British Mission To Cochinchina 1778 - 1822 - Alastair Lamb [PDF]

Zitiervorschau

Volume 34, Faits 3 & 4 - (Nos. 195 & IM)

JOURNAL OF THE MALAYAN BRANCH ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

(Covering tbe territories of the Federation of Malaya, the States of Singapore & Brunei, and the Colonies of Sarawak & North Borneo)

British Missions to Cochin China: 1778 - 1822 compiled and edited by

Alastair Lamb

Printed for the MBRAS by PR1NTCRAFT LTD KUALA LUMPUR

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Copyright MBRAS, 1961

Edited for the Council of the Society by R. ROOLVINK, M.A., D.LITT. ii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Without help from many people it would not have been possible for me to have compiled this work. I would like especially to thank Mr. Douglas Matthews of the India Office Library, London, who searched through records for me and sent me microfilms with miraculous despatch; Dr. C. A. Gibson Hill, who converted some of the microfilms into photostats which are so much easier to work from,

and who provided me with books from the Library of the Raffles Museum, Singapore; Dr. D. K. Bassett, who gave me some very useful advice, and who read the whole work in proof; Miss J. Waller of the University of Malaya in Singapore Library, who tolerated with remarkably little protest a prolonged loan across the Causeway of several books in her charge; Miss Khoo, who typed out Chapman's narrative; and, finally, my wife, who helped in typing, in compiling the index, and in countless other ways.

Alastair Lamb, September, 1961. University of Malaya,

Kuala Lumpur.

iii

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CONTENTS

Page Ch.

1.

Introduction.

Ch. 2. The Genesis of the Chapman Mission A.

The

arrival

of

the

Rumbold

.

B. Hastings proposes to send Chapman to Cochin China.

C.

Chapman's

D.

Ch.

3.

instructions.

French

The

...

intrigues

Chapman

Mission

A. Chapman's narrative. 26 B. C.

Chapman's

Chapman's

return

report to

Bengal.

...

Appendix A. Narrative of the proceedings in Cochin China in 1764-65 by Captain Blomfield of the Admiral

Pocock.

Appendix B. Captain Blomfield's observations on the geography and trade of Cochin China

Ch.

4.

Lord

Macartney

and

Cochin

China,

1793

Appendix. Barrow's text of the Treaty of Versailles of

Ch.

5.

The

A.

First

1787

Roberts

Mission,

1803.

Background

B. David Lance decides not to call in at Cochin China. 101

C. The Select Committee of the Supercargoes at Canton depute Roberts to Cochin China in place of D. E.

Lance.

Roberts'

instructions.

Roberts

at

Tourane

F. Roberts leaves Tourane for Bengal, and submits a report on his mission. ... ... ... ... 113 Ch.

6.

The

Second

Roberts

Mission,

1804.

...

A. Roberts goes to Calcutta and receives instructions from Lord Wellesley for a second visit to Cochin China B.

Roberts

C.

Roberts'

D.

leaves

second

Roberts'

E.

India

for

visit

to

proposals

Roberts'

Cochin

China

Cochin

China

to

the

King

report.

v

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Page Ch. 7. The Failure of the Roberts Missions Discussed. ... 149 A. The Select Committee at Canton consider the reasons for Roberts' failure. ... ... 149 B. Barrow's views on the need for the establishment of British relations with Cochin China. ... 154 C. A French account of the Roberts missions. ... 163 Ch.

8.

The

A.

Crawfurd

Background

B.

Mission,

to

Crawfurd's

the

1822.

mission

instructions

C. The Indian Government explain to the Court of

Directors the motives behind the Crawfurd mission. 183

D. Crawfurd's first report to the Indian Government

on the conclusion of his mission to Cochin China. 187

E. Crawfurd's general report on his mission to Cochin China,

dated

3rd

April,

1823

F. Memorandum by the Court of Directors of the East

India Company, dated 22nd May, 1823, on the

results of the Crawfurd mission to Siam and Cochin China

G.

Ch.

Chaigneau

9.

on

the

Crawfurd

mission

Conclusions

Bibliography

Index

PLATES

Pl. I. A palanquin as used by persons of rank in Cochin China

Pl. II. Cochin Chinese shipping on the Fai-fo River Pl.

III.

Pl.

Pl. Pl.

PI.

Route

IV.

A

of

the

Cochin

Macartney

Chinese

V.

A

Cochin

VI.

A

Cochin

VII.

A

Cochin

Chinese Chinese

Chinese

Embassy

Mandarin

lady

soldier

entertainment

Pl. Vili. A strange shrine in a tree near Tourane.

Pl. IX. A Cochin Chinese Mandarin of the Civil Order in his dress

of

ceremony

Pl. X. A Cochin Chinese Mandarin of the Military Order in his

dress

of

ceremony.

...

Pl. XI. The Deputy Governor of Cambodia in his dress of ceremony

Pl. XII. The King of Cochin China (Minh-Mang) in his dress of

ceremony

vi

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FIGURES AND MAPS Page

Fig. 1. Chart of the coast between Fai-fo and Hué. ... 25 Fig. 2. A village scene in Cochin China: the game of shuttlecock

Fig.

Fig.

3.

4.

A

Boats

on

Cochin

the

Chinese

Fai-fo

temple

River

at

Saigon

Fig. 5. Tourane harbour as it appeared to W. Hamilton, a member of the Macartney Embassy, in 1793. ... 98 Fig. 6. Chart of the Tourane region, from the survey made during

Macartney's

visit

Fig. 7. A map of Cochin China reduced from the Tabula

Geographica Imperii Anamitici of the Right Rev. Jean Louis, Bishop of Isauropolis

Figs. 8 & 9. A map of the Kingdoms of Siam and Cochin China, compiled by John Walker to accompany the journal of

Mr.

Crawfurd's

mission

vii

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

BETWEEN China,1 their narratives form the substance thisBritish volume. BETWEEN These China,1 missions and 1778 their andand failedfailed narratives 1822to four form British theup substance missions of visitedof thistovolume. Cochin British These missions open new areas commerce on preferential terms; they resulted in the founding of no factories or settlements; they did not succeed in establishing a British

representative at Hué; and they form but a backwater in the main stream of British policy in South-East Asia during that period which saw the British acquisition of Penang and Singapore. Though lacking in positive results, however, the story of these four ventures, of Chapman in 1778, Macartney in 1793, Roberts in 1803 and 1804, and Crawfurd in 1822, is still one of considerable interest; for it throws much light on the nature of British commercial and political aspirations to the 1. The term Cochin China requires some explanation. It derives from the Portuguese Cauchichina . a rendering of the Malay Kutchi which would seem to be an attempt to reproduce the Chinese Chiao-chih. Chiao-chih, which to the Chinese meant Tonkin and from which is probably derived the early European name for Hanoi, Cachao, was applied by the Malays to a wider area. To the Portuguese and other Europeans it came to mean the regions of Indochina south of Tonkin. The Portuguese seem to have added the term China to the Malay Kutchi in order to distinguish it from the Cochin in India.

By the 18th century the Europeans had become accustomed to call Annam, that part of Indochina ruled by the Nguyen Dynasty, by the name Cochin China. When, in the early 19th century, the Nguyen had created a united Vietnamese state embracing Tonkin and much of Cambodia and Laos, the term the Cochin Chinese Empire covered the whole of this area; but writers like Crawfurd were always careful to distinguish between Cochin China proper, that is to say Annam with its capital at Hué, and the re*t of the Empire. With the French conquest in the second half of the 19th century Cochin China came to mean the region of the Mekong delta and Saigon, which Crawfurd, in 1822, would have included in his term Kamboja or Cambodia.

I have used Cochin China here in the sense intended by the authors of the narratives and reports printed in this volume, that is to say as the equivalent either of Annam or of the territory ruled by the Nguyen Dynasty at the time in question. I have usually used Vietnam as a racial or linguistic term. In its geographical sense it would be equivalent to the area now formed by the states of Vietnam and Vietminh.

Indochina I have used as a wide geographical term to cover all those regions which eventually came under French rule, Vietnam, Cambodia and

Laos.

(For the origin of the term Cochin China, see : L. Aurousseau,

Sur le nom de "Cochinchine" , BEFEO XXIV: J. Crawfurd, A Descriptive

Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries, London 1856.

D. 105.)

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Alastair Lamb

east of India during this period, on the quest for a solution to the problems of the China trade, and on the final phase of that Anglo-French struggle for eastern dominion which continued for many years after the

classic age of dive and Dupleix. These four missions, moreover, span a fascinating period of Vietnamese history which saw the conversion of

a state divided by dynastic and social war into a united empire determined to isolate itself from the influence of the European Powers.

For these reasons it has seemed worthwhile to assemble some account

of these missions between the covers of a single volume. The narrative of the Chapman mission of 1778 has been printed

before, but it is not easily available in its complete form. Some

passages from it, slightly abridged, were quoted by Staunton in his

account of the Macartney Embassy to China in the section dealing

with Cochin China to which further reference will be made below.

The entire narrative was published, according to Maybon,2 in the Annual Asiatic Register , 1801, and in the Asiatic Journal and Monthly

Register for British India and its Dependencies, Vols. Ill and IV, London 1817. A version, slightly abridged, appeared in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia , Vol. VI, Singapore 1852.

H. Berland made a French translation of the text in the Asiatic

Journal and Monthly Register , which he published in the Bulletin de

la Société des Etudes Indochinoises , NS, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Saigon 1948. Maybon3 also refers to another French translation by MalteBrun, but this I have not been able to see. Harlow gives an admirable summary of the Chapman mission and of the policy behind it.4 The version printed here is from China Factory Records , vol. 18, in the

India Office Library in London, to which I have added Hastings' instructions to Chapman and other documents from Bengal General Consultations and from General letters from Bengal , both series in

the India Office Library. I have also included here extracts from two letters from Chevalier, French Chief at Chandernagore to de Bellecombe, Governor-General at Pondichery, which I have translated from Taboulet's admirable collection of documents on the French connection with Indochina.5

In the summer of 1793 Lord Macartney called in at Tourane on his way to China. While his primary objective was to establish relations with the Chinese Emperor, Macartney's instructions also empowered him to open negotiations with the rulers of Cochin China 2. C. B. Maybon, Histoire Moderne du Pays D' Annám, Paris, 1919, p. ix. 3. Loc. cit.

4. V. T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, Vol. 1, London

1952, pp. 97-102. 5. G. Taboulet, La Geste Française en Indochine , 2 vols., Paris 1955, vol. 1, pp. 156-160.

2

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Missions to Cochin China

if he saw fit, and for this reason I have included in this collection some account of his visit from the narratives of Anderson,6 Barrow7 and Staunton.8

The story of Roberts' two visits to Cochin China, in 1803 and 1804, has been told very briefly by Morse.9 The texts of Roberts' instructions, journals and reports which I have printed here are from Secret Consultations China , vol. 268 for 1802-05, in the India Office

Library. To these I have added the translation of an extract from a letter from M. Janssaud to Count Molé, French Minister of the Marine

and Colonies, dated 15th November, 1818, which gives a French view of the Roberts mission. This letter has been printed by Cordier10 and (in part) by Taboulet.11 The Crawfurd mission to Hué of 1822 has been described at

length in Crawfurd's own account,12 and in that of his companion Finlayson.13 Portions of both these narratives, in so far as they concern Cochin China, have been translated into French by H. Berland.14 Moor printed a summary of the Crawfurd mission in his Notices of the Indian Archipelago15. In 1915 there was published in

Bangkok a collection of documents relating to Crawfurd's visit to Siam which preceded his mission to Hué; the collection is confined to matters relating to Siam, but some of the documents included do refer incidentally to Cochin China as well.16 Crawfurd's own narrative is based on his journal and his general

report at the conclusion of his two missions. The published journal agrees so closely with the MS version which he submitted to the Government of India on his return from Hué that I have not thought 6. A. Anderson, A Narrative of the British Embassy to China, London 1795. 7. J. Barrow, A Voyage to Cochinchina, London 1806. 8. Sir G. Staunton, An Authentic Account of cm Embassy from Great Britain to

the Emperor of China, 2 vols., London 1797. 9. H. B. Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China , Vol. 2, Oxford 1926, pp. 432-435.

10. H. Cordier, La France et l'Angleterre en Indo-Chine , and La Reprise des

Relations de la France avec ГАппат sous la Restauration, both articles in Toung Pao, NS Vol. IV 1903. 11. Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 276-277. 12. J. Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy . ... to the Courts of Siam and j Cochin China, London 1828.

13. G. Finlayson, The Mission to Siam and Hue, London 1826. 14. Bulletin de la Société des Etudes Indochinoises, 1939 nos. 1 & 2, 1948 no. 1.

15. J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries, Singapore 1837.

16. The Crawfurd Papers, Bangkok 1915. 3

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Alastair Lamb

it worthwhile to reproduce the latter and have contented myself with

his preliminary report which he wrote immediately after leaving Cochin China and which has not, hitherto, been published.17 The general report, on the other hand, does differ somewhat from the printed version, and 1 have reproduced here the paragraphs relating to

Cochin China : those sections dealing with Siam were printed in the

Bangkok collection of 1915. To these I have added Crawfurd's instructions, taken from the Appendix to Crawfurd's published narrative;18 the Indian Government's explanation of the motives behind

the Crawfurd mission; and the Court of Directors' summary of its achievements.19 Finally, from Cordier, I have added a translation of

a letter from J. B. Chaigneau, who was at Hué at the time of Crawfurd's visit, giving a French account of the mission.20 In the method of presentation of this material here I have to some extent followed the pattern of Taboulet, whose La Geste Française en Indochine , while by no means the last word on the subject, provides between the covers of two volumes a marvellous store of information

on many aspects of the history of Vietnam and of French colonial expansion. It is a tribute to Taboulet to say that one wished that his

two volumes had been four or five. These pages could almost be described as a supplement to Taboulet, La Geste Anglaise en Indochine

as it were, and like Taboulet's book they are far from providing an exhaustive discussion of the British contacts with Indochina during this period. The official documents which I have consulted do not tell the whole story, for example, of the trade with the Cochin Chinese coast which was carried out by merchant houses in Calcutta and Madras. There is surely a great deal of information yet to be gleaned from the French colonial and naval archives and those of the Missions

Etrangères , information which does not appear in collections of documents like those of Taboulet and Cordier. But the main outline of the

story of the British connection with Vietnam over the years 1778 to

1822 is here, and it is presented for the first time as a continuous narrative with emphasis on the French as well as the British point

of view.

17. The MS of Crawfurd's journal and report is to be found in Board's Collections vol. 774, Collection no. 20,935. The preliminary report on his mission to Hue, dated 25 October 1822, is to be found in Letters from Bengal > vol. 88.

18. Crawfurd, Embassy , op. cit., pp. 589-595. 19. Letters from Bengal, Vol. 86: Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 673.

20. H. Cordier, Le Consulat de France à Hué sous la Restauration, Paris 1884, pp. 91-96.

4

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Missions to Cochin China

In 1778 European nations had been trading with the various regions of Indochina for over two and a half centuries. By 1550 an appreciable trade was carried on by the Portuguese between Faifo (Hoi-nan) and Macao. The 17th century saw the arrival of the Dutch,

English and French, the latter as missionaries as well as traders. In the middle of the century the English experimented with a factory in Cambodia near Pnompenh and from 1672 to 1697 they maintained an ^establishment in Tonkin in competition with the Dutch. But, with the

brief exception of the English factory on Pulo Condore from 1702 to 1705, the opening of the 18th century saw the disappearance of European settlements in Indochina. The poverty of the region and its

small demand for European produce did not justify the prolonged effort of the great East India Companies. It would seem that in Tonkin, at least, the main profit for the European factories lay in the supply of fire-arms; and by the end of the 17th century developments in

Vietnamese history resulted in a considerable decline in the demand for this commodity.21

Since the end of the 16th century Vietnam had been dominated by three dynasties. The Le Dynasty, which had achieved great power

in the late 15th and early 16th centuries and which had led the thrust southwards of the Col des Nuages by the Vietnamese at the expense of the Chams, had by 1600 become a line of faineant rulers. The Le were the nominal lords of Vietnam, and in this capacity had their titles conferred upon them by the Chinese Emperor, but the real

power had fallen into the hands of two feudal families, the Trinh in Tonkin and the Nguyen in Annam and to the south. Until 1672 the Nguyen and the Trinh were continuously at war with each other,

and in the process created a considerable demand for European munitions. In 1672 they arranged an uneasy truce which continued until 1774.22

In the 18th century it was to the Nguyen dominions, rather than

to those of the Trinh, that European attention was attracted. The Trinh, direct neighbours of China, shared that policy of isolation which had led the Manchus to confine European trade with China to a single

port, Canton, under conditions which were far from ideal for European 21. For more detailed accounts of early European contacts with Cochin China, see: Maybon, op. cit.; D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, London 1958; Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1; Le Thanh Khoi, Le Vietnam, Histoire et Civilisation, Paris 1955; J. Chesneaux, Contribution a l'Histoire de la Nation Vietnamienne, Paris 1955; J. Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon, a political history of Vietnam, London and New York 1958. 22. For a detailed history, see the authorities referred to in note 21 above. 5

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Alastair Lamb

commerce. The Nguyen, on the other hand, were clearly an expanding power deeply involved in the main stream of the politics of mainland

South-East Asia. Their continued advance to the south brought

them into frequent conflict with Siam and Cambodia. Their military

ambitions created, in European eyes, a promising demand for

armaments and uniforms; and this added to the advantages detected in the harbours of Cochin China which were widely described as the finest in the South China Sea. The Nguyen rulers, moreover, did not show themselves to be hostile beyond hope of conversion to the idea of closer relations with the Europeans. While opposed in principle to the extension of Christianity within their territories, and prepared to initiate active persecutions from time to time, yet Nguyen rulers like

Vo-vuong (1738-1765) were able to establish relations amounting to personal friendship with individual missionaries. Thus in 1750, when Vo-vuong ordered a general expulsion of Christian missionaries from Cochin China, he still retained at his court the Jesuits Johann Köffler, Xavier de Monteiro and Juan de Loureiro.23 This fact was appreciated by the French, who since the days of Colbert had developed a tradition

of close liaison between state and missionary. From 1664, with the founding of the Société des Missions Etrangères , France had acquired a dominant position in the exploitation of missionary enterprise in Indochina, and it was inevitable that French commerce should endeavour to follow in the footsteps of the French clerics. It was not surprising, therefore, that the 18th century should see a number of French attempts to exploit the commercial opportunities of Cochin China; and it was even less surprising that these should eventually result in the revival of English interest in this region. Pulo Condore, which had been the site of an unfortunate English factory

from 1702 to 1705, was carefully investigated in 1721-22 by the engineer Reynault on behalf of the French East India Company then

much reinvigorated by the influence of Law. Reynault concluded that a French settlement here would not justify the concomitant expenses, and nothing resulted from his visit; but other schemes were

in the offing. In 1739 the traveller Gentil de la Barbinais made an eloquent case for French entry into the commerce of Cochin China, and this was repeated in 1744 by Jacques O'Friell, a nephew by marriage of Dupleix. During Dupleix' administration of French India a number of practical experiments were made in opening Cochin China to French trade on a regular and preferential basis. Dupleix had his own agents at Tourane trading on his private account, and in 1748-50 the French East India Company employed Pierre Poivre, at one time a missionary 23. Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., p. 294. 6

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Missions to Cochin China

in Indochina, to undertake a political and commercial mission to the court of the Nguyen ruler Vo-vuong.24

The Poivre venture is really the ancestor of subsequent French and British projects in Cochin China, and as such deserves some attention here. Poivre was deputed to Cochin China in 1748 by the French East India Company, and by the French Minister of Marine Marchault d'Arnouville, with two objectives: on the one hand he was to open a French commercial establishment, and on the other, he was to obtain specimens of various spices with a view to their eventual cultivation in Madagascar to free the French from their dependence upon the

Dutch monopoly of such produce. Dupleix was opposed to Poivre's scheme, which conflicted with his own projects, but he none the less provided Poivre with the Marchault , a vessel of 600 tons and 40 guns, to convey him from Pondichery to Tourane, where he landed in August,

1749. Poivre then made his way to Hué where he was able to talk with Vo-vuong and to obtain a licence for the French Company to trade

in Cochin China at a very moderate scale of duties; but he did not establish good relations with the mandarins at the Nguyen capital, and he involved himself in an acrimonious argument with his interpreter, a Vietnamese Christian convert. Hostility from Nguyen officials, and the difficulty of finding a market for French goods, combined with Poivre's failure to obtain for the French Company the right to establish a permanent factory in the Bay of Tourane to convince the French envoy

that only a show of force would open Cochin China to a profitable French trade. Poivre was to argue this conclusion with greater force in

1768 when he urged the establishment of a French base in Cochin China as a means of competition with the English in the China trade. Poivre's mission, therefore, was a failure, and its immediate result, the consequence of his dispute with his Christian interpreter, was to make Vo-vuong resolve to expel most of the Christian missionaries from his 24. These ventures are described in some detail in Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 110-156 and in Maybon, op. cit., pp. 153-173. Pierre Poivre was born at Lyon in 1719. His family had grown wealthy in the silk trade. Poivre studied for the priesthood and, as a novice, joined the Missions Etrangères and went out to Cochin China in 1742-43. Here he seems to have abandoned his vocation. From 1743-45 he was at

Canton, and in 1745, on his way from Canton to Pondichery, he was obliged to spend some five months in Java, an experience which much influenced his views on the great wealth to be gained in eastern trade.

Poivre was back in France in 1748, when he received his commission to

return to Cochin China. In 1760, ten years after his return from Cochin China, Poivre was appointed Intendant du Roi in the Ile de France and the Ile de Bourbon. From 1767-72 he was in charge of the administration of the French possessions in Madagascar. He returned finally to France in 1773 and he died in 1786.

See also: M. Ly-Tio-Fane, Mauritius and the Spice Trade : the Odyssey of Pierre Poivre, Port Louis, Mauritius 1958. I am indebted to Professor

J. Bastin of the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur for bringing this

interesting work to my notice.

7

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Alastair Lamb

dominions. Dupleix, however, persisted in his belief that France could profit from a close connection with Cochin China, and until his recall in 1754 he continued to send envoys and French ships to that country. A French factory on a modest scale was established at Tourane, and

a limited repeal of Vo-vuong's ban on missionary enterprise was secured.

After Dupleix' recall interest in the prospects of Cochin China continued in France, and gave rise to what Taboulet has called "a cascade of projects" for the commercial exploitation of Cochin China and Tonkin and for the founding of French establishments there. The Due de Choiseul-Praslin was inspired by Poivre in 1768 - the latter had just returned from the Ile de France where he had been Intendant du

Roi - to propose an ambitious venture in Cochin China which was intended to compensate France for her losses in India at the hands of the British; but the fall of the Choiseul Ministry and, with it, the

suppression of the French East India Company, frustrated this scheme.25 In 1775 Vergennes revived this project on the grounds that : it seems that there remains only Cochin China which has escaped the vigilance of the English; but can one flatter oneself

that they will delay in casting their glance there? If they

decide on that place before us, we will be excluded for ever and we will have lost an important foothold on that part of Asia which would make us masters by, in time of war, intercepting the English trade with China, by protecting our own in the

whole of India, and by keeping the English in a continual

state of anxiety.26 But the onset of the American War and financial crises in France

rendered this project as abortive as had been that of Choiseul-Praslin.

France, however, was not to forget the possibilities of Cochin China; and the course of Cochin Chinese history was destined to create

circumstances which appeared very favourable for European intervention. Under Vo-vuong it seemed most unlikely that the Nguyen would surrender any sovereign rights over their territory without great struggle. Following Vo-vuong's death in 1765, however, the power of

the Nguyen began to decline rapidly. In 1771 a revolt broke out

which was to plunge Cochin China into three decades of civil war and, for a while, to all but eliminate the power of the Nguyen Dynasty.

This was the so-called Tay-son rebellion. It was in origin a social

movement, a coalition of merchants and peasants against the oppression of the Nguyen, and it was led by three brothers, Van-Nhac, Van-Le and Van-Hue, often referred to collectively as the Tay-son brothers after the name of their native village. By 1773 the Tay-son movement had become a serious threat to the Nguyen Dynasty, and by 1777 it 25. Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. 1 pp. 151-154. 26. Ibid., p. 155. 8

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Missions to Cochin China

had all but destroyed it. In 1774 the Nguyen had been so weakened that the Trinh broke the truce which had obtained for just over a century and invaded Nguyen territory, occupying Hué. From that moment Cochin China was plunged into a three cornered civil war, with the Trinh and Tay-son competing for domination and the Nguyen struggling to survive in their last remaining strongholds in the south.

This situation was brought dramatically to the notice of both the French and the English in India in early 1778 when the English

merchantman Rumbold arrived at Calcutta with two Cochin Chinese

Mandarins, refugee adherents of the Nguyen cause, and with the Jesuit missionary de Loureiro who had resided for many years at the Nguyen court.

The French Chief at Chandernagore, Chevalier, saw in the arrival of these men the ideal opportunity for France to win for herself an

empire in Indochina. A French ship, and a small force of French

soldiers, could escort the two Mandarins back to their home. French

military intervention, even on this minute scale, could tip the balance in favour of the Nguyen Dynasty which, in a gratitude, would give

France all she wanted in Cochin China. Warren Hastings, who was well aware of this line of reasoning, resolved to anticipate the French

plan and send the Mandarins to Cochin China in an English ship accompanied by an English envoy, Charles Chapman. In proposing the deputation of Chapman to Cochin China, Hastings had much more in mind than the anticipation of French intrigues. As the Bengal General Consultation of 30th March, 1778, shows clearly

enough, one of the main interests in Cochin China lay in the fact that here might be found some solution to that chronic problem of

the China trade, the drain of specie to the East. By the 1770s, so Harlow noted, "the activities of the Company as a genuine trading association had been transferred from India to China".27 Canton,

the only Chinese port open to European trade, had become a place of the greatest importance in the scheme of British commerce, and the conditions of trade there were matters of increasing concern to

the East India Company. The basic difficulty of large scale trade with China was to be found in the fact that the Europeans sought Chinese produce, especially tea, for which they were unable to pay with the export of their own manufactures. Specie had to be exported to

China, the East India Company in the 1780's sending an annual

average of £700,000 of silver. Before 1762 the Company had been able to secure an appreciable surplus of silver for Chinese investment from 27. Harlow, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 63. Chapter III of this work contains an admirable discussion of the British occupation of Manila and of the schemes of Alexander Dalrymple for a British settlement in the Borneo Archipelago.

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its dealings, in the main illegal, with Manila where came annually two Spanish galleons from Mexico laden with the silver ore of Acapulco. In 1762, however, with the outbreak of war between England and Spain

and the British occupation of Manila, the flow of silver to the Philippines was interrupted; and, though the galleons resumed their

sailings at the conclusion of the war, British trade with Spanish

territory in the East did not return to anything like its former volume. The deficiency, in theory, could have been made up easily enough by the revenue surplus of British India; but only in times of peace, and these were rare enough in the Indian subcontinent in the second half of the

eighteenth century, a period which also saw an astronomic increase in the value of British tea imports from China. It was this problem, how to finance the rapidly increasing quantity of imports from China

and how to continue the China trade, on which the profits of the East India Company came increasingly to depend, in the face of opposition in England from those who saw the Company as a drain on the nation's wealth, which provided a theoretical economic background to projects for British expansion into South-East Asia. There appeared to be more than one practicable solution to this

problem. The most obvious answer, and, so it must at one time have seemed, the easiest to put into practice, lay in the improvement of those conditions under which British merchants traded at Canton.

Here monopolistic restrictions raised prices and the attitude of the local Chinese authorities made the redress of grievances almost impos-

sible to obtain. There was, however, the possibility that were diplomatic relations once established with the Court at Peking the hold of the Hong merchants at Canton might be broken and other Chinese ports might be opened to foreign trade. In these conditions the cost

of Chinese tea and other produce might be reduced, and a Chinese market of a significant size might be found for British and Indian manufactures. The cooperation of Peking also held out the hope of a more rapid settlement of debts which the British found it almost impossible to collect from those Chinese merchants at Canton whose solvency was constantly being threatened by the "squeeze" to which they were subjected by the Canton authorities. These considerations, among others, led Warren Hastings to attempt to open relations with Peking through the mediation of the Panchen Lama of Tibet28; and

they gave rise to the abortive Cathcart Embassy to China of 1787 and the Macartney Embassy of 1793.

While the complete solution of the financial problems of the China trade demanded the establishment of adequate Anglo-Chinese 28. See: A. Lamb, Tibet in Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1767-1842, JRAS 1957, pp. 164-168; A. Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia: the road to Lhasa , 1767-1905, London 1960, Chap. I generally. 10

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Missions to Cochin China

diplomatic relations, there were a number of other ways in which those problems could be rendered less acute without taking the step,

which, Macartney's experiences in 1793 showed, would probably be doomed to futility, of sending a full scale British mission to Peking. There were British or Indian goods, like opium, which did command

a ready sale in China under existing conditions of trade, and the increased export of these could reduce, if not stop, the drain of specie.

If British manufactures did not sell in China, they might still be disposed of for bullion in other parts of Asia, and the profits of this

trade could be invested in Canton without affecting the supply of specie in England or India. Other ports, outside China but astride the sea route between Canton and India, might serve as meeting places for Chinese and British merchants and alternative sources of supply for Chinese goods. Such places, with their promise of attracting junks not only from Canton but also from all the other ports of the China coast, had much to offer as sites for British settlements; and here lay one of the arguments behind the British founding of Penang and Singapore.29

The first attempts to found settlements of this sort, the British

occupation of Manila in 1762, and Alexander Dalrymple's schemes for an establishment in the Borneo Archipelago which resulted in the costly and abortive Balambangan venture over the years 1763-1775, failed to provide the desired answer, but they pointed the way to later

projects in Malaysia and Indochina. They also pointed out, in that age of European conflict which was the second half of the 18th century,

that the establishment of British bases in South-East Asia both met

and posed strategic as well as commercial problems, and involved active competition with the Dutch and the Spaniards as well as with the French who persisted in their challenge to British supremacy in

India. There was a real threat to the security of British sea routes between India and Canton. There was a serious danger, in the event (which at times did not seem unlikely) that the Chinese would close themselves completely to European trade, that the British would find that the domination of South-East Asia by hostile European powers would exclude them altogether from contact with sources of Chinese produce. It was this kind of reasoning which induced Hastings to pay so much attention to the two Cochin Chinese Mandarins whom chance

had brought to Calcutta. On the one hand, they might provide the opportunity for the French acquisition of the superb naval base offered by the sheltered waters of the Tourane region; on the other 29. I have given a fuller discussion of some of these theoretical solutions in Lord Macartney at Batavia, March 1793, Journal of the South Seas Society, Singapore 1958. 11

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they might pave the way for a British settlement in this same area which would meet many of those requirements later to be catered for by Penaňg and Singapore.

Why then did the Chapman mission not mark the beginning of a British dominated Indochina? The answer lay partly in the state

of Cochin China which Chapman described so graphically in his narrative and which, despite Chapman's own arguments to the contrary, offered little attraction for intervention in a region so far from the

settlements of British India. Only a French attempt to meddle in these troubled waters could have provided the cause for an immediate

sequel to the Chapman mission, and this was ruled out for a while when, shortly after Chapman's departure, the outbreak of war between England and France resulted in the British occupation of Pondichery and Chandernagore. The story of the Chapman mission, from the arrival of the two

Mandarins in February 1778 until Chapman's return from Cochin China in February 1779, is told in the next two chapters, in Chapman's own narrative and report, in correspondence to and from the Bengal Government, and in extracts of letters from Chevalier at Chandernagore.

Note: The extracts from documents and other sources which are

reproduced below are printed in 10 pt. unleaded type. They either follow a heading in bold type or they are indented. My own comment, except in the notes, is always printed here in leaded 10 pt. type.

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CHAPTER II.

THE GENESIS OF THE CHAPMAN MISSION

(л) THE ARRIVAL OF THE RUMBOLD

The Rumbold, with two Cochin Chinese Mandarins "< and the

Portuguese Jesuit missionary Father Loureiro on board, reached Calcutta in early February 1778. The news was immediately communicated to Warren Hastings by David Kellican of the firm of Crofts and Kellican, the owners of the vessel. Hastings in Council decided on 12 February 1778 to house the two mandarins at Company

expense until they could find a ship back to Cochin China; and on 20 March 1778 this decision was communicated to the Court of

Directors in London.

1. Extract from Bengal General Consultations, 12 February 1778. The Governor General lays before the Board the following note which he received from Mr. Kellican.

Hon'ble Sir,

I beg leave to inform you that two Mandarines from Cochin China with a Portuguese Missionary are arrived in Calcutta. They

came in a ship belonging to me called the Rumbold. The Captain was

directed to sail to the Eastward and to the Coast of Cambodia and

Cochin China as far as Turon Bay, where he landed. The two

Mandarines came on board of the Rumbold with an intention to go

down the coast, to a place called Donnai in Cambodia where the

King of Cochin China now resides, but a gale of wind coming on the ship drove past the Port and was unable to regain it. I take the liberty of requesting your permission, to present the Mandarines to you, whenever it may be convenient, as likewise the Portuguese Missionary. The Mandarines are men of distinction. One of them is a first

cousin of the King of Cochin China. Calcutta,

I

am,

etc.,

12th February, 1778. (Signed) David Kellican. The Governor-General submits to the Board whether, as the Mandarines from Cochin China are said to be men of considerable rank, it would

not be for the Credit of the Company to allow them a house with a 13

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suitable establishment during their residence in Calcutta which he supposes will be but for a short time. Agreed that a house and a suitable establishment be allowed the Mandarines from Cochin China and the Governor General is requested

to issue the necessary orders for this purpose.

2. Extract from General Letter from Bengal, 20 March 1778 Par. 11. A China ship which lately imported here having on

board two Mandarines of distinction from Cochin China attended by

a Portuguese Missionary who had embarked with them for a port

on that coast to which the vessel was bound, but which a gale of wind prevented her reaching, we thought it incumbent on us to show them

every mark of civility and attention in our power, during the short stay which they must necessarily make in Bengal, and have therefore furnish-

ed them with a proper habitation and a suitable establishment of

servants at the public expense.

(B) HASTINGS PROPOSES TO SEND CHAPMAN TO COCHIN CHINA

Extract from Bengal General Consultations, 30th March, 1778

The Governor General lays before the Board the following

minute: -

An accident having brought to this Settlement two Mandarines of Cochin China, the one a near relation of the reigning Prince and the

other a man of considerable rank; humanity as well as policy has induced the Board to afford them every assistance their situation

required and to treat them with an attention which might impress them with a favourable opinion of the people they were come amongst and

alleviate their anxiety at being separated from their country and

families.

The proper season for their return home is now arrived and they are extremely anxious to set out. I have therefore not the least doubt that the Board will concur with me in thinking it expedient to provide

them with the means. It is true the gentlemen in whose ship they

came hither have fitted out a small vessel and offered to send them back. This was incumbent on them and no more would have been

necessary had they been persons of less distinction. But a greater degree of attention is I think due to so considerable a Prince as the King of Cochin China. I would therefore propose that the Amazon Snow be got ready for their reception. I am induced to wish this for several reasons. That the vessel is at present unemployed and may return from the service in the month of December. She will properly accommodate the Mandarines. She may be employed on a service of humanity in going in search of a part of the Earl of Temple's crew, thirteen men of which, I am credibly informed, still 14

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remain on the Paracel Islands opposite to Cochin China. She may be directed to make any surveys or proceed on any other service the Board may judge proper. The French Chief of Chandernagore, sensible of the importance

of these people, has I am told made them an offer of a vessel to

return in.30

The above, tho' I think them sufficient, are not my only motives for proposing to send the Amazon.

The owners of the vessel which brought the Mandarines have acquainted me that they understand from them as well as other Channels that great advantages may be reaped from a commercial

intercourse with Cochin China, and, wishing to avail themselves of the present favourable opening for establishing a trade with that country, they propose sending a vessel and cargo, and earnestly request that a person may be deputed, in a public capacity, from this Government,

with the Mandarines as a security to their property and to procure the sanction of the ruling power of Cochin China to their future

undertakings.

The advantages are represented to be : the extending the sale of Europe commodities, such as iron, lead, copper, cutlery, glassware and

broad cloth, together with various manufactures of Bengal to the

Cochin Chinese, but more particularly to the Chinese junks, and the procuring returns in gold, silver, pepper, cinnamon, cassia, elephants'

teeth, aquila wood, and many other valuable articles to the great

benefit of this country and which may in the course of time assist in the investment of Europe.

The Company have always had in view the encouragement of

a trade with the Chinese junks, this was Mr. Dalrymple' s object when he proposed the Settlement at Balambangan, and it was this allured

the Company to incur so considerable expense there as they did.31

30. See also pp. 22-23 below.

31. Alexander Dalrymple, 1737-1808. From 1779 to 1808 Dalrymple was hydrographer to the East India Company, and after 1795 he also served in the same capacity for the Admiralty. Dalrymple was one of the leading exponents of the argument that the East India Company should solve the problems of the drain of specie in the China trade by the vigorous extension of British trade into South-East Asia. He argued that a British

settlement suitably located in the Archipelago would both provide a market where British and Indian goods could be sold for specie to be

invested in the China trade and a port where Chinese merchants might bring their wares for sale at a price lower than that obtaining in the monopolistic conditions of Canton. His advocacy resulted in the British acquisition in 1763 of the Island of Balambangan off the north-east coast of Borneo. The Balambangan venture came to an end after Suluans in early 1775 captured the British settlement and forced its inhabitants to

flee to their ships.

The arguments behind the Balambangan venture, and the short-lived attempt to establish a British foothold in the Philippines in 1762. were now being applied by Hastings towards the establishment of a settlement in Cochin China. Balambangan had not been an ideal site for a venture of this sort, and the settlement there had cost a great deal of money (£170,000). Hastings was suggesting here that all that was once hoped for from Balambangan could perhans be obtained from Cochin China at no greater expense than the cost of maintaining Chapman as British Resident at the Cochin Chinese court.

For the Balambangan episode see: Harlow op. cit. pp. 70-77 15

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It is not now intended to subject them to any charge whatsoever

except the trifling one of maintaining a single gentleman as a resident

in Cochin China, which measure it is hoped may be productive of many of the advantages expected from the prosecution of that unfortunate scheme. I am informed that 70 or 80 junks resort to the single Port of Turon in one season and that the trade is the chief support of the town of Macao. That the country itself produces the several valuable articles above mentioned, is evident not only from the

printed accounts of travellers who have visited it and from the

testimony of living witnesses now in Calcutta, but from samples of

some of them in the possession of the gentlemen who are desirous

of venturing their property in the undertaking.

Cochin China is peculiarly happy in its situation for commerce,

possessing a large extent of coast of its own. It is within five days sail of Canton, has the Philippines laying opposite to it, the great Island of Borneo, the Molucca and Bunda Islands a few degrees to the South-East, with Siam and Malacca to the Westward. Its many

excellent harbours would afford a safe retreat to our Indiamen when

they might be so unfortunate as to lose their passage either to or from

China, instead of being obliged to keep the most tempestuous seas

with great risk to the ships and cargoes. Satisfied that advantages might accrue to this country and to the British Nation, from an intimate intercourse with Cochin China; that expense of the experiment will be but trifling; that there may never offer an opportunity equally favourable with the present; and that the arrival of these Mandarines may awake the curiosity of foreign nations,

which it seems has already been the case from the offer by the French Chief of sending them back; I think it therefore a measure

both prudent and politic to seize the present occasion and to

endeavour to form some kind of commercial alliance with the

ruling power of that country calculated to secure to the English superior privileges to the French or others; and for this purpose I

propose that a person be sent, in a public capacity, with the Mandarines to investigate the real state of their country, its sources for trade, and

to discover what connection can be made-^with it advantageous to Bengal, and that he be likewise vested wi$i powers, should he find

the state of things answer the expectations formed of them, and agree

with the accounts which have been given, to form a Treaty of

Commerce on the part of this Government with that of Cochin China.

(Signed) Warren Hastings.

Mr. Francis. I have no objection to the experiment being made, and I agree with the Governor in thinking that the civilités we have already shown to these Mandarines, and even our paying the expense of their return, might be productive of good effect, but as the Amazon is the only armed vessel we have in the river, and as many occasions may possibly arise in which her services may be wanted, I am unwilling to send her on this expedition. I think it would be better to make use of the vessel already fitted out by the gentlemen in whose ship the 16

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Missions to Cochin China

Mandarines come hither, and to make them a compensation for the

expense of the voyage.

Governor General. I think it proper to inform the Board that

the vessel prepared to be sent by the merchants to Cochin China, is only 120 tons Burthen and has no accommodation for passengers. Agreed to the Governor General's proposition. Ordered that the Amazon be prepared immediately to perform the service intended.

The Governor General recommends Mr. Charles Chapman to be appointed to accompany the Mandarines, and to perform the services specified in his minute at Cochin China and proposes that the Captain of the Amazon be put under the orders of Mr. Chapman. Agreed to, and resolved that Mr. Chapman be allowed during the course of the present service 1000 Rupees per mensem. Agreed that Mr. Totty assistant surgeon be appointed to attend

Mr. Chapman with an allowance of his usual pay, gratuity and full

batta for this service.

(C) chapman's instructions

On 9 April 1778 Hastings issued instruction to Chapman on his mission to Cochin China, and the decision to undertake this mission was communicated to the Court of Directors in London on 23 April 1778.

1. Extract from Bengal Consultations, 9 April 1778. The Secretary having prepared instructions for Mr. Chapman lays them before the Board for approval. Agreed to the Instructions, and ordered that they be accordingly delivered to Mr. Chapman as follows: Sir,

As we conceive that many advantages might be derived to the

British Nation from a Commercial Intercourse between the Company's Settlements in India, and the Province of Cochin China, and the

presence of two Mandarines of considerable distinction who lately

arrived from that Country affording a favourable occasion to make Overtures to the Government there for the encouragement of such an

Intercourse, we have thought proper to order the Company Snow

Amazon to be prepared for the Reception of the said Mandarines, and

accommodating them with a passage to Cochin China. We have

appointed you to accompany them to that place, and to reside there on the part of this Government, if our wishes to establish a beneficial

Trade can be effected.

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You will receive a Letter of Credence from the Governor General

to the Prince of Cochin China, and v/e direct that as soon after your arrival there as may be convenient, you propose to him the Establish-

ment of a natural and free Traffic with the English, and use your Endeavour to obtain his Sanction to the measure in general, and his promise of a favourable Acception and Protection to the Merchant Vessels which may in consequence be consigned to his Port. You will also make such Enquiries into the Sources of Trade which the Country of Cochin China possesses as will enable you to judge of the advantages of any Connection that it may be eligible to

form with it, and we hereby authorize and empower you to enter into a Treaty with the Government there, for the establishment and security of a Commerce with vesels importing there under English passes, and in like manner with any Vessels which the subjects of that Nation may send to either of the Company's Settlements in India. In the Negotiation of this business we recommend it to you to obtain such Rights and Privileges in favour of the English as the Prince may be willing to grant, and you will define them as clearly and precisely as possible in the Treaty which you may form with him in order to obviate misunderstandings respecting them. We hope it is needless to urge to you the necessity of showing every

attention and civility in your power to the Mandarines during the Voyage, as such conduct will be the readiest means to secure their

favourable Report and Assistance in the Prosecution of your

Undertaking.

We have placed the Commander of the Amazon under your Orders in the present Expedition, and we have fixed your Allowances for the service on which you are deputed at 1000 Rups. per mensem. Fort William,

9th. April 1778.

2. Extract from General Letter from Bengal, 23 April 1778. Par. 6. The presence of the two Mandarines from Cochin China whom we mentioned in the 11th Paragraph of our last Letter to you and the civil treatment and attention which have been shown them

during their Residence here, affording a favourable occasion to

attempt establishing a Commercial intercourse with the people of that

country, which we conceive might be very beneficial both to the

Company's Possessions in India and to the sale of the Staple Commodities of Great Britain, we have ordered the Amazon Snow, which was lying unemployed, to be prepared for accommodating them with a

passage to their Native place; and we have appointed Mr. Charles

Chapman, one of your Covenanted Servants, to accompany them. 18

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Par. 7 . We have given Mr. Chapman a Letter of Credence

addressed to the Prince of Cochin China which he will deliver, with a

suitable present prepared for that purpose, on his arrival; and if he meets with a favourable reception from the Prince, we have authorized him to negotiate and conclude a Treaty for opening and securing a free Trade with his Dominions. We have further instructed Mr. Chapman to solicit and use his endeavours to obtain by the Treaty such Rights and Privileges in favour of the English Merchants and such protection to their Ships as the Prince may be inclined to grant, and if he finds

encouragement in this undertaking he is to continue Resident at Cochin China on the part of the English, otherwise he will return

with the Amazon.

(D) FRENCH INTRIGUES

Since at least 1773 the French chief at Chandernagore, Chevalier, had been interested in the prospects of Cochin China as a field for the expansion of French influence. In 1777 he sent the Diligente there to report on the situation, and he received news of the outcome of this

venture on the same day that Hastings learnt of the arrival of the Rumbold. Chevalier lost no time in informing his superior at Pondichery, de Bellecombe, of the great possibilities offered by the civil war then raging in Indochina, and urgently advised that France should not let this opportunity slip.

Three days later, on 15 February, Chevalier wrote to de

Bellecombe about the Rumbold and its passengers. The presence of the Cochin Chinese mandarins at Calcutta, and the knowledge that Hastings would put this to good use, made French action all the more essential. Chevalier proposed to see Father Loureiro as soon as possible in order to find out what the English were up to and to try to persuade the Jesuit to work for the French. Meanwhile, he urged, a French expedi-

tion should be sent on its way to Cochin China as soon as possible. Shortly after the despatch of this second letter to de Bellecombe, Loureiro came to Chandernagore to confer with Chevalier. Loureiro proposed that the French should make use of Bernardo Moniz, a Portuguese merchant who had accompanied the Jesuit from Cochin China and whose experience of that place would make him well qualified to be a French agent. The approach to Moniz in this respect, which is contained in two letters printed below, came to the notice of

the British and provided them with documentary evidence of the 19

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Alastair Lamb

nature of French ambitions in this region.32 Chevalier, however, clearly preferred to make use of Loureiro himself as the French agent, and in April he persuaded the Jesuit to sail to Pondichery to confer

in person with de Bellecombe. Loureiro, Chevalier now proposed, should return to Cochin China as a French envoy, accompanied by 200 Europeans, an impressive artillery and 200 or 300 sepoys. With this force he was to offer French aid to the Nguyen against the Tay-son rebels and, in return, to obtain a treaty along the lines of the document

which Pigneau de Behaine was later to negotiate. But Chevalier's scheme was not put into execution. The French home government was apathetic and, in any case, by the time Loureiro reached Pondichery

Chapman had already sailed. Shortly afterwards Hastings learnt of the French declaration of war against Great Britain arising from the American crisis, and he lost no time in undertaking the capture of the French settlements in India. Chandernagore fell in July 1778 and, in October, after a stout resistance, de Bellecombe surrendered Pondichery. In these circumstances, even had the French home government at that moment been eager to embark upon an adventure in Cochin China - which it was not - , the French position in India hardly lent itself to the pursuit of schemes of this kind. (See : Taboulet, op. cit,

vol. 1, pp. 157-60; Maybon, op. cit. pp. 174-181.)

1. Chevalier to de Bellecombe, 12 February 1778. (Translated from Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 157-159.)

I make haste to inform you of news which I have just received from Cochin China by means of a ship which I had sent there. The events which have taken place there would have provided a great opportunity to our nation had the government authorised you to take advantage of all the occasions which offered themselves for augmenting her power and increasing her trade, and, at the same time, had you been in possession of all the resources necessary for such a project.

It would have been thus, Sir, that you would have achieved great

things in India and throughout Asia. But the indifference with which

the government in France has continually treated these great

objectives

in which we vegetate ....

The Diligente , which I sent to Cochin China under the command of M. Cuny, captain and supercargo, on reaching Tourane found the

country much devastated by a most vigorous war which was being

waged against the Emperor [of Cochin China] by one of his subjects

32. These letters were probably communicated to the British by Moniz himself. Moniz accompanied Chapman on his mission to Cochin China and served in a confidential capacity as a liaison between the British envoy and the local authorities.

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called Teisson, who had as a result of his piracies become very

powerful. Having fought the galleys of the Emperor [of Cochin China],

this man then planned ... to sack and burn the town of Faifo and also that of Tourane. An English ship was then anchored before Tourane. Its captain having threatened to open fire on the pirate

[Teisson], the latter at once withdrew. M. Cuny . . . did not wish to be involved in this quarrel. He set sail for Macao despite the fact that the English captain had proposed that they join forces to defend the Emperor [of Cochin China], drive away his enemy and restore order

in the country .... The English captain remained behind and

established relations with the court [of the Emperor], whose defence he wished to undertake; but what could he do without forces and

with only five or six Europeans with him? This was the situation

when Captain le Fer arrived with his big ship, the Lauriston, armed with 26 guns, but with a mixed crew of lascars and about fourteen

Europeans. He sent ashore to Tourane his surgeon, Philibert by

name, who was well known and loved in this land because he had

lived here when our nation maintained here that establishment which

M. Dupleix had founded. He was warmly welcomed by the mandarins, some of whom he had known previously. They offered him everything he might need .... and proposed that the ship be brought in to defend the place and maintain the interests of the Emperor against his rebel subject; but M. Philibert, who appreciated the weakness of the crew [of the Lauriston ], contented himself with asking the mandarins to convey to the Emperor the good will and sincere friendship of the French nation, and added that the season was advanced and that he

should take advantage of what was left of the monsoon to return

to China .... Those who . . . had looked upon the arrival of this

ship as the means of their salvation, now fell into a profound state of alarm and, in tears, accompanied M. Philibert back to the ship. The mandarins . . . begged him to return and bring with him arms and

ammunition . . . 33

In' such a situation, Sir, it would be easy for us to send a

detachment of troops and so render the Emperor such marked services

as would lead to our ruling in some form in his name and to our obtaining hold of one of the richest aspects of the trade of the Indies

forces [of Cochin China] would be more than enough to destroy the enemy, consolidate the Emperor on the throne and restore peace and tranquility. It would be an important and most profitable operation for our nation and would require neither great force nor extensive means.

33. According to Taboulet, the Diligente was at Tourane in September 1777. By this time the Nguyen Dynasty (to which the term Emperor is here applied) were facing disaster in the south. Hué was under the control of the Trinh Dynasty and, according to both Maybon and Le Thanh Khoi, Quang-nam Province, in which lay Tourane and Faifo, had been confirmed in the possession of Van-Nhac, the Tay-son leader, by the Trinh ruler Trinh Sam. From the account of the Diligente, however, as also from Chapman's narrative (see p. 36 below), it would seem that Nguyen supporters still retained some power in Tourane at least. The English ship referred to here was almost certainly the Rumbold. The Lauriston was a Burmese built vessel.

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Alastair Lamb

I am sure that if we are not in advance of the English, they will follow this plan, and we will have to experience next year the sorrow of learning that they have just acquired a new empire

know that the Captain of the Rumbold has sent such a proposal from Madras to Calcutta, whither he must come soon to argue warmly in this sense before the Council

of which to meet the expenses which must of necessity arise from a

project of this kind? And even were the funds available, would

you not be held back by the fear that you might be blamed for having

acted without the orders of the Court [of France]? These are the

considerations which forever prevent the Governors of [French] India

from acting on a large scale and with effect. The English, on the

contrary, always have the widest powers to carry out anything which might augment their power and the trade of their nation

In the present instance it would be easy for us to become the

masters of Cochin China and to establish there a formidable power.

We are going to let the opportunity slip by, and it is the English

who are going to profit from our lack of activity. It is already a long time since this war [in Cochin China] began,

and it still goes on. I do not wish it to result in the death of the French missionaries in that land from not informing you [of the possibilities]. Now, you might without exposing yourself carry out

the revolution in question. The Brillant offers you the means. Instead of letting her winter at Achin or Ile du Roi, you could send her to

Cochin China with a hundred or so soldiers and some sepoys. The

country would be ours and all its ports open to French ships .... If Cochin China has in your eyes, Sir, all the importance that it deserves to have, and if, in consequence, you should decide to follow my suggestions, then, Sir, I offer to go there myself and I promise you that I will not return without having accomplished great things ....

I could even provide a ship already to sail, and without costing the

administration a sol , which would only have to provide the people, supplies, arms and ammunition required. It will suffice to set out in July

costs money in Cochin China or in Pondichery, it is the same thing for the government, to whom it will cost neither more nor less - and you

will mark your government with a monument which will make its

memory eternal, and you will deserve on this just count the thanks of the nation by the importance of the acquisition which you will have

made for it .

2. Chevalier to de Bellecombe, 15 February 1778. (Translated from Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 159-160.) I have just learnt of the arrival of the English ship Rumbold which

had been to Cochin China . . . She brought back with her a Jesuit

missionary of the Spanish nation, Father Loureiro, accompanied by a mandarin of the first class. Both are now in Calcutta, where I do not doubt at all they have come to enter into treaty with the English and to ask assistance from them . . . This Father Loureiro enjoyed for a 22

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Missions to Cochin China

long time great confidence at the Court of Cochin China, where he is a physician to the Emperor.34 He is said to be a man of great wit, very wise and a shrewd negotiator. I am on the track of this business and

will spare nothing to discover its outcome. I have sent one of the

priests of this parish to go and call on him . . . and have told him to do

the impossible to make him come to spend several days ... at Chandernagore. Then he will certainly come to see me and I will

employ all means possible to discover his secret and to bring his ideas towards us rather than the English

This business, Sir, from every point of view must be considered by us as being of the greatest importance because of all the developments which might arise from it with a nation as powerful, as active and as enterprising as that of the English. One cannot conceal from oneself the conclusion that if the English send help to Cochin China they will not delay in becoming masters of the whole country, just as they did in Bengal and in the rest of their possessions in India. After which they will easily extend their domination to Siam and Tonkin. It is thus that they are going to prepare a new empire which, by its revenues, its situation, and the fertility of its productions, will open to them another promising source of riches and power. Who knows, even, that they will not be capable of extending their undertakings to China, whose immense wealth cannot fail to arouse their cupidity?. . . There are so many motives in combination which make me wish with the greatest ardour that you undertake to anticipate the English

by sending as soon as possible the Brillant with 150 Europeans, 300

sepoys, arms, cannon and ammunition. Such an armament .... would make clear, on its arrival in the Tourane river, that the French, who have always cherished the friendship and the gratitude for the good treatment which they have received from the government, are very pleased to have found the opportunity to prove the sincerity of their sentiments by sending to the Emperor the help required to defend him against his enemies. There can be no doubt that one would be well received for, in this kind of business, it is always he who arrives first who has all the

advantages. The English, who will arrive after us, will be obliged

to return home ... If we do not take these steps, then I see from afar a great empire forming itself for the English. If, on the other hand, we anticipate them, this same empire will fall into our hands and will

be the glorious fruit of our activity and our perspicuity. In the

present situation it is inevitable that some European nation will rule over the country [of Cochin China], and it will be the country which first brings help that will win the prize.

34. Jean de Loureiro, Jesuit. Born in Lisbon in 1710. Came to Cochin

China in 1742 and soon became a physician at Hué at the court of the Nguyen ryler Vo-vuong (1738-1765). He continued to reside at Hué until

1777, when he left Cochin China aboard the Rumbold. He died in 1791.

Father de Loureiro had a considerable reputation as a naturalist and astronomer, and on his return to Europe in 1781 he became a member of a number of learned societies. In 1790 he published his Flora Cochinchinensis. (Maybon, op. cit., pp. 141-142.) 23

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Alastair Lamb

3. Translation of a letter in Portuguese from Father Loureiro to Bernardo Moniz. Chandernagore 20 March 1778. (Appendix no. 3 to Chapman's narrative, China Factory Records, Vol. 18.) Sir,

Monsieur Chavalier, after being informed by me of the present state of Cochin China, seems to wish to undertake an expedition from

Pondichery to that place, but being at a loss for a person that is

acquainted with the said State, I took the liberty of mentioning your name to him, also related the accidents you have met with; whereupon

he has requested me to invite you to Chandernagore and promises to give you a passage to Cochin China with everything you may be in need of, which you will see by the enclosed from Monsieur

Chavalier, notwithstanding many other advantages, offers wherein are

no deceit.

I would therefore advise you to stick to this as is the surest; and

I dare to say you will be of the same opinion if you consider well

into it or otherwise. Should you disapprove of this I beg you'll keep it a secret. Your answer.

4. Translation of a letter in Portuguese from Chevalier to Moniz.

Chandernagore 20 March 1778. (Appendix no. 4 to Chapman's narrative, China Factory Records, Vol. 18.)

Sir,

Having had the honor of being acquainted with your character by my friend Padre Loureiro, meanwhile understood that you intend

returning to Cochin China : therefore should esteem the pleasure

of your company at Chandernagore, and from hence you are welcome to a passage (with all necessaries) to Pondichery where you will have

the pleasure of seeing Monsieur De Bellecombe who will give you a

passage to Cochin China in any of His Majesty's ships.

24

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Missions to Cochin China

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Missions to Cochin China

with painted paper. I really experienced this to be a very commodious way of travelling, preferable in some respects even to a palanquin. It requires but two bearers, for with that number I compute I was carried 15 miles in the day without changing. It was

much cooler than the bed used in a palanquin and, the net affording an equal support to every part of the bcxiy in whatsoever position

you lie, prevents that wearing you are liable to in the other. Our route at first lay along the banks of a considerable river till we entered a well cultivated valley which appeared encompassed on all

sides with high mountains. In this valley we passed through three or four pretty villages pleasantly situated in which as well as on other parts of the road were public houses where country tea (most vile),

fruits and other refreshment are sold to travellers. At noon we

alighted at one of them where a dinner was soon prepared for the Mandarine who accompanied us. We partook of it and paid for it.

It consisted of fowls cut in small pieces, dressed up with a little greens

and salt, some fish and tea. We left this village about 4 in the

afternoon, and in the dusk of the evening reached another which we were told was within an hours ride of the King's residence; but the

Mandarine recommended to us to stay here for the night as we

should be too late to get admittance into the Fort. Our servants and

baggage not being come up we readily consented. A cold fowl and

piece of salt beef we had brought with us made a comfortable supper,

but, a fire breaking out near us, the cracking of the bamboos and

cries of the people endeavouring to extinguish it proved quite unfavourable to our repose.

Early in the morning we pursued our journey along a bad road

through paddy fields, and passed several ill-constructed bridges. About

eight o'clock we came in sight of the Fort his Majesty resided in.

The east front, by a gate of which we entered, extended about three

quarters of a mile; and was merely a straight stone wall, in many

places much out of repair, without guns, embrazures, flanking towers or any other requisite to make it a place of strength. It is sufficient,

however, for the purposes of its possessor; I was informed it was a

square and that the other sides correspond with the one we entered at.

When we came to the gate we were made to wait half an hour in a

hovel. The gate and wall were entirely without guards and the ground within laid out in paddy fields. Our conductors were at some trouble

to persuade me to alight from my palanquin and the gentlemen

with me from their horses; but, understanding we had some distance

to go, we insisted on retaining them and we prevailed. Proceeding on about ' mile, we alighted at the house of the King's son-in-law. He expressed himself exceedingly glad to see us; we sat with him about half an hour and were treated with a little beetle. He then

conducted us to a tolerable house near his own which he acquainted us was alloted for our residence and belonged to him. He requested to see what we had brought for the King, which we shewed him; afterwards he took his leave desiring we would repose ourselves for that day and recover from the fatigues of our journey. The King, he said, would grant us an audience next morning. In regard to provisions we were obliged to shift for ourselves and a bad meal we were likely to make. A man who offered to be our provider 39

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Alastair Lamb

Fig. 2. A village scene in Cochin China: the game of shuttlecock. (W. Alexander in Staunton, op. cit., Atlas of Plates).

40

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Missions to Cochin China

furnished us with a fowl, a duck and some greens. He had the assurance to say that this was all he could procure for five dollars that had been advanced him, and to avoid disputing the point he

got out of the way. By six o'clock next morning a message was brought us that His Majesty was ready to receive us, but, this being so much

earlier than we expected to be summoned, we were obliged to keep His Majesty waiting for at least half an hour while we dressed. We then attended our conductor for near a mile till we came in sight of the palace from an eminence. Here we were desired to dismiss all our attendants, not so much as a boy with an umbrella being

allowed to follow us, and to leave our swords as they assured us it was never permitted anybody to enter into the presence with arms. The

preliminaries adjusted, we advanced towards the palace. In the front were drawn up two ranks of men consisting of an hundred

each with spears, pikes, halberds & c. of various fashions with some

banners flying and from within appeared the muzzles of two long

brass cannon. In the middle of a gravelled terrace in front of the palace was laid the presents I brought. As soon as we ascended this terrace

the Mandarine our conductor told us to make our obeisance in the

same manner he did, which consisted in prostrating himself three times with his forehead to the ground. This mode of salutation,

however, appearing to us rather too humiliating, we contented our-

selves with making as many bows after the English fashion. We mounted half a dozen steps to the apartment his Majesty and his Court were assembled in. It was open in the front and at the sides,

the roof tiled and constructed after the Cochin Chinese fashion supported by fine wooden pillars the back part wainscotted; against this was placed the throne which rose two or three steps above the floor of the apartment, and upon the eminence stood an arm-chair, painted red and ornamented with the gilded heads of dragons, in which the

King sat, having before him a small table covered with a red silk cushion wrought with gold flowers for him to lean on. On each side of the throne was also placed a chair. In one was seated his

brother, the other was empty and as I understood belonged to another

brother who was then absent at Donai. Several rows of benches were

behind these, and upon them were seated the Mandarines according to their rank. The King was clothed in a robe of silk of a deep yellow upon which dragons and other figures were wrought in gold; upon his head he wore a kind of close cap turned up behind, the front ornamented with some jewels and on the top of it was a large red stone through which passed a wire raising it a few inches. It shook and sparkled as he moved himself. The Mandarines were

many of them clad in gowns of silk of different colours adorned with

dragons and their caps with flowers of gold or gilt. Round their waists they wore girdles some of which were covered with scarlet

broad cloth fastened with clasps of gold and decorated with cornelian

stones set in the same metal. Upon the whole, the appearance was

a fine one, and, altho' the scene wanted many of the requisites which constitute grandeur and magnificance amongst other Eastern Princes, as

a profusion of jewels, carpets attendants & c., the regularity and decorum

observed here presented one with some adequate ideas of a powerful sovereign surrounded by his Court. Behind the whole, farthest from 41

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Alastair Lamb

the throne, was placed a bench for me and my companions. This I, however, objected to, conceiving that both as an ambassador (in

that character I at least appeared there), and a stranger, I had a right to a more honorable one, and also that it would be very inconvenient for addressing myself to the King or hearing what he said. As soon

as he understood this he desired me to come forward to the front bench and we were seated next to his son-in-law.

I then through the interpreter addressed myself to the King

telling him that "I was a servant to the English Government in Bengal from whence I had been deputed to settle a commercial and friendly

intercourse with inhabitants of Cochin China". He said "that the

fame of the English exploits at sea had reached him and that he had heard they exceeded all other nations in the number of their ships

and excelled in the management of them. But they made an ill

use of the advantage, for he had also been informed that they indis-

criminately attacked and plundered whatsoever vessels they met with. That he was very willing to permit the English to trade to

his ports and hoped that they in return would not molest his gallies, boats, or other vessels." I replied "that the first part of his information respecting the power of the English by sea was strictly true but the latter was absolutely false and must have been insinuated to him by those who were jealous of our prosperity and wished to give him an unfavourable and unjust opinion of us; that the English were at the

present time at peace with all foreign nations and that their ships resorted to almost all the parts in the known world where their

merchants were renowned for their probity and the fairness of their

dealings". He then desired the interpreter to acquaint me that the English might trade to his ports in the same manner as the Portuguese

did. Upon this I begged leave to observe that the English would be ready to pay all the just duties of his government, but as I had been informed that the Portuguese and others trading to Cochin China were subjected to many obstructions and delays in carrying on their business (by reason of these duties being undefined which

sometimes involved them in disputes with the Mandarines and officers

of government), I wished, in order to avoid such disagreeable cir-

cumstances, that in lieu of the various presents, anchorage & c. required from the Portuguese, some specific payment might be agreed on either

by way of duty or otherwise as His Majesty might judge proper".

After he had taken a short time to consult with the Mandarines about him, he replied that he had considered my representation and to show how willing he was to settle everything to our satisfaction he proposed that every three masted vessel for the liberty of trading a whole season in Cochin China should pay 10,000 quans (they allowed us five quans

for a Spanish Dollar); that large two masted ones should pay seven

thousand and smaller ones four thousand. I urged to him that

"these were large sums which I was afraid would deter any merchants

from sending their vessels, that I therefore hoped he would lower them something as an encouragement". It was at length settled that

for vessels of three masts seven thousand quans should be paid, of two masts four thousand, and smaller ones two thousand. He now

desired to know whether and upon what terms I would assist him 42

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Missions to Cochin China

with the vessels I had under my orders against his enemies. I told

him "I had no authority to act offensively or to interfere in the disputes

subsisting in the country, and I requested to know the reason of his putting to death some persons left in the country the preceeding year".

He said that this circumstance had happened at Turon where one

of his Mandarines commanded, that he himself was not thoroughly informed of the matter but understood the persons I mentioned to have been killed fighting against his people. His Majesty then withdrew

and I was acquainted that he expected some further conversation

with me at his private house.

We accordingly followed him. This house we were informed

was the residence of his family, the one we left being entirely appropriated to the assembling of the Council, receiving Ambassadors and to other public services. Round it was a bamboo fence through which

we entered by a gate leading to a spacious court and crossing this we ascended by three steps to a large hall open in the front and furnished with small screens to keep off the weather. In the back part of this apartment, within a smaller one whose front was also open to the hall, divested of his robes and cap of state, and having on a plain silk jacket buttoned with small diamonds and a piece of red silk wrapped round his head in the form of a turban, His Majesty

was sitting to receive us there. Our conversation was without

constraint and general. He began it with repeating his good intentions towards us and assuring me how desirous he was of connecting himself with the English; that altho' to save appearances before his Council

he had mentioned a sum of money to be paid by our ships for the

liberty of trading, yet to procure the friendship of the English nation

he would never exact it from them but would show them every

indulgence in his power. He enumerated the articles produced in this country as pepper, cardemons, cinnamon, agula wood, elephants teeth, tin and many others which he said the ignorance of the inhabitants prevented them from making the most of, and that for this reason as well as for instructing his people in the art of war he earnestly desired

that the Governor of Bengal would send him a capable person. He said the country, owing to the late commotions in it, was in some

confusion which he should apply himself to settle.

He was then pleased to disclose some of his future designs to me. They were no less than to subdue the Kingdom of Cambodia

with the whole peninsula as far as Siam, and the Provinces belonging to Cochin China to the north now in the hands of the Tonquinese. To

effect these (and indeed it would be requisite) he wished much for the assistance of some English vessels, in recompense for which he would make them such grants of land for settlement as they might think proper. He concluded with saying how ready he should be to do anything to satisfy the English if they would assist him and secure to him and his family the Government of Cochin China.

