Vanguard 01. British 7th Armoured Division 1940-45 [PDF]

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OSPR EY· VANGUARD I

British

7th ARMOURED DIVISION 1940-45

John Sandars

..

VANGUARD SERIES EDITOR: MARTI N WINDROW

British

7th ARMOURED DIVISION 1940-45 Text by JOHN SANDARS Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELL

OSPREY PUBLIS HI NG LONDON

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Published in 1977 by O sprey Publishing Lid M ember company of the Geo rge Philip Group 12- 14 Long Acre, London WC2[ 9LP © Copyright 1977 Osprey Publishing Ltd This boo k is co pyri ght ed und er the Bern e Convention . AI! ri ghls rese rved. Apart from a ny fai r d ealin g for th e purpose of private stud y, resea rch, crit icism or rev iew, as permitted und er th e Copyright Act, 1956, no pa rt of this publ ica tion may be reproduced , stored in a re tri eval sys tem, or Iransmi n cd in an y form or by a ny mea ns, clcClfonic, elec tri ca l, chemi ca l, mecha n ica l, optical , photoco pying, record ing or oth erwise, wi th ou t th e prior permiss ion of th e copyri g ht own er. En quiri es should be addressed to th e Publishers.

Filmse t a nd prin ted by BAS Printers Limit ed , O ver \'\Iallop, Hampshire

The au th or wishes to thank th e Imperial \'Var Muse um , the Kent a nd Sharpshooters Yeo manry a nd Boris Mollo, Mike Co nnirord , a nd T erry Gand er ror permission to use phorograp hs from their collections, and Dav id List for making ava ilable the result s o f research in ro vehicl e ca mou Aage and markings not yet published. The mai n sources co nsulted were: The Desert Rats by M aj Cell Vern ey, 71h AmlOllred Division by Li ndsa y an d J oh nson, The SIOry rifthe RASC 193'r45, CrajtsmeJI of lhe Army. The regimenta l hisro ries of3 rd , 7th a nd 8 th H ussa rs, I I th H ussa rs, 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd & 4th C LY, 2nd RGH , The Royal Tank Regiment, Th e Rifl e Brigade, th e KRR C, a nd the Quee ns, a nd th e Roya l Artillery Com memoration Boo k have proved most helpful , as have British and Commonwealth Anlloured Formatiolls by Dunca n Crow, a nd Our Armoured Forces b y Ma rt el.

Cover painting by Mike Chappell shows A I 0 a nd A9 Cr ui ser tanks of 6th Roya l Tank Regime nt , willler 1940 . 2

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U ni versal ca rrier of a motor batta lion with Italian prisoners,

lai C 1940; lypical armament of Boys ami-lan k riflc in front

spo nson and (covered ) Bren gun on AlA mou nting. These vehicles were subsequen tl y used by carrier platoons in lorried inranlfY ballal io ns, and as arlillery OP ve hicles, ambulan ces, mo rt ar and machine.gun ca rri ers in NW E.urope . ( Imperial War Muse um )

Introduction The story of 7th Armoured Di vision is one of a lmost

of old) and a small number of guns and sa ppers.

continuous front-line service throug hout six years

The laller type of formation , w hi ch was in due

of war: a record un equal led by any similar British formation. I t is told against a background of

course to become th e armoured division of World Wa r ll , was naturall y based on lessons learnt from

cOlll inuous changes in composition , equ ipm ent, and organi za tion. Units were replaced as th ey

th e previous war and the id eas of c urrent military

became depicted by casualties or were required elsewhere; better weapons were isslied as they became available, a nd the orga ni zational 'mix' of

theorists such as Fuller and Lidd ell Hart. As a result its role was envisaged as one of exploiting breakthroug hs, turn ing flank s and other 'i ndirect'

units was a ltered frequentl y in the lig ht of ex -

actions, rather tha n the assa ulting of fixed defences, whi ch task was to be left to the infantry di vision. At

perience, and to cater for different th eatres ofwar.

the sa me time, th e relative invulnerability of vVorld

The Bri tish Army started to ex periment with

War I tanks , once they had got behind the narrow defended belts into the rear areas, with at best primitive anti-tank measures a nd few if any tanks for counter-attack, led to an overestimate of the capabilities of unaccompanied tanks and a failure to understand the need for adequate infantry a nd

mechanized formati o ns ora ll arms in th e late

1 9~ws

and earl y 1930s. By 1934 it had decided o n- but not formed - two types of division: a mechanized infantry divisio n wi th its own battalion o f slow heavy tanks to support the foot soldiers in dismo un-

ted actions, and a mobile di vision with a brigade of lighter tanks : a mechanized cava lry brigade in tru cks (intended to fight dismounted like dragoons

artillery in armoured formations. Tank desig n therefore split into two streams]

