The Development of Consciousness: An Integrative Model of Child Development, Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis 9781849405980, 1849405980, 9781855754829, 1855754827, 9788847006591, 8847006597 [PDF]

Zitiervorschau

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 1

28/9/07 14:59:04

EFPP Series Editors in Chief: Monica Lanyado and Didier Houzel

OTHER TITLES IN SERIES • Invisible Boundaries: Psychosis and Autism in Children and Adolescents • Countertransference in Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy with Children and Adolescents • Supervision and its Vicissitudes • Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in Institutional Settings • Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy of the Severely Disturbed Adolescent • Work with Parents: Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy with Children and Adolescents • Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy: The Controversies and the Future • Research on Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy with Adults • The Therapist at Work: Personal Factors Affecting the Analytic Process

J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 2

28/9/07 14:59:04

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS An integrative model of child development, neuroscience and psychoanalysis Giampaolo Sasso Translated and revised by Jennifer Cottam

published by

karnac for The European Federation for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in the Public Health Services and The Cyprus Association for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy Studies

J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 3

28/9/07 14:59:04

Published in 2007 by Karnac Books Ltd 118 Finchley Road London NW3 5HT

Copyright © 2007 by the European Federation for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in the Public Health Services Series Editors’ Preface Copyright © 2007 Monica Lanyado and Didier Houzel The rights of Giampaolo Sasso to be identified as the sole author of this work have been asserted in accordance with §§ 77 and 78 of the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A C.I.P. for this book is available from the British Library ISBN-13: 978-1-85575-482-9

Edited, designed, and produced by HL Studios www.karnacbooks.com

J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 4

28/9/07 14:59:04

Contents About the author

3

Series Editors’ Preface By Monica Lanyado and Didier Houzel

4

Introduction

7

Chapter one The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

11

Chapter two Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

26

chapter three The current idea of a child’s mental development

55

chapter four A new model of brain development

68

CHAPTER FIVE Drive dynamics and maternal modulation 110 CHAPTER SIX Normal and pathogenic development of mother-child interaction 137 CHAPTER SEVEN Defence structures and the development of consciousness 170 CHAPTER EIGHT The origin of language 193 CHAPTER NINE Child development and the integration of psychoanalysis and neuroscience

226

CHAPTER TEN The unresolved problems of Freudian metapsychology

253

CONCLUSION

266

REFERENCES

269

INDEX

291



J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 1



28/9/07 14:59:04



J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 2

28/9/07 14:59:05

About the Author Is it realistically within the capabilites of neuroscience today to explain identificatory development in childhood? Forging a new link with Freud’s Project, Giampaolo Sasso describes a model of brain development which crafts new associations between current neuroscientific knowledge and the classic themes of psychoanalytic theory. The main focus of this new theory is a neurophysiological interpretation of the identificatory process in children resulting from interaction with the mother. If we are to begin to understand the instinctive and relational complexity of this development we need to look at how the intrinsic, autonomous dynamics of neural integration are ceaselessly modulated and modified by the mother. The endogenous properties of brain development and the influence of maternal relations actually throw light on the significance of Freud’s drive theory and its links with object relations. Sasso’s theory explains how the brain is continually regulated by introjective-projective dynamics which are essential to its ongoing development and to interaction with the environment. Introjectiveprojective dynamics constitute the essential basis not only for identificatory development in childhood but for all human communication and, as such, are essential to language-based psychoanalysis. The intrinsic dynamics of the nervous system form the foundation of this highly innovative theory, certainly destined to generate a great deal of discussion between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Giampaolo Sasso is a graduate in Engineering and Psychology. He lives in Milan and is a practising psychotherapist and psychoanalyst. He is a member of the Italian Society of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (SIPP) which forms part of the European Federation for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (EFPP). Giampaolo Sasso is also a linguist and has had a number of books published in Italy including Le strutture anagrammatiche della poesia (Feltrinelli, Milan 1982), La mente intralinguistica (Marietti, Genoa, 1993), Struttura dell’oggetto e della rappresentazione (Astrolabio, Rome, 1999), Psicoanalisi e Neuroscienze (Astrolabio, Rome, 2005), Il segreto di Keats, Il fantasma della Belledame sans merci (Pendragon, Bologna, 2006).



J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 3

28/9/07 14:59:05

Series Editors’ Preface It has always felt somewhat ”unfair” that psychoanalytic publications in English have a bit of a head start in becoming known internationally, because of the widespread use of English as a ”common language”. Because of this, the EFPP Book Series is making efforts to publish English translations of important books which we feel should be made available to the broader psychoanalytic community. Whilst there are many ways in which the work of psychoanalytic psychotherapists is developing in similar ways in, for example, Norway, Italy and Spain, there will of course also be differences – and new ideas which should fruitfully be shared, across the language divide. So we are pleased that Giampaolo Sasso’s fourth book in Italian is the first to be translated into English for this Series. As the title suggests, The Development of Consciousness. An Integrative Model of Child Development, Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis, addresses the complex and very exciting developments that are currently taking place in neuroscience and psychoanalysis, with particular emphasis on the ways in which they relate to child development. More specifically, Sasso aims to provide a clear neurophysiological interpretation of the identificatory processes of the child with the mother. This is a rapidly growing area of interest which psychoanalytic psychotherapists around the world need to become as well-informed about as possible. In offering his integrative model, Sasso is suggesting new links between the brain as the physical organ of the mind, with all the advances in understanding that modern technology is providing, including findings emerging from child development research of babies and children in the real life process of normal development, and our psychoanalytic theories, going right back to Freud’s Project. This is an ambitious and exciting goal, and it makes demanding reading. It is also fascinating and challenging, both for those well steeped in their interest in these areas, and those who approach this kind of read with some trepidation. It was Freud’s ambition to found a new psychology encompassing all psychic experiences in a theoretical frame without reference to brain functioning. This was despite the fact that, at the time, he was also a specialist in the field of neurophysiology and wrote important papers on the brain and its pathology. Yet his ambitious attempt to describe mental functioning in terms of neuron connections and specialization as it unfolds, in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), failed to really satisfy him and he did not build on these ideas. This was probably for several reasons. 

J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 4

28/9/07 14:59:05



SERIES EDITORS’ PREFACE 

Firstly, it is important to emphasize the epistemological reasons which stemmed from existing knowledge of the brain and neurons that led Freud to give up the Project. He wanted to avoid any model which reduced psychic functioning to its biological background. Sasso agrees with this point of view. He doesn’t suggest a unidirectional model where psychic phenomena could be inferred directly from biological ones. His model is bi-directional: all psychic experiences depend on a neurological background, but conversely every subjective experience determines brain growth and organization. A second reason which made Freud fail in his attempt to construct a biological model of the psyche was his choice of ”energy” rather than ”information” as the basic concept of his metapsychology. When Freud started to construct his metapsychological model, thermodynamics, based on the concepts of force and energy, was the prevailing discipline among the natural sciences. So it only was natural to borrow those concepts for a theory of the psyche. But this came with serious inconveniences. Freud himself noted that the postulated psychic energy was not measurable. Later the concept of ”information” emerged when scientists took interest not only in the exchanges of energy between two systems, but also in the communication of ”shapes”. Sasso underlines the importance of this shift for neuroscience and its suitability for metapsychology. The more two individuals are able to exchange stable shapes, i.e. ideas, instead of energy, the more they exchange at a psychic level. The advances in neuroscience have demonstrated that nervous system functioning is understandable in terms of ”information” and not in terms of ”energy”, even if very small quanta of electrical energy are involved in the circulation of information within this system. There is no such thing as a nervous impulse which has served as a basis for the concept of psychic energy. Using ”information” instead of ”energy” as the basic concept for a psychological model can give us new insights into the understanding of psychic growth and functioning. The problem now is not so much to get rid of an overload of energy, as Freud described in the economic model, but to construct and share complex and stable psychic shapes. In this process the infant needs the help of his/her mother. So the infant/mother relationship is an invaluable paradigm with which to explore the whole process. The object is not only “the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim” [Freud, 1915, S.E. XIV, p. 122], it is the ”root” of a dynamic system, the subject being the other root of the same system, within which stable psychic shapes are to be constructed in an 

J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 5

28/9/07 14:59:05



SERIES EDITORS’ PREFACE

inter-subjective interaction, which gradually becomes an intra-subjective experience. This leans toward object-relations theory rather than instinct theory. In the former, the role of the object is not only to achieve the instinct’s aim, but also to transform primitive and unstable feelings into thinkable and stable presentations. Empathy, projective and introjective processes are the tools at child’s and mother’s disposal to achieve that transformation. Sasso underlines very clearly and in detail how these inter-subjective processes stem from our neurological equipment and functions, some of them very specific to the human species. Nowadays, psychoanalytic psychotherapists cannot ignore the tremendous advances in neuroscience. However, these new developments should not be considered as a blueprint for psychotherapy. They offer, nonetheless, valuable help in determining the areas in their own field where they should deepen their knowledge and competence. The reader’s time and efforts will be well rewarded with the present book. Monica Lanyado and Didier Houzel Series Editors



J6916_Sasso_Prelims.indd 6

28/9/07 14:59:05

Introduction

W

hat does child development mean to us, today? Can we think of it in purely neurophysiological terms, particularly given the current level of neuroscientific knowledge? From a psychoanalytical viewpoint, I feel it is important to frame this problem in terms of the neurophysiological model Freud described in his Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895). As I hope will become clear as the book unfolds, there is a fundamental similarity between his conceptual nucleus and the one I describe here. Both hinge upon the perceptual-motor properties of neural pathways, which help to shed light on how memory coding gives rise to representation, thought and language. That memory coding is treated differently in the two models can, I believe, help us to understand Freud’s neurophysiological model better and the reasons behind its limitations. In the Project, energy theoretically flows only from perception towards motility so it is impossible to deal adequately with the flow in the opposite direction. For Freud this gave rise to insurmountable difficulties when he tried to explain early development of the psychic apparatus. By replacing the concept of energy with that of information and assuming that information can