I promised him faithfully to report what he had said to the Governor-General in Bengal. The rest of our conversation was of little moment. He particularly desired amongst other articles that I would procure a horse to be sent him, cost what it would, by the first vessel to Cochin China, of a gray colour and with fine sharp 43

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Alastair Lamb

pointed ears. After being treated with tea and beetle we took our leave. In the evening he sent me three papers; one, sealed with the

great seal of the Kingdom, set both the conditions upon which English

ships were to trade to his dominions and his desire of having some person sent to him capable of instructing his subjects in the military science; the other two were sealed with a smaller seal, one described the horse & c., the other contained his licence for visiting any of his

ports. The latter I had requested of him in order to go in search of the little vessel that came in company with us and had been separated from us a few nights before we arrived at Quinion. I

supposed the commander had proceeded to Turon. The next morning we set out on our return to the vessel, the King's son-in-law furnishing us with horses and coolies for which I paid him thirty dollars. Those

which came with us he said had dispersed, he knew not whither.

Before we set out I sent a message to the King to acquaint him that as

I had made him a handsome present, I expected he would send one to the Governor General of Bengal which I would call for on my

way back from Turon. He returned me for answer that he would

most willingly. We reached Quinion the same day ( the 26th July) and in two days after sailed for Turon. Our poor Mandarine, and

indeed all on board the vessel to whom he had in some measure communicated his apprehensions for us, were exceedingly rejoiced at

our safe return. Upon the road coming from the Court we were passed by his Majesty who was going, on account of some bad news from his fleet at Donai, to perform a sacrifice at a Temple situated in the Bay our vessels lay in. He traveled in one of the net palanquins I

have before described, distinguished by its being red, which colour no

subject is allowed to use in dress or equipage. We afterwards saw him from the deck cross the river and land at the Temple. He was

in a covered boat attended by five or six gallies and about two hundred men. The ceremony I was informed chiefly consisted in bowing his head to the ground before the idols and sacrificing a buffalo; I made application to be present at it, but it did not succeed. One might be led to imagine from the conversation I had with this rebel that he was possessed of resources in some degree adequate to his

ambition, and that amongst the nations around him he might blaze into a meteor as baneful and as transitory as a Nadir .50 In the rise of their fortunes there may be traced a remarkable concurrence of

circumstances : like the Persian, he was the commander of a small

fortress in a strong situation from whence he sallied and made a prey of the unwary; like him he grew into consequence at about the same age, and under the pretence of supporting his sovereign made himself master of the throne; like him he declared himself the avenger of the wrongs of his country and became a tyrant more odious and destructive than it had ever before experienced; and like him it is not improbable he may finish his career, at least it will be a reward best proportionable

to his merits. Happily, however, there is the appearance of some

insuperable barriers which promise to confine his future deeds to the scene he is now acting in. Ignaac himself is allowed to have abilities, but these are ill seconded by the Mandarines who govern under him. 50. Nader Shah, the Persian ruler who captured Delhi in 1739. 44

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Missions to Cochin China

Fig. 3. Boats on the Fai-fo River. (From W. Alexander, as printed by Pinkerton).

They are all low illiterate men chosen from amongst the inhabitants of his native village of Tyson who, as soon as they have got into power, have been remarkable only for their perfidy, cruelty and extortion, and

if at a distance barely acknowledge a dependence on the hand that

raised them. Famine and its attendant pestilence have distroyed one half of the inhabitants of the country. Shocking are the accounts of the methods taken by the remainder to preserve a miserable existence. At Hue, the Capital, though in possession of the Tonquinese and better supplied than any other place, human flesh was publicly sold in the market. The country is almost drained of gold and silver*, part, on

* At least apparently so. Padre Loreiro, as I am informed by a gentleman who conversed with him on the subject at Canton, is of a different opinion and says there are vast sums concealed. He should be better informed than me. The Portuguese in speaking of Cochin China constantly compare it to the Brazils.

45

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Alastair Lamb

breaking out of the troubles, was plundered and carried away by the Tonquinese and Chinese. The remainder, since the great neglect

of cultivating the lands and the distruction of manufactures, is daily decreasing by sums sent to China in return for the common necessaries of life supplied from thence at an exorbitant price by the junks. The force of lgnaac by land is very inconsiderable and so deficient in the art military that I may safely aver a hundred disciplined men would

rout his whole army. His marine force, consisting of a few gallies

and three or four junks seized from the Chinese, is almost as despicable,

and in this his main dependence. He met with a severe loss which I was in the country by the secession of one half of it on a dispute arising between his brother and one of the principal commanders

under him.

Finally, his government is held in the utmost detestation; yet the spirits of the people are so broken by the various calamities they have

been afflicted with that they want courage to resist it effectually. Many of his soldiers and almost all principal people I met with openly declared to me and to those with me how reluctantly they submit and expressed their wishes that the English would take them under their protection, assuring us that upon the least appearance of a force the whole country would fly to join them; but more of this in its

proper place.

Thus circumstanced, I think there is little probability of his

executing the projects he mentioned at our conference. I rather conclude while the Tonquinese possess the finest provinces to the northward, with an old claim to the whole country*, and his attempts are baffled upon Donai, that he has more reason to dread the loss of his * After the great revolution which made the Tartars master of the Empire of China, the western provinces threw off their allegiance and were formed into

a kingdom under a prince, whose descendant now reigns at Tonquin. A

colony from thence about the beginning, of the 15th century possessed themselves of Cochin China, having driven the original inhabitants back to the mountains, and after long and bloody struggles with the Tonquinese, who still consider them as rebels, became independent.

[The Le Dynasty acquired control over Vietnam in 1427 after a rebellion against the Chinese. In the 16th century it became little more than a line of faineant kings, and the real power passed into the hands of the feudal chiefs of the Trinh Dynasty. In the early 17th century the Trinh lost control of Annam to the Nguyen Dynasty but remained masters of Tonkin. For the greater part of the 17th century the Trinh tried to dispossess the Nguyen, but with no success, and by the end of the century an uneasy truce existed between the two dynasties. In 1774, taking advantage of the Tay-son troubles, the Trinh renewed their attack on Nguyen territory and occupied Hué, the traditional Nguyen capital. In 1786, after the Tay-son leader Van-Hue, Van-Nhac's younger brother, had defeated the Trinh and occupied much of Tonkin, the Le attempted with Chinese aid to reassert their ancient supremacy. The outcome was a decisive victory by Van-Hue and the flight of the last of the Le line to a Chinese exile. Van-Hue assumed the imperial title which had once been that of the Le, taking the regnal name Quang-trung, and he was confirmed in this

by the Chinese Emperor in 1790. See also Chapman's note, p. 61 below. Chapman, in this note, also refers to the southwards march of the

Vietnamese at the expense of the Chams. The Vietnamese crossed the Col des Nuages into Quang-nam Province in the 15th century, and thereafter

moved steadily down towards the Mekong delta. The process is well

illustrated in Map 16 in Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., p. 530.] 46

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Missions to Cochin China

present possessions than to flatter himself with the hope of future

conquests.

About two degrees to the North of Quinion lies an island called

Pulo Canton, and between thirty and forty minutes north of this another named Pulo Campella. The latter possesses a convenient

place for ships to anchor in and other advantages, which induced the French some years ago to send a vessel with a letter from the King,

accompanied by rich presents, offering to purchase it from the

Government of Cochin China. The offer was, however, wisely refused. I believe it would now be at the service of any nation who would be at the trouble of taking possession of it.50a Upon the continent, opposite to this island, is the entrance of a river by which the junks go up to Faifo, and there is a branch of it which falls into the harbour of

Turon.

We anchored in Turon Bay the second of August , and found here

four Macao vessels; a few days after they were joined by another. There had also been a small Spanish snow trading upon the coast this season. The Portuguese of Macao buy up the refuse of the Canton market, after the departure of the Europe and India ships,

which they hitherto disposed of in Cochin China to great advantage;

but this year they complained much of their losses and of the impositions they had suffered. Having obtained the permission of the Mandarine, I hired a tolerable house in the village of Turon. It is built upon the banks of a river falling into the harbour to the

southeast, and communicates, as I before observed, with the river of

Faifo. There had been several large and good houses here, but most of them were destroyed in the troubles. The banks of the

river were cultivated with rice, brinjalls,50b and some sweet potatoes. The country farther back seemed entirely neglected, covered, however, in several places with groves of oranges, limes, jacks, plantains, and

bamboos, in most of which were the remains of dwelling houses.

When I had been here three or four days the Mandarine who governs

the Province of Cham on the part of Ignaac came down the river

attended by four gallies rowing between forty and fifty oars each, and landed at a house on the opposite side to where I lived. The same day he sent to know when he should wait on me. I chose, however, to be

first to make this compliment and crossed the river in one of his

gallies for that purpose. He received me in great form, himself seated upon a bench placed on an eminence, the lesser Mandarines and soldiers

to a considerable number ranged on each side of him. I presented

to him the passport I had received from the King, which he respectfully stood up to hear read, and then welcomed me to Turon. This was the Mandarine with whom the dispute had happened the preceding year; I begged therefore he would inform me how it had arisen and the cause of his severity to the people who had fallen into his hands. He replied that the commander of the English ship had been prevailed on by some Mandarines of the former government then in arms at

Turon to assist them with men and arms, and that the ships boat

50a. The Poivre mission.

50b. Brinjall or Brinjaul is the egg-plant. Yule, Burnell, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 47

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Alastair Lamb

being sent up the river with them had been attacked by his people and taken; that some of the crew were killed, some jumped into the river, and were drowned, and some fled to the woods where they perished with hunger. He then gave me a licence for trading, strictly enjoining all persons to pay for what they purchased, and in no wise to molest or ill treat us or our attendants upon pain of being severely punished. The misfortune was we could not find anybody capable of purchasing

in the Province. After he had given me an invitation to visit him at Faifo, I took my leave. He returned the same night. The thirteenth [of August] I set out for Faifo in a small galley provided by the Mandarine of Turon. We left the village between six and seven in the evening and reached Faifo about nine o'clock the next morning. It was a pleasant serene night, the water perfectly smooth, no noise to be heard but the regular strokes of our oars and a song not destitute of harmony from the rowers. Listening to this and chatting amongst ourselves we gradually fell asleep, and when we were awakened at the places the galley stopped at, to give an account of who we were, it was only to be returned to a like

pleasing repose. On one of these occasions we were not a little alarmed when on opening our eyes we found ourselves under a high mountain part of which impended over the river, and it seemed ready to tumble

and bury us under its ruins; returning by day we found this place really curious. It was a large mountain of white marble situated on a low plain close to the water-side unconnected with any of the distant hills. We could perceive several cracks and holes in the body of the mountain and round it were lying some vast fragments which we concluded to have been separated from it. The eye in wandering over it presented the fancy with the ideas of pillars, houses, towers & c., near it were a few huts inhabited by stone cutters. I did not

see any other specimens of their ingenuity than pestles and mortars of different sizes; probably the marble was formerly applied to a more

extensive use. On arriving at Faifo we were surprised to find the recent ruins of a large city; the streets laid out on a regular plan

paved with flat stone and well built brick houses on each side. But,

alas, there was now little more remaining than the outward walls

within which, in a few places, you might behold a wretch who formerly

was the possessor of a palace sheltering himself from the weather in a miserable hut of straw and bamboos. Of the few edifices left

standing was a wooden bridge built upon piles over a narrow arm of the river with a tiled roof. The temples and their wooden gods

were no further molested than in being robbed of their bells which

I understand the present usurper had seized for the purpose of coining them into money. After refreshing ourselves at Faifo, I

set out for the Mandarine's residence which I reached in about five hours. The course of the river from Turon to Faifo was a little to the eastward of south. It now seemed to spread all over the country in a great numbef of branches. Near his house was a very populous village where I procured some pineapples and jacks [jack-fruit] both excellent in their kind. Over the river in this place, about fifty yards broad, was a floating bridge of bamboo hurdles. Here I was obliged

to leave the galley and proceed by land in my net for about two 48

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Missions to Cochin China

miles through paddy fields. The Mandarine's house, like several

others I saw, was within an enclosure formed by driving strong stakes

into the ground intermixed with bamboos growing, and for some distance round it short pointed bamboos were driven obliquely into the ground as if designed to keep off cavalry. Several good chevaux de frise were lying about in different places. The house was spacious, partly consisting of brick and partly of thatch and bamboo. He was almost as well attended as his master Ignaac ; several of his people were well dressed and had swords in their hands, the hilts and scabbards

ornamented with plates of beaten gold. My conversation with the Mandarine was but short. I was informed that he was an illiterate

man and had the character of being cruel and oppressive. An instance of cruelty and perfidy was related to me at Faifo - there

was a certain distant relation of the royal family who lived in disguise in that part of Cochin China possessed by the Tonquinese with whom

this Mandarine had some acquaintance. He made it a pretence to

send him a pressing invitation to come and reside under his protection

with his family and dependants, not only assuring him of personal security, but promising him his friendship. The poor man, deceived by these specious professions of personal regard, set out with his wife,

his children and the rest of his family to a considerable number.

When he arrived in Turon Bay he procured an expeditious conveyance to the Mandarine's residence, leaving his family to follow him in their boats. He was received by the Mandarine apparently with the highest marks of satisfaction and regard. They partook of a repast together and when it was finished the Mandarine told him that his attendants

would conduct him to a house he had prepared for his reception, but

he had no sooner passed the threshold than he was seized by the soldiers and had his head immediately severed from his body. To conclude the scene as he had begun, he embarked on one of his

gallies to meet the family who were on their way up to town and as soon as he had reached their boat he instantly caused the women and children to be bound together and thrown into the river, seizing all that they had brought with them for his own use. I was afterwards assured that I ran the greatest risk in trusting myself in the power of this man who no further obeyed the orders of Ignaac than they answered

his own purposes. This I had some suspicion of at our interview,

for the King having desired to have some articles which were in the

Jenny , I told him I would prevail on the Captain to deliver them to his Mandarine at Turon if he would write to him to receive and

pay for them. I mentioned this circumstance and he acknowledged

the King had done so, but said if he made any purchases they would

be on his own account. Finding nothing to detain me in Faifo and, indeed, not being altogether satisfied that we were secure there, I stayed only one day and returned to the vessel. It was now the

fifteenth of August, to which time we had warm dry weather with a few light showers, but the latter end of this month rain began to fall frequently and heavy and the wind to blow strongly from the south. On my arrival on board the Amazon I was visited by a Portuguese

merchant just come from Hue*, the capital of Cochin China. He * Hue lies in Lat. 17°. 30' North.

49

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Alastair Lamb

acquainted me that he was charged with a verbal invitation to me

from the Tonquinese Viceroy to proceed thither and to dispose of my articles of trade we might have remaining. I have omited to mention that I had dispatched my writer accompanied by Mr. Moniz, with a letter to the Tonquinese Mandarine requesting this favor. He said it

had not been received when he came away, nor had the Mandarine

any intimation of my design of going, but had sent this invitation entirely of his own accord. I determined therefore not to write for

an answer as the weather began to grow bad and the Portuguese

informed me I might procure any kind of refreshment there and pass my time more agreeably than where I was till the season would admit

of my proceeding to the southward. Hearing that there was but a

very small depth of water upon the bar of Hue river, I proposed to the Commander of the Jenny to go in his vessel, which might give him an opportunity of disposing of his investment. He consented, and

leaving the Amazon in Turon Bay I embarked with Mr. Bayard the eighteenth of August. The Doctor was so good as to remain with Captain Maclennan who was dangerously ill. I prevailed with some

difficulty upon our Mandarine to accompany me. He alleged that he was equally apprehensive of the Tonquinese and Tysons who were both the declared enemies of his family. The Portuguese merchant, however, acquainting me that the Tonquinese had never yet put any of the royal family to death but suffered them to live unmolested in the country provided they made no disturbances, I at last brought him to consent.

He was well known to the Portuguese to whom he voluntarily discovered himself. I really believe that he had now contracted so

strong a relish for the European manner of living, that the utmost of

his ambition was to go back to Bengal. In our way up we anchored in the Bay of Chimoy,51 which is the boundary of the Tonquinese

possessions. I was informed that grapes grew wild in the hills which surrounded this Bay, but I never saw any myself. In the country here I was met by my writer accompanied by a Mandarine with an answer to my letter containing the permission of the Viceroy to proceed to Hue, and to bring the vessel into the river if we found it practicable,

The Mandarine's name was On-ta-hia. He was the offspring of a Chinese by marriage with a Tonquinese woman. By trading to Canton he had acquired some knowledge of the mode practised by the Europeans in conducting their commerce. He appeared to approve highly of our opening a trade with Cochin China and to

have a view of procuring the management of it under the denomina-

tion of the Companies Merchant. I did not think it necessary to discourage his expectation. In the course of our conversation he took an occasion to abuse the government he was a member of, and hinted if the English thought it an object, how easy it would be for

them to become masters of the country. The hook was too unskil-

fully covered for the bait to allure. I utterly and entirely disclaimed any such intention. When we came to the entrance of the river, the Mandarine stationed there came on board in a galley with a number

of soldiers and undertook to pilot the vessel in. She was, however, 51. Cape Choumay, half way between the Bay of Tourane and the mouth of the Hué River.

50

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run aground and remained so in some danger until the following night the tide rose here about six feet.

It was two days after the vessel anchored within the mouth of the

river ere I received permission to go up to town. A galley was then sent to carry me. The distance from the place we lay at was about fifteen miles. Towards the sea, the country was sandy and barren; advancing, the scene gradually changed. The land put on every appearance of fertility and we saw the husbandmen on the banks busied in cultivation. Abreast of the town twenty-five Chinese junks were at an anchor, innumerable country boats were passing and repassing, and the shore was thronged with people. We landed at On-ta-hias house. It was the resort of the Chinese, as his office consisted in reporting the arrival of their junks and procuring them their clearances when they were leaving the port. The next day he

carried me to the Tonquinese Viceroy. Before we set out On-ta-hia

decided to see what presents I designed for the Viceroy and what for

the General*. I showed them to him. He approved them but

advised me as a friend to reserve the best articles for the latter, giving as a reason that the Viceroy was a good man who really meant to be a friend to us, but that the favour of the General who was an Eunuch and of bad character, was only to be purchased by sacrificing to his

avarice. I observed that I had heard from a like principle, they

offered the most costly perfumes to the evil being, while they totally

disregarded the supreme and benevolent one. He allowed the comparison to be just and supported the principle they acted upon. 1

requested him to select such things as would procure me a favorable reception from this counterpart of the infernal one. He made choice

amongst others of a gold repeating watch set with a few small

diamonds and emeralds; I, however, took care to reserve an equivalent which I hoped would sufficiently satisfy the respect I entertained for the virtues of the Viceroy. He resided in the palace of the Kings of Cochin China, six miles higher up the river than the town I landed at. The Abbé Raynalõla informs us its circumference is a league and the

walls of it planted with thousands of cannons. This description is certainly heightened. I visited it several times myself and a person

who accompanied me found an opportunity of examining the whole. The fortification is an oblong square, the greater sides extending, as near as I could guess, half a mile, the lesser, two thirds of that distance. It is formed by a retaining wall behind which a rampart of earth ten or eleven feet high was thrown up, with steps rising to a convenient level for the discharge of missile weapons. It had no embrasures, the guns being pointed through a kind of portholes, made in the bottom of the retaining walls. The number mounted was about sixty, the largest nine pounders. For six or eight feet without the wall, short pointed bamboos from twelve to six inches long were driven obliquely into * The second Mandarine, who had the command of the fleet and the army. 51a. Guillaume Thomas Francois Raynal (1713-1796), author of L'Histoire philisophique et Politique des Etablissements et du Commerce des

Européens dans les deux Indes, 4 vols., Amsterdam 1770. An English

translation appeared in 1776, and it is probably to this that Chapman is

referring here.

51

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Alastair Lamb

the ground; beyond these was a ditch, eight feet wide and as many in depth, fenced with bamboos growing which was succeeded by another space with pointed ones driven in the ground, and the whole encompassed by a low checkered bamboo rail. The ground within the fort was divided by a number of brick walls meeting at right angles and

forming squares; some were allotted to holding markets, others to

granaries, quarters for the soldiers, stables for elephants and horses. The whole was much out of repair, the gates of communication were mostly down and the walls falling.

The palace deserved the name of a good lower-roomed house. A terrace thrown up about six feet formal the floor; fine polished pillars of wood with stone pedestals supported the beams and rafters upon which the tiled roofs of the different compartments were laid. Illese were without ceilings. The capitals of the pillars, the beams and rafters were ornamented with carved work. The buildings were

laid out in spacious verandahs and private rooms, generally wainscotted up in the center where the roof was highest and admitted of making

lofts above them. Their furniture consisted of very few movables,

mats spread upon the floor with hard cushions, great silken lanthorns

painted in different colours suspended from the roofs, with some frames

hung up against the pillars containing sentences written in large characters, composed the whole. In one of the verandahs I was

introduced to the Viceroy. I found him swinging in a net hammock

extended between one of the pillars and the wainscot of the inner apartments. He was a venerable old man about sixty years of age, with a thin silver beard, of most engaging manners. His dress was

plain and simple like the rest of the Tonquinese, consisting of a loose gown of black glazed linen with large sleeves, a black silk cap on his

head stiffened into a particular form, and sandals on his feet. The cordiality which he received us with, and to the last apparently

preserved towards us, still inclines me to acquit him of being voluntarily

the author of the unmerited ill treatment we afterwards experienced. He himself and others often hinted to me that although the first in rank, he was subject to the control of his colleagues. I acquainted him

with my business in Cochin China, much in the same terms I had

made use of to Ignaac , adding that the high character given of his own

personal virtues and the lenity and humanity I had heard the

Tonquinese had shewn to their vanquished enemies, had inspired me with so strong a desire of making him a visit and forming a connection with so deserving a people that soon after my arrival at Turon I was

induced to apply for his permission to come up to the Capital. The

voluntary invitation he had sent me by the Portuguese previous to the

receipt of my letter, I assured him, enhanced the obligation I was

under to him, and that I would study to deserve so high a mark of his favor. I then requested he would receive the present I had brought as

a small token of my respect. Pleasure seemed to dance in the old gentleman's eyes at the few little compliments I made him. He descended from his net and seated himself upon the ground nearer to us. The linguist told me that he seized every opportunity the

intervals in my address allowed him of making a favourable comparison

to the Mandarines about him of our manners and deportment with 52

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Missions to Cochin China

those of other Europeans that had hitherto fallen under his notice. He desired the linguist to assure me of a hearty welcome at the seat

of his Government. He admired the presents I brought him, but

lamented that I should think it a necessary part of my introduction to

him. He approved, he said, of my proposal to form a commercial

intercourse with his nation, and would promote it all in his power. To

encourage us to prosecute the design he remitted the payment of anchorage and all duties whatsoever on account of the vessel in the

river. He requested to be furnished with a list of the articles on board, some of which he said he would purchase himself, the remainder the Commander had free liberty to dispose of to whomsoever he might be able. He desired, should obstructions be thrown in our way by any of his people, be their rank what it would, that I would without ceremony

order them to be thrown into the river. He then inquired several

particulars respecting the nation I belonged to as to our force by sea and land, our commerce, customs and religon with the grounds of our difference in the latter article from the Portuguese. I satisfied him as I was able.

He also requested permission to examine our hats, swords and

the other parts of our dress, frequently apologising for his curiosity. The evening was now approaching, and we had been with him some

hours, I made a motion to retire but he insisted on our staying to partake of a repast. It was presently brought and a small low table

being set before us it was covered with a number of basins and saucers

containing fowls mixed with a few vegetables and a little salt and

water, pork and buffalo, beef cut into small thin slices, fish stewed with soy and onions, several fish sauces - some not unlike anchovie

in flavour, plain boiled rice, and rice moistened with the broth of

meat, and a few other articles.

Chopsticks were given us to eat with but observing we managed

rather awkwardly he ordered some porcelain spoons and pieces of

pointed bamboos to be given us, and, with these we did pretty well. A desert of fruits and China sweetmeats was afterwards served up, tea was made for our drink and when we asked for water, it was brought, warm and sweetened with sugar. We were desired to taste

some excellent Tonquinese liquor. It was a hot spirit and had a

strong flavor of some grain from which it was distilled. A separate

table was spread before the Viceroy. He desired all our attendants to be called, for every one of whom a mat was brought to sit on.

He was much surprised at their hesitating to sit in my presence and more so when the vessel men refused to eat any of his cookery. He ordered them to be asked if there was anything they could eat that

would not interfere with their religious prejudices, and on their mentioning fruits, some of every kind was set before them. He politely requested I would dispense with the ceremony of their

standing - an English tar of our party afforded much diversion to the

Viceroy and his attendants by the keenness of his appetite and the unaffected relish he appeared to have for the Tonquinese brandy in which we begged leave with great submission to drink towards their honour's good health. 53

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Alastair Lamb

During our repast several war elephants were brought into an

area fronting the verandah where some figures of soldiers were placed in ranks. These the elephants attacked with great fury, seized them with their trunks, loosed them in the air and stamped them under their

feet. Some soldiers were employed in shooting at a bull with long

matchlocks which had swivels and three-legged stands to fire them on.

The workmanship of these pieces was as good as any I have seen of the kind in Hindostán. The Viceroy acquainted me they had been fabricated under his own inspection. I now made a second motion

to retire. This brought on a renewal of the Viceroy's professions of friendship and regard. He hoped, he said, I should find here sufficiently agreeable to induce me to prolong my stay, and that during

it he should see me as often as possible; that when the season demanded my departure, he would make a request to me to carry one or two of his people to Bengal. I thanked him in the highest

terms that occurred to me for the honorable and friendly reception he had given me, assured him that I meant to avail myself of his kind

invitation for passing the approaching winter under his protection where

peace, plenty and regularity seemed to abound, so different from the situation I found in the other parts of Cochin China, and that if he should persevere in his intention of sending anybody to Bengal, I would with pleasure accommodate them with a passage and engage for their meeting with every return of the civilities he had shown me. When we stood up to depart he ordered all the Mandarines who were with him to attend me to the Eunuch's to whom it was necessary, he said, I should make a visit whenever I came to him. Just as we were

leaving him he expressed himself sorry he had no equivalent to make

me for the present I had given him. I desired he would suffer no uneasiness on that account for the. Government I belonged to did not admit of my receiving any. The old gentleman was some time

silent with an apparent admiration. He, however, ordered two ingots of silver (value near twenty-eight Spanish Dollars) to be brought and forced our acceptance of them by saying he could not consider our hearts and words to be of one accord if we refused. We took them

but found an opportunity of disposing of them amongst his attendants. Highly satisfied with the reception we met with from the Viceroy, we left the palace to pay our respects to Quart Tam Quon*, the Eunuch Commander-in-Chief of the gallies and army. The distance between their habitations was too short to complete the pleasing presages we

were drawing of an agreeable residence at Hue, and the praises we

were lavishing on the person we expected would chiefly contribute to it. The prospect, though not altogether enveloped in darkness, was presently obscured.

Attended by a numerous train of Mandarines who marched in ranks before and behind us we presented ourselves at the Eunuch's gate. I attempted to enter but was rudely pushed back and made to wait a considerable time in the open street. This afforded an opportunity of observing the architecture of his house. It differed from the others I saw in the fort in having upper apartments. I was

informed that it had been the Council house in the time of the Kings. * This title signifies Commander of the fleet. 54

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Missions to Cochin China

Fig. 4. A Cochin Chinese temple at Saigon. (From Crawfurd, Embassy, 2nd edition, vol. 2.)

The most adequate idea of the external appearance of the best dwelling houses in Cochin China as well as of the Temples of their Gods may

be formed from views painted on the chinaware, screens and other

articles imported from Canton.

Half an hour elapsed ere we were ushered into a large hall. The roofs were finally arched with planks and supported by wooden pillars about thirty feet in height. We seated ourselves upon some

chairs placed for us before a rattan screen from behind which a shrill

voice called our attention to the object of our visit. He did not

however become visible till the common questions were passed and I had acquainted him with the reasons of my coming to Cochin China. The screen was then turned up and a glimmering light diffused from a small waxen taper, disclosed to our view, not the delicate form of a woman the sound had conveyed the idea of, but that of a monster disgustful and horrible to behold. He was sitting in a kind of boarded shrine in form like a clothes press. I can be no judge of his height as I never saw him standing, but I believe he was short of stature. This was, however, amply made up to him in bulk and, I may venture to affirm he measured an ell over the shoulders. Great flaps hung down

from his cheeks like the dewlaps of an ox, and his little twinkling

eyes were scarcely to be discerned for the fat folds which formed deep

recesses around them. Tho' I had said every handsome thing that

occurred to me, yet there was so evident a difference between his

behaviour and that of the Viceroy. He hardly appeared civil. He

received my present with indifference, notwithstanding it was chosen

by his own jackal. In my subsequent visits I found he was a great

pedant and valued himself much on his knowledge of books. It may be worthy of remark that he had one day a volume written in Chinese 55

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Alastair Lamb

open before him which he said contained an account of Bengal.

Amongst several extraordinary things he told me were related in it

one is curious and I believe is allowed to have had some foundation in

truth. It was that so good a police was observed there that a traveller might lie down to sleep under a tree with his purse exposed by his

side without danger of losing it. He also mentioned the custom of

burning the dead. A month elapsed in a mutual intercourse of civilities. During this space the frequent interviews I had with the Mandarines were generally taken up in conversing upon the subject of our opening a trade with

their country. I omitted no occasion of expatiating on the benefit

both nations would derive from it and they seemed to be convinced

of the justice of what I advanced. They had been furnished with

lists of the cargo of the Jenny and after having adjusted the prices of the different articles she brought, they from time to time sent written orders to the Commander and myself for such as they stood in need

of. Iron, copper, lead, hardware, glass, Bengal and Madras cloths, small quantities of each, but the whole together amounting to a considerable sum, were delivered on these requisitions without

hesitation. We had been informed by the Portuguese and themselves that it was an invariable custom for them not to adjust their accounts till the vessel was about to leave the port. The season obliging us to remain some time longer, we were not importunate. I had hitherto resided in the house of Ong-ta-hia , but finding this

inconvenient, I made repeated applications to him to procure me a

separate one. He had often evaded complying, and by his underhand influence prevented my being able to hire one. He was afraid, should he suffer me to remove from immediately under his own eye, some parts of the unreasonable profits he hoped from his connection with us might escape him, and his disappointment in the expectations he had formed, added to his unwillingness to discharge the amount of his purchases, may be considered as the first causes leading to the troubles we were afterwards involved in. As I found this man was the

particular agent of the Eunuch I made him several considerable

presents but all inadequate to satisfying his rapacity. The latter end of September the rains were so heavy and the floods came down with so much violence from the mountains that almost the whole town was

overflowed in a single night, during which the noise made by the

rushing of the water through the streets and the cries of the people

removing their effects was horrible and alarming beyond idea. In

the morning great numbers of boats were passing the streets and small

ones even entering the houses. The floor of the house I was in was a foot under water; fortunately our beds were placed in the small

sleeping apartments, the boarded floors of which were raised something

above that height. Notwithstanding these floods happening several times during the periodical rains, few precautions are observed by the inhabitants to secure themselves and their effects against the

sometimes melancholy consequences. The convenience of transacting business draws the people to the river side where the ground is low

and I am told that the Government is so absurd and unreasonable as

not to allow any person except their sovereign an upper roomed 56

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house. Attention to our health obliged me to be urgent with Ong-ta hia for his consent to remove to a drier habitation, and the application

of a present apparently reconciled him to it. It was only in

appearance, for we had been gone but two or three days when a young man, who with his father served me as linguists, came and complained

to me that he had been cruelly beaten by Ong-ta-hia for being

instrumental in my leaving his house and assisting in procuring me

another. The following day I was alarmed by the same person

running to me and conjuring me to hasten to Ong-ta-hia if I wished

to save two of my people he was just going to put to death. I went immediately, accompanied by Mr. Totty. We found his house

filled with a great number of Chinese, some of whom were busy in

binding a poor sick Frenchman and a cook belonging to Captain

Hutton to the pillars of the house. Ong-ta-hia had a drawn sword in

his hand and foamed at the mouth like a madman. I desired to know

the reason of his behaving so, but he was too much agitated to acquaint me, and retired. I then applied to some of the Chinese. They told me that the Frenchman had some trifling dispute with a woman in the bazar that sold eggs, who had made a complaint to

Ong-ta-hia, and, they believed, his having taken a larger dose of opium than usual, was the cause of his behaving in this outrageous manner. The Doctor and myself released the prisoners without any opposition

from the people, some hundreds in number about them. We

immediately repaired with them to the Viceroy. To him I offered to deliver them up for punishment should he upon inquiry into the affair find they merited it. He declined, however, taking charge of them, highly blamed the conduct of Ong-ta-hia and promised to send some people to enquire into the affair who should give me ample satisfaction.

The following day two Mandarines arrived and entered upon the

investigation with great formality. A decision was given in our favor, no redress however was to be obtained; after receiving presents from both parties, they advised us to be friends and departed. In my next visit to the Viceroy and the Eunuch I remonstrated with them on the unmerited affront afforded me and claimed the promise of the former

to see justice done on the offender. The Viceroy replied by saying

he was sorry it was not in his power to act as he wished, but hoped we should meet with no more such disagreeable occurrences, desired we would have no further connection with Ong-ta-hia and that he and his colleagues would appoint another person to transact our business. The Eunuch was not so civil; he hardly vouchsafed me an answer to

what I said; gave orders for some more goods being sent him and

acquainted me that having broken the repeating watch I gave him it was become unless and he should return it. Both he and the Viceroy however gave me the strongest assurances that they would immediately

oblige Ong-ta-hia to pay for what he had purchased of the Captain and would order his house and other effects to be sold for that

purpose if he delayed it more than fifteen days. Apprised of this,

the villain counterfeited frenzy, got upon the roof of his house and hurled the tiles upon the passengers in the streets and acted a number

of other tricks equally suitable to the character he had assumed to

complete the comedy. The Magicians were sent to consult with : they 57

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Alastair Lamb

wisely pronounced his distemper to proceed from an evil spirit that

had gotten possession of him, but had great hopes of being able to

oblige him to quit his hold. The exorcists began by illuminating the

house with a number of candles placed before their idols. This was

followed by a din of copper basins, drums, trumpets and bells, while the conjurors clothed in whimsical garments uttered some words in a chanting tone and practised a number of gesticulations and leapings till at length the patient, overcome with the noise, fell into a kind of stupor. They then acquainted us the devil had left him but desired, as the exortions made in ejecting him had much weakened the patient, he might not be troubled for some days. In the meantime, we left the

town and lost our money about the commencement of the above disagreeable affair. I received a letter from Captain Maclennan

acquainting me that the bad state of his health had led him to resolve on bringing up the vessel to the mouth of the river that he might land and try the benefit of a change of air. I was accordingly sorry

that Captain Maclennan's health should render so imprudent a step necessary. Altho' the vessel could not be brought into the river, I was convinced it would alarm the Government or at least furnish a

pretence for their appearing so. Either might be productive of dis-

agreeable consequences to myself and those with me. It was also

exceedingly hazardous to risk the vessel on the coast in the present inclement season. To obviate the first of these objections I had to her coming, I hastened to the Viceroy and Eunuch and acquainted them with the cause of it, notwithstanding which a parade of guards was made and a number of precautions taken which alarmed us not a little. To exculpate myself from the second, I thought it necessary to protest

against the Captain for any consequence that might arise from so

impudent an action.

The Amazon anchored at the mouth of the river the last of September . Captain Maclennan came on shore the next day, but in such a situation as to produce all hopes of his recovery given over by our Surgeon. He was desirous of trying whether anything could be done for him by the Physicians of the country. Two of them successively exerted their skill upon him, but to no other purpose than

their own emolument; an exorbitant charge of near three hundred dollars

was made for ginseng alone. This drug is held in the highest estimation in China and the adjacent countries and accounted a sovereign remedy for almost all curable disorders. In mortal ones they say it will detain

the fleeting spirit of life beyond the prescribed limit and even preserve a kind of general warmth in the body long after it has taken its flight. Our

poor Captain, however, breathed his last the second of October . I

was obliged to apply to a Portuguese to take the management of the

funeral. By his means I obtained the loan of a fine painted bed to

lay the corpse on, and a number of Christians to carry it. The coffins are made here of very thick plank, so compactly joined and lined on

both sides with oiled paper, that it is a common practice with the

principal people of the country to keep their relations in their houses without inconvenience a month after their decease. The top is arched

and the whole of the same size from the head to the foot. The

outside is covered with silks or rich stuffs according to their fancy 58

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or ability of the family the deceased beloned to. The seventh of

October was fixed for the funeral, and having invited the Portuguese,

we assembled early in the morning to attend it. On the night preceding I was informed that the owner of the house Captain

Maclennan died in had declared he would not suffer the corpse to be

removed. Upon enquiry into the reason, it appeared to be done to

extort money under pretence of defraying certain ceremonies to purify

the house; to comply was my only alternative. When we came to

the door we were alarmed at perceiving a large concourse of Chinese armed with bludgeons; they had been assembled by the landlord to dispute our entrance and to prevent the coffin from being carried out,

but, as his demands were complied with, they forebore any act of hostility. The behaviour of the Chinese had latterly been very suspicious. On my first arrival, supposing I was come with a force

to avenge the wrongs done to the English ship the year before by the Mandarine commanding at Turon, they seemed to vie with each other in showing me civilities, and the principal people amongst them made me repeated offers to raise a body of their countrymen to support my

designs either against the Tysons or even against the Tonquinese themselves. In these offers I believe they were sincere; the injuries they had experienced had irritated them against both governments.

Supported by a power of whose courage and skill they had a high

opinion, they flattered themselves with the pleasing expectations of retaliating and of coming in for a share of the plunder which would compensate them for all their losses. Disappointed by the declaration of my intentions being entirely pacific, which it was some time before they would give credit to, and finding my views bent on the establishment of a commerce they were afraid would be rather detrimental to them than otherwise, an alteration in their behaviour soon became evident. They represented to the Mandarines that the English were come to drive them off the country; and to exasperate them against

us they invented a number of falsities, the most improbable and groundless. I was frequently warned that they intended to plunder us, and assured it was at the hazard of being murdered I remained amongst them. Our lives and property were equally at their mercy, for the whole town was occupied by them and a few of the poor broken-spirited natives of the country. All the Tonquinese resided

five or six miles higher up the river.

The Portuguese burial ground where I purchased permission to

deposit the remains of Captain Maclennan was at the distance of seven or eight hours journey. We went part of the way by land and part by water. The beauty of the country round this spot is not to be paralleled by that of any I had before seen; in the East fine rising grounds and fruitful valleys watered by rivulets whose crystal streams might vie with the famed ones of Europe formed the most delightful prospect. The next day I made a visit to the Mandarines and found a most ridiculous report had been carried to them of my having made a pretence of

attending the funeral of Captain Maclennan that I might have an opportunity to examine the country and the gold mines said to be situated near the place he was interred at. They were even almost

made to believe that the funeral was a sham contrivance to effect 59

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Alastair Lamb

some purpose or other. Complaints were daily carried to them, or they pretended so. A Chinese junk was said to have run foul of the Jenny and to have been plundered by our people; they were also accused of having seized a new boat which had broken adrift and cut

her up for firewood. For the former there were no grounds whatever, for the latter, no other than the Lascars having picked up a few old planks that had floated down with the tide. My house was continually filled with Mandarines sent to hear and adjust these complaints, from whence there was no other means of dislodging them than by presents; and this, in the end, only proved an inducement to fresh parties to

visit me. Something or other was daily devised to give me trouble, and they seemed anxious to engage me in a dispute with them. But I avoided everything that might give rise to one, and rather chose to

suffer their impositions than enter into fruitless altercation. A demand

was now made for anchorage and duties notwithstanding the Mandarines had publicly and unsolicited exempted us from both on

our arrival. When I represented this and the daily vexations I

experienced to the Viceroy, he referred me to the Eunuch, in whose

province the adjustment of all those matters lay, and lamented it was not in his power to afford me redress; from the Eunuch an accumulation of injuries and insults was all I could procure. Things continued in this disagreeable situation till the beginning

of November. I was obliged to make so many pťesents upon every

little complaint that was justly or unjustly preferred against us and

even, at last, to procure admittance to the Mandarines, that I was

afraid our little vessel would soon prove incapable of answering the drafts we daily made on her. The monsoon beat with great violence

in the coast and our prospect of getting away, which we now

anxiously looked for, was still distant. A few days after the vessel anchored in the river the Mandarine

we brought from Bengal left her and retired amongst some of his relations who lived in disguise at a distance from the town. The dangers he would have been exposed to by a discovery would not

permit of his seeing me while I remained in the house of Ong-ta-hia,

but his servants daily came with inquiries after my health and

accompanied them frequently with little presents of fruit and specimens

of their cookery. From the time of my arrival in Cochin China I

continued to receive the strongest proofs of the gratitude and attachment of this poor man, and it will presently appear that myself and those with me were indebted to him for the preservation of our lives. As soon as I removed to another house he made me a visit. Although we had not been a long time separated, the most lively emotions of

joy took possession of him on meeting me and some others of his shipmates. When he had composed himself and poured forth a

number of grateful acknowledgements for the friendly treatment he had met with from the English, he told me he had been informed of the alteration in the behaviour of the Tonquinese and that it gave him

a good deal of anxiety. During the subsequent month that I

remained in Hue I had two or three more interviews with him and

several with some other relations of the late King and Officers of

his Government who, like him, were necessitated to pass their time 60

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in obscurity and disguise. To these our Mandarine had recounted the wonders of his voyage and fondly inspired them with hopes that the English would one day assist them to resume their rights. Many were

cur conversations on this subject, and various the plans proposed, but they all agreed that a very inconsiderable number of the fine fellows who had passed in review before our Mandarine in Bengal

would effectually do the business. Several applied to me for a

passage down the coast to Donai where they said the King had still a party in arms, and some urged me to permit them to accompany me to Bengal. To the former place I promised to conduct two

young ladies, the King's sisters, and their uncle, but my precipitate retreat deprived me of the pleasure of their company. From the beginning of October I had received frequent hints from

many of the Cochin Chinese that the Government had treacherous designs against us. I was informed that the Eunuch, our declared

enemy, had at length brought over a majority of the Council to his measures and that the principal Mandarine, who was still reported to

be inclined to favour us, would be no longer able to protect us. To

these reports I gave little credit, but on the seventh of November , as myself and Mr. Totty were sitting at breakfast, a messenger came in from our Mandarine and desired to speak with me. Immediately he told me that his master, alarmed at the danger we were in and anxious for our preservation, had sent him to advise us to secure ourselves on board the vessel without delay. He added that his master understood that the King (or rather the Chooua*) of Tonquin, instigated by the representations of the Eunuch and his party and allured with the hope of obtaining a valuable booty, had sent an order to the Government to seize our vessel; that the Mandarines were in consequence of it arming their gallies and had ordered their troops to hold themselves in readiness for service. He concluded with saying that, although his master could not absolutely determine whether the design originated with the Mandarines at Hue or was adopted in consequence of orders from Tonquin,

he was confident it was resolved to seize upon us and exhorted me

instantly to take measures for our security. Whilst I was employing a few minutes in ruminating on this intelligence, the landlord of the house we lived in came and informed me that the Tonquinese were determined to take our vessel and that he

was in hourly dread of a party of soldiers being sent to secure our

persons.

I was now beyond a doubt convinced of the treacherous intentions of the Tonquinese. At any rate, to have waited for a further confirmation would have been folly when an escape might have been impracticable. Having, therefore, put what we had most valuable into a small * The Sovereign of Tonquin is styled Booas which signified King or Emperor; he has only the shadow of authority, the? whole power since the beginning of the 15th century having fallen into the hands of the Chooua or General. [Chapman is here commenting on the two dynasties in Tonkin. The Le ruler, though faineant, was still the titular king or emperor. His title was vua, which term is intended by Chapman's booas. The Nguyen and Trinh rulers, in theory feudal chiefs subject to the Le vua , were entitled to be called chua or lord. Chapman's chooua is a surprisingly close approximation. The Nguyen and Trinh rulers also used the title vuong, meaning prince]. 61

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Alastair Lamb

country boat I kept in pay, Mr. Totty and myself with three or four Bengal servants and some Cochin China rowers left the town between eight and nine in the morning, and fortunately reached the vessel at noon.

The following day ( November the eighth) my writer whom I had left in town contrived to send a part of my baggage to the vessel. The ninth in the morning five Portuguese came on board. They acquainted me that they had fled from town in consequence of having received intelligence that the Tonquinese Mandarines, irritated at our escape, which they were suspected of being instrumental in, had come to the resolution of putting them all to death. In the evening they were followed by my writer, and another Portuguese disguised in the habit of the country, who informed me they had been obliged to make

a precipitate retreat for the same reason. They added that a little

before they left town a Tonquinese of the Eunuch's family came privately to them and offered for a sum of money to disclose some intelligence which intimately concerned the English, and that, having bribed him with two ingots of silver and some pieces of cloth, he declared to them that it had been resolved in council to seize me and to make themselves masters of the vessel. All hands joined in putting our little bark in the best state of defence she would admit of. Our force consisted of the Captain and a Mate, one English sailor, two Frenchmen, two Portuguese and twelve or thirteen Lascars which with myself, the Doctor, my writer and our servants, amounted to about thirty persons. Most of my Cochin Chinese servants also remained with the vessel, which was armed with seven or eight old and very bad two pounders for which we had scarce any shot, two swivels, some wall pieces and

twelve muskets.

The 10th [of November ] I sent my compliments to the Mandarine of the lookout house just opposite to which the vessel lay, requesting he would send me a writer as I wanted to write a letter to the principal Mandarines. He complied with my request. I wrote to them that my "reason for leaving town in so abrupt a manner was the several reports brought me of their not being so much my friends as formerly and

that they had even formed a design of doing me an injury; that although

I myself did not believe them capable of so base an action, yet as I

knew a number of lies had been circulated to our disadvantage, I could not be certain of the effect. I assured them that I was as much their

friend as ever and had no design of molesting them or anything

belonging to them unless they began in which case I was not afraid of them". Nothing occurred the next day. The 12th, the look-out Mandarine sent off a boat with his compliments, desiring permission to bring a friend on board who wished much to see the vessel. I returned for answer that I should be happy

to receive them. When they came they told me they were ordered by the principal Mandarines to assure me of their friendship and of the falsity of the reports I had heard. This they did with a profusion of compliments. The person who accompanied the Mandarine was an aged man and very particularly examined the vessel. It was conjectured afterwards that this was the person appointed to conduct the attack

on us.

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The thirteenth. In consequence of the message I received, I

determined to send my writer to the Mandarines, either to endeavour

to settle matters or to learn what was going on. I also gave him

directions to send down the remainder of the things I left at Hue as well as a quantity of goods belonging to the Jenny's cargo if he found

it practicable. He left the vessel early in the morning and, as the distance he had to go was considerable concluded he might be absent two days. He, however, returned on board about midnight. Upon demanding the reason of his sudden and unexpected

appearance, he informed me that, having called at Hue on his way up to the Mandarine's residence, and proceeded to the house I rented, he found both it and the warehouse the goods were deposited in occupied by parties of Tonquinese soldiers who were busy in breaking open all the chests and packages and carrying off their contents. That upon his demanding by what authority they acted, he was told by that of the two principal Mandarines, and menaced, if he offered to interfere, that

he should be deprived of his head. Alarmed at this, he was glad to

seize the opportunity which their attention to their plunder gave him of retreating to his boat and returning to the vessel. In the course of

this day we observed some gallies and large boats come from town

which brought to at a little distance above where we lay. We afterwards learnt that they were laden with guns and stores. These they carried over a neck of sand forming one shore at the entrance of the

river to erect batteries to prevent our escaping them. Five gallies which lay at the look-out Mandarine's were observed to move up to a kind of dockyard to take in their stores. The fourteenth. At daybreak I was awakened by our Captain to acquaint me that two large armed gallies full of men were dropping

down with the tide upon the vessel, as if with the intention of boarding us, for that on being hailed and desired to keep clear of us no answer was returned, nor did they make any other use of their oars than to

preserve a proper direction to board us. The Captain therefore

earnestly requested by permission to fire at them, giving it as his opinion

that if they were suffered to come alongside we must inevitably be taken. I myself was not so apprehensive, and as earnestly desired him

to have patience. While we were parleying our people stationed on the forecastle, who had been exceedingly alarmed at the accounts

brought from town by my writer, and were yet more terrified at the

warlike appearance the gallies made on their near approach, fired some swivels and two or three guns at them. Upon this the gallies

immediately dropped their anchor and the people in great numbers began to jump into the river. I now gave up all hopes of effecting an amicable accommodation; at the same time considering should we suffer them to recover from the panic they appeared struck with, they would redouble their efforts

against us, I therefore instantly determined to prosecute what had been begun and to deprive them of the means of hurting us. For

this purpose, I ordered two little jolly boats to be manned and armed and sent them to board the gallies, furnishing them with two or three hand grenades each, which I directed them to throw into the gallies before they attempted to board them. This precaution proved highly 63

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Alastair Lamb

necessary, for although great numbers had already deserted them and not a man appeared on their decks, yet on the bursting of the handgrenades thirty or forty more jumped overboard from each of them

and swam to the shore. Our people with the aid of some Cochin

Chinese then towed them off as well as five others which were lying

near the shore and preparing as was apprehended to come to their

assistance. We were obliged, as we knew not what to do with them, to destroy all the gallies except one which had a brass gun in her, a nine or twelve pounder. She foundered three days after, in a violent

gale of wind, as she lay astern of our vessel. The largest of these

gallies was about fifty feet long and ten or twelve broad, the head and stern sharping off to a point; they were armed with spears from fifteen

to twenty feet in length and matchlocks some of which had large bores

and turned upon swivels, with great quantities of powder and balls made up in bamboo cartridges.

The fifteenth [of November]. One Senhore Pascal, an old man,

who had formerly been linguist to the Dutch Company when they traded

to Cochin China, and the landlord of the house I resided in at Hue, arrived with a message from the Viceroy. They told me they were instructed to assure me of the continuance of his friendship; that he

entertained no resentment against us for the destruction of his gallies which he was convinced we had been driven to by the ill-treatment we had met with, but never with his consent or participation, and that he earnestly desired to effect an accommodation. After delivering this message, Senhor Pascal took me aside and told me that such was the fair speech he had been ordered to make me, but that he advised me to be constantly on our guard as the Tonquinese were manning the remainder of their gallies, and also intended to attempt burning our vessel by means of fire floats. My answer to the Mandarine was that I was happy to find he had adopted such sentiments respecting what had happened, and assured him that nothing but the indignation raised in our people on finding their

property plundered by the authority of the Government, and their lives threatened, could have induced them to carry matters to the lengths they had. I begged him to recollect I had told him in the presence of his whole Court that the English were a great and generous people, that always retained a grateful sense of any favours conferred on them, and on the contrary never failed amply to revenge any injuries that were offered them. I concluded with desiring the linguist to tell the Mandarines that I should be happy to join with them in accommodating our differences, hoping as a preliminary to it that they would give immediate orderes for all the property we had been plundered of to be restored. The linguist, having taken down the purport of my answer,

returned.

We now held a council to consider our situation and what was to be done. It was generally agreed that the aim of the Tonquinese was to protract by entering into a negotiation with us till they were prepared to attack us with advantage, and that it behoved us to get away

as fast as possible. In this opinion I concurred, but I was at the

same time exceedingly apprehensive of attempting to cross the bar of the river at the present inclement season; I recollected the difficulty we 64

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experienced and how nearly the vessi was lost in crossing it in the

finest weather, assisted by the people of the country and the boats belonging to the Chinese junks. For these considerations I resolved to

write to the Commander of the Amazon acquainting him with our situation, and to desire if he found it practicable, to come up to the

mouth of the river to favour our escape, or to send us his boat to

assist us in getting over the bar. To carry my letter I was obliged to send to the shore to press a country boat. Our boat brought one off together with her crew who, being all Cochin Chinese, were without much difficulty prevailed on to undertake the trip. The sixteenth: we dispatched a boat to the Amazon . The seven following days the weather was so exceedingly bad that we could expect no news from the Amazon; and the wind having continued to blow violently almost from the time of our dispatching the boat, we doubted of their being able to reach Turon. In this interval several messages and some letters passed between the Viceroy and me. He continued his assurances of friendship with promises to restore all our property, and earnestly invited me to an interview. The people,

however, who were the bearers of these messages and letters, as regularly

as they brought them, advised me of the insincerity of his professions,

and of the preparations carrying on against us. They informed me

that nothing but the badness of the weather, which had rendered useless four large fire floats the Tonquinese had constructed to burn our vessel, if they should find themselves unable to master us by any other means,

had for some days retarded an attack being made on us. We also

learned, from Cochin Chinese boats that frequently stole off to the vessel to dispose of fruit, that a number of guns were carried down to erect batteries which would incommode us when we attempted to cross the bar, and that should we touch the ground, as they expected, our destruction was deemed inevitable.

The twenty fourth [of November ]: in the morning the weather appearing more fine the Captain resolved to move the vessel farther out, and we anchored about a mile from a prodigious high surf which

broke across the mouth of the river. We had not been long in this

situation before we observed crowds of people on the shore on each side of us busy in bringing down guns, fascines and stores to the waterside. They immediately began to erect batteries. We endeavoured to disturb them by firing some shot at them, but the smallness of our guns

gave them but little interruption. At six o'clock in the afternoon three or four guns began to play upon us, which continued till it was dark. One shot only struck the vessel. A little before they began to fire at us we perceived a boat in the offing. Shortly after, she came on board

and proved to be the one I dispatched to Turon. By her I received

the two guns and shot I had written for and a letter from the Captain of the Amazon informing me that he had sent up his boat with three

Europeans and five Lascars to our assistance as he did not think it possible to come up with his vessel. The people acquainted me that

when they were in the offing, the Amazon's boat was in sight. From the dismal account given us of the surf they had passed through and the approach of night, we were exceedingly anxious for her safety. 65

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In the night I was awakened by some shocks I conceived occasioned by the vessel striking the ground. I immediately started up and went upon the deck. lbe scene which then presented itself was dismal to the last degree. The heavy swell having driven the vessel from her anchor, she was then thumping her bottom upon a hard sand. Not a single person was keeping watch. The Captain and her

mate overcome with fatigue were both asleep, the lascars and the rest of the ship's company, to shelter themselves from the rain, were all in the hold. To add to our distress, during the confusion the country boat upon which our ultimate hopes were placed for preserving our lives in case of an accident to the vessel, broke loose with two of our

people on board, and we heard no more of her. It was fortunately

low water: when the tide rose we got off without damage. The twenty fifth. At day break the Tonquinese, having completed their batteries in the night, fired briskly at us. Their shots mostly flew

high and the damage they did was chiefly in our rigging. A few

struck the hull and one wounded a Frenchman in the foot. We returned their fire with very little effect. Having seen nothing of the

Amazon boat, we gave her up for lost. The wind blew very fresh

from the N.E.; we anxiously waited for a little change to attempt our

escape.

The twenty sixth . We moved the vessel a little, but so confined was our situation between the surf and the sands that we found it impossible to get out of the way of the shots. The Tonquinese began to take better aim; several shots struck the vessel's hull, and one killed

the only English sailor we had on board. The spirits of our people,

depressed by the accident, received a momentary relief about noon. A cry of joy resounded from every part of the vessel that the Amazon's boat was in sight. This was but of a short duration. Those who were judges of the matter were convinced it was impossible for her to come

to us. For a considerable time we saw her cruising backwards and forwards at the back of the surf in search of the channel. Unfortunately she made choice of a part where the surf broke with the

greatest violence, and no sooner had she entered it than she disappeared. The deepest consternation immediately became visible in the countenances of all on board our vessel. Unable to afford them any assistance we concluded the whole boat's crew must perish. The Tonquinese, to express their joy at the accident that had befallen us, fired at us with redoubled fury. Regardless of the danger, every eye on board appeared fixed with melancholy steadfastness on the place the boat overset. In

about an hour the heads of two persons were discovered swimming towards the vessel. Our boat instantly put off to meet them, and shortly after returned with two Europeans, and those Englishmen. As

soon as they were provided with clothes and their spirits revived with some warm wine, they informed me that a Dutchman was drowned in

the surf, that they supposed some of the lascars gained the shore

towards which they themselves first swam but turned about and determined to endeavour to reach the vessel on the Tonquinese with wanton cruelty firing at them with small arms. In the evening part of the cargo was thrown overboard to lighten

the vessel.

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The twenty seventh [of November ]. All our fore topmast rigging was shot away with two of the fore shrouds, and one shot struck the

vessel between wind and water. The damage done by the latter was

with much difficulty and labour repaired.

The twenty eighth . Things become still more serious and the

damages we sustained more alarming. Hitherto the largest shots fired at us were four pounders. Today some additional guns began to play and several struck us, weighing nine and six pounds; these gave terrible shocks to our little bark. The trysail mast and one of the flukes of the stream grapple were shot away. The best bower cable parted close

to the hawsehole, supposed to have been cut by a shot, and a poor Lascar in the boat received a wound in his arm which obliged the

Surgeon to amputate it. Night brought us a short reprieve from the dangers which every instant flew round us in the day. But the intermission of them by affording us time to reflect on our melancholy situation rather served to increase than to alleviate our anxiety. The vessel had already received considerable damage in the hull and rigging,

one anchor only which she was riding by remained, that could be depended on. In short, it was more than probable fom the number

of guns now brought against us, that by the next evening she would either be totally destroyed, or so shattered as would entirely preclude us from any chance of escaping. I therefore earnestly conjured our Captain, and every other person on board I thought capable, seriously

to give their attention to the forming of some expedient for our deliver-

ance. In consequence of this a considerable part of the night was spent in a fruitless debate. To return to our former station in the river, it was alleged, was returning to inevitable ruin, batteries might be erected there with the advantage of being nearer to us. The gallies, boats and

fire floats which the high swell and rough sea we lay in prevented

from approaching us enabled us to act, and we were not precluded from immediately availing ourselves of a change of wind, to run out. On the other hand, to pass the bar while the wind blew in its present direction was impossible, and to remain where we were, exposed to the fire of nine or ten pieces of cannon, was certain destruction. Thus all were sensible of our difficulties yet none offered a remedy for extricating us.

Critical as our situation was, it was necessary that something should

be done, and as I found our escape for the present impracticable I

resolved, although with little hope of success, to attempt bringing about

an accommodation.

The twenty ninth. At daybreak I ordered a white flag to be hoisted at our top gallant mast head and some of our people by beckoning to the Tonquinese to invite them on board. To our great astonishment they immediately began to pull down the war flags displayed in the batteries and to beckon to us to return. Two or three guns only were fired and these it was imagined without shot. We could plainly perceive them assembled in a consultation at the grand battery. One boat attempted to come to us, but was obliged to put back by the high sea. The Tonquinese, as we supposed, waiting for orders from town, suffered us to remain unmolested the whole day. In the evening the

wind changed and at half an hour past nine o'clock was at W.S.W.

The Captain then acquainted me it was possible to get out, and was for 67

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making the experiment. Our anchor, was accordingly weighed and our

sails set. In profound silence we steered S. E. I must confess for

my own part I expected nothing better than to be wrecked amongst the breakers, conceiving that in a dark night there was little chance of finding our way over a dangerous bar, through a channel not more than

sixty yards wide. At one time the vessel's head was close upon the

breakers of the sea reef when our sails were most fortunately taken

aback. At half past ten o'clock we crossed the bar. The Tonquinese

then perceived that we were giving them the slip and kept up a brisk fire at us till long after we were beyond the reach of their guns; but the darkness of the night prevented their taking good aim and not a shot struck us. Thé wind continued favourable the whole night and the next day at eleven o'clock in the forenoon we anchored in Turon Bay. As it was thought that the season would now admit of our proceeding to the southward I resolved to make my stay here no longer than would allow the Jenny to repair her damages, intending to call at Quinion for the present Ignaac had promised to send to Bengal, and from thence to take a pilot to conduct us to Donai. In the interim I expected our Mandarine, with some of his friends from Hué, would contrive to join us. But I apprehend they must either have found it impossible to escape the vigilance of the Tonquinese or been prevented by the extreme badness of the weather, as I never after heard of them. The Commander of the Amazon having informed that during my absence two Europeans, a Frenchman and a Dutchman, had run away, I despatched my writer to the Mandarine at Faifo requesting him to return them and a small Malay prow they had gone off in. I likewise directed him to acquaint the Mandarine of the behaviour of the Tonquinese and what had happened in consequence. My messenger returned the fifth of December. He informed me that the Mandarine expressed himself highly pleased on his recounting to him our disputes with the Tonquinese and that he offered in case it should be our intention to attack them to assist us with his whole force by sea and land. In regard to the two deserters, he acknowledged they had been with him, and proposed to him if he would furnish them with five or six of his gallies to seize both our vessels; he promisi to search for them and send them down. I afterwards was at a great deal of pains to recover these villains, but without effect. One probable opportunity that presented itself I lament letting escape me which was not detaining two Mandarines with their attendants who came on board to make a bargain for delivering them up. A Portuguese merchant who accompanied my writer as an interpreter acquainted me that while they were at Faifo they were privately

spoken to by some of the principal inhabitants earnestly expressing their

wishes that the English would come and assume the government of the country, assuring them that all the natives would joyfully and instantly submit to them as soon as a force capable of protecting them should appear. As an inducement to this they set forth the former flourishing state of the country, the valuable commodities it produced, the various manufactures (now almost lost) it excelled in, and the extensive trade

it carried on. They concluded with saying that the arrival of the 68

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Missions to Cochin China

English had inspired them with hopes which they trusted they should not be disappointed in, and requested that I might be made acquainted

with them.

The next day a letter was brought on board by a fisherman which he said was delivered to him by a person he did not know, and who desired him to carry it on board the English vessel. It was addressed to Ong-tom-being* and the English gentlemen at Turon and written in the name of a person who styled himself Teon-tow-Comtuck , nephew to the late King and Commandant in the woods. The purport was to inform us that he had heard of our treatment by the Tonquinese, that he had a considerable army under his command and that if we intended to fall upon the Tysons he desired we would fix the day when he would co-operate with us. There was no person on board competent to judge of the genuineness of this letter. I had suspicions of its being an artifice of the Tysons to discover our intentions and detained the fisherman two days, sending his wife and boat with orders to bring me the person who delivered the letter to him. As we were going to sail, I then dis-

missed him thinking it not worth the trouble to concern myself further

about the matter. From the eighth to the eighteenth of December

when we finally left Turon we made repeated attempts to put to sea and were as often till then driven back by the badness of the weather. In one of these attempts the Jenny was separated from us.

The nineteenth. The wind increased to a violent gale which

continued to the twenty first , in the morning when we found ourselves

becalmed in a most disagreeable situation near Pulo Sapata and very near to some rocks and breakers. About eight o'clock in the morning a breeze sprung up with which for some time we endeavoured to steer for Donai, but it beginning to blow very hard against us towards the

evening we were obliged to bear away and to abandon all hopes of

being able to regain the Coast of Cochin China. The twenty third we passed Pulo Condore. The first of January , One thousand seven hundred and seventy nine , we anchored in Malacca

roads. Sailed from thence the eighth [of January] and arrived at

Calcutta the sixteenth of February.51*

(B) chapman's report

A sketch of the geography of Cochin China, some particulars relative

to the manners, customs and history of the inhabitants and a few

considerations on the importance of forming an establishment in that

country (China Factory Records, Vol. 18.)

I have been imperceptibly led into a detail of much greater length

than I intended: yet satisfied as I am of the great importance of a

settlement in Cochin China might be to the British Nation as well as to

the Company, I cannot prevail on myself to abandon the subject

* The name of the Mandaríne who came with me from Bengal. 51b. See pp. 160-161 below for Barrow's version of the Chapman mission. 69

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Alastair Lamb

without giving a more connected account of the country and offering some further remarks on the advantages to be made of its situation and its productions. Cochin China, called by the natives Anam, extends from about the twentieth degree of North Latitude to Pulo Condore which lies in eight degrees forty minutes. It is bounded by the Kingdom of Tonquin on the north, from which it is separated by the River Sungen,52 by the Kingdom of Laos and by a range of mountains which divides it from Cambodia on the west, and by that part of the Eastern Ocean, generally called the China Sea on the south and east.

The Kingdom is divided into twelve provinces all lying upon the sea coast and succeeding each other from north to south in the following

order:

Ding-oie

Cong-bing ... in the possession of the Ding-cat Hue

-

or

the

Cham

Court

...

Cong-nai Quinion

Phu-yen

...,

Bing Khang ..., ... « Dubious whether by Ignaack or

Nha-tong [ m the possession of the

Bing-thoan or Champa Donai

The breadth of the country bears no proportion to its length;

few of the provinces extend further than a degree from east to west,

some less than twenty miles. Donai which is properly a province of Cambodia is much larger. The whole country is intersected by rivers which although not large enough to admit vessels of great burthen yet are exceedingly well calculated for promoting inland commerce; their streams are gentle and the waters clear. The climate is healthy, the violent heat of the summer months being tempered by regular breezes from the sea. September, October and November are the season of the rains, the low sands are then frequently and suddenly overflowed by immense torrents of water which 52. Sungen = Song Giang. S5rlan(?> °P* c^*' P* makes the following identifications: Ding-oie = Dong-hoi, the capital of Quang-binh province, Cham == Quang-nam province, Cong-bing = Quang-binh province, Ding-cat = Dinh Cat, a town in Quang Tri province, Cong-nai = Quang-ngai, town and province, Quinion ■= Qui-nhon, Nha-tong = Nha Trang, capital of Kanh-hoa province, Bing-thoan or Champa = Binh-thuan, the last bit of the country in which the Chams retained a degree or autonomy, 70

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Missions to Cochin China

fall from the mountains. The innundations happen generally once a fortnight and last for three or four days at a time. In December, January and February there are also frequent rains brought by cold

northerly winds which distinguish this country with a winter different from any other in the East. The innundations have the same effect here as the periodical overflowings of the Nile in Egypt, and render the country one of the most fruitful in the world. In many parts the land produces three crops of grain in the year. All the fruits of India are found here in the greatest perfection, with many of those of China. No country in the East, and perhaps none in the world, produces, richer or a greater variety of articles proper for carrying on an advantageous commerce, cinamon, pepper, cardamons, silk, cotton, sugar, aguila wood, sapan wood and ivory, are the principal. Gold is taken almost pure from the mines, and before the troubles great quantities were brought from the hills in dust and bartered by the rude inhabitants of them for rice, cloths and iron. It was from them also the Aguila and Calambao woods54 were procured with quantities

of wax, honey and ivory. For some years past the communication

between the hills and the low lands has been entirely cut off. The animals of Cochin China are bullocks, goats, swine and buffaloes, elephants, camels and horses. In the woods are found the wild bear, tiger and Rhinoceros with plenty of deer. The poultry is excellent and the fish caught on the coast abundant and delicious. The flesh of the elephant which I never heard that any other nation thought eatable is accounted a great dainty by the Cochin Chinese, and when the King or the Viceroy of a province kills one, pieces are sent about to the principal Mandarines as a most acceptable present. The breeding of bullocks is little attended to, their flesh is not esteemed as food and they are made no use of in tilling the land which is performed by buffaloes. As for milking their cattle, they are totally unacquainted with the art strange as this may appear to us who have been accustomed to find the most savage nations we have discovered depending for a considerable part of their food on the milk of their cattle and flocks, yet I am inclined to think that the use of it was formerly unknown amongst the nations from the Straits of Malacca eastward: the Malays make no use of milk, the Chinese very little; amongst the latter it was probably introduced by the Tartars.

