on 23

This MiG-23MLD is nowadays serving as ‘117’ of the LDAF (the other MiG-23MLD known to have been operated by this force wears the serial 474). This photograph shows it standing on alert at Misurata AB, in December 2015, fully armed with R-24 and R-60 missiles because of continuous tensions with the LNA. (Arnaud Delalande Collection)

March 2015, when this aircraft crashed while attacking the Zintan airport, killing its pilot. On 11 June 2015, the LDAF suffered the next blow, when the Daesh blew up two L-39s and one An-26 at Gurdabiyah/Syrte AB. Furthermore, it lost one of its MiG-25s that was undergoing overhauls to another air strike by MiG-23s of the LNA/AF against Misurata AB on 6 July 2015. The Libyan Dawn was thus down to two MiG-23MLDs, one Mirage F.1ED, and few light jets. At this point in time, France, and then the USA became involved in the war against the Libyan Daesh, and started providing air support in the form of air strikes.115 In December 2015, the UN brokered a cease-fire, and on 31 March 2016, the leaders of a new, UN-appointed ‘unity government’ arrived from Tobruk in Tripoli. The Islamist government in Tripoli then announced a suspension of its operations and handing power to the new, Government of National Accord. However, Haftar – who meanwhile controlled most of the Libyan oil production and major oil exporting terminals – continued to refuse to subject himself and the LNA to the control of Tripoli. As of late 2017, both the LDAF and the LNA/AF were undertaking efforts to overhaul and return additional aircraft – including several MiG-23s – to operational service.

MiG-23MLs with serial numbers 6117 and 6452 used to form the backbone of the LNA/AF as 2014-2015. Before both were written off in different accidents, they seem to have shot down at least one helicopter and a light aircraft of the LDAF. (Arnaud Delalande Collection)

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With some help from Egypt, technicians of the LNA/AF are known to have returned nearly a dozen of the MiG-23s stored since the 1990s to service, between 2014 and 2017. Included in these were two MiG-23BNs equipped with in-flight refuelling probes left over from the ITTL’s project run in the 1980s. The aircraft in question have serial numbers 4136 and 8985 (shown here). (Arnaud Delalande Collection)

20 Years of Vegetating The most active MiG-23 user in the Middle East remains its first customer in this part of the World: the Syrian Arab Air Force. To start with, their fate over the last 30 years was dominated by the de-facto break between Damascus and Moscow in 1989. Not only that the Syrian economy proved unable to support any additional military build-ups, and unable to service its debts to Moscow – estimated at between US$12 and 17 billion – but, due to its own mass of problems the former USSR stopped providing equipment ordered by Damascus. Furthermore, on 11 October 1989, Major Muhammad Adel Bassam defected with a MiG-23MLD to Israel and landed at the small airport of Megiddo. To say that this was the drop that over spilled the barrel, would be an understatement: the aircraft in question – serial number 2786 – was at the latest standard of the Soviet technology. To a certain degree, it can be said that for the next 20 years the status of the entire Syrian armed forces was frozen at the position of what it was in autumn 1989. Cut off from its primary source of equipment, arms and spares, and denied the necessary funding even by its own government, the SyAAF spent much of the 1990s and 2000s literally grounded. The lack of funding resulted in widespread shortages of spares and fuel, in turn ceasing all the regular maintenance activity. The majority of pilots considered themselves lucky if they managed to clock 15-20 hours of flying every year. With the value of their pay decreasing to a level where most were unable to support their families, officers and other ranks began taking jobs in civilian life: nearly everybody served in the air force during the morning, and then drove taxies during the afternoon or evening, or earned themselves additional income as tourist-guides or car-mechanics. Nearly all higher-ranking officers became deeply corrupt and involved in all sorts of criminal activities, including smuggling of arms, fuel and lubricants, drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, cell-phones, computers and DVDs. During the early 2000s, the Syrian air force became involved in a sort of a ‘shadow war’ with Israel. This was characterised by regular operations of the IDF/AF’s reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs over Lebanon, and – sometimes – inside the Syrian airspace. Most such overflights were undertaken with

the purpose of tracking deliveries of weapons from Iran and elsewhere – to the Syrian military, but especially from Iran via Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The SyAAF was regularly scrambling its MiG-23s in response and these have reportedly shot down several Israeli UAVs, the first of these in late July 2001. In October 2007, a SyAAF MiG-23ML may have shot down an Israeli drone equipped with air-to-air missiles too. According to unofficial Syrian sources, up to ten Israeli UAVs were shot down over Syria on average every year between 2001 and 2006, principally while flying along Syrian-Jordanian and Syrian-Turkish borders, but sometimes as deep as 50 or more kilometres inside the Syrian airspace. In other cases Israeli operations resulted in confrontations with Syrian interceptors, several of which are said to have ended with exchange of fire – but none of which was ever confirmed by any of official sources.116 As the tensions slowly continued to increase, the Russian government launched several attempts to re-establish military relations, but Damascus showed little interest. Even when the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, wrote off 50% of the Syrian debt to Moscow, in 2006, the regime refused to place any kind of major arms orders: it merely allocated funding for acquisition of spares necessary for basic maintenance, and an overhaul of about a dozen MiG-23MLs at the 275th Aviation Repair Plant in Krasnodar, in Russia, in the period 2008-2010.117 In 2008, cooperation with Belarus resulted in the conclusion of a contract for the delivery of 28 second-hand MiG-23MLDs (Izdeliye-23-18) and 5 MiG-23UBs. Delivered in very poor condition and nearly unflyable, the aircraft were brought to The Works at Nayrab AB, where their parts were used to assemble less than a dozen ‘new’ MiG-23MLDs.118 Such acquisitions resulted in slightly improved availability of the fleet. Training activity was increased – pilots receiving up to 25 hours a year on average – but flying at low altitudes was strictly prohibited due to a few fatal accidents. Foremost, and as absurd as it might sound: developing new tactics or even related discussions between pilots and officers – or discussing reasons for fatal accidents – were all strictly forbidden and punishable (usually with jail sentences without an official end).119 61

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The acquisition of second-hand MiG23MLDs from Belarus enabled the SyAAF to finally retire its remaining MiG-23MS in 2008. Serial number 1614 was one of the last operational examples as of that time. (Syrian Ministry of Defence)

Row of four MiG-23MLDs and one MiG23UB of the former VVS acquired by Syria from Belarus in 2008, as seen at the tarmac of The Works at Nayrab AB in 2009. Except for the UB, all have had their former national insignias and bort numbers overpainted prior to arrival in Syria. (Photo by Erwin Husmann, via Menno van der Wal)

Syrian Civil War As of 2011, the SyAAF was under the command of MajorGeneral Isam Hallak. It’s MiG-23 fleet was still sizeable and included about 40 MiG-23BNs and MiG-23UBs, and up to 50 MiG-23MFs, MiG-23MLs, MiG-23MLDs, about 30% of which were operational on average. However, while loyal to Assad, Hallak kept the force out of the ensuing civil war: during the first year of protesting, and then the armed uprising, most of the SyAAF – and especially all the Sunni officers – was grounded. The sole exception were a few trusted helicopter-crews. A major escalation occurred in May 2012, when the headquarters of the Ba’ath Party in Damascus ordered the entire SyAAF into action. Right from the start, this instance began issuing explicit, written orders for all squadron commanders to ‘bomb civilians’ in insurgent-controlled areas. Every officer in question was obliged to confirm the receipt and his obeyance to such orders with his signature. By June 2012, this practice was ‘expanded’ to all the fighter and helicopter pilots, and all SyAAF units were addressed as ‘Ba’ath Squadrons’ – followed by their numerical designation.120 The circumstances under which Syrian MiG-23s entered their last conflict were unique: after 20 years of neglect, sectarianism, favouritism, and endemic corruption, they went into ‘combat’ on behalf of a regime that was financially bankrupt, and surviving only with help of comprehensive financial support from Tehran. Not only that Damascus publicly confirmed its inability to cover more than 40% of the Syrian annual budget (and thus that of the SyAAF), but Tehran later declared the survival of the Assad Regime for its ‘red line’ in Syria. 62