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 7



19/9/07 16:23:18



INTRODUCTION

travel along neural pathways in both directions, it is possible to extend the Freudian model to highly complex dynamic processes. I discussed some of these ideas in Struttura dell’Oggetto e della Rappresentazione (Sasso, 1999). What, then, is the aim of this book? It is to provide a clear neurophysiological interpretation of the identificatory process of the child during its relationship with the mother. This development is easier to understand in its entirety, including both drives and relations, by taking into proper account the autonomous, intrinsic dynamic of neural integration. Its function, however, can be explained only if we also bring in the evolution of the brain and the continual regulation during child development by dynamic activation of the brainstem. A number of important theories, like those of Edelman and Tononi, as well as Damasio, inform the model described in this book, because they focus on the importance of the constructive function of the brainstem in the development of the brain and consciousness. Edelman/Tononi’s theory of re-entries in particular explains in detail how the interaction between mother and child inevitably produces fundamental changes in neural organization, fixing the mother’s projective-introjective modulation of the endogenous dynamic in cerebral maps. This dynamic is regulated by rhythmic properties of internal information flows that serve to modulate surrounding information appropriately so that the organism can interact with it actively. This basic characteristic explains how, after birth, the child gradually masters interaction with the mother, drawing from this the projective-introjective identificatory relations necessary for development. It is an essentially simple dynamic that explains how, during child development, the evolutionary project of the brain produces the rich phylogenetic reorganization that Freud was so interested in and also the relational predisposition of the child. It is the integration of constructive endogenous properties and the maternal contribution of object information that makes it possible to identify the relationship between Freud’s drive theory and object relations theory.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 8

19/9/07 16:23:18



INTRODUCTION



There are, of course, many hypotheses that draw upon this theoretical standpoint. These include the way in which pathogenic precursors of development are formed and their influence on defences, the significance of the main pathogenic classes in relation to the different psychoanalytical models and the origin of language in the developing brain and its therapeutic function during patientanalyst interaction. There is, in other words, a self-consistency between the various hypotheses put forward in this book. In Chapter Eight, on the origin of language, the various arguments presented in the previous chapters are brought together. Introjective-projective modulation during verbal (and non-verbal) communication is certainly the most important conceptual nucleus covered by this model, based, as it is, on the endogenous introjective-projective dynamic. I would be extremely pleased even if this were the only concept to be taken in serious consideration from this whole book. The nervous system is traversed autonomously and continually by an introjective-projective dynamic that is necessary for integration as well as being indispensable to the identificatory processes of the child studied by psychoanalysis and to the possibility of psychoanalytic treatment. This dynamic is the “natural breath” of the cerebral system, exactly the same as a physiological drawing of breath. It feeds information to the inside through introjection and releases information to the outside through projection. Our responsibility in our interactions with other human beings is certainly enormous, and as psychoanalysts we question ourselves continually about this awesome task. The hypotheses, however, put forward in this book about the introjective-projective properties that are inherent to any interaction suggest that this responsibility is even greater than previously imagined. The influence of the therapist over a patient is shown to be much greater than is usually acknowledged. The brain turns out to be quite similar to a musical instrument living in complex resonance, rendered active and participatory by reciprocal interaction. I hope that this contribution to the exploration of underlying neurophysiology will prove useful in clarifying (and even imagining) the rich dynamic that secretly subtends our inner life. In

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 9

19/9/07 16:23:18

10

INTRODUCTION

addition I hope, above all, that it will help to build a bridge between psychoanalysis and neuroscience so that awareness of our limited access to this imperceptible dynamic remains a continuous stimulus to understanding child development and the work we undertake with our patients.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 10

19/9/07 16:23:19

CHAPTER ONE

The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

The Project and its influence on the genesis and development of psychoanalysis

F

reud unquestionably considered The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) to be his most successful theoretical work, the book that, also as a result of its great clarity, laid the foundations for the birth of psychoanalysis and its subsequent development. The work he considered his most unsatisfactory, on the other hand, was Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), which he interrupted after a laborious first draft. The style is complicated and rather arcane, and it is difficult to follow Freud’s line of reasoning, which at times is quite contorted. Indeed, when the manuscript came to light in 1937, Freud was opposed to its publication as he considered it to be an unsuccessful draft of several personal neurophysiological hypotheses, written at a time of emotional exaltation and totally unreliable from a scientific point of view. He was, in fact, right for a number of reasons. His concept of the neuron, which had only been discovered by Cajal a few years earlier in 1889, was completely mistaken and this resulted in several unrealistic ideas about brain function, which are discussed later. Nevertheless, it is impossible to state with any certainty just how unreliable this work is. A careful study of the Project shows that

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 11

11

19/9/07 16:23:19

12

The Development of Consciousness

Freud had set himself a goal–that of understanding how thought and consciousness could derive from the sensorimotor organization of the brain–which is still considered of fundamental importance today. That is why, in the Project, Freud decided to tackle the problem of how memory traces–the basis for all brain processes–are formed in the sensorimotor apparatus. This is identical to the approach adopted by Damasio, who believes that it is essential to study sensorimotor control in order to understand the origin of consciousness. It is clear to anyone studying the evolution of the brain, however, that the nervous system must have originated from sensorimotor connections (Llinas & Pare, 1996; Kinsbourne, 1998). I shall show later by means of a few examples how Freud appears to have been trying to understand how a generic network of neurons can learn to encode and recognize differences in motor encoding in such a way that it can then be used for the retrieval of information, or, to use a more modern terminology, to understand the problem of the comparison between anticipatory states and perception (Gray 1995). When Freud was writing the Project back in 1895, he was not really interested in neurophysiological matters, even though this area may seem to predominate. It was his interest in clinical work and his discovery that a hysterical pathology did not follow the laws of anatomy that led him to make a difficult abstraction and attempt to formulate a general model of neural functioning. This may appear an extreme form of reductionism, but it is in fact a powerful conceptual abstraction by means of which Freud hoped to provide his already well-developed theoretical ideas with neurophysiological support so that they could then be formulated more concisely. This may explain the surprise that followed the publication of the Project in the 1950s and the continuing interest shown in the book (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Schore, 1999) despite the rapid progress that has since been made in the neurosciences. One of the most fascinating things about the Project is the large number of topics Freud dealt with, anticipating to a considerable extent his own future research. As Jones pointed out shortly after its publication in 1953, there are 23 distinct topics, 20 of which were developed by Freud in greater detail in his later works. Similar observations were

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 12

19/9/07 16:23:19



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

13

made by Strachey (1966) and Holt (1965), and then in greater detail by Pribram and Gill (1976), although these topics have also been studied by many other authors. These topics can easily be identified by anyone acquainted with psychoanalytic theory. The basic idea in the Project is the discharge of energy in order to arrive at a state of inertia. Although this idea is now considered mistaken (the brain is always neurophysiologically active), Freud used it to explain many of the essential properties of the psychical apparatus that are unquestionably both valid and important: hallucinations, desire satisfaction, the difference between primary and secondary processes, the function of dreams, the origin of thought, attention, the relationship between perception and representation, and the function of language. All these topics clearly form the very basis of the theory that was later developed by Freud, though several of them were only dealt with in detail many years after being first mentioned in the Project. This work shows that by 1895 Freud had already developed the core of his whole theory. Take, for example, the discharge of energy, the very basis of the Project. This is clearly at the origin of the drive model he subsequently developed in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), and Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915c), but it is also even more clearly at the origin of his problematic theory in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), developed a good 25 years later. Moreover, Freud paid special attention in the Project to the development of the ego, a subject he did not tackle in detail until 1923 in The Ego and the Id. So Freud included an extraordinary number of theoretical ideas in the Project, which he then took many years to reorganize. The Project is undoubtedly difficult to understand as a result of the type of language used. Although Freud wanted to provide a broad neurological description, the language is closely tied up with the quantitative hypotheses of energy discharge. It is a conceptual construct that is both scientific and metaphorical, and Freud’s line of reasoning has to be followed very carefully. I think it is useful to try to enter Freud’s mental laboratory, albeit very briefly, in order to understand his theoretical goal and how this affected his perception of child development.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 13

19/9/07 16:23:19

14

The Development of Consciousness

The discharge of energy Q: energy and information flows As has already been mentioned, the Project is based upon an erroneous concept of the neuron according to which neurons function by means of a simple discharge of a quantity of energy. Freud conceived the neuron as a passive reservoir of energy coming from outside, whereas nowadays it is considered to be an active transducer of information endowed with its own metabolic energy by means of which it modulates signals transmitted by other neurons. Freud’s quantitative hypothesis (partially borrowed from Fechner) was consistent with his aim of showing how a discharge could become qualitative in psychological processes. This topic fitted in with his early scientific and philosophical studies, including those under the guidance of Meynert and Brücke. The energy concept with which Freud was familiar was clearly that of an electrical current, which is a typically quantitative concept. Freud applied this definition of the neuron to the concept of a reflex arc, in which a stimulus produces motor discharge as a response. According to this idea, when energy in the environment cathects the perception neurons, it flows along the neural pathways in the same way that an electrical current flows along a wire and is discharged into the motor neurons, where it activates movement. By following Freud’s line of reasoning in certain key passages, it becomes clear that his goal was to explain how this process formed memory traces as a result of external stimuli and, above all, how these traces could be reactivated erroneously from within. Freud was very fond of this topic because in his clinical work with hysterical women he had discovered the pathogenic importance of memories, but also because while he was writing the Project, he had sensed that a dream could be interpreted as a deformation of memory traces from the waking state. Freud firstly made a very simple distinction between perception neurons and motor neurons in order to exemplify the principle on which the Project is based. The external energy Q enters the perception neurons (which he calls ϕ) and its passage stops with motor discharge. This simple process alone produces the most important property of the apparatus, i.e., memory, which forms because the