The aborigines of Cochin China are called Moyes and are the

people which inhabit the chain of mountains which separates it from

54. Aguila and Calambao woods. An aromatic wood found in various parts of eastern India and S. E. Asia. It is sometimes called eagle-wood or aloes-wood. By Calambao is meant Calambac, a word which Crawfurd deriveis from the Javanese kalambac, and which refers to the finest grade

of eagle-wood. See: Berland, op. cit., pp. 70-72; H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, Hobson-Jobson, London 1886, pp. 110, 258; J. Crawfurd,

Л Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries, London 1856, pp. 6-7.

Sapan wood, or Sappan wood. The wood of Caesalpinia sap pan, or

Brazil-wood. Used for making dyes. See: Yule, Burnell, op. cit., p. 600; Crawfurd, Dictionary, op. cit., p. 376. 71

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Alastair Lamb

Cambodia.55 To these strongholds they were driven when the present possessors invaded the country. They formerly paid an annual tribute

for the liberty of bringing down the produce of their hills and bartering

it for such commodities as they stood in need of. They are a savage people, very black and resemble in their features the Caffries.56 Monsieur Le Gai,57 a Frenchman who was in Cochin China in the year one thousand seven hundred and twenty, mentions another race of people distinct from the Cochin Chinese, who inhabit the province

of Champa called Loys.58 He also says the Mahomedan is one of the prevailing religions. But from the most particular enquiries I made

I did not find that there are now any people distinguished by that name, and I never met with a musselman in the country. It was about the year One thousand two hundred and eighty of the Christian era that the first Tarter prince became possessed of the Throne

of China. This revolution afforded an opportunity to the western

provinces bordering on the sea to throw off their dépendance and they

were formed into a kingdom under a prince whose descendant now reigns in Tonquin and is called Kuah-Whang. About the beginning of the fifteenth century a large body of people from these provinces being disaffected to the government, joined under a leader of abilities and marched to the southward; meeting with little opposition they soon became masters of the coast of Cochin China as far as Cape A vrilla.* The Moys, the original inhabitants, retired to the hills bordering their country to the westward, where they have ever since remained. The emigrants, under their conductor, founded the Kingdom of Cochin China. His successors extended it to the great River of Cambodia and

raised it to a high degree of splendor and opulence. The continual

wars they were engaged in with the Tonquinese, who considered them

as rebels, about one hundred and fifty years ago made the Cochin Chinese build a wall, on the southern extremity of the province of

Ding-noi to prevent the irruptions of the Tonquinese.59 Every communication by sea was forbidden under the severest penalties. Long wars and mutual jealousies have rendered the Tonquinese and Cochin Chinese

inveterate and implacable enemies. In the year One thousand seven

hundred and sixty four when the Indiaman was in Cochin China,60 the 55. The Moi people, a generic term for the Indochinese aboriginies.

56. Caffries = Kaffirs.

^ * íí'f ^ac> cominander of the French East India Company frigate Galathee, which visited the Cochin Chinese coast in 1720. One of the

officers of this ship visited Binh-thuan, where a vestige of the ancient Cham

state still persisted. (Maybon, op. cit., p. 114.) 58. By the Loys is clearly meant the Chams. * Cape A vrilla lies in the latitude of 20.30 N.

[Cape Avrilla = Cape Varella.]

59. The wall of Dong-hoi and the wall of Truong-duc were constructed by the Nguyen early in the 17th century as a defense against attack by the Trinh. They were situated not far to the north of Hué and they ran across the narrow coastal plain between the mountains and the sea. See: Le Thanh KJioi, op. cit., p. 246; Le Mur de Dong-hoi, by M. L. Cadière. BEFEO VI 60. See pp. 78~7it below for the account of the visit to Tourane of the Admiral Pocock in 1764-65.

72

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Missions to Cochin China

country was in a flourishing condition and governed by a prince of

abilities. Soon after her departure, his son, whose misfortunes and

fate I have briefly given an account of, in the foregoing narrative, succeeded to the throne and anarchy and confusion ensued.61 The Cochin Chinese bear evident marks of being derived from the same stock as the Chinese. They resemble them in their features and

in most of their manners and customs. Their religion is the same.

Their oral language, though different, appears formed upon the same principles, and they use the same characters in writing. They are a courteous, affable, inoffensive race, rather inclined to indolence. The ladies are by far the most active sex. They usually do all the business while their lazy lords sit upon their haunches smoking, chewing beetle or sipping tea. Contrary to the custom in China they are not shut up, and if unmarried a temporary connection with strangers who arrive in the country is deemed no dishonour. Merchants often employ them as their factors and brokers and it is said the firmest reliance may be placed on their fidelity. The habit of the men and women is cut after the same fashion

and is one of the modestest I know of. It is a loose robe buttoning with small collar round the neck and folding over the breast like a banyan gown with large long sleeves which cover the hands. People

of rank and especially the ladies wear several of these gowns, one over the other, the undermost reaches to the ground, the succeeding ones are each shorter than the other, so that the display of the different colours makes a gaudy appearance as they walk along. Such are the few particulars relative to Cochin China that occur to me as curious or interesting. It now only remains to show how a connection with this country may prove beneficial to my own and to conclude the subject. The drain of specie from the Company's settlements in India is become a matter of such serious import that I make no doubt any plan which may be offered to remedy so growing an evil will be deemed

worthy of consideration. I am sanguine in my expectations that a

settlement in Cochin China would conduce to that desirable end as well as be productive of many other advantages. Our two little vessels brought from Cochin China to the amount

of about sixty thousand rupees in gold and silver bullion. Had we

been paid for all sold the sum would have been much more considerable. The Rumbold the year before also brought bullion to considerable amount. This money was received on account of sales of Bengal 61. Chapman is surprisingly well informed on the history of Vietnam, and his historical comments are far more reliable than those1 of Barrow whose elaborate sketch of Vietnamese history is very confusing. (Barrow, op. cit., pp. 249-285).

In this passage Chapman refers first to the "march to the south" of the Vietnamese which, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, resulted

in the extension of Vietnamese domination from the Col des Nuages to Cape Camau at the expense of the Chams and the Cambodians. Next he

describes the long wars between the Nguyen and the Trinh, and he mentions the wall of Dong-hoi, one of the two elaborate defensive works which the Nguyen constructed north of Hué as a protection against Trinh attack. Finally, he refers to the death of Vo-vuong and the succession of Dinhvuong in 1765, the year after the visit of the Admiral Pocock. 13

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Alastair Lamb

and Madras cloths, opium, iron, copper, lead, hardware and glass;

some enquiries were made for broadcloth but we unfortunately had none. These are matters of a trifling nature. In the sequel I hope to fix the attention to many of greater importance. The situation of Cochin China is excellently well adapted to com-

merce. Its vicinity to China, Tonquin, Japan, Cambodia, Siam, the

Malay Coast, the Philippines, Borneo, the Moluccas, & c., renders the intercourse with all these countries short and easy. The commodious harbours found on the coast, particularly that of Turon, afford a safe retreat for ships of any burthen during the most tempestuous seasons

of the year.

The nations of Europe, having hitherto found it impossible to

provide cargoes sufficiently valuable to barter for the commodities of China, are obliged to make up the deficiency by sending thither immense quantities of bullion, by which means it has, for a number of years past,

drained the eastern and western worlds of their specie. The number of junks annually resorting to Cochin China plainly proves how much the productions of it are in demand amongst the Chinese. These productions, had we a settlement and a confirmed influence in the country,

might with ease be brought to center with us, purchased with the staples

of India and of Europe. Turon would become the emporium for them, where our ships bound to Canton, from whence it is only five days sail, might call and receive them. The quantity procurable it is impossible

to determine. Whatever it might be, it would prove a saving of so

much specie to Great Britain or India as the value of the commodities amounted to China. In a few years there is every reason to believe a very considerable investment might be provided. Our trade to China has ever been burdened with enormous imposts and exactions. These under various pretences are annually increasing,

and in process of time may become insupportable. It is an opinion

latterly grown current that the Chinese are desirous of totally excluding all Europeans from their country. May we not hazard a conjecture that the vexations they oblige them to suffer are the premeditated schemes of this politic people to effect it. Were such an event to happen the want of a settlement to the eastward would be severely felt. The Chinese would export their own commodities and Java or the Philippines as the nearest ports would become the marts for them. As there is no reason to suppose that our inability to procure them from the first hand would hinder their consumption, we must buy them either from the Dutch

or from the Spaniards. A settlement in Cochin China will give us a superior advantage to either, both as its situation is nearer and the Chinese are more accustomed to resort thither. In all events there is

reason to suppose it will enable us to procure the commodities of China

at a much more reasonable rate than now purchased by our factors

at Canton, and certainly on less humiliating terms to the nation. Large colonies of Chinese have from time to time emigrated from the parent country and fixed their abode in different parts of Cochin China. These have their correspondents in every sea port of the Empire. Through their means, teas, chinaware and the various other articles, the objects of our commerce with China, might be imported in junks to our own

settlement equally good in quality, and cheaper, as the Chinese are 74

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Missions to Cochin China

exempted from the exorbitant duties levied on foreigners. Some of the best workmen might be encouraged to settle in Cochin China and under direction manufactories carried to as great a degree of perfection as at

China itself.

The intercourse between Japan and Cochin China might be renewed and we might participate in a trade for many years monopolised by

the Dutch.

An advantageous trade might be carried on with the Philippine Islands, and Madras and Bengal goods introduced amongst them by

means of the junks for the consumption of Spanish America.

The Siamese and Cambodians would bring the produce of their

respective countries and barter or sell them for such articles as they wanted from Cochin China; amongst them it is probable a vent might be found for quantities of Bengal cloths. The lower class of people in Cochin China are, for the most part, clothed in Cangos, a coarse cotton cloth brought from China, but the preference which I had an opporunity of observing they gave to Bengal cloths, on account of their being wider and cheaper, would soon induce them to adopt the use of them. The demand for opium, already in some measure become a necessity of life to the Chinese, would increase in proportion to the facility of procuring it, the importation of it no longer confined to Canton, but carried by the junks to every sea-port in the country would spread the demand for this drug to the remotest parts of the Empire. But what inspires the most flattering hopes from an establishment in

this country is its rich gold mines celebrated for ages as producing the richest ore, so pure that the simple action of fire is said to be sufficient to refine it. I omitted no opportunity of making enquiries respecting this valuable article and was informed that mines were formed in different parts of the northern provinces, particularly in Hué, where the ore lay so near the surface of the earth that it was dug up with little labour, under the direction of a skilful metallurgist. What might not be expected from such a source! Great as the commercial advantages are, the political ones resulting

from a settlement in Cochin China would be scarce inferior. Turon Bay would not only afford a secure retreat to our Indiamen in case of

losing their passage to China, but from thence we might also intercept the fleets of any hostile power either going to or returning from that country. We should become formidable neighbours to the Dutch and to the Spaniards and, in the event of a war with either of them, attack

with advantage their most valuable settlements. In short, all the

arguments in favour of a settlement at Balambangan may with much more propriety be urged for one in Cochin China. Should anything that has been said appear sufficiently well grounded

to induce the Company to form a settlement in Cochin China, it may be effected on principles strictly just and at a small expense. Several of the Royal Family, besides the Mandarines who were in Bengal, with many officers of the late government urged me to use my endeavours with the Government of Bengal to induce it to afford them assistance, promising a powerful support whenever we should heartily engage in their cause. To restore their lawful sovereign to the throne would be 75

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Alastair Lamb

now a measure so popular, that the sincerity of their offers cannot be doubted. To relieve an unhappy people groaning under the weight of the most cruel oppression would be an act worthy of the humanity of the British nation. Fifty European infantry, half that number of artil-

lery and two hundred sepoys would be sufficient for this and every other

purpose; the natives of Cochin China are infinitely below the inhabitants of Indostan in military knowledge. I have, however, no doubt that a body of them, well disciplined and regularly paid, would prove faithful to us, and contribute as much to the security of any possessions which we might acquire to the eastward, as the Sepoys do to our territories in India. In case of any distant expeditions they would be found superior, being entirely free from all religious prejudices, and having no objection

to the sea.

While Cochin China remains in its present distracted state, a

favourable opening is presented to the first European nation that may attempt to obtain a footing in the country. Three years ago, the French sent a frigate to Turon Bay and from the pains taken to be informed of the produce and political state of the country there is strong reason

to conclude some such decision was in agitation. Since that period,

the accurate accounts Mr. Chevalier must have received of Padre Loreiro during his residence with him at Chandernagore, added to the loss of all their settlements in India, will most probably induce them to resume it. If they do not, some other power may adopt the scheme; should the Company therefore entertain a design of making an establishment in Cochin China, no time should be lost in carrying it into

execution.

(C) chapman's return to bengal

1. Bengal General Consultations, 4 October, 1779. Read the following letter from Mr. Chapman. Hon'ble Sir & Gentlemen, I do myself the honour to lay before the Board a narrative of my

transactions in Cochin China.

Altho' I failed in the object of establishing a factory, I hope it will appear that it did not arise from any misconduct or want of exertion on my part, but from the distracted state of the country, and the total suppression of the party I relied on for support. I have a satisfaction in the reflection that the miscarriage has been

attended with a very small expense to the Hon'ble Company, and I

flatter myself if the scheme of making a settlement in Cochin China should ever be revived, the information I have obtained will not be useless. I beg leave to refer the Hon'ble Board to the two last sections for short sketch of the geography of the country, and for some observation on the advantages which appear to me may be derived from an esta-

blishment there.

76

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Missions to Cochin China

Sensible how much I need the indulgence of the Hon'ble Board I

submit my narrative to them with the greatest deference, and hope they

will excuse its length and defects. Calcutta

I

am

etc.

17th Sept., 1779. (Signed) Cha. Chapman. Ordered that the *narrative be copied apart from the Consultations,

and transmitted by the first ship to the Court of Directors.

* This narrative is of considerable length, and is bound up in a

separate volume in the India House.

2. General Letter from Bengal, 14 January, 1780. Par. 48. Mr. Charles Chapman, who was deputed to the Government at Cochin China in order to enquire into the advantages of a

commerce with that country and to endeavour to establish a freedom

of trade to all the Company's Settlements under the sanction and

authority of the ruling power of the place, has laid before us since his return a narrative of his proceedings and observations on Cochin China and Tonquin, a copy of which makes a number in the packet. We are pleased with his conduct in this troublesome and perilous service, and recommend his narrative of it and the observations which follow it as deserving of your attention.

77

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Alastair Lamb APPENDIX A.

Narrative of the proceedings in Cochin China in 1764-65, by Captain

Blomfield of the Admiral Pocock. (China Factory Records, Vol. 18.) The Pocock arrived at Cochin China in the month of December

one thousand seven hundred and sixty four and continued there five months; from thence they went to Canton and carried with them soft sugar and sugar candy which yielded them from twenty-five to thirty

percent profit. During their continuance at Faifo (which is a town

thirteen miles up the river) they were very well treated by the inhabitants

who are a very harmless inoffensive people (a boy by a pistol acci-

dentally going off killed one of the natives which occasioned some

trouble to the Captain of the Pocock just before he left the place).

There is not the least danger to be apprehended from the natives as the Pocock1 s men were dispersed about different parts of the country and never any of them received any injury nor did the natives shew any disposition to hurt them. There is no foreign trade carried on except by the Chinese junks from Canton; five or six of which annually come there in the months of January and February for sugar and sugar candy which they carry back in the months of July and August. The Pocock lay in a fine Bay during their stay at Cochin China, free from risk of winds or weather where they had fine anchoring ground. There is no danger to be apprehended from the Chinese junks nor from a sort of galley which belong to the Cochin Chinese; they are pretty large with a good number of oars. It is however proper to be on your guard to prevent any accident should any attempt be made. The Pocock' s people never had the least reason to suspect any of the

natives, they always kept up the appearance of being prepared by

showing their guns and having their arms always ready and occasionally exercising some of their men upon deck and fired regularly an evening and morning gun.

On the way up to the Faifo (the principal town) there are two Custom houses where all boats stop. The passport from the ship is

given by a Mandarine at the fishing town called Turon at the entrance

of Faifo River. He will make probably some objections in order to

extort something. Two or three Spanish dollars generally removes his doubts. It is the same with any boats that leave Faifo for the ship. The man in office there is called the Quansi. The Port charges are very trifling. The Pocock' s people paid no duties upon the goods they brought away with them, nor were any demanded except a sort of perquisite to the man in office at the above places. Their government is absolute like the Chinese and the inferior officers of government are as corrupt. The great staple of the country is sugar of which they cultivate immense quantities, and as they have no vend for it but to the Chinese who send their junks there, it is remarkably cheap. When the Pocock7 s people first arrived amongst them, which was in the month of December, their crop of canes was not ripe, therefore the Pocock's people paid at the rate of four Spanish 78

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Missions to Cochin China

Dollars a pecul [or picul] for such sugar as we call in England the

Finest Lisbon. Their pecul is exactly two hundred pounds weight but in the months of April, May and June sugar is to be bought at least forty percent cheaper. Sugar candy of the best sort is about twenty-five percent dearer than sugar. They make a sort of damask and a great qantity of pilongs, which they sell considerably cheaper than at Canton. Cotton is produced there much of the same kind as in China, but they do not appear much acquainted with the manufacturing of it. They have a cloth like dungaree but they seem ignorant in bleaching. There are likewise great plenty of Aguila wood and of the finest timber, likewise birds nests which one sold very cheap. Silver is a scarce article amongst them, but they have great plenty of gold in ingots. Silver may be exchanged for gold upon every advantageous terms. As Faifo is not the capital of the country, Captain Blomfield cannot particularly describe what branches of trade and manufactures may be carried on at and about the capital where the King resides which is three days journey from Faifo. A great part of the inhabitants even at Faifo appeared in silk dresses from which it is natural to infer there is great plenty of that article produced in the country. There is a great appearance of plenty and riches amongst them. It is very necessary to carry some presents for the King such as gold and silver, muslim, kincobs,62 a few pieces of broadcloth, cheap cutlery, glassware and a pair of glasses, some cordials and sweet wine; as the King offered to grant Captain Riddle an exclusive trade to his country we may expect the same indulgence by judicious management.

At our first setting out, some presents of inferior value will be necessary

for the Minister and Mandarines about his Majesty; some attention must likewise be given to Padre Loreiro, a Portuguese Jesuit who has long resided there and is a man of influence with his Majesty.

62. Kincobs. A gold brocade fabric. See: Yule, Burnell, op. cit., pp. 368-369. 79

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Alastair Lamb appendix в.

Captain Blomfield's observations on the Geography and Trade of Cochin China. (China Factory Records, Vol. 18.) If I were to sail for Cochin China any time in the S.W. Monsoon, I would go within the Paracels for which navigation there are ample instructions in the ninety-seventh page of Herbert's Directory. But I cannot find he carries you with any certainty further than Pulo Canton which is an island on the coast of Cochin China in latitude fifteen

degrees forty minutes. N.W. from it about twenty-five leagues lies the island Campello which you may go boldly in with the Chinese junks. All come into Faifo River (which runs into Turon Bay) to the southward of Campello. But from all the intelligence I could gain from the

fishermen there is not above fourteen or fifteen feet water in that chan-

nel. In the Admiral Pocock we went into Turon Bay round the N.W. end of a long crooked island that defends the Bay, which island lies

about twelve leagues W.N.W. from Campello. It is a noble entrance

and quite clear of all danger. We lay within a cable and half's length of a little round island which is not seen until you open the whole Bay, not more than two stones throw in diameter. It is full of pineapples

and has a well of good water. Our cooper did all his work on this

little island. We might have lain three miles nearer Turon, the fishing

town at the entrance of Faifo River. The winds on that part of the coast are variable all the year as indeed they are close in with most

lands, that is, I would be understood to mean that the periodical winds lose their influence near the shore - I mention this that you may not be

deterred from engaging this coast at any season. We closed with it

the latter end of November and had our doubts as we considered it as a lee shore at that season, but had not necessity overruled our objections experience showed us we had little to fear. In the S.W. Monsoon a ship may be at Macao in five days very well from this port and in the N.E. Monsoon she would not be longer from Macao back. Of the produce cf the country as it is connected in trade: The attention of the husbandmen in this country is chiefly turned to cultivating the sugar-cane. It may be said sugar is the staple commodity cf this country. It is both finer and richer than any sugar in

the East, or perhaps the West. The crops are taken in about May.

When we first got there we found it near fiftv percent dearer (which was

in December) than when we left them, which was in June. But I do not think it was entirely owing to the season so much as that on our

first coming amongst them they entertained great notions of our wealth,

therefore it will be highly necessary to be careful how you show them

monev. Tf they found a scarcity of it, I am inclined to think they would covet many of the Bengal and Madras manufactures as well as abundance of those from Europe. We latterly purchased sugar at the rate of two hundred pounds weight for six silver Rupees. But I believe

two new Spanish Dollars would have bought as much. The suçar

candv was always about twenty-five percent dearer than the sugar. We saw but little else they had to sell, except pilongs,63 sattins and Aguila wood; thev showed us some birds nests, which they told us thev got

from the Paracel Islands. They appeared to be as f?ood as what I 63. A kind of chinz bed cover.

80

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Missions to Cochin China

have seen at Soolor64 or anywhere to the eastward. As we did not

want to buy any we enquired but little about them. The pilongs are considerably cheaper than in China, and so are their damasks of which they have much, but not very stout.

Their Government is much like the Chinese. The inferior officers of the Revenue are like those in China and are called Mandarines - a

trifle of money overrules their objections which they are constantly making. From Turon, a fishing town at the entrance of the River, you

take your pass for Faifo, the Capital Town. This is obtained from a little Mandarine stationed there, he must be frequently touched and kept in good humour; whenever we failed sending a trifle, which we usually did once or twice a week, he never failed reminding us by putting a stop to our daily supplies we received from Turon under some pretence of ill behaviour in some of our people that went on shore. There are boats come on board every morning, from Turon, with all sorts of things to sell, and they usually remain till sunset. They distil

a spirit there from rice which by being sold extremely cheaply may pro-

mote much drunkeness in our ship. Boats that load from Faifo with anything for the ship are obliged to obtain a pass there from a man in office, whom they call a Quansi. He is a sort of Mandarine, and of a much superior order to him at Turon. The people we purchased our

sugar from usually got the pass. The boats in their way down are stopped, generally twice, to be examined. After we had been two

months there, some Mandarines, of a very superior order, came down from Court and regulated matters. They were very attentive to any complaints we made - some elegant presents to them would be of use. They seemed to be much superior to anything mean. There is a Jesuit at the Court who has much influence and is a Mandarine. He is of a

high family in Portugal, in all respects an exceedingly worthy person; his name is Loreiro. There is vast plenty of good timber at Faifo. We got lower yards and top-masts made there of a sort of poone, and very

well it turned out. It is here, as in China, they have but one real

coin; it is exactly the same as the China cash but here they are called Sappecas - all their other money is ideal. We heard of nothing but a Quan which is equal to six hundred Sappecas; they used to give us five hundred for a Spanish Dollar, and two hundred for a Rupee, but as our silver grew scant, especially our dollars, they gave us more. When we

had been about two months among them they gave us six hundred

Sappecas for our Spanish Dollar, and at last they took two Rupees for

a Quan, or six hundred Sappecas. I take the Quan to be nearly equal to the Chinese Tale.65 It is incredible how greedy they were of our

silver, of which they have but little-^- gold they have in abundance, it was brought us in ingots of about four or five ounces. It seems they have a great deal of gold dust in their rivers, but as all our views were taken up with sugar, we gave ourselves but little trouble concerning the gold - indeed, none of us knew the mode of buying gold. I have no doubt but four Rupees would buy one of their peculs (which is two hundredweight) of the very best sugar and six as much of their good suear candv, provided thev did not discover vou had olentv of money. 64. Soolor = Sulu.

65. See p. 194 below. 81

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CHAPTER IV.

LORD MACARTNEY AND COCHIN

CHINA, 1793

CHAPMAN'S the CHAPMAN'S political proposalsthe statepolitical of were Cochin statenotofChinaCochin followedChina was up. too wasdisturbed too disturbed It was clear andand thatits its

future too uncertain to make the prospect of an attempt to

establish a British settlement there very attractive. In any case, shortly

after Chapman's departure the strategic need for such a settlement became far less pressing with the British occupation of the French possessions in India following the French intervention in the American

war. France, without Pondichery, could not be expected to achieve much in Cochin China; and only the fear of sustained and successful French intervention in this region could have produced an active British

policy. Cochin China was remote from British territory, and the arguments for an establishment there had to compete with proposals for

the solution of some of the problems of the China trade in other directions: for example, proposals for the establishment of British relations with Peking, either direct or through the mediation of the Panchen Lama of Tibet, and for the extension of British influence in Malayasia. In 1785 Pondichery was returned to France, and this event coincided with the reappearance of the threat of French power in Cochin China. By 1787 France was on the verge of acquiring a protectorate over the territories of the Nguyen Dynasty. The Treaty of Versailles of that year promised French help to Nguyen Anh against the Tay-son in return for French settlements and preferential status in Indochina. Had this document been implemented, and had the French Monarchy survived to exploit the opportunities which it presented, it is

most probable that Indochina would have become a real base for French rivalry with British India. Even in its failure the Treaty of 1787 provided a psychological basis for French intervention in Indo-

china in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The Treaty of Versailles was the achievement of a French missionary, Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of Adran, who was able to help Nguyen Anh in his escape from the Tay-son in 1777, and who

thereafter won a great measure of confidence and affection from the

Nguyen ruler. Pigneau de Behaine, who became in 1775 the head of the establishments of the Missions Etrangères in Indochina, appreciated 82

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Pl. Ш Route of the Macartney Embassy. (From Staunton, op. dt, Atlas of Plates.)

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Missions to Cochin China

that a victory of the Nguyen offered the best chance for the spread of

Christianity in these regions. Vo-vuong, with his friendship to the

Jesuits Köffler, de Monteiro and de Loureiro, had established a tradition

which Pigneau de Behaine hoped Nguyen Anh would follow to become

not only the champion of the Christian cause but also the ally of

France.

Nguyen Anh was certainly most reluctant to accept the French help which Pigneau de Behaine offered to secure for him. It was only in 1783, after the disasters to his forces which accompanied the fourth capture of Saigon by the Tay-son, that he gave serious consideration to this prospect and entrusted his son Prince Canh to the French bishop as a pledge of his earnestness in this matter. It was not until the end of 1784, when an attempt to recoup his fortunes with the help of King Rama I of Siam had failed, that he authorised Pigneau de Behaine to go to seek this aid.

Pigneau de Behaine, accompanied by the young Prince Canh, arrived in Pondichery in February 1785 with a draft Franco- Vietnamese treaty in his pocket; but he found that the government of the French

settlements in India was opposed to his plans. Pondichery had just been returned to France by the British. The acting governor, Coutenceau des Algrins, shared the death-bed conclusion of Bussy that the French only existed in India so long as the British tolerated them. He disapproved, therefore, of Pigneau de Behaine' s project which he saw as yet another of those schemes which had frittered away French power in the East. On the folly of French intervention in Indochina he wrote that:

a prince [Nguyen Anh] who has fought for eight years and has never had any success is either without great ability or is not loved by his subjects. An attachment cannot exist

between a man who carries out all his whims and men bent

under the yoke of tyranny and oppression. The expenses

which must be met in going to take this prince and his suite, and the far more considerable ones involved in transporting troops and arms to wage war at one of the ends of the world, cannot be borne by us who are at this moment lacking much that is indispensable

undertake any expenditure to rçstore His Cochin Chinese Majesty. Even if all these reasons which I have advanced to the prelate [Pigneau de Behaine] are not accepted according

to the wise principles of a moderate government, yet the nature of the French administration and the character of the nation

are forever opposed to such distant expeditons on the vain pretext of commercial profit. Such an expedition could only be acceptable to a worn-out nation which pursues every

chimerical hope in order to blind itself to its real state. France, 83

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Alastair Lamb

happily, is not in so desperate a situation as to lead it to

throw itself on to the cake of the fable. I believe that the

Minister, to whom I have passed on this little digression, can only approve the reply which I have made. I suspect that the dear prelate, who is said to be on very familiar terms with the

King of Cochin China, has a strong desire to increase his

revenues and the credulity of the catholics of that kingdom.66

In the face of this opinion Pigneau de Behaine had no alternative but to go on to Paris, where he and the young Prince Canh arrived in

February 1787. Here he presented to the French Government the following argument in a forceful memorandum:

the political balance in India is so inclined towards the

English nation . . . .that one must consider it a most difficult task to bring it back to equality. Perhaps of all the methods

one could use an establishment in Cochin China would be the

surest and most effective. In fact, if one glances at the

resources of Cochin China and at the location of its ports, one

will see clearly that by settling there one will obtain the

greatest advantages both in peace and in war. 1st advantage. - It is to be supposed that the surest means of opposing the English in India is by ruining or weakening their commerce. In peacetime one would decrease greatly the profit they could make from their China trade by trading oneself at much less cost and with far greater ease. 2nd advantage. - In wartime it would be easy to prohibit

this same trade to all enemy nations; because, by cruising at the

outlet of the Straits [of Malacca] or, even more effectively, at the Bocca Tigris which is the entry to the Canton River, one could prevent from entering or leaving those whom one wished to prevent.

3rd advantage. - One would find in Cochin China easy and inexpensive facilities for recaulking ships, for careening them, and, even, for building new ones. 4th advantage. - One would find there all one could need

for supplying naval squadrons and for providing the basic

needs for other colonies.

5th advantage. - One could find there, in case of need, assistance in men, soldiers, sailors, etc. 6th advantage. - One would easily stop the English in those . projects which they appear to have in mind to extend them-

selves on their eastern side.

Other advantages, perhaps more important though more remote

Government would not approve at this moment. It has thus seemed necessary to hold to those which speak for themselves, and to leave on one side those which one can only forsee in

the distant future.67

66. Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 179-180. 67. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 181. 84

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These arguments held a far greater attraction for the Ministry than

those of Coutenceau des Algrins. France, indeed, was in that very condition which the acting Governor General at Pondichery declared so confidently she was not; and the vision offered by Pigneau de Behaine was irresistible. Thus, on 28th November, 1787, Comte de Montmorin, the French Foreign Minister, and Pigneau de Behaine, as Nguyen Anh's plenipotentiary, signed a treaty at Versailles which embodied the terms on which France would give aid to the Nguyen Dynasty. 1 . The French agreed to help in the most effective way they could

the efforts of the King of Cochin China to regain control of his dominions.

2. For this purpose the French agreed, to send to Cochin China four frigates with 200 infantry, 200 artillerymen, and 250 native soldiers.

These troops would be fully equipped.

3. The King of Cochin China agreed to cede to France "eventually" the absolute property in and sovereignty over "the island which forms the principal port of Cochin China, called Hoi-nan and by the Europeans Tour on ".

4. Apart from this island, the French would have the right to found all the settlements which they might consider it desirable to possess on the mainland.

5. The King of France would also be given possession of Pulo Condore.

6. The French would be free to trade throughout the Cochin Chinese dominions, which would be closed to the commerce of all other

European nations. They would not be restricted in their trade and only subject to reasonable duties and taxes.

7. The King of Cochin China would extend his full protection over the French subjects resident in his territory.

8. Once France was in possession of Hoi-nan and Pulo Condore she would come to the aid of Cochin China in the event of an attack

by any European or Asian power. This help, in troops, ships and arms, would be provided within three months of its being asked for; but the King of Cochin China was not to use this force beyond a region bounded by the Moluccas, Sunda and the Straits of Malacca. 9. The French would help the King of Cochin China in maintaining internal security in Cochin China. 10. These terms were subject to ratification by the two sovereigns concerned.

In an additional article Pigneau de Behaine committed the Cochin Chinese to undertake the initial cost of constructing and fortifying the 85

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Alastair Lamb

proposed French settlements on Hoi -nan (which the English knew as the Island of Callao) and Pulo Condore.68 While the French Ministry was prepared to negotiate this Treaty, it was still in considerable doubt as to the wisdom of intervention in

Cochin China. It had been much alarmed by the anti-French policy which, with the help of Prussian troops, William V had been able to impose on the Netherlands in 1787, and which deprived the French

of so many potential bases in eastern waters. Hence de Montmorin

left the final decision as to the sending of French aid to Nguyen Anh

to the Comte de Conway, Governor General at Pondichery. In May 1788, when Pigneau de Behaine and the Prince Canh reached Pondichery on their way back to Cochin China, they brought with them not only the text of the Treaty of Versailles but also secret instructions for de Conway which, unknown to the bishop, empowered the Governor

General to make up his own mind as to the wisdom of the Cochin

China venture.

De Conway, like Coutenceau des Algrins, was strongly opposed to Pigneau de Behaine's scheme which he felt was beyond the available resources of France and likely to lead to trouble with the British. Pigneau de Behaine was able, however, despite de Conway's refusal to help, to raise and equip from his own resources four ship-loads of volunteers whom he promptly despatched to Nguyen Anh. This help reached Indochina in September 1788, and Pigneau de Behaine followed it in May 1789. Thus de Conway's opposition had not prevented French intervention in Indochina; but it altered significantly its shape. The Treaty of Versailles had provided for support to the Nguyen by the French Monarchy. What in fact materialised was a private enter-

prise of Pigneau de Behaine, and the Treaty was to all intents and

purposes a dead letter. With the outbreak of the French Revolution and the disappearance of the monarchy it lost any remaining force; but this did not prevent later French statesmen and admirals from reviving this document.

Nguyen Anh must have been glad to discover that events had turned out in this way. During Pigneau de Behaine's absence his fortunes began to change for the better. In September 1788, with Siamese support, he recaptured Saigon for the fourth and last time.

While the aid which Pigneau secured was still of great value, it no longer offered the only hope of a Nguyen victory and it certainly did not justify any longer the eventual cession to France of Vietnamese

territory. Numerically, French help was of no great significance. Its chief importance lay in the provision of a few military and naval experts

who were able to bring something of European organisation and equip68. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 185-188. 86

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ment to Nguyen Anh's forces. Improvements in the fleet were of special importance in the struggle which broke the naval power of the Tay-son. It is probable, however, that Nguyen Anh would have defeated his enemies without any French help at all, though the process might well have taken much longer and been less complete. By 1786 severe strains

were becoming apparent in the structure of the Tay-son state. In that year Van-Hue undertook the conquest of Tonkin from the Trinh. His successes aroused the jealousy of his elder brother Van-Nhac and provoked Chinese intervention on behalf of the Le Dynasty which saw

in the collapse of the Trinh the last chance for the revival of its ancient power. In the summer of 1787 the two Tay-son leaders came

to blows. Van-Hue besieged Van-Nhac in the latter's capital at

Qui-nhon, but was forced to come to an uneasay truce under pressure of events in Tonkin. The Chinese intervention in Tonkin was repulsed, and Van-Hue was recognised by China as the successor to the Le with the reginal title of Quang Trung; but on his death in 1792 his power was far from being consolidated and relations between the northern

Tay-son kingdom and China remained strained. Van-Hue left a ten year old son to succeed him, Quang Toan, under the regency of Bui Dac Tuyen. In the south Van-Nhac was now far less formidable than he had been in Chapman's day. In 1793 Nguyen Anh was only prevented from capturing Qui-nhon by the timely arrival of forces from

Tonkin. When, at the end of 1793, Van-Nhac died, his possessions

were taken over by Bui Dac Tuyen in the name of the young Quang Toan. By this time the Tay-son had lost much of that popular support which they enjoyed earlier in their history. The country was devastated by continual war and the Tay-son rulers had abandoned many of those altruistic principles which had made them so attractive to the peasantry and the merchants in the 1770s.

When Macartney called at Tourane in May and June 1793 he found

Vietnam divided into three parts. From Quang-nam Province, in which lay Tourane and Faifo, to the north of Tonkin extended the kingdom of Quang Toan, the young son of Van-Hue (or Quang Trung),

which was then ruled through the Regent Bui Dac Tuyen. To the

south of Quang-nam lay the territories of Van-Nhac with their capital at Qui-nhon. In the extreme south, based on Saigon and Gia-dinh

Province, were the forces of Nguyen Anh and their small band of French advisers. At the very moment when the British Ambassador was going ashore at Tourane, the Nguyen army and navy were beginning an attack on Van-Nhac's capital, Qui-nhon, which, but for the timely intervention of Bui Dac Tuyen and a Tonkinese army, would have resulted in the complete reconquest of the southern Tay-son state. 87

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The political situation in Vietnam offered little, therefore, to tempt British diplomacy at this time. The nothern Tay-son kingdom seemed powerful enough, but its relations with China were very strained - just

before his death in 1792 Van-Hue had laid claim to Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces - ; and it was unlikely that a British Embassy bent on establishing closer relations with the Chinese Emperor would fish in

these troubled waters without the express approval of Peking. The southern Tay-son kingdom seemed to be on the verge of collapse. The Nguyen Dynasty, it was clear, was committed to Pigneau de Behaine and his French companions; but this fact implied no great threat to British commerce in the east so long as Pigneau de Behaine was in no way sponsored by the Revolutionary French Government. Even the prospect of a British settlement in Indochina in the most favourable political circumstances would not have been so tempting in 1793 as it

might have been in 1778; for by the time of Macartney's visit the British had obtained in Penang most of those advantages which Chap-

man had reported to be inherent in a British establishment in the neighbourhood of Tourane.

It must not be supposed, however, that Indochina had lost all interest to the British by 1793. The possibility of a French forward policy here at some future date could not be ignored completely, and there were good arguments for taking a close look at those areas in the neighbourhood of Tourane which would have become French had the Treaty of Versailles been implemented. Cochin China, moreover, was a region with commercial potentialities which merited a fresh investigation. As Dundas' instructions to Macartney stated: in the small but fertile kingdom of Cochin China not only tea but sugar in great abundance is said to be produced, and exported from thence at a cheaper rate than from any other part of the East or West Indies. The alarming increase in the price of the last article in Europe not only affects the lower classes of the people, among whom it has become a necessary of life; but the public revenue, as well in its own diminished consumption as in that of other taxable articles with which it is used. This consideration renders any country that is likely

to supply the want of it at a reasonable rate an object of

attention in the present instance.69

Thus Macartney was authorised to visit Cochin China or depute Sir George Staunton there, either on his way to China or on his return. This accorded well with the general objectives of the Macartney

Embassy. Its primary purpose was to secure improvements in the terms on which the British traded with China. The restrictions at

Canton which limited trade to a single port and obliged British mer69. Morse, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 241. 88

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chants to deal exclusively with a single trading monopoly resulted in

greatly increased prices for Chinese goods, especially tea. With the Commutation Act of 1784, which drastically reduced the duties imposed on the import of tea to England, the consumption of this commodity there increased by over three hundred per cent; and the consequence was a corresponding rise in the export of specie. It was felt that this "drain of specie" could best be checked by the freeing of the conditions of the China trade. The results hoped for were a reduction in the cost

of Chinese produce and an increase in the sale in China of European manufactures. But it was appreciated that China was not the only direction in which these benefits might be sought. There was a possibility, to which Macartney's instructions refer, that Chinese tea might be obtained in Japan at a lower price than that prevailing at Canton; and Macartney was authorised to visit Japan if he thought it worth while. Chinese merchants, as it was argued at the time of the founding of Penang, might be encouraged to bring their wares to markets outside the Chinese Empire and free of the monopolistic greed of the Canton

authorities. Chapman had seen such a market in Cochin China, and Macartney was well aware of his observations.

The Macartney Embassy arrived in Tourane Bay on 26th May, 1793, and left for Canton on 16th June. Its transport and escort consisted of four vessels, the Lion, the Hindostán , the brig Jackhall and the brig Clarence , the last having been purchased at Batavia to replace the Jackhall which was at one time thought to have been lost at sea. The appearance of this force off Tourane seems to have led the local authorities to believe that a French squadron had come to attack the place on behalf of the Nguyen. Macartney did not succeed entirely in removing the suspicions of Quang Toan's government. The proceed-

ings of the Macartney Embassy at Tourane are outlined briefly by Aeneas Anderson, as follows: 70

Anderson's account of Lord Macartney's visit to Tourane in May and June 1793.

Sunday , 26th May , 1793. At nine in the evening anchored in Turon Bay, in Cochin China. Found here a Portuguese brig, who saluted us with eleven guns.

Monday 27th. The ship's company employed in watering. The water here is of a reddish colour. Several proas came along-side the Lion with ducks, cocoa-nuts, and joghry,71 for sale. Several mandarins also came on board to see the ship. Tuesday 28th. Men were sent on shore to raise tents for the sick. 70. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 50-56. 71. Joghry or Jaggery. A coarse brown sugar. Yule, Burnell, op. cit., pp. 340-141.

89

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Wednesday 29th. The Ambassador was visited by several man-

darins, with a great train of attendants. They were entertained with wines and liquors of various kinds, which, however, they were very cautious in tasting, till Lord Macartney banished all apprehension by setting them the example: they then drank, without reserve, whatever was offered to them; but they appeared to prefer cherry and raspberry brandy, above all the other liquors with which they were regaled. The dress of these persons consisted chiefly of a black loose gown, of a kind of crape, with silk trousers, slippers, and a black turban: a

girdle, of silver cordage, was also tied round their waists. Some of

them, but whether it arose from accident, or was a badge of distinction, I cannot tell, wore dark blue gowns of the same stuff. The domestics were clad in a plaid, or Tartan dress; their trousers were tucked up to the knee, and they wore no shoes or slippers; their legs were entirely naked; and their turban was of plaid, like the rest of their very curious

dress.

Friday 31st . In the evening, the Prime Minister of the King of Cochin China, came on board the Lion, accompanied by several mandarins, and a considerable train of attendants, to request the Ambassador's company to dinner, in the name of the King, who had given his minister a special commission to make this invitation. It was, accordingly, signified to this distinguished personage, that his Excellency received the message with the utmost respect, and would, in consequence of it, go on shore on Tuesday morning, at ten o'clock. After this conference, the Cochin Chinese minister, and his suite, returned in their barges, which were decorated in a very gaudy manner. They were saluted on their departure from the ship with five guns. Saturday , 1st June. In the forenoon the Ambassador received a visit from two mandarins, who brought from the King of Cochin China a present, consisting of 10 Buffaloes

50 Hogs 150 Ducks

200 Bags of rice, and 6 Large jars of samptsoo The last is a liquor made in China, and imported from thence.

Sunday 2nd. I went ashore in the forenoon and saw the town,

the name of which is Fie-Foo [Faifo]. It consists of nothing more than

a crowd of wretched bamboo huts, though it contains a spacious market-place, well supplied with ducks, fowls, eggs, cocoanuts, and

fruits. The surrounding country is flat, and very fertile: but the natives seem to have little or no idea of cultivation, which would make it the scene of extreme abundance. Their principal traffic seems to be with their women, by consigning them, for a certain consideration, to the society of Europeans who touch here. They have no coin, but a sort

of small caxee; and all their silver is in the form of long bars, or wedges. The residence of the principal mandarin consists of a large

open range of bamboo huts, of a better form, and more elegant appear-

ance than the rest; containing several rooms of a tolerable size and 90

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Plate IV. A Cochin Chinese Mandarin. (Crawfurd. Embassy, op. cit.)

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proportions, which are fitted up and furnished in a neat and ornamental manner.

Monday 3rd . In the afternoon the Ambassador's guards, with

some of the marines, went on shore to practise the ceremonial duties that had been assigned them for the following day. Tuesday 4th. This morning the Ambassador, atended by his whole suite, in full uniform, with Sir Erasmus Gower, Captain Mackintosh,

and several of the officers of the Lion and the Hindostán , went on shore

with great ceremony; when, in honour of the birthday of our most excellent Sovereign, George the Third, he was saluted with twenty-one guns by the Lion , the Hindostán , and Portuguese brig. The British troops, with their officers and band of music, had been previously sent ashore to wait his Excellency's arrival. On this day the royal standard of Great Britain was displayed at the main-top-gallant-royal mast; the St. George's ensign at the fore-topgallant ditto; and the union at the mizen.

The Ambassador was received, on his landing, by several man-

darins with every mark of attention and respect; when he proceeded, under an escort of his own troops, to the house of the Prime Minister, where a collation in the best manner of the country was prepared for him. Here his Excellency remained for some time; and, after an exchange of mutual civilities, returned to the Lion , when he was saluted by fifteen guns from all the ships lying at anchor. Wednesday 5th. I went ashore in the afternoon, and purchased some fruit and sugar of a very good quality: it is made in large cakes, and resembles fine bread, for which, at some small distance, it may be

actually mistaken. I also saw six large elephants, which had been brought for the amusement of the mandarins: they appeared to be perfectly innocent, were obedient to every command, and performed

many feats of unwieldly agility. These huge animals moved at the rate

of eight miles an hour.

Friday 7th. On this morning the sick were received on board the ships from the station on shore. Mr. Jackson, master of the Lion, went in the cutter to take soundings in the bay; but having gone up the mouth of the river Campella, which rises about eighty miles up the country, and forms a confluence with the river that discharges itself into Turon Bay, he inconsiderately began to survey, and take plans of, the coast; but, in attempting to

execute this design, he, with the seven men who accompanied him, were made prisoners by the natives, who seized the boat, and carried them to the capital city of the kingdom. This very disagreeable intelligence was communicated from the shore by the mandarins, whose good offices were earnestly solicited by Lord Macartney, and Sir Erasmus Gower, to obtain the return of these men to the ship. Indeed, this unreflecting conduct of the master might, as it was apprehended, be attended with consequences that would have interrupted the course of the embassy; as the country of Cochin China is tributary to the Chinese empire, and sends an annual Ambassador to

the court of Pekin; so that all this business might have been mis-

represented in such a manner to the Chinese government, as to have lessened the good dispositions we were disposed to believe that they 91

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Alastair Lámb

entertained towards the British embassy. In short, it appeared, that very serious apprehensions were entertained on that subject, by those who were the best qualified to form a right judgment of the policy and temper of the court which was the object of our destination. Tuesday l Ith. Mr. Niaung, one of the interpreters, went on shore with some of the Ambassador's suite, to inquire concerning the British prisoners, and he was informed by the mandarins, that they had been released, and were on their return.

Wednesday 12th. William Tothill, Esq., purser of the Lion , died

this morning, after an illness of a few days.

The King of Cochin China sent another large present of rice to

the Ambassador.

Thursday 13th . The body of Mr. Tothill was interred on shore with every possible mark of respect and regard: Sir Erasmus Gower also ordered an inscription to be cut in wood, which was afterwards placed on his grave. At four o'clock in the afternoon Mr. Jackson returned with the cutter and his men, from their imprisonment; during which period they had undergone the severest sufferings both in body and mind; and no circumstance, but their belonging to the British embassy, could have preserved them from being put to death. Sunday 16th. At four in the afternoon weighed and set sail from Turon

Bay

The discussions between Macartney and the Vietnamese produced no significant results. Relations were friendly enough despite the initial impression that the British squadron was a French fleet allied to Nyuyen Anh, and despite the crisis which arose over the arrest of some members of Macartney's party who were engaged on a survey of Tourane Bay. An important official of Quang Toan's government, whom Anderson

calls "Prime Minister" and who may well have been the Regent Bui Dac Tuyen who was ruling during Quang Toan's minority, came down from Hué to talk with the Ambassador. As the following extract from

Staunton shows, the Regent had good reasons to seek some sort of

alliance with the British, but Macartney resolved to keep himself free from any commitment until he had seen the Chinese Emperor. Overtures were made for the purchase of arms and ammunition; and it was easy to perceive that any assistance given to the cause of the prince, then reigning at Turon, as well as at the capital and northern parts of the kingdom, would have been willingly purchased on any terms. His situation, indeed, was verv far from being secure. Beside the province of Donai, or southern part of Cochin-china, which had reverted to the ancient family of its sovereigns, Quin-nong, or the middle province of the kingdom, was in the hands of the late usurper 92

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of the whole. He had entrusted to bis younger brother the care of his conquests, to the northward; but the latter availed himself of his command, first to invade the neighbouring king-

dof of Tung-quin, which he effected with complete success,

notwithstanding the assistance given to the latter by the

Chinese, and then declared himself sovereign both of Tungquin and Cochin-china: intending to wrest, for his own use, from his elder brother, whatever the latter still possessed of the last-named kingdom, as well as whatever part had been recovered by the lawful sovereign. This new usurper was an able warrior, and had formed vast projects of conquest, even of some Chinese provinces; he was one of those politicians to whom all means are equally eligible that can contribute to their successes. He died in the midst of them in September, 1792. Of his sons he left the eldest, who was illegitimate, in the government of Tung-quin. The youngest, who was his legitimate offspring by a Tung-quinese princess, was at Turon at the time of his father's death. He instantly assumed the reins of government, as lawful successor to his father, while his elder, but illegitimate brother, retained, possession of Tung-quin, and claimed a right to the whole of his father's conquests.72 The state of rebellion or civil warfare in Cochin-china had begun upwards of twenty years before, in the course of which so very many of the combatants were slain, the country was so exhausted, and the surviving parties so balanced, that, at this time, no considerable enterprize was undertaken by any of them; tho' each was busy in preparing new plans for the support of himself and the overthrow of his enemies. In the mean time the people began, in some degree, to breathe; but had the kingdom even been more settled, the Embassador did not think it would have been proper to enter into any sort of

negotiation, or even to present the credential letters, with which

he had been entrusted for that kingdom, before he had delivered, in the first instance, those he had in charge for the Emperor of China. His Excellency, therefore, determined to confine himself to messages of compliment and respect, and to a return of presents for those he had so seasonably receivèìd for the use of the squadron. An uninterrupted communication was continued to be maintained with the people of Turon; but not without some marks of mistrust, and consequent watch-

fulness, on both sides.73

72. It is hard to reconcile this story of a disputed succession on Quang Trung's death with the recorded facts of Vietnamese history. Quang Trung was

succeeded by his ten year old son Qu$ng Toan, whose uncle Bui Dac Tuyen became Regent. Bui Dac TuyenV administration was harsh and

unpopular, and perhaps it was this fact, as heard through bad interpreters, which gave rise to Staunton's story here. 73. Staunton, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 376-378. 93

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Alastair Lamb

Macartney's visit to Tourane, however, was not without its results. In the first place, the neighbourhood, coast and islands, was surveyed by Jackson, master of the Lion , and by Captain Parrish and Barrow

who took a careful look at Callao or Campellos Island, which would have been French had the Versailles Treaty been fulfilled. Before these

surveys, it would seem, the only available charts of this coast were rough sketches prepared by members of the Admiral Pocock's crew in 1764.74 In the second place, the views of Chapman as to the potential

value to British commerce of an establishment in Cochin China were

examined anew and found to have much to support them; always with the proviso that political conditions were favourable, which they were

not in 1793. As Staunton noted:

considering Cochin-china in a general view, it must be allowed to be excellently well adapted to commerce. Its vicinity to China, Tung-quin, Japan, Cambodia, Siam, the Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, and Malacca renders the intercourse

with all these countries short and easy. The commodious

harbours with which the coast is intersected, and particularly that of Turon, afford a safe retreat for ships of any burden during the most tempestuous seasons of the year.75

These advantages, Staunton thought, might well have been exploited by the French had circumstances been a little different; and a French establishment on Callao Island would probably have resulted both in French expansion on to the mainland and in the French entry into the China trade on terms which might have presented the British with serious competition. As he put it: want of shelter in the south-west monsoon would

soon induce the French, were they once in possession of

Callao, to seek for a further settlement near it, upon the main

land of Cochin-china. The coast abounds with navigable

rivers. In settled times several hundred junks, from forty to

one hundred and fifty tons burden, from the different ports of

China, frequented those of Cochin-china, to procure cargoes, chiefly of areca nut and sugar, the last article alone equalling

annually about forty thousand tons. They paid for these

cargoes in a few manufactures of China; but, for the greatest

part, in silver. The distance is very short between the two countries, and the voyage made in four or five days with a favourable monsoon; and, as these junks leave their own ports almost in ballast, it is probable that they would, readily, bring teas, or other articles in demand among Europeans, for a trifling freight to Cochin-china. It being generally understood that no duties are levied in China on articles of trade exported 74. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 369. 75. Ibid, vol. 1., p. 401. 94

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by its own subjects in their own vessels, possibly the French might have had in contemplation to be able, by the means of a settlement on the coast of Cochin-china, to procure Chinese

articles at a cheaper rate than could be obtained by any

foreigners trading immediately to China, where the duties and exactions, amounting, upon an average, to about ten thousand pounds upon every considerable ship and cargo, must materially affect the price of the exported articles, and enable those

exempted from them to be sold at a lower rate in Europe.

While, indeed, the jealousy of foreigners continues so great in China as to confine their trade to Canton, the method of carrying it on by their own vessels, sailing between their own ports and Cochin-china, might be desirable, especially if the European manufactures could by those means, as is likely, be imported, not into Canton only, but into other Chinese ports.

Until such jealousy shall be done away by a more familiar

communication with the government of China, which must be followed by the vent of an immense quantity of foreign manufactures throughout the whole empire, the mode of obtaining their commodities, and supplying them with those of Europe, through their own people, might certainly be more advantageous and secure, as well as more agreeable to them, than by the present method of foreigners going immediately amongst

them.

If, from these considerations, a solid settlement in Cochin-

china were to be productive of advantage to any European nation, it must peculiarly be so to Great Britain; because,

beside the opening it would make for the sale of its own manufactures, among the people of the country, the British posses-

sions in Hindostán would be sure of a very considerable

demand from thence for their production.76

Macartney intended to return to Tourane after his mission to China had been completed. The failure of his Chinese negotiations,

however, probably deterred him from further ventures in oriental diplomacy and, in any case, by early 1794 conditions did not favour

extended travel in eastern waters. The war between England and Revolutionary France which broke out in early 1793 began to make itself felt in the Far East by the end of that year. By September French cruisers, based on the Isle of France, were operating in the Straits of Malacca, and a number of English vessels had fallen prize to them. In January 1794, therefore, Macartney resolved to return to England in safe convoy. The war with France, however, seems to have had to effect upon the conduct of Macartney at Tourane; indeed, it is most unlikely that he received news of it until after his arrival at Canton.

76. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 419-422. 95

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Alastair Lamb Appendix

BARROW'S TEXT OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES OF 1787.

Barrow gives the following text of the Treaty of Versailles of 1787 which Pigneau de Behaine negotiated on behalf of Nguyen Anh with the French Government: 77

I. - There shall be an offensive and defensive alliance

between the Kings of France and Cochinchina; they do hereby agree mutually to afford assistance to each other against all those who may make war upon either of the two contracting

parties.

II. - To accomplish this purpose, there shall be put under the orders of the King of Cochinchina a squadron of twenty French ships of war, of such size and force as shall be deemed

sufficient for the demands of his service.

III. - Five complete European regiments, and two regi-

ments of native colonial trops, shall be embarked without delay

for Cochinchina.

IV. - His Majesty Louis XVI shall engaged to furnish,

within four months, the sum of one million dollars; five hun-

dred thousand of which shall be in specie, the remainder

in saltpetre, cannon, musquets, and other military stores.

V.- From the moment the French troops shall have

entered the dominions of the King of Cochinchina, they and their generals, both by sea and land, shall receive their orders from the King of Cochinchina. To this effect the commanding officers shall be furnished with instructions from his Catholic

Majesty to obey in all things, and in all places, the will of his new ally. On the other hand,

I. - The King of Cochinchina, as soon as tranquillity shall be re-established in his dominions, shall engage to furnish, for fourteen ships of the line, such a quantity of stores and provsions as will enable them to put to sea without delay, on the requisition of the ambassador from the King of France; and for the better effecting this purpose, there shall be sent out

from Europe a corps of officers and petty officers of the marine,

to be put upon a permanent establishment in Cochinchina.

II- - His Majesty Louis XVI shall have resident consuls

on every part of the coast of Cochinchina, wherever he may

think fit to place them. These consuls shall be allowed the

privilege of building, or causing to be built, ships, frigates, and

other vessels, without molestation, under any pretence, from the Cochinchinese government.

III. - The ambassador of his Majesty Louis XVI to the

Court of Cochinchina shall be allowed to fell such timber, in any of the forests, as may be found convenient and suitable for building ships, frigates, or other vessels. 77. Barrow, op. cit., pp. 261-264. 96

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IV. - The King of Cochinchina and the Council of State shall cede in perpetuity to his most Christian Majesty, his . heirs, and successors, the port and territory of Han-san (bay of Turon and the peninsula), and the adjacent islands from F ai jo on the south to Hai-wen on the north. V. - The King of Cochinchina engages to furnish men and

materials necessary for the construction of forts, bridges, high-

roads, tanks, &c. as far as may be judged necessary for the protection and defence of the cessions made to his faithful ally the King of France.

VI. - In case that the natives shall at any time be un-

willing to remain in the ceded territory, they will be at liberty

to leave it, and will be reimbursed the value of the property they may leave upon it. The civil and criminal jurisprudence shall remain unaltered; all religious opinions shall be free; the taxes shall be collected by the French in the usual mode of the country, and the collectors shall be appointed jointly by the ambassador of France and the King of Cochinchina; but the latter shall not claim any part of those taxes, which will belong properly to his most Christian Majesty for the support

of his territories.

VII. - In the event of his most Christian Majesty being resolved to wage war in any part of India, it shall be allowed to the Commander in Chief of the French forces to raise a levy of 14,000 men, whom he shall cause to be trained in the same manner as they are in France, and to be put under French discipline. VIII. - In the event of any power whatsoever attacking

the French in their Cochinchinese territory, the King of

Cochinchina shall furnish 60,000 men or more in land forces, whom he shall clothe, victual, &c. &c. Beside these articles, the treaty contained some others of inferior importance, but all of them, as might be expected, greatly in favour of the French.

Maybon points out that his version differs somewhat from the official text, of which a summary has been given above. Its arrangement is not the same and it gives far higher figures for the quantity of French aid than were in fact specified. On the other hand, as Maybon also notes, Barrow's text agrees very closely with the version which has been preserved in Vietnamese sources, and which probably represented a preliminary draft of the proposed treaty as drawn up by Nguyen Anh and Pigneau de Behaine.78 Where did Barrow obtain this text? His account gives no answer

to this question. Much of Barrow's information on the history of Cochin China was derived from a memoir by Barizy, a Frenchman who had at one time served under Pigneau de Behaine (see p. 102 below). 78. Maybon, op. cit., pp. 413-416. 97

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Alastair Lamb

Perhaps Barrow's text came from this source. On the other hand, it is possible that this version might have been communicated to the British by someone in Pondichery at the time of Pigneau de Behaine's journey

to France, and thus have been known to Macartney when he was in Tourane. Staunton's narrative suggests some familiarity with the terms of this treaty; and the Macartney Embassy was certainly aware of the

proposed cession of the Island of Callao to France. The British seem to have been under no illusions as to Pigneau de Behaine's intentions

from the moment he left Cochin China for Pondichery; Francis Light, for example, sent to Bengal in January, 1786, a fairly full account of

the missionary bishop's plans which he had derived mainly from

Siamese sources.79

Fig. 5. Tourane harbour as it appeared to W. Alexander, a member of the Macartney Embassy, in 1793. (From Staunton, op. cit., Atlas of Plates). 79. Straits Settlements Records , Vol. 1. Light to Bengal 25 January 1786. 98

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Fig. 6. Chart of the Tourane region, from the survey made dur This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 01:58:03 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

/';-=09

)(8*

=-0/']

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CHAPTER V.

THE FIRST ROBERTS MISSION, 1803

(A) BACKGROUND

In the nine years following the visit of Macartney to Tourane Nguyen Anh completed the conquest of the Tay-son dominions. In 1799 Qui-nhon was taken, and in 1802 the Nguyen were once more in possession of their traditional capital at Hué. In the same year Nguyen Anh acquired most of Tonkin, executed Quang Toan and the rest of the Tay-son ruling family, and proclaimed himself emperor of Vietnam with the regnal title Gia Long. By 1802 the number of Frenchmen in the service of the Nguyen, never very large, had dwindled to four. Pigneau de Behaine died in 1799. Many of his companions had by this time returned home or died or left the king's service to become mer-

chants. By 1802 only Philippe Vannier, Jean Baptiste Chaigneau, de Forsanz and Dr. Despiau remained as French "mandarins". They were treated with honour by Nguyen Anh, and their advice was listened to, especially on questions concerning relations between Vietnam and the European Powers, but they could be hardly said to be a dominant

force in the realm. Nguyen Anh tolerated Christianity and several French missionaries lived freely in his territory, but he was far from becoming a French puppet or an europeanising king. Indeed, it is now clear that Nguyen Anh, once his success had been assured, resolved to avoid all entanglements with the Europeans and began that anti-Western trend which, under his son and successor Minh-Mang was to result in renewed persecution of Christians, and eventually was to bring about the Vietnamese rejection of all things European. During the period 1793 to 1802 France made no attempt to exploit

the foothold which Pigneau de Behaine had gained in Cochin China. The elaborate proposals of Captain Larcher, which were presented to

the Directory in 1797, seemed to have aroused no enthusiasm. No thought was given to the execution of this sort of plan until the Peace of

Amiens, when Napoleon attempted, though somewhat halfheartedly, a reassertion of French power in eastern waters. Larcher had urged the

creation of a French base in the Philippines - in the possession of France's Spanish ally - , and had pointed out the advantages which 99

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Alastair Lamb

France already possessed in Cochin China thanks to the work of Pigneau de Behaine. An establishment in Cochin China would: make France the mistress of the commerce of the Straits of

Malacca and the Gulf of Siam, and would give her a dominating position in the trade of China. In concert with the establishment in the Philippines, and with the government of Manila, at the least provocation by the English the East of Asia

would be closed to them, and one could defy all the naval

forces of that power to break through these barriers.80

By the Treaty of Amiens, which was signed in March, 1802, the

British agreed, though reluctantly, to return to France her Indian settlements. Napoleon, whose thoughts had been directed since 1798 towards the means of attacking the British possessions in India, saw here an opportunity for the reassertion of French power in the East. General Decaen was appointed to the post of Captain-General of the French territories in the East and sailed from France in March, 1803* with some 1,300 troops and a naval force of six vessels under the com*

mand of Durand de Linois. Decaen's aide de camp, it is interesting to note, was one Captain Stanislas Lefebvre, a nephew of Pigneau dé

Behaine.81

As events turned out, Decaen's mission was a failure. He was

prevented from reoccupying Pondichery. His fleet, mishandled by Durand de Linois, missed its chance to strike a serious blow against British trade when it allowed the China convoy to pass through the Straits of Malacca in February 1804.82 From the Isle of France Decaen was never in a position to intervene in Cochin China along the lines of

Larcher's plan of 1797 or of a similar proposal of Charpentier de Cossigny in 1803. 83

To the British in early 1803, however, the despatch of General Decaen implied a number of alarming possibilities should war with France break out once more, as then seemed more than probable. Among other things there seemed to be a chance, albeit slight, that the French might now pursue those opportunities in Indochina which were

allowed to lapse when de Conway refused his help to Pigneau de Behaine. It was for this reason that Castlereagh at the Board of Control for India resolved in the spring of 1803 to send an envoy to

Cochin China. A French dominated Cochin China at this date, it

should be remembered, was a far more formidable a prospect, united 80. Larcher's proposal, which was aimed at "bringing proud England down from that state of splendour to which trade had raised her and which makes her so insolent towards all nations" is printed in full by H. Cordier in his paper La France et l'Angleterre en Indo-Chine et en Chine sous le Premier Empire, T'oung Pao, Series II, Vol. IV, 1903, pp. 207-211. 81. Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 273. 82. C. N. Parkinson, War in Eastern Seas 1793-1815, London 1954, Chapter XI. 83. Cordier, Toung Pao Vol. IV op. cit., pp. 202-206. 100

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Missions to Cochin China

as it now was under Nguyen Anh, than ever was the war torn country

which Chapman and Macartney had visited. This mission to Cochin

China, in fact, was another demonstration of that fear of the use to

which France might put the coming of peace which had been an important consideration behind Symes's mission to Ava in 1802. As Lord Wellesley, the Governor General of India, observed in his instructions to Symes:

His Excellency thinks it extremely probable that the

Government of France will take advantage of the season of peace to endeavour to establish a connection with the State of Ava, an occurrence which may eventually be productive of material injury to the British interests in India. It is this consideration which principally constitutes the political importance

to the Company of an improved alliance with the State of Ava, which would necessarily tend to the exclusion of the

French interest.84

The envoy selected was David Lance, who was about to go out to

Canton to take a seat on the Select Committee of the Supercargoes there. He was instructed by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company to call in at Cochin China on his way to China, and to establish relations with the king of that coun-

try. Lance, on board the Coutts commanded by Captain Torin, reached Cape St. James in early September, 1803. He intended to proceed to Saigon, where he had reason to believe the king was then

residing, but an encounter with the brig Eleanor, commanded by Captain Allan, caused him to change his plans, for Allan sent a note to say that the king was at present either in Hué or campaigning in

Tonkin.85

(B) DAVID LANCE DECIDES NOT TO CALL IN AT COCHIN CHINA.

Extract from David Lance's Diary, 9 September, 1803, off Cape St. James.86

Captain Allan of the Eleanor brig came on board and confirmed the intelligence conveyed by his note; said he had a valuable cargo of opium and piece goods; that the intelligence of the removal of the King to Hui was known in India before he quitted the coast and brought by 84. D. G. E. Hall, ed., Michael Symes, Journal of his second embassy to the

Court of Ava in 1802, London 1955, p. 106. See also Hall's admirable introduction, pp. xxix-xxxv, which discusses the French question in

Burma with some reference to Cochin China.

85. Lance's Diary. Secret Consultations China, vol. 268.

86. This document, like all the English documents relating to the Roberts

mission which are printed here, is to be found in Secret Consultations China, vol. 268, in the India Office Library, London. 101

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Alastair Lamb

a vessel built by the King [of Cochin China] and given by him to

Messrs. Abbott & Co.; that had the weather favoured him he should

have endeavoured to have disposed of his cargo at Saygon but the season was too far advanced for that delay, and as no commerce of consequence could be carried on but with the King, he intended to

proceed immediately to Hui. He fully confirmed the accounts of the favourable disposition of the King towards the English, and that of their

exemption from all dues. He said that Möns. Barisy87 was dead and

that a ship, the Griffin , from Madras was daily expected on the coast belonging to the house of Abbott & Co. to take away the proceeds of 200,000 dollars belonging to that house entrusted to the management of Möns. Barisy; that we should get no intelligence of any kind in the

Bay [of St. James] and he conceived it would be at least four days

before we could reach Saygon where at present there only resided a mandarin of inferior rank. Captain Allan was of the opinion that the King could send an answer to me at Canton to any letter I might send by him, either overland or by a returning vessel, and promised carefully to deliver any I might entrust to him. From the above information, which I have no reason to suspect, I am of the opinion it was a cause of much risk of delay to proceed into

the Bay of St. James and from thence to Saygon from whence it

appears the respectable establishment is now removed; and I could only have communication with inferior officers who probably can give me no information on the motions of the court.