The first area hit by air strikes was that around Dayr az-Zawr, where defections of top military and security officials resulted in a near-collapse of the regime and the emergence of several large insurgent groups, in late July and early August 2012.121 The SyAAF deployed MiG-23BNs into random bombardment, primarily hitting private homes, and killing scores of civilians. With family and tribal ties being particularly strong in this part of Syria, such attacks caused ever more outrage and a rapid expansion of well-equipped and organised insurgency. In turn, this caused the first MiG-23 loss of this war. On 13 August 2012, the MiG23BN flown by Colonel Mohammad Suleiman was shot down by ground fire while attacking Mohassan, a village outside Dayr az-Zawr. The pilot ejected and was captured shortly afterwards. Few days later, the entire 2nd Battalion of the 55th Air Defence Regiment based in Dmeyr had defected, and nearly half of the town was secured by insurgents. Correspondingly, MiG-23BNs from the nearby based 17th Fighter-Bomber Brigade heavily bombed Dmeyr, intentionally striking homes of top defectors. Although a majority of the SyAAF personnel by this time were Alawite – and there were very few Christians, Druze and Sunnis left – orders for attacks on civilians had caused strong dissent. The notorious Air Force Intelligence, meanwhile the top security service of the regime, reacted with terror: any officers that refused to obey their orders were disappeared: only a handful re-appeared, usually after a week or two in prison, where torture was the rule, no exception. Several dozens were never seen again. Orders for attacks on civilians and mistreatment of personnel caused a wave of defections – not only by the Sunnis, but by Alawites, too. Tragically, this provoked the regime to impose drastic

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

punishment, including the kidnapping of families of defectors. About a dozen cases became known in which even small children of SyAAF pilots that left their posts were tortured until these turned themselves in. Learning from this experience, hundreds of officers continued to serve only until they were able to bring their families to the relative safety of refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan – prior to their own defections. Homes of officers and pilots that managed to flee were always torched by the regime: even homes of several bearers of the Hero of the Syrian Arab Republic Medal were outright bombed by loyalist pilots, if they were within insurgent-held territories. Ultimately, desertions – but also a spate of combat losses during the second half of 2012 – have at least halved the total SyAAF manpower and the available fleet of aircraft. By the early 2013, only the staunchest supporters of the Assad Regime continued serving: sole exception from this rule were instructors and students at air bases cut-off from the outside world by insurgents, and then by the advance of various extremist Islamist groups. In July 2012, Assad dismissed Hallak and replaced him with MajorGeneral Ahmad Balloul. The latter disbanded several units and then deployed the remnants of the SyAAF – meanwhile known as the ‘Assadist air force’ not only amongst defectors, but even within its own ranks – with full force.

Auto-Didacts to the Rescue For most of the 1990s and 2000s, every SyAAF unit equipped with combat aircraft only had two pilots that regularly flew. These were the squadron-CO and his ‘chief instructor/test pilot’ (usually, but not always the Deputy CO). These two top pilots used to serve as ‘instructors’ for all other pilots and officers in their unit. They were not really capable of combat flying: only of taking-off and landing their aircraft. Correspondingly, all they could teach their pilots was how to take-off, make a circle around the base, and land. A mere handful of squadron commanders and their deputies knew how to fly an interception, and this only if all the time guided by the ground control. Correspondingly, the mass of pilots still serving when the war began in earnest, simply did not know how to fly and fight with their MiG-23s. Unsurprisingly considering such circumstances, the SyAAF abandoned any kind of ‘normal operational behaviour’ right from the start of its combat operations. Primary objective of up to 230 sorties flown daily for much of autumn 2012 and the spring of 2013 became what the Ba’ath Party officially termed as the ‘punishment and destruction of US-Israel-supported al-Qaida terrorists’, and what loyalist officers are boastingly describing as ‘burning Sunnis’: extermination of civilians in insurgentcontrolled parts of the country. The objective of this campaign was to deny the emerging civic authorities the ability to organize and run everyday life and present themselves as a functioning and viable opposition to the regime. This is because the Assad-Regime defines its legitimacy by the level of control it exercises over the Syrian population, while the sheer existence of civilian authorities not under its control is clear evidence that Syrians can organize and run their life without the regime, and without turning into a ‘horde of blood-thirsty jihadists’. Correspondingly, though late 2012 the SyAAF was particularly active over Eastern Ghouta, densely cultivated eastern and southern suburbs of the Syrian

capital, which not only became one of hot-bets of the uprising, but was largely under insurgent control by early 2013. The MiG-23s from Dmeyr, an-Nassiriyah and as-Se’en flew up to 30 bombing sorties a day for most of October and November 2012, before their activity was limited by fuel shortages and bad weather, though by attrition too: the second MiG-23 written off in this war – a BN with serial 1673 – was shot down under unclear circumstances on 5 October 2012. Furthermore, in January 2013, an unknown pilot may have defected with his MiG-23 to Turkey.122 With next to no pilots having any kind of serious training in flying and fighting with their aircraft, and any discussions of tactics remaining strictly forbidden, the effectiveness of their attacks was very poor. Therefore, a few loyalists began – clandestinely and gradually – teaching themselves how to operate their aircraft with the benefit of standard tactical manuals. Some began using cellphones and Google Earth for navigation. Even then – and while a handful of pilots flew relatively often, and became proficient enough to target selected spots even in densely populated cities – the majority of the SyAAF’s fliers continued releasing their armament randomly, in the ‘general direction of the target’: some did so because they did not know better – others, especially those seeking an opportunity to defect – intentionally. ‘Tactics’ were, and remain, non-existent – as is formation flying: until today, all sorties are flown by single aircraft, underway along the straightest possible course between the base and the target, under strict guidance from the ground, and usually end with weapons release from altitudes above 1,500 metres. Similarly, and

A pair of MiG-23BN unleashing S-24 heavy unguided rockets during a fire-power demonstration staged in October 2011. During the following war in Syria, such weapons were deployed for attacks on insurgent fortifications. (Syrian Ministry of Defence)

A MiG-23BN from Dmeyr AB, underway low over Eastern Ghouta, following bomb release, in 2014. (Photo by LensDimashqi)

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contrary to standard practices in any other air force in the world, the air force intelligence not only continues suppressing any kind of reporting unfavourable to the regime – but even that considered unfavourable to SyAAF’s own operations. For example, the discussion of reasons for specific combat losses remain an absolute ‘no go’.

Deployment of Guided Missiles Through autumn 2013, a significant increase in training activity of the SyAAF was observed for the first time in decades. During October that year, up to 30 training-related flying operations could be monitored a day, many of these by MiG-23UB conversion trainers. Another ‘new’ emergence was the re-introduction to service of old, radio-command guided Kh-23 ASMs on SyAAF MiG-23MFs and MiG-23ML/MLDs. Other ‘new’ weapons foremost deployed by interceptor variants were B-8M pods for unguided 80mm rockets, and S-24 heavy unguided 240mm rockets. Combined with improved work of the Syrian intelligence services – meanwhile entirely re-organized and controlled by the IRGC – this enabled the air force to start targeting insurgent HQs with precision. One of the crucial attacks on the insurgency during this period was flown by a single MiG-23MF, which deployed a pair of Kh-23s to destroy the headquarters of the Tawhid Brigade, north of Aleppo. In addition to killing all of the top commanders and dozens of insurgents of this large unit, such blows massively weakened the already disunited insurgency, enabled a further growth of groups with extremist Islamist ideology, but also enabled the IRGC and loyalist troops to lift the siege of Western Aleppo in November 2013. This success benefitted the SyAAF greatly: it resulted in a renewed availability of The Works. By 2016, this installation hurriedly overhauled nearly 40 aircraft, greatly increasing the number of airframes available at the time the air force was down to launching 45-50 sorties a day. Furthermore,

Still armed with a single Kh-23 guided missile (and carrying the related Delta guidance pod under the right underfuselage hardpoint), this MiG-23MF was photographed while pulling up from an attack on insurgent positions in Eastern Ghouta in November 2013. (Photo by LensDimashqi) 64

MiG-23BN serial number 1665, as seen at Dmeyr AB, in 2015. It’s notable that the MDBZ multiple ejector rack installed underwing, but also the unique, box-like chaff and flare dispenser attached on the top of the rear fuselage, near the fin. Although using cartridges of Soviet origin, the latter systems are unique for the Syrian MiG-23-fleet. (via B. A.)

the IRGC’s offensive on Aleppo recovered the so-called ‘Defence Laboratories’ – a complex of defence-related factories in the asSafira area. There, the Iranians quickly reconstructed several ammunition factories and launched ‘domestic’ production of various bombs based on Soviet/Russian FAB-100M-54 and FAB250M-54 designs. This was of crucial importance because by that time the air force had run its pre-war stocks of bombs dry.