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 14

19/9/07 16:23:19



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

15

energy encounters different resistances along the way. It first flows unaffected through the perception neurons (which he therefore defines as being permeable), but is then modified by the following neurons ψ, whose contact-barriers obstruct its passage (which is why he defines these neurons as being impermeable). These barriers, which modify Q, are very similar to the modern idea of synapses, and memory derives from the state of facilitations among neurons as a result of the energy that is removed. After this first description of the nervous system, Freud began to define the function of the neurons of consciousness (ω), which are necessary to produce the subjective sensations that must necessarily accompany perception. These neurons, which operate with extremely reduced quantities of energy, are almost permeable (in a similar way to the ϕ neurons), and are therefore comparable to perception organs. Freud provides a qualitative explanation of their properties: a period of excitation (a concept developed only in part), which the neurons of the sense organs transfer to the ω neurons. These neurons then translate them into sensations of pleasure and unpleasure. Here is how Freud summarized the way in which energy, by passing through three different kinds of neurons, ultimately becomes qualitative (1895, p. 314). “The qualitative characteristic of the stimuli now proceeds unhindered through ϕ by way of ψ to ω, where it generates sensation; it is represented by a particular period of neuronal motion...” If we draw this pathway in Figure 1.1a, we can see that Freud’s conceptual core is very simple at its origin. Perception produces at the same time both the memory trace and the conscious sensation, and this summarises the main process of the whole of the psychic apparatus. After defining this basic flow of energy, Freud went on to study another flow of Q, which this time was internal rather than external (Figure 1.1b). As stated earlier, the ψ neurons also receive energy from cellular elements within the body. Freud’s goal here was to resolve the erroneous reactivation of memory traces that form for endogenous reasons, the memory traces in which he was most interested.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 15

19/9/07 16:23:20

16

The Development of Consciousness

fig.aZ





\



MQ

fig.bZ





\ \



MQ

nuclear

Q fig.cZ





\ \



MQ

nuclear

Q Figure 1.1 Perception, memory, and the conscious sensation.

These neurons are not only present in the cortex, where they transform perceptual energy, but they are also nuclear, by which Freud meant deeper inside the cortical system, where they are connected to the pathways from which the endogenous quantities of excitation arrive. The summation of these endogenous quantities of energy produce within the nuclear ψ neurons their discharge, thereby activating in the cortical ψ neurons mnemic images linked to the perception of the object. In Figure 1.1b we can see how Freud expanded his first description of energy flow: the endogenous stimulation, cathecting the ψ neurons, backtracks along the ψ →ϕ tract in an inverse direction in relation to the original movement of the exogenous energy entering the apparatus. The discharge of endogenous energy stops when there is an alteration in the external world (food supply, proximity of the sexual object), which means the experiencing of satisfaction of the desire stimulated within. Yet, as a result of memory associations already formed among the ψ neurons during previous experiences, the endogenous flow–Freud noted–can produce a perception that is not real, but hallucinatory. In order to clarify how hallucinatory satisfaction can be prevented, Freud focused on how the motor images of the ψ neurons form, as these are necessary for the object to be

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 16

19/9/07 16:23:20



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

17

identified again, and on how their energy flows are regulated by sensations of pleasure and unpleasure (which produces the defences). The ego forms from this development in the ψ neurons to inhibit the flows of Q in the primary processes aimed at achieving satisfaction by directing them towards more suitable lateral cathexes belonging to the secondary processes. In order to justify exactly how perception can be distinguished from hallucinatory representation, Freud assigned an indication of reality to perception, deriving it from the ω neurons: In the case of every external perception a qualitative excitation occurs in ω, which in the first instance, however, has no significance for ψ. It must be added that the ω excitation leads to ω discharge, and information of this, as of every discharge, reaches ψ. The information of the discharge from ω is thus the indication of quality or of reality for ψ. (Freud 1895, p. 325).

So, in order for the memory traces of the ψ neurons to acquire the conscious quality of perceptual origin, they must also participate in the ω excitation, which is what happens if the discharge reverses and reaches ψ (Figure 1.1c). It is interesting to note how Freud now used the term information in a strictly cybernetic sense, similar to the way in which the basic property of the neuron is conceived today, i.e., the transmitting of information by means of a discharge. Freud now described the ω→ψ reversal, which, together with the preceding ψ→ϕ reversal, completes the reversal of the entire neural pathway. He therefore justified this entire property of inversion with an original connection of the ω neurons to the other end of the pathway, where the sense organs are located. For this purpose it must be assumed that the ω neurones are originally linked anatomically with the paths of conduction from the various sense organs and that they [the ω neurones] direct their discharge back to the motor apparatuses belonging to these same sense organs. In that case the information of the latter discharge (the information of reflex attention) will act to ψ biologically as a signal to send out a quantity of cathexis in the same directions. (Freud 1895, p. 326).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 17

19/9/07 16:23:20

18

The Development of Consciousness

This is the culmination of Freud’s argument. In this process the discharge of the ψ neurons, which should only produce a reflex attention, becomes a conscious attention and from then on operates as a signal fixed biologically in the ψ neurons, which can treat the cathexis of energy towards ϕ as a memory trace of real perception. In Figure 1.1c, we can see how the first simple formulation of the apparatus has been made more complex in order to show how perception can be considered as something real and not confused with hallucinations. Its conceptual core is the system of ψ neurons, which is where the external and internal flows of energy converge, together with the energy arriving in the opposite direction from the ω neurons. By means of this new pathway, which is completely inverted, Freud (1895, p. 326) stated that “the indications of ω discharge become quite generally indications of reality, which ψ learns, biologically, to make use of.” Freud considered these flows to be flows of energy, but if we interpret them as flows of information–a term he often used–it can be seen that he was trying to define the cooperation between two opposite types of signals in the neural pathway, one originating from ϕ and the other from ω. Their convergence on the ψ neurons gives rise to typical properties of feedback, i.e., the reversal of the signals of the ω neurons used for the motor control of perception. The problem Freud encountered in the Project appears evident in this development: the transformation of quantitative properties into qualitative ones implies the concept of information, but Freud could not describe how it worked in the nervous system. He nevertheless followed his own intuitions about the need for controls in the sensorimotor system, adapting the energy concept to fit in with these intuitions.

The perceptual complex and the subject-complex As will be seen during the course of this book, the conceptual core summarised in Figure 1.1 is the source of many important ideas concerning the type of brain functions Freud was trying to describe and was to have a lasting influence on all Freudian theory.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 18

19/9/07 16:23:20



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

19

Correctly interpreted, it corresponds to the essential properties of the so-called central comparator, the system of the brain that produces the motor comparison between anticipatory states and perception (Gray 1995). In this small system, the inverse pathways of the ω “consciousness” neurons can moreover be easily explained by Edelman/Tononi’s theory of re-entry. For reasons similar to those of Damasio, Edelman/Tononi believe that consciousness cannot occur unless the brain continually carries out comparisons between decision-making processes and perceptual responses. Following the ideas developed in the Project a little further, it is possible to gain a better understanding of Freud’s specific neurological model and how this led him to define abstract processes such as judgement and thought. Percepts, for Freud, did not obviously consist of one single neuron, but of a complex of several neurons. To give a very simple example, he considered two percepts that have one neuron, “a”, in common but differ by another neuron, “b”. The retrieval of a correct memory trace from one of them means, therefore, being able to find, between the two percepts with the neuron in common, the additional pathway that leads to the neuron necessary for the completion of the sought after percept. The retrieval of this neuron produces the sensation of identity between the memory trace of the percept and real perception. For Freud, the search for this identity involved an act of judgement. The perceptual complex, if it is compared with other perceptual complexes, can be dissected into a component portion, neurone a, which on the whole remains the same, and a second component portion, neurone b, which for the most part varies…The aim is to go back to the missing neurone b and to release the sensation of identity–that is the moment at which only neurone b is cathected, at which the travelling cathexis debouches into neurone b. It is reached by means of an experimental displacement of Q 1 along every pathway…(Freud, 1895, pp. 328-9).

1 Unlike Q, which is a quantity of generic energy (which acts from the outside, for instance, on body receptors), the Q symbol represents interneuronal energy. This may be in motion, passing from one neuron to another in order to energise it, or static, constituting the actual energy itself of the neuron.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 19

19/9/07 16:23:21

20

The Development of Consciousness

This dissection of a perceptual complex is described as cognising it; it involves a judgement and when this last aim has been attained it comes to an end. Judgement, as will be seen, is not a primary function, but presupposes the cathexes from the ego of the disparate [non-comparable] portions [of the perception]; in the first instance it has no practical purpose and it seems that during the process of judging the cathexis of the disparate components is discharged, for this would explain why activities, “predicates”, are separated from the subject-complex by a comparatively loose pathway...The necessary precondition for this remains that the ψ processes should not pursue their passage uninhibited but in conjunction with an active ego…The aim and end of all thoughtprocesses is thus to bring about a state of identity, the conveying of a cathexis Q , emanating from outside, into a neurone cathected from the ego. (Freud, 1895, pp. 331-2).