(C) THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SUPERCARGOES AT CANTON DEPUTE ROBERTS TO COCHIN CHINA IN THE PLACE OF LANCE.

Lance considered it pointless to open discussions with the inferior

mandarins in Saigon. Cä^tain Torin told him, moreover, that the season was too advanced to justify the risk of going on to Tourane if 87. Laurent Barizy was born in Brittany in 1769. In 1793 he entered the service of Nguyen Anh, and took part in many of the major battles against the Tay-son. His chief service to the Nguyen, however, lay in the securing of supplies, which gave him the opportunity to visit India, Manila and

Malacca. In early 1801, while Nguyen Anh was away campaigning,

Barizy fell foul of the mandarins who had him sentenced to the cangue; but he was soon freed and restored to favour. Later in that year he took part in some of the final actions against the Tay-son leading to the capture of Hué. He died in 1802. He was married to a Vietnamese, and one of his daughters, Heléne, became in 1817 the wife of J. B. Chaigneau. Barizy was the Cochin Chinese agent of the Madras merchant house of Abbot and Maitland which was doing a profitable business supplying the Nguyen with armaments. (See: Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 253-253.) The Griffin was commanded by Captain Pureroy, whose trading on the Cochin Chinese coast was to result in many arguments with the Government of Gia Long which were destined to trouble both Roberts and Crawfurd. Purefoy wrote an account of his experiences in Cochin China during the years 1800-1807, a French translation of which, entitled Remarques sur la

Cochinchine, was published in Nouvelles Annales des Voyages , July-

Setember, 1826. For more about Purefoy, see pp. 133, 136 below. 102

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Missions to Cochin China

he hoped to reach Canton that year. Accordingly, Lance wrote a letter to the King, which Captain Allan said he would deliver, explaining the

objects of his mission and the reasons for its postponement, and announcing his intention to return later in the year. He then left the Bay of St. James for Canton. On his arrival at Canton in November, Lance found that his health was such that he did not feel he could risk again exposing himself to the humid heat of Indochina. He proposed, therefore, that his mission should be entrusted to John William Roberts, one of the Supercargoes

at Canton. This was considered by the Select Committee on 11th November, 1803. It was agreed that Captain Barbor of the Gun java should be engaged to carry Roberts to Tourane and thence to Calcutta. Barbor was to be paid 2,000 dollars for the voyage, 2,000 dollars for the keep of Roberts and his party, and a further sum at the rate of Rs. 6,000 per month for every day over twenty days that he had to wait for Roberts at Tourane.

On 20th November, 1803, the Select Committee wrote to Lord Wellesley, the Governor General, to inform him of these decisions. They drew the Governor General's especial attention to the case of the

Nonsuch , which had captured a vessel belonging to the King some years before, and for which incident the Select Committee felt it might be equitable to make reparation, especially since the King had recently helped a British vessel in distress. It was suggested that Roberts might be empowered to act in this matter.89

The Select Committee appreciated that the French missionaries resident in Annam might prove of great value to Roberts as interpreters and advisers on local affairs. Accordingly, they wrote to J. B. Mar-

chini, Agent for the Propaganda Fide at Macao, to request that he provide letters of introduction to these missionaries. Marchini was asked to approach only those priests who were known to be friendly to the British, and it was emphasised that the aims of Roberts' mission should be kept secret for as long as possible from the French officers

in Cochin Chinese service, those former companions of Pigneau de Behaine who might well be opposed to any extension of British influence 88. I have been unable to find any information on Roberts' early life. In January 1807 he became President of the Select Committee of the Supercargoes at Canton, but was dropped from the Committee in December, 1810. In 1812 he was reappointed a member of the Committee. He died at Canton in November, 1813. 89. For the Nonsuch affair see note 96 below.

The aid to a British vessel in distress was probably the incident to which Barrow referred, Barrow, op. cit., p. 280. An English vessel from Canton, according to his story, called in at Saigon where both the master and the first officer died. The Cochin Chinese authorities thereupon instructed Barizy to assemble a crew, sail the vessel back to Canton and hand it over to its owners. Barrow gave no date for this incident. 103

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in this quarter. On 16th November Marchini prepared the letters which the Select Committee had requested, addressed to Bishop Labartette90 and to Fathers Liot and Gerard. The missionaries were asked to give Roberts all the help they could and to interpret for him. Roberts received his instructions on 19th November and sailed from Canton for Tourane on 24th November.

(D) ROBERTS' INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions freni the Select Committee to J. W. Roberts on his mission

to Cochin China, 19th November, 1803. Mr. Lance being empowered by his Instructions from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors in case any event should render it inexpedient or impracticable for him to proceed on an Embassy to the King of Cochin China to which they had done him the honour to appoint him, to select one of the Supracargoes on the spot to supply his place; confident in your zeal and abilities he has nominated you to a mission such had circumstances permitted it would have been the object of his ambition to have personally executed. Herewith is a copy of Mr. Lance's Instructions from the Secret Committee which you are implicitly to follow as far as circumstances will permit.91 But as a variety of events have taken place of which the Secret Committee were in ignorance when these were drawn up, and which have materially changed the situation of the King, and as in the various conversations Mr. Lance has had with the Secret Committee on

this subject it appeared that uninformed as they were of the actual state of Cochin China they left much to the discretion of the person honoured by their mission, to act as circumstances might require, we think it proper to add such advice to these instructions as will tend to promote the object wished to be obtained and which the altered position of affairs may render necessary.

Mr. Lance's letter to the King of Cochin China92 will have

announced to him his mission and he will be prepared for the reception of an Envoy from the Company. The accompanying letter will explain

the cause of Mr. Lance's not proceeding and will place you in every

respect in the same situation he was to have held.

90. Jean Labartette, Bishop of Veren, 1744-1822. In 1799, on the death of Pigneau de Behaine, Labartette became head of the Catholic mission in Indochina.

91. I have been unable to find a copy of Lance's instructions, which are not

included in the collection of documents on the Roberts mission in Secret Consultations China , vol. 268.

92. Dated: off Cape St. James, 9th September, 1803. This letter explained why Lance had postponed his mission and announced that he intended to return to Cochin China shortly. 104

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Two memoirs presented by Mr. Dalrymple93 to the Secret Commit-

tee have been communicated to you: these contain the History of

Cochin China from the commencement of their Revolution down to

1801. The papers communicated by Mr. Drummond continue its

sequel to the present period - when we find the King not only in possession of his hereditary Dominions but of the whole Kingdom of Tonquin, having at his command a victorious army of 300,000 men and a navy hitherto unequalled by any native power in the East - a nominal feudatory to the Empire of China for the Tonquin Kingdom but in fact a rival power and dangerous neighbour to that Empire, should discus-

sions take place so probable between jealous powers whose frontiers

join.94

Detailed information is furnished you by Möns. Barisy's and Möns.

Marchini's letters.95

93. Dalrymple's two memoirs are not, unfortunately, included in the collections in Secret Consultations China, vol. 268. Dalrymple (see pp. 11, 15 above) was much impressed by Cochin China as the potential site of a British settlement. In his Oriental Repertory , 2 vols., London 1808, vol. 2, pp. 321322, under the heading " Some notes concerning the trade to China" and written in 1790, he made the following observations on Cochin China: it is obvious that the Chinese trade must lie under great disadvantages, from the regulations under which it is necessarily carried on: and it is equally certain that very great advantages would have attended a settlement of our own, in the vicinity of China, to which the Chinese junks from all the maritime ports of that Empire could have freely come. The pamphlet I formerly published on the proposed settlement at Balambangan has discussed that matter at large; and although all circumstances considered I know of no situation so admirably adapted for an Oriental emporium, considered with respect to China only I should prefer Cochin China even to it : and as it is likely that the French in their present confusion should abandon, if they have not already abandoned, that enterprise, it would be very desirable to get possession of Turon, which is a harbour formed by a high peninsula connected to the continent by a long low isthmus, and consequently has a natural capacity to be rendered impregnable, at a small expense; and this peninsula is of sufficient extent for all necessary cultivation and

habitation: and the Chinese junks, of all sizes, would navigate

thither, never being out of sight of land and but a very little way out of sight of their own coasts. A depot in China, which was in contemplation, cannot answer the desired purpose, because, supposing, what is by no means probable, that the Chinese Government would have allowed an European fixed establishment in their country, the trade would be

carried out under the1 same restrictions as at present, and the vicinity

would expose them to effectual obstructions from the officers of government. This objection would operate against Macao, should the course of European politics ever eixpose the Portuguese flag to hostility. Macao is also very strong by natural situation, but the peninsula is barren and not fit for cultivation like that of Turon, and the harbour of Macao will not admit ships of the largest size. 94. This is certainly a most exaggerated account of the strength of the forces of the Nguyen. Barrow, op. cit., p. 283, apparently quoting Barizy, described an army of 1 1 3,000 men and a navy of 26,800 men. 95. Neither of these is in Secret Consultations China , vol. 268. Barizy's letter may well be that document which Barrow relied upon for so much of his information on Cochin China. (Barrow, op. cit., p. 271.) Marchini was in close touch with the missionaries in Cochin China. Barizy also corresponded with him and seems to have been a close friend. 105

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Every account confirms the King's good will to our nation, and desire of connecting himself with us; unfortunately his advances have hitherto met with no encouragement; on the contrary by some unaccountable neglect, they have either been forgotten or slighted; and in return for acts of hospitality and kindness he has been subject from ignorance of our maritime regulations to losses by predatory war. It appears that on the 20th of October, 1799, he addressed a letter

in duplicate to His Majesty. The original, it is attested, was sent to

His Excellency the Governor General and the duplicate to Tranquebar

to be forwarded to the Danish Ambassador at our Court. There is

reason to suppose that neither of these letters reached His Majesty, at

least there was no advice of them at the Office of the Board of Control.

The object of this letter, after conveying professions of esteem and expressing desire of a connexion, was to reclaim a vessel belonging to

him captured by the Nonsuch , Capt. Thomas, and condemned and

sold on pretence of wanting some necessary documents.96 The King's regard for the English is said to have suffered some diminuition from this act and the subsequent inattention to his letters and claims. It must be your first object to explain this affair in the best manner you are able. You may positively assert that his letters have not reached England and that the want of customary papers may

have rendered his vessel subject to capture, by the right of our Maritime

Laws, you have little doubt on the affair being explained to the

Governor General, he will give him redress. The favourable state of the King's affairs will now, we hope, render all European aid unnecessary to him, as we fear such assistance would ultimately prove fatal to his independence and would probably be the cause of great expense and final embarrassment to us; but it may happen that we shall be obliged to give him this assistance to prevent his receiving it from our Enemies, which, and their probable consequent establishment, it must be our great object to prevent. Should any overtures be made to you on this subject, you should offer to convey them to the 96. In August, 1797, off Penang Captain Thomas of the British frigate Nonsuch confiscated the merchant vessel Armida and its cargo. The Armida, which was commanded by Barizy, was trading on behalf of Nguyen Anh and carried a cargo, mainly of sugar, destined for the Danish firm of Harrop and Stevenson of Tranquebar which had been acting as an agent of the Cochin Chinese King. Captain Thomas put the Armida' s cargo to sale, and no doubt justified this action on the grounds that Barizy was a French national. Barizy hastened to Calcutta to protest against this action, but found little sympathy on the part of the British authorities there. Nguyen Anh then sent another Frenchman in his service, Olivier de Puymanel, to Calcutta to seek the return of the Armida and its cargo. Olivier impressed the Company with his argument that the King of Cochin China, an ally of the Chinese Emperor, might well be in a position to harm the British trading position at Canton, and it was decided at least to return to the Cochin Chinese the value of the Armida and its cargo. The Armida was eventually returned to Saigon, but not until the King of Cochin China

had attempted to use Danish mediation in an appeal to the King of England. (See: Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 254; S. Karpelès, Un cas de

droit maritime international en 1797 , Bulletin de la Société des Etudes Indochinoises, NS, vols. 3 & 4, 1948, pp. 125-131. Neither of these authorities states when the reparation took place. From what the Select Committee wrote one may presume that in 1803 either this reparation had not yet taken place, or they had not been informed of it.) 106

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consideration of the Governor General, and at the same time generally

assure the King that we are convinced in case of necessity that the

Company would be willing to give him assistance rather than he should apply for it to our enemies the French whom we could never suffer to get a footing in his country from which they would certainly endeavour to exclude us and interrupt the friendship subsisting between him and

us.

At the same, time he should be informed that a connexion of a very

long standing unites us to the Chinese Empire by ties of mutual interest: that nothing can entice us to hazard this in any degree:

therefore should he ever have occasion to require aid from us, it is to be understood that under no circumstances whatever it can be employed against our allies. In Mr. Dalrymple's memoir it is suggested that the King might be induced to relinquish the Province of Donai to the Company on their paying the present annual amount of its revenue.97 A proposal to that effect could not be attempted in this early stage of our connexion, and it is much to be doubted if his policy would permit him to allow such powerful neighbours to establish themselves in so fertile and considerable a province; but it is not improbable that as a proof of his good will, and desire to form a connexion with us he might be induced to give us an establishment on his coast, which would answer every purpose of commercial accommodation and security without being of such extent as to occasion any dread of political aggrandizement - such we conceive

would be the Island of Callao or Campellos, situated about seventy miles to the S.W. of the harbour of Touron. A detailed description

and survey of this Island is given in the History of Lord Macartney's Embassy,98 and it is asserted and supposed that nearly at the period of the commencement of the disturbances in Cochin China the French had obtained a grant of the Island;99 a very good account of the commercial advantages of this Island as a depot is given, to which we think might be added, that of a resource in the event of disturbances in the Chinese Empire, where we might receive its produce, now so necessary both to our commerce and revenue. This possession might contribute to extend the sale of opium should the Port of Macao no longer be a

depot for that article as may be the case in the event of war with

Portugal. Chinese junks from the Provinces of Tchekian and Fokien to the amount of several hundred used to frequent this part of the coast, going in ballast to take back returning cargoes of beetle nut and other gross goods. As the chief consumption of opium in this Empire is in these provinces, it is most probable that should the Chinese find a constant supply of that article ready for them at this port, a considerable fraction of the consumption of China may be taken from thence without hazard to our trade here, or dependence on the vile inhabitants of Macao. The piracies on the west coast of China have for some years interrupted this commerce, but it is not to be supposed that a state so disgraceful to the Empire can long be suffered to continue. 97. By Donai is meant the region of Saigon. 98. Staunton, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 410-422.

99. Pigneau de Behaine's Treaty of Versailles of 1787. See pp. 85-86 above. 107

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In an interview Mr. Lance had with the Right Hon'ble President

of the Board of Control a few days before his departure, after expressing

his opinion of the consequence and necessity of a connexion with the Government of Cochin China, he declared it to be his intention, should

Mr. Lance's reception be favourable, of which he entertained little

doubt, to have a constant Resident at that Court. You will therefore

prepare the King for the reception of an Envoy either immediately from England, or from the Government of Bengal, and you will represent this Mission as a circumstance intended to do him honour, and which you doubt not he will consider in that light. Should the King wish to send an Envoy to accompany you to the Governor General, we would recommend you to encourage the proposal. The splendour and magnificence of the capital of our flourishing Empire in the East and the reception we doubt not he will receive from the distinguished personage presiding there must make an impression highly favourable of our national consequence and character. As the King is the principal and almost the sole merchant in his dominions, your commercial overtures must be made to him, and we have little doubt that a most beneficial intercourse will be the result. The commerce of Cochin China with the European nations before the Revolution must have been of considerable extent, as both the French and Dutch Companies sent their ships to Touron, and about a century ago there was a large vent of woollens at Tonquin, now a part of that Empire. In 1770, on the commencement of the troubles, Möns. Poivre, since Intendant at the Isle of France, was at Hui as Embassador from France,

and two of their large Company's ships, the Maunpas and Choiseul,

were in Touron Bay;100 a trade with such a representation and carried on in such ships must have been of importance. The articles of import from Europe are lead, iron, glass, woollens, hardware- from India, opium, saltpetre, and Bengal piece goods. The exports to Europe, sugar, pepper, raw silk, cassia lignia the finest in the world, gold and silver in ingots - for China, cotton, beetlenuts, carda-

mums, sapari wood, aquila wood, gum lack and birds nests. As they have hitherto been supplied with woolens either by ships touching at

their ports or from Macao from whence they must have come with an accumulation of charges and duties, you will probably find the price of that article very high, but as it is the liberal policy of our Hon'ble Masters rather to look to national benefit by the extension of the sales of our manufactures, than to their own particular advantage by a considerable profit on a limited vent, the same view should regulate your conduct, and in the proposal you make for the delivery of our manufactures you should diminish the expected profit in proportion to the

extension of the order.

We should conceive the King will willingly engage to receive a cargo from Europe of the articles above mentioned, and as you are 100. The Select Committee, of course, were in error here. The Poivre mission

?Ln in some mention bas been made in pp. 6-7 above, took place in 1749-50. I can find no reference to the Maunpas and the Choiseul:

perhaps the Marchault and the Fleury are meant.

108

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furnished with samples of all the woollens imported here by the Company, have sanguine hopes that a considerable portion of it will consist

of that valuable article of our national manufacture. In return you will engage to take such articles of export as will find a market at Canton. Probably at the commencement of this exchange these may not be procurable in considerable quantities, yet as the relative value of gold to silver is less in that country than in any part of the East, an advantageous payment of any balance might be received in that article. Sugar was formerly sold at Touron for 2' dollars per picul,

and the finest cotton at nine tales.

We would advise you first to proceed to the port of Touron which is within thirty miles of the capital of Hui, or Hui Foo, where you will procure information of the King's residence and take the first opportunity of advising him of your arrival and mission, and endeavour to

procure an audience as soon as possible. Should the King not be

at his Court, you will take the speediest mode of following him. The term of your residence must be regulated by your own discretion; at that period when you conceive you have attained the object of your mission you will proceed to Bengal, touching at Malacca or Pulo Penang, leaving there with the Governor or Resident a packet for the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors (with a communication to be destroyed in case the ship by which it may be sent should be in

danger from an enemy) advising them of your proceedings and of

the course of your mission, which is to be conveyed by our ships from hence, should they pass through the Straits of Malacca, or otherwise

forwarded by the way of Madras. At the same place, and to be conveyed in the same manner, you will leave the various specimens

of the produce and manufactures of Cochin China, duplicates of which you will take with you to Bengal. On your arrival at Calcutta you will deliver the packet you will receive from us for the Most Noble the Governor General, and communicate to him the whole of your proceedings, and your future conduct

will be guided by such instructions as you will receive from him. Mr. Charles Mackintosh, late a commander in the country service and well known to you, is going passenger in the Gunjava to Bengal; as this gentleman, when engaged in commerce, had it in view to touch

at Cochin China, and in consequence cultivated the acquaintance of

the Cochin Chinese Ambassadors when at Canton last season and has received from them letters of recommendation to their Sovereign101, as he is perfectly acquainted with the navigation of the China Seas and particularly with the coast of Cochin China, we have thought proper to communicate to him the object of your mission which he has obligingly offered his services to promote. As he is well versed with the

101. Fallowing the completion of the conquest of Tonkin, Nguyen Anh sent an embassy to the Chinese Emperor to seek Chinese confirmation of his

rule. The two junks conveying this mission arrived in the Bogue in

August, 1802, and were detained there for about a month before permission came for the envoys to go on to Peking. The result of this embassy was that while Nguyen Anh was acknowledged as a tributary of China, this was done in such a way as to arouse his resentment, or so Roberts was to report. (See: Morse, Chronicles, op. cit., vol. II, p. 398.) 109

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trade of India, and is a person of much general knowledge and extreme discretion, we think you may on all occasions have recourse to his advice and assistance, and we think his professional knowledge may not only

be highly useful to you on this occasion, but also beneficial to the public.

We have engaged the ship Gunjava, Captain J. Barbor, to convey you to Cochin China and thence to Calcutta, on the terms and conditions therein specified, and should any unforeseen emergency occasion your detention beyond the 20 days stipulated, you will give Captain Barbor written directions to await your further orders, and in that event

you will ascertain the additional sum to which he may be entitled, and apply to the Most Noble Governor General to discharge the sum. Through the Revd. J. B. Marchini, Agent of the Propaganda Fide

at Macao, we have procured you letters of introduction to the Missionaries resident with the King, on whom you will have to depend as

interpreters, and the grateful sense which the French ecclesiastics

throughout the East appear to entertain of the manifold kindness and unremitting attention shown to their emigrant bretheren by the British Nation, will we have no doubt stimulate their exertions to aid you in the object of your mission; and their zeal will be strengthened by the assistance they may hereafter expect to demand from our Hon'ble Masters and

His Majesty's Ministers. We should recommend however the utmost attention to their behaviour and proceedings, and a candid declaration should you discover any backwardness on their part to promote the Hon'ble Company's views, that the need and support they may hereafter expect from the British Nation will entirely depend on their zeal and attachment on the present occasion. We are, Sir,

Your humble servants,

Canton (Signed by the Select Committee.) 19th November, 1803.

(E) ROBERTS AT TOURANE

Roberts left Canton on 24th November, 1803, and arrived in Tourane Bay on 4th December. He wrote immediately after his arrival letters to the King and to the chief mandarin of Tourane which he entrusted for delivery to a mandarin from Faifo who came to call on him. On the following day Roberts learnt that the King was not then at Hué, but somewhere near the Tonkin border where he was still campaigning. 110

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Roberts was in some doubt as how best to send his letters of introduction from Marchini to the French missionaries. He wished to

keep his connection with these men as discreet as possible and did not feel justified in giving the letters into the hands of a local agent. He resolved, therefore, to confine himself to writing to Labartette, Liot and Gerard to announce his arrival; and this he did on 7th December,

sending the letters by way of the chief mandarin at Faifo. At the same time he addressed a request to the Governor of Hué that a senior and responsible official be sent to receive him at Tourane. On 11th December Roberts made a short excursion to Faifo, where

he paid a courtesy call on the local authorities. He was told here that two senior mandarins had just left Hué and would soon be in Tourane to welcome him.

On 14th December Roberts received by way of Canton a letter from

Captain Allan to David Lance, dated 7th October, which described Allan's visit to Tourane after leaving Lance off Cape St. James. Allan reported that he had put Lance's letter to the King into the hands of a Frenchman in the King's service, M. J. B. Chaigneau.102 Chaigneau seemed well disposed towards the British and might, so Allan thought, prove helpful to any British mission to Cochin China. But Allan also warned against too great a reliance on the French mandarins at Hué, and he quoted the opinion of Captain Purefoy, with much experience of these parts in the service of Abbot and Maitland, that some of these Frenchmen were far from friendly to the Britsh. In the early afternoon of 16th December the two mandarins from Hué reached Tourane and called on Roberts. One of them was

M. Philippe Vannier,103 a Frenchman in the King's service who, like

J. B. Chaigneau, had at one time been a companion of Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of Adran. His conversation with Vannier, which as

recorded in his diary is printed below, convinced Roberts that he would be well advised to leave Tourane at this time and return later in the

year when the King would surely have returned to Hué from Tonkin where he was at present reported to be. Vannier seemed friendly and not unhelpful, but very reluctant to provide Roberts with information. 102. Jean Baptiste Chaigneau was born in Brittany in 1769. After service in the French navy he came to Indochina in 1794 and joined Pigneau de Behaine. He fought with Nguyen Anh on land and sea against the Tayson. He was given the Vietnamese rank of general in 1803. In 1820, after the Bourbon restoration, he was appointed French Consul in Huê. He left Indochina in 1824 and died in France in 1832.

103. Philippe Vannier was born in Brittany in 1762. He served in the French navy and then, in 1789, joined Pigneau de Behaine. With J. M. Dayot he helped Nguyen Anh build up an effective naval force. In 1802 he was confirmed by Nguyen Anh (who had just assumed the name Gia Long)

in the rank of 1st class mandarin. He left Indochina in 1824 and died in France in 1842.

Ill

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Extract from Roberts' diary. Tourane, 14th December, 1803.

About two o'clock Möns. Vannier with the other mandarin (who I found spoke very good Portuguese and had in the early part of his life visited Bengal) came aboard. They stated the letters to the King and the Governor of Hué had been received and that in consequence they had been sent down by the General Council to conduct us to what place we chose and to afford us every accommodation during our stay

in Turon, which, with the supply of every article the ship might require, was very politely offered by the Cochin Chinese mandarin who is known to the Europeans by the name of Sr. Juan Babtiste and who appeared an active intelligent man. By these gentlemen I was informed that the King was at present

in Tonquin and his present situation was very uncertain as he was

making a tour of that part of his dominions, repairing and constructing

such fortifications as he considered necessary for the defence and security of his country, and that before his return he expected an

embassy from the Emperor of China; and from these circumstances they did not think I could expect an interview in less than two or three

months.

On a further consideration of the subject, seeing no reason to alter the resolution I had taken, this information which I could not doubt was correct determined me to inform these gentlemen that if it was impossible to see the King sooner than the time now mentioned it was my intention to proceed to Bengal and return to the dominions of His Majesty early in the month oř June or as soon as the season would permit. They affirmed that an interview with the King could not be expected in a shorter space of time, and that they thought that by the period mentioned for my return I might rely on finding His Majesty at

his capital unless in the event of his being engaged in a war with China, which was considered by them as probable as the King had

claimed the Island of Haynan and some places bordering on Tonquin, which, it was asserted, tho' now annexed to the Chinese dominions, had formed part of that of Tonquin, and his right in virtue of his conquest

of that kingdom. These claims they assured us His Majesty would

not relinquish, that his ambition was without bounds, and that at the

head of a victorious army whose discipline and valor he considered

far superior to that of the troops of any neighbouring prince, he felt no doubt of the issue of a contest with the Emperor of China. Notwithstanding these high ideas which he perhaps with justice might have

formed, he will, I conceive, have some hesitation in engaging in a

contest with a power in numbers so much his superior, and particularly when his authority at home cannot be established on any firm basis. As it appeared that these officers were sent to Turon as well as for the purpose of offering such assistance as we might require as to ascertain the objects of my mission with which Mr. Vannier seemed very desirous to be made acquainted, he was therefore informed that it was the wish of the Hon'ble Company to form such commercial connexion with His Majesty of Cochin China as might tend to the advantage of both parties and in every possible manner strengthen the friendship subsisting between them. He seemed of the opinion that if our purpose was commercial, every agreement we could desire would be entered 112

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into by the King, but that as he was now in full possession of his

dominions he did not require any foreign aid nor would he be disposed to grant any tract of land or island. I again repeated what had before been said with assurances that nothing further was required but what would afford mutual advantage and security to the proposed commerce. Unacquainted with the character and sentiments towards our nation of the person who made these observations, it is impossible to say what degree of reliance may be placed on them. It may be proper to observe that on every occasion he seemed to wish to impress us with the power and resources of the King in whose service he was. Having come to the resolution of quitting this port without waiting for an interview with His Majesty, it remained for consideration the

propriety of leaving the presents with the delivery of which I was charged, or of carrying them to Malacca. By leaving them much of their effect would be lost, and as perhaps it would be thought improper to return without something for the King, it would be exposing the

Hon'ble Company to additional expense. The object to be gained by

leaving them was preventing their exposure to loss by capture which I conceived was so considerable a risk that I determined to make the offer of presenting them by the means of Möns. Vannier if he was authorised and disposed to receive them. It was accordingly proposed to him, but on his observing that perhaps the King would wish to be made acquainted with the objects of the mission prior to receiving anything of that nature, the intention was immediately relinquished. It is unnecessary to note the remainder of the conversation, during which we endeavoured without success to procure commercial information from our guests.

(F) ROBERTS LEAVES TOURANE FOR BENGAL, AND SUBMITS A REPORT ON HIS MISSION.

Roberts, having decided to leave Tourane, wrote to the King and the French missionaries to explain his reasons for this step. On 16th December he delivered these letters to Vannier along with copies of them for Vannier's eyes. Vannier observed that: the views of the Hon'ble Company as now stated were very different from what had been understood; and .... from representations that had been made the King had been led to suppose the principal object of the Company was to obtain a settlement on his coast.

On the afternoon of 16th December Roberts set sail from Tourane

for Bengal, having been in Cochin China for just twelve days. At

Malacca, which he reached on 24th December, Roberts sent off to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors a report on this stage of his mission; and this document is printed below. 113

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To the Hon'ble the Secret Committee of the Hon'ble Court of Directors.

Malacca, 24th December, 1803. Advices from Canton will have conveyed to your Hon'ble Committee information of Mr. Lance being prevented the honour of proceeding to the Court of His Majesty the King of Cochin China, as directed by the Hon'ble Company, and my consequent nomination, to carry those

orders into execution.

In pursuance of the instructions received from the Select Committee

at Canton, I embarked on board the Gun jay a on the 24th November , and on the 4th December anchored in Touron Bay. Detailed accounts of my proceedings during my stay there I have the honour to transmit. On my arrival my first consideration was, with as little delay as possible,

to lay before His Majesty of Cochin China the orders with which I have the honour to be entrusted, and was much disappointed to find him absent from his capital, and in Tonquin, at such distance as precluding the possibility of my seeing His Majesty within such period as would enable me to forward to your Hon'ble Committee the event of my mission by the ships of the present season; the most material object to be gained by an immediate interview with the King. Having ascertained the impracticability of this point, I resolved to proceed to Bengal, and return to the dominions of His Majesty as early as the season will permit, by which means, it appearing probable that no agreement could be concluded until the sentiments of the Most Noble the Governor General are known, the negotiations will be terminated as soon as it could have been under any circumstances, and opening with the advantages to be derived from his instructions. Had I remained and detained the ship the Hon'ble Company would have been exposed to a very heavy expense without any benefit being

derived as until advice could be forwarded to Europe the period of

entering into any agreement with the King of Cochin China was of little importance, it being scarcely possible any occurrence could take place in the interim tending to prejudice the views of the Hon'ble Company.

Remaining singly, as I must have done had the ship been despatched, appeared objectionable in many respects. Unprepared for a residence, my manner of living could not have been suitable to the situation I have the honour to hold, which must have created unfavourable impressions in a nation fond, we are to believe, of pomp and show; and might be made use of by any persons inimical to the interests of the mission (of which I have reason to believe there were some) as an argument to prove want of attention and respect on the part of the Hon'ble Company. Under these circumstances, therefore, I trust your Hon'ble Committee will approve the resolution I have adopted. From my short stay in Cochin China I feel but little qualified to offer any remarks worthy of attention of your Committee. The few observations that have occurred, however, I consider it to be my duty to communicate and, acquainted with the circumstances under which they are offered, such attention may be paid to them as, in your judge-

ment, they may merit.

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Missions to Cochin China

The injury the trade of the Hon'ble Company to China must

experience from our enemies having any settlement on the coast, or protection in the ports of Cochin China, are so fully known to your

Hon'ble Committee that any observations on the advantages to be

derived in a political point of view from a connexion with that country are unnecessary.

The prospect, therefore, of commercial benefit is the only subject on which it is necessary to communicate my ideas.

In a country long a prey to internal commotion and every evil

attendant on a usurping and tyrannical government, it cannot be supposed that commerce will immediately flourish, in its recommencement after the severe checks it has for thirty years experienced. The progress must be slow and gradual; but from the industry, population and natural wealth of the country joined to the known disposition of the King and his subjects to cultivate commercial intercourse with foreigners, there is every reason to suppose a commerce with Cochin China will in time become valuable to the Hon'ble Company. The kingdom of Tonquin has formerly, and doubtless would again when means are offered, consumed the British woollen manufacture to a considerable extent, the case of which might also be extended to the northern part of Cochin China; in the southern, perhaps, the heat of the

climate may prevent woollen becoming the dress of any but the soldiers whose uniform the King seems disposed to make of that manufacture.

Various articles of glass and hardware, there is also reason to

believe, would be in general demand, and as it is probable that the north eastern part of China might be supplied with such articles of European and Indian produce as they require by means of their junks on more moderate terms than they can receive them after paying the high duties of Canton and the additional duties and charges on their carriage to the northwards, an established commerce with the dominions of the King of Cochin China might become flourishing and lucrative, and by this

means, perhaps, cargoes might be obtained for Europe. At present

the produce of Cochin China is principally suited to the China or Indian

market.

Obtaining the desirable point of forming a depot for opium in any part of the King of Cochin China's dominions will be attended

with difficulty, as it is an article the importation of which is strictly prohibited. Admission of its sale to foreigners may therefore at present be questioned. As the means of commencing the commercial intercourse, it might be advisable to order one of the Hon'ble Company's ships to touch at

Touron Bay with instructions to the Hon'ble Company's resident in Cochin China to dispose of such part of the cargo as he may find a vent for. Previous to any arrival taking place every agreement with

the King of Cochin China will be completed and the woollens and other

articles, in consequence, delivered on the stipulated terms. Should

no such engagement be entered into, and they cannot be disposed of on terms advantageous to the Hon'ble Company, the ship will proceed to China and no other loss or inconvenience be incurred than what may

arise from the trifling addition to the length of the voyage. 115

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Alastair Lamb

At the commencement of this trade it is most probable that but small quantities of woollens would be in demand, and still less of any other European manufacture, it might therefore be proper in the first instance to confine the investment entirely to woollens. It may also be

advisable to send as specimens a few articles of hardware such as

mirrors of small value, not that in my opinion they will ever become in such demand as to merit the attention of the Hon'ble Company; but it will still be desirable to ascertain how far these articles of our national

manufacture may answer in the private trade of the Commanders and Officers of the Hon'ble Company's ships. The assortment of woollens should chiefly consist of long ells and the coarser kind of cloths. Black, dark and light blue, scarlet and green are the colours they seem most to admire. Yellow in small quantities

will also be required. It appears absolutely necessary very much to

confine the importation of European manufactures until the probable

consumption can be determined as a great and sudden influx must lessen their value in the estimation of the Cochin Chinese in such

manner as not to be easily recovered. Should it be the intention of the Hon'ble Company, as I conceive it will be, to endeavour to promote a trade with Cochin China, the necessity of appointing a Resident at that Court, as well for the purposes proposed by the Hon'ble Company as occasionally to control the conduct of individuals trading to that Empire, is strongly manifested; as

even in the small intercourse at present carried on I have reason to

believe their conduct in one instance has caused some dissatisfaction and, if repeated, cannot fail to alienate the frienship and esteem at present entertained by all ranks of people for the European character in general and particularly for that of the English, I much regret my inability to forward to your Hon'ble Committee more full and satisfactory information on a subject that may prove ultimately of great importance to the Hon'ble Company. Immediate benefit is not to be expected, and attention and perseverance will be necessary to ensure success, the greatest obstacle to which appears the ambition of the King; and unless he remains satisfied with the recovery of the dominions of his ancestors and allows his subjects to enjoy the

blessings of peace, little commercial activity can be expected; and

should he be tempted to carry his hostile views against the Emperor of China into execution, it may remain a question the possibility of the Hon'ble Company, with a regard to the valuable trade carried on with that Empire, remaining in friendship with him. For these views, however, I have only the authority of the French gentleman with whom I

had an interview at Touron, and who was on every occasion anxious

to display the power and resources of the King he served.

The Europeans residing in Cochin China, being all natives of

France, many of whom from motives of self interest I conceive would be desirous of promoting the views of the Hon'ble Company, and in consequence, that the public service would be much forwarded by sending translations in French of such letters as I might have occasion to write, and as my knowledge of that language did not qualify me for

that purpose, previous to my arrival at Touron, I requested the 116

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Missions to Cochin China

assistance of Mr. Guise, a passenger on board the Gunjava, a gentleman well known at Canton, and on whose judgement and discretion I know every confidence might be placed. To him, and Mr. Mackintosh, I feel under many obligations for their ready and serviceable assistance on every occasion.

From Calcutta, or by the earliest opportunity, I shall have the

honour of transmitting to your Hon'ble Committee the remarks which

have been made by Mr. Charles Mackintosh on the coast of Cochin

China and, more especially, Touron Bay. I have the honour to be with greatest respect,

Hon'ble Sirs, Your most faithful, humble servant, Malacca, J. W. Roberts.

24th December, 1803.

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CHAPTER VI.

THE SECOND ROBERTS MISSION, 1804

(A) ROBERTS GOES TO CALCUTTA AND RECEIVES INSTRUCTIONS FROM LORD WELLESLEY FOR A SECOND VISIT TO COCHIN CHINA.

After a short stay in Penang, Roberts arrived at Calcutta on 1st February, 1804. On 7th March he wrote a long report to Lord Wellesley in which he suggested some of the possibilities inherent in British relations with the powers in Indochina. He pointed out the strategic importance of this coast in any conflict between England and France. He remarked on the strong position which the French mandarins had secured for themselves at the court of Nguyen Anh (who assumed in 1802 the title Gia Long). But the French Revolution, Roberts thought, had damaged French strength. Nguyen Anh was much alarmed by the acts of a regicide government. Even the Frenchmen, missionaries and mandarins, were probably royalist at heart and likely, for this reason, to prove willing to help the British against the revolutionary rulers of France.104 He argued that the main objective of his mission should be the securing of the Island of Callao or a port on the Cochin Chinese coast both as a commercial settlement and a strategic base: this, in view of what Vannier had said, would take time, but its attainment was well

worth the patience. The King of Cochin China, Roberts went on, should be provided with British arms and Indian saltpetre on the condition that he did not use these war materials against the Chinese. On the basis of these remarks Lord Wellesley issued to Roberts the following instructions dated 20th April, 1804: 104. The fortunes of a family like that of Barizy, by no means atypical of this troubled period of French history, could well give grounds for such a belief. Barizy wrote to Marchini in April, 1801, that the Revolution had affected his family thus:

M. de Flotte, my uncle, Governor of Toulon for the King, his throat cut; my uncle M. Boisquenai, commander at Lorient,

degraded, forced to flee for his life, proscribed; my uncle M. Barizy,

priest, imprisoned in a dungeon; my brother-in-law M. Lorach, hanged; my cousin M. Le Veyer, hanged. (Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I,

p. 253.)

Moreover, men like Vannier and Chaigneau were Bretons, and thus came from a region which remained strongly Monarchist and clerical. 118

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Plate V. A Cochin Chinese Lady. (From Crawfurd, Embassy , op. cit.)

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Missions to Cochin China

Extract from Lord Wellesley's instructions to Roberts, dated 20th April, 1804.

4. The objects of your mission to the Court of Cochin China are stated by the Hon'ble Committee to be the establishment of an amical

connection and a commercial intercourse with the state of Cochin China

and the permanent exclusion of the power of France from that country.

5. The Governor General in Council is of the opinion that the

latter object is more important than the former, in the degree in which

it is more desirable to provide for the security of our commercial

interests in China than to extend the branches of our commerce in that

quarter of the world.

6. This also appears to have been the sentiments of the Hon'ble

Committee, whose instructions direct that the first of the two objects described in the preceeding paragraph be made if practicable subser-

vient to the second.

7. It appears from the diary of your proceedings in Cochin China,

and from information contained in your address to the Governor

General in Council of 7th March, that some of the French clergy reside in Cochin China and are in the confidence of the King, and that some

of the principal offices of His Majesty's Government are held by

Frenchmen.

8. His Excellency the Governor General in Council has directed

his special attention to the course of argument contained in your letter of 7th March tending to infer an opinion that the subjects of France

residing in Cochin China and possessing influence and power at the Court of His Majesty, are favourably inclined to the British interest, and would readily promote the accomplishment of the objects of your mission to that Court. His Excellency in Council apprehends that it may prove a dangerous policy to depend upon any supposed disposition of the French in Cochin China, or to resort to this agency for the accomplishment of the objectives of the Secret Committee. 9. The aversion of those persons to the present system of government in France, and their attachment to the monarchy, do not necessarily involve either a desire to obstruct the general aggrandisement of the power and supremacy of their nation, especially in remote foreign countries, or a disposition to promote the interests of the British Government by a sacrifice of the national interests of France. 10. The ambition of the Monarchy was directed with more diplomatic policy, and with more wisdom and energy, to the injury of the British interests in the East, than has yet been manifested by France since the period of the revolution. The cause of monarchy in France therefore, is not necessarily the cause of Great Britain in India. Those of the French nation who desire the subversion of the existing system of government in France, cannot be supposed to desire a diminuition of the national power of France abroad, or to have abandoned that general

sentiment of attachment to the power and honour of their country.

11. It cannot therefore be confidently expected that the subjects of France residing and exercising power in the dominions of the King of Cochin China would cordially employ their influence and exertions in promoting an arrangement in favour of the British Government pre119

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judicial to the views and interests of the French nation. It may rather be supposed that those persons will endeavour to frustrate both our political and commercial views in Cochin China.

The private interest and the local and temporary views of the

French now resident in Cochin China may however render their services

useful to you under proper precautions. I am directed with these

observations to suggest to you the inexpediency of rendering any of these persons the channel of confidential negotiation with the King of Cochin China, if you should be enabled either to communicate personally with his Majesty or to employ agents of another description for purposes of negotiation. 12. If the disposition of the King of Cochin China towards the British Government be as favourable as it has been represented to be, his ready consent to the establishment of a commercial connexion with the Company may reasonably be expected. 13. It may also be expected that His Majesty will be induced to consent to the conclusion of engagements with the British Government of a Commercial and Political nature on principles of reciprocal benefit, and the following are the general terms of a political nature which in the

judgement of His Excellency in Council would promote the accomplishment of the objects in the contemplation of the Hon'ble Committee. 1st. A stipulation of the permanence of friendship between the

two states.

2nd. The free use of the ports of Cochin China to all British ships for the purposes of commerce or of obtaining provisions and of repairing eventual damages. 3rd. The grant of an island or tract of land on the coast of Cochin China in perpetual sovereignty of the the Hon'ble Company. 4th. A stipulation on the part of His Majesty never to permit a French establishment within his dominions for any real or ostensible purpose whatever. 5th. The Hon'ble Company to engage to supply His Majesty with

arms and military stores at the amount of their actual cost to any practicable extent provided that such arms and military stores be not at any time required by His Majesty for the purpose or prosecuting hostilities against the Emperor of China or against any other state or country in alliance or friendship with the Company. 6th. A provision for the annual supply of a specified quantity of saltpetre from India to Cochin China under the reservation stated in

article 5th.

14. The stipulations of a commercial nature, which should form a part of die proposed engagements with the King of Cochin China, must depend in a great degree on the further information which you may acquire in Cochin China with respect to the demands and the products of the country, and the instructions of the Hon'ble Committee added to your own just comprehension of that subject, preclude the necessity of any suggestion on tiiat branch of the proposed arrangement. 15. The preceding stipulations involve the utmost extent of concessions which under actual circumstances the King of Cochin China can be expected to grant. 120

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16. You will, however, be regulated in proposing them by the

information which you will acquire on your arrival at Cochin China with regard to the disposition of the King, and the situation of His

Majesty's affairs. His Excellency in Council entirely concurs in the

justice of the observations contained in your letter of the 7th of March on the subject of obtaining a grant of an island or tract of territory in Cochin China, and His Excellency in Council desires that you will be

guided in soliciting that concession, or in abstaining from such a request,

by the considerations stated in your letter of the 7th of March. 17. The Governor General in Council is of the opinion that every effort should be employed to obtain His Majesty's consent to the proposed stipulations for the exclusion of the French, and with that view it will be proper that you should confirm in the mind of His Majesty the just sentiments which His Majesty appears to entertain with regard to the nature and operation of these licentious principles which have long influenced the councils of France, and you should explain to His

Majesty in the most impressive manner the dangers to which the

independence of His Majesty's dominions will be exposed by permitting the French Government to establish its authority and influence in any degree within His Majesty's dominions. 18. In this point of your negotiation the supposed dispositions and

prejudices of the French now residing in Cochin China may prove

serviceable to the progress of your views. The French now residing in Cochin China will probably concur in your representation of the evils which have been occasioned by the operation of those principles on which the existing government of France is founded, and if the King of Cochin China be endowed with the capacity which he is supposed

to possess, it will not be difficult to satisfy His Majesty that the restora-

tion of monarchy in France cannot reasonably be expected with any period of time or under any circumstances which would render the admission of a French establishment in Cochin China a safe or prudent measure for the interests of the monarch of that country. Whatever may be the policy of admitting a British setlement in Cochin China, the King of Cochin China cannot reasonably expect to derive any advantage from the admission of a French establishment proportionate to the evident peril of such an arrangement. 19. If the King should refuse to accede to the proposed stipulations for the exclusion of the French, it will be proper that you should apprize His Majesty, in distinct terms, that if His Majesty by granting to the French an establishment within his dominions, or by any other concessions shall afford to that nation any additional facilities in the prosecution of hostilities against the British Government or against the Empire of China, His Majesty will be considered to be an ally of France and to have placed himself in the condition of a public enemy of the

British Government.

20. If the King should be averse to the conclusion of engagements in the manner proposed, His Majesty may still be induced to consent to the commercial arrangements suggested by the Hon'ble Secret Committee, and the establishment of such arrangements may ultimately be rendered subservient to the attainment of the political objects of the proposed connexion with Cochin China. Every object, however, both 121

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of a commercial and of a political nature, will manifestly be facilitated by the residence of an agent on the part of the Hon'ble Company in Cochin China. His Excellency in Council, therefore, deems it proper

to recommend this object to your most particular attention. It will

be proper under any circumstances that you endeavour to ascertain the disposition of His Majesty on the subject of admitting the permanent residence of a representative of the Hon'ble Company at His Majesty's Court. If His Majesty should be disposed to receive a British Officer

in that capacity, you will transmit to His Excellency in Council the

earliest practicable intimation of His Majesty's consent to that arrangement, and if His Majesty's disposition on this point should appear to be favourable, the Governor General in Council desires that you will act in the capacity of a representative in Cochin China on the part of the Company until you shall receive further advices from the Governor

General in Council.

21. In all your preceedings under these instructions you will carefully attend to the cautions contained in the instructions of the Hon'ble Secret Committee on the subject of adopting any measures calculated to alarm the jealousy of the Chinese Government; and the Governor General in Council authorizes you to deviate from the preceding instructions by limiting or otherwise modifying the terms of the proposed

engagements if such deviation should appear to you to be advisable with a view to the principal caution prescribed by the Hon'ble

Committee.

22. By a communication contained in your diary of proceedings,

it appeared to be probable that the King of Cochin China would bê

involved in a war with the Chinese. If at the period of your arrival at Cochin China the King should actually be at war wtih the Chinese, or should have proceeded to any acts of a nature to produce a rupture

between the two states, the Governor General in Council is of the

opinion that you should communicate with the Select Committee of Supracargoes and obtain the benefit of its opinion previously to the commencement of any negotiation with the Court of Cochin China.

23. Under such circumstances it might be most advisable that you should proceed in the first instance to Macao, and should communicate personally with the Supracargoes previously to the commencement of any negotiation in Cochin China.

24. With a view to enable the Select Committee to suppress any emotion of jealousy or apprehension which might be excited in the

minds of the Chinese, by any misinformation with regard to the nature and design of the proposed connection between the Hon'ble Company and the state of Cochin China, it would be advisable that you should

forward to the Select Committee of Supracargoes a copy of these instruc-

tions at the earliest practicable period of time, and that you should

transmit to the Committee by every opportunity the most ample

information of your proceedings and negotiations in Cochin China and the Governor General in Council expects that you will attend to any suggestions which you may receive from the Committee on all ques-

tions connected with the objects of this letter and of your mission.

25. The Governor General in Council has taken into consideration the suggestions contained in your letter of the 9th of February on the 122

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subject of adding to the presents with which you are already charged for the King of Cochin China, and of providing presents to the officers of Government and other persons in Cochin China.

26. The Governor General deems it highly expedient that you

should be furnished with presents for His Majesty to be delivered in the name of the Governor General, and also with such articles as may enable you occasionally to make presents to the officers of Government and to other persons in Cochin China whose situation or services may

render such donations advisable. You will accordingly be pleased to

transmit to me a list of such articles as you may deem necessary for the purposes above described to be submitted to the aprobation of His Excellency the Governor General. 27. You will be furnished by the Persian Secretary with a letter

to the King of Cochin China which His Excellency the Governor

General in Council has deemed it proper to address to His Majesty on

this occasion.

(Signed: N. B. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, 20th April, 1804)

(B) ROBERTS LEAVES INDIA FOR COCHIN CHINA

Roberts left Calcutta on 3rd June, 1804, aboard the Page formerly the General de Caen - Captain Mackintosh commanding, and

reached Penang on 24th June. Here he talked with the Lieutenant Governor, R. J. Farquahar, who warned him that a French privateer was then cruising off the Indochinese coast. Farquahar offered Roberts the escort of the brig Amboyna, Lt. Trinder commanding, and suggested that after his mission Roberts could send the Amboyna on to Canton whence it could return to Penang as escort to the China junks then waiting the north east monsoon; for, as Farquahar wrote to the Select Committee on 26th June to advise them of this arrangement, "it is of considerable moment to the progress of this rising settlement that those junks should not be plundered or infested by pirates on their voyage under the Straits of Malacca".

From Penang Roberts went to Malacca and thence, on 6th July, set sail for Tourane. On 15th July he reached Cape St. James, where he

learnt the King was in Hué, and on 22nd July he reached Tourane Bay. The events of his stay in Annam between 22nd July and 25th August, 1804, are described at length in his diary which is reproduced

below.

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(С) ROBERTS' SECOND VISIT TO COCHIN CHINA.

Extract from Roberts' diary 22nd July to 25th August, 1804. July 22nd.

Anchored at about one o'clock this day in Turon Bay, when the mandarin who had before visited the Gun java came on board, to whom I delivered the letter to be forwarded to Fai Foo, with which he immediately went on shore. At anchor off the entrance of the harbour

were two of the King's junks, bound to Hué, but the appearance of blowing weather had alarmed them and they stood into the Bay with us. These for country vessels appeared remarkably well constructed. They had been much improved in imitation of European ships .... The commanders of these vessels came in the evening to visit us. At the termination of the war the guns had been taken out of these vessels, and they were now employed in conveying a cargo of rice from the southward to the capital.

July 23rd.

Late in the evening a mandarin from Fai Foo came on board, accompanied by the mandarin of Turon. He informed me that the letter I had written had been received and immediately sent to the capital, and in four or five days an answer might be expected and

some person sent to conduct us to His Majesty's court. Until the 29th we remained in expectation of hearing from the King. On the evening of that day I was informed by Mr. Rock,105 who had been on shore, that a mandarin from Hué had just arrived and that three boats were on their way down for my conveyance to Hué.

He also said this person wished to see me on shore the following

morning. July 30th.

Early in the morning the mandarin from Turon came on board

and acquainted me with the arrival of the mandarin from Hue Foo whom he represented as one of three deputed by the King to conduct

me to his capital. It appeared that his commission was jointly with

the others, and that he had hastened down to make preparations for their reception. Under these circumstances therefore I did not think it necessary to visit him but sent my compliments, and that if he was inclined to come on board or had anything to communicate, I should be happy to see or hear from him. July 31st .

The next morning he came on board accompanied by one of the principal mandarins of Fai Foo. In the person arrived from Hué we

recognized the junior member of the council at Fai Foo when we visited

that place in December. They acquainted us with the arrival of the 105. Mr. Rock was a Frenchman with trading experience of Cochin China who accompanied Roberts from Calcutta and who acted as an interpreter and liaison officer.

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other mandarins from Hué, of which we had long before been informed and had seen the boats pass. This appeared merely a visit of ceremony.

They brought with them a present of poultry and fruit and such articles

as they thought would be acceptable on board, and said the mandarins

just arrived were fatigued with their voyage but would visit me the next

morning. After partaking of some refreshment these men took their leave. Some hours after their departure a servant of the mandarins from Hué attended by an old linguist came on board with the compliments of his masters, and said that from fatigue they were unable to

come on board but would be happy to see me on shore. As I could

not without inconvenience at that time quit the ship, and not being very desirous of complying with an invitation delivered in the manner this was, I sent word I could not conveniently visit them at that time,

but Captain Macintosh intended going on shore in the evening and

would pay his respects to them, and that I should be happy to receive them on board the following morning. On Captain Macintosh's return

I found he had been received by the mandarins from Hué, one of

whom, the superior, seeming a man of some consequence. The other

was Snr. Joao Babtiste who had been sent to Turon when I was there

in December last, and, I understood, acted in the capacity of interpreter to the King. They informed Captain Macintosh they would come on

board or receive me on shore as I preferred, but as they had some

communication to make and wished to be informed of the nature of the

business I was come upon, the latter would be the most convenient as they had their writers and other conveniences more about them than

they would have on board. In consequence I determined to go on

shore the next morning. August 1st. Early in the morning a boat was sent from the mandarins with a message communicated by the inferior mandarin of Fai Foo importing that it was sent for my conveyance. I preferred, however, going in the ship's boat, and about nine o'clock, accompanied by Captain Macintosh and Lieut. Trinder I proceeded on shore where we were received much

in the same manner as on former occasions except that guards and attendants in general were more numerous. They informed me they were ordered to assure me of His Majesty's satisfaction at my arrival, and requested to be informed of the nature of my mission. I replied that they had been fully informed when I was at this port in December, and with which Snr. Joao Babtiste to whom I addressed myself was acquainted. They were not however satisfied with this but now desirous of having copies of the letters I had in charge, with which the senior

mandarin would immediately proceed to Hué and return with the necessary accommodation for our conveyance to the court of His

Majesty. This request under many circumstances I should not have thought proper to have complied with, but in a situation where there was reason to suppose reports of the purport of the mission highly injurious to its interests would be circulated, I considered there could not be a more effectual mode of removing the impression such reports might have

caused than giving publicity to letters so strongly expressive of the desire of strengthening the friendship at present subsisting between the British 125

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Alastair Lamb

Government and the state of Cochin China as those I had in my charge, and that a refusal might be employed by persons inimical to the views

of the Hon'ble Company as an argument to prove the truth of any report they might have propagated. Resolving therefore upon a compliance, I informed these mandarins that the letters I had in charge I was directed to deliver to His Majesty of Cochin China and I considered the request of delivering copies of them to any other person as very unusual. Snr. Joao Babtiste said it was invariably the custom of their country in their communication with China and other neighbouring governments. I replied by saying that I wished by every means in my power to prove the friendly disposition of the Hon'ble Company towards His Majesty of Cochin China and should therefore be happy to comply with the customs of their country as far as I consistently could; that I would acquaint them with the substance of the letters which they might

communicate to the council at Hué: the which I did by reading

Portuguese translations of the letters, and if they would come on board the Page they should be furnished with copies of the letters; to which they agreed, and we shortly after returned to the ship. About one o'clock the mandarins came on board, and finding we could not make them sufficiently understand the contents of the letters to enable them to give their meaning in Cochin Chinese, they were furnished with copies and translations in Portuguese with which, after having dined, they took their leave and said the principal mandarin would immediately proceed to Hué. In the course of the morning's conversation I stated to Snr. Joao

Babtiste that I considered the detention we had and were likely to experience as very extraordinary, particularly as His Majesty was

acquainted of my intention of returning. I had hoped some preparation would have been made for my reception and that I should not have experienced these unpleasant delays. I was unwilling to commence a negotiation that should be conducted in the most amical manner by representations unpleasant to both parties, but that a longer continuance of such conduct would render this absolutely necessary, and I requested he would impress the officers of government with whom he acted with these sentiments. He assured me every expedition should be made and that on the third day from this I might depend upon everything being

in readiness.

August 8th. I continued daily amused with promises of the immediate arrival of an answer and boats from the capital until the morning of the 8th, when the mandarin who had before been sent down arrived accom-

panied by five boats and came on board the Page to announce his

return and readiness to accompany me to Hué. I informed him I was ready to set off whenever he would send boats to take on board the presents and my necessaries. As we had neither of the interpreters on board we could only explain our meaning by the Chinese written character which he did not seem very fully to understand, and in a short time took his leave to proceed on shore. At two o'clock he returned accompanied by Snr. Joao Babtiste and the mandarin of Turon, bringing with him the boats this morning arrived and the three before sent. These vessels were about 50 feet long, in proportion very narrow, little more 126

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Missions to Cochin China

than 8 or 9 feet in the widest part, rowed from 24 to 28 oars. They carry a carriage gun in the bow, and four swivels, two on each side. The prows and stems are raised and ornamented gaudily with paint and

gilding. The boat we were to embark on board had a cabin in the

centre 8 feet long and 9 or 10 broad and very low. These boats, tho'

1 have no doubt very serviceable for the purposes of war in this country,

do not afford very comfortable accommodation. The one resting for myself was singular in having a fixed cabin, the others had merely a temporary covering of mats. The dress of the rowers in the five boats

last arrived made a very handsome appearance. It consisted of red short trousers with a loose jacket, or rather covering to the body

without sleeves, of scarlet serge bordered with blue cotton cloth and a narrow edge of lighter blue. On either side of the border on the dark blue small pieces of tin near the size of a common button were fixed about three of four inches distant. The men in the other boats wore

black jackets and red collars and cuffs. These men, tho' always

employed on board the King's vessels, are occasionally made use of as regular land forces. The presents and baggage having been got onto the boats in the

course of the evening, leaving the instructions for Lieutenant Trinder . . .

[to follow in the Amboyna ] ... at night I embarked accompanied by Captain Macintosh and about two o'clock in the morning got under

weigh. August 9th.

At daylight we found ourselves clear of Turon harbour and at half past 8 were abreast Cape Chou-moy .106 Round the next point which forms with the cape a bay near 6 miles wide, we entered the small

mouth of the river leading to Hué. At 11 o'clock we anchored at a

small village where an inferior mandarin with a guard is stationed to protect the river and give information of any arrivals. At this place we found a more commodious boat ready for our reception. Its construction was similar to those already mentioned but of greater dimensions with a very good cabin in the centre richly ornamented with paint of various colours and gilding. Changing our boat with allowing

the people who had been at the oar since leaving Turon some rest caused a delay of an hour and a half, when we proceeded along a

broad but shallow river running nearly parallel to the coast. Its banks

appear as all sandy soil not capable of much cultivation. We expe-

rienced some little delay in waiting for the boat in which our dinner was carried, and arrived at the guard house at the principal entrance of the river about 8 o'clock where we remained until three the next

morning.

106. Cape Choumay. Findlay describes this as "the extremity of a round and rugged peninsula of moderate height, which, united to the coast by an

isthmus of sand, appears like an island with two summits when seen from the N.E. or S.W. A chain of high mountains with round summits extends

almost to the coast. There is a good anchorage in a small bay on the West side of the cape where there is a river. A canal leads from Cape Choumay to Huê, and facilitates the communication between that city and Turon." (A. G. Findlay, A Directory for the Navigation of the Indian Archipelago , etc., 2nd edition, London 1878, p. 455.) 127

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Alastair Lamb

August 10th .

At daybreak found ourselves approaching the capital of Cochin China. The port of the city we passed does not present a very magnificent appearance but is apparently extensive and populous. The houses being all of wood and straw gives a mean appearance to those accus-

tomed to more substantial structures. As we proceeded against the

tide our progress was slow, and at eight o'clock we landed immediately fronting the house fitted up for our reception, at the entrance to which we were received by two mandarins, one we understood to be the Prime Minister - meaning I believe only a man high in his sovereigns confi-

dence - the other whose office I could not exactly learn was a man deputed by the King as his ambassador to the Emperor of China.

These men made some enquiries respecting some part of the letters they did not understand, and shortly after took their leave. The place fitted up for us appeared to have been originally intended as a place of worship. It was now provided with partitions of cotton

cloth with silk hangings in different places, and made a very com-

fortable temporary lodging place for our attendants, and offices were also provided. Shortly after our arrival a more than sufficient quantity

of such articles as it was supposed we should require was sent, and

we were informed we should receive a daily suuply and that every other necessary required should be furnished. In the course of the morning I received a message expressing His Majesty's congratulation and satisfaction at my arrival with repeated enquiries to know if every wished

for necessary was supplied. A boat was also sent should we wish to

divert ourselves on the river. The old mandarin, by name Ong-to-noe, still continued with us and the interpreter was our almost constant attendant. This man, whom I considered might be extremely useful, I endeavoured to make my friend by every means; but he refused every present offered to him as improper to be received until I had seen the King. That ceremony over, he expressed his willingness to receive any mark of my friendship. It was hinted to him that in the event of a

commerce being established between his nation and the Hon'ble

Company he would no doubt be appointed interpreter to them, with a

monthly salary. This man had in the early part of his life visited

Bengal, and returned to his native country with Captain Hutton, Commander of the Jennv, when Mr. Chapman visited Cochin China, and acting as servant to Captain Hutton during his stay in the country. The mandarin who returned on that occasion was, we learnt, uncle to the present King. August 11th. The morning of the 11th the mandarin who had received us visited me for the purpose of obtaining a more full explanation of the letters. The translations they had made were explained to me, and I was happy to find were much more correct than I had expected. I endeavoured to amend such parts as seemed to reauire it, and I trust the sentiments

of the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General

will be fully conveyed to His Majesty. Thev also wished to have a list of the presents, and as this was more easilv done by shewing them than by description, thev were unpacked and exhibited. I was sorry to find that the frames of the convex mirrors nearly destroyed and also 128

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Missions to Cochin China

one of the supports of the cylinder of the electrical machine broken. Considering, however, the length of time these articles had been packed,

and the number of times they had been landed and reshipped, this rather a matter of satisfaction that more were not destroyed. All the other articles we found in very tolerable order. This business occupied the greater part of the morning. Previous to these mandarins quitting

us, I requested they would express to His Majesty my readiness to

deliver the letters in my charge whenever he might think proper, which

they said they would do, and took their leave. In the evening I was informed the Amboyna had arrived in the

river, and at a late hour Lt. Trinder arrived to acquaint me the Amboyna had anchored above the bar, over which he had found

abundance of water: tho' he had passed it when the tide was nearly at the lowest, he had never less than 17 feet. The passage he represented as intricate. Mr. Rock, who was absent when we quitted Touron on a visit to some of his friends at Fai Foo, had been, Lt. Trinder informed me, of considerable assistance in bringing up his vessel. About 10 o'clock the interpreter returned and acquainted me the

King had appointed the morning after the following day for my

reception. During this and the preceding day I received several visits from different officers of government, some I imagine from curiosity and others in execution of their duty. These men appeared desirous of being very civil, but according to our ideas are by no means polished in their manners. In their best manner, however, they seemed desirous of showing me civility and attention, and our wants were immediately supplied by those who seemed deputed for that purpose. I also received a message from Möns. Chaigneau saying he was desirous of paying his respects, but as a foreigner did not think it would be proper until the ceremony of my reception was over. August 12th. The ceremonies to be observed on my reception were during this day adjusted. I was given to understand that no person was permitted to sit in the presence of the King, and that as the usual ceremonies with

which he was approached was with Europeans dispensed with, he

expected they would conform in this respect. As this appeared reasonable, after some little conversation it was agreed I should bow on being

introduced and continue standing during the audience, which, they assured me, should not be long. In the evening I received a message saying the King had appointed an early hour for receiving me as he

knew Europeans were unaccustomed to exposure to the sun. I returned my thanks for his attention, and that I should be in readiness to attend at any hour he would appoint.

August 1 3 th.

At 4 o'clock in the morning I was called, and informed the mandarin Ong-to-noe had arrived, and directed the presents to be sent on board a boat in readiness for their reception, which was accordingly

done, and at half past five I embarked, accompanied by Captain

Macintosh and Lieut. Trinder, having sent the two 6 pounders under charge of a guard of sepoys with my palanquin and some of the servants

to await my arrival at the landing place, where we disembarked a

quarter of an hour after leaving my residence. Fronting one of the 129

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Alastair Lamb

gates of the old fort near the landing place were four handsome large brass guns which had lately been cast at this place. Their dimensions were: calibre eight and eight tenths inches; length from muzzle to breach 17 feet; greatest diameter two feet five inches, smallest one foot six inches. Some little delay taking place in bringing the presents on shore, we wálked to the place were these guns were, and from thence proceeded to the palace by the gateway opposite to which we landed, to the left of which is a large building open in front and looked used as an arsenal. In the front, pointing to the river, were six long handsome brass guns. The wall of the old fort is nearly destroyed, I imagine to furnish material for carrying on the extensive new works the King is constructing. Behind the arsenal is a flag staff on which the yellow fl^g was displayed on our approach. About 80 yards in a line behind the first building is a council hall, a large open building before which the presents were laid. At some distance in front as well as the sides sheds are at present erected for the carpenters employed in preparing

materials for the new palace. On each side of the council hall and

sheds in front, 10 elephants were drawn up forming between them and the buildings an avenue on either side. Two lines of troops, one armed with muskets, the other with spears, were drawn up from each front corner of the arsenal to the river; and in the same manner from the council hall to the carpenters' sheds, these armed with muskets and swords. A number of men with drums were in front of each line.

There was also a guard at the gateway who presented arms on my passing. Our palanquin's guard and servants were not permitted to

pass the gateway. We were conducted along the avenue to the right, and passing a small gateway in a wall continued from the back of the council hall at which a small guard was stationed who likewise presented arms, turning immediately to the right we entered a spacious court. At the upper end was the hall of audience. Two lines of troops in the same manner

as before the other buildings were drawn up, and within them the principal officers of government. The dress of the troops was mainly similar to that of the rowers already described, except that they were

of various colours, yellow, green and blue and all with big sleeves.

The general covering of the head was a conical cap with some ornament

on top. One body of men had no caps. We were conducted to the centre of the square, and desired to

pay our respects to the King whom we observed seated cross legged

on a low couch with a table before him and a handsomely painted screen behind. His dress was yellow silk with figures of dragons embroidered, and a black cap richly ornamented with gold. At this

place the letters were delivered by the men who had brought them thus far to two mandarins of superior rank, and after bowing we were conducted to the end of the right line of mandarins, who on an order given advanced some of them within the building; and the letters being

conveyed and placed on the table before His Majesty, we followed

and were placed in a direction with the line of pillars to the right of the

throne nearly in front of the building. After making our bow the King commenced the conversation by enquiring how long we had been on our passage from Bengal, and whether myself and Captain Mac130

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Plate VI. A Cochin Chinese soldier, drawn by W. Alexander (From Barrow, Cochinchina , op. cit.)