with speed ta king precedence over armour a nd

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hitting power in vehicles destined to serve in th e mobile divisions, and pro tection taking precedence in those (' I ' tanks) for the infa ntry divisions. This di cho tomy, which made it difficult for the two types to opera te together, was to continue throughout th e war even after the 'I' tanks were removed fro m the actual infantry d ivisions. This was foll owed by the abso rption of the mecha nized cavalry in to the Roya l Armoured Corps a nd their re-eq uipment with tanks on the eve of the wa r. Altho ugh at th e same tim e specia l Motor In fantry battalio ns, mounted, unlike th eir mechanized counterparts, in small cross -country tru cks and carriers were added to what were by then armoured divisions, the result was a very tank-heavy organization with inadequate infantry, guns, or support services. These earl y ass umptions as to type of tank a nd orga nizatio n were to dog 7th Armoured , a mong o ther British divisions, for much of the war. As tanks were few, and the cavalry, apart from a coupl e of armoured-ca r regiments, was still mostl y horsed in ' 934, the first mobil e di visio n, which subsequentl y became First Armoured Di vision, was not in fact formed until la te ' 937. In the mea ntim e th e threat to Egy pt posed by th e I talians in Libya during the Abyssini a n crisis had led to th e mecha nization of the Cairo Cavalry Brigade in '935 , a nd this was the nucl eus arou nd which 7th Armoured Division was to be form ed some fi ve years la ter. The brigade consisted of , Ith H ussars in armou red cars, 8 th Hussa rs in trucks, and 7th Hussars in light tanks. Th ey origina lly formed th e basis of the ' Matruh M obi le Force', or ' Immobile Farce', as it came to be known. Between '935 and th e Muni ch crisis in '938, w hen it next 'stood-w' in the desert, the force had learnt mu ch a bou t operating there, and had been a ugmented by a tank regiment, a regiment of g uns, and skeleton service units. Further reinforcements followed in th e form of ano ther tank regiment and a motor in fantry battalion and th e force was renamed 'Mobile Division Egypt'; at the same time the reeq uipm ent of 8th Hussa rs with light ta nks tra nsformed th e cavalry brigade into a light armo ured brigade. I t was during this period between the M-unich crisis and the declaration of war with Cerma ny in September ' 939 th at ma ny of the drills and proced ures for o perating in the desert, which were to remain as dogma throughout the cam -

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paig n, were d evised and practised und er th e d ynamic leadership of the divisional comm a nder, Maj Cen P. C. S. Hobart. This offi cer had been in volved in th e earl y armo ured formation experiments in Eng land , and was subsequently to form 79th Armoured Divisio n, with specia li zed types of armour, for th e 'ormand y in vasion. Even after the war in Europe had sta rted there was a further period for training and reinforcement before Ita ly came in on the Cerman side in June ' 940. In Februa ry th e d ivision was renamed 7th Armo ured a nd became part of ' Western D esert Force' under Lt Cen R. N. O ' Connor. Maj C en H obart was relieved by Maj Cen M . O ' Moore Creagh as div isional commander.

2 Bofors 37m m anti ·t ank gu n- no t a standa rd British Arm y weapo n. A batch on their way to the Sudan were com · mand eered in [940 and issued to the div ision, ror lack or an alternative. Carried po n ce o n 15cwt tr ucks, th ey were rep laced ea rl y in [94 [ by regu lat ion 2pdrs, also portccd on 30cwt and 3 ton trucks. (Gander)

War with Italy The deserts of western Egypt and Libya where the d ivision was to fi ght for the next three years were ap tl y described by a Cerman genera l as a 'tacti cian's drea m and a quartermaster's nig htmare'. Much of th e area is covered by a feat ureless, level, gravel platea u on which movement at speed in any d irectio n, even by wheel ed vehicles, is usual ly possible. At two points, nca r Agheila and Alamein , salt marshes and an impassable depression form bo ttl enecks to within a few miles of the coastl ine. Th ese a rc the o nl y places where defences can be built that ca nnot be ou tfla nked throug h the o pen desert, until lhe mountains and cultivated areas of western T ripolitania ancl Tunisia are reached. Th ese gaps are not th e o nly milita ril y

Orders of Battle 1939 and 1940 MOB I LE D IV I S I O N EGY PT August ' 939 Divisiollal H Q.

-------DiV troops:

~

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Light Arm'd Bdt 7lh Hussars (light tanks) 8th Hussa rs (Iighl la nks) I I

HtO/!)' Arm'd Bdt lSI RTR (Iighllanks) 6lh RTR (light ta nks &

lh H ussa rs (arm'd cars)

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RASC Coy.

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Field Aumbul ance

Pivot Group 3rd RHA (field & A /T guns) 1St KRR C (molOr infantry)

c rui se rs)

7th A RM O

R ED D IV ISION

'ovcm ber I 940

Divisiollal HQ.