It is important to note that the conveying of Q to this neuron involves the trying out of different directions, which reveals the imprecise search that starts the process before a state of identity is achieved. “This would explain why activities, “predicates”, are separated from the subject-complex by a comparatively loose pathway.” (Freud 1895, p. 332). As Freud stated, this search occurs by means of a dissection of the perception complex, i.e., a knowledge of its characteristics (the a and b neurons), and it only ends when there is a definite identification, i.e., a judgement that this is the right pathway. This conceptualization, as can be seen, boldly derives abstract categories from actual neural processes. The most obviously modern feature of this concept is, perhaps surprisingly, Freud’s abstract type of neurological mapping of neural processes. The way in which he imagined the percepts presupposes a distributed memory made up of configurations of neurons, the type of memory that is now considered best suited to dealing with associations and the retrieval of local information. In this way, the ego clearly acquires the function that Freud had hoped for, i.e., an active participation through the ψ neurons in the original flow of energy with the necessary inhibitions. He stated (1895, p. 332) that “The necessary precondition for this remains that the ψ processes should not pursue their passage uninhibited but in conjunction with an active ego.”

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 20

19/9/07 16:23:21



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

21

In Freud’s opinion it was essential to define the autonomous properties of the ego, such as will, attention, consciousness and, above all, the changing of a primary process into a secondary one, from which the origin of thought could be deduced. It is important to understand however that the ego becomes active through the possibility of dissecting the perceptual complex from within, and of acquiring a knowledge of it. This is clearly a neurophysiological form of knowledge that the nervous system has of itself and which involves the subjectcomplex making a distinction between the different activities of the perceptual complex. The latter is the most abstract expression with which Freud defined the neurological entity of the ego, which is formed from the knowledge and judgement of perception. This shows, however, that Freud needed a neurophysiological imagination in order to define the realistic properties of the concepts he was exploring. It is not difficult to notice how throughout the Project Freud gradually adapted the simple principle of energy discharge to the intuition he had of his own mental processes. Take, for example, what he has to say about the contribution of movement to perception: While one is perceiving the perception, one copies the movement oneself–that is, one innervates so strongly the motor image of one’s own which is aroused towards coinciding [with the perception], that the movement is carried out. Hence, one can speak of a perception having an imitationvalue. (Freud, 1895, p. 333).

Freud affirmed that perception triggers a copy of the perceived movement, which causes innervation of the motor response (this helps the search for perceptual identity), and therefore that perception has an imitational function in this case. Only recently has it been possible to demonstrate this process neurophysiologically (Gallese, 1999, 2003; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004) and this idea is now at the centre of a wide-ranging debate as to the importance of primary imitations in child development. Freud clearly did not deduce this process from his own theoretical concepts, but merely followed his own personal intuition and used it to confirm the hypotheses on which the Project was based.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 21

19/9/07 16:23:21

22

The Development of Consciousness

It may be clear now why Freud could only provide an explanation for dreams after he had first discussed these different aspects of energy flow. Dreams only have a precise meaning if it is first possible to identify the whole series of inhibitory processes that produce the secondary process: dreams depend on the inversion of the flow of energy in the apparatus aided by motor paralysis, to use the classic terms that can be immediately recognized from their accurate description in his later works: It is an important fact that the ψ primary processes, such as have been biologically repressed in the course of ψ development, are daily presented to us during sleep…Perceptions should not be made during sleep, and nothing disturbs sleep more than the emergence of sense impressions, cathexes entering ψ from ϕ...it might be supposed that the current from ϕ to mobility has [during waking life] prevented a retrogressive cathexis of the ϕ neurones from ψ, and that when this current ceases ϕ is retrogressively cathected. (Freud, 1895, pp. 336-9).

If one reconstructs the long process that leads to dreams, the originality of what Freud was trying to achieve becomes easier to understand. Presumably he already had a clear explanation of the processes that led to dreams, but he wanted to compare these processes with the thought processes when we are awake. Yet, he only had a few rough neurophysiological hypotheses, which he tried to adapt to the mental processes he was studying. Freud therefore attached considerable importance to the precision of his own mental processes, although the neurophysiological hypotheses did enable him, despite their limitations, to discover ever more revealing details. What was important for Freud, however, was to attempt to provide an explanation for regression in scientific terms by making use of the most simple of hypotheses, that of energy discharge. It is easy to understand why Freud abandoned the Project. Once he had clearly understood the processes that most interested him, he became overjoyed at having managed to decipher the general meaning of the intuitions he had acquired over the years. Now his intuitions were organized within a fixed framework and this explains the strong influence they had on Freud’s subsequent works. He must have realized very soon however that the approach he had adopted was mental rather than physiological and did not fully re-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 22

19/9/07 16:23:21



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

23

sult from the energy hypothesis, which was very difficult to defend. This explains why he subsequently concentrated on just the psychic aspects of the apparatus. As has already been observed, the neurophysiological intuition of the mental processes is more accurate than Freud had imagined and, if suitably interpreted, is modern enough to suggest that the Project is neither completely unrealistic nor erroneous.

The concept of nervous apparatus in The Interpretation of Dreams All experts agree that the concept of the nervous apparatus described in the Project is taken up in Chapter Seven of The Interpretation of Dreams. It is interesting to note therefore how Freud’s interest in the complex organization of ψ neurons, the main point of his study, still causes him problems. If we compare Freud’s original energy flow (ϕ, ψ, ω) with the diagram in Chapter Seven, we can see that the latter, although very similar, has clearly been modified (Figure 1.2). The ψ neurons, which Freud had originally been most interested in, have now become numerous ψ systems. The complex functions that had previously been associated with the neurons are now represented as a simple series of passages of energy along generic memory traces. M

Z



Mnem’’’





Mnem’’ Mnem’

Pcpt

\M

Figure 1.2 Pcpt shows the perceptual apparatus and M the motor apparatus. The psychic process flows from Pcpt to M and is fixed by memory traces in successive Mnem mnemic systems. The diagram is inverted in relation to Freud’s original one (Freud, 1900a, p. 538).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 23

19/9/07 16:23:22

24

The Development of Consciousness

In the diagram, the ω neurons are not shown. This reveals that the organization of the ω consciousness neurons did not convince Freud. The energy flow in this new diagram retains its original meaning however, indicating just how important it was for Freud’s theories. Considering the way in which Freud first explored the characteristics of energy flow in the Project, I believe it also possible to understand why the energy concept suffered from a kind of involution in several later works. This involution is important in order to clarify the problematic origin of the first psychoanalytic theory and the reasons for which this theory was subsequently modified. As has already been noted, in the Project the discharge process becomes more complex as a result of the local controls carried out by the ψ neurons and it gradually changes its functioning in the network of neurons it helps to create. This change however can no longer be translated into mental processes without the neurophysiological support used by Freud when he first conceived this process (it is necessary to read the Project to understand how the concepts of energy and discharge become meaningless without Freud’s original line of reasoning). This may explain why the idea of energy discharge seems conceptually weaker when compared, for example, to drive concepts or to the far more problematic concept, in 1920, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (in which the principle of neuronic inertia gives rise to the Nirvana principle).

Drive theory and the theory of object relations It is easy to understand why there were different types of problems when the Project was published in the 1950s. As has already been seen, the Project is based on the theory of the discharge of exogenous and endogenous energy, anticipating the drive processes that Freud considered to be central to child development. A change occurred during those years however, under the influence of other theoretical models, including the very different positions of Klein and Freud’s daughter, Anna, who were later joined in their polemical discussions by Winnicott. The classic drive theory began to change by opening up to object relations. Analysts

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 24

19/9/07 16:23:22



The cultural inheritance of Project for a Scientific Psychology

25

began to look cautiously at theories about child development that were not strictly psychoanalytic, and also to observe the interaction between a child and its mother. At the same time, the study of dreams, from being just a topic of psychoanalysis, was now becoming a matter of great neurophysiological importance following the discovery of REM sleep that accompanies dreams. With all these different ideas circulating, the rediscovery of the Project did not always produce positive effects. Analysts, the great majority of whom were doctors and psychiatrists, had a good knowledge of neurophysiology and were therefore able to recognize the naïve ideas and inconsistencies in the Project. In other words, they did not receive any innovative indications, either theoretical or practical, as to which direction to take in the fierce debate that was going on. The theoretical conflict within the psychoanalytic movement was tending towards making changes to the drive theory, while the Project, with its clear theorizing about energy, seemed to confirm the original importance. The fact that Freud had based the Project on clearly erroneous assumptions was easily justifiable using Freud’s theory itself: the unbridgeable gap between a neuropsychological description and a psychological one. A great deal has changed since then. Psychoanalysis has gone through many difficult crises, at times even dramatic ones. The theory must, of course, be measured against the developments that have since been made in the neurosciences in order to understand the specific reasons for certain erroneous concepts in the Project and to see whether an alternative theory can be obtained that justifies, in more modern terms, the original aims which converged in the Freudian concept of development. This means that it must also be measured against the current theories of child development, which presuppose the dynamic predisposition of the child, as they differ too greatly from the simple energy release imagined by Freud.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 25