Russian Come-Back Despite Iranian support and sheer fanaticism of the loyalists, the war-weariness resulted in many pilots and ground personnel becoming reckless. On 23 March 2014, a MiG-23BN was shot down by an F-16C of the Turkish air force after violating Turkish airspace.123 A number of aircraft were destroyed in unnecessary accidents, and others shot down by small-arms fire: pilots that safely ejected three or even four times by that point in the war, became a norm, rather than an exception. Overall, the air force was barely operational as of mid-2015, when ground forces of the Assad Regime suffered one of their worst defeats ever, in Idlib. Even Lattakia, the heartland of Alawite loyalists, was threatened by insurgent advance. The resulting crisis and the IRGC’s proven inability to reverse the course of the war eventually reached the point at which Moscow arrived at the decision to launch a military intervention in Syria in August 2015. Because the Russian government is foremost interested in stressing the legitimacy of the AssadRegime, it insisted on bolstering whatever was left of the regular Syrian military – instead of cooperating with dozens of local warlords and their militias, as the IRGC-QF is doing. Unsurprisingly, the SyAAF and the Air Force Intelligence became one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Russian support. Still paid for by Iran, deliveries of spare parts and more effective weapons from Russian stocks further improved the overall condition of the fighter-bomber fleet, significantly raising the number of available combat aircraft. By early 2016, the air force was back to flying 5060 sorties a day. However, intensive flying of worn-out, 30-year-old aircraft in combat proved particularly dangerous. Indeed, it resulted in the Syrian MiG-23 units suffering another series of losses. On 15 or 16 April 2016, a MiG-23 crashed shortly after take-off from Dmeyr AB, killing Colonel Anwar Najdo al-Halabi. The seventh confirmed loss of a Syrian MiG-23 since the start of this war occurred on 22 April 2016, when a MiG-23ML (serial 2754) from No. 67 Squadron was shot down over eastern Qalamoun. The pilot,

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One of last few MiG-23MLDs still operational in Syria is this example, serial number 2771. It is operated by Hama-based detachment of the No. 675 Squadron, and almost exclusively used for ground attacks. (via B. A.)

A top view of the MiG-23ML serial number 2750, as seen while exiting one of the hardened aircraft shelters at Dmeyr or as-Se’en AB, in 2016. Note the camouflage pattern applied during the overhaul at The Works in Nayrab, and roundels applied on both top surfaces of the wing. (via B. A.)

Captain Assam Eid, was captured by the extremists of the Daesh, and subsequently executed. On 27 June 2016, a MiG-23BN from as-Se’en AB crashed in the Qalamoun mountains, killing its pilot, Lieutenant-Colonel Nader Ramadan. On 4 July 2016, a MiG-23 was shot down over Eastern Ghouta and its pilot, Ali Shawkat Suleiman was killed. On 29 July 2016, a MiG-23ML from an-Nassiriyah either crashed or was shot down over north-eastern Qalamoun, and its pilot, Major Mohammad Ismail Soleiman, was killed. On 21 September 2016, a MiG-23BN from No. 697 Squadron was shot down by SA-8s operated of the Liwa Ahmad al-Abdu of the Jaysh al-Islam over Petra, north of Dmeyr. Its pilot, differently cited as Lieutenant-Colonel Eham Soleiman or Lieutenant-Colonel Ya’rob, ejected safely and was captured. On 10 December 2016, a MiG23ML crashed in the Hayyan oilfield, in eastern Homs province. The pilot, Colonel Thabet Ismail, was recovered.124 In the aftermath of an attack by two Su-22s of Shayrat-based No. 677 Squadron on the insurgent-controlled town of Khan Sheykhoun, in southern Idlib, on 4 April 2017, during which over 110 civilians were murdered by Russian-made bombs filled with Sarin, the USA delivered a debilitating blow upon the air force of the Assad regime. In the pre-dawn hours of 7 April 2017, two warships of the US Navy underway in the central Mediterranean launched 59 RGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Shayrat AB. While one of the Tomahawks failed and crashed shortly after crossing the coast near Tartus, the other 58 wrecked the Shayrat AB. They scored direct hits on at least 44 different installations, including 15 hardened aircraft shelters, 10 ammunition depots, 7 workshops, 7 fuel depots, and some of weapons of the 136th Air Defence Brigade, responsible for protecting this crucial

installation. Foremost, the Tomahawks destroyed at least 10, and probably up to 15 MiG-23ML/MLDs parked inside or in front of diverse hardened aircraft shelters. Before the US strike, MiG-23s from Shayrat were launching 10 combat sorties a day on average: ever since, this figure dropped to zero. Furthermore, two weeks later, on 17 April 2017, insurgents of the Jaysh an-Nasser plastered the Hama AB with BM-21 multiple rocket system, destroying – amongst others – at least one MiG-23. Finally, the MiG-23MLD with serial number 2779 was shot down on 5 May 2017, while the MiG-23MLD serial number 2797 was shot down on 5 June 2017.

Into the Darkness The handful of MiG-23s surviving in Syria nowadays is worn-out to a degree where most have only their most basic instruments still in operational condition. It is unlikely that any would be declared for ‘fully mission capable’ by any professional military service somewhere else. Indeed, although still nominally operated by two squadrons, no MiG-23BNs have been sighted in action since 11 January 2018, when a MiG-23BN from the 73rd Fighter-Bomber Brigade crashed after an engine failure, forcing Brigadier-General Abd al-Karim Alia to eject. Apparently, the last few remaining aircraft were subsequently all withdrawn from service. Ever since, their job has been taken over by interceptor squadrons equipped with a handful of remaining MiG-23MF/ML/MLDs: these are meanwhile down to launching between two and five sorties a day. For all practical purposes, this means that the air force of the Syrian regime is out of condition to protect its own airspace. Its outlook in any kind of a larger conflict would be nothing else but extremely doubtful. 65

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Table 6: SyAAF MiG-23 Units, 2011-2018 Brigade

Squadron

Base

Variant

Notes

14th Fighter-Bomber Brigade

678

Hama

MiG-23MF/ML/MLD

50th Fighter-Bomber Brigade

675

Shayrat

MiG-23ML/MLD

20th Fighter-Bomber Brigade

698

an-Nassiriyah

MiG-23BN

disbanded in April 2017

17th Fighter-Bomber Brigade

697

Dmeyr

MiG-23BN

Brigade disbanded, remaining units merged with 946 Squadron in 2017

73rd Fighter-Bomber Brigade

946

Khelkhleh

MiG-23BN/MLD

former 945, 946 Squadrons and 17th Fighter-Bomber Brigade

Other than more advanced MiG-23MLs and MiG-23MLDs, Hamabased No. 678 Squadron is still operating two or three MiG-23MFs – survivors from a batch delivered starting in 1979. Known examples wear serial numbers 2657 and 2661 (shown here). (via B. A.)

A close-up view of the MiG-23MLD serial number 4000, as seen inside a hardened aircraft shelter at Hama AB, and fully armed with R-24R and R-60MK air-to-air missiles. (via B. A.)