I 4th Anll'd Bdt

I

7th Hussars

7th Anll' d Bdt 1st RT R

2nd RTR 6th RTR

grd Hussa rs 8 th Hussars

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Bty. 3rd RHA (A/T )

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Bty. 3rd RH A (A/T )

(Mk V IB light tanks, A9 & A ,o Cru isers, 37mm Bofors A/T guns, I 8/2s pdr fi eld guns)

sig nifi ca nt fea tures, ho weve r ; in Egypt a nd C yrenaica the level inland pla teau steps down to a narrow coasta l plain in a series o f steep esca rpments, a nd the points a t which these pelcr o ut, south o fSidi Barra ni a nd west o fTo bruk, or where ga ps ena bled vehicles to pass up o r dow n th em , such as H a lfaya nea r So llu m a nd S idi R ezegh JUSt so u th o f T o bruk, were to be th e focus o f mu ch action. In the fl a t dcsen even the lo w hills a nd ri dges o f th e coasta l pla in a nd in th e A la m ein ga p achieved an imporla nce o ut o f a ll propo rti o n to th eir size. The sing le m eta lled coa st road , a lo ng wh ich a ll supp lies ha d to tra vel , was to become th e lifeline of bo th sides, linking th em to t heir bases a t

Support Group 4th RHA (field g uns) ISI KRR C 2nd RiAe Ede

Diu troops 11th Hussa rs (arm 'd cars) lo6 th RHA (A /T & AlA) I Bty. 3rd RHA (A/T ) R E : Fld. Sqn . & Pk . Tp. RASC : 6 Coys RAM C: 2 Cav Amb RAOC : Workshop, Pk & 3 It rc pa ir sees

Alexa ndria a nd Tripo li a nd limiting th eir speed of advance and depth of penetra tion into the desen 1O th e south . The o th er m a in features were th e hill y culti va ted a rea of th e Djebel Akhdar in th e Beng ha zi-Mec hili-Dern a tri a ngl e, a nd th e barbedw ire ba r ri er wh ich th e Italians had built a long Lhe Li byan-Egy ptian rro ntier. It was here 'on the wire' thatlhe divisio n first wenl inlo acuo n in mid - I940. Des pite th eir five divisio ns in Cyrena ica backed up by nine more in Tripo lita nia the Ita lians made no immed ia te a ttempt to in vad e Egypt. Instead th ey preferred to remain within th e defend ed perimelers o rlhc coasta l lOwns, a nd in 'Beau Gesle' forts behin d th e fro ntie r, esconing co nvoys be -

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.'. 3 Crusade r Mk II of 3rd Cou nty of London Yeoma nry, pho tograp hed at a momenl of domestic tranquillity! The ma rkings of'A' Sqn, 4 T roop are just visi ble on the rear of lh e turret bin, beyond the lowered NO.9 set aeria l which is he re being used as a washing-line. A name (' A I LSA II '?) is dimly visible on the tu rret side , but there are no divisional or unit tactical signs. The rack of2gal water ti ns, and the use of cutdown 4gal 'Aimsics' as stoves, are typical , as is the tarpaulin bivouac slung from a side ra il origina ll y fitted to mount a hessian 'lorry' camouflage rig. (Sharpshootcrs)

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This press ure was maintained for the next fou r

months a nd led to th e compl ete dom ination o r th e Libya n side o r the rro ntier by th e division 's patrols. Not onl y was mu ch userul intell igence gained abo ut the enem y's defences and th e nature of the desert

(th e 'going' ), bu t q uite substa ntia l rorts were captured and sacked ; even c ucumber patches

cul tivated by th e Libya n troops were not immune tween them with tanks and trying to dominate the

from sudd en ra ids by hungry riA emen or hussars in

desert by air power a lone. With 7th Armourecl Division still in the process o r re-equipping and th e

search o r a cha nge or diet I Armou red clashes a lso occurred in which th e skilrul combinatio n or the speed orth e light ta nks a nd th e hitting power orthe

onl y other trained division , 4 th In dian infantry,

short or a brigade, as well as an acute overa ll shortage or artill ery a nd motor transport, the Western D esert Force was hardly in a position to o ffer an e ffec tive defence, let a lone to mount an

cruisers, backed up by their own a ttached anti -tank guns (a combin a tion which the Ge rmans were to use most effec tively, but whi ch Bri tish com manders

seemed to rorget in later battles) led to spectac ular attack . It thererore establ ished ilSelr in dep th wi th small-scale successes. O n on e occasion the RiAe the in ran try based on the derended area or M ersa Brigade even engaged a n Ita li a n destro yer with M a tr uh whi le 7th Armoured Division lay behi nd Bren g uns. All this led th e I ta lian Commander- in-Ch ier, th e rronti er with a small rorce, usua lly consisting or th e I I th H ussars, pa rt or the support group, and M arsha l G raziani, to overestimate British strength one of the armoured regi ments, right up on the

