Abord clinique des affections du rachis par le chirurgien [1 ed.] 2287721010, 9782287721014, 9782287721021 [PDF]

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ABORD CLINIQUE DES AFFECTIONS DU RACHIS PAR LE CHIRURGIEN

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VINCENT POINTILLART Avec la collaboration de Christian Soderlund

ABORD CLINIQUE DES AFFECTIONS DU RACHIS PAR LE CHIRURGIEN

Vincent Pointillart Unité de pathologie rachidienne Hôpital Pellegrin-Tripode Place Amélie-Raba-Léon 33076 Bordeaux Cedex

ISBN-13 : 978-2-287-72101-4 Springer Paris Berlin Heidelberg New York

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Maquette de couverture : Nadia OUDDANE Illustration de couverture © Fotolia Photographe : Chen

Collection Abord clinique, dirigée par Paul Zeitoun

La collection « Abord clinique » est composée d’ouvrages destinés aux professionnels de santé confirmés ou en formation, intéressés par le point de vue de spécialistes ayant une grande expérience clinique et un goût affirmé pour l’enseignement. On trouvera dans ces ouvrages la description des symptômes et de leur expression, des signes physiques et de leur interprétation, ainsi que des aspects relationnels avec le patient et son entourage. Témoignant du vécu de l’auteur, ces ouvrages ont pour objectif la description du plus grand nombre possible de paramètres utiles à la prise en charge de la maladie ou des symptômes et au suivi du malade.

Dans la même collection : Ouvrages parus : – Abord clinique en cancérologie Bernard Hoerni, Pierre Soubeyran, février 2003 – Abord clinique en gastro-entérologie Paul Zeitoun, François Lacaine, février 2003 – Abord clinique en gynécologie Bernard Blanc, Ludovic Cravello, juin 2004 – Abord clinique des malades de l’alcool Dominique Huas, Bernard Rueff, juin 2005 – Abord clinique des urgences traumatiques au cabinet du généraliste Jean-Claude Pire, Carole Carolet, juin 2005 – Abord clinique en urologie Ariane Cortesse, Alain Le Duc, septembre 2006 réimprimé en 2007 – Abord clinique du malade âgé Robert Moulias, Sophie Moulias, décembre 2006

ABORD CLINIQUE DES AFFECTIONS DU RACHIS PAR LE CHIRURGIEN – Abord clinique des urgences au domicile du patient Jean-François Bouet et Jean-Claude Pire, 2008 – Abord clinique en obstétrique Florence Bretelle et Marianne Capelle, 2008 À paraître : – Abord clinique en neurologie Jean-Claude Turpin – Abord clinique du sevrage tabagique Brigitte Métadieu – Abord clinique de l’hypertension artérielle Antoine Lemaire

6

SOMMAIRE ■ INTRODUCTION .............................................................................

11

■ ENFANT

Rachialgies .................................................................................................. Interrogatoire......................................................................................... Examen physique .................................................................................. Examens complémentaires................................................................... Principales causes................................................................................. Radiculalgies............................................................................................... Radiculalgies des membres inférieurs................................................ Radiculalgies des membres supérieurs .............................................. Déformations ............................................................................................. Interrogatoire......................................................................................... Examen physique .................................................................................. Examens complémentaires................................................................... Modalités thérapeutiques.....................................................................

13 13 14 14 15 15 24 24 32 33 33 35 39 43

■ ADULTE JUSQU’À CINQUANTE ANS ..................................... Rachialgies .................................................................................................. Interrogatoire......................................................................................... Examen physique .................................................................................. Examens complémentaires................................................................... Principales causes................................................................................. Radiculalgies............................................................................................... Névralgie cervicobrachiale d’origine discale ..................................... Lomboradiculalgie d’origine discale................................................... Lomboradiculalgie provenant d’autres causes..................................

47 47 48 49 49 49 63 63 67 73

■ ADULTE

75 75 76 76 77

ET ADOLESCENT ..........................................................

DE PLUS DE CINQUANTE ANS ..............................

Rachialgies .................................................................................................. Lombalgie par dégénérescence discale évoluée................................. Tassement ostéoporotique .................................................................... Métastase vertébrale ............................................................................

7

ABORD CLINIQUE DES AFFECTIONS DU RACHIS PAR LE CHIRURGIEN Autres causes......................................................................................... Radiculalgies et atteintes neurologiques arthrosiques ..................... Radiculalgies cervicales ....................................................................... Myélopathie cervicarthrosique ............................................................ Radiculalgies des membres inférieurs et claudication neurogène .. Déformations ............................................................................................. Scoliose................................................................................................... Cyphose : troubles de l’équilibre sagittal ..........................................

78 78 79 79 84 86 87 92

■ PATIENTS

PARAPLÉGIQUES OU TÉTRAPLÉGIQUES : SUIVI À LONG TERME ...................................................................

Complications vitales ............................................................................... Complications cutanées........................................................................ Complications urinaires....................................................................... Complications respiratoires................................................................. Complications vasculaires ................................................................... Complications fonctionnelles ................................................................. Douleurs neurologiques ....................................................................... Douleurs osseuses................................................................................. Spasticité................................................................................................ Troubles du transit intestinal .............................................................. Complications ostéo-articulaires......................................................... Dysautonomie (ou hyperflexion autonome).......................................

95 96 96 97 97 97 98 98 98 99 99 100 100

■ RÉFLEXION

ET STRATÉGIE PÉRICHIRURGICALES : SUIVI À LONG TERME DES PATIENTS OPÉRÉS................

Réflexion du chirurgien et information du patient ........................... Réflexion préopératoire........................................................................ Risques encourus du fait de l’intervention chirurgicale................... Période postopératoire.......................................................................... Rééducation postopératoire ................................................................. Évolution à long terme d’un rachis opéré et gestion des récidives douloureuses............................................................................. Causes techniques au niveau de l’étage opéré.................................. Causes techniques au niveau des étages adjacents.......................... ■ RACHIS

103 104 104 105 107 108 113 114 118

ET PSYCHOSOMATIQUE ...........................................

121

■ LEXIQUE................................................................................................

125

■ INDEX .....................................................................................................

145

8

Je remercie tout particulièrement Violaine Avinc et Émilie Savineau pour leur aide dans la retranscription du manuscrit. Yves Vollette et Aurore Karl pour leurs schémas, Christine Casterot, Marine Plé, Guillaume Coste kinésithérapeutes du service pour leur aide dans le chapitre Rééducation postopératoire.

9

CRITICAL STUDY Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Edited by Julia Annas Volume I, 1983, x + 268 pp., Volume II, 1984, x + 304 pp. Oxford: Clarendon Press. JOHN GLUCKER

Of making of many books there is no end. Volume 52 (1983) of L 'Annee Philologique has a list of periodicals occupying 22 pages in small print, most of which print also articles on ancient phlosophy. It includes three periodicals wholly devoted to ancient philosophy: Apeiron, Elenchos and Phronesis. One could add the more recent Ancient Philosophy, as well as the numerous collections of Essays on .... More Essays on .... N e w Essays on... ,Studies in .... N e w Studies in... - not to mention Doubt and Dogmatism, Science and Speculation, Epithet and Episteme, Etymology and Ethos (the last two being my own contribution to this 'ongoing' Jane Austen game in the spirit of Voltaire's famous back-handed compliment to the Deity), and more. Apart from the fact that ancient philosophy (like most academic subjects) is a growing industry in an age of increased literacy, and apart from the prestige of the University of Oxford, is there any more substantial justification for having now a regular volume, each year, of Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ? The one reason which naturally rises to the mind in connection with Oxford is raising the standard. An Oxford periodical should show by example how one should, and by implication and instruction how one should not, do ancient philosophy. It should help to curb excesses and eradicate dangerous habits and fashions. It should recall ancient philosphers to their main task, 'the scholarly and sensitive analysis of ancient texts', as the editor so aptly has it in her Editorial (I, IX). It is in this spirit that I shall make the following observations The two beautifully produced volumes before us have articles and reviews ranging from Parmenides to Proclus. Plato and Aristotle still preponderate (ten out of fifteen articles, three out of eight 389