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Missions to Cochin China

intosh were the persons who had been in Touron last season; also the name of Lieut. Trinder; which being answered, he observed that we

had experienced much trouble in visiting him, to which I replied I

could not consider as trouble the execution of orders that offered me

the satisfaction of paying my respects to His Majesty, that I had the honour of presenting him in the name of the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General the letters and presents which I had now delivered in testimony of their sentiment of friendship and

regard. He replied that with the Governor General he was well acquainted, but that the Company was not well known to him. On

attempting to explain the nature of the Company, I was stopped by the interpreter observing with that His Majesty was well acquainted, and was given to understand that it was meant to be implied that from a correspondence which had taken place with the Government of Bengal His Majesty was acquainted with the Governor General, but that this was his first communication with the Company. His Majesty further

said that in proof of his friendly disposition towards the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General he would accept the King of England's picture and a few of the presents, but that the

whole was more than he could receive; that his country might at present be considered as new and requiring but little; that Tonquin was in a different state and might require some woollens, but as they, however, were hot climates the demand would not be very great; that English ships would be received at any of his ports on paying the customary charges; and when he required anything he would write to the Hon'ble Company. The former part of his reply appeared so very extraordinary and unexpected, I scarce knew what answer to make. I observed that I had the honour in the name of the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General to request His Majesty's acceptance of the articles now presented, which request His Majesty would comply with entirely or in part as he thought proper. The interpreter took some

pains to explain this mode of acceptance as conformable to their

customs on the commencement of any intercourse, that at any subse-

quent period His Majesty would receive whatever the Hon'ble Com-

pany or Governor General should send, and that I must not consider it as unfriendly. I informed him it was so contrary to any customs I was acquainted with that I could scarce consider it otherwise. The King then enquired if I had anything further to communicate more

than the letters contained. In reply I stated that it was the desire

of the Hon'ble Company as expressed in their letter to form a commercial connexion and by every means strengthen the friendship at present subsisting, and requested His Majesty if it was his wish to meet the views of the Hon'ble Company that he would consider in what manner they might be most effectually accomplished, and I should be happy to have the honour of adjusting this matter with him. He answered he would see and consult with his council; and we shortly after took our leave with the same forms as on entering and were then accompanied to the council hall where refreshments of tea and sweetmeats were provided and handsomely served in a variety of bowls many of

gold richly ornamented. This hall as well as the hall of audience are large buildings, low and supported by numerous pillars without much 131

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Alastair Lamb

ornament. At present the ornamental part appears neglected in con-

sequence of His Majesty's intention of building another palace. In

the centre, nearly at the back of the hall, is a chair richly gilded raised about four feet intended for His Majesty when he sits in council, which is, I understand, never the case. A table was in front with chairs on either side. In one front corner was suspended a large gong, extremely sonorous, for the purpose of beating time during the night; and in the

opposite corner a large bell for the same purpose. Returning, we

went into the arsenal, where a number of guns of various sizes were deposited, principally ship guns and their carriages, in general nine pounders. From this we returned to our place of residence, accompanied by Ong-to-noe and the interpreter. Shortly after our return the mandarin who had been deputed to the Court of China, and who had received us at this place and attended us during our stay there, arrived saying that His Majesty would accept

the picture of the King of Great Britain with some of the other pictures, the chronometer, sextant and case of mathematical instruments. To

this person I represented that the manner in which the King had

accepted the presents offered was contrary to the customs of every country I was acquainted with, that I could not but consider the repre-

sentations I should have to make to the Hon'ble Company and the

Governor General would be very unsatisfactory. He replied that it was conformable to the customs of his country and had been adopted by the Emperor of China in his reception of the presents he had delivered to him in the name of his King. He was informed that the reception of the English Embassy at the Court of China was very different as it

had been at every Eastern court with which the English had held

communication; that with respect to their own customs I believed this was the first time the King had ever received a public minister. Of course he would act as he thought proper, but that I did not consider this the mode to secure the friendship of the English nation. I desired the interpreter would acquaint His Majesty that if it was his intention to enter into any connexion with the Hon'ble Company, it was my wish to have the honour of a private interview; which he promised to do in the evening. About 4 o'clock Mr. Rock, who had been to visit his countrymen

Messrs. Liot and Chaigneau, returned and delivered me two letters

from the Bishop of Veren, one dated 13th December, 1803, in reply to my letter to him on my first arrival but not sent in consequence of hearing of my departure from Turon, the other dated 30th April, 1804, replying to my last letter from aboard the Gun java and addressed to

me at Cape St. James but, I believe, never forwarded to that place, containing strong professions of a wish to render every service in his power and in one or the other recommending to my confidence all the French gentlemen about the King, particularly Messrs. Liot and Chaig-

neau. The only information contained was that after receiving on the 22nd of February last the patent of the Emperor of China,

the King was solemnly proclaimed King of Tonquin and Cochin China. Mr. Rock also delivered me the compliments of the other gentlemen, and that they regretted it had not been in their power to render the services as interpreter. They would gladly have done, but that they 132

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Missions to Cochin China

had received a message from the King on my arrival saying that as our nations were at war he did not suppose it would be proper they should have communication with me. He also said that these gentlemen had informed him that the character of the English had suffered in the opinion of the King and his mandarins from the representations of those Portuguese commanding vessels from Macao, as well respecting

our possessions in India as that we had on obtaining Pulo Penang entered into engagements with the King of Queda which had never

been fulfilled, and that we were now coming to Cochin China with the same intention; and that Mr. Chaigneau had much lost the confidence

of the King from having been represented as concerned in some

unpleasant disputes between the Cochin Chinese and Captains Purefoy and Makepeace when in this country in charge of the English vessel the Griffin à107 He concluded by saying that now the ceremony of my acceptance was over these gentlemen would request the permission of the King to visit me tomorrow. In the evening a complaint was made to the mandarin then with

us that some of our servants had been behaving improperly to the

Cochin Chinese without the house, which was represented to us with

some warmth on the part of the mandarin. I should not have re-

counted these circumstances had not the frequency of these complaints induced a belief that it was intended to harass us with triflng vexatious disputes in the hope of hastening our departure. On the present occasion I found that the boy who had given rise to the complaint had not passed the doorway of our house, and that his offense consisted in making improper signs to some of the women without. I represented that this was much too trifling an occurrence to make subject of serious dispute. They had been informed that I had given most positive orders to any person belonging to me to behave in the most civil manner to the natives of this country, and had not suffered any person to go out after

dark. These orders had been repeated at their request, and I had no reason to believe they had in any way been deviated from; on the

contrary, I had seen the sepoys on guard indulge with the greatest good

humour the curiosity of the people in examining their dress and acoutre-

ments; that similar vexatious circumstances had frequently occurred which, coming in the most friendly manner we had not a right to expect; that if by the orders of the King we were not to be received as

friends, and he was not disposed to have any intercourse with the

English, I requested that he would order boats to be in readiness for our return to the ship; and the old mandarin returned to us with many professions of personal esteem.

107. Captain Purefoy was in the employ of the Madras firm of Abbot and Maitland, the owners of the Griffin. He was in Cochin China during the period 1800-1807 to settle the many financial disputes which arose between

his employers and the Cochin Chinese Court. The disputes referred to

here, however, were of a different nature, being concerned with the Cochin

Chinese claim that members of the Griffin's crew had committed thefts

and other outrages in Tourane. (See p. 151 below.) Purefoy later

wrote a brief account of his Cochin Chinese experiences which, according to Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 275, was published in French translation in Nouvelles Annales des Voyages, July-September 1826, pp. 338-355. 133

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Alastair Lamb

August 14th. Early in the morning we were informed that His Majesty extended us the honour of sending us breakfast, which arrived at 7 o'clock with

the mandarin who visited us yesterday and had received us at the palace. The breakfast, consisting of three large trays one destined for ourselves, was spread upon the table and would have been fully

sufficient for twenty times our number. One of the trays was for our

servants, and the other with the remains of ours was destined for the

people in attendance about the house. Among other articles set before us were several bowls of small pieces of raw pork folded up in a fresh leaf: of the merits of this dish I am unable to speak. The ceremony did not last long and concluded by our requesting the mandarin would return my thanks to His Majesty for his attentions. After the breakfast was removed, the mandarin informed me that His Majesty very much admired the chronometer, sextant and mathematical instruments, but that he did not understand them; they were very valuable and, if

left with him, would be spoiled. He therefore returned them and would take one of the gun carriages instead. I repeated that I had before expressed my sentiments and that His Majesty would act

respecting the presents as he thought proper. We then rose from the table and, requesting to speak to this officer of government, we retired into the inner room when I desired he would return my thanks to His

Majesty for the orders he had given for our accommodation and

supply of every requisite, which orders had been most satisfactorily executed by the persons he had deputed for the purpose; that I had yesterday the honour of presenting His Majesty in the name of the Hon 'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General letters and several presents which they requested his acceptance in testimony of the regard and friendship they extended towards His Majesty and expressive of their desire of forming such connexion with His Majesty as might be mutually advantageous. The manner in which His Majesty had been pleased to accept the presents was so different from any mode of friendly reception I was acquainted with, or that had been expe-

rienced by the Hon'ble Company in their communication with the Eastern courts that I must apprehend the representations I should have to make would be extremely unsatisfactory. I trusted His

Majesty would consider the advantages that might be derived from the friendship and commerce of the English nation, and that in forming his opinion he would not give implicit confidence to reports which may have been concocted by persons inimical to the Hon'ble Company from ignorance and self interested motives: that if His Majesty was disposed to meet the views of the Hon'ble Company I should be happy to adjust the business with him, either by personal conference or any other mode His Majesty might prefer, and requested His Majesty would favour me with an answer. This message he promised to deliver, and bring an answer by six o'clock in the vening. I considered it necessary to request this mandarin would state this to the King as I had found that the interpreter had not made any request for a private interview. In the coursé of the morning one of the gun carriages was removed About nine o'clock I received a note from Mr. Liot saying he would have the honour of calling on me in the course of the morning, to 134

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Missions to Cochin China

which I returned an answer expressing the pleasure I should have in

seeing him; and in a few hours he called, accompanied by Messrs.

Chaigneau and Forsans,108 officers in the service of the King of Cochin China. As it was rather a visit of ceremony, little communication of consequence took place. On taking leave Mr. Liot observed with many professions of service and friendship for the English that the missionaries here were of but little importance, meaning, I imagine, to imply that he had it not in his power to render very material assistance.

In the evening the interpreter returned with an answer to the message I had desired in the morning might be delivered to His

Majesty, saying that the mode in which His Majesty had received the presents was according to the customs of the country, and that he would give me an audience the day after tomorrow. August 15th. In the morning, after walking to see the new works carrying on,

we were informed a theatrical representation was prepared for our

entertainment, and that the King had ordered a company of his comedians for that purpose. Previous to the commencement I returned the visit of the French gentlemen, whom I had before invited to dine with

me this day. On our return from them we quitted our boat to

examine a very handsome vessel we had observed in passing the sheds on the bank of the river opposite the city erected for the purpose of sheltering the boats of His Majesty. That which attracted our attention had been built during the time of the Taysons and was extremely

magnificent. At the head and stern there was an apartment richly

carved and gilded, as were the sides of the vessel and mouldings of the

gunnels; and rowed by fifty oars.

On our arrival home we found preparations making for commencing the play, which between two and three o'clock began and continued till we were disposed to retire at about twelve o'clock It

was nearly similar to the Chinese, except that in the evening female dancers were introduced. In consequence of this representation, which Mr. Liot as a priest could not witness, we were deprived of his com-

*1 "inner- 9ther two gentlemen, however, attended. From

the different conversations with these gentlemen I could form but a very unfavourable opinion of the success of the mission. They represented the Kmg as extremely apprehensive of any settlement of the English those of in his country that he was willing to receive English ships as

been those of other nations but nothing further. These fears they said had as

had been fallen produced by some incautious and unwarranted expressions that had tion had fallen ot from the commander of the vessel that first expressions brought intima- that tion ot the mission, in giving reason to suppose that it was the Hon'ble

ioT to a К/ belief ,hntfnt/°n that it was t0- in get P°sses,si?n of Turon. This had given rise

St. to a belief that it was in contemplation to seize either Turon or Cane St. James, and that the English character had suffered from the or stories Cane

King К fn m a я / favourable wrtUr4eSe'u but Thfy rePresented the disposition of the

mandarins King m a я favourable light, but that he was much influenced by of the the mandarins in his confidence, many of whom were prejudiced ignorant the 108. Godefroy de Forsanz another Breton, came to CochinChinain 1789

(Taboulef, op.T" vol Ь p. 2570 COmmander' He died at Hué in 181 1789 ' • 135

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Alastair Lamb

men. From their report Mr. Chaigneau observed he had suffered in the estimation of the King, who was informed he had been concerned with Captain Purefoy and influenced his conduct in this country which had given great offense from his intemperate behavour. Among other acts, I understood, several articles of food had been violently taken from the shore, and a Cochin Chinese boat fired upon from the ship. The cause given for such conduct, I was informed, he was irritated by the King's refusal to comply with an engagement entered into for the supply of muskets for which payment was refused in consequence of their being found inserviceable. This was represented by the other party as arising from their having been exposed to all the injuries of the weather as they had been left after landing for a considerable time

on the beach. I represented to Mr. Chaigneau that this strongly

pointed out the necessity of His Majesty, if he desired an intercourse with the English, forming a connexion with the Hon'ble Company by which means all similar occurrences would be prevented; that I had requested a private audience when I should state to His Majesty the

terms on which the Hon'ble Company were willing to form such a

connexion with him, the heads of which were stated to him, when he made many professions of friendship and desire to render assistance. August 16th. I was informed His Majesty could not see me till the next morning, and that he requested nothing further on the subject of the presents might be mentioned. August 17 th.

At half past six in the morning I proceeded to the palace accom-

panied by Captain Macintosh and Lieut. Trinder, also the mandarin Ong-to-noe and, as usual, the interpreter. We were received in the

same hall as on the 13th, but without the same ceremony. There were not any troops drawn up except the usual guard that accompanies the King. The mandarins present were few in number and in their common dresses; among them on this occasion we observed the Frenchmen. We paid our respects as before and were also kept standing. After a few questions respecting our health, His Majesty expressed his thanks to the Company for their attention and that he was ready in every way to serve them. I then observed that I had requested this audience for the purpose of stating to His Majesty, if he was disposed to enter into commercial engagements with the Hon'ble Company, the mode which in my opinion the arrangements might be most advantageously made. He answered by saying his country required only cloths, and those but little; that at present he did not require any but when he

did he would write to the Hon'ble Company. To this I replied that

the Company did not send any persons in their ships with authority to dispose of their cargoes, therefore if inclined to trade with the

Hon'ble Company he must permit a resident at his court by which

means any communication with the Company would be facilitated and unpleasant disputes with individuals of the English nation might be amicably adjusted. To this I was answered that he would consult with his council. I also stated that if the articles given in return for the Company's goods were of a nature not to find a market at the port where their ships might be bound, they must have liberty to dispose 136

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of them to any persons inclined to purchase. I was then requested

to state in writing what I had to say on this subject which would be

submitted to his council. This I thought and replied would be the best mode. I observed I feared His Majesty had heard many false-

hoods circulated by persons inimical to the English, but that when he had a better acquaintance of that nation I trusted he would be convinced of their falsity. He replied he should see who was right. We were frequently asked if we had anything further to say, whether from a wish to know if the stories the King had heard were well founded, or from an impatience to have finished with us, I am unable to determine. I requested to assure His Majesty that the views of the Hon'ble Company were of the most friendly nature, in proof of which I was authorized to enter into an engagement with him tending to strengthen the friendship subsisting between His Majesty and the English Nation. He replied that everything should be submitted to his council, when the conversation concluded by my requesting, as it was late for ships

to make their passage to China, he would oblige me by giving me an answer as soon as possible; which he said he would do, and we took our leave. During the conference the King asked, in case his council should approve a resident at his court, whether I should be

content to have a house or wish to build one in the English style. As this question was not put in a manner as of mere curiosity, I concluded there was some apprehension of too great show being made and replied,

certainly, I should be satisfied with such house as could be hired.

After quitting the hall of audience we were conducted to a room on one side of the court where tea and refreshments were served up; and we soon afterwards returned home when I wrote ... [a letter to the King] . . . and delivered it to the interpreter, with which he took his leave to carry it to the court.109 In the evening I heard from Mr. Rock that the French gentlemen

rather thought themselves implied in the observations I had made

this morning respecting the reports that had been circulating, but from the manner in which these apprehensions were stated I imagine it was only their wish to determine if such was my intention. They stated that the King had expressed his surprise to them that I should suppose they had prevented his receiving the presents, to which nothing that I had said could certainly in the smallest degree allude; and as it was the wish of His Majesty expressed thro' the interpreter that nothing on

that subject should be mentioned, it is not probable he would have

introduced it himself.

August 21st.

Till the 21st the time was occupied in having my letter of the

17th translated, and passing thro' the forms of laying it before the council. On the morning of this day the mandarin Ong-how-bow, who

had been in China and who attended us upon all public occasions, came to me with a verbal answer. He read the translation that had

been made of my letter, and then communicated His Majesty's deter-

mination not to admit any representative of the Hon'ble Company

at his court, and repeating his former declaration that English ships would be received in the same manner as those of other nations, but 109. Tne letter is printed here below, pp. 142-143. 137

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Alastair Lamb

nothing more would be granted. This decided rejection of the proposals I had made, so strongly evinced a determination to avoid all

intercourse with the English, and as I at different times had as strongly as in my power endeavoured to impress these men with the advantages to be derived from a commerce with the Company, I considered it only necessary to reply that on any other terms than those proposed it was impossible for the Hon'ble Company to trade with his country, and

as I considered this answer decisive of the King's resolution not to enter into any engagements with the Hon'ble Company, I requested His Majesty would be pleased to order as soon as possible boats to be in readiness for our return to Turon.

August 22nd .

Early this day the arrival of the mandarin who had yesterday

brought His Majesty's answer to my letter of the 17th was announced,

and on meeting him I found he was deputed to deliver the answer

of the King to the letters of the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General, with sundry presents consisting of elephants' teeth, cinnamon, Aguila and Columba woods, and with two horns of the Rhinoceros of extraordinary length and age. Considering that the King had marked in the strongest manner his determination to decline all intercourse with the Company and this rather in a contemptuous manner, in the first place after accepting part of the presents changing and selecting such as were likely to be useful and taking the carriage of one of the 6 pounders and returning the gun, in returning a verbal answer, refusing every proposition contained in my letter of the 17th without condescending to state any reason whatever, and repeating he was willing to receive the English ships as those of other nations, as had always been the case, was in part saying he was willing to trade with the English in the manner he had already done but declining any more intimate connexion; had the presents been received in a friendly or even handsome manner and this declaration candidly made, I cer-

tainly could not have hesitated in receiving it with attention and civility;

in addition to these circumstances is to be observed my long detention at Turon and demand of an explanation of the nature of my mission which my communication to Mr. Vannier in December must have fully

informed the King, and his general reserve and imperious conduct,

avoiding all means of private conference, keeping me at a great distance at the audience I requested might be private, and from the little ceremony observed was I suppose meant to be considered so, during which also putting a stop to all explanation by referring every question to his

council, and by hastening the business over by asking almost after

every sentence if I had anything further to state; under these circumstances I did not think I would be justified in accepting on the part of

the Hon'ble Company and the Governor General any presents from His Majesty. I therefore stated my willingness to take charge of the

letters, but declined accepting either the presents for the Hon'ble

Company or those for the use of the ship which were offered, consisting of bullocks, goats, rice and such other articles as they thought

would be acceptable. After much argument with these men, who

urged mv acceptance of at least a part, saying that they were presented

to the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the Governor General, 138

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Missions to Cochin China

and not to myself, to this I replied that they must be aware that as I had in the present occasion the honour of being their representative, my acceptance or refusal was to be considered as theirs, and frequently repeated to them my reasons for not complying with their request. Finding me determined, they retired to state the circumstances to His Majesty. I was rather surprised on their return to find no notice taken of my refusal but did not consider it necessary to say anything on the

subject. In the course of the morning we found that the packages

had been secretly conveyed to the boats preparing for our departure by order of the interpreter, and on sending for him to enquire the reason, he affected not to understand what I had said and considered I only meant to refuse the presents for the ship. So direct a falsehood could not be received with perfect coolness. On repeating part of this conversation, his observations on their being offered to the Company and Governor General, so strongly proving he did understand me, he was obliged to shift his ground and lay the blame on Ong-how-bow to whom he asserted he had explained what I had said, but that the King had not been informed. It was evidently their intention that the presents should be conveyed to the ship when I suppose they relied that representing the difficulties and disgrace attending their return

would induce my acceptance. Finding me persist in a refusal, he

retired, and shortly after returned with Ong-how-bow, when a conversa-

tion nearly similar to this morning took place. They appeared under considerable apprehension of representing the case to the King, and were very anxious for my acceptance of a least a part. I replied that the reasons I had before given rendered it impossible but that if His Majesty wished to explain any part of his conduct or make remarks for the attention of the Hon'ble Company, it might be done by deputing a dependable person to His Excellency the Governor General at Fort William, where I promised he should be received with every respect due to the representative of the King of Cochin China, and that if an

English vessel was required for the conveyance of an embassy, on application to Canton one would be supplied. It was observed that

if I refused what the King had offered he would return the presents of the Hon'ble Company which he had accepted. I could only answer in this respect the King would do as he thought proper. They shortly after went to the King and returned saying that His Majesty would return the presents that he had accepted, and requesting the letter that had in the morning been delivered for the purpose of altering those parts acknowledging the receipt of presents and specifying those sent in return. I represented this as unnecessary, that His Majesty by those letters expressed his intentions and I should have to explain the reason of their not being carried into execution. The letters, however, were

wished for and delivered. They then took their leave, saying they

would be returned the next morning.

In the course of the day Lieut. Trinder returned to his ship, intending to proceed to Turon as soon as possible. The two six

pounders and carriage were sent to the Amboyna as the most ready means of conveyance to India.

I also received a visit from Messrs. Liot and Chaigneau, who furnished me with French translations of the King's letters to the 139

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Alastair Lamb

Company and Governor General, and seemed desirous I should employ them to procure from the King a written reply to my propositions of

the 17th.

August 23rd.

The letters for the Hon'ble Company and His Excellency the

Governor General were in the morning delivered to me, and I understood had been returned at a late hour last night, unaltered, whether

in consequence of my suggestion I know not. ТЪе reason assigned by the interpreter was not to lose my time. The gun carriage and

prints were early returned, and these as well as the other articles being embarked, about noon we quitted Phu-tchuan not with quite the same honours as on entering. The boats prepared were exactly the same, the large boat for our accommodation to the mouth of the river, and the

others for our conveyance afterwards, but no troops drawn up or

mandarins in attendance.

Previous to my departure I was desirous of making some presents

to the soldiers and different people who had been employed in

attendance upon us, and considered the most regular mode of doing it would be to give a sum in charge of their superior to be divided according to the situation of the men. On enquiry finding who was considered as their immediate commander on the present occasion, I desired he might be called, and after waiting a considerable time he arrived accompanied by another mandarin who appeared to have the

direction of our supplies. To this man I gave the sum I thought

sufficient to be distributed among the people who had attended us. They represented that the people were in the service of the King and that he would be much offended should they receive any compensation for the employ they had been ordered upon. We, of course, explained this was not intended as a payment for service but merely as a token of its being performed agreeably, and should have been happy could

they have been persuaded to have received what would have been extremely acceptable to a number of well disposed oppressed men.

However I imagine it would have been inconsistent to receive anything

themeselves at the time they were refusing for others. These men returned the few presents of cloth and cetera I had previously made.

This was a species of insolence I did not chuse further to expose

myself, therefore desired if they did not think proper to accept what I had offered that it might be returned, and leaving them walked to the boat where the things were afterwards sent. We were soon joined by our companion Ong-to-noe and the interpreter and took leave of the

capital of Cochin China.

The city had been almost entirely destroyed by the present King, who is now rebuilding it upon a very magnificent scale. The fortifica-

tions are to enclose a square of one mile and a half, within which palaces are building for himself and family. The city is also to be very great. From whence the means of building it are to arise was

not pointed out, and from the poverty of the people I imagine it will be some time before completed. Upon the works at present carrying on 5,000 men are said to be employed besides those in distant situations cutting wood and making bricks & cetera. The soldiers are employed for these purposes, and as their pay is not increased it is really insuffi140

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Missions to Cochin China

cient for their support; and as most of them are brought from the provinces where by means of their families they are able to gain a livelihood, in their present situation are at all times in great distress, and

in case of sickness or accident die from want of attention and nourish-

ment. In addition to this, from the numbers employed, there is not left sufficient to gather in the harvest. This ostentatious display may therefore perhaps leave His Majesty forts and palaces without defence

or attendants.

The situation and climate of this country make it capable of being one of the most flourishing in the world, and no people in my opinion are better qualified to render it so than its present inhabitants under a

proper government. They appear an extremely mild, well disposed, hardy and industrious race; and as this appears under the present discouraging circumstances, what might not be accomplished from proper encouragement. Extreme poverty pervades everywhere. Commerce, therefore, cannot immediately flourish, and under the present order of things it is difficult to say when it may. Could the King be induced to grant any establishment it might soon I conceive be rendered valuable but among the natives from their not possessing the means of purchase,

even the smallest cargo would go off so low that the expenses of a

ship remaining would never enable a trade carried on in that way to

answer. Some place therefore where goods could be landed and disposed of to the Chinese or other persons trading to Cochin China

becomes essential in the first instance.

As much has been said respecting the navy of the King, it may not be improper to mention the naval force he at present possesses, which consists of three vessels, one entirely constructed at Saigon, the other two French vessels rebuilt, that is, by degrees, every plank and timber

changed. One of these vessels we saw, I believe the largest. She appeared capable of mounting 16 or 18 guns. He has also one vessel

originally built as a junk, but the upper works finished in the European

manner and rigged as a ship. The King had originally 17 Junks, or

Tows, similar to those we met with on entering Turon. Only five of these are now remaining, the others having been lost. In addition to these, the King has we were told fifty boats similar to those sent for our conveyance, of larger and smaller dimensions. These, I imagine, he considers his best defence, and appears very much increasing their

numbers.

At one o'clock we got under weigh and proceeded by the same

track as before. After waiting from daylight the next morning until late the evening at the entrance of the river under apprehension of blowing weather, we arrived early on the 25th aboard the Page , when I wrote a letter to the King and delivered it the next morning to the mandarins, of whom we then took leave; and having given in charge to Lieutenant Trinder the address to His Excellency the Most Noble Governor General from the King with my dispatches for the Lieut. Governor of Prince of Wales's Island, he was directed to proceed to that island, . . . and at two o'clock we quitted Turon Bay. Signed: J. W. Roberts, Turon Bay, 26th August, 1804. 141

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Alastair Lamb

(D) ROBERTS' PROPOSALS TO THE KING

Roberts to Gia Long, 17th August, 1804.

To His Majesty Ya Laun, King of Cochin China. May it please Your Majesty, In consequence of Your Majesty's wish to have the proposals I had the honour this morning to make to Your Majesty on the part

of the Hon'ble English East India Company expressed by letter, I have now the honour to submit to Your Majesty's consideration the means by which I consider the proposed commercial connexion may be established in the most advantageous manner for all parties concerned. I request in the first place to assure Your Majesty that the views of the Hon'ble Company are of the most friendly nature, and trust in forming your determination on the present subject Your Majesty will

not place undue confidence in false representations that may have

reached the ears of Your Majesty circulated by those inimical to the English nation from ignorant and self interested motives. I am well aware that in a country as long subject to the miseries of war an extension of commerce cannot be immediately carried on.

The happy success which has crowned the reign of Your Majesty's

arms has rendered your dominion of great magnitude which, with the

security and prosperity that must arise from the energy and good government of Your Majesty, will undoubtedly in a few years place

the country in a situation to enable commerce to flourish. That a

commercial intercourse with the English nation affords the most probable means of increasing the wealth and prosperity of Your Majesty's

subjects will I imagine be admitted. Such intercourse the Hon'ble

Company are willing to form on conditions as follows.

1st. That Your Majesty will receive and constantly permit to

reside at your court as representative of the Hon'ble Company a resident on the part of the said Company for the purpose of superintending their affairs, controlling the conduct of individuals and regulating all matters affecting the English nation in Cochin China.

2nd. To the representative of the Hon'ble Company Your

Majesty will state the articles required from Europe and the quantity, also what will be given in return, the terms to be setled from time to

time as the demand may arise. Should Your Majesty wish for any

immediate supply, I shall have the honour of furnishing Your Majesty with specimens of the different cloths, the manufacture of England. 3rd. To afford every encouragement to the industry of the country the Hon'ble Company are willing to take any articles of its produce in return for their goods. Should they, however, be of such a nature as not to find a market at the ports to which the Hon'ble Company's ships may be bound, they should have full permission to dispose of

such articles to the Portuguese, Chinese and any persons willing to

purchase them.

4th. In order to afford facility to the proposed commerce the

ships of the English nation shall be received on the most favourable 142

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terms. Should Your Majesty think proper to demand any sum for

anchorage, a stated sum shall be fixed; but in case the Hon'ble Com-

pany shall deem it necessary to send ships for the sole purpose of

conveying to India the articles they may have received in return for merchandise, these ships shall be admitted free of every charge what-

ever as it is understood the ship who imported has already paid

anchorage.

5th. The ships of the English nation shall have permission to touch and trade at any port of Your Majesty's dominions of Cochin China and Tonquin; but as the port of Turon is most conveniently

situated for the trade of the Hon'ble Company, Your Majesty will agree there to receive and deliver such articles as may be required and given in exchange; and in case it should be found necessary to deposit the whole or any part in warehouses, such conveniences shall be furnished

by Your Majesty or permission given for their being built by the Hon'ble Company. I have thus stated the points on which it is necesary for Your Majesty to decide. Should it be your desire to enter into commercial

intercourse with the Hon'ble Company, every further arrangement Your Majesty may deem requisite or that circumstances from time to time make necessary on that subject or any other relative to the English nation it is to be understood will be adjusted with the resident on the part of the Hon'ble Company in which situation, if it is Your Majesty's pleasure to accede, I am willing and authorised to remain. Permit me further to state to Your Majesty in proof of the earnest desire of the Hon'ble Company to confirm by every means in their power the friendship at present subsisting between Your Majesty and the English nation that I am authorised on their part to enter into any engagement with Yoùr Majesty that you may consider desirable for that purpose.

I have the honour to be with the highest consideration, Your Majesty's most faithful and obedient servant,

Phu-tchuan, [Hué], J. W. Roberts. 17th August, 1804.

(E) ROBERTS' REPORT

Roberts to Lord Wellesley, 26th August, 1804. 1. After quitting our pilot on the 8th of June I experienced some

detention from the severity of the weather and reached Prince of

Wales Island on the 25th. On my arrival a note from Mr. Drummond was communicated, intimating the probability of a French privateer cruizing off the coast of Cochin China. In a confidential conversation 143

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Alastair Lamb

with Mr. Farquahar on the subject it was proposed that, as the services of the Hon'ble Company's armed brig Amboyna were not at present absolutely required in the Straits, she should accompany me. As well as for the purposes of defence, I considered this arrangement might be extremely desirable by affording means of conveying to your Excellency early information of the event of my mission, should it be necessary.

2. It is with much regret that I have to avail myself of this

conveyance to acquaint your Excellency my reception at the Court of Cochin China has been extremely different from what I had reason to expect, and such as I fear will entirely frustrate the intentions of the Hon'ble Company of forming a friendly connexion with that country. At the same time I have received every mark of personal respect and attention I could expect or require.

3. The Amboyna joined me at Malacca on the 6th of July , the

presents for the King of Cochin China having been embarked on board the Page and everything in readiness for several days, we sailed in the

evening, and after touching at Cape St. James for information,

anchored in Turon Bay on the 21st of July. Altho' three or four days only are required for communication with the capital, I did not receive any reply to the notice I had given of my arrival until the 31st when I was informed a Mandarin from Hue Foo was at Turon and under-

stood he wished to see me on shore. Desirous of proving it was my

wish to act in the most friendly manner, I the next morning went on

shore.

4. On being introduced to this officer of Government, who

appeared of some rank, I was acquainted he had been deputed for the purpose of enquiring the nature of my mission and requested copies

of the letters I had in charge, with which he would return to the capital.

This I thought proper to comply with, considering it probable that reports might be circulating respecting the intentions of the Hon'ble Company on the present mission injurious to its interests, to which a refusal would give strength. Copies of the letters were therefore given, and the business generally explained. 5. I represented to the interpreter, who was the person sent with M. Vannier to receive me when at Turon in December last, that as His Majesty was apprized of my intention of returning to the country

I was surprised at the detention I had experienced. I was unwilling

to commence a negotiation I was desirous should be conducted in the most amicable manner by representations unpleasant to both parties, and that a longer continuation of such conduct would render them necessary. These sentiments I desired he would impress on the minds of the officers of Government with whom he acted. Notwithstanding promises of the greatest expedition, I heard nothing further till the morning of 8th of August , when the same Mandarin returned with boats for my conveyance to the Court of His Majesty. In the evening I went ashore and arrived early in the morning of the 10th. 6. On the 13th I obtained an audience [with His Majesty.]

[This audience, and that on the 17th of August , are described in

Roberts' diary, to which he makes reference here]. 7. The King's acceptance of only part of the presents was represented by all with whom I had an opportunity of conversing as com144

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Missions to Cochin China

formable with the customs of this country. Admitting this to be the case, I cannot but consider some part of his conduct in this respect must have proceeded from ignorance or intentional disrespect, as after

having received a few prints, chronometer, sextant and case of

mathematical instruments, the three last were returned as articles he could not make use of and would be spoiled by being left with him, desiring to have one of the gun carriages in lieu, which we were given to understand was complimenting the Governor General by accepting part of his presents as well as those of the Hon'ble Company. 8. As many professions of friendship were made, I should have been content to pass over these circumstances unnoticed until I could have the honour of receiving your Excellency's further instructions, had the conduct of the King in other respects given reason to suppose these professions were sincere.

9. In consequence of the King's desire, I wrote on the 17th

stating the mode in which the Hon'ble Company were willing to engage in a commerce with his country, as I had teen informed that the King was by some means strongly prejudiced against the English nation. I

trust your Excellency will approve my avoiding as much as possible

any request that could be considered unreasonable and confining myself to such demands as would merely secure the Hon'ble Company from inconvenience in the event of their engaging in trade with this country, relying on a resident being able in confidential communication with the King to remove unfavourable impressions and gradually obtain such concessions as might be deemed necessary. 10. To every part of this letter ... I on the 21st received a verbal reply conveying a positive refusal, repeating that the King was willing to receive English vessels on the same terms as those of other nations

but nothing further would be granted. As I could not but consider this as a final rejection of the friendly overtures of the Hon'ble Company, and as every means of confidential intercourse was avoided either with the King or any person authorized by him whom I might

have convinced of the advantages to be derived from a friendly intercourse with the English nation, I considered it unnecessary to lose time in attempting any further explanation by writing; and understanding

this was his final answer, I desired the King might be informed I considered this a positive refusal to have any intercourse with the

Company and requested that he would order boats to be in readiness

for my return.

11. After a full and attentive consideration of every part of His Majesty's conduct, it appears as far as my judgement will enable me to decide to have evinced from the first a determination to decline any

connexion with the English nation. On my arrival being so long

detained at Turon with the pretence of sending to enquire the nature of my mission which my communication to himself and M. Vannier in December last must have fully explained as far as in the first instance

could be necessary, will not, I imagine, be considered a mode of

reception that would have been adopted had it been the intention of the King to accede to the proposals of the Hon'ble Company.

12. The manner in which the King after much deliberation

accepted the presents, tho' justified as the usage of his country, the 145

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Alastair Lamb

only instances given in proof were his reception of those sent by the

King of Siam and that of the articles sent by His Majesty to the Emperor of China. On both these occasions, I believe, the receivers

were desirous of asserting superiority, a circumstance which, tho' never

in the smallest degree hinted respecting the Company, I should ex-

tremely regret could be implied from any act of mine.

13. My opinion is also formed from the imperious manner in

which the King conducted himself, apparently studiously avoiding every means of private communication on my first and ceremonious audience, and insisting upon my standing. As the customs of his court may be thought correct, and considering it in that light, I had no hesitation in

complying; but on the second occasion, which I requested might be private, and from the little ceremony observed was I suppose considered so by himself, being kept at so great a distance was not I

considered the reception I should as coming with friendly propositions

have received.

14. Under these impressions I did not think I should be justified in receiving on the part of the Hon'ble Company or your Excellency

any return presents and, in consequence, when on the morning of the 22nd the letters for your Excellency and the Hon'ble Company were delivered, I expressed my willingness to deliver the letters but declined the acceptance of the presents as well as those offered for the use of the ship. After much consideration the Mandarin retired to communicate the determination to the King, which I imagine his fears prevented, as I found the packages had been secretly conveyed

to the boats preparing for my departure. The Mandarin again

attended and nearly the conversation of the morning was repeated. When finding my determination fixed, the King was actually informed, and answered that as I had refused the presents he had sent, he should return those he had accepted. As he had intimated previously would be the case, they were delivered the next morning and I shortly after quitted his capital.

15. The motives which have induced this attitude in the King,

though in many instances perhaps the effect of ignorance, are represented as having arisen from his apprehension of admitting the English to form any establishment lest it should gradually increase even to the subversion of his Government. These fears are stated by the Frenchmen, the only persons from whom I could procure information on this subject, to have been produced by some expressions used by the commander of the vessel that brought the letter to the King announcing

the mission, giving rise to an idea that it was the intention of the

Company to obtain Turon or some other Port. This report, injurious to the English character, circulated by the Portuguese from Macao, has

strengthened and confirmed the principal officers of government in their

distrust of the intentions of the Hon'ble Company, and that they have in this instance completely influenced the conduct of the King. 16. Altho' these reports are of a nature I can readily conceive to

have originated with a native of Macao, I do not think they would

have gained the strength they unfortunately have unless confirmed by persons more in the influence of the King. Whether the Frenchmen have been instrumental in this effect it is impossible for me to deter146

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Missions to Cochin China

mine. Their conduct in some respects however justifies a belief that such has been the case. In the first place abstaining from all intercourse with me until the ceremony of my reception was over under pretence that the King had so ordered. It appears scarcely probable as they were admitted to what was intended to be a private interview they should be directed to absent themselves from one of mere ceremony. Secondly that they professed to be unable to render any service from the little attention paid to their advice. They represented the King's acceptance of part of the presents as arising from their advice as he had previously determined to reject the whole, and claimed the merit of everything they considered would be pleasant to me having

been done by their recommendation. Any circumstances of a con-

trary nature, I was informed, had been determined upon in haste or when they were absent. These contradictory proceedings corresponded with the rest of their conduct, expressing on every occasion regret that

the King should have been influenced by unfavourable impressions

which they had not power to remove, at the same time insinuating that tho' not admitted to his public council, the King was much swayed by their private advice - as indeed he must be to men to whom he is in a great measure indebted for his kingdom.

17. The reply of the King to the address of your Excellency with a copy to the Hon'ble Company I have the honour to forward to Prince of Wales Island to be transmitted to Fort William by the most expeditious means. Of these letters, it is only necessary to

observe that His Majesty endeavours to conceal the time between my arrival and reception by stating my arrival as taking place in August, and what little proof of his desire of friendship he might have been thought to have given by accepting part of the presents is I conceive

completely done away by representing this to have taken place in

consequence of my persuasions. I repeated the offer of the presents but certainly never requested his acceptance of a part, nor have reason to suppose at the time I was present that anything was said by the interpreter. As I have however detected him in several falsehoods, I cannot be confidently assured for what may have afterwards passed unauthorized by me. As this man was appointed interpreter by the King, all official communication of necessity was by this means, and

being a native hoped he would have been trustworthy. I had, how-

ever, but little reason to be satisfied with his conduct as well from the circumstances above mentioned as his avoiding on all occasions giving me information on subjects of which he could not have been ignorant. 18. Considering it more desirable to obtain the advantages to be desired from an intercourse with this country by friendly than any other means, should circumstances produce an alteration in the sentiments

of the King, in my address from hence .... I have mentioned that a deputation of some confidential person to your Excellency is the only mode by which an intimate connexion with the Hon'ble Company can

now be formed.

19. The situation of Cochin China and the security of its har-

bours renders it a place that may be advantageous to the English, and must be extremely detrimental to our trade in the possession of our

enemies. The present situation of the Country renders commerce, 147

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except upon a very limited scale, for many years impracticable. Extreme poverty pervades every order, and under the present Government

must continue. The King has destroyed the principal city, and his

attention is at present engaged in building fortifications of greater extent than he can have the means to defend, and magnificent palaces for himself and family upon which such numbers are employed on a pay insufficient for their support, that there are not people to collect the produce of the fields.

20. When these undertakings are completed, the Frenchman

assert from their knowledge of the King's character that he will not remain inactive, and China, they represent, as the great object of his ambition. In an attack on that country he expects to be joined by a number of Chinese disaffected with the Tartar Government. The

King, they said, is offended with the Emperor of China for not having acknowledged him King of Tonquin by the title he demanded. Should these his intentions be carried into execution, it would perhaps be a favourable opportunity of establishing our influence in his country, and by diverting his attention proving our desire of assisting the Chinese Government by the means of extending our interests in that quarter.

Dated. Turon Bay. 26th August, 1804.

148

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CHAPTER VII

THE FAILURE OF THE ROBERTS MISSIONS DISCUSSED

(A) THE SELECT COMMITTEE AT CANTON CONSIDERS THE REASONS FOR

ROBERTS' FAILURE.

It is not difficult to see why Roberts failed to achieve anything

in Cochin China. Gia Long had no particular need for the support of the British - or, for that matter, of any other European power - now

that he had emerged victorious from the long years of Vietnamese civil war. He had no wish whatsoever of entangling himself with the

British or of granting them any territorial concessions. With the example of the spread of British power in India to warn him of the danger of allowing the British a foothold in his dominions, and, even closer to hand, with the demonstration provided by the rulers of Kedah whose cession of Penang brought them very little advantage indeed, it

was hardly likely that the cautious and experienced Gia Long was going to offer to the Company the Island of Callao. Nor was he likely,

at Roberts' request (which Roberts was never given the opportunity to make) to banish the French missionaries and the four remaining

French mandarins. The French nation itself no longer threatened Vietnamese independence, and towards those individual Frenchmen who had done so much to make Vietnam what it was Gia Long seems to have felt some loyalty and, even, affection. He had not forgotten his old friend Pigneau de Behaine, whose memory sufficed to preserve a measure of toleration of Christions. But it is significant that when, following the restoration of the Bourbons, France made serious efforts once more to establish political ties with Vietnam, Gia Long showed himself to be no more receptive to French diplomatic overtures than he had to those which Roberts had made to him on behalf of the British.

It is clear from these considerations, therefore, that the Roberts mission was doomed from the start. Only a show of force might have

won the British any concessions in Vietnam in 1804; and force, as 149

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Lord Wellesley's instructions to Roberts had made clear, was quite out of the question, if only because it would certainly annoy the Chinese and thus put in jeopardy the Company trade at Canton. It is probably true, however, that even had political conditions favoured

Roberts' enterprise the hostile advice of men like Chaigneau and Vannier, combined with the bad impression created by British crews like that of the Griffin , would have sufficed to frustrate it. Vannier and

Chaigneau were friendly and helpful to Roberts, but only, one cannot help feeling, because they were certain that he would fail. Even though they had no sympathy for the political idealogy of the French Revolu-

tion, they were still Frenchmen inspired by the imperial visions of Pigneau de Behaine. Similarly, the Portuguese, who had long traded with Cochin China, were most unlikely to do anything to help open this market to wider British competition. Roberts was very much at the mercy of these people, French and Portuguese, whose knowledge of the

politics and the language of Cochin China he could not match. It seems very likely that had Roberts been able to circumvent Vannier and Chaigneau he would have been able to make a far more effective presentation of the British case. Was Roberts justified in making such an issue of the King's refusal to accept his presents? Should he have accepted the King's presents?

It is probable that had Roberts decided to accept the humiliation which he felt was implied in the King's attitude towards the question of the presents, he would have left Cochin China with greater pomp and circumstance. But it is most unlikely that anything Roberts might

have done would have changed Gia Long's attitude towards the objectives of the British mission. The Dutch embassy to Peking of Van Braam and Titsing in 1794-95, which accepted every indignity which the Chinese chose to put its way, was no more successful than the mission of Lord Macartney and the British refusal to kow-tow

before the Emperor; and the same considerations applied to some extent in Cochin China which was much influenced by Chinese diplo-

matic practice. On the Chinese analogy, even the fact that Roberts was the envoy of the Company and not of the British crown- a point which Gia Long emphasised - had in all probability little consequence

to the outcome of the mission. Had Roberts been a Royal envoy, however, the presents crisis might not have developed and Roberts might have left Hué on more amicable terms with the Cochin Chinese Court. As Hall has shown in the case of Burma and Siam, this question of the distinction between the representative of the Governor 150

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General and that of the Britsh Crown was one of great significance in Asian eyes.110

The Select Committee of the Supercargoes at Canton failed to appreciate the inevitability of Roberts' failure. When, on 11th Septem-

ber, 1804, they considered the report on this mission, the point to which they attached most importance was that Roberts seemed to have been opposed with success by persons hostile to the British who had

obtained the confidence of Gia Long. They noted that: in the perusal of Mr. Roberts' Diary of Proceedings we have had frequent occasion to remark that some secret springs and inimical influence have been employed to poison the mind

of the King in respect to the views and intentions of the

British Nation: but whether proceeding from the few officers

in his service, or from the Portuguese who annually visit

that country, appears in some measure doubtful. Perhaps it may be attributed to the combined suggestions of all parties.

They also noted, in this connection, the scant assistance afforded to Roberts by the French missionaries, and for which the missionaries had thought it necessary to provide some explanation in a letter to Marchini in which they claimed that the Purefoy incident - the perpetration, so they said, of various crimes in Tourane by members of the crew of the Griffin - had so annoyed the King that any open friendship to the British cause on their part would have endangered their own position in the country. The Select Committee were not convinced. They felt the circumstances of the postponement of Lance's mission had given the enemies of the Company ample time to work for the failure of this project, and that this time had been well used. The Select Committee concluded with some remarks on the strategic significance of Roberts' failure, and on the part which might have been played in securing that failure by one M. Dayot, as follows:

Extract from Select Committee Consultation, 11th September, 1804. Any establishment formed in Cochin China or footing obtained in the country either by the French or Spaniards may eventually be productive of the most injurious and pernicious effects to our commercial intercourse with China. The position is favourable almost beyond belief to the equipment of a naval force, and the ingress and egress to ports and harbours capable of containing half the navy of England attended with so little difficulty or danger at any season of the year, that our enemy might molest or destroy our trade to this country [China] with

even more facility than from Manila and the Eastern Coast. We are

more induced to advert to this circumstance from the information 110. Hall, Symes, op cit., pp. lvii-lviii. 151

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obtained that a Mr. Dayot11 formerly in the King's employ and in command of his naval forces for several years, having visited that

country in the month of January or February last, ostensibly for the

purpose of procuring a supply of rice for Manila where a scarcity

prevailing, but secretly we believe on a mission from the Governor of

Manila to the King to whom he also carried presents, tho' whether valuable or considerable we are not apprised. Mr. Dayot is a Frenchman well educated and possessed of considerable abilities, and having left the King of Cochin China's service in disgust, or rather indeed 111. Jean Marie Dayot was born in 1759. In 1788, after a period of naval service, he joined Pigneau de Behaine and became the chief force in the construction of Nguyen Anh's fleet, and was its commander in several major engagements with the Tay-son. Dayot, whose ability was of the highest order, aroused the hostility of some of the most influential Vietnamese mandarins. Shortly before Pigneau de Behaine's death in 1799 these officials managed to seicure Dayoťs disgrace and punishment by the cangue. On his release he made haste to leave Cochin China (along with his younger brother Felix Dayot who had joined him there in 1789) for Manila. Here Dayot set himself up as a merchant, and he was soon acting as a commercial agent of the Cochin Chinese government, Gia Long haying forgiven his former servant. In early 1804, between Roberts' two visits, Dayot came to Tourane to propose a closer commercial relationship between Cochin China and the Philippines on behalf of the Governor of that Spanish colony. Since Spain was then an ally of France, it is very likely that Dayoťs mission had its anti-British features and that the Select Committee were justified in their interpretation of its nature. It is interesting that Roberts made no mention of Dayot, and it seems as if Dayoťs visit was kept secret from him. What effect would Dayoťs words, as they were imagined by the Select Committee, have had on Gia Long? On the one hand, the King would have had good grounds for trusting Dayoťs judgements on naval affairs, and would probably have paid close attention to any reports of the impending arrival of powerful French fleets. On the other hand, from his experience in the period of the Treaty of Versailles he would have derived a certain scepticism about promises of the arrival of large French forces; and from the battle of Pulo Aur in February, 1804, of which news would have surely reached him before Roberts' second visit, he would have learned of the incompetence of Durand de Linois whose ships had failed to stop the British China convoy from passing through the Straits of Malacca. On the whole, one may well conclude that anything Dayot might have had to say would have done no more than confirm Gia Long in an already well established determination to avoid all entaglements with any of the European powers in the East. Dayoťs career provides an admirable demonstration of Lord Welleslay's wisdom in doubting Roberts' suggestion that the French in Cochin China, good monarchists and catholics, would help the British against Revolutionary Franch. In 1807, through Renouard de Sainte-Croix, an officer who had served on Decaen's staff and whom Dayot met in Macao, he presented to Napoleon Bonaparte the charts of the Indochinese coasts which he had prepared, urged that France assert herself once more in the East and offered his services as French consular agent in Cochin China.

Like so many such proposals in the past, this one came to nothing

despite the efforts which Renouard de Sainte-Croix made on its behalf

when he returned to France in 1808.

Dayoťs maps and sailing instructions were finally published in 1818 by the Restoration government under the title Le Pilote de Cochinchine. Crawfurd made use of them during his mission to Cochin China in 1822. Dayot died in a shipwreck in the Gulf of Tonkin shortly before or after the publication of his great hydrographical work. (See: Taboulet, op cit., vol. 1, pp. 249-250; Cordier, T'oung Pao 1903, pp. 219-224.) 152

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obliged to retire in the apprehension of the King's vengeance having in some manner given offence, it is the more probable that unless filling some ostensible situation in a foreign service, he would scarcely from his knowledge of the King's temper and disposition have again ventured himself in his power, it having been frequently asserted His Majesty threatened to put him to death if he should ever return. By letters from the missionaries shown by Mr. Marchini to the President, it appears that Mr. Dayot was certainly vested with powers from the Governor of Manila and afforded presents to the King which, unlike his behaviour to Mr. Roberts, were all accepted. It is said also that Mr. Dayot used some freedom in his observations on the English character, dwelling on their ambitious views in the East and the extension of their conquests over those countries in which similarly with the supposed object of our embassy to his they had in the commence-

ment obtained a footing under the cloak of commercial views. The declaration of war with France was announced, and Spain was also

declared to be engaged in the contest. There existed every possibility

of a general combination of the Powers of Europe against England

which, it was asserted, must inevitably prove her ruin. Powerful fleets both of the Spanish and French nations being hourly expected in India would speedily destroy those of the English; and a request was preferred soliciting His Majesty's consent to their admission into his harbours, and for the supply of timber and naval stores, the produce of his dominions. If any treaty was completed, or promises made known, they do not appear to have obtained publicity, as the priests do not hint

at any circumstances of this nature in their correspondence. It is

obvious, nevertheless, that the King must have been pleased with the mission, having permited Mr. Dayot to withdraw his family which from

the period of his departure from the country has been invariably

refused, and from his also having been appointed agent for the King both at Manila and in China.

Neither can it be questioned that these reports corroborated,

doubtless by the other Frenchmen in his service, have in great measure operated to rendering the King inimical to the English interests. The views of this Eastern tyrant, for such he in reality appears to be con-

sidered by all those around him, are probably vast and unbounded, and when the fort on which he is now employed shall be completed and his family and riches can be securely protected against the revolt of any of his mandarins, it is not impossible that he may be induced to make some attempt on the adjoining Chinese territory. Policy at the present moment will deter any such hazardous enterprize, for tho' he may contemn the military of China, he cannot but be aware the power

and resources of the empire are infinitely too strong for him to continue

against in the existing state of his country and affairs. It is said, tho' with what truth we cannot aver, that the Tonquinese are much dissatisfied with his Government and ready for revolt whenever opportunity presents itself. All attempts, however, to throw off the yoke will doubtless be deferred until some person be found capable of leading them, or the probability of success justify the instance; and in the present moment this appears very unlikely, the King having many of his best troops in garrison there, and not a descendant or relation of 153

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the usurper's family being in existence, the whole and every person of power and consequence together with their wives and children having been barbarously murdered. On a review of the subject and after giving it their best considera-

tion, it does not appear this committee are called on to adopt any

further measures towards opening a friendly intercourse with Cochin China; and Mr. Roberts, having already transmitted to the Governor General detailed accounts of his proceedings, it only remains for them to forward the duplicates accompanied by such of their foregoing re-

marks as have not come to Mr. Roberts' knowledge, and His Excel-

lency will be more competent to decide on the propriety of those steps which for the attainment of the object it may be found expedient to

pursue.

(B) BARROW'S VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH RELATIONS WITH COCHIN CHINA

With the report of Roberts' mission in their hands, the Select Committee felt that they had done all they could, or wished, in this region. The French threat, for all the machinations of J. M. Dayot, could hardly be described as serious at that moment, and the commercial possibilities were not likely to be improved by further British missions. The Indian Government also seems to have felt that it could

afford to neglect Cochin China for a while. For one thing, the real centre of French power in the East, the De de France, had first priority as a target for British policy. For another, French influence in Burma and French exploitation of the Dutch possessions in Indonesia seemed far more dangerous to British trade and diplomacy than anything that

Vannier or Chaigneau might do at the Court of Gia Long. Thus Cochin China, never a major target of British policy, became once

more a South-East Asian backwater.

There were, however, British observers who felt that the Roberts

mission should be followed up. The Dalrymple school of thought still had its adherents, and amongst them was John Barrow. Born in 1764,

Barrow had accompanied Macartney to China as comptroller of his household, and had written two of the standard accounts of the Macartney Embassy. In 1804 Barrow was appointed 2nd Secretary at the Admiralty, where he no doubt came into close contact with Alexander Dalrymple. Barrow was also a close friend of Dundas. He was made

a Baronet in 1835 and died in 1848. In 1806 Barrow published his Voyage to Cochinchina, a work devoted mainly to the journey of the 154

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Macartney Embassy from England to Canton; and in Chapter XI of his book Barrow summed up his views on the desirability of continued

British relations with Gia Long's dominions. Though his personal

experience of Cochin China dated from his visit of 1793, Barrow in

this chapter was writing from the viewpoint of 1806. He was well informed on the history and results of the Roberts mission, and he was familiar with the main events of European diplomacy in the East which followed the Macartney Embassy. His views, however, are in

some ways archaic, belonging more to the period of the Chapman mission than to that of Crawfurd in 1822; and as such they form an interesting epilogue to the story of the Roberts mission. Advantages of a Commercial Intercourse with Cochinchina (Barrow, op. cit., pp. 334-349.) The Bishop Adran, in negotiating the treaty between Louis XVI and the King of Cochinchina, has clearly shewn that, however great his attachment might be to the latter, he was not at the same time by any means unmindful of the interests of the former. The terms of this

treaty also prove that, by fixing on the peninsula of Turon as the

cession to be made to France, the good Bishop had not been inattentive to the comparative merits of the local advantages which the coast of

Cochinchina possessed. He seems to have been well aware that if France was once permited to occupy this neck of land, she would

thereby be enabled to secure to herself , a permanent establishment in the East. In fact, the peninsular promontory of Turon (or Hansan) is

to Cochinchina what Gibraltar is to Spain; with this difference in favour of the former that, to its impregnability, it adds the very important advantage of a convenient port and harbour, securely sheltered from all winds and at all seasons of the year, possessing every

requisite for a grand naval station, where ships can at all times refresh and refit, and where abundant rills of clear fresh water fertilize the

numerous vallies which open upon the shores of the bay. Near a

small island, connected with the peninsula by a neck of land which is uncovered at low water, ships of any magnitude might conveniently be hove down and careened; and opposite to it, on the peninsula, is a sufficient extent of level surface for a small town, with a naval arsenal, and magazines of every description: the whole capable of being rendered perfectly defensible by a handful of men. A small island called Callao , situated at the distance of about thirty miles to the southward of Turon bay, was also included in the territory to be ceded. This island completely commands the entrance of the main branch of the river on which Fai-joo , the ancient mart for foreign commerce, is situated; and is completely inaccessible on every side but that which faces the mouth of this river. Here a small but a fertile and well-watered valley opens upon a bay, wherein ships of any size may lie at anchor in perfect security. The views of France in fixing upon this part of the coast, which are obvious indeed from the whole tenor of the above-mentioned treaty, were evidently directed to the building and equipment of a 155

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naval force that should one day overawe our territorial possessions in the East; and it is by no means certain that the attempt will not be renewed, and that Imperial France may not accomplish what Monar-

chical France had only in contemplation. Their complete exclusion

from the coasts of Hindostán will render that of Cochinchina the more

inviting, especially as from this station our valuable trade to China, as well as our possessions in India, may most effectually be injured and

annoyed. But independent of the mischief which the possession of

this place might enable an active enemy to meditate against our concerns in the East, the advantages, on the other hand, which it holds out to our naval and commercial interests in this part of the world ought alone to entitle it to a higher degree of consideration than has yet been bestowed on it. I would not here be understood as speaking of this part of Cochinchina in a colonial or territorial point of view.

We may perhaps already possess as many colonies as we can well

maintain, and as much territory as is rendered useful to the state; but we never can have too many points of security for our commerce, nor too many places of convenience and accommodation for our shipping.

To dwell upon the necessity of keeping up our commerce, and the

policy of adding facilities to the distribution of the fruits of our productive industry, would be wholly superfluous. The loss of commerce must inevitably be followed by the loss of that rank which England

at present holds in the scale of nations. France, having a larger

territory in proportion to its population, perhaps generally speaking, a more favourable climate, a more fertile soil, and more varied productions, may be excused when she affects to despise foreign commerce, and to speak with contempt of the nation who depends solely on its support. The miseries, the misfortunes, and the devastations, however occasioned in such a country, may certainly be repaired without the

aid of foreign commerce. But this is not the case with regard to England. We need only cast a glance at the articles with which the

numerous large and well-stocked shops and warehouses in the capital are stored, at the multitudes of shipping which frequent our ports, to

make it obvious that the national industry is more employed, and

consequently more productive, in manufacturing the raw material of foreign growth than in raising such as are congenial with our own climate and soil. From Tyburn turnpike or from Hyde Park Corner to Whitechapel almost every house is a shop or a warehouse, and two thirds at least of these shops and warehouses are stored with articles of foreign growth. Any check, therefore, to our commercial prosperity, and to that preponderance which we now enjoy in foreign trade, could not fail to be attended with the most injurious consequences to the country at large. In fact, having advanced perhaps a little too far in this career to retreat with safety, every exertion must now be made to hold our own, to give protection and permanent security to that commerce which has hitherto enabled us to measure our strength with an enemy as implacable as he is powerful. It may be necessary even that the paws of the British Lion should yet be extended - that they should grasp every point which may add to the security of what British valour and the industrious and adventurous spirit of the British nation have acquired and annexed to her original dominions. 156

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But beside the security which, on the one hand, the possession of the strong peninsula of Turon would afford to our valuable fleets employed in the China trade and, on the other, the annoyance it could not fail to give us if in the hands of an active and enterprizing enemy, the important advantages which would result to our Indian commerce by having in this part of the world a secure harbour, where water and every kind of refreshment may be procured, are not lightly to be appre-

ciated. Considered in this point of view only, if the management of our China ships was less dexterous and the means of preserving the health of the crews less efficacious than they really are, the having of such a port to resort to, in the event of a ship being too late in the season and caught by the adverse monsoon, which sometimes happens, would be an invaluable acquisition. Many other considerations might be urged in favour of establishing an intercourse with Cochinchina, but I shall at present confine the few observations I have to make to a brief view of those advantages which the East India Company would

derive in their commercial concerns with China, by establishing a

factorv on the peninsula of Turon bay. That the China trade is the most important and the most advantageous of the Company's extensive concerns is, I believe, universally admitted; and that it is worthy of high consideration in a national point

of view requires but little oroof. It employs direct from England

20.000 tons of shipping, and nearly three thousand seamen; it takes off our woollen manufactures and other productions to a very consi-

derable extent; and it brings into the Exchequer an annual revenue

of about three millions sterling. It is the grand prop of the East India Company's credit, and the only branch of their trade from which perhaps they may strictlv be said to derive a real profit. The reason of

these superior advantages is pretty obvious. To India the Company trade as sovereigns; to China as merchants. Yet it is unquestionably

true that the balance of the trade between England and China is greatly in favour of the latter, and that this balance is drawn from the former

in hard monev to the amount of about half a million sterling annually. The bullion, however, thus sent out for the purchase of teas is converted into a productive capital, and has hitherto been replaced with large profit by the continental nations of Europe. There is besides a very considerable trade carried on by British subjects between India and China, the balance of which is nearly as much against the latter as in the other case it is in its favour against England. With Europe in general the balance of trade remains, however, greatly in favour of China; and the Spanish dollars which are carried thither to pay this balance are never again returned into circulation, but, being converted into a new and totally different shape, remain locked up in the country. In all despotic governments, where the laws are not sufficient for the protection and security of property, land and houses are considered of

a nature too tangible to represent wealth. The object of every one

whose revenues exceed his expenses is to secure the greatest possible 157

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value in the least possible space, which in the evil day can most conveniently be concealed. In such countries the profits upon trade are usually hoarded up in the precious metals. Such, I believe, is pretty

much the case in India, and still more so in China: the latter may therefore be considered as a perpetual sinking fund for European

specie.

This annual drain of hard money to China is of the less consequence to us, so long as, by our supplying the continent of Europe

with a considerable part of the return cargoes, with our manufactures, and the produce of our colonies, the metals which are dug out of the mines of Potosi shall ultimately find their way up the Thames; or, in

other words, so long as the general balance of trade of the whole

world shall remain in favour of England. Notwithstanding, however, this may be the case at present, it would still be a desirable object to

accomplish an equalization of the trade between this country and

China, and thereby put a stop to the annual drain of specie required by the latter. An intimate connection with Cochinchina would, in my opinion, go a great way towards effecting this object. This country furnishes many valuable articles suitable for the China market, and would open a new and very considerable vent for many of our manufactures; and its situation in the direct route from England to China is an unexceptionable consideration. The forests of Cochinchina produce, for instance, a variety of scented woods, as the rose wood, eagle

wood, and sandal wood; all of which are highly acceptable in the

China market, and bear most extravagant prices. The Cochinchinese cinnamon, though of a coarse grain and a strong pungent flavour, is preferred by the Chinese to that of Ceylon. It is said to be a species

of Cassia, and not of the Laurus. For rice there is a never-failing demand in the populous city of Canton, and sugar and pepper are

equally acceptable; all of which are most abundantly produced in the fertile vallies of Cochinchina. The price of sugar at Turon was about three dollars for 133 lb., of pepper six or eight dollars for the same quantity, and of rice only half a dollar. To these productions may be added the areca nut, cardamoms, ginger, and other spices; swallows' nests, which are collected in great abundance on the large cluster of islands running parallel with the coast, and known in the charts by the name of the Paracels; the Bichos do Mar , or sea-snakes, more properly

sea-slugs, and usually called Trepan in commercial language, which

with sharks' fins, Moluscas or sea-blubbers, and other marine products of a gelatinous quality whether animal or vegetable, are at all times in

demand by the Chinese. It furnishes besides many other valuable

products, as gum lac, Camboge, indigo, elephants' teeth, cotton, and raw silk; and there seemed to be no want in the country of gold, silver, and copper. The hilts of the officers' swords and the clasps of their belts were generally made of silver, but we frequently observed them of solid gold. It is said, indeed, that a very rich gold mine has lately been discovered near Hué , the northern capital. Silver is brought to 158

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market in bars about five inches long, in value about eleven Spanish

dollars.

All these articles, so well adapted for the China market, might be taken by us in exchange for fire arms and ammunition, swords,

cutlery and various manufactures in iron and steel, light woollen cloths,

camblets, Manchester cottons, coarse Bengal muslins, naval stores, opium, and a few other drugs. Articles of this nature, when carried

to the ports of Cochinchina, have usually been disposed of at an

advance of from 20 to 30 per cent., and their value paid for in ingots

of silver.

There is another consideration which renders the possession of a

port on the coast of Cochinchina, or at least a factory in some of them, extremely desirable for the concerns of the East India Company. It is well known that the Chinese government has more than

once intimated a design of excluding foreign traders altogether from their ports, and very serious apprehensions have been entertained in consequence of it. In such an event, the trade might still be carried on, and perhaps with advantage, by means of Chinese junks bringing

cargoes of tea and silks to Turon bay, or other parts of the coast;

thus avoiding the exorbitant duties levied at Canton on foreign vessels. But if in such case we should have no establishment within the limits

of Chinese navigation, the Spaniards at Manila, the Portuguese at

Macao, and the Dutch at Batavia, would be put into the possession of the whole commerce carried on by Chinese junks, and England would become in a great degree dependent on them for the share they might be disposed to allow her in their respective ports.

If, however, the Còchinchinese should not be disposed to cede

any part of the coast or adjacent islands to a foreign power, which,

after the fortunate turn of affairs in favour of the legitimate sovereign,

will in all probability be the case, we might still derive important advantages from a mere commercial intercourse. The timber alone

which this country is capable of supplying, suitable for the purposes of

building ships, is an object highly deserving the consideration of government. The docks of Bombay and those intended to be established on Prince of Wales's Island must rest their dependence on a

supply of teak and other timber on very precarious grounds. If in the former it be intended to encourage the building of ships of the line, it

may be doubted whether, in a few years hence, the whole of the

Malabar coast will afford a sufficient supply to keep a single ship on the

stocks of seventy-four guns. Even now the greater part of what is

valuable is exhausted, and such as would be fit for building large ships

of war is not procurable without very considerable difficulties and

delay. Equally precarious is the supply of teak timber, which is floated down the river Ayerwaddy from the dominions of Ava or, as it has

lately been called, the Birman empire. Yet this is the grand source from whence the supplies are meant to be drawn for the docks of Prince of Wales's Island. We have little, however, to trust to or to

hope from the favourable disposition of the government of Rangoon.