wi re. This rorce had the tas k or ra id ing in to Libya to fi nd out the enem y d ispositions, to harass his garrisons and convo ys, and genera ll y to take and kee p the initiative in th e area, as well as giving

adva nce warn ing orany moves tha t he might make. So effecti ve was this policy th at in the first rew

grea tl y, so it was not until 13 Sep tember tha t, und er increasing pressure from Mussolini , he sent his

large bu t poorl y equipped a nd a lmost entirely unm echa ni zed arm y across the rronti er into Egy pt. The division , with an a ttached ba tta li o n of Coldstream Guards and some machine-gu nn ers,

rell back as planned towards Matruh borore a n

weeks o f hostiliti es severa l hundred prisoners were taken with little loss, some of them even unaware

e nem y who ad va nced w ith great ca ution in formations more sui ted to th e parade gro und than

that war had been decl ared.

the battlefi eld , covered by heavy arti llery ba rrages

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usuall y dirccted onto arcas of cmpt y desert. Delays

(it was seldom to coincid e exactl y with any official composition). The difference between cavalry and tank formations had disappeared , at least on paper, a nd the three regiments in each armoured brigade all had a mixture of light and cruiser tanks, achieved in some cases by swapping squadrons

were imposed by mines and hit-and-run a ttacks

where possible, and some 3,500 casualti es were inflicted for about '50 British losses in the first three days. Then, to th e surprise of the British, the advance slopped orits own accord a t S idi Ban·ani , onl y half way from the frontier to the dcfences at Matruh . Thc Italians sCllled down to improvc the road and build fortifi cd ca mps where the escarpment ended south of Sidi Barrani ; they then a nnounced to the wo rld that th ey had restorcd the tram services in that city (which was in fa ct nothing more than a coll ection of SLOne huts). Thus began another three months of sta ti c

between units.

Thc ' lights' were by then mostl y the three -man Vickers Mk Vlb, a fast, generall y reliable lillie tank which suffered from poor tracks and from being armed o nl y with mac hine guns. Although it could not compete with the gun -armed Ita lia n medium tanks M, , and M ' 3, its speed usually kcpt it out of trouble ; a nd the small number of A9 and A, 0 Cruisers, a lthoug h obsolcscent by Europcan standards, were both faster and better-armed tha n the Italian mediums, while the Italia n light tanks were no match for any of ours . The support group was up to strength, shortages in th e KRRC having been made good by Rhodesian voluntcers; butth e combined AA-A/T regim ent only had the lilli e Bofors 37 mm gun, carried ponce on the back of a 15c\vltruc k, in its two AfT batteries. Even this was ca pa ble of stopping most [talian ta nks at over 600

warfare during which th e division continued its harassing and reconnaissa nce tasks and went on

building up its streng th. It was during this pcriod that the 'J ock Column ', which was to become such a feature or the divisio n's acLivilies in quie t periods,

came into being. Named after Lt Col J ock Campbell of 4th RHA , these columns consisted of a fcw fi eld g uns, some a rmoured ca rs and usually a company of motor infantry. Their offensive mano euvres did much to foster British morale and to

upset that of the encmy, but the material damage they could inflict was small. By the cnd of November ' 940 the arrival of new troops and equipmcnt had built Western Desert Force into quite a hand y lillie corps consisting of 7th Armoured Di vision ; 4th Indian Infantry Division; two medium-gun and three ficld-gun banerics in addition to those in the divisional

artillerics; 7th RTR (a ballalion of the heavy Ma tilda infantry suppo rt tanks which were impervious to any Italian and-tank g un) and a minimum of necessary service uniLS . 7th Armo ured Division

yards however, and the presence of an ex tra

regiment of these guns, 3rd RHA, meant that ba lleries could be allached to the armoured brigades, and troops distributed to individual units. Th e ,"h Hussars had also been augmented by Rh odesian troops, and were subsequentl y to borrow a squadron of RAF armoured cars. Th ey still retained th eir ' 9'0-'4 pattern Rolls-Royces, armed only with Bren guns and A /T rifles of do ubtful va lu e, and were without wireless, but

regimental and squadron HQs and troop leaders

had at las t more or Icss ca ught up with the o ffi cial

now had th e roomier Morris cars which carried No. g seLS. Units had their own first-lin e services such as

establishment of an armou red division of that time

filters, sig na llers, medical officer, and usually two

Bizel1a 'b""\..

M~ .