JOHN GLUCKER reviews - this without counting the length, which also weighs in their favour). The Presocratics have one article and one review. Post-Aristotelian philosophy gets three articles and three reviews. This apart from Owen's article, which falls into no neat category and stands in a class by itself. By and large, I have found the post-Aristotelian articles and reviews more uniformly satisfactory (which is not to imply that some of the others are not excellent or brilliant or both, but merely to say that not all the others are so, or even entirely satisfactory.) I hope I am not being entirely subjective. What I find satisfying in all these post - Aristotelian contributions is that their authors stay close to their texts, read them carefully, abstain from reading into them what is not in them, and when they demolish an ancient thesis or argument, they do it properly and without pontificating. When I first read in Gwil Owen's Preface to Doubt and Dogmatism, that 'A field too often tilled by clever but isolated husbandmen is now opened to philosophers and scholars of philosophy', I had a nightmarish vision of those new species of rational animals, the Greekless Greek Philosopher and the Loeb Classical Philosopher, invading the privacy of my isolated field and beginning to teach me and my banausic (if clever) fellow-labourers how to till it: what is the true meaning of that famous English expression pithanon kai aperispaston kai diexodeumenon, no matter what its remote Greek etymology may imply, and how to reconcile apparent contradictions in Zeno of Citium by analysing the logic behind the words of the late Rev. R.G. Bury. This has not yet happened, by and large, in Hellenistic-Roman philosophy, although the gam~ of translation and transliteration for the benefit of 'mere philosophers' (who should really regard this implied illiteracy as an insult) has been going on for a while. Most scholars writing on post-Aristotelian philosophy still have a Classical grounding and make good use of it. This sorry state of affairs will doubtless be rectified as more translations and transliterations become available. Meanwhile, this provides me with a good excuse for breaking the chronological routine and reviewing the post-Aristotelian articles before the rest. Before I do this, I shall pay my homage to G.E.L. Owen's posthumous article (Philosophical Invective, I, 1-25), which opens this periodical and reminds us all of our painful loss. That this is vintage Owen is hardly surprising, since Owen was always vintage. That it is brilliant and brilliantly written, densus et brevis et semper sibi instans, full of the joy of scholarship and 390

CRITICAL STUDY thought, is also not surprising. That I find most o f it convincing on the evidence submitted (and one can trust Owen to submit the relevant evidence) is also fairly obvious. What should be noted is the matter of this article and the methods it employs, since it reveals a side of Gwil Owen which many of his disciples and followers would prefer to forget or ignore as irrelevant to ancient philosophy. The article deals with no philosophical issue of any import. It is wholly concerned with the nature of the ancient biographical tradition, in its application to philosophers, and with its reliability (or largely, the lack of it), an issue which is entirely philological and historical. It reveals Owen as a scrupulous reader of complex ancient texts, who knows how to discuss sources and chronology, how to emend a corrupt passage and how to complete a lacunose papyrus. But this is really not 'just another side of Owen', as little relevant to ancient philosophy as, say, Amhari poetry or Croatian history might have been. Owen's rigorous and sensitive, but at the same time imaginative and adventurous, philological and historical approach to ancient texts is fully reflected - for those who have eyes to see - also in his 'purely philosophical' work, and it has often saved him from some of the excesses or deficiencies of 'mere ancient philosophers'. This is the old Oxford tradition, where Mods comes before Greats as a necessary condition, and is never replaced or obliterated by Greats. It may have been an accident that this was the most finished article in Owen's Nachlass - and even here, Professor Martha Nussbaum had to add some footnotes and references. But divine providence may also have had a part to play here, reminding us of some of the fundamental rules of our trade, which Owen never despised, but which are sometimes neglected by those who take his name in vain. When will we have his collected writings available? Now to my promise. I shall deal first with three articles on post-Artistotelian philosophy. (Reviews will be discussed collectively and more briefly towards the end). In The Role o f Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics (I, 143-167), Gisela Striker sets out, with great philosophical penetration, to answer the question whether, as Pohlenz and others have maintained, o&eicootr is really the foundation of Stoic ethics. The answer (165) is a qualified dissent: '...oikeiosis did have an important part to play, although it was probably not the fundation of Stoic ethics.' This is 391

JOHN GLUCKER reached by showing, in the first place, that the transition from natural oirekootr towards one's natural (in the everyday, not the full Stoic, sense) interests to o&eit.ootr towards virtue and honestum is never convincingly demonstrated by the Stoics, and would involve some contradictions; and, in the second place, by pointing to the conflict inherent between what is now conveniently (although I still believe wrongly) termed 'egoistic' and 'altruistic' olre~cootr The last section maintains that the Stoic tenet that virtue is self-sufficient towards happiness was defended by the Stoics out of preference for, or emphasis on, the autarchic aspect of the r~Xor at the expense of its eudaemonistic side. We may as well start here. Striker (165) quotes a sentence of De Fin. IV, 40 in English. In Latin it runs: . . . virtutem non posse constitui si ea, quae extra virtutem sint, ad beate vivendum pertineant. I take constitui to be ouvtaraoOat, in the logical sense frequent in definitions of the Stoic aoPqtqa~vou. That is: virtue cannot be logically construed if we admit any other kinds of good. This, I take it, is a clear reference to the logically consistent syllogism represented, for example, in De Fin. III, 27 ff, and V, 79 ft. There (79), we are expressly told that what we are concerned with is quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat, and the argument with Piso shows that, because Zeno had his carefully constructed syllogism up his sleeve, he could consistently claim that the Sage is always happy and that there were no gradations in happiness. We may not be impressed by this syllogism, which relies heavily on loaded words like ~rrawer6r dTaO6r KaX6r (and if we take the longer version provided by Plutarch, Stoic. Rep. 13, 1039c = S V F III, 29, also aLoer6r and &peov6r But the Stoics do seem to have taken this neat logical consistency to be a major reason for making virtue the only good, and for producing jargon words like rrpo~71~dua and &lrocrporrTll~pa for what the man in the street (and Chrysippus himself in the marketplace or at home: bTn. V, 89) would call goods and evils. A major reason - but the only reason? I would doubt it. Not just that this syllogism is ascribed already to Zeno: even Chrysippus was not merely a logician. The Stoics, after all, claimed to have, not merely a set of statements based on impregnablo logic, but a system in which logic, physics and ethics were consistent with each other and presented a unified picture of the world in all its aspects. If so, one should be surprised to find that the admirable argument construed by Striker ( 1 5 3 - 4 ) is " n o t . . . spelled out in any source.' 392

CRITICAL STUDY Very briefly, it is that, for human beings, living in accordance with nature implies living in accordance with full human nature, including virtue and reason. I think that the difficult and hastily strung together Fin. III, 2 3 - 5 may conceal some hint to this - e.g. 2 3 : . . . sic appetitio animi. . . non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data~ itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. This may well be what a man discoveres when (III, 21) he attains to inteUigentia et ratio. This would still not rid us of the other difficulty - why the prima naturae have, at this stage, to be ejected from the realm of the good and relegated to praeponenda, sumenda, eligenda and other monsters of the same water - rather than be included as an inferior constituent (as the Peripatetics claimed - or indeed, as one could have expected from multo earn pluris aestimavit of III, 21). Cicero's defence (and we have no proof that it goes back in all details to early Stoicism) shows only that the Zenonian syllogism is consistent, not that the whole system is; and the inconsistency in the content of the good and between the two kinds of oire~atr (which, to the nee-Peripatetic Piso, reflects an inconsistency in life itself), points to a breakdown in the system at the crucial point of the link between physics and ethics. Whether Posidionius sensed this and abandoned obxet~atr as the physical and psychological basis of the supreme good (as Striker, 160) is doubtful Ciem. Strom. II, 21 does not exactly say that only virtue is good; and Galen's report that he attacked Chrysippus need not necessarily imply that Zeno and Cleanthes had radically differed here, but merely that he had found Chrysippus' formulation more convenient for his argument. We simply do not know what Zeno and Cleanthes thought of o&ef~ootr S V F I, 197-8, and no relevant fragments of Cleanthes, are not enough to go by. Does Aristotle have no proper argument for including moral virtue in happiness, apart from the ambiguity in the meaning of d~per~ (150-1)? The arguments of EAr I, 5 ft. may not stand the test of logic - perhaps not even the test of Aristotelian syllogism. Nor, if we remember 1094bll ft., do they have to. But the way in which they are related to ~v~pTeta, a6rdpKeta and to Aristotle's whole conception of human nature, suggests that this is not merely the result of being trapped by language. Aristotle is no Meno. Nor did the Peripatetics uphold the absolute primacy of morals: the highest good for them was, of course, the life of contemplation (EN X, 7), and "the rest of virtue' lags behind as second-best (8). 393