19/9/07 16:23:22

CHAPTER TWO

Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

The architecture of the brain: cortical and subcortical structures

A

s the brain comprises numerous structures that cooperate closely with one another, a brief description of these structures will be given in order to highlight the types of problems that neurophysiology has had to face in the more than one hundred years since the pioneering work of Freud. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 give an intuitive idea of the brain’s complexity, which is the result of its evolutionary history. The neocortex is the most recent part of this evolutionary development and its size is what distinguishes the development of man from that of other mammals. It is in the neocortex that the two most evolutionarily innovative areas of the brain, specialized in language, were located by Broca and Wernicke. The extensive cortical cloak hides the extraordinarily numerous underlying subcortical structures. Although these structures, which are much older in evolutionary terms, have names that are far less familiar, they are nevertheless equally important. What is the function of this complex system? Generally speaking, it fulfils the task outlined by Freud in the Project, i.e. it enables the body to respond adequately to both external and internal informa26

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 26

19/9/07 16:23:22



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

27

PRIMARY MOTOR CORTEX PREMOTOR CORTEX

PRIMARY SOMATOSENSORY CORTEX POSTERIOR PARIETAL CORTEX WERNICKE’S AREA HIGHER ORDER VISUAL CORTEX

PREFRONTAL LOBE

PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX

BROCA’S AREA

PARIETAL-TEMPORAL-OCCIPITAL ASSOCIATION CORTEX

LIMBIC ASSOCIATION CORTEX AUDITORY CORTEX

CEREBELLUM

PONS SPINAL CORD

Figure 2.1 Map of the different regions of the human cortex responsible for specialized functions: motor and somatosensory functions, in addition to visual, auditory, and olfactory analysis. The main association areas (the prefrontal area being the most extensive) and Broca’s and Wernicke’s linguistic areas are also shown (adapted from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991, Fig.2.1 pp. 52-3).

tion. Exactly how the analysis of all this information is coordinated in the various brain systems is the very core of neurophysiological research. Certain features enable us to understand fairly rapidly why the brain is organized the way it is. It specializes in analysing the sensorial properties of objects in the environment and the spatiotemporal relations by means of which the organism can interact with these objects. This appears evident in the specialized sensory areas of the cortex, where the visual, auditory, somatic and proprioceptive pathways arrive, and in the prefrontal processing areas, from which the motor pathways needed by the body to control the environment originate. The subcortical structures constitute important stages in this coordination and explain the general principles of brain evolution. Information is analysed along specific pathways by means of a succession of homologous functions on different levels, with each function becoming slightly more evolved on each successive level (Figure 2.3).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 27

19/9/07 16:23:23

28

The Development of Consciousness SOMATOSENSORY CORTEX

MOTOR CORTEX

CINGULATE GYRUS BASAL GANGLIA

CORPUS CALLOSUM

PREFRONTAL CORTEX

FORNIX PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX THALAMUS THALAMUS

INFERIOR COLLICULI

AMYGDALA EYE

LATERAL GENICULATE BODY

RETINA OPTIC NERVE

LOCUS COERULEUS

HYPOTHALAMUS HYPOPHYSIS HIPPOCAMPUS

HIPPOCAMPUS

CEREBELLUM

OPTIC TRACT SUBSTANTIA NIGRA PONS

MEDULLA OBLONGATA SPINAL CORD

Figure 2.2 The numerous internal brain structures that cooperate with the cortical areas with specialized functions are visible beneath the cortex (adapted from Oliviero & Castellano, 1996, p. 64).

This intuitively simple architecture, which is common to all animal brains, does not of course explain the sudden appearance in Fig.2.2 the human cortex of linguistic specialization in the areas identified by Broca and Wernicke, although it does justify certain functional properties. The functions in Broca’s area, which are typically concerned with grammatical articulation, are connected to the motor control of body articulation; those in Wernicke’s area, which are typically semantic, are connected with the sensory-perceptual functions of the surrounding areas. There is basically not very much difference between what Freud knew about cortical specialization and what we know today. The network of connections he reconstructed between the areas of language in On Aphasia (1891) is still a valid model today; and the evident perception and motor specializations in the neocortex justify the link between perception and motility, which is one of the basic ideas in the Project.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 28

19/9/07 16:23:44



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

29

Figure 2.3 The diagram shows in a simplified form some of the pathways of subcortical and cortical integration in the (1) visual, (2) auditory, and (3) tactile-proprioceptive system. In the visual system, signals from the retina reach the external geniculate body (Cg1) and then travel to the primary visual cortex of the cortical occipital region. The acoustic pathways transmit signals from the cochlea to the internal geniculate body (Cgm), and from there to the temporal cortical region (T) in the acoustic area. The main stages of the proprioceptive sensory system are: the optic thalamus (Th), the temporalparietal-occipital areas and the areas of somatic sensitivity in the cortex. The diagram also shows other subcortical stations of the acoustic and tactileproprioceptive pathways as well as secondary visual pathways that branch from the geniculate body to the thalamus. The regularity of the pathways between the thalamus and the cortex signal the topographic correspondence between similar areas in these two structures involved in the analysis of the same type of information (Luria, 1962).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 29

19/9/07 16:23:47

30

The Development of Consciousness

The evolutionary organization of the brain is traditionally summarised, as in Figure 2.4, to include several subdivisions, rhombencephalon, mesencephalon, proencephalon (diencephalon and telencephalon), which signal the structural organization common to the development of all mammal brains. Following this organization of the brain, it is possible to obtain a better understanding of some of the stages in the evolutionary process that give rise to the main structures shown in Figure 2.2.

BASAL GANGLIA

THALAMUS PROENCEPHALON TELENCEPHALON:

CEREBRAL CORTEX, PALEOCORTEX PROENCEPHALON (LIMBIC LOBE , HIPPOCAMPUS, AMYGDALA) BASAL GANGLIA

CEREBRAL HEMISPHERE

DIENCEPHALÒN: THALAMUS, HYPOTHALAMUS,

MESENCEPHALON MESENCEPHALON

SUPERIOR, INFERIOR COLLICULI

DIENCEPHALON RHOMBENCEPHALON

RHOMBENCEPHALON

MESENCEPHALON

BRAINSTEM

PONS AND CEREBELLUM MEDULLA OBLONGATA

PONS

BRAINSTEM

MEDULLA OBLONGATA CEREBELLUMŶ---

Figure 2.4 A simplified outline of the classic evolutionary brain divisions: rhombencephalon (pons, medulla, and cerebellum), mesencephalon (superior and inferior colliculi), diencephalon (thalamus and hypothalamus), and telencephalon (neocortex, hippocampus, amygdala and basal ganglia). (Adapted from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000, Fig. 1-2a).

Fig.2.4

The telencephalon, as the most recent formation, has the neocortex at its top. Below the neocortex there are neural formations that branch off from the paleocortex, which contains many important structures. Among these there is the paleocortical system called the limbic lobe (formed by the orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate gyrus, the insula, etc.), the hippocampus (indispensable for preserving

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 30

19/9/07 16:23:47



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

31

memory) and many nuclei involved in various types of emotional control (including the amygdala) and ideational and motor control (including the striate body, caudate nucleus, and putamen, which are also residual from the oldest cortex, the archipallium). Further down is the thalamus, with its various subdivisions. This is the integrative structure through which input from the senses passes on its way towards the specialized and associative areas of the cortex. The thalamus is a part of the diencephalon, where the hypothalamus, the important formation below the thalamus, carries out functions connected with the internal regulation of thermal, hormonal, and sexual systems. Below this there is the even older (in evolutionary terms) mesencephalon, which is one of the first structures responsible for visual and auditory analysis and integration, and includes the two swellings known as the superior colliculi and inferior colliculi. Finally, the rhombencephalon (hindbrain), the oldest formation in the brain, is found immediately after the spinal cord, of which it still maintains traces of the old metameric organization. It has important homeostatic control functions in respiratory and cardiac rhythms and in wake-sleep rhythms, which are regulated by the reticular formation. The cerebellum, which is now considered a highly complex centre of integration for the motor system, is also a part of the rhombencephalon. What is the essential meaning of this organization of the brain? The upper part includes the neocortex and the formations derived from the oldest cortices, including the limbic lobe and basal nuclei, while at the centre of this system there is the thalamus, which connects the cortical structures to the mesencephalic structures. This complex structure cooperates with the lower level structures, where the most evident processes of internal regulation take place. The entire system is not ordered, but generally speaking there are ascending pathways, which analyse specific sensorial information on successive levels up to the specialized areas in the cortex. The motor systems proceed from their respective areas in the cortex in the opposite direction along the other descending pathways. There are top-bottom controls in both of these sets of pathways, and integration of the sensory and motor information takes place on the different levels.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 31

19/9/07 16:23:47

32

The Development of Consciousness

The first important integration in the brain occurs in the brainstem (Figure 2.5) through the reticular formation, which collects signals from different sensory and motor sources, and activates the other structures. The reticular formation is also involved in sleep and dream processes, and is therefore of particular interest from a psychoanalytic point of view.

BASAL GANGLIA

THALAMUS

CEREBRAL HEMISPHERE

PROENCEPHALON

MESENCEPHALON DIENCEPHALON RHOMBENCEPHALON MESENCEPHALON PONS MEDULLA OBLONGATA CEREBELLUM

ERTAS RETICULAR FORMATION

Figure 2.5 An outline of the reticular formation, an older structure involved in sleep and dream processes. The reticular formation forms part of the ERTAS (Extended Reticular Thalamic Activating System), the ascending activating system, which stretches as far as the thalamus.