A "'0 MALTA

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\ J Enlidavllie ~ - le Kel ~'Sousse

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EGYPT

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Gabes / Medenine '

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CA'RO\~

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Siax )

Gain . Aklill

M edi t erranean

· 8eda Fomm

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,j 100

LIB Y A

EI A!lhella

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300

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4 Stua rt (' Honey') fo ll owed by Crusader Mk Is, late 194 1, in typical desert scrub coun try with esca rpm ent in backgro und. All appear to be finished plai n stone without added camou Aage or markings. ( Im pe rial War Mu se um )

transport and suppl y ech elons: 'A' to carry fuel and ammunition needed in ac tio n, and 'B' to link this

with th e di visional services fa rther bac k and to hold vehicles such as office trucks nOt needed in th e battle area. Divisional services were still very wea k. Two of the RAS C compa nies were borrowed from Commonwealth formation s; the divisional sig nals were a scratch unit with very little eq uipm ent, and the workshop orga ni zation was largely stati c, with less than a dozen recovery vehicles in th e whole di vision. This was the state when th e C-in-C Middl e East, Gen Sir Archiba ld Wavell , ordered Gen O 'Connor to lau nch a surprise attack on th e Italian ca mps south of Sidi Barrani. Pa trols of the division had discovered an unprotected ga p between them through which the Indian infantry and the invincible Matildas were able to pass, undetected , to attack them from the-rea r at dawn on 9 December ' 940, while 7th Armoured Division swept up through the desert to cut ul e coast road west ofSidi Ba rra ni , which fell on th e following da y. This signall ed the start of the Bri tish advance that was to drive the I talians right out of Cyrena ica, and during which the di vision was able to report the prisoners taken in acres rather than numbers. In

8

th e next two months they cut off first Bard ia and th en Tobruk prior to their assa ult and ca pture by 6th Austra li an Di vision (which had replaced the India ns). On , J a nuary ' 94' th e Wes tern D esert Force, by th en well clear of th e western desert of Egy pt, was renamed ' 3 Corps. Although the ad van ce w ~s rapid and the e nemy's tact ics were orten more suitabl e to the Na poleoni c wa rs than LO the 1940s, the di visionIs losses from e nem y ac tio n and attritio n were not insig nificant. The 3rd H ussars lost 13 light tanks in a matter of minutes when th ey bogged down in a sa lt marsh in th e face of enemy g uns cast of Sollum , and o ther isolated reargua rds and counter-attac ks took their toll . By mid-J anuary o ne regim ent in eac h armoured brigade had to be dismou nted to keep the remainder up to a reasonable ta nk stre ngth. The farth er west th ey went- before the coaSt road was cleared th roug h Bardia a nd T obruk- th e more acute the suppl y situation became. Eventua ll y the infantry truc ks had to be pressed into service to keep the di vision supplied , and water was severely rationed. Food stocks were often augmented by ca ptured Ita lian del icacies such as tinned tunn y fi sh . Petrol was the main prob lem, mad e wo rse by the high rate of leakage from the flim sy 4-gallon tins in w hich it was suppli ed - this remained a headache until th e appearance of the 'j erri can ' in '943· By earl y February a d epleted but hig hl y con-

fid ent 7th Armoured Division had reached Mechiii , where it became known that th e Italians were plann ing to abandon Benghazi, their last major town in Cyrenaica. At this point one of the boldest decisions of the campaig n was made, and the division was ordered to move almost 150 mil es a t full speed ac ross a ppal li ng cou ntry in ord er to cut the enemy off from escape in to Tripolitania along the road past Beda Fomm . This move sta rted o n 4 Febru a ry, bu t it soon became clear that if the division continued to move as one formation it wo uld arri ve too late. A fl ying column consisting of 2nd Bn Rifle Brigade, 11th Hussars, a battery of fiel d guns and less than a dozen anti -ta nk guns was therefore sent on a head with orders to block the road a nd hold it until th e rest of the di vision ca ught up. Despite ai r attacks and minefields, this col umn of 140 vehicles reached the road south of Beda Fomm near Sidi Saleh at 14.30 hrs on the 5 th , less than an hour before the advance g uard of loth Italian Arm y a ppeared from th e north, all un aware of th e ambush. From then until daw n two days late r the thin lin e of gunners a nd riflem en beat off frequent, bu t luckil y unco-ordinated attacks from some 20,000 bewi ldered Ita li a ns, while a solitary sq uadron of the KDGs, who had just j oi ned the d ivision, protected their rear against possible a ttack from the direction of Tripol i. At one stage a Rifle Brigade

se rgeant major even succeeded in capturing an M 13 ta nk by knocking its commander over the head with a rifle butt, and many other insta nces of close combat occurred. By nightfa ll on 5 Februa ry the two rema ining regiments of 4th Armoured Brigade, 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR, had reached the road in the vicini ty of Beda Fom m and were ab le to a ttack the massive I talian column from the fl a nk ; by early the next morni ng the 3rd Hussars a nd leading elements of 7th Armoured Brigade were also in position a little furth er north. The battle raged a ll that day bu t the Ital ia ns never managed to co-ordina te th eir efforts and break out, alth ough it was often touch-a nd-go. Their final effort came at dawn on the 7th when a column of some 30 ta nks attacking straight down the road broke through the Rifl e Brigade com panies and destroyed most of th e anti -tank gu ns at the roadblock before being stopped by field gunfire within yards of the ba tta lion HQ At th is point, Gen Bergonzol i and fi ve other generals sur rend ered, together w ith over 20,000 men and their 5 Armoured regiment breaking leag uer; tanks and softskin vehicles ope n o ut from the close formation adop ted at night. Grants and 15cWl lorries arc visible in the backgrou nd and ae ri al pe nn ons arc in evidence. Th e Crusader in the foregrou nd has a seru[ly ca mouflage finish, sugges ting the use of coloured cement applied wet with CO llon waste - a me thod used for a lime in 22nd Armoured Brigade. The turret bea rs the 'A' Sqn sign, and the number T 43739, tOge th er with th e slogan 'Avon/i .1 Avonti.1 ') the Italian fo r 'Forward!' (Sharpshooters)