JOHN GLUCKER I am far from sure that the difference between Zeno's plain

blaoXtrrovladvox ~'//vand Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' addition o f rE ~6aet 'is indeed just a matter of explicitness' (154, n. 11). In the profound philosophical sense of a system based on the unity of nature, yes. But, like his master Heracfitus, the Stoic can pull things in different directions inside that unity. Stobaeus' evidence (SVF I, 179 b, quoted in this note) seems to point more in the direction of a Socratic position like that represented in Gorgias (e.g. 4 8 1 b 1 0 482c2). This may be yet another case where Zeno was more Socratic than his followers (and perhaps less systematic and less concerned with physics). I am not happy with the statement (166) 'While it is impossible for a good person to attain happiness outside this framework, there is no guarantee that keeping the rules will bring happiness'. This may be useful in a modern discussion, but it is hardly a problem with which we could confront the Stoic. For him, virtue is not a matter of any rules of any game, and happiness has nothing to do with what ordinary people are told would accrue t o their lot if they pay their rates and abstain from stealing their neighbours' bicycles. It is precisely because we all know that the man who is good by common standards - the man who 'keeps to the rules of the game' - is often unhappy in the common acceptation of this word, that the famous Stoic paradoxes appear less paradoxical on reflection. All this is in no way to detract from Striker's real contribution to the debate about olxet'watr and from looking at it from a refreshingly different angle. I am far from entirely happy (not being a Stoic sage either) about much of what I have suggested here. The truth is that so much of what serious Stoics said has reached us through the doxographic sieve, and what we find in SVF is all too often the same definitions and statements, and little proper argument in the original words. There is a lot o f argument in Cicero, but he worked too fast and was less sympathetic to the Stoics than to the Academics or even to Antiochus - at least in what concerns the more abstruse fundaments and deductions. One book of Chrysippus found among the sands of Egypt would have settled many more problems than all our lucubrations put together. Striker works usually close to the texts, and to argue with her is to argue about what the Stoics said, not about what some of us think they 'obviously' meant. I am not sure that one would expect any issue to be 'the foundation of Stoic ethics'. In a system which claims to be coherent, any beginning is only a methodical device, like beginning 394

CRITICAL STUDY to draw a circle from one point. But I believe that she has shown oiKethmtr to be far more problematic than one has suspected and far less crucial than one has been asked to assume. The fact (I believe it is a fact) that the inconsistency in this concept does not appear to come under very heavy fire from ancient critics, and that the Stoics do not seem to use it as an irrefutable answer to them, suggests that she is right. Jonathan Barnes' Immaterial Causes (I, 1 6 9 - 1 9 2 ) is as brilliant as anything Barnes has written. In his final note (40, p. 192) he apologizes that 'this paper is amateurish: I do not know enough Proclus to pose as a scholar, and I fear my approach to the Elements will not commend itself to the experts.' So much the worse for those experts. Proclus did not write this book for Proclus scholars. The Erotxet'~o~r is (Dodds, p. 187) an 'elementary handbook' True. (as Barnes, 171) that 'the Elements makes no concessions to the inattentive and weak-minded reader'. But it does not require previous knowledge of all its sources, from Parmenides, through Plato and Aristotle, to Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus. It can be read and analysed in its own rioht, provided (and this proviso will occur in this review often and in various shapes and forms) that we read it and not into it. Barnes does just that. He reads it. He is, in fact, far more conversant with the sources and with Proclus himself than his disarming remark would suggest. He often interprets an obscure Proclean expression, not just through other propositions of the same book (which is within the rules of the 'elementary handbook' game), but through Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and others. The chief merit of this article is that it shows what an acute philosophical critic can do with a proposition like Elements o f Theology 80 by analysing it minutely on its own merits. Apart from a suggestion offered with a caveat on pp. 1 8 9 - 1 9 1 , Barnes never imputes to Proclus things not said or implied in his own Greek words, which Barnes has pondered carefully with Dodds' and Trouillard's comments. His repunctuation (184) of a crucial passage is an entirely satisfactory piece of philology. If, at the end, the poor proposition is left without a leg to stand on (and my impression is that further surgery might amputate a few more legs), this should not surprise any reader who has attempted to treat this Proclean treatise on its own merits as a work of philosophy. I am still puzzled by the statement that 'bodies are divisible alone', and suspect that Barnes' note 30 is too kind to 395

JOHN GLUCKER Proclus. If I differ on a few points, I do not imply that anyone has said the last word - both because there is no such thing in scholarship, and because too little has been done, as far as Proclus is concerned, in the way Barnes has done it. On p. 175, n. 11 and its text, one might argue that there is a tacit assumption here that a thing cannot just 'split' (in the English middle voice) of its own accord, without some external power splitting it - dryness, moisture, and the like; or a tacit reliance on the mere fact that 6~.tper6~ and laeoto'roq have a passive connotation. That this would involve us in a circular argument is no reason why Proclus did not make this tacit assumption. On p. 17 and n. 16, I still think that, in re, there is a difference between the two kinds of Aristotelian change. The black gown realizes its potentiality to become green at the price of having its blackness destroyed. Barnes realizes his potentiality to write while retaining this very potentiality - indeed (see Kosman's article), while having it in a fuller sense. A proper parallel would be if Barnes, who has a potentiality to write English, realized it by writing Estonian and losing his English in the process. If this is far-fetched, this may show that Aristotle has some point. Is Proclus' error, analysed on pp. 1 8 3 - 4 , due to his implied treatment of r6 o~o/aa and 7"6 &o6~l~a'rov as if they were individual opposite substances or qualities rather than e~6~ rffov 6vrwv? On p. 186 and n. 32, I would still assume that ~rotop rat' &66va~ov is in direct contrast to r6 7rotof)v 66valaw ~• 7rotrtrtr~v, and ~urotov should be interpreted in terms of this chiasmus. Whether we take Dodds' transposition or not, I agree (1"87, n. 34) that it is 'logically idle', and put in, perhaps, for the sake of the nice chiastic contrast. That Proclean la~Oe~t~ is no predication (189 ff.) is clear from Barnes' arguments. I doubt if calling it 'synecdochic predication' would improve matters in a more than logical sense. Proclus ends his rider, or corollary, by saying that immaterial beings share in bodies and their divisibility. Having read the first part of Parmenides (and commented on it at some length), he could hardly have maintained this - or I~Oe~tr in general - as a literal spatial sharing, with all the Platonic problems involved. The Beautiful itself is indivisible; but since the many beautiful things share in it, it becomes divisible among them, at the same time lending them unity. Not unlike the exciting adventures of The One in Prop. 20 ft. Having demolished the proposition to my satisfaction (and one 396

CRITICAL STUDY can - and should - do a similar exercise on others), Barnes ( 1 9 1 - 2 ) adds a disquisition which confirms me in regarding him not only as one of my favourite philosophical writers, but as one of my favourite writers of English. He wants to distinguish between treating ancient philosophy as a collection of useful propositions and regarding it as a mere pastime and antiguarianism, and reject both attitudes to it. That it is part of our philosophical tradition, and that we still persist in asking similar questions, is good enough for those who appreciate Western culture and take it seriously - a dwindling minority, I suspect. Even Barnes' final statement, 'If a modern philosopher declares himself unconcerned with that tradition, then (as it seems to me) he is either intellectually stunted or merely perverse' - however much I would subscribe to every word of it might be analysed away by a modern fanatic as a 'mere' valuejudgement - and that, today, is deemed by some a dirty word. Comparison might suggest to the thoroughly modern that one can be a perfectly good scientist without knowing much of the history of science. If philosophy is unlike science in this matter, one might as well say why. The catch may be in the assumption (191) that 'a typical exercise in ancient philosophy' constitutes a treatment of 'a number of dubious arguments for a series of implausible theses'; and I would rather see someone competent like Barnes demolish an implausible thesis of Proclus than someone who cannot use LSJ properly and has never got within a mile of North and Hillard 'demonstrate' that Proclus' argument is a brilliant anticipation of some theory of Einstein or Quine, provided that when Proclus (that is, Dodds) says a, he obviously means the square root of b - 1 8 . But are ag ideas of all ancient philosophers implausible theses, and are they always supported by dubious arguments? Is Proclus a representative example? Are our theses and our arguments going to stand the test o f time any better? With this, I take m y leave of a brilliant essay, which shows what a modern philosopher can do by arguing with an ancient philosopher in his own terms, if not on his own terms.