The French have obtained here, as well as in every other part of Eastern India, a decided superiority of influence beyond all other

Europeans; and they will not fail to exert it to the utmost, in order to 159

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render nugatory our grand scheme of increasing our navy by establishing docks for building at Prince of Wales's Island, which they would most effectually accomplish by shutting up the Ayerwaddy against us, and thus cut off the grand supply of that timber which is best suited

for the purpose.112

The river Sai-gong , usually called Cambodia, flowing into the sea at the southern extremity of Cochinchina, runs through inexhaustible forests of stately trees, possessing every quality requisite for naval architecture, such as teak, ironwood (Syderoxylon), and poon ( Callo phyllum); the last of which grows tall and straight as the Norway fir

or the larch, and is extremely well adapted for ships' masts. In the forests of Cochinchina are also ebony (Dios peros), cedars, mimosas,

walnuts, and indeed most of the timber trees that grow in India. Down this magnificent river all kinds of timber might be brought to Prince of Wales's Island, almost as conveniently as from Rangoon. Having thus briefly stated some of the important advantages which an intimate connection with Cochinchina might be expected to produce, the next point to be decided is the mode in which such a connection would most effectually be established. With this view it may not be amiss to inquire whether any, and what, steps have hitherto

been taken for the accomplishment of so desirable a purpose. The

first attempt to open a friendly intercourse with this country appears

to have been made by Mr. Hastings, in the year 1778, when, on his

receiving some favourable representations of the advantages that would probably result from such a measure, he was induced to give permission to a mercantile house to send a couple of ships laden with mer-

chandise, entrusting, at the same time, a sort of demi-diplomatic

commission of a public nature to a gentleman connected in the firm of the house. Whatever the motives were which influenced the conduct of Mr. Hastings in this instance, the result of the mission might easily have been foreseen. The character of merchant is here, as well

112. The value of Burmese teak for ship building had been appreciated by both

the French and the English East India Companies early in the 18th

century. Dupleix had tried to support the Mon rebels against Alaungpaya in the hope of obtaining a monopoly of this strategic material and of the usei of the shipyards at Syriam (near the modern Rangoon); but he had been frustrated by that lack of support from his superiors which culminated in his recall in 1754. Shortly after Dupleix' departure the supression of the Möns by Alaungpaya put an end for a while to French plans in this direction. In the 1770s the French established a dockyard near Rangoon, where a number of ships were built (including the Laiiriston,

see pp. ? above). This was abandoned in 1778, following the English

capture of the French settlements in India. In 1783 Bussy and Suffren made a fresh attempt to establish French influence on the banks of the Irrawaddy, but without success. But the British were not able to convince

themselves of the failure of French ambitions in this direction, and in the last decade of the 18th century they sent a number of missions to Burma with, as one important objective, instructions to investigate the French threat. Even as late as 1809, when the British were preparing to invade the Ile de France, Lord Minto thought it prudent to send Canning to Rangoon to explain to the Burmese that an attack on the French base in no way implied British hostility towards the Court of Ava. Canning was able to confirm the nugatory nature of French influence in Burma; but this was three years after Barrow wrote his Voyage to Cochinchina. (See: Hall, Symes, op. cit., pp. xix-xxv, xxix-xxxv, lxxxix.) 160

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as in China, held in very low esteem, and the government is equally jealous of admitting an indiscriminate introduction of foreigners into its ports. How much soever, therefore, the monopolizing system of

the East India Company may be deprecated, and the wisdom of

that policy questioned which prohibits English ships from doubling the Cape of Good Hope, whilst those under the flags of every other nation profit by such restriction, I am decidedly of opinion that the trade to China and to Cochinchina ought never to be thrown open to individual merchants. The Chinese, in particular, are so averse to their subjects trading promiscuously with foreigners, that the government appoints an united body of merchants who exclusively are allowed to deal with strangers; and one of whom is obliged to become security for the fair dealing and the good conduct of the Captain and crew of every ship

which visits the port of Canton. All trade is considered by these

nations as a species of gambling, in which the number of foul players far exceeds the number of those who play fair. The temptations indeed of large profits, which commerce sometimes presents, are difficult to be

resisted; and when individual interest comes in competition with the public service, the latter is very apt to give way to the former. Hence, without adopting the illiberality of the Chinese maxim, the impolicy is

obvious of committing the affairs of government into the hands of those

who are in any shape connected with the concerns of trade. However honourable a merchant may be in his dealings, he cannot be responsible for the good conduct of a whole ship's company; nor, with the cargo which he transfers to the management of another, can he transfer at the same time character and principle. But independent of the frauds and tricks that are too frequently connected with trade, there is something in a commercial intercourse which is inconsistent with diplomatic

agency. There is every reason to believe that all those employed on Mr. Hastings' mission conducted themselves with a proper degree of forbearance and circumspection; yet, having called at different ports on the coast of Cochinchina, and traded with different parties then struggling for the government of the country, they were suspected by all of them, and were unfortunately drawn into actual hostilities with the ruling power at Hué , where they had a narrow escape from having their vessel seized, and themselves in all probability put to death; and although they were obliged to leave behind them unsold a part of their merchandize, they contrived to bring away a large sum of specie or bullion in ingots of silver. An interesting narrative of the whole transaction is published in the Asiatic Annual Register for the year 1801.

The second and last attempt to open a public intercourse with

Cochinchina was made about two years ago, when, from representations communicated to the Directors of the East India Company of the

advantages which might be derived from a connection with this country,

and of the favourable disposition of its present Sovereign towards the

English nation, from which reasonable hopes of success might be entertained, a resolution was taken by the Court to send back to

China one of its servants, who had retired from the factory at Canton, with instructions to proceed from that port on a secret mission to the King of Cochinchina. This gentleman, on his arrival at Canton, finding the state of his health would not permit him to go through the 161

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fatigue of a voyage to Cochinchina, transferred his instructions to one of the supracargoes in the Company's employ at that factory, who lost

no time in proceeding to the Court of Cochinchina. The King saw

him, it is true, but received him in so cool and distant a manner as to

point out very clearly that the shorter he made his visit the more agreeable it would be to the Cochinchinese government. In fact, he

found the Sovereign Caung-shung 113 completely surrounded by Frenchmen; and as he knew nothing himself of the language of the country, nor had any one with him who did, every proposition he had to offer, and every explanation regarding his mission, were necessarily made

through the French missionaries. That these men are but little dis-

posed to be friendly to the English nation might have been known without sending to Cochinchina for the information, and the consequence of making overtures through them to the King easily foreseen. The very reserved, not to say contemptuous, conduct of every one about the Court to the Company's Ambassador makes it probable that the proposals he had to offer on the part of his employers were wholly mis-

represented: they might indeed be interpreted by the French into insults. The conclusion drawn by the East India Company from the

complete failure of this mission, is that the King of Cochinchina is not favourably disposed towards the English nation. The correctness of this conclusion may, however, in my opinion

fairly be called in question. However well qualified the gentleman

might be who was sent on this embassy, in every respect except in his not knowing a single character of the written or one syllable of the spoken language, the want of the indispensable means of communication seems quite sufficient to have rendered the object of the mission completely abortive. As far as the joint testimonies of several English gentlemen, who a few years ago were at the Cochinchinese Court, and of French officers in the service of that Court, can be allowed to have weight- as far as any confidence is to be placed in professions declared in public edicts - as far as actions may be considered to develope sentiments - and as far as we were enabled to judge of the disposition of the people during our stay at Turon, I should be inclined to conclude that the contrary is the case, and that neither the King of Cochinchina nor the people would be in the smallest degree averse to an intimate connection with the English, provided suitable overtures were made to them in a direct manner from the British government, and not through

those Frenchmen to whom the Sovereign owes so many personal

obligations, nor through the medium of the East India Company.114 Where the prejudices of the people will not admit of any honourable distinction being annexed to the profession of merchant, whilst the

utmost deference is paid to a royal commission, official rank and

literary acquirements, it is neither politic nor expedient to fly in the

face of opinions so long and so deeply rooted. I have heard it was

once in contemplation, shortly after the truce of Amiens, to follow up 113. Gia Long.

114. This was certainly a weakness of the Roberts mission (see p. 150 above), but there is no reason to suppose that Gia Long would have welcomed in any circumstances a closer political relationship with the British. 162

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the communication with the Court of Pekin, so favourably opened by the Earl of Macartney, with a splendid embassy to proceed from the Governor-General of Bengal.115 Those who flattered themselves with the successful issue of such a measure must have known little of the

temper and character of the Chinese government. I have no hesitation in saying, that all the splendour and magnificence of the East, unless accompanied by a royal commission, would not have secured for the Ambassador more respect and consideration than the fine velvet dresses trimmed with broad gold lace were able to procure for Mynheers Titsing and Van Braam . Without such a commission, the great Bahadur from Bengal, like these two compliant Dutchmen, would infallibly incur the risk of being lodged in a stable.116 Whether, therefore, it may be found advisable to keep up the communication with the Court of Pekin, or endeavour to establish an intercourse with the Cochinchinese, it will in either case be politic and expedient that the Ambassador be furnished with the King's commission, and that he proceed on his mission in a King's ship.

(C) A FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE ROBERTS MISSION

In 1818, when the Government of Louis XVIII in France was

once more considering an active policy in Cochin China, J. Janssaud (whom Taboulet calls Jaussaud) wrote to Count Molé, Minister of the Marine and Colonies, to offer his services as French representative in

that country. After a lengthy discussion of the advantages which France might derive from a such a step, Janssaud gave an account of Roberts' visit to Hué, which is of great interest as a French view of this mission. Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 275-277, prints an extract from this letter as his sole document relating to Roberts. Cordier, in

his La Reprise des Relations de la France avec ГАппат sous La Restauration , T'oung Pao, Series II, Vol. IV 1903, prints the letter in its entirety, and it is from this work that I have translated the extract reproduced here. Janssaud had been a merchant engaged in eastern trade, and had travelled in India and Malaysia; but he does not appear to have visited 115. Instead, in 1804, a letter was sent from King Getorge III to the Chinese Emperor to warn that ruler against being beguiled into any alliance with the French. (Cordier, T'oung Pao 1903, op. cit., pp. 216-217). 116. For a full account of the abortive embassy of Van Braam and Titsing of 1794-1795, see: J. J. L. Duyvendak, The Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court (1794-1795), T'oung Pao XXXIV 1939; J. J. L. Duyvendak, Supplementary Documents on the Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court, T'oung Pao XXXV 1940; С. R. Boxer, Jan Companie in Japan 1600-1850, The Hague 1950, pp. 158-164. 163

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Cochin China. Where did he obtain his information on the Roberts

mission? Perhaps from P. J. L. de la Bissachière, a missionary who left Cochin China in 1806 and whose notes on the history and economy

of Indochina, compiled in 1807, were used by a number of French

writers.117 In 1817 de la Bissachière became director of the Paris

Seminary of the Missions Etrangères , and there was no one then living

in France with a greater knowledge on Cochin Chinese affairs. But whatever the immediate source, Janssaud's story must have derived from Chaigneau or Vannier. Chaigneau and Vannier were certainly responsible, if indirectly, for the account of the nature of the presents. From Roberts' diary one learns that the presents he brought for Gia Long included such objects as mirrors, an electrical machine, a chronometer, mathematical and astronomical instruments, and a portrait of King George III and "some other pictures". What these "other" pictures were Roberts did not say, but nowhere in the collection of Roberts material from which the documents quoted here have been taken is there any mention of a

pictorial demonstration to Gia Long of the regicide nature of the French Revolution; though, as has already been noted above (p. 118), Roberts did suggest to Lord Wellesley that this aspect of recent French history might well win to the English cause the support of the French missionaries and mandarins in Cochin China. When Crawfurd was in Cochin China in 1822, Vannier mentioned this matter of the presents to him, but on this occasion gave an account somewhat different from that

in Janssaud's letter. He said that Roberts had presented to Gia Long illustrations of the British capture of Seringapatam and of the death of

Tipu, and that the Cochin Chinese King had concluded that "the Governor General of India wishes to intimidate me by pointing out the fate of the Indian prince".118 Had Roberts indeed thought of any such scheme of pictorial propaganda, it seems very likely that he would have mentioned it in his diary or his report. He made no bones about his efforts to bribe the

mandarin Ong-to-noef and the general tone of his diary suggests a rather naive honesty. The evidence, therefore, rather suggests that Vannier and Chaigneau somewhat modified the facts of the Roberts mission when they told about it to other people. The Janssaud version was the one most likely to attract attenion in Restoration France, while the version told to Crawfurd was certainly a more tactful story for English ears. 117. P. J. L. de la Bissachière, Le Relation sur le Tonkin et la Cochinchine . . ed. С. В. Maybon, Paris 1920.

De la Bissachière's material was made use of by Renouard de Sainte-

Croix in his Voyage Commercial aux Indes Orientales, Paris 1810. 118. Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., p. 255. 164

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In Janssaud 's story of the way in which Roberts had won over the mandarins to his side we may perhaps detect the French mandarins in an attempt to make the most of their role of protectors of French interests in Cochin China. From Roberts' diary one does not get the impression that the mandarins were particularly co-operative. Ong-tonoe , one of the very few Cochin Chinese officials with whom Roberts came into close contact, was clearly interested in the proposition of the English envoy (see p. 128 above), but he refused to commit himself in any way until Roberts had seen the King. It does seem likely, however, that the mandarins saw in the arrival of Roberts a useful lever

against the French officers of whom they were clearly jealous, and they may well have pointed out to Gia Long that, now that the English were showing an interest in Cochin China, he would be wise to get rid of the Frenchmen; but this does not mean that they would have advocated the granting to the English company of any special privileges.

If this argument has any truth in it, however, Chaigneau and Vannier would have had strong motives of self preservation in preventing the King from showing any signal marks of friendship towards the

British; and they may well have, as the Select Committee believed, distorted somewhat the nature and wording of Roberts' proposals. The letter which Taboulet quotes, and which he said Roberts had sent to Gia Long on 14th August, 1804, to protest against the King's "imperious, proud and arrogant conduct",119 is hard to reconcile with the text of Roberts' letter of 17th August, the only written communication which the English envoy sent to the King while at Hué (see pp. 142143 above). It sounds more like a distorted version of Roberts' verbal observations of 14th August, which the French mandarins - or Cochin Chinese mandarins, for that matter - had turned into a formal state-

ment of outspoken complaint (see p. 134 above).

Janssaud speaks of Roberts as "chief of the Supercargoes at Canton"; but Roberts, of course, did not obtain this position, that is to say the Presidency of the Select Committee, until 1807.

Janssaud to Molé, Paris 15th November, 1818 (extract). You will get a better idea of the character and resolution of the king

Gia Long from the way in which he dismissed an English representative who was sent to him about fourteen years ago, not long after he had conquered Tonkin. This event, which placed the King of Cochin China amongst the

ranks of the princes of the most powerful countries, attracted the

attention of the English who, till then, as much because of the extent of their possessions in the other parts of India as because their cornil 9. Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 276, quoting the text printed by Abbé L. E. Louvet in La Cochinchine Religieuse, 2 vols., Paris 1885, vol. 2, pp. 496498.

165

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merce in these regions was mainly carried on at Canton, had neglected

Cochin China: and perhaps this was also because they did not see

there any rivals from whom they had to fear an annoying influence on their system of world wide trade. However, the King of Cochin China did not seem to be a man to be ignored, and the East India Company resolved to send to him one

of its most distinguished representatives. It selected Mr. Roberts,

chief of the Supercargoes at Canton, and entrusted to him a mission which was both diplomatic and commercial. This envoy arrived in Cochin China in about 1804 with two ships

loaded with goods and presents. He began by bringing over to his

cause the chief mandarins, whom he had little difficulty in persuading that a trade with the English would offer them great opportunities for enriching themselves. These mandarins in turn persuaded their king

to accept the presents intended for him and to grant the audience

sought for by the English envoy, who already believed that the success

of his mission was assured.

The English were not unaware of the special esteem and favour which the French enjoyed under Gia Long; also they neglected nothing which might prevent this having any effect. For instance, among the presents intended for this prince were pictures illustrating the most tragic periods of our revolution, and which brought to mind above all the sufferings of the unfortunate Louis XVI for which Gia Long had often expressed his regrets. One did not need to go further to make certain of the French missionaries from whom, it seemed, one had nothing to fear and who were, in effect, foreigners to their motherland.

But two other Frenchmen, sailors in the service of the King of

Cochin China, were at the Court at this time. Gia Long consulted

them on the power of the English in Europe and in India, and also on the mission of Mr. Roberts who asked nothing less than the cession of a port. These gentlemen revealed to the King that it was just about in this way that the English began to establish themselves in other countries, of which they subsequently became the masters and the

oppressors of those very princes who had received them with a

welcome.

On hearing this the King Gia Long (although by nature verging on the avaritious) returned without hesitation all the presents which he had already received, and told Roberts that the English who from now onwards came to trade in his dominions would enjoy there without distinction the same privileges as all other people. This reply was a dismissal for the English envoy who left at once

for Canton.

166

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CHAPTER VIII

THE CRAWFURD MISSION, 1822

(A) BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION

The failure of Decaen, which culminated in the British capture

of Ile de France in 1810, marked the end of the attempt of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France to take advantage of the

groundwork laid down by Pigneau de Behaine. With the return of

of the Bourbon, however, France once more began to look for fields of commerce and glory in the East. The Duc de Richlieu,

who succeded Talleyrand as French Foreign Minister in 1815, almost at once turned his thoughts to a revival of the French connection with

Cochin China, on which country he was well informed by de la Bissachière of the Société des Missions Etrangères. Richlieu's ideas were very welcome to the French Chambers of Commerce, especially that of Bordeaux, who saw great prospects for French trade in eastern markets. Cochin China, with its excellent harbours, its proximity to the ports of South China, and its long history of close relations with France, was an obvious choice as a base for any commercial enterpise in this direction, and the Chambers of Commerce were not slow in pointing out to the Government its advantages. By the end of 1817 a definite course of action had been decided

upon by the French Government. Ventures in eastern trade would receive some Government assistance in the form of special rates of customs. A French Consular Agent would be appointed to Cochin China to protect French interests there. A French diplomatic mission would be sent to Hué. Communication would be established between

the French Government and the French officers still remaining in Vietnamese service. These lost two tasks were entrusted to M. de

Kergariou, who left Brest for Cochin China aboard the frigate Cybèle in July 1817 with instructions to bring presents to Gia Long and to inform that monarch of the changes which had taken place in France

since the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbon. Kergariou was to seek assistance from the authorities for French ships which might put in to Cochin Chinese ports, and to request

fair and reasonable terms of trade for them, but he was not to 167

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attempt to open any formal negotiations with Gia Long. His most important commission was to get in touch with Chaigneau and Vannier, to whom he was to present the insignia of membership to the Légion d'Honneur.120

After visiting Manila and Macao, Kergariou arrived at Tourane on 30th December, 1817, full of hope for a successful mission, for he had learnt at Macao from Father Marchini that Gia Long had no love of the English. Marchini told him that in 1812 an English ship had called at Tourane and demanded, with a threat of force, that payment of a debt which since 1807 the Cochin Chinese considered to have been

cancelled. This reference, it is presumed, to the disputes which Captain Purefoy conducted with Gia Long's Government on behalf of Abbot and Maitland of Madras was accompanied by a report of the Cochin Chinese King's declaration that he would rather be smothered beneath the debris of his kingdom than give way before the

unjust demands of the English; and it was said that in anticipation of an English attack he had strengthened the fortifications of the Bay of Tourane.121 But Kergariou soon discovered that whatever fear the

Cochin Chinese King might have of English ambitions, this did not imply any desire for a close connection with France. Vannier was sent down to Tourane to meet Kergariou, and the French envoy was treated with considerable ceremony by the local mandarins, but he was not permitted to go to Hué and he was refused an audience with Gia

Long. Indeed, the Court declined to recognise Kergariou as the

properly accredited representative of the French Monarchy. On 22nd January, 1818, the Cybèle left Tourane for France, calling on the way

at Malacca where Kergariou was regally entertained by Farquahar, and reaching Brest in October.122

The Kergariou mission could not be described as a success, but it had little effect on the optimism of those French merchants who saw great prospects in the trade of Cochin China, for they had already 120. The Duc de Richlieu also tried to communicate with Chaigneau by letter, dated 17th September, 1817, entrusted to an agent of the French merchant firm of Opperman-Mandrot, and which does not seem to have reached its destination until 1819. In this letter the Duc de Richlieu requested information about commercial and political conditions in Cochin China, and informed Chaigneau of the projects then being contemplated by the Bordeaux firms. (See; Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 286-287.) 121. On Captain Purefoy, see also pp. 102, 133 above. The issue here was an argument between the Cochin Chinese and Abbot and Maitland over the quality of some rifles which the Madras firm had supplied. This dispute, in which the Cochin Chinese saw ample evidence of British bad faith, was still sufficiently alive in 1822 to be brought to Crawfurd's notice. Finlayson, op. cit., pp. 356-357. 122. Documents relating to the Kergariou mission were printed in H. Cordier, Bordeaux et la Cochinchîne sous la Restauration, T'oung Pao, Series II, Vol. IX, 1908, pp. 176-213. 168

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made practical experiment in that commerce which they found quite

encouraging. The initiative was taken by two Bordeaux firms of shipowning merchants, Balguerie, Sarget et Cie., and Philippon et Cie. Balguerie-Stuttenberg, the head of Balguerie, Sarget, had been attracted

to Cochin China by what he had learnt of the cartographical work of J.-M. Dayot; and through an intermediary, Paul Nairac, a representative of the Bordeaux Chamber, he had approached the Due

de Richlieu on this matter in 1816. Early in 1817 Balguerie, Sarget sent a ship, La Paix , to Cochin China; and Philippon et Cie. rapidly followed suit with the despatch of the Henry. La Paix arrived off the Cochin Chinese coast in August, 1817, and both at Saigon and at Hué its supercargo, Auguste Borei, negotiated with the authorities over such matters as harbour dues. Borei was

welcomed by Chaigneau and Vannier, and he was treated with consideration by the Mandarins. The cargo of La Рейх , however, seems to have been badly chosen so that the venture was something

of a commercial failure, though Borei concluded that with more experience Cochin China could be developed into a region of great value to French trade. In December, 1817, just before the arrival of Kergariou on board the Cybèle , La Paix left Tourane on its way back to France only to be wrecked off Ile de France in February, 1818. The

Henry , commended by Captain Rey, reached Tourane at about the same time as La Paix and had much the same commercial experience. It returned to Bordeaux in August, 1818, having survived the storm which wrecked La Paix.

In 1819 Philippon et Cie. sent the Henry under Captain Rey back to Cochin China, and Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. sent the Larose. Their captains and supercargoes visited Hué where they were entertained by Chaigneau and Vannier and had discussions with important Mandarins.

They acquired a return cargo consisting mainly of tea, sugar and silks in exchange for their fire-arms and other French manufactures. At the end of 1819 the two ships set sail for France. Chaigneau, who had for many years longed to see his family in France, obtained leave of absence from Gia Long and took passage aboard the Henry , which reached Bordeaux in April, 1820.123 These two years of experience in the Cochin Chinese trade showed that there were no great political difficulties in its way so long as it was carried on at a very moderate scale. Gia Long, who had no reason to love the English, and who appeared to be somewhat annoyed by the conduct of the Portuguese, welcomed a fresh source of supply for arms 123. H. Cordier, Bordeaux et La Cochinchine sous la Restauration, T'oung Pao, Series II, Vol. V, 1904, pp. 505-560. Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 282-293. 169

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for his army and was prepared to help the French merchants up to

a point; though it was clear that he would give them no exclusive rights and would not cede any territory to them or in other ways lay

the foundations for a French settlement in Cochin China. From a

commerciai point of view, however, these ventures were not very successful. The voyages of 1818-19 did not realise a profit sufficient

to cover the costs of the first experiment of 1817, a fact which determined Philippon et Cie. to withdraw from the field to leave Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. as the sole French participants in the Cochin

Chinese trade. A profitable trade, in fact, seemed to demand some sort of established political relationship between France and Cochin China maintained by a French representative in Hué; for obstacles and disputes, which were by no means absent during the ventures of 1817 and 1818-19, were bound to arise in the future to threaten the already

slim margin of profit. The obvious candidates for such a post were Chaigneau and Vannier whose loyal services to France had been recognised in 1817 by membership of the Legion d'Honneur . Chaigneau's return to France in 1820 made his selection inevitable. Chaigneau had been considered in this light since at least 1817, when the Duc de Richlieu had tried to correspond with him on the part he might play in "the establishment of a permanent and regular commerce with the country where you reside". His appointment was strongly advocated by Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. There seems little doubt that this question was one of the major factors behind his decision to return to France.124 In the summer of 1820 Chaigneau was granted an audience by Louis XVIII and made a member of the Order of St. Louis. In October he was appointed French Consul in Hué, Agent de France at the Court of the ruler of Cochin China, and Commissaire du Roi for the negotiation of a commercial treaty between France and Cochin China. As Agent de France Chaigneau was to conduct diplomatic relations between France and Cochin China; as Consul he was to exercise jurisdiction over French subjects in Cochin China and to deal with purely commercial matters; and as Commissaire du Roi he was empowered to negotiate on behalf of France a treaty which would enable him to act in his other two capacities, and would guarantee the lives and property of French subjects trading in Cochin China. To these three functions Chaigneau suggested the addition of a fourth, that which would now be performed

by the Alliance Française , the education of the Cochin Chinese in the arts and industries of France, and he asked that he be provided 124. It seems most probable that the Duc de Richlieu 's letter of 1817 reached Chaigneau in 1819 by way of the Henry or the Larose. See Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 286. 170

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for this purpose with a small library including the latest edition of

L'Encyclopédie. On 1st December, 1820, Chaigneau left Bordeaux for Cochin China on the Lar ose, and arrived at Hué on 1st May, 1821. 125

On his return to Cochin China Chaigneau discovered that Gia Long had died, and his son Minh-Mang was now reigning. Minh -Mang did not share his father's affection for and loyalty to those Frenchmen who, with Pigneau de Behaine, had helped the Nguyen Dynasty in its hour of need. Nor did he have any love for the Christian missionaries who had for many years worked virtually unmolested in Cochin China, and whom he now began to consider as the spearhead of European influence behind which would come European rule. As Labartette, Bishop of Veren and head of the

Catholic mission in Cochin China, wrote in June, 1822, in a letter to

M. Bourdel of the Missions Etrangères in Macao: this King detests all dealings with the Europeans. He is at

present showing a friendly face to our two gentlemen Chaigneau and Vannier who are here; but I am certain he would like to see them removed far away from him. He is destroying all that his father has done, and he is superstitious to

the last degree. Since he is very well educated, he is the greatest partisan of Confucius and of all the literati. He

threatens to chase us all out of his kingdom on the least complaint which might be made to him against us. Since he has ascended the throne our holy religion has made very little

progress.126

The death of Gia Long, in fact, removed the one element in the

Cochin Chinese political scene which promised to help the French in their plans for the commercial development of this region. Balguerie, Sarget et Cie., it is true, established a factory at Tourane

under Edouard Borei, brother of that Auguste Borei who was supercargo on La Paix; but in 1832, two years after the total wreck of one of their ships, the Saint Michel , off the Paracels, they closed it down and withdrew for good from the Cochin Chinese trade. The French Consulate was doomed to failure from the start. The fact that

Chaigneau was now the servant of two masters, Louis XVIII and Minh-Mang, made the French mandarins objects of even greater suspicion to the latter monarch; and in 1824 both Chaigneau and Vannier left Cochin China for France, never to return. The attempts by Chaigneau's nephew, Eugène Chaigneau, to carry on the Consulate ended in disaster, when the French representative was involved in the wreck of the Saint Michel and arrived at his post destitute and almost 125. See H. Cordier, Le Consulat de France a Hué sous la Restauration, Paris 1884, pp. 1-55. 126. Translated from Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 295.

171

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naked. He lost no time in returning to France, and thus brought to an end the history of the first French efforts to establish their influence in Indochina.127

The futility of the Restoration attempts to open Cochin China to French influence are now apparent. The experience of the second half of the 19th century was to show that European influence here

could only be secured by force of arms, and that the bonds of sentiment which once linked Nguyen Anh with Pigneau de Behaine were of little lasting political significance. It is hard to believe now that Gia Long (Nguen Anh) would have welcomed the implications of the French Consulate any more than did Minh-Mang. Gia Long, towards the end of his reign, seems to have been moving steadily towards that conservative frame of mind which rejected European ideas in favour of the traditional Confucian principles of government which Vietnam had acquired from China. He tolerated Christianity because of the memory of Pigneau de Behaine, but he did not like that religion; and one may well speculate how long that toleration would have persisted had he lived, in view of the 19th century development of an identity between missionary enterprise and national

expansion. Gia Long's foreign policy, once he had found that he would not be bound by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles of 1787,

was to treat the European powers civilly, but to give no one of them any special concessions. He feared, from his observation of the course of recent Asian history, that concessions to any power other than England would result in English pressure for similar terms, and any concession to the English seemed to have a habit of developing

into English occupation. For this reason he would never have given France any exclusive commercial treaty; and in this respect Minh-Mang

was simply following in his father's footsteps. Thus the arrival off Tourane of the vessels of Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. and Philippon

et Cie., and the appointment of Chaigneau to the Hué Consulate, did not by themselves imply an impending change in the balance of European power in the Far East. This would have demanded an active French intervention on a scale which was quite beyond the

capabilities and the intentions of the Restoration Monarchy. To many British observers, however, in the years immediately following the Congress of Vienna, the renewal of French activity along the coasts of the South China Sea had dangerous implications. The long Anglo-French struggle in Asia was not so easily forgotten; and in this fact lies one of the two most important factors behind 127. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 300-301. On Minh-Mang's foreign policy and his attitude towards the missionaries

see Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., pp. 338-343. 172

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the deputation of Dr. Crawfurd to Cochin China in 1822, and the justification for placing in this volume the Crawfurd mission in the

same category as those of Chapman and Roberts. The other factor, of course, was the quest for markets and sources of trade which followed logically the foundation of Singapore in 1819. Neither of these factors however, were likely to have induced the British to send

a diplomatic mission to Hué in 1822 had it not been for the fact

that such a mission could well be combined with a far more important

venture in Siam.

Siam was a market and source of supply with great attractions to the East India Company. Its teak forests could, it was hoped, supply the potential shipyards of Penang, which place would also become the port of entry whence European manufactures made their

way to Bangkok. Penang, moreover, was in contact with Siam through the rulers of Kedah, who had ceded Penang to the Company and whose territories marched with the British mainland possession

of Province Wellesley. Kedah's troubled relationship with Siam

culminated, in 1821, in a Siamese invasion of that state which threatened

the security the British possessions in northern Malaya and promised

much diplomatic embarrassment, the Sultan of Kedah and many of his subjects having sought refuge on British territory, and their surrender having been demanded by the Raja of Ligor who commanded the Siamese forces. The British could not comply with this request, nor could they agree to help the Sultan of Kedah against the Siamese, with the result that that ruler started to intrigue with the Burmese and

thus complicate an already difficult situation. The British, above all, wished to avoid a serious rupture with the Chakri dynasty of Siam, in whose territories and dependencies originated the greater part of the tin upon which the prosperity of Penang so depended. These circumstances decided the Indian Government of the Marquess of Hastings to send a diplomatic mission to Bangkok.128 John Crawfurd, (1783-1868), who was selected to head this mission, was an obvious choice for the task. After five years in the

Bengal Medical Service he served in Prince of Wales Island from

1808-1811. From 1811-1817 he was with Raffles in Java and at one

time was Resident in Jogjakarta. In 1820 he published his monumental three volume History of the Indian Archipelago , one of the

pioneering landmarks in the English study of South-East Asia. His scholastic turn of mind, his active curiosity and his experience of South-East Asian politics thus all combined to suggest that he would 128. The background to the Crawfurd mission to Siam has been discussed

briefly but adequately in D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, London 1958. pp. 444-446. See also Crawfurd's Instructions, Para. 21, p. 181 below. 173

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make the best use of such a mission not only to secure diplomatic

benefits but also to obtain information of a scientific and commercial

nature about a part of Asia which was then virtually unknown to

the British. After his return from Siam and Cochin China, Crawfurd

was, in 1823, given charge of the recently established British settlement

of Singapore, where he remained until 1826 when he was sent on another diplomatic venture of great importance, this time to Ava. In 1827 Crawfurd retired and returned to England, where, after four

failures to enter Parliament in the years 1832-37, he spent the remainder of his long life in compiling works of reference on South-East

Asia and composing memoranda of a somewhat Radical persuasion on the proper conduct of British policy in that region.129

Crawfurd's mission to Siam was no great diplomatic triumph, partly, no doubt, because he was the representative of the Governor General and not of King George IV; but he was able to dispel many British illusions as to the great strength of the Siamese army and to

collect much information on the commercial possibilities of that country. These were embodied in his Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China which appeared in 1828 and which was based on his official reports and journal. Some of these last documents, in so far as they related to Siam, were published in their original form in Bangkok in 1915 by the Vajiranana National Library under the title The Crawfurd Papers . The mission to Hué, which must be regarded as little more than an additional dividend which the East India Company hoped to derive from the investment involved in sending an envoy to Bangkok, was likewise far from a complete success.- As the documents printed below

will show, Crawfurd was refused an audience by Minh-Mang, who also rejected his presents, both actions being explained on the grounds that the British representative was not accredited by his own king, and that he had come about purely commercial matters of a kind which did not merit personal discussion with the Cochin Chinese ruler. Crawfurd was told at Hué that the British could trade

at Cochin Chinese ports on the same terms as the Chinese junks, but not in Tonkin (which, at an early stage in the discussion, was said to be open, but was later reported closed because, as a recent conquest, "it was not deemed expedient to encourage the resort of strangers to

it") 130 All this was in accordance with Minh-Mang's policy of not trying to shut out foreign trade but refusing to accept diplomatic entanglements with the Europeans - and, as the Robert mission of 129. For a brief account of Crawfurd's life, see J. Bastin, John Crawfurd, Malaya, Dec. 1954.

130. Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., p. 272. 174

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1832 showed, with Americans as well.131 As far as commerce was

concerned, Crawfurd achieved very little in Hué beyond the acquisition of a considerable body of information about the products and pros-

pects of the region. Diplomatically, the mission achieved even less. Crawfurd was instructed not to try to secure any Anglo-Cochin Chinese treaty, but he did hope that an interview with the King would

put the ruler of Cochin China in a more amicable frame of mind

towards the British, and pave the way for future British missions; but, as we have seen, such an interview was refused, and Crawfurd could hardly claim to have been honoured by any particular marks of distinction by the Cochin Chinese Court. The Crawfurd mission to Cochin China, however, was not without its importance to the history of subsequent British policy in South-East Asia. For one thing, Crawfurd was able to show that the influence of the French, still regarded as of possible significance in his instructions,

was of no importance in Hué; and thus he was able to lay to rest a bogey which had persisted since 1778. For another thing, it was demonstrated that the power of the Vietnamese monarchy was much overrated, and that as a centre for British trade Cochin China offered

nothing which was not already to be found in Singapore. The King of Cochin China was not a key factor in South-East Asian politics. The Dalrymple dream ,of a British base in the Bay of Tourane was a dream only, and after the Crawfurd mission we hear no more of it. The chronology of the Crawfurd mission was as follows: September 1821, Crawfurd while in Calcutta appointed to the mission by the Marquess of Hastings, 23rd November, sailed from Calcutta aboard the John Adam ,

380 tons, accompanied by G- Finlayson as medical officer and naturalist, Captain Dangerfield as deputy, and Lt. Rutherford in charge of an escort of 30 sepoys, 12th December, arrived at Penang, 5th January 1822, left Penang, 13th January, arrived at Malacca, 17th January, left Malacca, 27th January, landed at Singapore, 25th February, left Singapore, 24th March, anchored at the mouth of the Menam, 131. The mission of the American Robert, not to be confused with the envoy of the East India Company whose narrative has been printed here, is discussed briefly in Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., p. 340. Edmund Robert was twice sent by President Jackson, in 1832 and 1836, to try to contact Minh-Mang. Both these missions, which appear to have been among the very first diplomatic ventures in the Far East of the United States of America, were failures. See Buttinger, op. cit., p. 308. 175

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29th March, arrived at Bangkok, 16th July, left Bangkok,

22nd August, called in at Pulo Condore, 24th August, anchored off Cape St. James, 29th August, arrived at Saigon, 3rd September, left Saigon, 15th September, anchored in the Bay of Tourane, 26th September, landed at Hué, 17th October, left Hué by land, 22nd October, visited Faifo, 24th October, reached Tourane, 31st October, sailed from Tourane for Singapore, 16th November, reached Singapore, 23rd November, sailed from Singapore, 5th to 8th December, in Penang, 19th December, arrived in Calcutta.

(B) crawfurd's instructions

G. Swinton to Crawfurd, 29 September, 1821. (Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., pp. 589-595.) Sir,

Your appointment as Agent to the Governor-General, to proceed on a mission to Siam and Cochin China, has been already notified to

you in my letter of the 1st instant; and I am now commanded, by

the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, to furnish you with the necessary instructions for your guidance.

2. You are aware, that in the earlier period of the Indian com-

merce of the European nations, the trade of Siam and Cochin China constituted no unimportant branch of it;132 and that during their struggle for superiority among themselves in India, and those contests with the native powers which led to the establishment of territorial possessions, the commerce with these two countries was overlooked or neglected; so that, during the first half of the last century, that trade became extremely inconsiderable, and during the last seventy years may be looked upon as having altogether ceased. 3. From the most authentic information in the possession of this government, there is every reason to believe that the industry and 132. Referring to the 17th century, when the English and the Dutch were active in these markets.

176

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civilization, together with the geographical position and natural fertility of the soil which characterise the kingdoms of Siam and Cochin China, are such as to render it extremely desirable, under the present stagnation of trade, to negotiate with the Sovereigns of those countries the renewal of a commercial intercourse with Great Britain and her Indian

dominions. The subject, indeed, of cultivating a more intimate connecxion with Siam has been repeatedly brought to the notice, of the Supreme Government by the Government of Penang, and towards the end of last year, a proposition from that Government to depute an Agent to Siam received the sanction of his Lordship in Council. That sanction has, however, only been partially acted on, and the design may now be conveniently superseded by the Mission which his Excellency in Council has resolved to commit to your charge.

4. I now proceed to state to you some general Rules and

Observations for the guidance of your conduct in the execution of the important duty in which you are about to engage.

5- It is not unknown to you, that among the various states of

farther Asia, beyond the peninsula of Malacca, a very general fear and distrust of Europeans, highly detrimental to the interests of commerce, is predominant; resulting, it is too much to be feared, from the violence, imprudence, and disregard of natural rights, which occasionally

characterised the conduct of all the European nations in the earlier periods of their intercourse. The first object of your attention will be to endeavour to remove every unfavourable impression which may exist as to the views, or principles, of the Honourable Company and the British nation, in seeking a renewed connexion solely for purposes

of trade.

6. The Governor-General in Council does not contemplate, in

the first instance, the practicability of establishing our commercial relations with the countries in question upon a permanent and beneficial footing, by the absolute removal of those restrictions which national

jealousy and ancient prejudices at present oppose to the progress of external commerce. His Lordship in Council entertains hopes, how-

ever, that well timed and judicious representations on your part to the Rulers of these countries, may have in a great measure the effect of disarming their apprehensions, removing their antipathies, and, by so

doing, laying the foundation of a friendly intercourse, which may prepare the way for the establishment of a commercial relation, commensurate in extent with the apparent resources and population of those extensive regions, and our known capacity to supply their wants. 7. After the first establishment of a friendly intercourse with the nations in question, his Excellency in Council conceives that the trade with them will require little assistance in the way of diplomatic agency;

and that its prosperity and extension will mainly depend upon the

degree of freedom with which it may be conducted on both sides, and

the experience of the mutual advantages it may confer. Upon this

principle, you will carefully refrain from demanding or hinting at any of those adventitious aids or privileges upon which the earlier traders of Europe were accustomed to found their expectations of commercial benefit; such as the establishment of forts and factories, exemption

from municipal jurisdiction and customary imposts, monopoly of 177

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favourite articles of produce, and exclusion of rival European nations. Upon a dispassionate review of our commercial transactions in former times, his Excellency in Council is disposed mainly to attribute to the effect of the unpopular privileges so obtained, and to the indiscreet exercise of them, of which so many examples are recorded in the history of that period, the subsequent extinction of our commerce, as well as that of other European nations, or its arbitrary restriction, with all the considerable and independent countries of farther Asia. 8. Independently of the obstacles which jealousy of the European character opposes to the establishment of a commercial intercourse, we have to contend with another difficulty common to all the nations which bear any mark of the Chinese stamp of civilization - real or pretended contempt for foreign traffic in general. Under the influence of this feeling towards the traders who may resort to their ports, they

impose on them various vexatious restrictions. For example, the

Sovereign, in particular cases, claims and exercises the right of preemption ,and retains in his own hands a monopoly of certain articles most in demand, while the exportation of some of the native productions of the country is altogether prohibited. Your attention will of

course be directed to the means which, in your judgement, will be

most conducive to the remedy of this serious obstacle to the freedom of commerce, and by employing such arguments and representations as are most applicable to the character of the people, and least likely to offend their national pride or excite their jealousy. 9. Adverting to the state of civilization and the peculiar character of the people to whom you are deputed, his Excellency in Council sees less cause to apprehend obstruction to an improved commercial intercourse from the avowed magnitude of the imposts on external trade, than from the vexatious mode in which they are levied. His Lordship in Council considers the levying of duties in kind, the rude examination of cargo in detail by the native officers, the depredations of which it is thence liable, and the irregular exactions of the revenue officers, to be such serious impediments to the operations of commerce, that a still higher rate of impost, levied in a less exceptional manner, would be greatly preferred. If urged with prudence, it is not at all improbable that the native Governments may be induced, as well from the apparent as the solid advantages of such an arrangement, to accede to it. With this view, his Lordship in Council would suggest the advantages of establishing, in lieu of all others, one simple impost in the form of a duty upon tonnage or measurement - a mode of proceeding which, it is believed, is not inconsistent with the established usages of those countries. Any trifling inequality which might arise in practice from the adoption of this principal, would be much more than compensated by the exemption of vexatious interference which it would secure.

10- In conformity with the principals now laid down, adapted

to the people among whom you are to appear, and the relative situation of the British Government in India in regard to them, you will be furnished with letters to the Kings of Siam and Cochin China, in the terms of the English drafts which accompany these instructions.

11. With regard to the practical details which may arise out 178

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Plate IX. A Cochin Chinese Mandarin of the Civil Order in his dress of

ceremony. (From Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit.)

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of the principles above stated, and which must be, in a great measure,

contingent upon the knowledge you obtain in the progress of your mission, his Lordship in Council relies on your judgement and experience, and necessarily commits the conduct of them to your discretion, to be regulated according to circumstances.

12. Although Government is not inclined to contract formal

treaties, lest the native powers to whom you are now deputed should capriciously imagine their independence or their prerogatives com-

promised by such engagements; yet, his Excellency in Council is sensible of the great advantage which would result from obtaining

from the Cochin Chinese or Siamese Government official and authentic

records of such concessions as they might be induced to make to the freedom and security of commerce, either in the form of letters from the Sovereigns to the Governor-General, or from their Ministers to yourself, in the character of an edict addressed to their subjects.

13. As his Lordship in Council conceives that, after the first

establishment of a friendly intercourse with Siam and Cochin China, the extension and improvement of our amicable relations with these states will be greatly promoted by the maintenance of epistolary communication, you will see the propriety of encouraging a correspondence respectively on the part of the Sovereigns with the head of this Government, and on that of his Ministers with the subordinate Governments

of India, especially with the Government of Prince of Wales's Island,

and the Chief of the Settlement of Singapore. This will have the

salutary effect of impressing the native Governments with a conviction that our traders resorting to their ports have the constant protection

of their own Government, while it will not be accompanied by any of the inconveniences that may result from an attempt to exercise a

more direct control.

14. The Governor-General in Council calculates on your being

able to proceed from hence, at the very latest, by the 1st of November. It is to be hoped that you will reach Siam, which will be the first object of your attention, about the middle of December; touching at Prince of Wales's Island and Singapore for necessary information and assist-

ance. If, as Government has reason to hope, your reception by the

Court of Siam be friendly, it is not proposed to limit your residence there to any specific period, but to leave it to your own discretion; keeping in mind the advantage which may result from remaining for such a time as will afford you an opportunity of obtaining a competent knowledge of the character of the Court, the manners of the people, and the resources of the country. 15. After accomplishing the objects of the mission, as far as Siam is concerned, it will be necessary for you to return to Singapore or Prince of Wales's Island, and there await the favourable monsoon, to prosecute your mission to Cochin China. In your voyage from Siam

to the Straits of Malacca, an opportunity will be afforded you of examining, and reporting upon, the condition and resources of the

tributary and petty States upon the shores of the Gulf of Siam; but you will be careful to satisfy yourself, in the first place, that your holding communication with these chiefs will not excite the jealousy of the Siamese Government, nor give cause of complaint to the Dutch, that 179

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we are interfering with the settlements which they may have formed in that quarter.

16. The Governor-General in Council contemplates the probability of your reaching Cochin China in the month of May, with the

commencement of the westerly monsoon. 17. In your intercourse with a Court so jealous of strangers, and so reluctant to enter into any intimate intercourse with the nations of

Europe as that of Cochin China, much care and circumspection will be necessary. Should the mission be so far countenanced that you are called to the Court, you will endeavour to prolong your stay at the capital, that you may thus be afforded an opportunity of acquiring an acquaintance with the genius and habits of the Cochin Chinese Court, and of availing yourself of such favourable occasions as may from time to time occur, for disarming the jealousies of the Cochin Chinese, and for inclining them to cultivate a more intimate connexion with our

nation. His lordship in Council is not unaware, that, in the endea-

vour to attain the objects of your mission at Cochin China, you will have to contend with the previously established, and possibly adverse influence of other European nations at that Court 133 It will be your

especial duty, however, as far as practicable, to make yourself ac-

quainted with the views and policy of those nations, and the footing on which they stand with the native Government; also avoiding, however, any appearances that may countenance the erroneous belief that your mission is directed towards objects of a political nature. 18. Looking to a successful reception of your mission at Cochin China, it is supposed that you may be detained in that country until the beginning of July. At this period it will be impracticable, or diffi-

cult, to return to the westward against an adverse monsoon by a

direct passage. 19. Your easiest route will therefore be by the established eastern passage, which, without inconvenient loss of time, will enable you to touch at Manila, the Sooloo group of Islands, the independent portion of the Spice Islands, with such other countries by the way as are not under the control of other European nations. These countries are all

imperfectly known, and a knowledge of their social condition and commercial resources is intimately connected with the great object which the Government have in view by your mission - the extension of the commercial relations of the nation in general, and more particularly of its Asiatic possessions. It is not the wish of the

Governor-General in Council, however, that you should enter into any negotiation with the rulers of those countries. The expediency of any extension of the views of the Government in that direction will be matter for future consideration; and it is probable that the deliberations of his Lordship in Council may be materially influenced by the information which you will obtain. After thus completing the objects of your mission in the manner above pointed out, you will return to Singapore

and Penang; and unless you should, at either of these places, find

instructions of a different tenor awaiting you, you will be pleased to proceed directly to Bengal.134 133. The French.

134. This part of the mission, in the event, was not attempted. 180

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20. Having thus sketched out the general objects of your mission to Siam and Cochin China, it is necessary to revert to the views and objects of the Government of Penang, in suggesting at various times the deputation of an Agent to Siam, as stated in the third paragraph of

this letter.

21. In the year 1813-14, an application was received by the

Government of Prince of Wales's Island from the King of Queda, for the friendly interference of the British Government in his favour with his superior, the King of Siam. On that occasion, the Government of Prince of Wales's Island referred the question to the consideration of the Supreme Government, when it was determined that, whatever might be the claim which the King of Queda might be thought to possess to the attention and regard of the British Government, our mediation for the adjustment of the differences subsiting between Siam and that

country might lead us into an embarrassing participation in the interests

and concerns of one or both States; and the Government of Penang was accordingly instructed to limit its proceedings to opening a com-

munication with the King of Siam, and addressing a letter to him,

framed in conformity with the views and principles which wçre dis-

tinctly laid down for its guidance. The subject was resumed in the

year 1818, when the Governor of Prince of Wales's Island recorded a Minute, taking a full view of the former proceedings regarding the King of Queda, and another tributary of Siam, the Chief of Pera, and stating his deliberate opinion of the great political and commercial advantages which the Government of Penang would derive from culti-

vating a more intimate connection with Siam. Copies of the whole

correspondence which passed between the Government of Prince of Wales's Island on the occasion above adverted to, and also of a later correspondence in the year 1820, which led to his Lordship in Council sanctioning the deputation by that Government of an Agent to Siam for purely commercial objects, are now inclosed for your information.

22. Although the Governor-General in Council is solicitous to

avoid mixing anything of a political nature with your negotiations at Siam, it seems desirable that you should be in possession of the grounds on which the Governor of Penang has felt an anxiety for the security of the States of Queda and Pera; and that you should be prepared to

avail yourself of any favourable opportunity of accomplishing the

wishes of the Governor in Council by a friendly and unostentatious

representation to the Court of Siam. His Lordship in Council relies

entirely on your discretion for acting on this suggestion, or abstaining from any advertence to the subject, according to the experience you will obtain of the general disposition of the Siamese Government, and the chances of an overture of this nature meeting with a favourable

reception. Your visit to Penang will enable you to learn from the

Honourable the Governor in Council the actual state of the relations between Siam and its dependencies in the Malayan Peninsula, and to

ascertain more precisely the views and objects of the Governor of

Penang with regard to those States.

23. You will be provided with letters to the Honourable the

Governor of Prince of Wales's Island, and also to the Resident of

Singapore, who will be requested to afford you any information or 181

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assistance in promoting and facilitating the success of your mission.

24. You are apprised that the ship John Adam has been taken

up for the accommodation of yourself and suite, and will be at your entire disposal; the commander being instructed to consider himself subject to your orders in every matter, saving what may be connected with the immediate nagivation of the vessel. 25. His Lordship in Council proposes to appoint Captain Danger-

field, of the Bombay establishment, to be your assistant, with a monthly

allowance of six hundred rupees. With a view to provide against the contingency of your illness, or other casualty exposing to injury the special service trusted to your care, Captain Dangerfield will be authorized, in such event, to assume charge of the Mission, and act upon

the instructions contained in this letter.

26. A party of thirty Sepoys, under the command of a native

officer, will be attached to the Mission. Lieutenant Rutherford of the 14th Native Infantry, will be ordered to do duty with the escort. 27. You will be furnished with a small supply of instruments for surveying, to be used in the event of circumstances being favourable for such operations. His Lordship in Council is satisfied that you will carefully avoid any use of them which can tend in the slightest degree to excite the jealousy of the Governments to which you are accredited. A medical officer will also be attached to the Mission, and it will be the endeavour of Government to select for this duty a gentleman qualified by scientific attainments to avail himself of any opportunity that may offer of extending our knowledge of the natural history of the countries which you will visit.

28. In conclusion, I am directed to desire that you will report

to me, for the information of His Excellency in Council, the progress of the Mission from time to time; and that, in addition to an ample diary of your proceedings, you will be prepared, on the termination of the duty now assigned to you, which it is calculated will not exceed a twelvemonth from this date, and your return to Bengal, to submit a full and digested account of the transactions and negotiation on all points connected with the objects of the Mission, which you may have been enabled to collect during the period of your employment. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient, humble servant, Geo. Swinton,

Secretary to the Government.

Fort William, 29 th September, 1821.

182

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Missions to Cochin China

(С) THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT EXPLAIN TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE CRAWFURD MISSION.

Letters from Bengal, Vol. 86; Bengal Political Letter of 23rd Honorable Sirs,

November, 1821. 134a

1. We avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to report to

your Honorable Court our adoption of an experimental measure which in the present depressed state of commerce both in England and this country appeared to us to be well deserving the trial and likely in its result to be productive of great national benefit by opening a new and extensive field for British Traffic. We allude to a mission to the King-

doms of Siam and Cochin China for the purpose of cultivating a

friendly connection and negotiating and establishing an improved commercial intercourse with these countries, a measure which we trust will

be honored with the sanction and approbation of your Honorable Court as worthy of the greatness and liberality of the Honorable

Company and as affording the nation at large the strongest proof of your cordial disposition to co-operate with alacrity and zeal in forwarding the success of any enterprise in this quarter of the globe which may afford a well grounded hope of relieving the general distress of the manufacturing community at home. The object in truth is the promotion of the welfare and interests of the British Empire at large as well as to extend the commercial relations of your Indian possessions.

2. Your Honorable Court is fully aware that even in the earlier and ruder period of the commercial intercourse of European nations with India, the trade of Siam and Cochin China formed an important and valuable part of it.135 It could not therefore be a matter of doubt

that in the improved state of modern navigation and the superior

intelligence and active spirit of adventure which characterise the British merchants of the present day, every facility and encouragement which could be afforded to the revival of a trade with those countries would

be eagerly contributed. As those Kingdoms contain a population of at least 30 millions and possess a soil equal in fertility to that of any portion of the globe, the establishment of commercial relations with them

would open a vast field for the improved energies alluded to, and

would be attended with incomparably more extensive benefits than in former times. Those benefits will be largely partaken by the Possessions of the Honorable Company with which a commercial intercourse 134a. With the exception of paras. 7-9, this document has been printed in

The Crawfurd Papers , op. cit., pp. 1-12. 135. At various times in the 17th century English factories were established at Patani, Ayuthia, Lovec near Pnompenh, and various sites in Tonkin. All these had been abandoned by the end of the 17th century. In 1702 an English settlement was established on Pulo Condore, but it was abandoned three years later after the mutiny of the Macassar troops which made up its garrison. After the Pulo Condore disaster no official move was made towards the exploitation of the commercial possibilities of Siam and Indochina until the Chapman mission of 1778. See: D. K. Bassett. The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East, 1623-84. JRAS Pts. 1 & 2, 1960. 183

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of considerable and increasing value and importance cannot fail to result from an opening of the general trade with the countries in question. The Honorable Company has therefore a direct interest in the success of the measures in our contemplation, without which, however solicitous we might be for the improvement of the commercial resources of the Empire at large, we should not have felt ourselves altogether justified in undertaking the mission at the sole expense of the Honorable Company without the previous authority of your Honorable Court.

3. From the most respectable sources of information we are

warranted in stating that Siam, besides minor commodities, may be expected to afford in such an intercourse valuable returns of sugar and pepper for Europe and Western Asia, salt for the Indian Islands, and teak at a cheap rate as well as in abundance for the British Settlements: while Cochin China will furnish as staple articles of exportation raw silk for Europe and sugar for both European and Indian markets. It is known also that Cochin China produced to the earlier European

traders the largest supply of raw silk of any country in Asia, and

should it prove equally abundant in that article at present, the British manufacturer under any favourable alteration in the impost on this raw material, such as we now believe is contemplated by the Legislature, would be enabled successfully to contend with the continental trade

and our silk manufactures would be placed in point of extent and

prosperity on a scale with cotton. 4. With respect to the export of British manufactures to Siam and Cochin China, if we may judge from the success with which they have been introduced into Hindoostan, the Indian Islands, and even China, there is every probability that the demand will be considerable.

The inhabitants of those regions of Asia are not understood to be,

themselves, a manufacturing people in the most limited acceptation of the term, and they have in all times gladly received the imperfect and high-priced fabrics of Hindoostan and China. 5. If we succeed in removing the groundless fears and jealousies hitherto believed to be entertained by the Siamese and Cochin Chinese Governments with regard to an intercourse with Europeans, and in establishing a general freedom of traffic, an extensive demand may be

expected for woollens, cotton goods, raw and wrought iron, Bengal opium and various other articles of minor note. The trade with Siam is chiefly conducted at present by the Chinese settled in that country, who bring its produce to the European ports in the Straits of Malacca

and receive European and Indian goods in return: while Chinese junks and a few colonial Portuguese ships from Macao conduct the

traffic between the territories of the King of Cochin China and China.

But, by laying the trade with those countries directly open to the

activity of European enterprise an extension of commerce would follow which it would be vain to expect from the feeble, unskilful and indirect efforts of native speculation. Under all the imperfections of the exist-

ing system of intercourse with Siam, a trade of no inconsiderable

amount is carried on between that country and the Settlement of Prince

of Wales's Island; and your Honorable Court will have perceived in

the correspondence of the Government of that Presidency an anxious solicitude and an apparently well-grounded hope for an extension of 184

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that commerce through the means of more intimate relations between

the two Governments.

6. We do not anticipate any obstacles of a serious nature to the opening of a general trade with Siam. American and British country ships have within the last five years visited it in considerable numbers. The principal object which, we conceive, the deputation of a friendly

mission from this Government might effect was to place the intercourse

on a defined and permanent footing so as to expose the British trade to the least possible vexation and to hold out to the Sovereign of the country the prospect of obtaining such an increase of revenue as would make it his interest to afford his protection to the foreign merchants. This, it appeared to us, would be best effected by establishing some

summary mode of levying the import duty as is practised by the

Chinese, by which the import becomes comparatively light, while the inquisition of the native officers into the particulars of the cargoes

imported and all of the chicanery to which it is liable are entirely

avoided.

7. With the more populous and wealthy Empire of Cochin China the establishment of a commercial intercourse may be attended with more difficulty at first; but not to such a degree as to deter from the attempt if introduced in a manner which we contemplate. It is true

that for the last century and upwards European nations have been

nearly excluded from all parts of the present Empire, but we are of the opinion that this exclusion may be mainly ascribed to the intemperence and violence which marked the proceedings on the part of the European traders of those times.

8. It is known to your Honorable Court that in the year 1778

a mission was sent from this Government to the King of Cochin China. At the period in question the Agent deputed by Mr. Hastings found a country in a state of anarchy and rebellion and labouring under the miseries of a famine. He was courted by the rebel chief in possession of the sea ports in the hope of obtaining British aid, but ultimately came to an open rupture with one of the inferior chiefs and, after

committing acts of hostility, quitted the country. In 1804 another mission was sent from Canton under instructions from your Honorable Court, the failure of which was attributed to the influence of the French party at the court of the Sovereign and the want on the part of the envoy of any channel of communication with the court. These, we believe, are the only instances of an endeavour on our part to establish an intercourse with Cochin China and its dependencies since the end of the 17th century.

9. At present a few French missionaries we believe are from

political causes patronised by the reigning King of Cochin China, and it is generally supposed that the French nation at least are not likely

to experience any impediments to the establishment of a trade. Á

treaty136, the precise nature of which we have not been able to ascertain,

is said to have been concluded between the King of Cochin China and the present Government of France, and we have been informed that a 136. There was, of course, no such treaty. The reference here is, no doubt, to the Kergariou mission and the appointment of Chaigneau to the Hué Consulate.

185

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large investment of goods for that country was preparing for shipment

at Bordeaux about the end of the last year. We have also heard

that a Dutch ship from Java obtained a cargo last year in the ports of Cochin China.137 and hence it may be inferred that the difficulty of

gaining admission to those ports has at all times been over-rated.

But, even if better terms could not be obtained, it would be an object of some moment to place the trade of Cochin China on a footing at least with our intercourse with China, and we cannot suppose that the Sovereign of the former country would refuse to listen to a proposal for

opening a trade when we could hold up to his view the pecuniary

advantages resulting to the Chinese Government from our dealings in that Empire. 10. It appears to us, after a mature consideration of the subject, that a mission from the Governor General, as the supreme British authority in India, to the Kings of Siam and Cochin China would, if conducted with moderation, temper and address, afford a fair promise of success in realising the important objects which we had in view as above detailed. We were decidedly of the opinion that the more prudent and politic course would be to confine the object of the proposed

mission to the revival merely of a commercial intercourse on an

improved basis by more accurately defining the principles on which the

trade should be conducted, and by avoiding all negotiation for any

territorial cession. Any attempt to establish a factory on a permanent footing in the country, we were satisfied, would only tend to rouse the jealousies of those states and thus to defeat the very object we were anxious to obtain.

11. In the selection of the Agent to whom we determined to confide the charge of this mission we confidently anticipate the approba-

tion of your Honorable Court. The former employment of Doctor

Crawfurd of your Bengal Medical Establishment in a diplomatic capacity in Java, his intimate acquaintance with the manners, customs and commerce of the various nations of the Eastern Archipelago, and the high reputation for ability, judgement and discretion which he has so deservedly acquired, pointed him out to us as a person emminently

qualified for the successful conduct of this delicate and important

duty.138 We understood, indeed, that he had directed his particular attention to the trade with Siam and Cochin China, and he was thus

prepared for the task by the full and accurate knowledge he had previously acquired with regard to everything connected with the

former and present political and commercial history of those countries. 137. This, it seems probable, is the same Dutch ship which Chaigneau mentioned in the memorandum on Cochin China which he drew up for the French Government in the summer of 1820. If so, then the vessel must have arrived before Chaigneau left Tourane for France in November, 1819. See Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 299. 138. Crawfurd was Resident at Jogjakarta during the British occupation of Java, 1811-1816. In 1820 he published his great History of the Indian Archipelago in three volumes.

186

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12-23. (These paragraphs, dealing with the cost and scale of the

mission, have been omitted.)

Honorable Sirs, Your most faithful, humble servants,

Fort William, Hastings

23rd November, 1821. J. Adam John Fendali

(D) CRAWFORD'S FIRST REPORT TO THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE CONCLUSION OF HIS MISSION TO COCHIN CHINA.

Letters from Bengal, Vol. 88; Political Letter of 27th December, 1822,

enclosing Crawfurd to G. Swinton, 25th October, 1822, written at Tourane.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit for the information of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council the following summary narrative of the proceedings of the mission from the period of our quitting Siam until the termination of the negotiations with the Court of Cochin China, with a brief statement of the objects considered to be obtained by the mission as connected with that country, reserving the principal details for my arrival in Bengal. After finally quitting the bar of the river of Siam upon the 4th of August , we found it necessary to sail for a group of islands, called Si-chang,139 at the head of the Gulf of Siam and about forty miles 139. Ko Si-Chang Islands, which Hamilton referred to as the Dutch Islands. This group of islands provided an excellent harbour commanding the approaches to the mouth of the Menam, and in his journal Crawfurd noted their strategic importance to any European power wishing to dominate the maritime trade of Siam. As the Singapore Chronicle remarked in March 1826 (in an article perhaps written by Crawfurd or quoting his journal) :

as a station for an enemy meditating hostile measures against

Siam, no place can be better adapted than this harbour. A

very small fleet in possession of these islands would effectually blockade the port of Bangkok, at which nearly the whole trade of the Siamese empire is concentrated; and thus dictate terms to the monarch of Siam, without further exertion than the seizure and detention of the numerous junks which trade to Bangkok from various quarters.

(See: Board's Collections, vol. 774, Crawfurd's journal, entry of 4th

August, 1822; A. Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, edited

by Sir W. Foster, 2 vols., London 1930, vol. 2, p. 104; J. H. Moor,

Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries , Singapore 1837, pp. 197-198, an extract from the Singapore Chronicle of 16th March, 1826, on the Harbour of Ko-Si-Chang; A. G. Findlay, A Directory for the Navigation of the Indian Archipelago, China and Japan, 2nd edition, London 1878, pp. 423-424; Finlayson, Siam and Hué, op. cit. pp. 267-280; Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit. pp. 187-193.) 187

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distant from the mouth of the Ma-nam, for the purpose of ballasting and watering the ship or otherwise preparing her for our voyage to Cochin China. These operations detained us ten days, but this delay gave us an opportunity of affecting a complete survey of this group of islands which, besides commanding the entrance to the river of Siam and the approach to the capital - making it in a great measure a key to all that is most valuable in the kingdom - contains a good harbour

and lies in the direction of all the native commerce conducted in the

Gulf of Siam. On the 14th of August we sailed for Cochin China, and on the 22nd, with a view of obtaining some information respecting the actual state of that country, visited the Islands of Pulo Condor which are under its authority.140 On one of these islands an English settlement once existed, the avowed object of which, as it was to secure to our nation a portion of the trade of the countries lying between Siam and China, gave it a peculiar interest as connected with the objects of

our mission . . . ,141

The information received at Pulo Condor confirmed me in the

determination .... to visit Sai-gon, the capital of Lower Cochin China.

This place is situated upon the great River of Kamboja, and after Cachao in Tonquin is the most considerable commercial town in the

kingdom, and under the government of the most powerful chief of the country, left by the will of the late King protector of the kingdom and guardian of his son, the reigning prince. On the 24th we anchored in

the River of Kamboja. Immediately upon my arrival I addressed a 140. Visiting, en route, Pulo Panjang on 20th August. 141. While at Pulo Condore Crawfurd was able to find abundant traces of

the abandoned English settlement. After 118 years the brick foundations of the factory could still be seen, and the surrounding neighbourhood abounded in fragments of earthenware and porcelain. In his journal Crawfurd noted that the French had investigated Pulo Condore in 1720 with a view to founding a settlement there, but had abandoned the project after an adverse report from the party despatched

there.

Tne island, in fact, had attracted the notice of the French as early as 1686 when Véret, chief of the French East India Company's factory at Ayuthia, reported on the commercial advantaged of its situation. The first attempt at European settlement, however, was that of the English under Ketchpole from 1702-1705 which culminated in the massacre of most of the settlers by mutinous Macassar troops. In September, 1721, the French frigate Danae anchored off Pulo Condore and landed the engineer Reynault who remained there until June, 1722. Reynault advised against the projected establishment and the plan was dropped. In January, 1780, the Discovery, Captain Gore, visited the island. Despite a search, no trace of the English factory could be seen. Captain King, who described this visit, reported that he came across a sign of French influence in the shape of a note to all passing European vessels from Pigneau de Behaine, dated 10th August, 1779, which stated that the Mandarin bearing this note was an official in the service of the Nguyen instructed to look after European ships and to obtain the latest news from them. King and Gore were much puzzled by this document. The Macartney Embassy made a very brief visit to Pulo Condore on

their way to Tourane from Batavia.

(See: Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., pp. 195-201; Finlayson, Siam and Hué, op. cit., pp. 287-294; Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 114-116;

J. King, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, Vol. 3, London 1784, pp. 450-^ 464; Barrow, Cochinchina, op. cit., p. 244.) 188

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letter to the Governor of Sai-gon, proposing to pay him a visit and explaining to him in a few words the true objects of the mission. On the 28th I received an answer to my letter and an invitation to go there. It was accompanied by a deputation of Mandarins to compliment us upon our arrival, and by four handsome gallies to conduct us to the

place. On the same evening I proceeded to Sai-gon accompanied by a small number of our party, and arrived the next morning. From the Governor of Sai-gon we received a handsome reception,142 and he addressed his Court in recommendation of the objects of our mission.143 We continued at that place for five days.144 This afforded us an opportunity of making enquiries into the commercial resources of this part of Cochin China which are such as I trust will conduce to forward the views of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General as connected with the immediate objects of our mission. The river of Sai-gon is perhaps the noblest navigable stream in Asia, and

without difficulty or danger is accessible even to ships of the line up to the city. The Province of Lower Cochin China itself is an alluvial tract of great fertility, and is considered one of the finest grain countries

in this part of the world. Sai-gon carries on at present a considerable commerce with China, Tonquin, Siam, and lately with Singapore and the Straits of Malacca. During our stay at the place we received the most pointed and flattering attentions from the wealthy Chinese merchants who reside there, who expressed the most earnest desire for the success of our undertaking and the utmost anxiety to establish a commercial intercourse with us. On the 3rd of September we returned to the ship, and early the next morning proceeded on our voyage to the Bay of Turon. On the 13th of September we arrived there. A few hours after our arrival the principal Mandarine of the place came on board, and through him I communicated with the Governor of the Province residing about fifty miles distant, and with the Court. On the 22nd of September I received an invitation to proceed to the city of Hui, the capital, situated about fifty miles to the north of the Bay of Turon, and

upon the banks of a navigable river a few miles from the sea. A

Mandarine of rank came to conduct us, and two large gallies were provided for our accommodation. The persons to proceed along with me were limited by an express order of the Court to a very small number, nor was the accommodation furnished sufficient for more. The ostensible pretext for this was that the accommodation was the same as that always furnished to the Siamese Ambassador, and lately to the Envoy from France. I offered a temperate remonstrance against this, but found 142. Crawfurďs journal gives the name of this official as the eunuch An-tak

kien; and Berland, BSEI 1948, p. 49, identifies him as Le-van-Duyet. 143. But not before a great deal of haggling had taken place over the exact terms of the letter from the Marquess of Hastings to the King of Cochin China, as it was to be rendered into Vietnamese.