9

6 Fordson WOT'2c 15 cwt 4 x '2 infantry truck ; each section in a motor infantry platoon rode o ne of these, g ivi ng greater tactical flexibilit y th an in the lorried infantry, where a whole · platoon rode in asingle 3 -ton lorry. Morris, and la ter Chevrolet 15cwts were also extensively used. (Conniford )

action. Th e crisis was ca used by the arrival of the German 5th Light Di vision at Tripoli under Lt Gen Erwin Rommel. This officer, fresh from leading a Panze r Division in spectacular fashion during the Blitzkrieg in France, quickl y rea lized the weakness of the British troops in Cyrenaica and turned a 200 guns and 100 tanks, having cost 7th Armoured reconnaissance in force by his own units and the Division 9 killed and 15 wounded during the two- Italian Anele Armoured Division into a major day battle. offensive. The two und erstrength and inThus ended the division's first campaign. Shortly ex perienced British divisions, 2nd Armo ured and after the victory at Beda Fomm it was withdrawn to 9th Australian infantry, augmented by 3rd Hussars re-equip as its vehicl es were now tota ll y worn out. and 6th RTR left behind by 7th Armoured with the Before it wenl, however, it was to see om inous signs few serviceable light tanks and captured lta lian of things to come in the form of German aircraft ones, were no match for this Axis advance, which over the battlefi eld. Although th e campaign was not halted until it was across the Egyptian culminating in Beda Fomm, and the difficulties it frontier near Soli urn, with only Tobruk holding out had produced for the division , should not be behind it. belittled , the com para ti ve ease with which a wellThis sudden reversal of fortun e, which had led, highly-trained mobi le force had been abl e to includ ed the capture of Gen O ' Connor, was far defea t a badl y-led, poorly-equipped army with low from welcome to Mr C hu rc hil l, who responded by morale (many of whom were local Libyan troops), taking the bold step of di verting a tank convoy led to some tactics and practi ces which proved less thro ugh the M editerranean rather than sending it satisfactory against sterner opponents, and gave round the Cape, to enable an earl y counterundue confidence in the make-up of the armoured offensive to be launched. As a result, by mid -J un e division of that tim e. 7th Armoured Di vision was o nce again in business, but only as a 'scratch' formation, with two brigades each of two regiments and the support group. In 7th Brigade 2nd RTR had the old Cruisers while After leaving the desert in early 1941 the ' Desert 6th R T R got the first Crusaders, as yet untried in Rats' (so named by Mussolini in a gibe that battle and unfamiliar to their crews. In 4th Brigade misfired ) were virtu all y disbanded due to a lack of 4th a nd 7th RTR were given M atild a'!' tanks, as ta nks and oth er eq uipm ent fo r them. U n its found nothing else was available. themselves doing guard duties in Egypt while the Wavell 's plan for Operation Battleaxe was for the divisional commander gave lectures in Turkey, but 4th I ndian Division supported by 4th Armoured by late April first the KRRC battalion and then the Brigade (since they had all the ' I' tanks) to move up 11th Hussars, hurriedly re-equipped with South African Marmon-HerringtOn cars which offered little improvement over the Rolls, were back in

The Desert 1941-42

7 Chevrolet CooL 3· (on 4 x 4 CS lorry. T ogether with si milar Ca nadian Fords and Brilish 3 -tonn ers of various makes, these provided the workhorses of the divisional RASC compan ies and the unit echelons; in the desert they also carried the infantry of 131 Brigade. Desert tyres are show n, but 'trackgrip' and ' run flat' tyres were also common, even mixed on the sa me veh icl e. (Conniford ) 10

O RD ER O F BATTL E November '94'

Divisional H Q I

4th Arm'd Bd, Cp 8th HUSSarS} 3rd R T R Stuart 5 th R TR ta nks 2nd RH A (Fld. guns)

I 22nd Arm'd Bde

7th Arm'd Bd,

2nd R .G. Hussa rs

7th H ussars

3rd C. L.Yeomanry 4th C.L.Yeomanry (Crusader ta nks)

2nd RTR 6th RTR (Crusader, Alo & AI3 tan ks)