One of a few MiG-23MLDs acquired from Belarus and subsequently rebuilt by The Works at Nayrab AB wears the serial number 4000. This aircraft is still operational with No. 678 Squadron, and regularly standing quick-reaction alert at Hama AB. (via B. A.)

Closing Words Almost forty-five years since its first appearance in Syria, it appears all too easy to declare not only the entire MiG-23-family, but its deployment in the Middle East in particular, for a ‘conceptual mistake of the first degree’. If so, the question is who is to blame? The MiG OKB did its best to develop the fighter-interceptor the Soviet military theoreticians of the early 1960s wanted to have. The result was a powerful and fast aircraft, which proved manufacturable in large numbers, and adaptable to counter most – even though not all – the new threats, and that was originally attracting as much attention as derivatives of the Su-27/30-family do in our day. Over the following decade, military pilots of the VVS and the PVO, and multiple foreign military services went to great extents to adapt that design to emerging requirements. However, its basic concept was still that of a ‘hands-off interceptor’, remotely controlled from the ground. Such a design had its limits, foremost of which was that it always remained dependent upon support from a well-equipped IADS. As discussed extensively, this is something 66

that has rarely happened – and when it did, then the integrated air defence systems in question have proven as hopelessly obsolete in comparison to air warfare systems deployed by the opposition. This is the result of not only an entire series of mistakes in the Soviet military thinking, but another series of mistakes in the Soviet politics of arms exports, and at least as many mistakes in the arms acquisition policy of multiple governments (and top ranks of their militaries) in the Middle East. On the contrary, despite all the possible problems, pilots and ground crews of air forces in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria have accepted and flew the aircraft from the MiG-23-family with great enthusiasm, and often deployed them in a fashion considered ‘impossible’ even by its designers. Ironically, while most of Middle Eastern MiG23 pilots have had distinguished careers, and while dozens have paid the ultimate price, as so often, their service for their nations is largely ignored, if not outright forgotten, and at least as often belittled or misinterpreted. This is a mix for which neither the pilots nor ground crews that operated MiG-23s can be blamed.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Babich, (Col) V. Kirilovich, ‘MiG-23 Fighters in Lebanon War’, Aviation and Time (in Russian) Babich, (Col) V. Kirilovich, Interceptors Change Tactics (Moscow, 1983) (in Russian) Centre for Military Studies, The History of the Syrian Army (in Arabic), (Damascus, Centre for Military Studies, 2001-2002) Cohen, Col E., Israel’s Best Defense (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1993, ISBN 1-85310-484-1) Cooper, T., Weinert P., Hinz F. & Lepko M., African MiGs, MiGs and Sukhois in Service in Sub-Saharan Africa, Volume 1: Angola to Ivory Coast (Houston, Harpia Publishing, 2010, ISBN 978-0-98255395-4) Cooper, T., Nicolle, D., with Nordeen, L., Salti, P., and Smisek, M., Arab MiGs, Volume 4: Attrition War, 1967-1973 (Houston, Harpia Publishing, 2013, ISBN 978-09854554-1-5) Cooper, T., Nicolle, D., with Müller, H., Nordeen, L., and Smisek, M., Arab MiGs, Volume 5: October 1973 War, Part 1 (Houston, Harpia Publishing, 2014, ISBN978-0-9854554-4-6) Cooper, T., Nicolle, D., with Grandolini, A., Nordeen, L., and Smisek, M., Arab MiGs, Volume 6: October 1973 War, Part 2 (Houston, Harpia Publishing, 2015, ISBN 978-0-9854554-6-0) Cooper, T., Grandolini, A., and Delalande, A., Libyan Air Wars, Part 1 (Solihull, Helion & Co Ltd., 2014, ISBN 978-1909982-39-0) Cooper, T., Grandolini, A. and Delalande, A., Libyan Air Wars, Part 2 (Solihull, Helion & Co Ltd, 2016, ISBN 978-1-910294-53-6) Cooper, T., Grandolini, A., and Delalande, A., Libyan Air Wars, Part 3 (Solihull, Helion & Co Ltd, 2016, ISBN 978-1-910294-54-3) Cooper, T., ‘Floggers in Action: Early MiG-23s in Operational Service’, Air Enthusiast, Volume 100/July-August 2002 Cooper, T., ‘Algerian Fighter Deal Threatened’, Combat Aircraft, January 2008 Cooper, T., Canyon, C., Grandolini, A., ‘Libyens Luftwaffe – von König Idris bis Oberst Gaddafi’, Fliegerrevue Extra 29 Cooper, T. & Grandolini, A., ‘Ewiges Vergelten: Der amerikanischlibysche Dauerkonflikt‘, Fliegerrevue Extra 32 Cooper, T., ‘Wie MIG und Ikrut Kunden verprellen’, Fliegerrevue, September 2010 Cooper, T., ‘Aufstand in Libyen’, Fliegerrevue, April 2011 Cooper, T., ‘Alte MiG-23 kommt zu neuen Ehren’, Fliegerrevue, December 2009 Cooper, T., ‘The Libyan Story’, Combat Aircraft, November 2011 Cooper, T., ‘Out of the Darkness: the Modern Algerian Air Force’, Combat Aircraft, Cooper, T., ‘The Syrian Air Battle’, Combat Aircraft, July 2013 Cooper, T., ‘Fencer Shoot-Down Analysis’, Combat Aircraft, February 2016 Cooper, T., ‘Air Power in Decline’, Air Forces Monthly, June 2017 Cooper, T., ‘La Force Aérienne Algérienne’, Airpower, September 2017 Cooper, T., ‘Wo Steht Syriens Luftwaffe heute?’, Fliegerrevue, February 2018 Delalande, A., ‘Libyan MiG-23BNs prepared for Service’, Combat Aircraft, July 2016 Dildy, Douglas C., Cooper, T., F-15C Eagle vs MiG-23/25, Iraq 1991 (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2016, ISBN: 978-1-4728-1270-4) Flintham, V., Air Wars and Aircraft: a Detailed Record of Air Combat 1945 to the Present (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1989; ISBN 0-85368-779-X)

Green, S., Living by the Sword: America and Israel in the Middle East (Brottleboro, Amana Books, 1988; ISBN 0-915597-60-8) Gunston, B., An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighters and Attack Aircraft (London, Salamander Books Ltd., 1980, ISBN 86101-055-8) Hooton, E., R., Cooper, T., Nadimi, F., The Iran-Iraq War, Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4 (Solihull, Helion & Co Ltd, 2016-2018) Ilyin, V., ‘MiG-23: Long Path to Perfection’, Aviation and Time (in Russian) Ilyin, V., ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’, Aviation and Time (in Russian) Isaev, S., Pages of the History of the 32nd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, Part 2, Shatalovo, 1968-1989 (online publication available at militera.lib.ru) Iraqi Ministry of Defence, History of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Part 17; The Establishment of the Iraqi Air Force and its Development (in Arabic), (Baghdad, Iraqi Ministry of Defence, 1988) Iraqi Air Force & Air Defence Command, The Role of the Air Force and Air Defence in the Mother of All Battles: After Action Report (selfpublished for internal use, 5 November 1991, captured in 2003 and translated as ‘A 1991 Dossier on the Role of the Iraqi Air Force in the Gulf War’, by the US Department of Defence-sponsored Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC Record Number SHAADF-D-000-396) in the course of the ‘Project Harmony’) Khalil, Maj-Gen. Abed al-Menahim, Egyptian Wars in Modern History (in Arabic), (Beirut, Dar Mustakbal al-Arabi, 1990) Konzelmann, G., Damaskus: Oase Zwischen Hass und Hoffnung (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein Buch, 1996; ISBN 3-548-35588-9) Kotlobovskiy, A. B., MiG-21 in Local Wars (Kiev, ArchivPress, 1997) (in Russian) Markovskiy, V., ‘Hot June 1982: Syrian Strike Aircraft in the Fourth Arab-Israeli War’, World Weapons, No. 3/2006 (in Russian) Mladenov, A., ‘MiG-23MLD vs Western Fighters: The Soviet Air Force View’, Air Forces Monthly, October 2003 Moukiiad, Maj-Gen Mohammad Assad, My Life (az-Zakhira, Damascus, 2005), (in Arabic) Newdick, T., Modern Israeli Air Power (Houston, Harpia Publishing LLC, 2013; ISBN 978-0-985455-2-2) Omar, Maj-Gen K. K., Memoirs of the Iraqi Air Force CO (unpublished document in Arabic) Riad, M., The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (Consett, Quartet Books, 1981) ISBN: 978-0704322974 Sa’aydon, M. as-, Pilot Memoir (privately published document, 2005) Sadat, A. el-, In Search of Identity (Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1977, ISBN 0-060137428) Sadik, Brig Gen A., and COOPER, T. Iraqi Fighters, 1953–2003: Camouflage & Markings (Houston, Harpia Publishing, 2008; ISBN 978-0-615-21414-6) Sergievsky, A., ‘Fire in the Prairie’, VKO Magazine, No. 4/17, 2004 (in Russian) Shukairy, A., The Great Defeat; Major Defeat of Kings and Presidents (Cairo, Arab Foundation for Publishing and Distribution, 2005) Tereshenko, N. M., ‘Mission in Damascus’, Military History Magazine 12/1990 Villiers, G. de, Sabre au clair et pied au plancher: mémoires (Fayard, 2005, EAN 9782213622552)