144. While in Saigon Crawfurd met the young French naturalist Pierre Diard (1794-1863). Diard, a pupil of Cuvier, had been travelling in the East since 1817, visiting Bengal and meeting in Sumatra with Raffles whom he accompanied to Singapore. Diard came to Cochin China in 1821 and remained there until 1824. He became a good friend of J. B. Chaigneau, but had little respect for that person in his capacity of French Consul in Cochin China. Diard is said to have been the first Frenchman to set eyes on the ruins of Angkor. (See: Taboulet, op. cit., pp. 305, 308-310.) 189

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the difficulties against my obtaining any alteration in the arrangements prescribed by the Court insuperable. Influenced therefore by reasons and motives of which I shall hereafter have the honour of laying in ample detail before His Excellency the Most Noble Governor General, I resolved to accept of the invitation from the Court of Cochin China on its own terms to avoid all risks of embarrassing the negotiation by entering into a contention upon points of etiquette in these early stages of my intercourse with a people singularly pertinacious of form and jealous of strangers. On the evening of the 24th I left the ship on my journey to Hui, and

on the following night arrived there. Our first reception at this place consisted of a mixture of distrust and jealousy, but yet of personal

respect and attention of which it is no easy matter to convey an adequate

description. We were accommodated in one of the rest houses in the place, which was railed round, or rather barricaded, with a fence of bamboo and the only two approaches to it strictly guarded by bodies of soldiers denying egress or ingreSs without the special permission of the Mandarine in charge. While thus jealously watched, the people were

not allowed to pass our habitation without offering some mark of respect

to us, and all horsemen were expressly commanded to dismount as they passed our doors. Although some share of this conduct was to be attributed to the etiquette of the Cochin Chinese Court, yet it was but too evident that a great political jealousy of our Nation existed, and that the real objects of the mission had been misunderstood or misrepresented. An extraordinary degree of caution and moderation therefore became peculiarly necessary on our part. On the 29th, three days after our arrival, we had an audience with the first Minister.145 Mm. Vanier and Chaigneau, two French gentlemen who have the rank of Mandarines at the Court, were present. In this audience the Minister informed me that he was commanded by His

Majesty to state that the request of His Excellency the Most Noble

Governor General of India as contained in his letter was agreed to, and that our trade should be admitted to the ports of Cochin China on the same terms with the Chinese or other most favoured nations; that an

answer would be prepared to the letter of His Excellency the Most

Noble Governor General to this effect; and that I should be supplied with an official copy of the regulations of trade. I expressed the great satisfaction I felt at this, and assured him that I considered the essential objects of the mission fully attained in this declaration of His Majesty. Notice having been taken of introducting us into His Majesty's presence, I begged that a day might be fixed for granting me an audience. This subject, now and on subsequent occasions, gave rise to much discussion, and on the part of the Court to a good deal of equivocation;146 but after 145. According to Crawfurďs journal in the MS in Board's Collections

Vol. 774, this audience took place on the 28th; but the published version (Crawfurd, Embassy , op. cit., p. 246) gives the 29th, agreeing with the

narrative here.

146. An attempt was made to argue that an audience had been denied to

Roberts in 1804. Crawfurd appealed to Vannier, who said that he had been sick at the time of Roberts' visit, but that there could be no doubt that an audience had taken place. (Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., p. 249Finlayson, op. cit. p. 359.) 190

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Plate X. A Cochin Chinese Mandarin of the Military Order in his dress of ceremony. (From Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit.)

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Missions to Cochin China

a delay of some days it was finally resolved that no audience should be

granted, and that the presents of His Excellency the Most Noble

Governor General should be declined as the letter of which I was the

bearer was not directly from His Majesty the King of England. In

explanation it was stated that the Envoy sent by the Court of France in 1817 to his late Majesty had received no audience, and that the presents

sent by His Majesty Louis XVIII were declined because the letter of which the Envoy was the bearer was not written in the name of His Majesty the King of France but in the name of one of His Majesty's Ministers of State.147 The remonstration and explanations which I submitted in reply will in course of time be laid before His Excellency the Most Noble Governor General. This measure owed its origin in some

respects, I have reason to believe, to the suggestion of the French gentlemen at the Court, still more to the personal pride of the reigning Prince

and his ambitious imitation upon every occasion of the pomp and

etiquette of the Court of China. After this audience little restraint was placed on us. Visitors were permitted to frequent our house and we were permitted ourselves to go

abroad freely to any part of the city. The following day we were

invited to inspect the works and fortifications of the city with its arsenals

and granaries. The whole works, which are between five and six miles in circuit, surrounded by a double moat, may without exaggeration be termed truly extraordinary in any country and wonderful in the one in which they exist. They are generally constructed on scientific principles and of most excellent materials, and the arsenal contains more than two thousand pieces of artillery, the greater number cast in Cochin China and of beautiful workmanship.148 On the 2nd of October the Intendant of the Port waited upon me

by order of the first Minister to discuss with me certain matters respect-

ing trade, when I proposed that our commerce should be admitted into

Tonquin and Kamboja as well as into Cochin China. This valuable concession to our trade was acceded to without any difficulty. On

the 6th , the same person called again, and I had a further discussion with him on the subject of our trade, when the principle upon which the

duties to be levied upon our ships was determined. On this day and on two other occasions during our stay at Hui deputations of Man-

darines directly from the King in their robes of ceremony waited upon

us with complimentary messages from His Majesty and presents of fruits and other refreshments.

On the 12th of October I had another audience with the first

Minister, the object of which was to exhibit to me the answer to the letter of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, with the 147. This was the mission of de Kergariou, of which Crawfurd, according to the entry in his journal of 1st October, 1822, had learnt practically nothing until his visit to Hué.

148. Some of the guns were cast by the Portuguese, but in Cochin China or Cambodia, as far back as 1664.

Over 800 pieces of ordinance were employed in the Hué fortifications. More? than 2,000 cannon, in addition, were stored in the arsenal, so Crawfurd noted in his journal on the basis of information from

Chaigneau and Vannier. The printed version does not give this last

figure. (Crawfurd, Embassy , op. cit., pp. 253-254.) 191

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Alastair Lamb

commercial regulations. The Minister's two assistants were present as well as two Mandarines deputed directly from His Majesty to deliver to me the answer to the letter of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General. Copies of the different documents were read and presented to me, the contents of which, with one exception, appeared to be highly satisfactory. The exception regarded certain presents pro-

posed by His Majesty to be sent to His Excellency the Most Noble

the Governor General. The Minister announced to me that these

presents had been prepared by His Majesty, and some trifling ones for his agent with certain refreshments and provisions for the ship's crew and the followers of the mission, and that the presents for His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General would be exhibited tomorrow morning at the Palace, where I should be received in state by the Minister of Ceremonies for this particular purpose. This was a matter the discussion of which required some caution and delicacy to avoid giving any offence to His Majesty's known pride and pertinacity upon points of this nature. I resolved therefore to accept the trifling presents offered to my myself and the provisions for the ship; but for obvious reasons declined those for His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, avoiding, however, all discussions tending to excite irritation respecting the motives for doing so. The Minister seemed satisfied with the reasons I assigned, but an officious member of the deputation in spite of my endeavours to the contrary brought on a discussion of the subject which ended in a reference to His Majesty. The concessions originally granted on a former occasion of trading to Kam-

boja and Tonquin were formally withdrawn upon this, under what

council unfriendly to us I could not ascertain, but ostensibly because the countries were new conquests and His Majesty did not think it right for a short time to encourage resort of strangers to them. Our final departure from Hui had been set for the 14th, but the discussions which took place on the 12th necessarilv put it off. On the 15th the two principal assistants of the Minister waited upon me. Their object was to induce me to accept His Majesty's presents for His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, but, as I firmly declined this, they informed me that as I did not find myself authorised to comply with the customs of the country it was contrary to etiquette to send any reply to His Excellency's letter, which could not therefore be

done. They then proceeded to give to me the commercial document duly sealed and signed. On the following day I waited upon the first Minister and took leave. He endeavoured to persuade me to accept the presents, and as

an inducement stated that His Majesty would be present himself in the Hall of Audience when they were offered, but as I persisted in my first resolution, he expressed his regret that no answer could be given to the Governor General's letter owing to my thus declining an acknowledged form of the etiquette of the Court. During the whole of the negotiation which ended in this day's visit, obstacles of considerable difficulty were encountered. Counsellors hostile in a national point of view to our interests were on the spot to advise

His Majesty, and he was jealously alive to our ambition and fearful of our power. The great object which I held in view in my intercourse 192

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Missions to Cochin China

with them was to dispel these unfavourable prepossessions and to convince them of the real justice and moderation of our views. Had the objects of the mission in any respect been of a political nature, or had there been any chance of our maintaining a future connection with the country, it would perhaps have been necessary to have assumed a higher tone, but under existing circumstances such a line of conduct in the negotiations certainly did not appear to me the best means of ensuring our present success or the proper security against embarrassing the government I had the honour of representing. We quitted Hui on the morning of the 17 th to return to the Bay of

Turon by land, having previously obtained permission for this purpose and having been supplied with travelling equipage by the Cochin Chinese Government. This afforded us an opportunity of seeing a small part

of the interior of the country of which I was glad to avail myself.

On the 19th we reached the ship. The Intendant of the Port had been despatched from the capital to receive us and to deliver to me the presents for myself and the refreshments for the ship. On the 20th I went on shore for the purpose of being present at the ceremony of delivering the presents in question. While at Hui I had obtained permission to visit the town of Fai-fo, the principal commercial emporium of the northern provinces of Cochin China, distant about 36 miles in a southerly direction from the Bay of Turon where we lay at anchor. This object I effected on the 22nd , 23rd

and 24th of October. By the merchants of this place, who are all

Chinese, we were handsomely received as at Sai-gon, and they did not fail to express on every occasion the deepest anxiety for a commercial intercourse with our Nation. By this journey I brought to a conclusion as far as lay in my power every object pointed out to me by the spirit

of my instructions.

It is with great pleasure that I report that the concessions granted to our trade by the Government of Cochin China are equal to the highest

expectations of success entertained by His Excellency the Governor General as pointed out in my instructions. Our trade is admitted into the three principal ports of Cochin China on the same terms as that of the Chinese. These are the terms which were granted to the French about three years ago, and imply a reduction of the former imposts of one third of the whole amount. No import duties of any description are charged and export duties apply only to a few inconsiderable articles and commonly do not exceed five per cent. The duty on tonnage or measurement is fairly rated according to the size of the ship, and the amount is extremely moderate, being short - according to the nearest estimate I can make - of one half of that levied in China. There are neither port nor anchorage fees and the excellence of the harbours of Cochin China precluded the necessity of pilots and the charges incident to them. Ships paying the duties at one port are exempted at all the others during a whole season; and ships touching at the ports of Cochin China for refreshment or for making enquiries into the state of trade 193

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Alastair Lamb

are exempted from all charges whatsoever. These regulations appear so equitable and moderate as to leave little further to be desired on this subject with the exception of the admission of our trade to Tonquin, which from the private assurances made to me I have little doubt will

soon be conceded to us.149

I have omitted no opportunity of collecting information respecting the commercial resources of every part of the country we have visited, and I shall have it in my power to lay before His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council details of considerable length on this subject. These resources, indeed, as well as the population and military strength of the country, have been greatly overrated by the French and other European writers, but are still respectable. Cochin China will afford a market for some of our manufactures and colonial

produce, and supply us in return with articles suited both to the European and Indian market; but according to my best judgement it appears to me that the intermediate commerce which it will enable us to maintain with portions of the Chinese Empire with which we have at present either no intercourse at all or a moderate one will prove a more valuable channel for the employment of our trade than our direct intercourse wtih the country itself. The Chinese carry on trade with 149. These were not, in fact, special terms for the British or concessions on the part of lhe Cochin Chinese authorities, but merely the terms of trade then prevailing for the Chinese and, since the Bordeaux entry into this market, the French.

The duties on measurement were as follows, according to an appendix to Crawfurd's report: At Hué

Vessels 14-25 cubits (1 cubit = 16 inches) wide, 84 quans per cubit -

»

"

»

2

7-

-

54

О

8

"

О

„

"

-

^

„21

»

"

"

„

,,

-

" „

At Sai-gon

Vessels 14-25 „ „ 140 „ „ „ 11-13 » » 90 „ „ „ »

»

7~

,,

8

»

70

»

„

35

„

„

Chaigneau, writing in 1820, gave very similar figures:

„

„

„

At Hué

Vessels 14-25 cubits wide, 96 quans per cubit »

A t Sai-gon

7-13

"

»

»

"

60

„

"

„

„

"

7"13 » » 100 „ „ " „

(See: Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 298.) The currency of Cochin China was as follows: The sapeca or dong , copper cash, was the basic coin. 60 sapecas equalled a mas or tien. 10 mas equalled a quan. 2 quan 8 mas equalled 1 tael. 1 quan 5 mas equalled 1 Spanish Dollar.

(See: Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., p. 329.) 194

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Missions to Cochin China

Cochin China from every province of that Empire from Canton to the Yellow Sea, including at least ten different ports with which our Nation has no direct intercourse. What these traders are at a loss for in

Cochin China are return cargoes, and if we supply them with the

manufactures of Europe and Indian produce, particularly cotton, opium,

pepper and tin, they will leave the rough produce of Cochin China,

sugar, raw silk and cinnamon, for us to export. Besides this channel of employment for our capital through the maritime ports of China, a new and to a great measure an untried one is held out to us for disseminating our productions among the Chinese in the connection which subsists between the northern portions of Cochin China and those provinces of China which immediately border upon it, particularly the extensive one pf Yu-nan. A brisk international trade is at present conducted between

these countries, and even also our opium and some of our European manufactures find their way from Canton to the Western Provinces through the route of Tonquin. The most intelligent of the Chinese merchants with whom I conversed in the different parts of Cochin China which I visited pointed out these resources of employment for our trade and capital. The political condition of the Kingdom of Cochin China may be described in a few words. It embraces the whole of Tonquin, the whole

of Cochin China and the largest and best part of Kamboja,150 thus

uniting three distinct states and constituting a more extensive power than ever was established in the countries lying between China and Siam in any other known period of their history. The political impor-

tance, however, appears to have been greatly overrated. From the

information obtained by us in both countries, it does not appear that its population is superior, if indeed equal, to that of Siam. Its territory is in general of inferior fertility and its foreign commerce scarce amounts to one half of that of the latter kingdom. In Cochin China a military organisation has been established through the example and assistance of the French refugees in the country which has at least a very imposing

appearance. The army consists of about forty thousand men uniformly clothed in British broad cloth, officered after the European manner and

divided up into battalions under brigades. The park of artillery is

numerous and excellent. Not only cannon is cast in Cochin China, but shells, cannon ball and grape, and very good gunpowder is manufactured. All this makes the power of Cochin China sufficiently formidable to its native neighbours, but it is in all probability the very circum-

stances which would render it an easier prey to the ambition of any European power that might attempt its conquest. The principal part of the army, the whole magazines and granaries of the Kingdom, are at the seat of government the capture of which, no arduous enterprise to an European power, would be nearly equivalent to the conquest of 150. Cambodia, as the term is now understood, had become a protectorate of Gia Long's by 1812, and was thereafter a bone of contention between

Vietnam and Siam. Crawfurd uses the term Cambodia (Kamboja) in a wider sense to take in the whole Mekong delta region including Saigon. 195

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Alastair Lamb

the whole Kingdom. What degree of military courage was displayed by the Cochin Chinese troops in the long civil contest which took place among themselves I do not know, but as far as our own short experience

went the soldiers appeared to us to be remarkable only for their timidity

and singularly destitute of the confidence necessary to make good

soldiers. The terror of the European name was in particular here felt to an extent which I have never seen equalled even among the most timid of the peasantry in Western India. I make no hesitation in giving it as my decided opinion that no foreign influence exists at the Court of Cochin China hostile to our own political interests. Of all European nations the Cochin Chinese entertain great jealousy, nor is it in the least degree probable as long as the

country remains as it now is, united and free from insurrection or inter-

nal dissention, that they will permit any European party to establish an influence of the least importance in their councils. The whole of what

is now called the French party in Cochin China never amounted to

above 12 or 13 individuals, of whom two only are now alive.151 The missionaries have no influence whatever and never come near the seat of government. Of the French who have recently visited Cochin China, neither his present nor his late Majesty ever permitted an individual to come into his presence. The greater number of them indeed have not even been permitted to come within the walls of the new city, still less do they hold any fresh employments. Had the treaty which was concluded with France in 1787, when the Kingdom was divided by a civil war, been carried into effect matters would have taken a very different turn from what they have done, and the certain result would have been a French conquest of the country. The war between France and Great Britain put an end to this expectation, and ever since the year 1802, when the power of the late King was established without opposition throughout the whole of his present dominions and the assistance of the individuals of the French nation employed by him in his wars was no longer necessary, they ceased to have any influence or authority. In December, 1817, a mission from the Court of France arrived in

Cochin China. The Envoy was Mr. Kargariou, an officer of rank in

the French Navy, and from what I could learn from native authority the object of the mission was to require the cession of the Bay and territory of Turon tfiven to France by the treaty of 1787, as well as the payment of a certain debt said to be owing to the Court of France by

that of Cochin China. The late King, although the prince who had

formed the French connection, would neither see the Envoy nor receive

the presents of His Majesty Louis XVIII, highly offended, as I was

given to understand from the same source, at the nature of the proposi151. At the time of Roberts visit to Hué in 1804 there were four Frenchmen in the service Gia Long, Chaigneau, Vannier, de Forsanz and Despiau. De Forsanz died in 1811. Dr. Despiau, however, was still in Hué at the

time of Crawfurd's visit and died there of cholera in 1824. Despiau

was, by all accounts, a physician of abysmal mediocrity whose mental faculties, towards the end of his life, declined considerably. He failed to make a fortune during his long stay in Cochin China- he came out in 1J95 - and he enjoyed no political influence at all. It is not surprising that Crawfurd should make no mention of him. 388.)

(See: Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 296; Maybon, op. cit., pp. 387196

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Missions to Cochin China

tions made to him.152 In March last the Franch frigate Cleopatre

touched at Turon Bay, and it was generally given out that the commander was charged with some diplomatic mission from the Court of France, but neither would his present Majesty grant this officer an audience. 153i The French gentlemen at the Court of Cochin China themselves gave it out that His Majesty the King of Cochin China declined making over to France the territorial cession yielded in the treaty of 1787 only because he apprehended that Great Britain in the event of a war with France would seize upon the territory in question and make it a pretext for establishing its power in the Kingdom. The explanation

however offered by the natives, which represented His Majesty as

152. Crawfurd, of course, was misinformed as to the objectives of the Kergariou mission (see pp. ? above). Kergariou's instructions, which are printed below, make it quite clear that the French envoy was authorised to do no more than show the flag of the Restoration Monarchy and exchange compliments with Gia Long. Crawfurd does not state his source for this information, but implies that it came from some official personage. Perhaps we can detect here an example of the determination of the Cochin Chinese to avoid foreign entanglements, and can conclude that this information was given to Crawfurd to convince him that there was no danger of the Cochin Chinese permitting the establishment of French influence. Extract from de Kergariou's Instructions, issued by the French Ministry of the îVIarine and Colonies. (Translated from T'oung Pao, Series 2, Vol. IX, 1906, p. 177.)

On your arrival in that Bay [the Bay of Tourane] you will write to Messrs. Chaigneau and Vannier, former Naval Officers at present Mandarins at the King's Court. These gentlemen, having rendered services to His Majesty, should be able to help in obtaining an audience. But your mission having solely for its object to show the flag of the King of France in 1he seas of Asia, to protect there French vessels who might find themselves there, to collect useful information on trade and navigation, and there being no question of opening any negotiations, you will so inform Messrs. Chaig-

neau and Vannier.

You will, besides, say to them that His Majesty having

ordered you to call at Cochin China, has wished to offer to the

Sovereign of this Kingdom a small present as a token of the friendship which the unfortunate Louis XVI had for him and of that which he had also held for His Majesty, as much for their respective merits as for the similarity of their destinies. You will do your best to obtain an audience with His Majesty and present to him yourself this gift. But, whether you succeed in this or not, you will take this opportunity to inform His Majesty of the return to the kingdom of his ancestors of the King of France, Louis XVIII, and you will seek in his name the aid of His Majesty the King of Cochin China and Tonkin for the sailors and merchants of France who might come to the ports of his dominions. You will stay in the port of Tourane no longer than is necessary to fulfil this part of your mission; you will then set sail and cruise down the coasts of Cochin China. I authorise

you to put in at those ports of this kingdom in which the safety of your frigate, the purchase of fresh provisions and the need for water or wood should induce you to enter. You should leave this region by the middle of February [1818]. 153. The French frigate Cléopâtre, commanded by Courson de la Ville Hélio, anchored at Tourane on 28th February, 1822. Its commander sought an audience with Minh-Mang which was refused. The Cléopâtre set sail

on 2nd March, 1822. (See: H. Cordier, Le Consulat de France à Hué

sous la Restauration, Paris 1884, pp. 81-83.) 197

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Alastair Lamb

indignant at the prospect for a cession of part of his territory to a foreign

power, appears to me to be more reasonable and more consonant to the real character of the government and to the political station which it at present occupies. If the Court of France in sending the mission of 1817 really contemplated an acquisition of territory, an establishment in 'the country or any other political advantages beyond a fair commercial intercourse,

it must have acted in profound ignorance of the real state of the country

and the character of the government. Mr. Chaigneau, one of the French Mandarines now at the Court, returned to France in 1820 and, as he held an intercourse with the French Ministry, would have put them in possession of such information respecting the true state of the country

as must dissuade them from any other attempt to acquire political

influence in Cochin China until some internal change takes place in the Kingdom. Should however at some future period foreign European influence hostile to ourselves be established in Cochin China, or the government of that country be led into an offensive alliance against us, it appears in my judgement that there is no situation where such an influence could be more easily destroyed without the smallest risk of involving ourselves

in the affairs of the country. The capital and all the central provinces of the kingdom of Cochin China depend chiefly for subsistence upon the fertile countries lying upon the two great rivers of Tonquin and Kamboja, and the government receives the principal part of its revenues from the same quarter. A blockade of these two rivers, therefore, which could be done safely and effectively with the smallest naval force, would soon reduce the government of Cochin China to any terms that it might be found necessary to prescribe to it. The necessity of such a measure,

however, from the fair character of the Cochin Chinese government, but

above all from its great apprehension of the British power in India, can from present appearances be viewed only as a remote probability.

I have, & ca.,

Bay of Turon, J. Crawfurd.

Cochin China, October 25th, 1822.

(E)

crawfurd's general report on his mission to cochin china, dated 3RD APRIL, 1823.

Board's Collections, Vol. 774, Collection No. 20,935

115. I now proceed to offer a sketch of Cochin China. The

Empire known to us by that name appears to be in geographical extent at least the largest state which has ever existed in the regions between Hindustan and China, for it comprehends by far the larger part of that 198

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Plate XI. The Deputy Governor of Cambodia in his dress of ceremony. (From Crawfurd, Embassy , op. cit.)

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Missions to Cochin China

extensive peninsula which is situated between the Gulfs of Siam and

Tonquin.154

116. This Empire, which took its existing form in the first years of this century, comprises the whole of Cochin China, the whole of Tonquin, the principal part of Kamboja and the little state of Champa. Its geographical limits extend from the point of Kamboja .... to the northern confines of Tonquin .... It is bordered to the north by the Chinese provinces of Canton, Kwangsi and Yu-nan, and to the west by the kingdoms of Laos and Siam. The Gulfs of Siam and Tonquin and the China Sea bound it in every other direction. 117. For an estimate of the population of Cochin China I unfortunately found it impracticable to obtain any correct statements. There is every reason to believe however that it has been very greatly exag-

gerated. The last European writer whose work appeared as late as 1810 goes the length of stating it as no less than 23 ,000,000. 155 Tonquin

is by far the most populous portion of the Empire, and there is no

question that the extensive alluvial districts situated on its fine river are

very thickly inhabited. Cochin China with the exception of a few

favourable spots is a sterile and mountainous country and but thinly

populated. The same observations apply to Champa and Kamboja. The French gentlemen156 with whom I conversed in Cochin China 154. The first 114 paragraphs of this report, which deal with Crawfurd's mission to Siam, have been printed in The Crawfurd Papers, Bangkok 1915. A French translation of the paragraphs printed here, which relate to

Cochin China, was published by H. Berland in BSEI (NS) No. 1, 1948,

Les Papiers du Dr. Crawfurd. This was intended to provide those portions relating to Cochin China which were excluded from the documents printed in The Crawfurd Papers, Bangkok, 1915. The Bangkok collection was translated into French by Berland and published in BSEI 1941. 155. Père de la Bissachière, a French missionary who lived in various parts of Cochin China from 1789 to 1806, provided much information on the history and economy of Cochin China which was incorporated into the following two works: Felix Renouard de Sainte Croix, Voyage Commercial aux Indes Orientales, Paris 1810; and Baron de Montyon, Exposé statistique du Tonkin et de la Cochinchine, London 1811. Crawfurd is referring to one these two books. 156. Chaigneau and Vannier. Much of Crawfurd's information on Cochin China, its economy and history, seems to have been derived from this source. Crawfurd had access to a memorandum compiled by Chaigneau while in France in 1820, and intended for the information of the French Government. Crawfurd, in his Embassy, op. cit., refers to this document as the M.S. of M. Chaigneau. The portion of this quoted in Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., pp. 519-520 note, is a direct translation of part of Chaigneau's memorandum which Taboulet prints, Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 297-300. It seems unlikely, however, that Crawfurd was allowed to see this document in its entirety, for Chaigneau in his concluding summary points out the following advantages of a closer connection between France and Cochin China:

in times of war against England, [Chaigneau observed] French frigates would be able to undertake on these seas patrols useful for us and harmful for the enemy, who would not be able to bring past the produce of China. Our ships would always find

in Cochin China safe harbours, supplies of every kind, and, among the natives, friendly dispositions

disdains the advantages which the favourable inclination of the Emperor [Gia Long] would make it easy to obtain, it is to be

feared that a rival nation will seize them.

199

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Alastair Lamb

seemed inclined to estimate the whole population of the Kingdom at about ten millions, but even this appears to me to be greatly overrating it; and upon the whole holding in view the character of the government, the state of civilisation and industry, the nature of the soil and the geographical extent of the country, and comparing all these circumstances with those of countries the amount of whose inhabitants have

been better determined, I should not be inclined to rate the population

of the Cochin China Empire at above 6,000,000 of inhabitants. One

ingredient in the population of Siam, namely the Chinese, forms in the mass of that of Cochin China comparatively but an unimportant and inconsiderable one. They were estimated to me to amount throughout the Kingdom to about 40,000, of which 30,000 were assigned to Tonquin, 5,000 to Kamboja - or, rather, to Sai-gon - and as many more to the central provinces including the capital. 118. The Kingdom of Cochin China, although I thought inferior to Siam in fertility of soil and in variety and richness of productions, possesses extraordinary advantages for commerce, both from its central

situation and its navigable rivers and its innumerable and excellent

harbours.

119. Within the whole Kingdom there appear to be no less than 5 great or considerable navigable rivers, viz., that of Kangkac,157 of Kamboja, of Sai-gon, of Tonquin and Hui. 120. The first of these empties itself into the Gulf of Siam, and upon this are situated Athien158 and Pontiemas.159 This river, which connects itself with the great river of Kamboja and thro' it leads to the capital of that Kingdom, Panomipen,160 was much frequented about a

century ago by European traders. This is the place to which in my

negotiation with the Cochin Chinese Court I was anxious to obtain a free access as being the only considerable Cochin Chinese port upon the Gulf of Siam and offering a more direct access into the interior of

Kamboja. 121. The River of Kamboja appears to be one of the longest in

Asia. It empties itself into the sea in about the latitude of 10°, extends thro' the whole of Kamboja, the Kingdom of Laos, the Chinese province

of Yu-nan and, if the map of the Jesuits can be relied upon, passes

through Boutan and has its origins in the mountains of Tartary about the

latitude 35°. Owing to the anarchy and disorder which have for more than a century back prevailed in Kamboja, this river has for a long time scarcely been frequented by Europeans. Yet at one period it seems to have been well known and tolerable delineations have been handed down to us of the lower portions of it. 157. The river Kangkac. The Giang-thanh river leading to the Vinh-te canal which joins the Bassac branch of the Mekong at Chau Doc. The details of this waterway are shown in PI. Ill of Vol. 1 of L. Malleret, L'Archéologie du Delta du Mekong, Paris 1959. 158. Athien = Ha-tien.

159. Pontiemas was situated a few miles upstream from Ha-tien. Until 1717, when it was destroyed by the Siamese, it was the main port by which

European traders approached Pnompenh. (See: Hamilton, East Indies op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 105-108.) 160 Panomipen = Pnompenh. 200

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Missions to Cochin China

122. The River of Sai-gon ... is politically one of the safest and most commercial navigable streams in the world. Ships of almost any

size may enter into it without a pilot and even sail to the city of Sai-gon,

50 miles up the stream, by the common sailing directions. The natives informed me that the river was navigable for craft of considerable burden for 20 days voyage above this place. The River of Sai-gon is

not only convenient for navigation, but the alluvial districts in its vicinity

are highly productive; and on this account it forms the second place of

commerce in the Kingdom, ranking next to Cachao in Tonquin, and of late years it has attracted the whole commerce of Kamboja which used formerly to be conducted on the great river of that country itself. 123. Cochin China proper has no navigable river of any magnitude.

The River of Hui,

being but shallow, is not of extensive utility either to external or internal

navigation. Its estuary, however, forms a fine harbour. In the South West Monsoon ships of 200 tons burden enter and quit it in great safety. In the opposite Monsoon, on the contrary, it is almost inaccessible. 124. In Tonquin there is one river which in former periods was

well known to European navigators, and appears to have been then

accessible, notwithstanding the bar at its mouth, to vessels of 400 or 500 tons burden.161 From the best information I could obtain the entrance appears at present to be much obstructed by sand banks, and the river

is not navigable for vessels above 200 tons burden. The capital of

Tonquin is situated upon this stream at a distance of about 120 miles from its mouth. This river, which fertilises a great tract of country, is the principal source of the productiveness of Tonquin, and, having its origin in the centre of the great Chinese province of Yu-nan and extending throughout the whole of Tonquin, it would appear to afford a very extensive and useful internal navigation. 125. In regard to harbours Cochin China appears to be singularly fortunate. Within the 6 degrees and a half of latitude which intervene between Cape St. James and the Bay of Turon there are no less than 11 of the finest harbours in the world, accessible with every wind and safe to approach, and when attained affording the most complete pro-

tection.

126. The high roads and canals, constructed by the late king,

may here be alluded to as contributing very materially to encourage the trade and industry of the country. By the latter as well as the former Cochin China proper and Tonquin are now united to each other and by this channel a constant trading intercourse is maintained between them independent of the Monsoons. 127. An extensive chain of primitive mountains divides Kamboja

a low country - from Cochin China, while Tonquin is generally a wide champaign country. This formation of the land is a source of

considerable diversity in climate and productions, and renders much of these component parts of the Empire in a commercial point of view the more necessary to each other. In the champaign countries of Kamboja and Tonquin the two dry seasons correspond with those of Bengal and

161. See: Maybon, op. cit., pp. 403-409, for an account of the river of Tonkin, which was used by merchants of the English East India Company in the 17th century. 201

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Alastair Lamb

other countries about the northern Tropic, but owing to the extensive

range of mountains which run between Kamboja and Cochin China the seasons are exactly reversed, and the rain begins to fall in the

middle of October extending throughout the whole of the cold season. 128. The productive grain countries are necessarily those situated upon the great rivers of Tonquin and Kamboja and consequently supply

the capital and the central part of the kingdom with a very large portion

of their consumption. The latter could not well subsist without a large supply from the former, and this is the source of the most extensive

branch of its trade.

129. I shall proceed to enumerate the principal products of the country in reference to their importance to us as articles of foreign trade. Sugar is the most valuable of them. This is cheaply produced in the central districts of Cochin China proper, and both in agriculture

and manufacture is the result of the labour of the natives of the country

and not of that of the Chinese as in Siam. Upon the whole the commodity, of a good grain, is inferior in whiteness to that of Siam. The whole exportation appears to be about 130,000 piculs and has principally been sent to China. 130. Raw silk is the next article in value. Of this there is little

or none produced in Kamboja, but in Cochin China the culture as we had an opportunity of observing ourselves is extensive, and in Tonquin is still more so. The quantity of this commodity which the whole kingdom could export was estimated to me at about 120,000 lbs. weight a year. TCie objections to it are the shortness of the skein and, therefore, its unsuitableness to our machinery, and the want of gloss in the staple resulting from the solution of the gummy matter owing to the cocoons being subjected to too high a temperature in reeling them. A seer162 oř it duly examined in the Calcutta market was considered to be worth 11 Rs., being considered somewhat better than Bengal silk not produced

at the Company's filatures. The French ships which lately visited

Cochin China carried home considerable quantities of it, and it appears

that the coarser kind was found to answer very well in the French

market.

131. Cochin China produces the true cinnamon. The whole pro-

duce of this article for exportation appears to be about 2,000 piculs163

or 266,000 lbs. Its growth is confined to the mountains of central Cochin China, from whence it is exported to Kamboja and Tonquin,

but principally to China where it is much more highly valued than any

other quality of this aromatic. Altho' in taste highly agreeable and

aromatic in its present state of preparation, it is not suited to the Indian or European markets. To render it suited to our consumption it would be necessary that the natives should be instructed in freeing it from the epidermis and otherwise packing and preparing it as practised in Ceylon, a matter which might be communicated without difficulty through the Chinese. 132. Another exclusive product of the central provinces which is extensively cultivated and supplied to the neighbouring provinces is 162. By a seer Crawfurd meant a weight of about 3 lbs. 40 seers made a maund

163. A picul equals 100 catties or 133i lbs. 202

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Missions to Cochin China

tea. This is a very coarse and very cheap commodity, the price seldom exceeding a penny or two pence a pound. Whether under other circumstances of our relations with this part of the world this tea might not be exported for the consumption of the poorer estates in England may be a subject for consideration. 133. The productions of the alluvial districts of the kingdom and the adjacent forests are nearly identical with those of Siam, and it will only be necessary to enumerate the principal of them. These are for Kamboja: gamboge,164 cardomuns, eagle wood, areka,165 ivory, stick lac,166 hides and bones, dried fish, rare woods and woods for naval and

domestic architecture. For Tonquin they are: varnish, stick lac and

woods and roots for dying.

134. Of these commodities it will only be necessary to specify 2 or 3. Valuable timber is only found in Kamboja. A small quantity

of teak-wood, but undeserving of notice, is found in the forests of this country. The wood used for ship-building and for the manufacture of gun carriages, and for almost all architectural purposes is one called in the native language Sao. Not having seen the tree which produces it, we had no opportunity of ascertaining its botanical character. This

timber from all accounts is strong and durable. It is carried to the

capital in large quantities and from it were constructed the whole of the public buildings as well as the numerous and very beautiful gun carriages which we had an opportunity of examining in the Royal Arsenal. A hard black wood is extensively used in cabinet work, and being of large dimensions and affording a fine polish seems extremely well suited to this purpose, and may probably answer for exportation to our settle-

ments. Kamboja also produces the timber called by the Portuguese

rose-wood, and this the Chinese export as they do from Siam.

135. Of the vegetable products exported from Tonquin I shall advert only to one. This is a species of root called in the Annam

language Mao Kin and in that of Canton Shu-leong .166a It forms the

dead-weight of all Chinese cargoes exported from Tonquin. This,

which is a very cheap material, is extensively used both throughout

Tonquin and Cochin China as well as in China as the material for a red dye, and it is on this account that I notice it here, believing it possible that it may be applied to similar purpose by own manu-

facturers.

164. Gamboge. A drug prepared from the sap of a species of jungle tree related to the mangostine tree. The name appears to be derived from Kamboja, the Malay name for Cambodia which is the chief source of this commodity.

165. Areka. The fruit of the Areka palm. The dried Areca nuts were widely consumed in India and China, where they were appreciated as a stimulant comparable with tea, coffee or tobacco. 166. Stick lac. An incrustation produced on certain trees by the lac insect. The crude resinous product is known as stick lack, from which is produced lac dye and the varnish base known as shellac. The lac dye produces a red colour, and from the word lac is derived the English term lake as in crimson lake. The lac insect occurs throughout S.E. Asia, but the best quality product is to be found in the mainland rather than the islands.

166a. Berland, BSEI 1947, p. 55n, equates this with the Tonkinese dyestuff cu-nau, which provides the burnt Sienna colour of the clothes most commonly worn by the ordinary people of Tonkin. 203

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Alastair Lamb

136. Tonquin is the only portion of the Cochin Chinese Empire which yields the metals. Among these are iron, gold and silver. The iron of Tonquin, which seems to be nearly as cheap as that of Siam, supplies the whole kingdom with the exception of Sai-gon which is

furnished from the latter country.

137. About 12 days journey from Cachao,1®7 the capital of Tonquin, and lying in a westerly direction from it, are situated the gold and silver mines of Ton-Seng and Sai-Seng. These as well as the iron mines, are entirely wrought by Chinese settlers and not by the natives. Of the quantity of gold these yield I could procure no account, but

the ackowledged amount of the silver is 215,000 to 220,000 ounces

annually. Of both metals a large quantity, it is admitted, is smuggled into the neighbouring provinces of China. The gold and silver of Tonquin is both cast and coined into ingots in the country itself. 138. Tonquin also affords both copper and spelter, but commercially only, for I have reason to believe that these 2 metals are imported from Yu-nan. In whatever way obtained, the price of the spelter at least appears to be very moderate at Cachao, where it is largely purchased by the government to be coined, as it forms the principal currency of the kingdom.

139. The commodities which the Cochin Chinese receive in the

course of commerce in exchange for their productions now enumerated, are: the manufactured goods of China, certain of the productions of the Malayan Islands and of India, and a few of the manufactures of Europe. 140. The productions they receive from China are manufactured silks, porcelain, medical drugs, a very large supply of paper principally

for religious purposes and some fine teas. From the Malayan countries they receive pepper, cloves and nutmegs with sandal wood and

tin; and from India opium and saltpetre. From Europe the present

importations consist only of broad cloth and fine cotton goods, fire arms and wrought iron.

141. Upon some of these articles I shall offer a few remarks. Pepper of a good quality but in small quantity and of high price is produced in the central provinces of Cochin China. The quantity is inadequate to the demands which the Chinese trade creates for its exportation, and this article as well as tin may be pointed out as commodities likely to be imported with advantage into Cochin China. Of opium the consumption of the kingdom, estimating the wholesale price

at 3,500 Spanish Dollars the chest, is stated to be about 150 chests a

year, two thirds of this being estimated for Tonquin and one third for Cochin China and Kamboja. Until the establishment of Singapore the whole of this supply had been obtained indirectly from Canton, some portion of it by the junks and a great deal by land communication.

142. Broad cloth seems long to have been consumed in Cochin

China, and at present the army amounting to 40,000 men is uniformly and amply clothed in British woollens consisting chiefly of strong coarse scarlet broad cloth, and a small quantity of yellow and green of the

same texture with a few serges. Independently of these, there is a 167. The old Hanoi.

204

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Missions to Cochin China

demand for some woollens of a finer fabric among the better classes of the people for occasional winter use. 143. From Canton and Singapore the junks have of late brought small quantities of fine heavy cotton goods, which are much in request amongst the better classes. Chintzes and other coloured cotton goods, so well suited to the taste of the Siamese, are not at all consumed by the Cochin Chinese with the exception of handkerchiefs. Neither are our coarse white cottons such as are manufactured in India fit to be

imported in Cochin China, for from the specimens which I brought from that country it does not appear that we are capable of competing with them in this direction with their domestic manufacture.

144. The Cochin Chinese, notwithstanding their skill in the fabrication of cannon and the manufacture of ammunition, are incapable of supplying themselves with fire arms and have at all times been furnished

with them by Europeans. One of the French ships which came out in 1819 supplied the King of Cochin China with 10,000 stand of arms, yet these still continue as articles in demand.168 Notwithstanding the apparent cheapness of the native iron of both Siam and Cochin China, still this does not exclude the importation of the same commodity from Europe, the use of which, from the little loss sustained in the operation of forging compared to the native metal, has advantages over it even in point of dearness. 145. The foreign trade of the Cochin Chinese Empire is almost

exclusively with China. The trade which it carries on with Siam is inconsiderable, and that with Europeans still smaller. The Cochin Chinese, like the Siamese and, I presume, for the same reasons, are prohibited from going abroad, and whatever foreign trade they possess is carried on not by themselves but by the natives of those countries with whom they hold intercourse. The subjects of Cochin China, however, are permitted to go abroad by licence, and in this manner a few of them visit China; and within the last two or three years several of

their merchants have visited the European ports in the Straits of

Malacca and particularly Singapore. I may here remark that were the Cochin Chinese permitted the liberty of freely going abroad I know no people of the East so well fitted to make expert mariners from their

hardiness, their activity and their prompt and cheerful habits of obedience. The Cochin Chinese, altho' not permitted to go abroad,

conduct a considerable traffic by sea between one part of the Empire and another. In the course of this, as well as in the transporting of

the tributes to the capital, they acquire a good deal of maritime experience. Their vessels, it has been remarked by good judges, are

the best description of native craft anywhere to be seen in India, and fit to encounter without danger the worst weather. In addition to this testimony, the 2 French gentlemen at the Court of Cochin China who had each commanded a corvette of 16 guns manned entirely by Cochin Chinese assured me that they made brave and expert seamen.

168. The Henry, commanded by Captain Rey and belonging to the Bordeaux merchant house of Philippon, made its second voyage to Cochin China in 1819 - the first voyage was in 1817-1818 - with a cargo of 10,000 rifles. (See: Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 290-292; H. Cordier, Bordeaux et la Cochinchine sous la Restauration , T'oung Pao 1904, p. 529; Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago, op. cit. p. 230.) 205

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Alastair Lamb

146. The Chinese trade of the Empire is chiefly conducted with

Cachao in Tonquin, Sai-gon in Kamboja and Hui and Faifo in Cochin China, but there is also some intercourse with the minor ports of

Pung-tai, Ya-trang, Fu-yin, Sam Chao, Kwin-nyon and Kwang-yiieo

147. On the part of China the trade is conducted with all the

4 great maritime provinces from the Gulf of Tonquin up to the Yellow

Sea, and commonly with several ports of each. Of all this trade, it

may be generally observed that from the nature of the monsoons an annual voyage only can be made. The trade between Tonquin, Hainan and Canton, from their nearness and relative position, is an exception and admits of 2 voyages yearly.

148. The following sketch will convey a tolerable idea of the

character and amount of the Chinese trade.

Port of Cachao in Tonquin. From the Island of Hai-nan 18 junks of 2,000 piculs burden

each

From Canton 11 junks of 2,250 piculs burden each 24,750 From Fokien 7 junks of 2,250 piculs burden each 15,750

From Kiang-nan and Chi-kiang 7 junks of 2,500 piculs burden

each

Port of Sai-gon in Kamboja.

From Hai-nan 20 junks of 2,250 piculs burden each 45,000 From the port of Canton 2 junks of 6,000 piculs

burden

each

...

From Fokien 1 junk of 7,000 piculs burden

From the provinces of Chi-kiang and Kiang-nan 7 junks

of

6,500

piculs

Port of Faifo in Cochin China.

burden

each

From Hai-nan 3 junks of 2,750 piculs burden each 8,250 From the port of Canton 6 junks of 3,000 piculs

burden

....

From Fokien 4 junks of 3,000 piculs burden each ... 12,000 From Kiang-nan and Chi-kiang 2 junks of 2,500

piculs

burden

each

Port of Hui. From Hai-nan, Canton, Macao and the Northern Provinces generally 10 junks averaging at about 3,000 piculs burden

Minor Ports of Cochin China.

From different ports in China 18 junks of about

2,000 piculs burden each ... 36,000

(Total) Piculs ... 311,750 149. The whole of this trade, at a rate of 16 piculs to a ton.

amounts to nearly 20,000 tons, being very little more than one half of the Chinese trade of the single port of Bangkok, such is the benefit

derived to the latter from the numbers and free enterprise of the

Chinese residents of that country, for I make no doubt that it is to them

alone that the superiority of the Siamese trade is to be attributed.

169. Pung-tai - ? Phanri; Ya-trang = ? Nha-trang; Fu-yin = Phuyen; Sam Chao = ? Song-cau; Kwin-nyon = Qui-nhon; Kwang-yi = ? Quang-tri. 206

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Missions to Cochin China

150. The trade of Cochin China with Siam and which is confined

to the port of Sai-gon I have already described.170

151. The Cochin Chinese Government is in theory nearly as despotic and arbitrary as that of Siam, but in practice it is, if not

milder, certainly of a more manly and candid character. The Cochin

Chinese in their forms of Government, as they do in their other institu-

tions, imitate the Chinese; and they fall as much short of these people in the administration of their laws as they do in ingenuity and enterprise. The only rank amongst them is official, and this, as in China, is divided into 2 great classes, a civil and a military, an arrangement which creates throughout the provinces a sort of double administration. 152. The form of the administration is regular in the habits and modes of transacting business, equally prompt and methodical. Instead of the procrastination which characterises most eastern governments, a stranger will be surprised in Cochin China to find the almost alacritous despatch in all official business; but it is probable that this is an accidental advantage belonging to the personal character of the Sovereign.

153. In Cochin Oiina the princes of the blood seem to have no

share in the administration.171 The first dignity in the Kingdom is that

of Kwan. This is commonly bestowed upon the First Minister and

upon the Governor of Kamboja and Tonquin. Under the First Minister are 6 principal officers of state, who execute the details of the administration. The first in rank of these is the Chancellor who is

charged with the care of the archives and public correspondence. The

second is the Minister of Ceremonies and religions - for these two departments are considered to have a direct relation to each other.

The third is the Minister of Justice, the fourth the Minister of Finance, the fifth the Minister of War and the sixth the Minister of Woods and Forests. The duties of the latter officer are a little complex and 170. In paragraph 32 of this report Crawfurd gives a few more details of this trade. Apart from Saigon, Ha-tien was also concerned in the SiamCochin China trade, which was carried out almost exclusively by Chinese merchants. Cochin China imported from Siam iron, and exported to it raw silk. He estimated, in paragraph 36, that 18 junks of 850 piculs burden each traded annually between Bangkok and Saigon. 171. Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., p. 324, gives the following account of Gia Long's central administration:

The central government consisted, as under the Le, of six ministers ( luo-bo ) . . . The Minister of Personnel ( bo-Lai ) selected the civil servants, conferred titles and grades, drew up edicts and

proclamations. The Minister of Finance (bo Ho) was in charge of the state treasury, the regulation of taxes and the fixing of prices. The Minister of Rites (bo Lé) arranged the public ceremonies, examinations and rewards for meritorious persons. The Minister of the Army (bo Binh) recruited officers and soldiers and kept watch over public order. The Minister of Justice (bo Hinh) concerned himself with laws and punishments and with

the review of legal cases. The Minister of Public Works (bo Cong) arranged the construction of public buildings, citadels and war junks, and organised the conscription of labour and the purchase of materials. Each ministry consisted of a president (i thuong-thu ), two vice-presidents (tham-tri) and two assessors (thi-lang). It was this council, and not the minister by himself, which made all the decisions. The disagreement of a single

member resulted in the need for reference to be made to the

Sovereign.

207

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Alastair Lamb

not fully expressed in the title. He not only superintends the forests but everything that is constructed of wood, which of course includes the public buildings and houses.

154. The Governors of Kamboja and Tonquin have their courts

and public officers as at the capital, but they make regular reports of all their proceedings in every department to the Government. 155. The bane of the Government of Cochin China, like that of Siam, is the universal conscription. One third of the whole adult male population of the country is constantly employed upon the public service, and, as in Cochin China there is a numerous priesthood to escape to for immunity from the levee; and as a pecuniary commutation is not admitted for the natives, the conscription falls perhaps a little more heavily upon the people than in Siam itself. Altho' the conscription is ostensibly for military service, yet the soldiers are compelled to perform many species of hard toil and menial offices that the officers of

the Government may please to exact of them over and above their

military duties, such as the construction of fortifications, rowing and navigating the King's gallies and those of the chiefs and conveying the

taxes and tributes to the capital. We ourselves had opportunities of seeing them drawing water and carrying the chiefs' palanquins, and this too in their military uniforms. 156. Of the laws of Cochin China it is only necessary to say that

they are borrowed from China, but that they are evidently administered

in a spirit of less justice and mildness than in that country. The cane seems to be the great remedy for all offences. Every one who is but a single grade above another, either in a civil or a domestic relation, seems to consider himself warranted in applying it without scruple. The petty officer punishes the soldier and the officer the petty officer. The husband punishes his wife and the wife her children. Altho' our experience of them was but short and our intercourse casual, we had oportunities of seeing examples of all these and I had certainly not believed that corporal punishment could have been so frequently exercised in any country until I had experienced the Cochin Chinese. 157. Corruption and extortion among the officers of the Government are almost universal, and they appear to have no respect for the property or the services of the lower classes except in so far as they may contribute to their own convenience or emolument. 158. The military force of Cochin China forms as it is at present

constituted the most singular part of its government. The Cochin

Chinese army which consisted during the latter years of the civil war

of 150,000 men does not at present exceed 40,000. The men com-

monly consist of the elite of the general conscription. This army is

dressed, equipped and disciplined after the European manner. A

regiment consists of 10 companies of 60 men in each of which there

are no less than 12 non-commissioned officers and a 1st and 2nd captain. The regiment is commanded by a Colonel and a Lieutenant

Colonel. 5 regiments constitute a legion or brigade which has a chief

and a 2nd chief. 172 The artillery is a distinct service from the 172. Brigade = doanh ; regiment = ve; company = doi. Crawfurďs table of organisation for the army agrees well with that given in Le Thanh К hoi, op. cit., p. 330. 208

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Plate XII. The King of Cochin China (Minh-Mang) in his dress of ceremony. (From Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit.)

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Missions to Cochin China

infantry, and forms the completest and best organised portion of the army. There is no cavalry, for the small horses of the country are

unfit for this description of service. The allowances of the troops consist of pay and rations. They receive pay only when on actual

duty, and receive neither pay nor rations when on furlough. The pay of a common soldier of the infantry as well as of the non-commissioned officers, for in this respect there is no distinction between them, is one kwan a month and one measure of rice which consists of almost 64

lbs. The 2nd captain has 2 kwans and 2 measures of rice; the 1st

captain 3 kwans and 3 measures of rice; and the Colonel 8 kwans and 8 measures of rice; and the commander of a brigade has 30 kwans and 30 measures of rice. A regular pensionary system exists, and as the reward of merit or eminent services pay is often advanced when no

promotions take place. Besides all this, a large sum is disbursed by

the King for the funeral of every soldier, the only religious ceremony to which the Cochin Chinese attach any importance.

159. The fortifications and arsenals of the Kingdom are still

superior to the army. Almost everything in this department is upon

an European model. Besides the fortifications and arsenals of the

capital which I have described in my journal, there are also a strong and well constructed fortress and well arranged arsenal at Sai-gon, a strong fortress at Ya-trang and another at Kwin-nyon, not to mention the redoubts in the Bay of Turon and the strong fort at the mouth of

the river of Hui.

160. Since the termination of the civil wars the navy of Cochin China has been permitted to fall into decay. The late King had at one time 2 fine corvettes mounting 18 guns each, which were commanded by the French gentlemen who are still at Court, with an extraordinary number of war-gallies after the Cochin Chinese fashion. Of the latter

a good number still exist. They are lugg rigged vessels of 70 or 80 feet long, but extremely narrow. Their crew commonly consists of about 50 men, and they are usually rowed by 40 oars, carrying about 10 small pieces of brass cannon. It was in them that we were conveyed to the capital, and therefore we had a good opportunity of observing the extraordinary degree of good order and systematic discipline which

was maintained in them.

161. The whole of this system of military organisation was the creation of the late King, who received his instruction from a few Europeans, principally of the French nation. The most remarkable

person among these was Pignon, a native of Brussels and titular Bishop of Adran. A splendid mausoleum has been erected to the memory of this singular man by the gratitude of his employer, which is to be

seen within a few miles of Sai-gon. 173 The plan once matured,

however, now exists without the assistance of any European talent and 173. Pigneau de Behaine, who was born in 1741 at Origny-en-Thierache in the department of Aisne, and not in Brussels as Crawfurd says here. (See: A. Faure, Les Francais en Cochinchine au XVIlIe Siecle: Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, Eveque ď Adran, Paris 1891.) The French, in 1861, declared Pigneau 's tomb to be a national monument. (Ibid., p. 232.) 209

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Alastair Lamb

it is very remarkable that there is not a foreigner of any description whatever in the ranks of the army, nor employed in superintending

the arsenals, foundries or fortifications.

162. I believe the revenue of Cochin China to be very small in proportion to its extent and population. It arises from a land tax, a capitulation tax and imposts upon trade. The rigor of the con-

scription, while it appears to place the whole resources of the Kingdom at the disposal of the Sovereign, really impoverishes the people and dries up every fountain of production. The property of the cultivated land is considered to be vested in the Sovereign, but the tax or rent which the best description of them pay is fixed at one twentieth part of their

produce which is paid in kind. In conveying this tax to the capital

an enormous and cumbrous establishment is constantly maintained, of

which we had ourselves an opportunity of seeing a very large proportion. The capitulation tax amounts to Ц kwan or a Spanish Dollar for each family whether natives or strangers. The imposts upon trade consist principally of duty on measurement or tonnage with an export

duty upon a few articles of luxury. These are levied only upon

foreign commerce, and the domestic trade is nearly free from duties. The rudeness and unskilfulness of their fiscal arrangements will go a

considerable way towards accounting for the real poverty of the

Cochin Chinese Government notwithstanding its ostentatious display

of military strength and resources.

163. The religious institutions of Cochin China provide the

most singular contrast with those of the Siamese and their immediate neighbours. Instead of the systematic fabric of religious belief which exists in Siam, the Cochin Chinese seem to have no fixed scheme of worship, their religion consisting of scarcely anything better than

superstitious observances. The priesthood, so respected and so

numerous in Siam, are in Cochin China despised and few in number, and have no political influence whatever. The only form of religion

which lays hold on the imagination of the Cochin Chinese is the

worship or veneration of the names of ancestors. Unbounded honours are paid by them to the tombs of the dead. These are almost always within a few yards of their dwellings, and they never willingly quit them. This feeling has a powerful influence in attaching the Cochin Chinese to the place of their birth and suppressing in them all disposition to foreign enterprises. The late King of Cochin China, taking advantage of this powerful sentiment on the part of his countrymen, constructed at the capital 2 handsome temples in honour of the names of departed worthies, the one being devoted to persons of civil and the other of military employments. I may observe as a singular fact that to the honour of the last he admitted Europeans. We saw only the exterior of these temples, for they are opened only once a year. 164. The character of the Cochin Chinese, notwithstanding the severity of their political institutions, is remarkable for nothing so

much as its cheerfulness and even volatility. The higher classes,

indeed, commonly affected Chinese gravity, but the lower orders are full of curiosity, of gesticulation, great laughers and great talkers. We went freely into the villages and were everywhere treated with hospitality, kindness and good nature. 210

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Missions to Cochin China

165. Like the Siamese, the Cochin Chinese carry no arms. I was assured by the French gentlemen, who had so many years experience of them and who were masters of their language, that docility and good nature were the most remarkable features of their nature and that they were so little actuated by the spirit of revenge that murder

and assassination were crimes little heard of amongst them. The

existence of the unprotected and unarmed travellers whom we ourselves

saw passing along the highways in such perfect security must be

admitted as a substantial proof of this character perhaps as much as

of the vigilance of the Government. The vanity of the Cochin

Chinese takes a different character from that of their neighbours the

Siamese. It is of a national and not of a personal nature. They

look upon themselves as one of the first people in the world and their

King as one of the first of princes; but personally their conduct towards strangers is obliging and unassuming and they make no

objections to give to foreigners their personal services. Instead of the difficulties experienced among the Siamese in this respect, we found an abundance of Cochin Chinese ready to perform for us cheerfully every

menial office.

166. As soldiers they are obedient, hardy and, considering that they are the shortest race of people in Asia, remarkably athletic. With all these qualities, however, unaccustomed as they are to the use of arms and cowed by the severe despotism under which they

labour, I feel perfectly convinced that notwithstanding all the military display about them, they will be found not only far from martial but

even a timid race.

167. Cochin China after a civil war of nearly 30 years con-

tinuance, has now experienced tranquility for more than 20 years, and

I have no doubt, from the information given me, has made a very considerable start in prosperity and population. The conscription is indeed a great check to the last. The men cannot marry until they are in a capacity to purchase a wife, a practice universal in this country. This, considering the demand for his services by the public, he is seldom able to accomplish before 25 or 30. The effect of the conscriptions is, as in Siam, to throw an unusual share of the labour upon the women. The latter, therefore, are industrious, while their military and desultory employments render the men idle and unskilful. The women toil in every employment. They conduct the whole petty traffic of the country, they carry heavy burdens, they plough, sow and reap. The effect of all this is, that a woman's labour is as valuable as that of a man, and her wages the same, a matter I should suppose peculiar to the state of society in Cochin

China.

168. The price of day labour in the vicinity of the capital is about 4 ann$s a day, which is far beyond that of labour in Bengal. The average price of rice at the same place may be considered at

about 2 kwans the picul, at which estimate the labour of an individual 211

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is capable of earning sustenance for 6 persons as far as the mere article of grain is concerned, and probably for about 3 including lodging, clothing and other necessaries. From this statement, if accurate, it may be concluded that the reward of labour in Cochin

China is ample and that the population, therefore, if not impeded by other causes ought to be progressive. Infanticide and similar practices which prevail in China, indicating that the population is pressing upon the means of sustenance, have no existence in Cochin China. 169. Cochin China appears to have been at various times subject to very severe famines. Towards the commencement of the civil war one of these scourges is stated by Mr. Chapman to have carried off

near one half of the population. It apears to me that the central

provinces which include the capital are peopled far beyond their own means of affording subsistence and that any interruption of the supply

from Tonquin or Kamboja would at any time bring on a famine.

Such however has been the good order and tranquility maintained for more than 20 years back that there has not even been the appearance of a scarcity. 170. I may here shortly advert to the check which the population

lately received by the depredations of the epidemic cholera. This disorder was traced along the east coast of the Gulf of Siam, and broke out in Sai-gon in Kamboja in the month of June 1820. In August it appeared at the capital, and its ravages throughout the

Kingdom are said to have carried off 140,000 of the inhabitants. 171. Cochin China is at present at peace with all its neighbours.

It has no political connection with any people except the Chinese, the Siamese and recently, perhaps, with the Birmans. Of the two

latter relations I have already spoken. 174 The King of Cochin China

professes himself as a tributary of China, and by the pride of the 174. Crawfurďs report, paragraphs 88 and 89, has this to say on the relations between Burma, Siam and Cochin China: an uninterrupted course of embassies subsists between the Cochin

Chinese and the Siamese, yet they are mutually jealous of each other. The dismemberment of the Kingdom of Kamboja is the principal subject of contention* Each party has seized a portion of the country, and this having brought them into immediate contact with each other, there always exists some subject for dispute or contention between them. Their territories, population and resources are probably nearly equal, but the military strength of the Cochin Chinese, with the aid of European discipline, is infinitely better organised and is, as well as the national character, more fit for aggression and enterprise than that of the Siamese. If these two nations should quarrel, altho' neither be suited to maintain a permanent dominion over the other, yet an ambitious Cochin Chinese prince would find no difficulty in seizing the Siamese portion of Kamboja, or making formidable inroads into the Siamese territory and, especially, of destroying or sacking the capital which, defenceless as it is, would fall an easy prey to any sudden incursion. 89. Some attempt at a coalition between the Cochin Chinese and the Birmans, a people between whom there seems never before to have existed any diplomatic or other intercourse, has 212

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Missions to Cochin China

latter Court is recognised only as the governor of a distant province.

The dependence of Cochin China is, however, an affair rather of immemorial usage and hardly of necessity. Every King upon his

accession receives a letter of investiture from the Court of Pekin, but here the connection seems to end. The year before we were in Cochin China the present King proceeded to the frontier of Tonquin to meet a deputy from Pekin and was there duly invested. 172. Cochin China is indeed as essentially independent of China as China is of it. I should indeed be inclined to think under their

relative forms of Government more so, considering the unwarlike character of the Chinese, but an ambitious and able King of Cochin

China at the head of an army disciplined in European principles, would

find at least the plunder and depredation of a Chinese province, if

not the permanent occupation of one, an enterprise of no great diffi-

culty. The late King of Cochin China had indeed at one time such a project in view. That Cochin China itself is safe from the risk

of conquest on the part of China may be inferred not only from the present relative condition of the parties but from the history of their 174. (contd.)

been made within the last two or three years, the alleged object

of which is the conquest and partition of Siam. In the year 1821 an envoy was sent from Cochin China to Ava, and

from recent accounts it is understood that a mission has been

sent in return from the Birmans. When I was at Saigon, from which the Cochin Chinese embassy sailed, I endeavoured, but ineffectually, to obtain a correct account of the object of this mission. I could only learn that his conduct was in general disapproved of, and that when he returned he would be in considerable risk of losing his head. It appears when he arrived in Ava he was then received as a suspicious person and that doubts were entertained of his coming direct from the Court of Cochin China, upon which he was imprisoned. The long detention occasioned by this circumstance was received by the Cochin Chinese as a crime which they were preparing to punish in the manner I have described b

a. The dismemberment of Cambodia. Between 1812 and 1814 Cam-

bodia was more or less partitioned between Vietnam and Siam. In 1833 the Siamese undertook ihe conquest of the whole of Cambodia, acting ostensibly in support of a rebellion against Vietnamese domination; but Minh-Mang, as Crawfurd prophesied, had no great difficulty in driving back the Siamese. The Siamese, however, did not abandon their interest in Cambodia. In 1845 they recovered their rights over the western provinces of Cambodia, including Battembang and Angkor, rights which they subsequently lost to the French, recovered through the Japanese

and lost again after World War II. (See: Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., pp.

333-336.)

b. Cochin China and Ava. After writing this report, Crawfurd, in 1826, undertook an embassy to Ava in the course of which he learnt much more about the Cochin Chinese mission to Ava and the Burmese

reply, the latter taking place in 1823. The Cochin Chinese mission developed from a commercial venture on the part of Chao Кип , the Governor of Cambodia, for the purchase of Burmese bird's nests. The return Burmese mission was intended to obtain Minh-Mang's support for a project for the conquest and partition of Siam, but Minh-Mang refused to see the Burmese envoy and to have anything to do with this scheme. (See: Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., pp. 571-586, where Crawfurd prints as an appendix the journal of this Burmese mission.) 213

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former connection. During the civil wars, when the authority of the Tay-sons or usurpers prevailed, China, taking advantage of the distracted state of the country, invaded Tonquin, which was defended by one of the rebel brothers, with a numerous army. The Cochin Chinese met this army with an inferior force and defeated and nearly annihilated

it. This is still a subject of triumph with the Cochin Chinese, who hold very cheaply the military character of their more civilised

neighbours. I must however here observe that notwithstanding such

opinions as these, the Cochin Chinese admit without hesitation

the superior civilisation of the Chinese, and that in manners, religion,

literature and art they are proud to imitate them and follow their

example. This is always the source, whatever political differences they may wish, of an indissoluble and useful connection between them.

173. With European nations the Cochin Chinese maintained

scarcely any connection, except that which is kept up by the Catholic Missionaries, for nearly a century, and until the commencement of the French Revolution, when some French adventurers, generally Royalist emigrants, found their way into the service of the late King, disciplined his armies to restore him to the throne and may truly be said to have been the founders of that extensive Empire which now reaches from

Siam to China. The King of Cochin China in his distress sent his

son to France, concluded a defensive alliance with the French nation

and made them an extensive cession of territory. The war which followed in Europe and the success of the British arms in India

prevented France from improving the advantages which chance had

thus placed in her way. Of the 12 or 13 individuals of the French

nation who were at one time in the service of Cochin China, 2 only remain, and these are without influence or authority. 175 The political

connection with France may therefore be now looked upon as an

affair of mere history. The authority of the Sovereign is indisputably established throughout his dominions. He has no longer occasion for

the service of strangers, and I make no doubt that at present the

French are looked upon with more jealousy than any other Europeans, the English alone excepted.

174. In regard to our own relations with the Cochin Chinese, it does not appear to me that any advantage can arise to us from

any direct political connection with them. They are too distant and too insulated from the sphere of our Indian political relations, except indeed in the single case of Cochin China's becoming the scene of a

political intrigue on the part of our European rivals against our Indian Empire or commerce, to be of any real importance to us. In such an event, however, there can be no doubt but that the

existence of a foreign European influence in Cochin China would during war be very prejudicial to our prosperity. A very slender naval

force, for example, issuing from the many ports of Cochin China would be sufficient to cut off or harrass our extensive commercial 175. See p. 196 above, note. 214

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intercourse with China. This however under existing circumstances is a state of things from which we have very little to apprehend and considering the unenterprising character of the Cochin Chinese as a nation when left to themselves, and the fair, impartial and prudent policy of the Government, we have certainly nothing to apprehend

from their hostility.

175. I may here repeat however that in the event of the Kingdom of Cochin China ever becoming the scene of political intrigue against

our Indian Empire thro' the machinations of an European enemy, the easy and ready means of crushing such a combination present themselves in the blockade of the rivers of Tonquin and Kamboja;

a measure which can be effected with great safety by a very inconsiderable naval force, and which in a few months must reduce the Court, which chiefly depends both for subsistence and revenue on the fertile districts upon the two great rivers, to any terms.

176. It is in a commercial point of view alone, however, that a connection with Cochin China is at present of any interest to

European nations. I shall briefly describe the principles upon which

this intercourse is conducted. . . .

177. An erroneous opinion is prevalent amongst European

nations, communicated by some of the most recent writers, respecting

Tonquin and Cochin China, that the resort of European traders is

in great measure interdicted in this Kingdom on the same principles

as in Japan and in all the ports of the Chinese Empire with the

exception of one. This is so far from being true, that I believe that in no Asiatic country are European merchants admitted upon terms

more easy and liberal than in Cochin China. European ships have indeed been subjected to higher rates of duties than the vessels of Asiatic nations previous to the year 1818; but in that year the late

King established a new tariff for the foreign commerce and all foreign traders were upon that occasion placed upon an equality. 178. By this regulation all vessels pay a rated measurement duty

moderate in its amount, are exempted from all import duties or examination of import cargo, and pay a small export duty upon a

few articles only. 176 Vessels driven into the ports of Cochin China

by stress of weather, or visiting them for the purpose of making commercial enquiries, are free from all charges; and four of the

ports of the Cochin Chinese Empire are open to European commerce. 179. These moderate and liberal arrangements leave little to be desired in the way of mere regulation; but it is still more of consequence to the interests of foreign trade that in Cochin China neither the Sovereign nor his officers are traders themselves, that there are no royal monopolies and no claim of right of pre-emption, the exercise of all of which is infinitely more mischievous even than the heaviest

duties.