Brad Inwood's Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century A.D. ( I I , 1 5 1 - 1 8 3 ) makes a good case for regarding the second-century C.E. Stoic as more than a mere popularizer of ancient Stoic doctrine and as a man of his age (which may be one reason why the one work of his, apart from excerpts in Stobaeus, which we possess has been found in a papyrus.) From Hierocles' long 397

JOHN GLUCKER and detailed defence of self-awareness as the basis of o&et'~otr Inwood draws the right conclusion that he is arguing against some important critics. On doctrinal grounds, he shows to my satisfaction that these critics of innate self-awareness had a theory not unlike that of Piso=Antiochus in De Fin. V. This is as far as I would go without detecting more clues in the available sources. Inwood would rather identify these critics as Hierocles' contemporary Academics (171; 178). I have attempted to show in Antiochus that the Academy ceased to exist around 80 B.C.E., and that Taurus had no attested connection with it (142-3). Nor do I believe that we can establish a direct influence of Antiochus and his doctrines. I cannot think of any philosopher of the age of Hadrian (which is the accepted date of Hierocles) who was a follower of Antiochus. We may never be able to establish who precisely were his adversaries, since so much of the philosophy of his age is lost. Rather than search for them among the imaginary members of the extinct Academy, I would, perhaps, opt for those Middle Platonists like Gaius, Maximus and Albinus, who flourished in Syria and Asia Minor in that century (Antiochus 134 ff.) Theiler and Witt had shown the similarities between Albinus and some doctrines known or presumed to be Antiochus'. Rather than ascribe them to the hypothetical and unlikely 'decisive influence' of Antiochus (because we happen to possess the works of his pupil Cicero) on generations of Zumptian Academics, I have suggested that the Stoicizing tendency in the interpretation of Plato, found both in Antiochus and in many Middle Platonists, may well be a general trend, started by such people as Panaetius and his disciples, and of ~vhich Antiochus is merely an early specimen who happens to be better known to us because the author of the Verrines and Philippics also wrote about him. Albinus, for example, gives a heavily stoicized version of Platonic ethics. The Socratic Paradox is interpreted by means of b#/~ (31, pp. 184-5 Hermann), and the rrdOr? are analysed in Stoic terms (32, pp. 185-7), but the basic Platonic insights are usually maintained. If, as Praechter suggested, Hierocles was a native of Asia Minor (Inwood 153), it is probably among such Stoicizing Platonists of his own age and native land that one should look for his 'para-Stoic' (Inwood's felicitous expression) Platonic adversaries. More spade-work may or may not come up with more. I wish Inwood informed us (since I cannot find it in Long's apparatus or in Hicks" notes) who were the people who 'often and correctly, in my view' (169, n. 19) have emended o~t, eu3rlotu in 398

CRITICAL STUDY D.L. VII, 85 to avvatbOrlow. This is not a minor point. The word is rare, and in this sense not found before Plotinus (III, 8, 4). If we have compelling reasons for ascribing its use to the Stoics, this would mean that they coined this term some time before Plotinus, and most probably that Plotinus borrowed it from them, adapting it, of course, to his own cosmos. I am not entirely happy with Inwood's suggestion of two senses of aLad,lotr in the Stoa and his interpretation of this (172-3). If we trust the evidence of Diocles Magnes ap. D.L. VII, 52, (=SVF II, 71), the Stoics recognized four senses of aCaO~latr The passage is obscure. I am not sure that I understand the fourth definition, and the first defines aCodrTotr by means of aiod~oetr (unless one should emend here to ~rrt' rti tubOrlr~pta, o n ' the analogy of SVF II, 826b). The third definition, which means virtually 'the proper functioning of the sense organs', is the nearest we get to the 'everyday' sense; and it is probably in this sense that brutes can be called a~aOrrrtrd (SVF II, 716b), while in the proper Stoic sense, they are only endowed with 6p/ar} and (~wrao(a (ibid. 714). In the proper Stoic sense, of course, only the Sage has aibOrTatr (SVF II, 7 2 - 5 - especially 75, with Galen's report of the stricter formulation of Simias the Stoic - combined with III, 5 4 8 - 9 ) . If Plutarch's last sentence in Stoic Rep. 12 is in any way "a Summary of what he read in his Chrysippus, he confused a passage in which Chrysippus had used this word in its everyday sense with another one, where he used it in the strict sense. As to Porphyry, what he read is probably a passage in which his Stoic source had used a~bOdveaOat in the everyday sense. Why the Stoics did not invent a more technical term for everyday aCaO~otr ,on the analogy of npo~7#gva and X~77rrdin their ethics, once they had appropriated the term in the stricter sense for the unerring perception of the Sage, is, I fear, anyone's guess in the state of our evidence. In De Off. I, 11, we do have appetitus (or adpen'tus), but it is not stated there that this is the Greek bpla~. No need to explain this. In his earlier Lucullus 24 and Fin. V, 39 (where the context is explicitly Stoic), Cicero had made it clear that appetitus (or adpetitus) was his own rendering of that Greek word. A slight change in word-formation required no note. Is Margites merely 'a proverbially stupid man' (157, n. 10), or is it more probably a reference to fr. II Allen (where the source is Aristotle, EN 1141a12 ff., which Hierocles was most likely to know)? And can one simply say that the Stoics' 'materialism is a 399

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powerful extension of Aristotle's unified and hylomorphic view of soul and body' - even on a mere comparison of their philosophy and psychology, and leaving in peace the ghosts of Neleus of Scepsis, Tyrannio and Andronicus? In the nature of things, all our attempts to tie up the loose ends of our meagre sources for the Stoics are no more than excavations and reconstructions of ruined cities. Inwood knows his methods of excavation and sticks to his sources, without reading exciting and irrelevant modern ideas into the Hadrianic world. I shall await his forthcoming Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (176). It is a pity that in an article which deals with the precise interpretation of difficult terms and texts, partly fragmentary and partly in a papyrus, almost everything had to be given in translation and transliteration. This, I am sure, is not Inwood's fault, but a sign of the times, of which later. Since Aristotle, per definitionem, preceded post-Aristotelian philosophy, let him follow it here. L.A. Kosman's Substance, Being and Energeia (II, 121-149) is the sober and businesslike performance of a proper student of Aristotle, who finds The Philosopher interesting enough to pose Aristotelian questions to him and try to answer them in Aristotelian terms, rather than treat him in modern, 'meta' terms, which might have been of use once we could lay claim to a perfect understanding of everything Aristotle himself said. That this is not the case becomes clear from what I take to be the main innovation of this article: its new interpretation of 06, 1048b8-9; on pp. 136-144, Kosman is right in rejecting Alexander's rather lame interpretation, Which has influenced most commentators. By careful analyses and spelling out of the central concepts of this and the two preceding books, he arrives (144-5) at an interpretation of this vexed sentence which makes more sense to me than any I have seen. I shall not make the mistake of attempting to sum it up, because this would imply that Kosman could have made his point more briefly than he does - and possibly that Aristotle could - which is unlikely. For the Metaphysics, one does need a lot of patience and a lot of time. Kosman has both and repays them. Problems begin with the distinction between a human substance and God (147-9). Here, it is not enough to say that Abromowitz is only paronyrnously linked to God (148) or the like. In Kosman's own terms, one could (should) say that in Abramowi'tz, or in any 400

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other sublunary substance, potentiality and actuality are the same thing (i44) only tor the time being, since potentiality is still present at the stage of actuality, and sooner or later it is bound to apply the Second Law of Thermodynamics to poor old Abromowitz. With God, whose essence is pure actuality, this does not apply. Whatever the sence of Exodus 3, 14 (and, but for the end of the verse, I might have been tempted by Kosman's suggestion, n. 53), the nature of Aristotle's God is not 'to be what it is'. This would imply r6 de& e(paL, and therefore a limitation and a potentiality. God's very essence is being in actuality. It is actuality itself, rather than some form of actuality like that of Abromowitz or of the Common Market. Whether this would turn Aristotle into M~o00//r ' A r r t r ~ v is not a question I would like to answer, although Maimonides might have said a few relevant things. An otherwise excellent article is marred by the interpretation (146) of the last part of the sentence 1028a36-b2 as 'when we uoderstand the being that characterizes those entities capable of serving as a subject, when, that is, we understand the ti esti which characterizes ousia.' This is simply not what the text (even in Kosman's translation preceding this interpretation) says. What Aristotle says (and he repeats it at 1030a18-20, quoted and interpreted properly immediately after our passage) is that quality, quantity and place also have their own rt' tort, and that we know them better when we know the rt'~aTt of each o f them. Could nobody have told anybody that in Greek one does not say en heautoi theos echein (n. 14) and does not call gods in the plural athanatos in the singular (140)? I wonder if such errors would not be easier to detect and avoid if proper Greek were to become once more the language quoted in Greek Studies. Howard Robinson's Aristotelian Dualism (I, 123-144) is very unlike Kosman in its fundamental approach. It is a specimen of the 'Aristotle our contemporary' type of approach. Robinson, it appears, takes Aristotle for granted, and references to his works are few and far between. Such statements as 'this is undoubtedly Aristotle's argument' (127), or 'Aristotle says' (128; 140), with no reference to a text, are quite typical, and no passage of Aristotle's works is quoted and discussed in any detail in its original Greek. The inset passages singled out for discussion are those of Wilkes (123), Nussbaum (124), Hamlyn (summarized, 126-7), Nussbaum again (at length, 133, and briefly, 134) and Gotthelf (139). The discussion 401