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NOTES 1 Another classic example of the status of publicly-available information on MiG-23s are reports – launched by most acclaimed experts on the Soviet and Russian military aviation – about deliveries of this type to additional countries in the Middle East, foremost including the former South Yemen. As described in sister publication Hot Skies over Yemen, Volume 1, Yemen never received any kind of MiG-23s. 2 Some Soviet radars from this period – such as SON-4 and P-20 – were already copies of US radar systems delivered to the USSR during the World War II within the frame of the Lend-Lease program. 3 More precisely, the early Vozdukh-1 consisted of following major elements: Object 2B (the station – incluidng a Zil-157K truck, trailer, and ESD-60 electric generator – receiving information from early warning radars and forwarding this information to the command post, 8D); Object 8D (command post, consisting of a ZiL-157K truck, trailer and the ESD-60 electric generator, providing by information from the 2D to the higher level); Object 11D (including Objects 15D and 21D, which served as command posts for an air defence division); and Object 6B (two trailers and a radio station that served as ground control for manned interceptors). 4 The Lasour is transliterated in different fashion, and often known as ‘Lazur’. 5 A dual-key arrangement was found along which these US-owned weapons were kept on or near Starfighter-bases in Europe. For details, see ‘Lockheed F-104 Starfighter’, Wings of Fame, Volume 2, 1996. 6 Cooper et al, Arab MiGs, Volume 5, pp.29 & 48. 7 Exact identity of the VVS’ MiG-23M unit planned to be deployed to Egypt in 1972 remains unclear. Isaev, in his onlinebook covering history of the 32nd Guards Interceptor Aviation Regiment (see Bibliography) states that in 1972, the 2nd Squadron of that regiment received MiG-23Ms painted in an ‘unusual colour scheme’, ‘normally used on MiG-21s exported in the Middle East and Africa’. 8 Cooper et al, Arab MiGs, Volume 5, 48 & Abdallah Emran (leading EAF-researcher), interview, November 2017. 9 In comparison, the RP-22 installed in the MiG-23S and the MiG-21bis of the V-VS had three selectable carrier frequency settings and a slightly better range. 10 Considering it was during the same year, in 1963, that the Egyptians requested the delivery of exactly the same kind of a fighter-bomber – namely one capable of operating at speeds in excess of 1,000km/h while underway at low altitude and carrying 3,000kg of bombs – and how many of the Egyptian modifications on their MiG-21s and Sukhoi Su-7BMKs were subsequently adapted by the Soviets, it is perfectly possible that the VVS’ request for such a fighter-bomber was at least ‘influenced’ by the Egyptian requirement. 11 ‘Adel’ (retired communications officer of the Algerian armed forces; name changed and exact qualification withheld for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interviews, January 2005 & February 2018. 12 Brigadier-General Hayyan al-Masry, interview, April 2001 & Tom Cooper, ‘Floggers in Action’. 13 ‘Outgoing Message’, COMINT, CIA/WHSS, 4 April 1974, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room (henceforth ‘CIA/FOIA/ ERR’). In comparison, another US intelligence document – 68

Memorandum For (deleted), OSR/ER/MEA, from 28 March 1975 (available at the CIA/FOIA/ERR) is citing first deliveries of MiG-23s to Syria in May 1974. 14 ‘Boudros’ (retired MiG-21 pilot, SyAAF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, March 2007; ‘Hussam’ (retired MiG-21 and MiG-25 pilot, SyAAF), interview, October 2017; retired DIA analyst, interview provided on condition of anonymity, February 2001 & Gunston, Modern Fighters and Attack Aircraft, p.109. Amongst Soviet instructors present in Syria of the time was Konstantin V Sukhov, former fighter pilot credited with 22 victories during World War II. He served as the chief air combat advisor from 1973 until 1975, and was highly decorated by Hafez al-Assad in 1989. In the 1990s, Sukhov published a number of articles about air combats of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War in the specialised Russian press. 15 ‘Boudros’, interview, March 2007; ‘Duha’ (retired SyAADFofficer; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, August 2004 and March 2007; ‘Hashim’ (retired SyAADF-officer; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, March 2005 and March 2006; ‘Jabbar’ (retired officer of the Syrian Military intelligence; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, June 2003 and March 2006; for further details on establishment of the SyAADF, see Arab MiGs, Volume 5. 16 Ibid; ‘Nabil’ (retired SA-6 operator, SyAADF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, April 2001, March 2007 and October 2007 & Dr. Aleksander Andreevich Raspletin, History PVO website (historykpvo.narod2.ru), 2013. Unless otherwise stated, a crossexamination of transcriptions of interviews from these Syrian sources provided the background for this sub-chapter and most of the Syria-related content of this book. 17 Green, pp.154-155. 18 Terchenko, ‘Mission to Damascus’. 19 Contemporary press releases by AFP & UPI. As far as is known, Yasin’s aircraft experienced no technical malfunctions during that flight: he landed safely and his MiG-23MS was subsequently acquired by the IrAF. Two days later, Captain Ahmed Abdul Qadir at-Tarmanini, a veteran of the October 1973 War, defected to Iraq while flying a MiG-21 after refusing to bomb the Palestinian refugee camp outside the village of Tel Za’atar, in Lebanon. Tarmanini subsequently followed a highly successful career with the IrAF: after serving as deputy Commander of No. 17 Squadron (which flew MiG-21s from Rashid AB, in the late 1970s), he served as Deputy Commander of the Air Force Academy until 1988, and reached the rank of Major-General before retiring in the 1990s. 20 Retired DIA analyst, interview provided on condition of anonymity, February 2001. 21 Frunze is nowadays Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. 22 With very few exceptions, essentially all of the interviewed pilots of air forces of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya are stressing that the Soviets, and then Russians have never taught them more about flying, but how to take-off, navigate around their air base, and land. Until today, all requests for realistic tactical training have been turned down by Moscow. As recently as of 2017, when officers of one of the countries in question requested