2nd Scots Guards

Support Croup 3rd RH A (2pdr A/T guns) 4th RH A 60th Fld. RA 25pdrs IStKRRC 2nd Rifl e Bde

1

DivisionaL troops

3 arm'd car regts (I I1h Hus, KDGs, 4th SAAC) A/T regt (2pdrs) A/A regt (Bofors 40mm) Di v Signals regt

R E: Field and Park Squadrons RASC : 6 Companies RAMC: 3 ligh t Field Ambulances RAOC: Div Workshop & Par k, LAA WS + J It repa ir sec, I It recove ry sec &

1

park sec

to each brigade & Supp gp the coast and capture the area where the coast lost some 90 ta nks for very little gain. Al though Battleax, was a fa iled offensive rather road made its way up th e escarpment near Soli urn. At th e same tim e 7th Armo ured Division was to th an a maj or defeat it showed the da ngers of sweep ro und to the south a nd west on the inl a nd spli tting u p the availa ble armo ur, a nd gave a clear platea u to cut off the enem y defences near the wa rning th at the Germans, despi te lack of desert frontier, be fore moving north- wes t to relieve experi ence, were formid a ble opponents. It was a lso Tobruk . U ntil the in fa ntry cou ld release 4th clear that the Bri tish ta nks no longer had the edge Armoured Brigade, however, this inla nd th rust over the enem y; the M a tilda, although superior to wou ld onl y consist of the two regim ents of 7th the Germ a n tanks of the time except in speed, was Brigade. In the event the Germa ns had placed haIf- now vulnerabl e to anti- tank fi re. M ore important, a-dozen of th ei r 88mm guns a nd had la id mine- fro m 7th Armoured 's po int of view, the Crusader, fi elds in the So llum area, a nd by 15 ]une, when the which was th e latest design a nd whi ch was to British a ttack was launched , had placed the newly- rema in with the di vision until mid- 1943, had arri ved 15th Panzer Division near Bardi a, as we ll as proved unsatisfactory on several coun ts. Th eoreti5th Light near Tobruk. 4 th Armoured Brigade lost cally superior to the Germ an pzK w III a nd IV heavi ly to the 88m ms a nd were tied dow n by ta nks until a t least mid-1 942 on a g un/armo ur counter-attacks which prevented their reverting to basis, it was found to be difficult to maintai n, and 7th Armoured Di vision as intended ; the weak 7th tria ls in Egy pt showed tha t it could be penetrated Armou red Brigade o n its own could not break more easily th an should have been possible conthrough the skilful tank a nd a nti-ta nk g un a m- sidering the thi ckness of its armo ur. Perha ps even bushes laid by th e G erma ns a mong a seri es of low more serio us in the long run was its chron ic ridges in their path, and , witho ut a thi rd regiment, unreli ability, d ue to a fa ulty waterpump a nd had difficulty in repulsing flank a ttac ks by 5 th lubricating system whi ch frequentl y immobilized Light. After two d ays Lt Gen Beresford -Pierce, the the ta nk ; inaccessibility of these mean t tha t it was Corps comm and er, ca lled off the operation, having often impossible to repair them, a nd so CrusaII

8 Wh ite -Ruxtallg22 18-ton 6 x 4 tank transpo rter o neof the early models used by the division in 194 1. The fo ll owing year they were largely replaced in recovery units by ca mmell sem itrai lers. The vehicle shown appears to have bee n sprayed with a dark coloured camouflage over the basic stone shade j the so ft edges are ulll ypi ca l, as most Middl e East theatre ca mou flage dircctivt.'S stressed the need for sharp-edged pattcrns. (Conniford )