In brief, the organization of the brain seems to be based on two integrating networks. While the cortical network is extensive and well differentiated, the second network, at the base of the brainFig.2.5 stem, is undifferentiated, but it activates the first. This raises many questions as to the activating functions of this old evolutionary structure.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 32

19/9/07 16:23:49



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

33

Neural information coding How is the brain conceived today? The interpretation of this general architecture is still based on the Darwinian concept of the evolutionary hierarchy of systems and neural pathways as developed by Haeckel (1866) and Jackson (1931). Freud was influenced by both these men, deriving from the former, for example, the connection between child development and phylogenesis, and from the latter the concepts of regression and of the control of higher levels of evolution over lower ones, which are present in Freud’s writings from the moment he introduced his topographic theory (Sulloway, 1979; Goldstein, 1995). Current knowledge concerns both neuroanatomical and functional aspects, each of which offers useful insights into the sensorimotor organization that Freud wanted to anchor to the processes of memory, emotions and consciousness. Our understanding of the neural encoding on which the brain is based has changed considerably over the past century. It involves a transmission of information modulated by patterns of signals discharged by neurons along specific pathways and clearly not a transmission of energy (as Freud had thought). The main contributions to our understanding of the neuron come from the ever more specific study of the microanatomy of neural networks (Cajal, 1911), the detailed explanations of how neural activity functions (Eccles, 1973), and the functional and cybernetic interpretation of elementary neural networks (Ashby, 1952; MacGregor, 1987). A further contribution has also come from the study of primitive nervous systems (Young, 1964; Kandel, 1970, 1979). Is it possible to say that the concept of localizationism has changed over this long period of time? This would seem to depend on the approach adopted. From a neurophysiological point of view, it is very important to be able to ascertain local functions accurately in order to be able to assess and cure possible brain damage. Currently, several methods of study provide neuroimages of the live functioning of the brain, thereby describing its properties with a certain precision. This makes it possible, for example, to explain how the representation of an experience is stored in perceptual areas, while its memorization and recall occur as a result of the necessary contribution of many other areas of varying importance in

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 33

19/9/07 16:23:49

34

The Development of Consciousness

the organization of the brain. The cooperation between the different areas that allows the storage and reactivation of linguistic information can also be studied in a similar way. There are several theoretical problems regarding the validity of this type of analysis since it is still impossible, given the present knowledge of the brain, to define precisely the real meaning of a local encoding in the general system. Brothers (1997), for example, believes that the present approach to neuroimages emphasises the study of an “isolated” brain instead of highlighting the typical functions of human interaction, which are certainly subtler and more complex. This critical aspect is essential from a psychoanalytic point of view. Indeed, brain processes must necessarily be related to the activities of neurons distributed throughout the brain and encoded as engrams in numerous local structures (Schacter, 1996). Studies can therefore be focused in different ways on either the strictly local functioning of these neurons or on the dynamic properties of this functioning when one brain interacts with another. As Schore (1999) noted, there can be a dangerous parallelism between the purely “intracerebral” neurophysiological approach and the classic “intrapsychical” psychoanalytic one: both lack the concept of interaction with another human being. Jackson’s theoretical position was antilocalizationist, but in a cautious way, since he thought, like Freud, that brain functions can even occur through the cooperation of areas that are quite distant from one another. Bigler et al. (1996) shared this cautious approach, highlighting the importance of global models like that of Damasio. The brain is a highly dynamic system (Siegel, 1999) and the integrative nature of its local functional properties depends on this dynamic aspect. These preliminary observations help explain the functions of the neural structures whose cerebral dynamics were of such interest to Freud.

Sensory-perceptual organization Let us first consider certain features of sensory-perceptual organization, which were already partly known in Freud’s time (what he referred to simply as ϕ neurons), but which are much clearer today.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 34

19/9/07 16:23:50



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

35

As we have seen in the previous pages, the organization of the sensory systems proceeds serially in the ascendant pathways. In Figure 2.3, for example, in the visual system the signals produced by the retina first reach the external geniculate body, and from there proceed to the primary visual area of the cortex. In the auditory system, signals from the cochlea first pass through several stations in the brainstem and then into the internal geniculate body on their way to the temporal cortical region in the acoustic area. The proprioceptive sensory system functions in a similar way. In general, this kind of organization involves all sensory modalities and has the important characteristic of maintaining the topological relations. Consider, for example, the following: The most striking feature of the sensory systems is that the spatial relationship in the peripheral receptive surface–the retina of the eye, the cochlea of the inner ear, or the skin–are preserved throughout the central nervous system. For example, neighboring groups of cells in the retina project upon neighboring groups of cells in the thalamus, which in turn project upon neighboring regions of the visual cortex. In this way a visuotopic neural map, an orderly map of the visual field, is retained at each successive level in the brain.[…]Similarly, the body surface is represented by a somatotopic neural map in the somatosensory cortex. (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991, p. 280).

This organization is very important in order to understand the evolutionary process of the brain, which is described in Chapter Four. The storage of topological properties indicates that the cerebral maps, in which different levels of analysis are carried out, do not form in an independent way during the evolutionary process, but have to adhere to a common design. This design remains fundamentally stable during evolution, evidently for reasons of simplicity and structural economy. The overall design is quite evident considering the consistency with which it is found in the brain. The simplified representation given in Figure 2.6 shows the visual pathways of Figure 2.3 and the main path from the geniculate body to the primary visual cortex where the original layout of the retina is conserved. From here the pathways are disseminated through the cortex and integrated with other sensory modalities. The figure

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 35

19/9/07 16:23:50

36

The Development of Consciousness

also shows diagrammatically the somatosensory pathways that integrate first in the brainstem and then from the thalamus (together with other subcortical pathways) lead to the cortex.

SOMATOSENSORY CORTEX MOTOR CORTEX

SOMATOSENSORY AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION PATHWAYS PARIETAL CORTEX THALAMOCORTICAL PATHWAYS

FRONTAL INTEGRATION AREAS

SUBCORTICAL PATHWAYS THALAMUS ASSOCIATION CORTEX VISUAL PATHWAYS

PRIMARY VISUAL PATHWAYS

VISUAL INFORMATION OPTICAL TRACT LATERAL GENICULATE BODY

ASCENDING SOMATOSENSORY PATHWAYS SOMATOSENSORY INFORMATION

Figure 2.6 In the cortex, visual information is processed in stages and integrated with other perceptual modalities. It then continues to the frontal areas (see also Figure 4.12). Tactile information converges on the somatosensory cortex where it integrates with the neighbouring motor cortex. Proprioceptive information Fig.2.6 on the parietal cortex where it is integrated with visual information converges and then moves on to the frontal areas. The somatosensory areas correspond topologically with similar areas of the thalamus.

In the passage from thalamus to cortex, it can easily be seen that the arrangement of the areas of the thalamus corresponds to the arrangement of those areas of the cortex with similar functions, which therefore, generally speaking, maintain the organization of the sub-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 36

19/9/07 16:24:10



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

37

cortical level. (This extensive system of topological projections is one of the three broad neuroanatomical arrangements that in Edelman/ Tononi’s opinion explain the properties of consciousness). This organization of the different levels is worth highlighting as it shows the orderly way in which information is analysed and integrated. For example, there are three sensory maps–of visual, somatosensory and auditory space–in the colliculus, in addition to a motor map by means of which the sensory coordination necessary for saccade eye movements is achieved. So this specific perceptualmotor coordination, which concerns ocular-motor analysis, occurs in a subcortical structure before it does in the cortex. Integration occurs in the cortex with an even more complex cooperation of topological projections. For example, there is a complete retinotopic map in the striate cortex, but there are at least twenty more retinal representations, both complete and partial, in the extrastriate cortices. They serve to provide ever more complex processing of the original information. This information is integrated with the other cerebral areas, both perceptual and motor, with which the retinotopic projections form extensive, systematic connections. One aspect of this general systematic nature is the columnar organization of the cortex, which was first identified in the visual area, but is now thought to be present in the somatosensory area as well. The columns, which are modality specific, have a precise modular organization and are organized for submodality analysis (Jones, 1986). The visual area of the thalamus is in turn organized in matrix compartments similar to the columns called striosomes. This suggests that the mechanisms regulating the processing of information follow a common plan. Considering sensory-perceptual organization in its entirety, the overall design is again clear: The same general rules for coding that we have encountered in the other senses–labeled line codes, analysis of contrast, and parallel processing–may also apply to smell and taste. Thus, all sensory systems rely on the same basic principles of processing and organisation, not only in humans, but throughout much of phylogeny. The mechanisms of perception have therefore been remarkably conserved during evolution. (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991, p. 528).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 37

19/9/07 16:24:11

38

The Development of Consciousness

The fact that all sensory systems have to obey certain common principles can easily be explained by the evolution of the brain, which also justifies the origin of the parallel processing that characterises the cerebral system. The general way in which sensory analysis is carried out by means of “contrasts” is particularly useful in helping to clarify how the defences studied by psychoanalysis can modify perception and object representation. As Kandel (1970, 1979) rightly observed, these common principles derive from the phylogenetic continuity of the nervous system that results in the human brain. Freud would undoubtedly have been very interested in this reference to phylogenesis, and also in this common architecture of the different sensory systems. Both imply an optimal economy in their design, allowing the entire system to evolve in a relatively orderly way according to certain criteria common to the overall plan.