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

23

24 25

26

27

28 29

30

31

32

tactical training including deployment of on-board weapons, the Russians only provided their standard answer for such cases: ‘You learn to fight in your own country’. Notably, early MiG-23s exported to the Middle East were initially equipped with the SPO-3 Sirena-3 RWR system. MiG23MFs and then MiG-23MLs exported in the mid-1980s were usually equipped with the slightly more advanced, but still insufficient SPO-10 Sirena-3M. Only a handful of Iraqi MiG23MLs were further modified through the addition of the SPO15 Beryoza RWR system, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Abdelmajid-Tayari (former MiG-23 pilot, LAAF), interviews, September 2017-February 2018. The Americans in question were hired via the company OSI-SA Import-Export Co., based in Great Britain, but run by two former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Frank E Tespil and Edwin P Wilson. To better cover-up their business in Libya, Tespil and Wilson contracted a number of foreign pilots to serve with the LAAF via a Swiss-based company, SCFMO, and the Libyan para-military company Jamahiriya Air Transport. While most US pilots – but also two Britons and several Frenchmen – flew Lockheed C-130H Hercules transports (also during operations in Chad), two of them had enough experiences on fast jets and technical knowledge to help the LAAF write an entirely new flight manual for MiG-23s. For full details on this and other related affairs, see the mini-series Libyan Air Wars, Volumes 1 & 2, published in the Africa@War series. Hawker Siddeley Harrier for the Democratic Republic of Algeria, Volume 1, 20 April 1974 & CIA, Algeria: Air Force Modernization, NESA 83-10214C, September 1983, CIA/FOIA/ERR. ‘Amazigh’ (retired Su-7/MiG-23BN pilot, QJJ; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, August 2004 and September 2016 & CIA, The Conflict in Western Sahara, June 1977, CIA/FOIA/ERR. ‘Adel’, interview, April & May 2017 & Dr. Aleksander Andreevich Raspletin, History PVO website (historykpvo.narod2.ru), 2013. ‘Akeem’ (retired officer of the Algerian armed forces; name changed and exact position withheld for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interviews, August 2004, January 2005, February 2008 and October 2015 & Dr. Aleksander Andreevich Raspletin, History PVO website (historykpvo.narod2.ru), 2013. It’s notable that the ‘Independence Day parades’ in Algeria used to be staged on 1 November, every five years, in commemoration of 1 November 1954 – the first day of the uprising against the French rule. The last such parade took place on 1 November 1989, when Sukhoi Su-24s were shown for the first time in public. It’s notable that the Izdeliye-23-11B should have been exported without the Lasour datalink protocol, without ECCM-capability, and without compatibility with R-60 missiles. Whether this was the case in Syria remains unclear. In comparison, Warsaw Pact air forces were granted permission to order Izdeliye-23-11A, which was nearly identical to Soviet MiG-23Ms. National Intelligence Daily Cable, CG NIDC 77-94C, , 23 April 1977, CIA/FOIA/ERR. Ironically, most of this deal was financed by Saudi Arabia, which – curious to suppress the power of the Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein (renowned for his hatred for the government in Riyadh) – not only supported the government in Damascus as a counterweight to that in Baghdad, but emboldened the Assad Regime to support the forces behind the ‘Islamic’ Revolution in Iran, too. For details, see Konzelmann, pp.330-331.

33 ‘Boudros’, interview, March 2007; ‘Duha’, interview, August 2004; ‘Hashim’, interview, March 2005; ‘Jabbar’, interview, June 2003; ‘Mouhannad’ (retired MiG-21 and Su-22 pilot, SyAAF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, August 2004 & ‘Talal’ (former SA-6 operator, SyAAF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interviews, April 2001 and August 2004. 34 Syrian sources differ over the date at which some of SyAAF units were re-designated through the addition of digit 6 or 9 in front of their designation. According to one version, this happened in 1970; according to the other, only during the Soviet-induced reorganisation of the SyAAF in 1981. The exact background of the new system remains unclear but it is known that Nos. 95, 97, 98 and 99 Squadrons were re-designated as 695, 697, 698, and 699, while Nos. 67 (considered premier interceptor unit of the SyAAF in period 1967-1982) and 77 Squadrons retained their original designations. 35 Brigadier-General Ahmad Sadik (IrAF, ret.), interview, October 2007 & Ali Tobchi (former engineer in the Iraqi defence sector), diverse interviews since 2010. Unless stated otherwise, all the further Iraq-related information in this book was sourced from or via Sadik and Tobchi. 36 Major-General Alwan al-Abossi, ‘In Memory of a Comprehensive Response’, published online (in Arabic), September 2010. 37 Captain Mohammed F. al-Jassim, interview, February 2018. According to Sadik, the downed F-5E wore the serial 3-7121. The Iranians have credited this loss to an Iraqi SAM. It’s notable that in regards of the Iran-Iraq War is that both sides are firmly convinced that most of their losses were caused by SAMs – or other means of ground-based air defences – and this regardless of the evidence provided by the other side. Correspondingly, not only is every single claim for an aerial victory fiercely disputed by diverse researchers: what little in regards of official documentation from either side became available by now, is all instently crediting every loss to any other reason but enemy interceptors. 38 Major-General Fawzy Barzinji, ‘History of Battle Falcons in Year 1981’, algardenia.com, 17 March 2014. This and all subsequent citations from Barzinji are based on citations from the same article. 39 For full-coverage of the LAAF’s involvement in the war in Chad, see the mini-series ‘Libyan Air Wars’, published in the Africa@ War series. 40 While Tanoua was the official designation of this air base, it seems to have been rarely used. To most of LAAF pilots it was simply known as ‘Aouzou’, although the oasis with that name is more than 50km (27nm) further south. 41 V. A. Dudchenko, ‘Commentary to “Syrian Sketches” by O Akopov’, Art of war (magazine), 25 April 2007 (in Russian); V. A. Dudchenko, ‘Persona non grata’, Art of war, 17 March 2009 (in Russian) & Cooper, Syrian Conflagration, p.9. 42 A. N. Pochtarjov, ‘On the Lebanese Track‘, Red Star, 28 February 2002. 43 ‘Boudros’, interview, March 2007. All nine losses were semiofficially confirmed by Moukiiad, in Chapter 6 of his book, My Life (see Bibliography). 44 Konzelmann, pp.331-335 & Markovskiy, ‘Hot June 1982’. 45 In 1983, V. K. Babich, decorated the Hero of the Soviet Union already in the 1970s, gained even some prominence in the West, through his book, ‘Interceptors Change Tactics’.

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46 Ilyin, ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’ & ‘We were not only Advisors: we have fought Wars in Syria’, survincity.com, 1 March 2013. 47 Moukiiad, Chapter 6 (citing the Bureau of Chief-of-Staff SyAAF & SyAADF, 31 January 2005) & Konzelmann, pp.334336. Abazza was a highly-decorated veteran of wars with Israel, 1967-1973, and was appointed Chief-of-Staff SyAAF on 1 July 1978. 48 Cohen, p.443. 49 According to G. P. Yashkin, in ‘We fought in Syria’, VKO, 4/1988, Syrian SAM-units deployed inside Lebanon shot-down three F-16s and one F-15 within days of their arrival, though there is little, if any, evidence to support the claim. 50 Description of the SyAADF’s IADS as deployed in Lebanon of 1981 as provided by ‘Duha’, ‘Hashim’, and ‘Nabil’, in interviews cited above. Another of the interviewed Syrian officers, and one of interviewed Algerian officers (who was briefed about Syrian experiences from Lebanon in 1981-1982), have described the resulting ‘integration’ as ‘ridiculous’. Independently from each other, they all observed that this resulted in the information being provided on three or four different scopes, each of which was presenting the data in different format. In action, many Syrian officers thus preferred acting on their own rather than depending on the centralized IADS and waiting for commands from above. 51 Konzelmann, pp.327-335 & Cooper, Syrian Conflagration. 52 ‘Mouhannad’, interview, August 2004 & ‘Talal’, interviews, April 2001 and August 2004. 53 Data on E-2C Hawkeye based on Ian Shaw & Sergio Santana, Beyond the Horizon: The History of AEW&C Aircraft (Harpia Publishing, 2014). 54 Ilyin, ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’. Note that this was not the first kill ever scored by MiG-23s: for details on the actual ‘first’, see further below. 55 Ilyin, in ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’ – and most of other Russian-language publications based on that and similar articles – claim that the MiG-23MFs have shot down two F-16s during this engagement, both with R-23s, while losing one of their own to the F-15s. However, there is no evidence for the IDF/AF suffering such losses on that day. Furthermore, all of the interviewed Syrian pilots stress their standard formations were pairs and four-ships, not trios, as described in nearly all of Russian-language publications. 56 Markovskiy, ‘Hot June 1982’. 57 Claim for the number of Syrian SAM-sites knocked out as published by Dr Uri Milstein, ‘Mole Cricket: Israel Destroyed Syrian Missiles and Soviet Doctrine’, Ma’ariv, 4 June 2016. Accordingly, another two SAM-sites were claimed on 10 June, and two more on 11 June. Syrian sources – including ‘Duha’, interview, August 2004; Hashim’, interview, March 2005; ‘Nabil’, interview, April 2001; ‘Mouhannad’, interview, August 2004 & ‘Talal’, interviews, April 2001 and August 2004 – confirm that 14 SAM-sites were hit on 9 June, but stress that 12 of these were back in operations on the next day. 58 Cohen, pp.460-469; Flintham, p.70; Lambeth, pp.8-10; Matthew M Hurley, ‘The Bekaa Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned?’, Airpower Journal, Vol.III/No.4, Winter 1989; Nordeen, pp.171-173; Ilyin, ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’ & Milstein, ‘Mole Cricket’. Milstein pointed out that the deployment of Israeli ECM/ECCM stations was so intensive, that by the end of Operation Mole Cricket-19 many of the systems involved had developed problems caused by overheating. 70