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and notes deal with Hartman (124), Block (n. 5), A.C. Lloyd (n. 6), Rorty and Sellars (134), Kemp Smith (n. 12), and with Descartes (141--4) and Aquinas (143 and n. 13), both in English translations. The only Greek words I can find are nous (transliterated throughout) and r~Xor and ~u~pTeta - words which have long been part of the stock-in trade of the Loeb Classical scholar, although why one of them should be given in transliteration and the other two in Greek I cannot imagine. The one piece of Aristotle himself analysed and discussed extensively is a sentence of D e A n . II, 1 , 4 1 3 a 9 - : 9 , which is a notoriously puzzling simile, and is certainly not introduced by Aristotle as the major formulation of a central point of doctrine, but rather as diSr/Xopel . . . . That 'the general reaction to this remark is puzzlement' (128) could be learnt not only from Hamlyn's Clarendon Press translation and commentary which is not meant chiefly for the expert (no offence meant), but also from Themistius, Alexander, Simplicius and Philoponus, all of whose answers are quoted by Siwek ad loc. (p. 279, n. 272). Siwek's own solution may not be more satisfactory than that of the ancient commentators or that of Ross (pp. 21 4 - 5 ad loc.), but all these commentators have attempted, at least, to sort out the difficulty within an Aristotelian frame of reference. Needless to say, Ross and Siwek are never as much as mentioned - not to mention (and they are not) the earlier commentators like Tostrik, Rodier or Hicks, or the Greek commentators. That this sentence comes immediately after a discussion of whether the soul is separable (X6opLor~) from the body (413a4 ff.), and the preceding sentence reads: 'Yet indeed, there is nothing to prevent some [parts of the soul from being separable] , since they are not the actuality of any body', was taken into account by Themistius and Simplicius, who had more time for their Greek text this is not mentioned. Another passage of Aristotle, 408bl-32, is summarily invoked and dismissed on p. 131, but we are not told that at line 18 of that passage we have 6 6~ voOr ~oucev ~77t'TveoOat, obo(a rtr ofaa, ra~o6 r On p. 128, we have been told that 'a sailor is a man, and a man is a substance'. Aristotle in the sentence just quoted, tells us that nous is a substance, that it 'comes in', and that it is imperishable. This, as Themistius and Simplicius knew, was evidence - more evidence than any amount of self-generating modern speculation (including that of Themistius and the other Greek commentators where they do not stick to texts) For has not old Hemsterhuys rightly maintained sui quemque scriptorem optimum interpretem esse ? 402 -

CRITICAL STUDY But what can one expect in an article where we are told (125) that 'the immateriality of the passive intellect follows from its capacity to receive all forms (429a18)' - where the reference should be to 429a15 ff., and where this point is not made in the Greek text before me? Aristotle has &traO(7 at 15 and 64~t3'// at 18, where Anaxagoras is explicitly mentioned. Both epithets merely epitomize, with close linguistic echoes, what we have in Anaxagoras 59B12DK, where no immateriality could possibly be maintained - and Aristotle can, a few lines later ( 4 2 9 a 2 9 - 3 0 ) ascribe &rraOem to sense-perception as well. It is only at 4 3 0 a 1 7 - 1 8 that we have, in addition to these two epithets, also X6Optor6r Even this would imply immateriality only if we read into it the proper Platonic associations. Needless to say, this last passage is not mentioned. The problem is not merely one of interpretation, but one of asking the right questions. 'Dualism' in the sense of mind-matter (not body-soul) or thought-extension duality is a modern, postCartesian concept for a modern, post-Cartesian issue. Descartes started by doubting everything except the immediate reality of the thinking self, and the various modern 'dualistic' approaches spring mostly from this initial intuition, which made epistemology the starting-point of philosophical speculation for ages, until linguistic analysis took over in English and existentialism and other forms of speculation on the Continent. No Greek philosopher, not even the Eleatics, made thought the starting-point of his speculation. Even the Greek sceptics did not deny reality to the external world, only to our ability to grasp it as it really is. Aristotle did not deny even this. The question which exercised his mind is not whether one could provide a 'monist' - 'materialistic'~ 'mechanistic' or otherwise - interpretation of the universe. This he rejects in the first few chapters of Physics, and his doctrine of the four ' causes' and criticism of those Presocratics who maintained only one 649Xr~ are enough to show that he held no such view. What interested him in this context is whether (as followers of the Forms maintained) 'substances' such as universals or ideas could exist in 'separation' from matter. For him, universals do not exist in 'separation'; but his unmoved mover, although inextricably related to the motion of the sphere, is, and so is the vof~ in us. Aristotle's problem is not whether 'extension' and 'thought' are two different setsof ~wra. This was not his problem, if only because his starting-point was nothing like the Cartesian cogito. His form and matter are two aspects of the same concrete substances, and if some forms are 'separable', no matter is. 403

JOHN GLUCKER Even for that notorious 'dualist' Plato, the Forms are not thoughts, although they are grasped only by thought. They are the only true 6urn, in which phenomena 'participate'. They exist alone - because they alone exist in the proper sense (although Sophist raises doubts and glances towards extension of the suffrage). The world is thus not exactly duplicated or split in two for either of them. To discuss Aristotle's problems in terms of post-Cartesian metaphysics and our own contemporary logic, physics and philosophy of science can be made interesting in itself (although I do not find Robinson's discussion, which is mostly derivative, inordinately so.) But why call it Aristotle? Robinson could have benefited from Gaff Fine's article in Vol. II. This may not have been available to him; but as her references show, the issue is far from being new even in modern literature. The Greek sources have been available all along. My criticisms of Robinson have been restricted to what appears to me to be his main point - his post-Cartesian approach to Aristotle's theory of the Intellect. Martha Nussbaum (Aristotelian Dualism: Reply to Howard Robinson, II, 197-207) reminds us that the "dualism' of Aristotle is far from being restricted to animate beings, and that it encompasses his whole view of substance as matter and form intertwined and interdependent (which is cumbersome on my part, but seems to me to imply less than'hylomorphism', with its sorry echoes of the late Hylozoism). Unlike many writers on Aristotelian problems, she quotes and analyses central and relevant passages of Aristotle himself, and her analysis of body-soul relations in De An. I, 1 (202-3), although it offers nothing new to those who have puzzled out this difficult and concentrated chapter, puts things in proper perspective and shows that even the 'affections' of the soul as analysed by Aristotle would not support a 'dualistic' thesis. I am not sure whether Aristotle, if faced with the Cartesian problem, would have answered as Nussbaum does for him (206). He would more probably either be too old and set in his ways to understand what bothered Descartes (and perhaps rightly so), or try to answer in post-Cartesian terms (an attempt which was, perhaps, made for him by some post-Cartesians as Locke and Hegel, in their very different ways). But on the whole, Nussbaum stays close to Aristotle and argues mainly with him, and she knows that the questions Aristotle set out to answer are very different from those ascribed to the ghost of Aristotle grasped by some of us. Whether Aristotle clears the ground for Wittgenstein's idea of 'a natural history of man', and whether this is exciting (207), I am really not competent 404