180. The French are the only people who have availed themselves of the new regulations of the Cochin Chinese Government in favour of

European trade. 4 French vessels of considerable burden have since 176. For details of the duty on measurement, see p. 194 above, note. 215

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Alastair Lamb

then visited Cochin China.177 They brought out fire-arms, iron,

copper, woollens and some curiosities for the Court; and all received

full cargoes of sugar, with considerable quantities of raw silk. A

respectable merchant house at Bordeaux has left two French gentlemen as agents at Turon for the purpose of providing them with cargoes. 178

181. I shall conclude this report with a few general reflections upon the advantages which may result to our trade from an extended commercial intercourse with Siam and Cochin China, the great object of the mission which I had the honour to be entrusted. These 2

kingdoms between them certainly contain not less than 11,000,000 of

inhabitants who, in point of civilisation stand at least in the 2nd

rank of Asiatic nations, and whose Governments, altho' arbitrary and despotic, still afford a certain protection to the lives and properties

of their subjects, and are probably after all not worse than the generality of eastern governments while for mere security they are greatly superior to those of all the minor nations and tribes of Asia.

182. No intercourse having taken place with these nations for upward of a century, should a commerce be established with them

it will not be too much to assert that 11,000,000 of consumers and producers will strictly be added to the mass of our Indian commerce.

This population inhabits a fertile country and lies upon the shores of the most frequented and accessible portions of the Indian seas. Both nations are at the same time in a state more favourably circum-

177. The following are the names of those European vessels which visited Cochin China between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Crawfurd mission of which I can find any record: 1817. La Paix , belonging to Baigliene, Sarget et Cie. of Bordeaux, commanded by Captain Chavelaure. Visited Saigon and Tourane. Wrecked at Isle of France in February 1818. 1817. La Cybèle, the French frigate bringing Captain de Kergariou. 1817. Henry , belonging to the Bordeaux firm of Philippon and commanded by Captain Rey. She was at Tourane at the same time as La Paix . She was of about 450 tons burden.

1819. Larose, belonging to Balguerie-Stuttenburg, commanded by Captain Hardy. The Larose, a vessel of some 700 tons, was in Tourane at the same time as the Henry. 1819. The Beverly , an American ship commanded by Captain Gardner, called at Tourane when the Larose and the Henry were both in that port.

1819? A Dutch ship from Batavia is mentioned by Chaigneau. 1821. Larose anchors at Tourane on 17th May, 1821, and lands

Chaigneau on his return from France. 1821. Constance, a French brig, reaches Tourane from Isle of

France shortly after the arrival of Larose. She was commanded by

Captain Doret.

1822. Cléo pâtre, a French frigate commanded by Captain Courson

de la Ville Hélio, arrives at Tourane in March.

1822. The John Adam, bringing Crawfurd and his party. (These details are gleaned from Taboulet, op. cit., Cordier, Consulat a Hué, op.

cit., and Moor, Notices, op. cit.) 178. The brothers Auguste and Edouard Borei, agents for the Bordeaux firm of Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. Auguste Borei first came to Cochin China with La Paix in 1817. Edouard Borei, who who appears to have come out with Larose in 1819, resided in Tourane as agent for Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. until 1832 when, following the loss of its vessel Saint Michel off the Paracels in 1830, the firm decided to discontinue its connection with Cochin China. This marked the effective end of French trade with this

region until 1858. (See: Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 283, 301.) 216

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stanced for maintaining a foreign trade than in any known period of their history. Regular, even strong, Governments are established

in them, and they now have been for some years recovered from anarchy and civil war. The Siamese, it appears to me, are likely to become the most extensive consumers of our Indian and European manufactured goods, particularly our cottons. From the sketches I

have given of their trade some opinion may be entertained of their taste and capacity for the consumption of these and their ability to afford returns. The Cochin Chinese, from their peculiarity of taste

and the state of society amongst them, are upon the whole not so

likely to be such extensive consumers of our manufactured goods as

the Siamese, with perhaps the exception of woollens, but they are

more likely to occasion a demand directly or indirectly for the raw or unwrought productions of our Indian possessions.

183. I am inclined to hope that the trade of Siam and Cochin

China will also afford an indirect channel for the employment of our

capital still more extensive and advantageous than the direct trade

with those nations themselves. I mean a trade with China. This is more particularly applicable to Cochin China than to Siam because it lies more in the direct route of trade and the Chinese vessels which frequent its ports stand more in need of return cargoes than they do in Siam; but it applies indeed to both and embraces an aggregate trade amounting to 60,000 tons.

184. By this channel an indirect but still an easy intercourse may be kept up with every port of China from Hai-nan up to the Yellow Sea, and by these means may be conveyed to the ports of China also the commodities of the Indian Archipelago, of India and

of Europe known to be suitable to the Chinese market; while by the same course we might receive in return from the principal markets

the teas and plain and wrought silks of China. This is a commerce

which might exist independent of the caprice of the Chinese Government and which would increase in proportion to the freedom with

which it was conducted. I may here remark that the Chinese

merchants of Cochin China with whom I conversed constantly urged this branch of commerce upon my attention and showed themselves

most solicitous to enter into it.

185. Independent of the advantages which we may draw from

the maritime intercourse between Cochin China and the ports of the

Chinese Empire, I may mention here before concluding that the internal intercourse between Tonquin and the Chinese provinces to the north and west of it, and which is chiefly conducted thro' the

great river of Tonquin, may afford another channel of disseminating

our products in parts of China which have at present no cheap or direct communication with the only port which we are allowed to frequent. We should receive in return in this branch the precious

and useful metals which are productions either of Tonquin itself or of the great Chinese province of Yu-nan which borders immediately upon it.

^

Calcutta, ^ t

t

J.

Crawfurd.

3rd April, 1823. 217

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(F) MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY,

DATED 22 MAY, 1823, ON THE RESULTS OF THE CRAWFURD MISSION TO SIAM AND COCHIN CHINA.

Home Miscellaneous Series in the India Office Library, London, Vol. 673.

In their Political Letter of the 23rd November, 1821, the Supreme

Government inform the Court that, taking into consideration the

depressed state of Commerce in England and in India, they had resolved

to send an Agent to Siam and Cochin China, for the purpose of establishing a commercial intercourse with those Countries upon a

surer footing than had hitherto existed; and that they had selected Dr. Crawfurd of the Bengal Medical Establishment for that service,

on account of the diplomatic experience he had acquired at Java,

and his peculiar knowledge of the languages, trade, institutions, etc., of the Eastern Islands.

As their principal inducements for this undertaking they observed, that as the trade of Europeans with those Countries formed an important and valuable branch of intercourse with Asia in the earlier periods of Anglo-Indian History178a, there was little doubt but that a considerable addition would be made to it, in the improved state of modern navigation and the superior intelligence and spirit of adventure which

characterized British Merchants of the present day. That as those

Countries contained a population of at least thirty millions, possessed

a soil of equal fertility to that of any portion of the globe, were

almost devoid of manufactures, and had proved a ready market for the imperfect and high priced fabrics of India and China, it might be fairly presumed, from the success which had attended modern trade with Hindustan, the Eastern Islands and China that, the groundless fears and jealousies which influenced those Governments once removed,

an extensive demand would be created for woollens, cotton goods,

raw and wrought iron, Bengal opium and various other minor articles. For these, it was observed, that Siam might make valuable returns to

Europe and Western Asia of Sugar and Pepper, Salt for the Indian

Islands, and Teak for the British Settlements, to which Cochin China

would add raw Silk in such abundance (being the most productive Country in that article in Asia) as might place the English manu-

facturer, under an improved regulation of the trade, upon a footing

with the Continental.

Trade at Siam is at present carried on by certain Chinese residing there, who bring its produce to the European Ports in the Straits of

Malacca and receive European and Indian Goods in return; and at Cochin China by Chinese J unks and a few Colonial Portuguese

Traders, who would speedily yield to the energy of Europeans. Even

178a. For an account of early European contacts with Siam, see: Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century, by E. W. Hutchinson, London 1940, which was also published in French translation by H. Berland in BSEI 1947.

218

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under existing disadvantages a considerable trade is maintained

between Siam and Prince of Wales Island and, for the last five years, with Americans and British Country Traders. The opening of an intercourse with Cochin China , which has only been attempted twice since the seventeenth Century; (once in 1778, which failed in consequence of the distracted State of the Country and the imprudent conduct of the Agent in involving himself in its hostilities, and 2nd in 1804 which was frustrated by the French) would be

more difficult: but as the French are said to have succeeded in con-

cluding a Treaty with that State and have some Missionaries residing there, as the Dutch succeeded in procuring a Cargo so lately as 1820, and as the pecuniary advantages derived by China from her intercourse with England and India must necessarily operate as a strong temptation

to a mercenary government like the one in question, they had few doubts

but that temperance and perseverance would at length induce that

government to put our trade with it upon, at all events, a footing with that carried on with China. Instructions to this effect were accordingly addressed to Dr. Crawfurd on the 29th September, 1821, accompanied

by letters and Presents to the Kings of Siam and Cochin China, the former of whom had already opened a Correspondence upon commercial subjects with the Resident at Singapore. The Political Letter from Bengal of the 27th December, 1822, just received, reports the result of this Mission. From this it appears that in consequence of the continued preponderance of the party which had

occasioned the expulsion of the King of Queda from his dominions

under the pretence of his having refused to co-operate with their forces against the Birmans, Dr. Crawfurd had failed in his attempt at procuring his restoration: but that the right of the British Government to

the Sovereignty of P. of W. Island and the discontinuance of the

payment of the annual sum of 10,000 Dollars to the Kings of Queda (by whom the Island was ceded to the British) upon the death of the exiled sovereign, which was involved in that question, had not even been alluded to during the discussion. Dr. Crawfurd thinks too that the high tone assumed by him during the discussion is likely to produce a more conciliatory line of conduct on the part of the Chief of Ligor than has been hitherto manifested by him towards the Penang Government, and conceives that the approximation of the Siamese to P. of W. Island, by the conquest of Queda is more likely to lead to a good understanding

with that pusillanimous and corrupt Government, than otherwise.

Should any occurrence lead to a rupture with it, one gun brig would

be sufficient to put a stop to its trade, and another to destroy its capital.

In regard to the main object of the mission, the establishment of a Commercial intercourse, Dr. Crawfurd reports that although he had at first succeeded in procuring the consent of the Government to the establishment of a "free and fair intercourse" between the two nations, he had the mortification of finding those words exchanged and a pledge of assistance from the officers of Government substituted in the letters which were addressed to him and to the Supreme Government, just before his departure. The only concession too, which he was able to procure in regard to duties was their continuance on their present footing, a circumstance that may be attributed to the monopoly which 219

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Alastair Lamb

the Government had extended to almost every article produced in the

Country. These Reports were dated on the 13th July, 1822. Soon after which Dr. Crawfurd left the place for Cochin China. On the

19th October of the same year the attention of the Government of P. of W. Island was drawn to an outrage committed by the Siamese authorities on the Captain and Supra Cargo of a vessel called the Phoenix , of so gross and apparently unprovoked a nature as cannot

possibly be overlooked by our Government.17815

Dr. Crawfurd's account of his reception in Cochin China and character of the Government are highly satisfactory. So far from

throwing impediments in his way, every concession was immediately granted to him, and he had the satisfaction of reporting to the Supreme

Government that the trade of the British had been admitted into the three principal Ports of the Country upon the same terms as the Chinese - that is to say one third less duties than formerly. No import duties

were required, and generally speaking not more than five per cent

export; the duty on tonnage and measurement about half that levied in

China. No port nor anchorage fees. No pilots necessary, nor duties

levied upon Ships touching for refreshments or enquiring into the state of trade. At an early period of the mission the leave was extended to

Tonquin and Kamboja but forfeited by Dr. Crawfurd's persisting in refusing to accept the presents offered by the King to the Governor General* though he thinks that the privilege will ere long be conceded

to us. The main advantage however derived, in Dr. Crawfurd's

opinion, from this alliance, is the facility which it will afford for indirect

intercourse with large portions of China which are now either not at all or inadequately supplied by us. He speaks of the Chinese residing in these Dominions as ardently anxious for trade with the British; the Cochin Chinese army as well appointed, clad in British broad cloth and disciplined, by French refugees, in the European manner; their Capital (the capture of which would be tantamount to the conquest of the kingdom) as wonderfully fortified; their cannon as well cast and beautiful; but their resources, strength and population as much overrated, particularly the latter, which

he thinks inferior to that of Siam. Dr. Crawfurd speaks very lightly of the French influence, and says that the Government, like that of Siam, may at any time be brought to terms by the blockade of these two principal rivers. (G) CHAIGNEAU ON THE CRAWFURD MISSION.

Not only did the Crawfurd mission to Hué put an end to any illusions which the British might still have harboured up to that time as to the extent of French influence in Cochin China, but it also seems to * in consequence of the King having refused to accept of those of thé Government General, as not being a Sovereign.

178b. For a detailed amount of this episode, see The Crawfurd Papers,

Bangkok 1915, pp. 225-285, where the "outrage" perpetrated on Captain Smith and Mr. Storm by the Siamese authorities in Bangkok in October 1822 is illuminated by several documents. 220

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have had a most adverse effect on what little remained, in fact, of that

influence. As Chaigneau's letter, which is reproduced here below, indicates, Crawfurd's arrival, combined with the impression created by the recent founding of Singapore, served to reinforce Minh-Mang in his determination not to allow the British any opportunity to establish a

foothold in his dominions. Minh-Mang seems to have appreciated that in no way could he better attract the attentions of the British than by granting special conditions of trade and diplomacy to the French. Chaigneau clearly felt that the Crawfurd mission had made his already

difficult position in Hué, both as Cochin Chinese mandarin and as French representative, almost impossible; and he noted that it had, almost at once, damaged the conditions of French trade. The Larose , which put in to Tourane shortly after the departure of the John Adam , was obliged to pay anchorage dues, not charged to French vessels since at least 1817, as well as the normal duties on measurement; and this meant that France was now trading with Cochin China on terms worse than those which had been promised to Crawfurd.179 Chaigneau, however, saw some faint silver lining to the cloud that Crawfurd had created. The two British ships which visited Tourane between Crawfurd's departure and October, 1823, brought cargoes of rifles which cost more and were of poorer quality than those provided by Balguerie, Sarget et Cie., and Minh-Mang had refused to buy any of

them.180 Public opinion in Cochin China, Chaigneau added, was far from hostile to France and far from friendly to England. All this suggested that a fresh French diplomatic effort in this part of Indochina might yet succeed. But such a task was not for Chaigneau, who, like

Vannier, was getting on in years and anxious to see once more his family in France, and who considered that his position in Hué, diplomatically speaking, was now untenable. In November, 1824, the two French mandarins and their large families boarded a Chinese junk at

Tourane and sailed for Singapore. There they found the Balguerie, Sarget et Cie. ship, Courrier de la Paix , which landed them at Bordeaux in September, 1825. 181

Chaigneau had scant grounds, beyond wishful thought and a refusal

to accept the conclusion that his long career had not advanced the

interests of France, for the belief that further French missions would

do any better than he had done himself. In 1821 the French Government

had instructed Courson de la Ville Hélio, commander of the frigate

Cléopâtre , to seek while he was on the Cochin Chinese coast an audience with Minh-Mang; but, as has already been noted, the King refused to 179. See p. 225 below. 180. See p. 225 below. 181. Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 310-311. 221

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see the French officer when the latter requested an interview early in 1822. The visit of the Cléopâtre , in fact, was treated almost as if it

was the vanguard of a French attack on Tourane. In 1824, the Villèle Ministry (one of the members of which was Chateaubriand, a relative of

Chaigneau's), proposed yet another mission to Minh-Mang. This was entrusted to Captain Henri de Bougainville, commander of Thétis , 44 guns and one of the newest ships in the French navy. De Bougainville, so his instructions from Clermont-Tonnerre, Minister of the Marine, read, was to call in at Tourane during the course of his planned voyage around the world, and in an audience with Minh-Mang he was to dis-

cuss matters "of peace and the protection of commerce". Thétis arrived at Tourane on 12th January, 1825, to be joined there a few days later by the corvette L'Espérance. De Bougainville was entertained at Tourane by Edouard Borei, agent of Balguerie, Sarget et Cie.,

but he was refused permission to visit Hué and see the King. The letter which he had with him, from the French King to Minh-Mang, and

the presents were refused. De Bougainville, in a letter to the Minister

of the Marine dated Tourane, 12th February, 1825, explained his failure in these words:

I have much regret in informing your Excellency that I have failed in the mission with which the King [of France] had

honoured me, and that I was unable to make the King of Cochin China receive the letter and presents which I was

instructed to give to him. The impossibility of reading and interpreting this letter was the excuse with which this prince covered his refusal; but I am convinced that the fear of the English, whose invasion of the Kingdom of the Burmans has caused him great worry, was the real motive for it. Having refused to see Mr. Crawfurd, he did not feel able to give me an audience without offending them [the English]; perhaps he feared lest, at the news of the reception of Frenchmen at his Court, they would send another embassy which would embar-

rass him greatly, resolved as he appears to be not to allow

them to establish themselves in his kingdom.182 .

On 17th February, 1825, de Bougainville left Tourane. One conclusion he seems to have drawn from this abortive visit was that there

was still a need for a French Consul at Hué; for de Bougainville was very disappointed to discover, on his arrival at Tourane, that Chaigneau

and Vannier had left, an event which he considered set the seal of

failure on an already very difficult mission.183 182. Cordier, Consulat, op. cit., p. 105. 183. Ibid., pp. 105-111; Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 311-315. 222

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The outcome of de Bougainville's failure, and of the advice of Chaigneau, was the French resolve to keep, if possible, the Hué Consulate in being. Eugène Chaigneau, nephew of the French mandarin, was appointed vice-consul (temporary) at Hué with instructions to carry on this post until his uncle might return to Cochin China. In 1826, aboard the Larose, E. Chaigneau returned to Tourane where he was refused recognition by Minh-Mang's Government and obliged to leave immediately. In 1829, on the Saint Michel, E. Chaigneau was sent back to Cochin China, this time as vice-consul in his own right: but the Saint Michel was wrecked off the Paracels in August, 1830, and

the new French representative eventually arrived at Hué without baggage, funds and all but the minimum of clothing. He was refused all official recognition by the Cochin Chinese, who were not in the least impressed by the presence, off Tourane of the French corvette La Favo-

rite, Captain Laplace, which was then in Indochinese waters in the course of a cruise of circumnavigation. In January, 1831, Chaigneau boarded La Favorite , which took him to Surabaya where he joined the

Jules and sailed for Bordeaux. Subsequently E. Chaigneau served in the French Consulate at Manila, was Consul at Cavite and, finally, Consul-General at Singapore. He. died in France in 1846, at the age of 47.184

In the eight years following Crawfurd's mission to Hué, therefore,

no less than three French diplomatic overtures to Minh-Mang's Government were brusquely rejected. While the reasons for this were an

inescapable consequence of Minh-Mang's foreign policy, a policy based

on foundations laid by Gia Long, yet Chaigneau and other French observers felt that one factor was the fear of English power and ambi-

tion, of which the Crawfurd mission had given much evidence. The founding of Singapore and its rapid progress, the Crawfurd mission, and the British campaign against the Burmese in 1824, all these conspired to undermine in Hué what little remained - and this tended to be exaggerated by the French - of the good will built up on the labours of Pigneau de Behaine and his colleagues. This depressing conclusion emerges clearly from the correspondence of J. B. Chaigneau which Cordier printed in his Le Consulat de France à Hué sous la Restauration; and the letter reproduced here, which I have translated from this work, well represents Chaigneau's state of mind a year after Crawfurd had left Hué.

184. Taboulet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 315-320; Cordier, Consulat, op. cit., pp. 113-129; Le Thanh Khoi, op. cit., pp. 339-340; Cady, op. cit., p. 16; Buttinger, op. cit., p. 387.

223

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J. B. Chaigneau to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated Hué, 30th October, 1823 (Extract).185 I have read with as much sorrow as surprise, in the translation of a letter to Your Excellency from the Mandarin of Foreigners,186 that this person has claimed that the Court of Cochin China has only been able to acquire the vaguest understanding of the contents of the letters from His Majesty [Louis XVIII] of which I have been the bearer.187 It is well known here that M. Vannier and myself, acting collectively, have given the Emperor an exact and complete interpretation of the letters, and, moreover, that the late Bishop of Veren188 translated the

letters at the time of their arrival into Chinese characters. But I must

now speak plainly to Your Excellency; and such an evasive reply was but the prelude to all that has happened here since. This same Mandarin of Foreigners who, by his influence and by the nature of his duties, could do much to make up the King's mind to a favourable reply to the requests which I submitted to him, seems, on the contrary, to have induced in him such a state of irresolution that it is impossible to hope that he will recover from it. A willing flatterer of the young sovereign, he limits himself to agreeing with the King's opinions, and fears too much to run the risk of disgrace to make him

see that his fears are without foundation.

Now, I have already explained to Your Excellency at length the

timidity of the present Emperor in all that concerns his policy towards Europeans. I used to hold that by allaying his fear I would remove all difficulties and obtain favours. But, it must no longer be hidden, as much as the paternal benevolence of the French Government explores every means here to assure our national commerce precious openings and an expansion which is so desirable, another, rival, nation, envious of our maritime power, undermines ceaselessly all our efforts and has recently once more wiped out that hope we used to hold of soon enjoying the fruits of our labours. The effect that was produced here by the arrival of an ambassador of the English Government was such as one could have foreseen without difficulty.

This envoy, Mr. Crawfurd, was the bearer of despatches from His

Excellency the Governor General of Bengal, and empowered by his

Government to seek from the Emperor of Cochin China freedom for English merchants to visit all the ports of the Empire and to there trade under the same conditions as those under which the merchants of other

nations are admitted. On his arrival at Hué Crawfurd sought an

audience with the Emperor, which was refused him on the grounds that he was only an emissary of a governor general, and that it was even 185. Cordier, Consulat, op. cit., pp. 91-96. 186. The Cochin Chinese official responsible for foreign affairs. 187. Referring to the letters which Chaigneau brought with him on his return from France in 1821, and that which he tried to present on behalf of Courson de la Ville Hélio in early 1822. 188. Jean Lab ariette, Bishop of Veren and successor to Pigneau de Behaine as head of the Catholic missions in Cochin China. Labartette died in Cochin China on 6th August, 1822. 224

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considered contrary to protocol for His Excellency [the Governor

General of Bengal] to address directly his letters to His Majesty [the Emperor]. He then negotiated with the Mandarin of Foreigners, who gave him in the name of his master permission to trade in all the ports of the Empire, those of Tonkin excepted, and provided the laws and customs of the country were conformed with. It is doubtless because of this permission that we have seen arrive here lately two ships from England with cargoes of arms and other goods destined, for the most part, for the Emperor himself. One of these ships left again shortly after its arrival without having obtained anything. The other is still here, but it is going to leave soon, likewise with its cargo still on board.189 All the goods which made up the cargoes of these two ships were recognised here as being of a quality inferior to our own manufactures which have been imported since the peace in our merchant vessels, and

they are much more expensive. Five thousand military rifles, for

instance, of a type which we have been providing here at seven piastres each, have been priced at ten piastres each, and they are. far from com-

parable in quality. It is much the same with the rest of the goods.

Thus the Emperor refused the lot, and only took a few odds and ends from the English, lest, so he said, he should show too much obstinacy

in frustrating their commerce.

From what I have just said, Your Excellency will understand that

the English flatter themselves if they think they are going to secure the

least commercial advantage here over us. A thousand other local

factors, above all public opinion which has declared itself to be openly in our favour as much as it is opposed to our rivals, will hinder them

for a long time yet. But it is none the less true that the essential objective, perhaps the sole objective, which the English Company is

constantly seeking, has been achieved fully; namely, that while not gaining here any benefit for its commerce, it ensures that no other nation will establish itself here to its detriment; and, indeed, this year at the precise moment when we find ourselves in competition with the English, the Government of Cochin China has just exacted from the ship Larose payment of anchorage dues which until now our ships have been exempted from paying, at least since the peace. The ease which we experienced in the past in founding here an entrepôt both for our goods and for Chinese products will make them follow on our heels for a long time to come, and one must fear lest the Company should decide, if the need arise, to undertake great sacrifices to remove anything which annoys it. The proposed objective in the founding of its new establishment at Singapore (an establishment which increases daily at an incredible rate) is none other than to attract there those Chinese ships whose numbers rise year by year in a spectacular progression. The Company is thus 189. Immediately after the Crawfurd mission there was also a marked increase in the trade between Singapore and Cochin China, but all carried on by Chinese junks. By 1824 about 26 junks from Singapore visited Cochin Chinese ports each year with a total tonnage of more than 4,000. After 1824 the number of junks increased greatly. See Crawfurd, Embassy, op. cit., p. 513. 225

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Alastair Lamb

recompensed a hundred times for the temporary suspension of trade at Canton,190 since instead of paying in China enormous dues on its purchases, it receives for itself today at Singapore a part of these dues as well as goods at a much lower price. The proximity of this new establishment (of which a few months

ago Mr. John Crawfurd was nominated Governor) to the ports of

Cochin China facilitates navigation between these ports and all those in the possession of the British in India; and, already, everything seems to point to the fact that the British will not delay long in extending towards these points the boundaries of their huge possessions. Whether these suppositions are well founded or not, they are so firmly established in the mind of the young Emperor of Cochin China

that only great events could make him change his mind. Besides

abroad, he is much moved by fears originating from within the kingdom.

Today all those who remain here of the men who used to be devoted to the Emperor Gia Long, and are still devoted to his memory, find themselves in what amounts to a state of disgrace, though the fact is lightly concealed still, and they are at the mercy of the favourites of

the moment. A fairly widespread discontent has spread among the

mandarins, and it is shown openly by the people whose misery at this

moment is without limit.

In such a situation, and seeing myself especially the object of a mistrust which daily becomes more marked and will end by being

humiliating, I take the liberty to beg Your Excellency to excuse the plan which I have made of returning to France on the first favourable occasion which offers itself; and I would probably have availed myself of the Larose had not news of war with Spain placed an obstacle in the way of my departure. Your Excellency will deign to note that from the time when I first received signs of the confidence of His Majesty [the King of France] the relations with this country appeared to be of the happiest, and the friendship which the old Emperor of this country showed to me was a

sure guarantee of the results which I was seeking. But events have

completely upset my hopes, and I will always regret for France that Gia Long did not live a few years longer. Moreover, my advancing age and the precarious state of my health

made me agree to accept this honourable post which the King

[of France] entrusted to me for no longer than four years so that, after that time, I could think of settling in France my large family. It is this consideration above all which obliges me today to return home as

soon as possible.

M. Vannier no more than I considers it in conformity with the dignity of an European to remain here in the false position in which we find ourselves placed today; and, equally influenced by his age, he 190. The temporary suspension of trade at Canton, referred to here, was the result of the Topaz affair. In December 1821 some members of the crew of H.M.S. Topaz were involved in a fight on Lintin Island with some local

Chinese in which two Chinese were killed. The Chinese authorities

demanded that the English sailors responsible be handed over to them for trial. The English refused, strained Anglo-Chinese relations resulting. One consequence was the suspension of trade at Canton until February 1822.

226

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is resolved to accompany me and to bring to France his many children. He asks me to inform Your Excellency of this and to offer his profoundest respects. We must now examine most carefully by what means we can assure some success to new attempts in this direction; and there are doubtless powerful methods which, while not completely neglected in the past, could now be revived and applied most usefully in new circumstances. It is thus that one could put forward the old treaties, the services performed here by the French, and, besides the warm expressions of the

Emperor Gia Long, the honourable conduct which has always been

manifested by those who have stayed here during the last few years. All this makes me think that if I have not been able to make myself heard with favour, it is doubtless because the double position in which I find myself, so useful for persuading the old ruler, now presents an insurmountable obstacle; and I must add that negotiations cleverly and prudently carried on by an embassy, or other means adopted without delay, could, even must, still produce great results.

227

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CHAPTER IX.

CONCLUSIONS

in this volume all show a remarkable similarity to each other in their respective patterns of events. With the possible excep-

THE in this British volume missions all show to Cochin a remarkable China which similarity have been to each described other

tion of the Roberts ventures, they all have a certain accidental or incidental quality. Chapman went to Cochin China because of the chance arrival of the two Mandarins aboard the Rumbold. Macartney

called in at Tourane because it lay conveniently on his route to his Chinese Embassy. Crawfurd was sent to Hué because he was going to Bangkok anyway, and it seemed worthwhile to make the most of an occasion when a British envoy was in the neighbourhood of Indochina.

Only the Roberts mission could really be described as the outcome of a deliberate policy, that of anticipating, during the period of the Peace of Amiens, French plans should war again break out: and even Roberts was not the envoy originally deputed to this task. Each mission had as one of its main objectives either the frustration of French ambitions in Cochin China or the discovery of their

precise nature and extent. Without the stimulus provided by the French, it is unlikely that any of these ventures would have taken place. The Chapman mission arose out of the intrigues which Cheva-

lier hoped to conduct with the two Mandarins. Macartney was primarily concerned with an examination of the territory which would

have been French had the Treaty of Versailles of 1787 been implemented. The chief objective of the Roberts missions was the exclusion of French influence from Hué. The addition of Cochin China to Crawfurd's itinerary would probably have not been made had it not been for the efforts of Restoration France to open regular diplomatic relations with that country. But each mission was concerned with more than the French.

Each was dominated by the vision of Alexander Dalrymple, who saw in British settlements and entrepôts in South-East Asia those solutions to the problems of the China trade upon which, it seemed, must depend the prosperity of the East India Company and the future of British

power in Eastern waters. Harlow, quite rightly, has classified the Chap228

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Missions to Cochin China

man mission to Cochin China in the same category as the British pro-

jects of 1763-75 at Balambangan in the Borneo Archipelago. Chapman saw the Bay of Tourane as an ideal site for a British settlement

where the Chinese could bring their wares and their craftsmen, where British and Indian manufactures could be sold for a good profit to be invested in the China trade, and where, in time of war, British

ships could shelter and refit. The Macartney Embassy investigated these possibilities, and Staunton, in his narrative, was by no means convinced that there were no advantages to be derived from British policy in Indochina. Roberts, as one of his objectives, was told to try to secure some British foothold here; and Crawfurd, when the strategic needs had virtually disappeared and the financial problems of the China trade were well on their way to being solved by other means, was still told to investigate what Cochin China had to offer in these respects.

None of the missions, with the arguable exception of Crawfurd's, achieved anything of great significance; and for this reason they have been very much forgotten in the standard histories of British expansion

into South-East Asia. But it would be most unfair to lay too much blame for these failures on the envoys concerned. At this period Cochin China lay well outside the natural sphere, one might say, of British policy. It was not adjacent, or even near, to British territory. Its possession, unless the French influence had developed into something far more formidable than was ever the case, was in no way essential to British interests. An effective British intervention here, aid for the Nguyen as was suggested in 1778, or for the Tayson as was sought in 1793, could only have been made by mounting an expensive venture

with declared expansionist aims; and such ventures did not fit into the pattern of a period when Parliament was demanding that British

expansion in Asia should come to a stop. With the example of the costly Balambangan venture before them, responsible Company servants were unlikely to pay much attention to the optimistic prospects held out in Chapman's report. It must also have been clear that Cochin China, whoever was

ruling it, fell within the Chinese sphere of interest, and that active British intervention here without express approval from Peking could well produce an adverse effect on the position of the Company's trade at Canton. As with British policy towards the Himalayan border during this period, so in Cochin China was the fear of Chinese reaction a factor of significance; and especially after the British had concluded that the Tibeto-Nepalese war of 1792 was closely connected with the 229

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Alastair Lamb

failure of the Macartney Embassy. This point was certainly raised at the time of the Roberts missions. There were, in fact, good reasons why British influence should not have been extended into Cochin China.

There was, of course, in the last decades of the 18th century a trend in British policy towards expansion into South-East Asia, overland into Burma and across the Bay of Bengal into the Malay Peninsula. Those very factors behind the Cochin Chinese ventures, fear of France and the needs of the China trade, made such an advance inevitable despite the provisions of Pitt's India Act that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation". The need for a base to the east of India and astride the sea lanes to China was evident, and it was satisfied to some extent by the acquisition of the island of Penang in 1786. Had the French obtained the same position with regard to the Chakri Dynasty in Siam as Pigneau de Behaine did with the Nguyen, then Penang might well have developed into a springboard

whence British power was launched towards Bangkok. But by no stretch of imagination could Penang have become the base for a British

occupation of Cochin China; and the very existence of Penang tended to reduce the urgency of the search for a British base elsewhere. The failure of the British missions to Cochin China, therefore, had a logic which transcended the abilities of the individual envoys concerned. What, then, did these missions achieve? From a commercial point of view the answer must be practically nothing. The Crawfurd mission

was the only one to secure commercial concessions of any practical value, and these were found to be slight when it was discovered that British firearms, the commodity most obviously in demand in Minh -Mang's dominions, could compete neither in price nor in quality with

those of France. The Chinese junks from Singapore which, at about the time of Crawfurd's visit, began to come to Cochin Chinese ports in significant numbers, would probably have done so had Crawfurd never

gone to Hué at all. They were at product of Raffles' free port, not of British diplomacy.

Diplomatically, however, these missions seem to have had some effect on the development of French influence in Indochina. It is unlikely that the Nguyen, once they were no longer in need of the military

and naval help which Pigneau de Behaine had provided, would ever have welcomed any increase in French influence. The periodic arrival of British missions, however, pointed out to them that French influence,

undesirable in itself, also carried the far more distasteful prospect of 230

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attracting British intervention. Had it not been for the outbreak of the French Revolution and the virtual isolation of Pigneau de Behaine and his successors from metropolitan France, the rulers of Cochin China might have had to face a crisis arising from this consideration at a much earlier date. As it was, the attempt of the Restoration Monarchy to re-establish a close connection with Hué carried in its train, in the shape of the Crawfurd embassy, the lesson that such developments were being

watched by the British who, in 1822, were far closer geographically to

Indochina than they had been in Chapman's day. There can be no doubt that the Crawfurd Embassy put the seal on the Nguyen policy of avoiding all European entanglements whatsoever, a policy to which they were to cling until the French forced them to abandon it in the second half of the nineteenth century. This, of course, was not one of Craw-

furd's objectives. Cochin China at the time of Crawfurd's arrival was prepared to

trade with merchants of any nation, China, Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, England or the United States.191 It was not, however, prepared to commit itself to any one of these powers, though it still retained some small sentimental regard for the French. After Crawfurd that sentiment may have persisted, but it was not allowed to find expression in any practical form. As we have seen from Chaigneau's letter, one

direct result of the English mission was the demand that French ships visiting Cochin China should pay anchorage dues. In the decade following Crawfurd's visit that sentiment virtually disappeared, and with it went the Cochin Chinese toleration of Christians. Minh-Mang at first continued his father's policy of toleration, although he had no great love for Christians himself. In the 1830s, following the rebellion

against the Nguyen of Le Van Khoi in which Christians were thought to have been implicated, toleration gave way to persecution and proscription. Minh-Mang was determined that among the French Catholic missionaries still living in his territories there should arise no new Pigneau de Behaine to seek French aid for a rebel movement against his dynasty. The result was the execution, in the years 1833-38, of seven French missionaries and a somewhat larger number of Vietnamese converts. Even at this stage Minh-Mang still showed much moderation

and caution. In 1840, he sent missions to England, France and the 191. An American representative, Captain White, visited Saigon in 1820 to investigate the commercial possibilities of Vietnam. Minh-Mang's requirements, artillery, small-arms, uniforms and books, did not seem to White to be the kind to merit serious American notice. See Buttinger, op. cit., p. 311. 231

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Netherlands East Indies in an attempt to secure international recognition of his reluctance to commit himself politically and of his willingness to trade. The missions failed, in part because of Catholic opposition. Minh-Mang found that the Catholic Missions, far from accepting his wish to free himself of Christians, were persistent to a degree which must have seemed to threaten his sovereignty. This trend became more apparent after his death in 1841, when his successor Thieu -tri freed the French Catholic missionaries whom he had in custody and sent them out of the country, only to find that they promptly returned clandestinely. The repeated expulsions and secret returns of Bishop Lefèbvre, an admirable example of devotion to spiritual duty, must have seemed to the Vietnamese Government to be a deliberate flouting of its authority.

Persecution of the Catholic missionaries, for which the victims must be acknowledged to bear some share of the responsibility, combined, unfortunately for Vietnamese independence, with a rising tide of

imperialist sentiment in the France of Louis Napoleon. The outcome was the French demonstration against Tourane in 1858 and the French

occupation of Saigon in the following year. From the latter event emerged the French conquest of an empire in Indochina. In this second phase of French intervention the Nguyen were far less fortunate and far less able than they had been in the first. The failure in the

second half of the nineteenth century to resist European domination, however, must certainly be regarded as a consequence of success earlier

on. As we have seen, in the period of the Crawfurd mission the Nguyen turned towards a policy of isolation from political contact with

the European powers. This policy, partly as a consequence of the

conflict with the Christian missions, became one also of cultural and

technical isolation. Where Gia Long, and Minh-Mang in his earlier years, had shown themselves to have appreciated the advances made

by European technology, particularly in the arts of war, the later Nguyen became increasingly conservative and adhered with ever greater strength to the old principles of Confucian government. Even the most nationalist of modern Vietnamese historians admit that after Minh

-Mang Vietnam underwent a process of intellectual fossilization which was to prove disastrous: a process, one might remark, very different from that stimulated in Siam by the enlightened rulers of the Chakri dynasty. Here lies what is probably the greatest significance to world history of the period of Vietnamese history in which the diplomatic

missions described in this book took place. This was a time when 232

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Vietnam might have been peacefully opened to western influence, when

the Nguyen might have created their own equivalent of the Meiji reforms in Japan. During this period neither France nor England was, in fact, in a position to establish a protectorate over Cochin China. The arrival in 1817 of the Cybèle, with de Kergariou aboard, may well have offered Gia Long the opportunity to play off England

and France one against the other to his ultimate benefit. This was the only chance which the Nguyen were to have of modernising their country diplomatically and economically, and thus their only hope of

being able to resist European domination later on in the century. Why did Gia Long and Minh-Mang fail to achieve this, where the successive King Ramas of Siam succeeded? This still remains one of the most fascinating problems in the history of modem South-East Asia. 192.

192. The bibliography of the history of the French in Indochina in the second half of the 19th century is indeed impressive. Apart from the works of Le Thanh Khoi and Chesneaux, to which reference has already been made, a good discussion of the problems and an adequate bibliography can be found in: Buttinger, op. cit., D. Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indo-China, Oxford 1961; J. F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, Ithaca, New York, 1954. 233

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

(a) Documents. The following, all from the India Office Library, London, were

consulted:

China Factory Records, Vol. 18. Bengal General Consultations, 1778, 1779.

General Letters from Bengal, 1778, 1780. Straits Settlements Factory Records, Vol. 1. Secret Consultations China, Vol. 268.

Letters from Bengal, Vols. 86, 88. Board's Collections, Vol. 774.

Home Miscellaneous Series, Vol. 673.

(b) Published works (a select list).

Anderson, A. A Narrative of a British Embassy to China. London 1795.

Aurousseau, L. Sur le nom de "Cochinchine" . BEFEO XXIV.

Barrow, J. A Voyage to Cochinchina. London 1806. Bassett, D. K. The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East, 1623-84. JRAS 1960.

Bastin, A. John Crawfurd, Malaya, Dec. 1954. Berland, H. Edition of Chapman's narrative of his voyage to Cochin China, BSEI 1948.

Berland, H. Adventuriers au Siam au Dix-Septième Siècle (French translation of Hutchinson). BSEI 1947. Bissachœre, P. J. L. de la, Le Relation sur le Tonkin et la

Cochinchine, ed. С. В. Maybon, Paris 1920. Boxer, С. R. Jan Companie in Japan 1600-1850, The Hague 1950. Buttinger, J. The Smaller Dragon, a political history of Vietnam. London and New York 1958.

Cadiere, M. L. 1л Mur de Dong-hoi, BEFEO VI 1906. Cady, J. F. The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia. Ithaca, 1954.

Chapman, C. Narrative of a Voyage to Cochin China, Journal of the

Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, Vol. VI, Singapore 1852. 234

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Chesneaux, J. Contribution à l'Histoire de la Nation Vietnamienne. Paris 1955.

Clodd, H. P. Malaya's First British Pioneer ; the lije oj Francis Light . London 1948.

Cordier, H. Bordeaux et la Cochinchine sous la Restauration , T'oung Pao IX 1908.

Cordier, H. Le Consulat de France à Hué sous la Restauration . Paris 1884.

Cordier, H. La France et l'Angleterre en Indo-Chine et en Chine sous le Premier Empire . T'oung Pao IV 1903. Cordier, H. La Reprise des Relations de la France avec l'Annam sous la Restauration. T'oung Pao IV 1903. Crawfurd, J. The Crawfurd Papers. Bangkok 1915. Crawfurd, J. History of the Indian Archipelago , 3 vols, London 1820.

Crawfurd, J. Journal of an Embassy. .. .to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China , London 1828.

Crawfurd, J. A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries. London 1856.

Dalrymple, A. Oriental Repertory. 2 vols. London 1808. Dampier, W. A New Voyage Round the World , ed. Sir A. Gray, London 1927.

Duyvendak, J. J. L. The Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court. T'oung Pao XXXIV 1939.

Duyvendak, J. J. L. Supplementary Documents on the Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court. T'oung Pao XXXV 1940. Faure, A. Les Francais en Cochinchine au XV Ule Siecle. Paris 1891 Findlay, A. G. A Directory for the Navigation of the Indian Archipelago. London 1878. Finlayson, G. The Mission to Siam and Hue. London 1826.

Hall, D. G. E. A History of South-East Asia. London 1958. Hall, D. G. E. Michael Symes, Journal of his Second Embassy to the Court of Ava in 1802 , London 1955.

Hamilton, A. A New Account of the East Indies , ed. Sir W. Foster, 2 vols, London 1930.

Harlow, V. T. The Founding of the Second British Empire , Vol. 1. London 1952.

Hutchinson, E. W. Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century. London 1940.

Joinville, P. de. L'Armateur Balguerie-Stuttenberg. Paris 1914. Joinville, P. de. Les armateurs de Bordeaux et l'Indochine sous la Restauration. Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises. Paris 1920.

Karpeles, S. Un Cas de Droit Maritime International en 1797. BSEI 1948.

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Alastair Lamb

King, J. A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean , Vol . 5, London 1784. Lamb, A. Britain and Chinese Central Asia : the road to Lhasa 1767-1905 . London 1960.

Lamb, A. Lord Macartney at Batavia , March 1793 , J. of the South Seas Society, Singapore 1958. Lamb, A. Tibet in Anglo-Chinese Relations , 1767-1842 . JRAS 1957. Lancaster, D. 77ze Emancipation of French Indo-China . Oxford 1961.

Le Thanh Khoi, Lč Vietnam , Paris 1955. Louvet, L. E. Ltf Cochinchine Religieuse , 2 vols, Paris 1885. Ly-Tio-Fane, M. Mauritius and the Spice Trade: the Odyssey oj Pierre Poivre. Port Louis, Mauritius 1958.

Malleret, L. U Archéologie du Delta du Mékong , 2 vols, Paris 1959.

Malleret, L. Lfeveil de Г Indochine au grand commerce maritime : Г armateur bordelais Balguerie-Stuttenberg. BSEI 1948.

Maybon, С. B. Histoire Moderne du Pays d'Annam. Paris 1919. Montyon, Baron de. Exposé Statistique du Tonkin et de Cochinchine. London 1811.

Moor, J. H. Notices oj the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries , Singapore 1837.

Morse, H. B. Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China , Vol. 2, Oxford 1926.

Parkinson, C. N. War in Eastern Seas , London 1954. Purefoy, Capt. Remarques sur la Cochinchine , Nouvelles Annales des Voyages, 1826.

Raynal, G. T. F. L'Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Etablissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes. 4 vols, Amsterdam 1770.

Sainte-Croix, R. de, Voyage Commerciale aux Indes Orientales. Paris 1810.

Sheppard, M. C. ff. A Short History of Trengganu. JMBRAS 1949. Staunton, Sir G. An Authentic Account oj an Embassy from Great Britain to the Emperor oj China , 2 vols, London 1797. Taboulet, G. La Geste Française en Indochine. 2 vols. Paris 1955. Wood, W. A. R. A History of Siam , Bangkok 1924.

Yule, H. & Burnell, A. C. Hobson-Jobson , London 1886.

Abbreviations.

BEFEO: Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient. BSEI: Bulletin de la Société des Etudes Indochinoises. JRAS: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London. JMBRAS: Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic

Society.

236

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INDEX A

Abbot and Maitland, 102, 133, 168

Acapulco, 10 Achin, 22, 29 Adam, J., 187

Admiral Pocock, 27, 72, 73, 78, 80, 94 Adran, Bishop of, see Pigneau de Behaine Alaungpaya, 160 Alexander, W., 40, 45 Allan, Capt., 101, 102, 111 Amazon , 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 49, 50, 58, 65, 68 Amboyna, 123, 127, 129, 139, 144 America, United States of, 175, 185, 219, 231 Amiens, Peace of, 99, 100, 162, 228 Anderson, A., 3, 89, 92 Angkor, 189, 213 An-tak-kien, see Le-van-Duyet Antoine, see Duong, Prince Armida , 106

Aur, Pulo, Battle of, 152 Aurousseau, L., 1 Ava, see Burma

Ayuthia, 183, 188 В

Babtiste, Snr. J., 112, 125, 126

Balambangan, 11, 15, 75, 105, 229 Balguerie, Sarget et Cie., 169, 170, 171, 172, 216. 221 Balguerie-Stuttenberg, Baron, 169, 216 Ballasore, 29 Banda, 16

Bangkok, 3, 4, 173, 174, 176, 187, 199, 206, 207, 228, 230 Barbinais, G. de la, 6 Barbor, Capt., 103, 110 Barizy, L., 97, 102, 103, 105, 118 Barrow, J., 3, 69, 73, 94, 97, 98, 103, 105, 154, 155, 160

Bassac (Ba Tac), 31, 32, 33, 200 Bassett, D. K., 26

Batavia, 89, 159, 188, 216 Bathai, see Bassac

Battembang, 213

Bayard, Mr., 28, 32, 33, 35, 50 237

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Bellecombe, M. de, 2, 19, 20, 24 Ben Dinh, see Benthoan Bengal, 15, 27, 43, 44, 50, 54, 56, 60, 68, 73, 75, 80, 98, 108, 109, 112, 113, 128, 130, 159, 180, 182, 187, 189, 201, 202, 230 Benthoan, 34 Berland, H„ 2, 3, 70, 71, 189, 199 Beverly, 210 Bhutan, 200 Binh-thuan, 70, 72 Bissachière, J. L. de la, 164, 167, 199 Blomfield, Capt., 27, 78, 79, 80

Boisquenai, M., 118 Bombay, 159, 182 Bordeaux, 167, 168, 169, 171, 186, 194, 205, 216, 221, 223 Borei, A., 169, 171, 216 Borei, E., 171, 216 Borneo, 11, 15, 16, 74, 94, 229

Bougainville, Capt. H. de, 222, 223 Bourdel, M., 171 Brest, 167, 168 Brillant, 22, 23

Brittany, 102, 111, 118, 135 Brussels, 209

Budge Budge, 28 Bugis, 29

Bui Dac Tuyen, 87, 92, 93

Burma, 21, 101, 150, 159, 160, 173, 174, 212, 213, 219, 223 Burnell, А. С., 71, 79 Bussy, Admiral, 83, 160 С

Cachao, see Hanoi Cadière, N. L„ 72 Calcutta, 4, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 22, 26, 69, 103, 106, 109, 110, 117, 118, 123, 175, 176

Callao Island, 80, 85, 86, 94, 97, 98, 167, 118, 149, 155 Camau, Pt. (Point of Cambodia), 30 Cambodia, 1, 5, 13, 43, 70, 75, 94, 160, 188, 191, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 212, 215

Cambodia River, see Mekong Canh, Prince, 83, 84, 86

Canning, Mr., 160 Canton, 5, 7, 10, 11, 16, 47, 50, 55, 84, 88, 89, 95, 103, 104, 109, 110, 117, 139, 150, 151, 155, 158, 159, 161, 165, 166, 195, 199, 203, 204, 205, 206, 226 238

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Canton, Pulo, 47, 80

Castlereagh, Lord, 100, 108 Cathcart, Colonel, 10 Cavité, 223 Cécir de Terre, Pulo, 35 Ceylon, 158, 202 Chaigneau, E., 171, 223 Chaigneau, Helene, née Barizy, 102

Chaigneau, J. В., 4, 99, 102, 111, 118, 129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 139, 150, 154, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 185, 190, 191, 196, 197, 198, 199, 216, 220-227

Chakri Dynasty, 173, 230, 232, 233 Champa, 46, 47, 70, 72, 199 Chandernagore, 2, 9, 12, 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 76 Chapman, С., 1, 2, 9, 12, 14-77, 82, 88, 89, 94, 101, 128, 155, 161, 173, 185, 212, 219, 228, 229, 231 Charpentier de Cossigny, 100 Chavelaure, Capt., 216

Chekiang, 107, 206 Chevalier, M„ 2, 9, 12, 19, 20, 24, 28, 76

China, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 23, 27, 46, 59, 65, 72, 73, 74, 75, 84, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 100, 105, 107, 109, 112, 115 120, 122, 123, 128, 132, 137, 141, 142, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153,

157, 158, 159, 161, 163, 174, 184, 189, 193, 194, 195, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 212, 214, 225, 226, 229, 231 Choiseul, 108 Choiseul-Praslin, Duc de, 8

Choumay, Cape, 50, 127 Chuong Vo, 32 Clarence, 89

Clodd, H. P., 29

Cléopâtre, 197, 216, 221, 222 Clermont-Tonnerre, 222 Clive, Lord, 2 Cochin, 1 Cochin China; Chinese in, 74, 190, 193-5, 200, 205 Coinage of, 38, 81, 194 Geography of, 70-1, 199-202 Government of, 207

History of, 5-9, 21, 27, 32, 34, 46, 61, 72-3, 82-3, 86-7, 93, 99, 172, 213, 231-3

Peoples of, 71-2

Trade of, 15, 16, 28, 71, 79, 80, 88, 94, 184, 202-7, 216, 217 239

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Two Mandarins from, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 60, 61, 69, 228 Col des Nuages, 46, 73 Condore, Pulo, 5, 6, 30, 31, 32, 69, 70, 85, 86, 176, 183, 188 Constance, 216 Conway, Comte de, 86 Cordier, H., 3, 4, 163, 223 Courrier De La Paix, 221 Courson de la Ville Hélio, Capt., 197, 216 221 Coutenceau des Algrins, M., 83, 85 Coutts, 101

Crawfurd, J., 1, 3, 4, 55, 71, 102, 155, 164, 168, 173, 174-227, 228, 229, 231 Crofts and Kellican, 13, 26, 27, 28

Cuny, M., 20, 21 Cuvier, Baron, 189 Cybèle, 167, 168, 169, 216 D

Dalrymple, A., 11, 15, 105, 107, 154, 175, 228 Danae, 188 Dangerfield, Capt., 175 182 D'Arnouville, see Marchault d'Arnouville, Dayot, F., 152 Dayot, J. M., 111, 151, 152, 153, 154, 169 Decaen, General, 100, 152, 167 Denmark, 106

Despiau, Dr., 99, 196 Desvoeux, C., 29

Diard, P., 189

Diligente, 19, 20, 21, 36 Dinh Cat, 70 Dinh-vuong, 32, 34, 73 Directory in France, 99 Discovery, 188

Dong-hoi, 70, 72, 73 Donnai, or Donai, 13, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 41, 44, 46, 61, 92, 107 Doret, Capt., 216 Drummond, Mr., 105, 143 Dundas, H., 88, 154

Duong, Prince, 32, 34 Dupleix, J. F., 2, 6, 7, 8, 21, 160 Durand de Linois, Admirai, 100, 152 Dutch, see Holland 240

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E

Earl of Temple, 14 Edmonstone, N. В., 123 Egypt, 71

Eleanor, 101 F

Faifo, 5, 21, 25, 48, 49, 68, 78, 79, 81, 87, 90, 97, 111, 124, 125, 129, 155, 176, 193, 206

Farquahar, R. J., 123, 144, 168 Fendali, J., 187

Findlay, А. С., 127 Finlayson, G., 175 Fleury, 108 Flotte, M. de., 118 Forsanz, G. de., 99, 135, 196 France, 2, 5-9, 12, 15, 19-24, 28, 57, 82-86, 94, 95, 96-98, 99-101, 105, 107, 108, 116, 118, 119, 121, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, 160, 162, 167-172, 180, 185, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 205, 209, 213, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220-227, 229, 230, 231 Francis, P., 16 Fukien, 107, 206 G

Galathée, 72 Gambir de Terre, Pulo, see Cécir de Terre

Gardner, Capt., 216 General De Caen, see Page

George III, 163, 164 George IV, 174

Gerard, Abbé, 104, 111 Gia-dinh, 87

Gia Long, see Ngyuan Anh Giang-thanh, River, 200 Gibraltar, 155

Good Hope, Cape of, 161 Gore, Capt., 188 Gower, Sir E., 91 Griffin, 102, 133, 150, 151 Gunjava, 103, 110, 117, 124, 132 Guise, M., 117 H

Hainan, 112, 206, 217 Hall, D. G. E., 101, 150 Hanoi, 1, 188, 201, 204, 206 241

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Hardy, Capí., 216

Harlow, V. T., 2, 9, 228

Harrop and Stevenson, 106 Hastings, Marquess of, 173, 175, 187 Hastings, W., 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 28, 160, 161, 185 Ha-tien, 200, 207

Henry, 169, 170, 205, 216 Herbert's Directory, 80 Hieu, Prince, 32 Hindostán, 89, 91 Hoi-nan, see Faifo Holland, 5, 11, 64, 68, 75, 86, 108, 150, 154, 163, 176, 186, 216, 219, 231, 232 Hué, 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 21, 23, 25, 27, 32, 45, 49, 63, 64, 72, 73, 92, 101, 109, 110, 112, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128-141, 144, 150, 158, 161, 163, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 189, 190-192, 200, 201, 206, 220, 221, 222, 223 Hutchinson, E. W., 218 Huttien, 34, 35 Hutton, Capt., 28, 29, 32, 33, 57, 63, 128 I

Ignaac, see Van-Nhac

Ile de Bourbon, 7 Ile de France, 7, 8, 95, 100, 108, 154, 160, 169, 216 Irrawaddy, 159, 160 J

Jackall, 89 Jackson, M., 91, 92, 94 Jackson, President, 175 Janssaud, M., 3, 163, 164, 165 Japan, 74, 75, 89, 94, 233 Java, 7, 74, 173, 186 Jenny, 28, 31, 32, 49, 50, 56, 60, 63, 68, 69, 128 Jogjakarta, 173, 186 John Adam, 175, 182, 216, 221 Jules, 223 К

Kanh-hoa, 70

Karpelès, S., 106 Kedah, 29, 133, 149, 173, 181, 219 Kellican, D., 13 Kergariou, Capt., de., 167, 168, 169, 185, 191, 196, 197, 216, 233 242

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Ketchpole, Mr., 188 King, Capt., 188 Köffler, J., 6, 83

Kwangsi, 88, 199 Kwangtung, 88 L

Labartette, J., Bishop of Veren, 104, 111, 132, 171, 224 La Favorite, 223 Lance, D„ 101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 111, 151 Laos, 70, 199, 200 La Paix, 169, 171, 216

Laplace, Capt., 223 Larcher, Capt., 99 Larose, 169, 170, 171, 216, 221, 223, 225, 226 Lauriston, 21, 36 Law, J., 6

Le Dynasty, 5, 27, 46, 61, 87 Lefebvre, Bishop, 232 Lefèbvre, Capt. S., 100

Le Fer, Capt., 21

Le Gac, M., 72 Le Thanh Khoi, 21, 46 72

Le-Van-Duyet, 189 Le Van Khoi, 231

Le Veyer, M., 118 Light, F., 29, 98 Ligor, 173, 219

Lintin Island, 226 Um, 89, 90, 91, 92 Liot, Abbé, 104, 111, 132, 135, 139 Lisbon, 23 Lorach, M., 118 Louis XVI, 155, 166, 197, 96, 97 Louis XVni, 163, 170, 171, 191, 196, 197 Loureiro, J. de, 6, 9, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 45, 76, 79, 83. Lovec, 183

Lyon, 7 M

Macao, 5, 16, 21, 31, 35, 47, 80, 103, 105, 107, 108, 110, 133, 146, 152, 159, 168, 184, 206 Macartney, Earl of, 1, 2, 10, И, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 107, 150, 154, 155, 163, 188, 228, 229, 230 Mackintosh, С., 109, 117, 123, 125, 127, 129, 130 243

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Mackintosh, Capl., 91 Maclennan, Capt., 28, 30, 50, 58, 59 Madagascar, 7 Madras, 4, 22, 29, 56, 74, 75, 80, 102, 109, 133, 168

Makepeace, Capt., 133

Malacca, 16, 28, 29, 69, 71, 84, 85, 94, 95, 100, 102, 109, 113, 117, 123, 144, 152, 168, 175, 177, 179, 183, 189, 205, 218 Malleret, L., 200

Manchu Dynasty, 5 Manila, 9, 10, 11, 100, 102, 151, 152, 153, 159, 168, 180, 223 Mansur I, Sultan of Trengganu, 29 Marchault, 7 Marchault ď Arnouville, 7 Marchini, J. В., 104, 105, 110, 111, 118, 151, 153, 168 Maunpas, 108

Maybon, С. В., 2, 20, 21, 72, 97 Mekong, 1, 30, 31, 33, 46, 72, 195, 200 Menam, 187, 188 Mexico, 10 Minh-Mang, 99, 171, 172, 174, 197, 213, 221, 222, 223, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233

Minto, Lord, 160

Missions Etrangérès, Société des, 6, 7, 82, 164, 167 Monckton, Hon. E., 29 Monteiro, X. de., 6, 83 Montmorin, Comte de, 85, 86 Moniz, В., 19, 20, 24, 28, 31, 35, 50 Molé, Comte de, 3, 163, 165 Molucca Islands, 16, 74, 85 Montyon, Baron de, 199 Moor, J. H., 3 Morse, H. В., 3 N

Nader Shah, 44 Nairac, P., 169

Napoleon I, 99, 100, 152, 167 Napoleon III, 232

Netherlands, see Holland

Nguyen Anh, (Gia Long), 32, 33, 82, 83, 85, 86, 97, 99, 101, 102, 106, 109, 111, 118, 130, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 172, 195, 196, 207, 223, 226, 227, 229, 232, 233 Roberts, interviews with, 130-132, 136-137, 144 Roberts, letter to, 142-143, 145 244

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Nguyen Dynasty, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 21, 32, 40, 61, 72, 73, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 99, 171, 230, 232, 233 Nha Trang, 70

Niaung, M., 92 Nile, River, 71 Nonsuch, 103 О

O'Friell, J., 6

Olivier de Puymanel, 106 Ong-how-bow, 137, 139 Ong-tom-beign, 69 Ong-to-noe, 128, 129, 132, 136, 140, 164, 165 Ong-ta-hia, 50, 51, 56, 57, 60

Opperman-Mandrot and Co., 168 Origny-en-Thierache, 209 P

Page, 123, 126, 141 Panchen Lama, 10, 82

Pandaran, Cape, 35 Panjang, Pulo, 32, 188

Paracel Islands, 15, 80, 171, 216, 223 Parish, Capt., 94 Pascal, Snr., 64 Patani, 183

Peking, 10, 11, 82, 88, 91, 109, 150, 163, 213, 229 Penang, 1, 11, 12, 88, 89, 109, 118, 123, 133, 141, 143, 147, 149, 159, 160, 173, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 184, 219, 220, 230 Perak, 181 Phanri, 206 Philibert, M., 21 Philippine Islands, 10, 15, 16, 74, 94, 99, 100, 152 Philippon et Cie, 169, 170, 172, 205, 216 Phoenix, 220 Phuyen, 206 Pigneau de Behaine, 20, 32, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107, 111, 150, 152, 155, 167, 171, 172, 188, 209, 224, 230, 231

Pnompenh, 5, 183, 200 Poivre, P., 6, 7, 8, 47, 108 Pondichery, 2, 7, 12, 19, 20, 22, 24, 82, 83, 85, 86, 98, 100 Pontiemas, 200 245

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Portugal, 1, 5, 31, 36, 42, 47, 50, 58, 59, 62, 68, 81, 89, 105, 107, 133, 135, 142, 146, 150, 159, 169, 184, 191, 203, 218, 231 Potosí, 158 Prince of Wales' Island, see Penang Prussia, 86 Purefoy, Capt., 102, 111, 133, 136, 151, 168 Q

Quan Tan Quon, 54 Quang-binh, 70 Quang-nam, 21, 46, 70 Quang-ngai, 70 Quang Toan, 87, 89, 92, 93, 99 Quang Tri, 70, 206 Quang-trung, see Van Hue

Queck Foe, see Truong Phuoc Loan Qui-nhon, 27, 35, 36, 44, 47, 68, 70, 87, 92, 99, 206 R

Raffles, Sir S. T., 173, 189 Rama I, king of Siam, 83

Rangoon, 159, 160 Raynal, Abbé G. T. F., 51

Renouard de Sainte-Croix, 152, 199

Rey, Capt., 169, 205, 216 Reynault, M., 6, 188 Richlieu, Duc de, 167, 168, 169, 170 Riddle, Capt., 79 Riu, 29 Roberts, J. W., 1, 3, 102, 103, 104-148, 149-166, 173, 185, 190, 196, 219, 228, 229, 230 Robert, E., 174 Rock, Mr., 124, 129, 132, 137 Rumbold, 9, 13, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 36, 73, 228 Rutherford, Lt., 175, 182 S

Saigon, 1, 27, 33, 55, 83, 86, 87, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 160, 176, 188, 189, 193, 194, 195, 200, 201, 204, 206, 207, 209, 216, 232

Scant Michel, 171, 216, 223

Sapata, Pulo, 69 Seringapatam, 164 Sheppard, M. C. ff., 29 246

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Ships, see individual names Admiral Pocock, Amazon, Amboyna, Armida, Beverly, Brillant,

Choiseul, Clarance, Cleopatre, Constance, Courrier De La Paix, Coutts, Су bele, Danae, Diligente, Discovery, Earl of Temple, Eleanor, Fleury, Gdathée, Generai de Caen, Griffin, Gunjava, Henry, Hindostán, Jackall, Jenny, John Adam, Jules, La Favorite, Im Paix, Ixtrose, Lauriston, Поп, Marchault, Maunpas, Nonsuch, Page, Phoenix, Rumbold, Thetis, Topaz. Siam, 3, 4, 6, 16, 32, 43, 75, 83, 94, 146, 150, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 195, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 220, 232, 233

Si-Chang Islands, 187 Singapore, 1, 11, 12, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 189, 204, 205, 219, 221, 223, 225, 226, 230 Song-cau, 206

Song Giang, River, 70 Spain, 10, 11, 54, 99, 151, 153, 155, 159, 231 Staunton, Sir G., 2, 3, 88, 92, 93, 94, 107

St. James, Cape and Bay, 33, 101, 102, 103, 111, 123, 132, 135, 144,

176, 201 Suffren, Admiral, 160 Sulu, 15, 81, 180 Sumatra, 94, 189 Sunda, 85

Surabaya, 223 Swinton, G., 176, 182 Symes, M., 101 Syriam, 160 T

Taboulet, G., 2, 3, 4, 20, 133, 163, 165, 199 Talleyrand, 167

Tay-Son, 8, 9, 20, 21, 27, 32, 34, 45, 50, 59, 69, 82, 83, 87, 88, 99, 102, 111, 135, 214, 229 Tibet, 10, 229 Titsing, I., 150, 163 Thailand, see Siam Thétis, 222 Tho-chu Island, see Panjang, Pulo

Thomas, Capt., 106 Tonkin, 5, 8, 23, 32, 46, 61, 70, 74, 87, 93, 94, 99, 101, 105, 108, 110,

112, 115, 143, 148, 153, 165, 183, 188, 189, 195, 197, 198, 199,

200, 201-204, 206-208, 215, 217 Tonkinese Eunuch General at Hué, 54-56, 57, 60, 61, 62 Tonkinese Viceroy at Hué, 51-54, 57, 60, 64

Topaz, 226 247

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Torin, Capt., 101, 102 Tothill, W., 92 Totty, Mr., 17, 28, 32, 57, 61, 62 Toulon, 118 Tourane, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 20, 21, 27, 32, 36, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 69, 74, 76, 78, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91-99, 102-109, 110-117, 123, 124-141, 143, 144, 145, 151, 155, 157, 158, 159, 168, 169, 172, 175, 176, 193, 196, 197, 201, 222, 232 Tranquebar, 106 Trengganu, 29, 30, 33 Trinder, Lt., 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 136, 139, 141 Trinh Dynasty, 5, 9, 21, 27, 32, 46, 61, 72, 73, 87 Trinh San, 21 Truong-duc, 72

Truong Phuoc Loan, 31, 32 Tyson, see Tay-Son U

Ubi, Pulo, 29, 30 V

Van Braam, 150, 163 Van-Hue, 8, 46, 87, 88, 93 Van-Le, 8 Van-Nhac, 8, 21, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42-46, 49, 52, 68, 70, 87 Vannier, P., 99, 111, 112, 113, 118, 138, 144, 145, 150, 154, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 190, 191, 196, 197, 199, 222, 226

Varella, Cape, 72 Vergennes, 8 Veren, Bishop of, see Labartette Veret, M., 188

Versailles, Treaty of, 82, 85, 86, 88, 94, 96, 97, 107, 152, 172, 196, 197, 227 Vienna, Congress of, 172 Vietminh, 1 Villèle, 222

Vo-Vuong, 6, 7, 8, 23, 32, 73, 79, 83 W

Wellesley, Lord, 101, 103, 118, 119-123, 150, 152, 164 Wellesley, Province, 173 William V, of the Netherlands, 86 White, Capt., 231 Y

Yule, H., 71, 79 Yunnan, 195, 199, 200, 201, 217 248

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ERRATA

p. 35, note 48. For "Quiñón", read "Quinion". p. 55, caption to Fig. 4. For "from Crawfurd, Embassy, 2nd edition, vol. 2", read "redrawn

from Taboulet, op. cit., vol. 1, by C. A.

G.-H."

p. 160, note 112, line 11. Cross reference should

read "p. 21 above".

p. 197, note 152, line 2. Cross reference should

read "pp. 167-168 above".

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