59 ‘Adad’ (retired Su-7/20/22 pilot, SyAAF; full name withheld for concerns about personal safety), interview, May 1996; Ilyin, ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’ & Markovskiy, ‘Hot June 1982’. The Israelis claimed a total of 25 Syrian aircraft and 3 helicopters shot down on 10 June 1982. The full break-down of Syrian claims for 10 June 1982 remains unknown. 60 Flintham, p.70 listed initial Western estimates for total Israeli losses with ‘at least 13 aircraft, including an F-16, an F-4, two A-4s, an AH-1 and an AB.212’. Soviet reports as according to Ilyin, ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’. The Israelis claimed 18 Syrian aircraft and several helicopters on 11 June 1982 and a total of 85 Syrian fighters and 5 helicopters between 6 and 11 June 1982. 61 Ibid; Ilyin, ‘MiG-23: Long Path to Perfection’ & Markovskiy, ‘Hot June 1982’. For details about the Soviet propaganda campaign launched in reaction to the Syrian defeat of June 1982, see Lambeth, Moscow’s Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War. On the contrary, far away from the eyes of the public, the VVS started studying latest Western fighters far more seriously. One of the results of related efforts was the ‘Top Secret’ study ‘Aide-Memoire for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E, and Kfir C.2’, released in 1983. This clearly concluded that while the ‘MiG-23MLD(export)’ version has better turning performances than the Kfir C.2, and slightly better turning performances than the F-4 Phantom II, it is definitely inferior to the F-15 and F-16; that while having a radar comparable to that of the F-4E, the MiG-23MLD(export)’s avionics was inferior to that of US-made ‘teen fighters’, and that the MiG-23 should avoid not only frontal confrontations, but also any kind of prolonged dogfights. For details see Alexander Mladenov, ‘MiG-23MLD vs Western Fighters’ (full citation in Bibliography): curiously, while frequently plagiarised by diverse Russian authors ever since, even this is usually misquoted and misinterpreted by the same. 62 Data based on cross-examination of figures provided in interviews with ‘Adad’, May 1996; ‘Boudros’, March 2007; ‘Jabbar’, June 2003 and March 2006; ‘Mouhannad’, August 2004. Notably, the Assad regime has not permitted the publication of even one authoritative account of the fighting from June 1982 to any Syrian military officers: instead, it is following the policy of actively suppressing any kind of serious research to this topic – whether by Syrians or by foreigners. The former Syrian Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Mustafa Tlass (who used to own a publishing company, Dar Tlass, that – amongst others – frequently plagiarised different military publications from the West), did publish several books and articles touching the topic, but all of these are either discussing the politics, or degenerating into poetry. Officially at least, the SyAAF thus remained the ‘silent service’ (its colloquial designation among insiders). 63 Flintham, p.70. 64 A. Sadchikov, ‘Flashpoint Syria: When Games could lead to War’, ITAR-TASS, 5 September 2013 & S. A. Kolomnin, ‘Soldiers from four Continents and three Oceans’, Independent Military Education (magazine), 24 February 2012 (in Russian). Operation Kavkaz was the code-name for the deployment of Soviet PVO units in Egypt, in 1970-1972. Involved in the Operation Kavkaz-2 were the 202, 220 and 231 Air Defence Regiments PVO (the latter two were equipped with SA-5s), an independent helicopter squadron and several land-based units equipped for electronic warfare. 65 According to reports from unofficial sources in Russia, the MiG23MLs delivered to Syria were originally manufactured as MiG-

MIG-23 FLOGGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

23MLA (Izdeliye-23-16) – which was a sub-variant of the MiG23ML developed for the PVO. In Syria, they were originally known as ‘23-12s’, which puts such reports under a question mark. Furthermore, contrary to MiG-23MLAs, Syrian MiG23MLs could not use any R-24 missiles before their upgrade to Izdeliye-23-22B standard, which took place in 1984-1987 period. 66 G. P. Yashkin, ‘We fought in Syria’, Vestnik PVO, 4/1988 & Ilyin, ‘MiG-23 in the Middle East’ & ‘MiG-23: Long Path to Perfection’. 67 By the time most of the S-200s were handed over to the Syrians, and majority of Soviet instructors assigned to the SyAAF and the SyAADF was re-located to the T-4 AB. 68 Sadik, interviews, March & October 2007. It is possible, but remains unconfirmed, that the MiG-23MLs delivered to Iraq were second-hand aircraft taken from stocks of the VVS, and originally manufactured as MiG-23MLAs. Certain only is that the Iraqis called them the MiG-23MLs. 69 The last CO of No. 39 Squadron while this was still equipped with MiG-23MS’ was Major Alla’a Abid Atya. A new No. 39 Squadron was established in 1987, and equipped with MiG-29s. 70 Ali Tobchi, interview, February 2018. 71 Standard tactics for MiG-23 interceptors was to power-up the radar only when the target was within range, in order not to warn the enemy crew about own presence and an imminent attack. 72 Sadik, interview, March 2005 & Tobchi, diverse interviews since 2010. 73 Abdul Rahman al-Obeidi, interview, April 2017. 74 The IRIAF did lose six RF-4Es in combat during the war with Iraq, but not one of these was shot down between 1981 and 1986, and none ever by a MiG-23. For details see, Leon Manoucherians, ‘RF-4E: the incredible Story of Iranian Photo Phantoms and the Pilots that flew them, the most daring reconnaissance missions during the Iran-Iraq War’, Iranian Aviation Review No. 12. 75 Sadik, interview, March 2005, citing Colonel Ismael Abdul Jabar an-Naqeeb. 76 Ibid & Captain Mohammed F al-Jasim, interview, February 2018. According to another version, the successful Iraqi pilot should have been 1st Lieutenant Ismael Abdul Jabar an-Naqeeb, from No. 69 Squadron. However, according to information provided by Ali Tobchi, while indeed claiming a kill against an IRIAF F-14, Naqeeb should have scored his kill ‘in summer 1983’ – when no Iranian Tomcats are known to have been shot down. 77 Sadik, interview, March 2006 & Farzin Nadimi, conference on the ‘International Impact of the Iran-Iraq War’, at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), September 2010. 78 Jasim, interview, February 2018. According to information from available Iranian sources, the IRIAF credited its F-14-crew with at least one kill, while its Tomcat should have been shot down by an ‘Iraqi Mirage’. 79 Analytical Study of Iraqi Aircraft Attrition During the Iran-Iraq War, IrAF, English translation provided by Brigadier-General Ahmad Sadik, October 2007. 80 ‘Ali Thani’ (former MiG-23 pilot, LAAF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, April 2001. Unless stated otherwise, this and all following citations from Ali Thani are based on transcription of the same interview. 81 Abdelmajid Tayari (former MiG-23 pilot, LAAF), interviews, September 2017-February 2018.