CRITICAL STUDY to judge. The 'plain statement in De Anima II, 1', which I take to mean 413a4-5, should perhaps, have been specified on p. 207; and on the same page, one should note that the simile of the sailor and the ship is in Book II, not I. Gall Fine's Separation (II, 31-87), consisting of 57 closely argued pages, is virtually a monograph. Anyone working on this hackneyed issue of the 'separation' of the Forms in Plato and in Aristotle's account will have to study it from now on, and far more thoroughly than an overworked reviewer of two composite volumes of nearly 600 pages could do. I have annotated almost every page, and on some pages I can no longer read my own notes. I shall restrict myself to a few issues. Fine's basic method is correct: and should have been employed long ago. Since •162 and cognates are common technical terms in Aristotle - including his various criticisms of the Forms - and are surprisingly rare in Plato, one should first investigate Aristotle's meaning, and only then see if and how it applies to Plato. I am geherally convinced by most of her evidence for assuming that Aristotle means by this, not local or definitional separation, but ontological separation (what she calls IE, independent existence); but I cannot say this of her other claim, that this ontological separatin is only modal, the capacity for independent existence. On this later. That this ontological sense should have been obvious, since the Forms are 5vra and oboCat, not only rd ~aO6~ou and bptat~o( (which Aristotle claims they were for Socrates), and certainly not beings in space, is unfortunately not enough to state. A glance at pp. 3 1 - 2 and notes 3 - 7 will show that this has not been obvious to numerous very respectable scholars. Fine's evidence and analysis on pp. 3 4 - 4 5 should have exorcised a few ghosts. But problems begin already here. The two crucial passages analysed on p. 35 and often referred to later - Z 1,1028a31-b2 and /x 11,1019a 1 - 4 - deal with 'priority' (~rp6repov) rather than with 'separation' (in fact, the first of them deals even with 'priority' only in the context of the vexed issue of la~X~ou bpra). The remark in 1028a33--4 that, of all the categorems, only oboga is •162 comes only to substantiate (sorry for the unintended pun) its claim to priority. Now, priority 'in nature and being' (1019a2-3) may well entail separation in the IE sense, but does it mean the same? Logically, it can well be the same, from the definition at 1010a3-4. But even in that case, why does Aristotle deffme this kind of priority 405

JOHN GLUCKER quite clearly (along with other senses of this term in the same chapter), while he never, to my knowledge, defines separation? Had he done so, much of this article and the secondary literature which preceded it (and much more which will, no doubt, follow it and its followers for years to come) would not (well, should not: you will, Oscar, you will) have been written. This I hope, is not merely a peace of obscura diligentia. If Aristotle had a well-def'med sense of rrpbrepov Ka'rd r ras oOotav, and ff this is virtually equivalent to X6optor6v in the IE sense demonstrated by Fine from other passages (e.g.E.E. 1217b12-16, quoted 3 7 - 8 in English), then why bother to use the less well-deEmed Xu;ptoT"6v?More on this later. Fine (45-56) is right in pointing out that, in the three passage~ concerning the Theory of Forms, A6, M4 and M9, only the last does not merely state this 'separation' but demonstrates it. She is also right - and I shall make a long argument short - that this demonstration is related to the establishment of forms (in Aristotle's sense) as obofat in M9 (51 ff.). This is only natural in a book which deals with obo~at that are rtapa rar aioO~vdr (1076a10-I 1). M4 still belongs to the survey of previous views. It is only at 1086a21 that we start a renewed investigation, and there the notion of o~ot~z becomes prominent, and part of the demonstration of XwPtOla6r

Now is it an accident that the nearest Aristotle himself comes to defining separation is at H1, 1042a 2 9 - 3 1 , where only his own 'primary substance' is Xcoptar6~, ~rt~,&r I am not implying that this would necessitate anything more than IE (even if a primary substance is also in fact locally separate), since local and definitional separation have been excluded from the meaning of separation as applied to Forms. What I do imply is that it is not 'separation' on its own on which Aristotle faults the upholders of the Forms. If I remember rightly, he never makes this particular claim. It is t h a t by making the Form Xr they turn it into an oba~ which is at the same time general and particular. This is the main thrust of z~9, esp. 1086a31-35 and b 5 - 1 1 . Socrates - and Aristotle repeats that in all three passages of the Metaphysics - did not make this mistake. For him, ra raO6Xoo (which I take to mean, in this context, general properties) and 6pr are not separate from sensible objects. In what sense? Not that they themselves are sensible. This is not the place to argue against the theory of Irwin, accepted by Fine (82-86), except to say that if 'the Beautiful itself were a sensible 406

CRITICAL STUDY object present in all individual beautiful things albeit not identical with them, we would be faced with some of the problems of the ftrst part of Parmenides already at the stage of the Socratic dialogues (which would have pleased Burnet and Taylor no end). What, on Aristptle's account, and based on his use of Xcop~ladr Socrates did not do, is turn universals and det~mitions, which are general, into substances, which are (for Aristotle) individual. Fine may be right I believe she is - in maintaining ( 5 7 - 8 ) that Aristotle faults the separation of universals and the turning of them into substances mainly because his own intuition is that oOa~ in the proper sense is first and foremost a r66e ft. But is this the whole story? For Plato, a Form is not merely an obolh (which could be excused as r6 rt' ~v eguaO, but 6u and the only real 5v.What is more, they are tao~5 er ~Kd~rr~ o~aa (Phlb. 15bl; 2 - 3 ) . This seems to me to be the main criticism in M9: by making universals into particular monads, Plato (or whoever the 'friends of the Forms' may be) confused two senses of obu~t - i n our modern jargo_n, that of essence and that of a substance. An essence, albeit different from all things of which it is an essence, is not a separate, individual substance. In Aristotelian terms it is even necessarily not so, since it lacks the principium individuationis, matter. This last point can be disputed. Not so (or not so easily) the argument at 1086a32-35, that universals cannot be also particulars, with the clear implication that the culprit in this case of wrong individuation is our friend Xcoptap6~. I can only guess (since I have not read it) that this may be one of the points in Morrison's thesis mentioned in note 3. Its title indicates that it may have started from a right premise: separation as a property of the Aristotelian primary substance. I am convinced by Fine's evidence ( 5 6 - 8 ) that Xwpe'r and its cognates do not appear in the middle dialogues and 7~maeus, and that in Sophist and Parmenides they are not clearly defined in the stricter Aristotelian sense. What about the Philebus passage cited in my last paragraph? It does seem to come near enougn, without using the right expressions. I also_ agree with her (65 ff.) that one cannot deduce with absolute certainty 'separation' in the Aristotelian IE sense from any of the Platonic dialogues (leaving apart the artefacts and Timaeus - 74-81 - since both are isolated issues and much depends on interpretation). I am also convinced that Irapd, ~rel)ov and such other terms do not necessarily and in themselves imply IE (:59--65 and 67). What is interesting is that the latter terms both exist in Plato and are explicitly ascribed to him by Aristotle in A6 407

JOHN GLUCKER (987b5;8). 'Separation', on the other hand, is not found in Plato as an abstract noun and is not ascribed to him by Aristotle. It is wrong to say (as Fine in her very first sentence) that in 1086b4 we are told 'that Plato, but not Socrates, separates forms'. Plato is last mentioned at 1083a32, and nowhere near 1086. It may not be an accident that in A6, separation is only mentioned as something Socrates did not do, If it is mentioned in 991bl, this is already in the context of oi rd~ /Sdar rtO~laevvt of 9 9 0 a 3 4 - b l . M4 also deals with oi 7rp(.orOtrdq ~dar ~oa2~req e ~ t (1078b11-12), and M9 with oi rdr u3dar kdTourer (1086a31). Where separation appears as a positive attribute of the Forms, Plato's name is not mentioned. The same is true of the EE passage (1217b2-16) quoted on pp. 3 7 - 8 , and of EN I, 4, where Speusippus is mentioned at 1096b7. Ross' long note (Metaph. vol. II, p. 421) only shows that the people mentioned in the plural at 1078bl 1 are closely related to Plato. It does not explain why Plato is not mentioned by name, there or in A9 or in M9. When Aristotle wants to mention Plato by name, he does. I shall be told (is I have argued myself) that, if separation means turning universals into particular entities, into individual substances, Plato did so. By implication, yes. But it is one thing to say that forms are beings, each a unit to itself, and the like, and another to claim that these units are separate substances in Fine's IE sense. Does Aristotle's careful 'swiss-clock-game' with Plato and separation imply that Plato did not make the final move and did not use terms of separation and all that is implied? The contrast with Socrates would suggest that this 'separation' was made by other followers of Socrates close to Plato. At 1078, they are called 'thefirst people to say that there are forms' First before Plato? But why not? Plato may not, after all, have been the 'onlie begetter' of the Theory of Forms, although on the evidence of 987b7-8, he may well have been the first to give them that name. Note o~-or o~v at b 7 - as if the previous arguments are not Plato's alone. Could the enigmatic r6 rotofrrov at b4 (not necessarily 'his Heraclitean beliefs', as Fine p. 47: see Ross, I, p. 159 ad loc.) be an acroamatic shorthand for arguments used by others, which Plato only partly accepted and baptized as Forms, but which they, having appropriated the term, turned into separate particular substances? Could they, rather than the pupils of Plato in the Academy who became 'more Platonists than Plato' - be the 'friends of Forms' of Soph. 248a4? Aroint thee, Muse! But Aristotle's own careful alteration of separation with 408