g un ; it a lso needed special aviation -grade petrol. 22 nd Brigade no t o nl y had the unrelia ble C rusader, but was entirely composed of as-yet inexperienced Yeomanry (territoria l cavalry) regimen ts . With ders were abandoned intO enemy hands witho ut o nl y one suppOrt group, the whole organiza tion having suffered any action damage. These fau lts was very tank-heavy compared with 15th and 2 1St were never properl y cured . Panzers and Ariele, which each had their own After the fai lure of Ballieaxe many changes LOok infantry and a rtillery units. place. Gen Wavell was relieved as C-in-C by Gen Efforts to provide brigades with more direct Auchinleck, and within the division M aj Gen support by a naching baneries of fi eld guns, troops 'Strafer' GOlt, an old desert hand who had of anti-tank guns and companies of mOLOr infa ntry command ed the KRRC ballalion and later th e from the support group to them o n a semisupport group, assum ed comm and. His place in permanent basis onl y led to such a dispersal of the cha rge of th e support group was taken by Brig J ock ava il able guns and infantry that neither th e Campbell , eX-4th RHA . By November 1941 , remains of th e support group nor th e individua l when the next British offensive Operation Crusader brigades had enough to be able LO look after was launched , suffi cien t reinforcements had ar- th emselves without calling on the other formalions rived in the desert for 8th Army to be formed und er for assistance. Th e unwieldy nature of the di vision , Lt Gen Sir Alan Cunningham. This consisted of and the British policy of using extreme dispersion as tWO corps: the old 13th became a mainly infantry pro tection against air attack, mea nt th at all too formation with 4th Indian and 2nd New Zealand often the tig ht, well-balanced di visions of the much Divisions supported by a brigade of 'I' tanks, and more easil y-controll ed Afrika Korps were able to the new 30th had 7th Armoured Di vision with 1St ca tch single brigades, or the support g roup, on their South African In fantry Division and a Guards own. Another problem for Gen Go n was the fact mOLOr infantry brigade. that the corps commander, Gen Pope, was killed in 7th Armoured Division itself was made up LO the a n air crash and had to be replaced by Maj Gen unprecedented size of three armou red brigades by Norrie, himself onl y a divisional commande r a nd the addition of the 22 nd , which was really part of new to the desert. As a result, th e forthcoming 1st Armoured Division, then on its way out to th e banle was marked at times by more consultation Middle Eas t. Although this meant that with some than decision in 30 Corps, and on one occasio n Gen 500 tanks in units and as replacements th e division GOlt was left virtuall y in charge of the whole corps. had superiority over th e combined Italia n arBy 18 j ovember wh en, afte r va rious postponemoured division and the two German ones of the ments, Crusader was finall y launched , Rommel was Afrika Korps, who could onl y muster 320 between on the point of assa ulting T obruk, whi ch was still them , th e quality was very variable. 7th Armoured holding out. For this he had 15th Panzer a nd th e Brigade still had nea rl y 100 obsolete A I 0 and A 13 Germa n 90th Lig ht infantry division in that area, cruisers, some of which were so decrepit that th ey as well as the three static I ta lian divisions tha t were had to be taken inLO ballie on the few tank investing the fortress. T o cover his rear he had Ariele transporters that were in the desert a t that time. 4th at Gubi some 30 miles due south of T obruk, and Armoured Brigade was completely eq uipped with a nother J talian division backed by German g uns, the American Stuart or ~ H on ey' light tank, which plus 21St Pa nzer behind them in his frontier although reliable had a very short range and a poor defences, which had been extended some 20 miles 12

south-west from Sollum. Gen Cunn ingham 's pl a n was to send 30 Corps on a sweep round the end of this defence lin e to take up a position behind , from which it could threaten Romm el's communi ca tions in such a way that he wou ld be forced to a ttack the massed ta nks of 7th Armoured Di vision on ground of their own choosing, (using up ' his Panzer Divisions in the process. As soon as the armoured

battle was decid ed , 13 Corps was to capture the fronti er defences and move along the coast to Tobruk , where the garrison should already have broken out to link up with th e victorious 30 Corps. At first a ll went well , but such was the secrecy of the initial moves that Rommel was unawa re th at he was being threatened and fa iled to respond to 30 Corps's thrust as anticipated. The massed a rmour of the division, therefore, bega n to split up: 4th Brigade drifted east to protect the Aank of I 3 Corps, 22 nd Brigade was sent to a ttack Ariele in th e west, and 7th Brigad e went north to the real key a rea, th e airfield at Sid i R ezegh on the escarpments, just south ofT obruk, overl ooking the road leading up to the front ier. Each was individua lly too weak for its task ; 22 nd Brigade partly overran the Ita li ans a t Gubi but, owing to lack of in fantry, could not hold its gains; 7th Brigadefollowed by the support group occupi ed Sidi R ezegh, but could not ta ke the

dom in ating surrounding areas ; a nd 4th Brigade was attacked on its own by first one, a nd then both , Panzer Divisions, which then swung north in

concert a nd mau led 7th Brigade so severely that it was unable to take a ny further part in th e battle or even the campaign . D espite the switching of 22 nd Brigade, first to help 4th Brigade a nd then to Sidi R ezegh, a nd efforts by the T obruk garrison to break o ut, th e division never managed to achieve a local superiori ty, a nd on 22 November the support group was driven south off the airfield. During th e two days th ey had held it, the support group had won a ll three of the ves th a t the d ivision was to win in the desert. R fmn Beeley of the KRRC di ed wh ile charging a machin e-gun nest ; Lt Ward Gunn , RHA, was kill ed whi le firin g a 2pdr a nti-ta nk gu n from a b urning portee ; and Brig Campbell per sonally orga nized a nd led many counter-attacks in

9 Hu mbe r Mk I II armoured car. These followed th e simi lar Mk li s, wh ic h we re th e first modern ca rs to reac h the di visio n,

late in '94 1. With beller armour and a , smm BESA machinegun they could conrront Germa n rccce uni ts on more equal terms than their pred ecessors. Sand c hannels, fo r pUlling under the wheels in soft sand, can be see n secured below the spare wheel ; th e engine deck is in th e raist."