Organization of the motor system We can now look briefly at how this order is also shared by motor organization, the other system of neurons of interest to Freud in the Project. Motor control (Figure 2.7) is situated in the primary motor cortex (next to the somatosensory cortex) and in two other areas–the premotor cortex and the supplementary motor area–all of which are situated in the frontal lobe and are somatotopic. The somatosensory pathways and the associative information arriving from the other areas of the cortex converge in this extensive system (during phylogenesis the premotor area of man became enormous). It is important to observe that movement is guided by the parietal lobes of the neocortex which integrate visual-spatial information. This motor-visual associative network, which was known to Freud, is the implicit reference in the Project to the search for the motor image that corresponds to the real object. The coordination of this process involves various subcortical structures, such as the thalamus, which receives afferents from the prefrontal, premotor and motor cortex, relaying to these its own specific afferents; then there are the basal nuclei of the older paleocortex, such as the caudate nucleus, the globus pallidus, the subthalamic nucleus and the substantia nigra.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 38

19/9/07 16:24:12



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

SOMATOSENSORY CORTEX PRIMARY MOTOR CORTEX SUPPLEMENTARY MOTOR AREA

39

SOMATOSENSORY AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION PATHWAYS PARIETAL CORTEX PERCEPTUAL-VISUAL CONTROL PATHWAYS

PREMOTOR CORTEX

SUBCORTICAL PATHWAYS

THALAMO-CORTICAL PATHWAYS

THALAMUS

FRONTAL CONTROL AREAS

DESCENDING MOTOR PATHWAYS MOTOR INFORMATION

Figure 2.7 The motor areas of the cortex comprise the primary motor cortex, the supplementary motor area, the premotor cortex, and the frontal areas. DescendingFig.2.7 motor processing includes the topologically related areas of the thalamus and the basal nuclei and nuclei of the encephalic brainstem. Sensory-perceptual information reaches these areas (Figure 2.6), which in turn control the sensory-perceptual information for planning movement.

This system also seems to be substantially ordered: the afferents to the caudate nucleus and the putamen from the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus are topographic. There are also topographic projections from the subthalamic nucleus to both segments of the globus pallidus and the pars reticulate of the substantia nigra. The subthalamic nucleus receives direct and topographic afferents from the motor and premotor cortex. The motor system is, in a certain sense, complementary to that of perception and, like the perceptual system, is arranged topographically along the ascending-descending pathways, as shown in Figure 2.8, which incorporates the two previous diagrams. Integra-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 39

19/9/07 16:24:33

40

The Development of Consciousness

tion starts from subcortical levels along the pathways connecting sensory areas with those involved in motor control. SOMATOSENSORY CORTEX

SOMATOSENSORY AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION PATHWAYS

PRIMARY MOTOR CORTEX

PARIETAL CORTEX ASCENDING THALAMO-CORTICAL PATHWAYS

SUPPLEMENTARY MOTOR AREA PREMOTOR CORTEX DESCENDING THALAMO-CORTICAL PATHWAYS

SUBCORTICAL PATHWAYS THALAMUS

ASSOCIATION CORTEX VISUAL PATHWAYS

FRONTAL CONTROL AREAS

PRIMARY VISUAL PATHWAYS VISUAL INFORMATION

DESCENDING MOTOR PATHWAYS

ASCENDING SOMATOSENSORY PATHWAYS SOMATOSENSORY INFORMATION

MOTOR INFORMATION

Figure 2.8 Ascending sensory-perceptual information and descending motor information is integrated at each level by means of cortical and subcortical pathways.

Fig.2.8 Studying the development of the brain, it seems evident that the complementary nature of the two systems enables them to interact perfectly on different levels. Insufficient motor stimulation, for example, results in a lack of development in the sensory areas, which indicates a certain priority of motor organization (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991). This is very clear in the embryo, an organism in which motor functions predominate. The premotor areas are located in the frontal lobe, which is now known to be involved in the most complex cognitive and decisionmaking processes: thought, in its most abstract form, appears to be a process that is implicated in the control functions performed by this area. Similarly, the basal nuclei cooperate with the highest cognitive

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 40

19/9/07 16:24:54



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

41

features in motor strategy planning. In the left frontal lobe is Broca’s area, which is responsible for the grammatical articulation of language. Thought and language therefore interact with motor and premotor functions, and it is presumably from these functions that our linguistic abilities–so innovative for us–gradually evolved. Neuroimages provide many details about the cooperation in the various areas of all of these processes but we still only have a very general idea of the overall picture. Although Freud had few certain elements, these functional aspects were at the centre of the Project, in which both thought and language are differentiated from the control of motor images.

The three main types of memory: implicit, explicit, and working memory The most original knowledge we have today concerns memory. Freud might have been surprised by the fact that, despite the acquisition of many new elements, we still have difficulty in providing a precise definition of its neurophysiological characteristics, which he generically referred to the ψ neurons. As he had intuitively realized, memory is not a property that can be directly attributed to the perceptual neurons (which is why he said that they were permeable to the passage of energy). The peripheral organization of the sensory-perceptual system, to use the modern terminology, transduces sensory inputs into information. More precisely, the processing of this information is encoded locally in the perceptual areas and then unified in the associative areas. This enables us to define perceptual systems as being, within certain limits, encapsulated (Fodor, 1983), i.e. not directly accessible for the retrieval of information. These important clarifications have led to certain essential distinctions being made as regards memory processes. As revealed by neuroimages, representational encoding is in fact stored in the same cerebral sensory-perception areas (primary and association) that also process real experience but both the memory process and recall occur with the indispensable involvement of other areas (such as the orbitofrontal cortex). The memory process also involves subcortical areas in the processing of the perceptual-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 41

19/9/07 16:24:55

42

The Development of Consciousness

motor flow. Furthermore, neither the encoding of nor the access to information can, generally speaking, be defined in just one way. That is why nowadays a distinction is made between three major types of memory–implicit memory, explicit memory and working memory–corresponding to different modalities of encoding experience in the cerebral areas (Figure 2.9). ENCODING AND RECALL CORTICAL REPRESENTATIONAL ENCODING

PREFRONTAL CORTEX FRONTAL CORTEX ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX

SUBCORTICAL REPRESENTATIONAL ENCODING IMPLICIT MEMORY AREAS: MOTOR CORTEX, AMYGDALA BASAL NUCLEI, LIMBIC AREAS

HIPPOCAMPUS

Figure 2.9 The cortical areas (frontal, prefrontal, and orbitofrontal) involved in encoding and recall. The cortical and subcortical areas involved in object encoding are also given in outline. Implicit memory involves the motor cortex, the amygdala, the basal nuclei and other limbic regions.

Implicit memory is unconscious (which is why it is also called procedural memory) and is encoded in neural structures that are Fig.2.9 already developed at birth: the amygdala and other limbic regions, which elaborate emotions, and the basal nuclei and motor cortex, which encode actions and behaviour. This system operates in conjunction with the primary analyses of the sensory-perception areas (for example sounds or shapes), which facilitate the recognition of perception patterns.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 42

19/9/07 16:25:22



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

43

Explicit memory, on the other hand, is conscious (though many of its processes are inaccessible to consciousness) and seems to be typical of the frontal and associative areas of the neocortex, where it is only encoded permanently after sufficient maturation. It is divided into semantic and episodic memory, and the encoding of both requires the additional support of conscious attention and activation of the hippocampus (Moscovitch, 1995). Working memory is transitory and encodes present experience in a sensory-perceptual form, with the decisive contribution of the prefrontal cortex (Andreasen et al., 1995). These different types of memory involve different kinds of neurophysiological encoding. Working memory keeps information temporarily active only in local areas, while implicit and explicit memory involve consolidation in different areas (Milner, Squire, & Kandel, 1998), typically involving the association cortices (Kandel, 1989). REM sleep also has a role in the process of consolidation (Karni et al., 1992; Winson, 1993), though this type of consolidation is not definitive and memories are modified on recall (Bjork, 1989) due to the integration and associative activities of the frontal lobes. Working memory is dependent on the frontal lobes, which is where the most complex mental processes are performed, and this implies that it is a property of consciousness that is only responsible for certain information. An important integration process is now attributed to the 40 Hz thalamo-cortical wave, which performs an extensive collection of information (Llinas, 1990; Crick, 1994). In the connection between the frontal cortex and the basal nuclei (Wise, Murray, & Gerfen, 1996), the basal nuclei activate procedural behaviour, while the frontal cortex processes it with contextual information: this integration leads to a cooperation between implicit memory and explicit memory. It appears therefore that the brain is perhaps even more involved in memory than Freud had presumed with his complex organization of the ψ systems. Jensen and Hoagwood’s (1997) belief that in order to understand memory, attention, and perception, it is necessary to explore their function in the evolutionary past matches Freud’s phylogenetic concept.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 43

19/9/07 16:25:24

44

The Development of Consciousness

The neurophysiological organization of affects Freud would perhaps have been even more interested in today’s neurophysiological organization of affects. This term is now used to include emotions and motivations, with the latter being closer in meaning to drives. The structures involved in affects are located in the limbic lobe, an important organizer of motor and endocrine responses discovered by Papez (1937) and MacLean (1955). It includes many paleocortical formations, the exact boundaries of which are still not known (LeDoux, 1996; Brothers, 1997): the parahippocampal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, subcallosal gyrus, hippocampus, dentate gyrus, and the subiculum, some areas of the hypothalamus, the septal area, the accumbens nucleus, the orbitofrontal area, and the amygdala. Emotions form as processes associated with cognitive activities and the physiological responses of the autonomous nervous system, endocrine system, and cardiovascular system (Sroufe, 1996). The cognitive meaning that is now attributed to emotions in interpersonal relations (Ortony & Turner, 1990) derives from this coordination. Emotions provide the initial orienting response, which is useful in differentiating mental states (Barbas, 1995; Rolls, 1995; Lewis, 1996); they reflect changes in environmental and internal information, and are developed as patterns of attention (Ekman, 1992) regarding discrepancies between stimuli and expectations (Sroufe, 1996). The limbic lobe is a structure which, while old in phylogenetic terms, is evolutionarily advanced in animal development and this explains its cooperation with the neocortex, from where emotional influence is extended to the whole mind (Dodge & Garber, 1991). In this complex structure, the amygdala has the important role of processing emotions as a result of the integration between the cortex and the motivational structures (hunger, thirst, and sexuality) located in the hypothalamus. The regulation of the autonomous nervous system, the physiological basis of the mind (Jackson, 1931), also depends on the amygdala. This structural arrangement is particularly important in child development. It is only at 9-12 months, as a result of the increased myelination, that maturation of the limbic lobe with the cortical areas occurs, and this development oc-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 44

19/9/07 16:25:24



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

45

curs at the same time as relations of dependence and socialization are taking place. This induced Solms (1996) to place the seat of the superego in the mediobasal lower limbic regions of the frontal lobe. This development is of particular interest for a psychoanalytic approach that takes into account how emotions develop from the cooperation between the various parts of the brain. The information cooperates vertically (Luu & Tucker, 1996) on the three limbic levels (amygdala, anterior cingulate, and orbitofrontal insula). The orbitofrontal system consequently seems to be the most suitable location for the preconscious, a neural area in which the cerebral processing reaches an important stage before cerebral cooperation can continue into the frontal lobes, where it can engage in a form of processing that is more typical of conscious processes.