82 Ibid; official LAAF documentation – probably the related Soviet documentation too – cited all of the aircraft in question as ‘MiG23MLDs’. 83 Abdelmajid-Tayari, interviews, September 2017-February 2018. 84 ‘Abdoul Hassan’ (former MiG-23-pilot, LAAF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, March 2009. Unless stated otherwise, this and all following citations from Abdoul Hassan are based on transcription of the same interview. It’s notable that by 1986, the Libyans began utilising R-24s on their MiG-23MFs, instead of R-23s. Although similar to the earlier Iraqi adaptation, the corresponding modification was undertaken by technicians of the No. 1060 Squadron – LAAF’s oldest and most experienced unit of MiG-23s – at the initiative of their squadron commander, and without any influence from Iraq. 85 ‘Ramzi Souma’ (former MiG-23-pilot, LAAF; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, March 2009. 86 Villiers, pp.197-199. 87 For details about Operation Prairie Fire, see Libyan Air Wars, Volume 2. 88 Abdelmajid Tayari, interviews, September 2017-February 2018. 89 For extensive coverage of the following action, see Libyan Air Wars, Volume 3. 90 Abdelmajid Tayari, interviews, September 2017-February 2018. 91 Ibid. 92 ‘Abdoul Hassan’, interview, March 2009. 93 The CRA was officially declared operational only in 1998-1999, by when it included a unique integration of US-made radars (like AN/TPS-78 and AN/TPS-703), with such Soviet-made combat aircraft like MiG-29s (and, later on, Su-30s). Lately, Algeria entered negotiations for the acquisition of the Russianmade Polyana ATMS, which – should it be acquired – would be integrated into the (S)CRA. Nowadays, the CFDAT is operating a three-tier network of (US-made) early warning radar stations, Soviet/Russian-made radars (used as reserve and gap-fillers). Its Russian-made SA-3 (12 SAM-sites) and SA-10/12 SAMs (3 SAM-sites) are integrated into three local IADS, designated ‘Groupement des Moyens Anti Aériens (GMAA), used only for air defence of three strategically important areas in the country, and deployed as follows: 12° GMAA is defending Oran, Tafaraoui, Bou-Sfer and Mers el-Kebir, the Senia International Airport, and – in cooperation with the 21° Air Defence Group of the Army – Arzew; 13° GMAA is defending the town of Tindouf, the nearby air base, and the camps of West Saharan refugees controlled by the POLISARIO; 14° CGMAA is protecting Algiers. 94 ‘Adel’, interviews in August 2004 and January 2005. 95 ‘Radhouen‘ (retired officer of the Algerian armed forces, stationed at Annaba AB as of 1988; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interviews, March and April 2017. 96 ‘Akeem’, interview, October 2015. 97 Sadik, interview, October 2007. 98 The aircraft in question wore serial numbers 23252, 23260, 23269, 23292, 23267, 23279, 23282, 23288, 23278, and 23290. As of August 1990, the work was complete only on the MiG23ML 23269. Due to the separation of Croatia from the former Yugoslavia, this aircraft was subsequently flown to Batajnica AB, outside Belgrade. The other nine – all dismantled – were later transferred to a logistic support base of the Serbian military at Pancevo. Not one was ever returned to Iraq. 71

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 12

99 The Role of the Air Force and Air Defence in the Mother of all Battles, p.27 & Appendix to Iraqi Air Power Study Showing Losses from 1991 War (Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00030181). It’s notable that the former document is neither citing the existence of MiG23BN-equipped No. 29 Squadron, nor the MiG-23MF-equipped No. 63 Squadron, or the MiG-23ML-equipped No. 93 Squadron as of January 1991, although the latter document clearly shows that far more aircraft were available, and all the other available Iraqi sources confirm that these three units were still operational. 100 Dildy et al, pp.41-43. 101 To add salt to the injury, because the commander of the SOC West IrAF was uncertain about the reasons for Hassan’s loss, and suspected that this MiG-23ML was shot down by air defences of Talha, he subsequently deleted even the notion of this scramble from his after-action report. Instead, Hassan’s death and destruction of his MiG-23ML were credited to aerial bombardment. 102 Dildy et al, p.58. 103 Ibid, pp.58-63. Three different USAF F-15C-pilots were credited with a total of three kills in this engagement, while all available Iraqi sources stress there were only three MiG-23MLs around, and that one of these survived. 104 Sadik, interview, October 2007 & Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-000301818. The Report in question describes the destruction of the one MiG-23ML after crossing the border as the result of ‘bad weather’, but multiple Iranian sources have provided clear recollections about the downing of that aircraft by IRGC-operated anti-aircraft cannons. 105 There is some discrepancy between diverse related Iraqi reports: some cite the total of 15 different MiG-23s as flown to Iran (of which 14 should have landed safely), while most cite only seven, and do not mention the one MiG that was shot down by the Iranian air defences. 106 ‘Adel’, diverse interviews, 2004-2017. 107 Ibid & ‘Akeem’, diverse interviews, 2003-2015. 108 ‘Akeem’, interview, October 2015. 109 ‘Adel’ & ‘Akeem’, diverse interviews, 2003-2015. 110 Ibid. 111 Sadik, interview, October 2007. 112 Christopher Olgiati, ‘Libya: Muamar Gaddafi’s Secrets finally revealed‘, BBC, 3 February 2014. 113 The following sub-chapter is based on research by Arnaud Delalande from France, run with help of first-hand sources in Libya, and via the ACIG.info forum, in cooperation with Pit Weinert from Germany. The same resulted in publishing of multiple articles in specialised magazines in Germany, Great Britain, and France (see Bibliography).

72

114 The two Mirages of the LDAF were flown by foreign mercenaries only. 115 The LNA/AF is known to have operated the MiG-23UB with serial number 8213 until its crash in August 2014, and MiG23ML with serial number 6452 until late 2014; MiG-23ML serial number 6472 is known to have crashed in January 2016, while the MiG-23ML with serial number 6132 and the MiG23UB with serial number 7834 were lost a month later. This means that MiG-23MLs 6132 and 6472, or the MiG-23UB were possible ‘killers’. 116 ‘Duha’, ‘Hashim’, and ‘Nabil’, diverse interviews, as cited above. 117 ’SyAAF MiG-23MLs in Krasnodar’, Luftwaffe A.S blog (luftwaffeas.blogspot.co.at), 27 November 2012. 118 UN Conventional Arms Register & Cooper, ‘Alte MiG-23 kommt zu neuen Ehren’, Fliegerrevue 12/2009. 119 Ibid; ‘Mouhannad’, interview, August 2004; ‘Ismael’ (former SyAAF MiG-21/Su-22/Su-24 pilot; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, November 2015; ‘Mohammad’ (former SyAAF MiG21/23 pilot; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interviews, March & April 2015 & ‘Khalid’ (former SyAAF Su-22 pilot; name changed for reasons related to the personal safety of the source and its family), interview, December 2012. 120 ‘Ismael’, interview, November 2015; ‘Mohammad’, interviews, March & April 2015 & ‘Khalid’, interview, December 2012. The author was shown originals of at least two such orders, both issued by the Ba’ath Party HQ to the commanding officer of specific units. The reason for the regime of Bashar al-Assad issuing such orders (and those for deployment of chemical weapons) via the Headquarters of the Ba’ath Party was an attempt to hide the regime’s direct involvement and responsibility: communication links of the Ba’ath Party’s were expected to raise less attention from foreign intelligence services. 121 Between leading defectors were Brigadier-General Mohammed Fares, first and only Syrian cosmonaut, and Deputy Director of the Air Force Intelligence for Dayr az-Zawr, Brigadier-General Mustafa Nassr. 122 ‘Assad kündigt Rede an‘, n-tv, 5 January 2013. 123 The weapon deployed by the Turkish F-16C during this engagement was an AIM-9X Block 1 – one of latest variants of the Sidewinder. 124 Information on these losses was collected by members of the ACIG.info forum and the owner of the blog LuftwaffeAS. blogspot.co.at