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Plato's name, and the absence of a proper terminology of separation in the dialogues, requires some explanation. One advantage in my hastily adumbrated proposal is that it would explain Aristotle's use of separation for his own primary substances and for some 'friends of t.he Forms' in the plural - but not for Plato. He found (or heard) them using such terms in a way which suited his own primary substances, but in a way that did not do justice to Plato. But this needs checking If I have not been entirely happy with everything Fine says, I could hardly have said half the things I have said here without the stimulation of her article. If space prevents me from doing anything like justice to her monograph, it also prevents me - whether this is a comfort or not - from making more criticisms of details. Her work is a solid achievement both in opening some new prospects and making a bonfire of some dead wood which has been lying around too long. I hope it forces future scholars to look harder at their Greek texts rather than start a new subliterary species of 'Fine on IE'. But I cannot end without adding that one cannot expect Aristotle to qualify X~pt'r withr6n~ (p. 41) since that would be no Greek; that eb;at'n is not 'is something' (59) but 'to be something'; and that I shall only believe that 'appears', in Greek, can function veridicaUy, to mean 'manifestly is' (67) when I am given evidence for this sense of the particular verb referred to in the context. Nor is it enough (35, n. 18) to state one's emendation without comment (especially since half of it - the better half - has already been suggested by Alexander, Bessarion and the Aldine, all of whom are mentioned in Ross' apparatus and note). Pace Fine, this reading is relevant to what she says at lines 7 - 5 from end of that page. Can one expect Jaeger, as an editor of a text, to supply lacunae which are merely implicit inferences (n. 39)? Is o#aga in Soph. 248a7 (contrasted with 71ueotr 'substance' (57), or rather 'being'? In Prot. 330cl, Socrates does not merely ask Protagoras whether justice is 'something or nothing' (59), but whether it is lrpdTl~d rt - 'a certain object' - and he carries on with such 'object-questions for other virtues. Protagoras (like Nestle ad 330cl) falls into the trap. Should we? 'Not if we read our Greek carefully' is the answer not only to this last question. This has already brought us to Plato and to Charles H. Kahn's Drama and Dialectic in Plato:s Gorgias (I 75-121) another monograph, which is a massive contribution to the analysis of this dialogue both as philosophy and as literature. Its exposition of the 409

JOHN GLUCKER relation between the types of refutation used against Gorgias, Polus and CaUicles and the personalities o f these gentlemen is, in its main outlines, excellent, and it demonstrates once again that one should read a Platonic dialogue not merely as a collection of p's, q's and r's to be dissected (mostly in translation) as if they were the straight propositions made by Professor Smith in his latest article in some philosophical journal (although Kahn is as much an adept in the logical and material analysis of arguments as any modern philosopher), but also as a piece of literary and philosophical drama by a master of the craft,.for whom philoslophy was a matter of life, not merely an tr~d~V~Ol.Zair r6 ltapaxpil~a. This gives the Conclusion of the article ( 1 1 0 - 1 2 1 ) an edge over much that has been written on this dialogue, on the Socratic elenchus, on Plato, or on Socrates. Kahn is quite right to point out that the main impact of the dialogue is not merely in the sedes o f elenchi (which have their faults, some of which are analysed here), but also in the positive views o f Socrates expounded after the proper refutation of CaUicles, in 499b f f , as well in the image of Socrates, embodying in his own life the virtues which he preaches. It is good to find in an article written in the 1980's and printed in an philosophical journal that 'the trial and death of S o c r a t e s . . . are part of the argument o f Grg. in much the same way that the fall of Troy is part of the plot of the Iliad? (n. 63). Without forgoing the benefit of modern philosophical analysis, the reader is kept throughout the article firmly on Greek soil. Kahn's mastery of the Greek text - despite the compulsory translations and transliterations - is refreshing at an age where ancient philosophy in Greekless Greek is becoming an accepted norm. It is not only that close attention is paid to the nuances of Greek terms and phrases, including seemingly innocent ones (e.g notes 16 and 26), but Kahn even goes into textual criticism. If this passeth the understanding of some 'merely philosophical' readers, it should at least remind some that competent experts still exist. If I differ from Kahn on some points, his real achievement stands unaffected. Only a careful reading of the whole work would show how much in it is new and makes sense. I am not entirely convinced that Kahn's argument on p. 78 and n. 6 settles finally the textual point at 464b8; c2; 4 6 5 c 5 In all these cases the split is between the BTW family and the F family, and the split is consistent. My own feeling leads me to accept the reading o f BTW with Kahn; but the reading of the more 'popular' F is hardly lectio facilior, and the possibility of two recensions, even in 410

CRITICAL STUDY antiquity, and perhaps even by Plato himself has not, to my knowledge, been disproved. On the other hand, it is astonishing that Kahn seems to be the first to detect a lacuna at 489c6-7. How many times have we all read this passage without noticing that there must. be a lacuna here? And Dodds and all the earlier editions he consulted? But I am not entirely happy with his completion, based on 488d4-9. Both palaeographically, and because it would represent the final stage in the argument of 488d-e, I would rather complete the lacuna from 488e4-5 and read raf) ra Kard 0600; KaXd e~at Kay"

vd#tua. On p. 96 n. 41, one should emphasize that a/56~r is shame of 'what will the Trojans say' in the future, while a~ox/~r/ is shame for what has already been done (or is being done). Kahn's excellent suggestion in the last sentence of n. 48 will be confirmed by Apol. 25ct-26al (esp 2 5 e 7 - 8 ) and somewhat less pointedly, by Rep. I, 335b2 ff. To the passages listed in parentheses on p. 113, lines 6 - 7 , one could add Euthyd. 278el ff. and the rest of Socrates' arguments in'that section. The main thrust of Vlastos' argument about the fallacies in the refutation of Polus (which is largely assuaged by Kahn 8 6 - 9 2 without being fullly exorcised) is essentially the point made by Aristotle in EN 1096a19 ff. Terms like 'pleasant', 'useful', and even 'good' in some of its senses (1096a 26) are rrp6r ft. It does not strike me as entirely impossible (pace Kahn 87) that Plato himself, at the Gorgias stage, may not have realized all the snares involved in using 'relative' t e r m s like this as if they were 'substances' or 'qualities'. This may repay checking in works on Plato's logical development Or it may be a trick on the part of Plato's Socrates, the purpose of which (for the benefit of the reader) should then be explained. One should certainly look again at Polus' substitution of 'good' for 'beneficial' at 474a3. Dodds' remark ad loc. (p. 251), that Socrates accepts it since it suits his own view, smacks of 'the documentary fallacy'. Kahn's remark (89) that it 'does not affect the substance of the reasoning' (although it does shorten it by one stage, at which Socrates would have had to demonstrate that 'the two are one', and one can rely on Plato to have made him do so elegantly), is not enough to explain why Plato, the author Of this drama, chose to do it 'on the quiet'. Gorgias is far from carelessly written. A more important point is the distinction (94) between Polus as 'an apprentice sophist', who is "a faithful mirror' of public opinion, and Callicles, who has 'the critical independence of m i n d . . , to 411

JOHN GLUCKER reject such 'conventional' moral judgements in favour of a set of 'natural standards {ta physei kala)'. Callicles, no less than Polus, represents a widespread Sophistic view. The difference is that Polus like another pupil of Gorgias, Meno - still belongs to the first stage of Sophistic theory, in which rhetoric and dialectic were regarded as neutral and respectable techniques for achieving political excellence, and lip-service was still paid to 'the quiet virtues', for reasons excellently explained by Kahn ( 8 0 - 8 4 ) . Callicles has already learnt the 'New Left' doctrine of the contrast between v6/2or and r162 which was not his own invention, but is already found in the papyrus of Antiphon, in the Melian Dialogue., hinted to in passages of Euripides, and presented as a well-known popular doctrine (358c7 ff.) by Glaucon in Rep. II (358e4 ff.). Apart from the richer detail of his speech, its greater literary polish, and his use of v6l~o~ rr162~6oer162most probably for the first time (Gorg. 483e3 see Dodds ad loc., p. 268), there is nothing substantial in Callicles' first speech in Gorgias which cannot be found in these and similar sources of the v6tzoc-q~faotr controversy. This, I believe, rather than Kahn's reasons ( 1 0 4 - 5 ) , would explain Callicle's initial stance of indiscriminate hedonism at 491e5 ff. Why require of him (as Kahn 104) to be a 'selective hedonist' like the timocrat or plutocrat of Rep. VIII, which Callicles had not read, and Plato had not written, as yet? Callicles himself gives us a clue at 491 e 6 - 4 9 2 a 3 , where full-blooded development of one's ~rrLOo#(atis r6 Kard ~6aw Kctk6u ~r 6(xutov. After all, these desires are precisely what nature implants in us, as Antiphon (Col. 2, 23-Col. 3, 25, where we have ~zrtOOlamtat 3, 17) has taught us. And Callicles? No matter. What we find in a papyrus must have been 'in the air'. Callicles is thus no more original and independent than Polus -- only more sophisticated and in possession of a more sophisticated and consistent doctrine. His refutation (Kahn 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 ) is not so much a refutation of that doctrine, since his own personality and his private inconsistency, necessary in a budding politician, is more interesting for the purposes of the dialogue. This does not mean that the theory is irrefutable. One may require a theory of human nature like Aristo_tle's (Polit. I) to refute it in its own terms. Plato the dramatist may have been more interested in showing that it is difficult to hold that doctrine without some other implications. After all, this may well be one side of the Socratic elenchus, as Vlastos has tried to remind us (see below). Khan ( 7 6 - 7 and 121) repeats a claim he had made.in a previous article, that Gorgias belongs with Apo/ogy and Crito, and is earlier -

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CRITICAL STUDY than Laches, Protagoras and Meno. He admits (77) that this is not crucial for the argument of this article. But since the point is made twice here, and votaries of authority and secondary literature will doubtless quote it as established, one may as well raise one or two queries. If Prot. is later than Gorg, how can Socrates still maintain in it the thesis that pleasure is the good, refuted in Gorg. (which even a landowner in Corinth could buy and become converted to philosophy)? Just for the elenctic reason Kahn suggests (n. 62)? If both Prot. and Meno are later than Gorg, how can Socrates still maintain in them that statesmen like Pericles and Themistocles, Aristides and Thucydides (Prot. 319bff.; Meno 9366 ft.) were wise and virtuous, after the devastating attack on the great statesmen of Athens in Gorg. 515b6ff.? If Gorgias is later than these two, one could understand why Plato makes his Socrates here clarify issues he had left confused or unanswered (officially) in them. It would also explain why Gorgias does not end with the refutation of Callicles, at 499b, but continues with the presentation of positive Socratic views. This part, which could be called, in Kahn's terminology, Act Four, is as much part of the work as the first three, and Kahn comes near enough to saying this in his conclusion. In this respect, as well as in its length and breadth, Gorgias is nearerPhaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium or Republic than Aplology or Cn'to. David Bostock (Plato on "is not" II, 8 9 - 1 1 9 ) sets out to show against Shorey, Ackrill, Owen, Vlastos and a host of others - that Plato did not understand the distinction between the incomplete 'is" of identity and the incomplete 'is' of predication. His logic is brilliant, but his treatment of the text of Plato leaves something to be desired, if only on the part of readers with strong Classical desires. If I find myself in agreement with his main conclusion, I do it for rather different reasons. This will become clear soon. I could not agree more that Soph. 2 5 6 a 1 0 - b 4 'has nothing to do with the verb 'is' (95). I would translate a l 0 not as 'we do not speak in the same way', but 'we do not mean the same thing (see LSJ h~Tco III, 9, where the Platonic usage with adverbs and accusatives is specified). I would still take it to refer to an ambiguity in calling rdprlotr both raOT"6v and o~) rabr6p: the first, because as aneifiocit must be the same as itself; the second, because if it did not also 'partake of The Other', it would be the same as any of the other e/~r/ (the argument of dl 1-257a6). This may be trivial from the point of view of identity, predication and the verb 'to be', and Plato himself for his own reasons - makes the Eleatic Guest tell us not to be -

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JOHN GLUCKER too anxious about it. But I agree that this is not meant as a distinction between 'is' o f . identity and 'is' of predication - or between identity and predication as we understand them. I find Bostock's arguments down to p. 104 (skipping minor disagreements on matters of detail) generally convincing within the context of the modern discussion, and pointing in a direction which might make one question some of the 'unwritten philosophy' behind much of the modern discussion. His statement (102) that 'from the fact that a man uses a word in a certain sense it obviously cannot be inferred that he has noticed that it has that sense' would stand even if this were a fact, and Plato, in his Greek, did use the verb 'to be' as often as it has appeared in English translations and discussions. Much of the time, this English word translates r6 ~ , and as the Eleatic Guest tells us (243d ff.), our starting-point is the Eleatic 6v, not the verb 'to be'. On this anon. What I find difficult to accept is what I take to be Bostock's major supporting argument - that in the course of the central section of Sophist, Plato confuses the 'naming' and the 'generalizing' uses of the Greek neuter adjective (or participle) with the definite article. I have my doubts as to the legitimacy of interpreting such expressions in Greek, even outside Plato, 'to generalize over the things which the adjective is true of ('whatever is beautiful', 'whatever is') (104). Greek is resourceful enough to have 6aor frtromrr Irtir 6, rL and similar expressions in their manifold forms and combinations, and it makes full use of them. For Plato, as early as Euthyphro, these definite neuters are always 'names' ( ~Ke&o a6r6 ~'6 e~or akeady in Euthyphro 6 d 1 0 - 1 1 ) . That such abstracts (later to-become Ideas or Forms) have, of course, a relation to the many things which are beautiful, just, equal and the like goes without saying, and causes so many of the headaches of the first part of Parmenides and of Aristotle's critique of the Forms. This is not to say that Plato uses terms like 76 ra~ou in the 'generalizing' sense o f 'whatever is beautiful'. But back to the text. At 256b6, when we are told that 'change is not at rest', we have (b6) ctbr~ K~rr/oLr and (b8) ~'&u Teudou- This is not the language of 'generalizing' over particulars, but of 'naming' and 'forms'. Bostock's objection (107): 'Then it must presumably entail that the form change is not at rest, that is, is not changeless', is ingenious. Even a chance look at Cornford would suggest that this may well have caused some disquietude to earlier commentators, but none has put his finger on it. But assume that Plato realized that this Was entailed. 414

CRITICALSTUDY Since we have already seen that 'change is both the same and not the same', this should not come as a perfect shock. The possibility that the Forms are not changeless has already been aired in the argument with their friends (248c-e). The statement that 'change is not at iest' ~s no more outrageous than the statement that being itself is not (257a4--6), where (al) the reference is to _r6 6v abr6: emphatically a matter of 'naming'. Nor do I see why 257bl should constitute a break. The 'large thing' at b6 is brought in merely as an example (ogov). Once we have drawn the conclusion from this example at b 8 - c 3 , we return to 'the nature of the other', and to 'the good itselff and 'the not-good itself'. At 257d7, the move is opened with r5 Kak~. The expression r5/a~ Ka~6v ~rdorore at 10 need not have a 'generalized' meaning: in fact, it need not be read that way. The adverb ~rdorore would more naturally qualify r as Cornford translates: 'Wherever we use the expression 'not beautiful" - or rather (since I have made this point about the definite article and will support it anon), 'the not-beautiful'. Plato requires this cumbersome expression, rather than the natural aLaxp&, since he is dealing with negation. (By the way, this is one place where we can show that Plato is not averse to using an unnatural expression to convey a precise nuance: we should bear this in mind, for we are to return to it soon). In this context, and with this interpretation, neither this nor ~1too KaToOq~Ootr at dl 1 should be taken as 'generalized'. Indeed, //to6 KaToOr162 must be 'the Beautiful itself', not just a general etiquette for its manifestations or else Plato has learnt very little from Hipp~s Major (which I believe he did write) and Symposium (which very few people would claim he did not), where, at 2 1 1 b l - 2 , we have the gem abr6 KaO

airr6 #eO dbroO Isovo~u3 ~r &et'fiv. This brings us to an even more philological point. On p. 93, Bostock maintains that, on Owen's interpretation, we should have had lrp6r abrd rather than the t a d abrd we have, at 255c13, as 'the appropriate Greek expression.' I should like to meet some specimens of this: 'appropriate Greek expression', in Plato or elsewhere. Bostock himself must be fully aware that Plato usually contrasts Irp6r rt (or...~3ffr/Ta), not with rrpdr abr6, abrd, but with abr6 ~r dbro6 (Thtt. 160b10), ~br6 raO abr6 (ibid. 156e8-157bl), or gar abrd (Phlb. 51 c7) - since I have picked up these examples from his note 5 on the same page 93. Ka0 abr6, raO abr& and the like are quite common for the Forms (e.g. Parm. 128e7-129al; 129a7-8). Bostock could have used this as a supporting argument.

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