Right and left hemisphere specialization It is impossible to know how Freud would have mentally reordered all these notions concerning the basic elements of his first neurophysiological concept: perception, motility, memory, and emotion. We now have a very detailed picture of the brain, which is difficult to summarise in just a few pages, but a few additional points may help to give some idea of the known complexity of the brain. Perhaps the most important development is the growing importance attached to the asymmetry between the left and right hemispheres. The linguistic areas are usually located in the left hemisphere, as a result of which it is deemed the dominant hemisphere. This functional property now appears far more complex however. During the first three years, the right hemisphere is in fact dominant in both activity and development (Thatcher, Walker, & Guidice, 1987; Chiron et al., 1997), and throughout childhood there are alternate cycles of growth in the two hemispheres. The lateralization that can be noted after the first year of life begins before birth (Fride & Weinstock, 1988) and continues until the age of twenty. This asymmetrical development appears to be at the same time both an endogenous process and an adaptive reorganization.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 45

19/9/07 16:25:24

46

The Development of Consciousness

Children who have had a hemisphere removed have then grown up to have a normal linguistic development, albeit with certain critical periods (Schuman, 1997). Linguistic organization makes use of these different properties in the left hemisphere, while cooperating with the right hemisphere: language re-elaborates motor and perceptual encodings in the cortex within its own functions, as can be seen from neuroimages, where conscious thought seems to be closely correlated to the cortical activities responsible for both real and imagined movement. There are two other interesting features as regards cerebral asymmetry. Unpleasant emotions usually appear to be processed in the right hemisphere, while pleasant emotions are processed in the left hemisphere (Otto, Yeo, & Dougher, 1987). In dreams the two hemispheres are activated alternately in a rhythmical, synchronized way. This can be explained by the two different ways–recall and registration–in which episodic memory recall seems to be encoded in the two frontal areas: the left frontal cortex seems dominant in registration processes and the right one in recall. The rhythmicity during dreaming serves to reorganize these two encodings, producing long-term consolidation (Winson, 1993).

The neurophysiology of sleep and dreams As will have been noted in some of these brief observations, neurophysiology deals with both sleep and dreams. This is because of the considerable importance attached after the 1950s to the reticular formation, which is fundamental to organization of the wake-sleep cycle. Situated in the brainstem at the base of the brain, the reticular formation is the rostral extension of the interneural network of the spinal cord. It is the main constituent of the ascending activating system (known as ERTAS or “Extended Reticular Thalamic Activating System”)2. With its diffuse network of neurons, it performs a first general integration of motor and sensory functions (Fessard 1954), and for this reason has what is now considered a fundamen2 The ERTAS comprises a number of different structures apart from the reticular formation: the nucleus of the locus coeruleus, the nucleus of the rafe, the parabrachial nuclei, the ventral tegmental area, part of the hypothalamus and certain thalamic nuclei.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 46

19/9/07 16:25:25



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

47

tal role in the functioning of all brain activity. Besides this role of primary importance, it also activates the wake-sleep cycle and, during sleep, the dream cycle, which is closely associated with the REM phases. From a neurophysiological viewpoint, the regularity of dreams is explained by the cognitive and neurobiochemical need for experience consolidation, and has nothing to do with the Freudian concept of dreams as the realization of a desire. The absolute pre-eminence of the reticular formation in keeping the brain alert, and its equally important role in generating dreams, would undoubtedly have been of fundamental interest to Freud. The regressive function of dreams and its relationship with the phylogenetic evolution of the cerebral system would not have surprised him since the reticular formation is a very old structure. This important structure continues to be the subject of research, with attempts being made to come up with an explanation for its existence, as will be seen in Edelman’s and Damasio’s conceptualizations.

Neural patterns and network modification and integration How do these different brain structures interact in order to create thoughts and representations? First and foremost, as is apparent from Figure 2.8, the flow of information continually connects up, at all levels, the structures of a perceptual origin with those of a motor origin. In general, neural signals can be interpreted as neural patterns that correspond to codes or symbols. Neural cells integrate their functions within the neural network, giving rise to reciprocal activation profiles: this integration shows how representations can be explained by dynamic neurological processes (Perner, 1991). Freud’s hypotheses about the facilitations between contact barriers are at the basis of the modern hypothesis concerning synapses, but with certain additional features that have above all to do with child development. During cerebral growth there is a general overproduction of synapses, the elimination or conservation of which is regulated by environmental factors. This makes it easier to under-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 47

19/9/07 16:25:25

48

The Development of Consciousness

stand the effects of early traumatic experiences. Stress hormones, for example, cause neuronal death in fundamental limbic and neocortical arrangements responsible for the regulation of emotions (Karr-Morse & Wiley, 1997). It is also clear that the resources for brain development increase in an enriched environment (Rosenzweig, Bennet, & Diamond, 1972; Greenough, 1986). There are still many unanswered questions about plasticity and development (Merzenich & Sameshima, 1993), but it is a commonly shared belief that neurons that are excited together survive together and tend to be connected (Post & Weiss, 1997). This extension of Hebb’s axiom (1949) concerning the interconnection between cell assemblies that reverberate together forms the backdrop for the ever alert brain life, which is regulated by numerous rhythmical pulsations, whose self-regulatory functions shift continually between basal activation and cortical integration. The brain is endowed with its own metabolic energy and its neurons are continuously rendered active by the circulation of neural information, the purpose of which is evidently to keep the brain’s numerous structures in a state of integration. The brain is dynamically ready to collect external information, which is very different from what Freud had imagined.

The three primary neural circuits in Edelman/Tononi’s model What, however, is a localized function? Is it a real property of brain structure or is it just something that appears as a result of the methodology used to study the brain? Perhaps nothing fascinates a neuroscientist more than trying to provide a single explanation for these two complementary aspects. The models developed by Edelman/Tononi (2000) and Damasio (1999) are two interesting examples of a unified concept of neural integration. The two models, albeit for different reasons, deal with two questions that were also tackled by Freud: the understanding of consciousness and emotions. Edelman/Tononi are not so much concerned with the nature of local specializations as with the global design of the brain, by

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 48

19/9/07 16:25:25



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

49

Figure 2.10 The three main neural systems in the brain (Edelman & Tononi, 2000, Fig. 4.4).

means of which it is possible to understand how the activities of consciousness occur. This activity is based on three broad neuroanatomical arrangements in the brain (Figure 2.10). The first arrangement, A, is a thalamo-cortical system and includes the main system of neural pathways, which are organized

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 49

19/9/07 16:25:30

50

The Development of Consciousness

on the basis of topographical correspondences between the cortical and subcortical areas specialized in sensory analysis and motility (as explained previously, this arrangement best exemplifies the conservation of topological projections described by Kandel). The areas are assembled according to re-entrant maps (a type of connection that will be explained shortly), which together form a highly integrated network. The second arrangement, B, is made up of what tend to be isolated, polysynaptic loops of faster, more precise neural pathways between the cortex and the subcortical nuclei. The third arrangement, C, is the diffuse projection system of values produced by a group of brainstem nuclei, which forms an extensive network of pathways that control the activity of the first two systems. According to Edelman/Tononi, the enormous variability in the structure and functions of the brain in vertebrates, and therefore also in man, is due to the availability at the beginning of brain development of a large repertoire of possible connections in the neural circuits from which those that later form the neural networks are selected (Figure 2.11). CELL DIVISION CELL DEATH

DEVELOPMENTAL SELECTION

(yielding primary repertoire)

PROCESS EXTENSION AND ELIMINATION CAM ACTION

Time 1

Time 2

EXPERIENTIAL SELECTION

CHANGES IN STRENGTH

(yielding secondary repertoire)

OF POPULATION OF SYNAPSES

Time 1 STIMULI

Time 2

map 1

map 2

map 1

stimuli to map 1

stimuli to map 2

stimuli to map 1

map 2

REENTRANT MAPPING

Time 1

stimuli to map 2

Time 2

Figure 2.11 The three concepts of neuronal group theory: selection during development, experiential selection, the formation of re-entrant mapping (from Edelman & Tononi, 2000, Fig. 7.2).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 50

19/9/07 16:25:30



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

51

At first, during the initial stage of development, it is the combined electrical activity of the neurons that selects the connections. Subsequently, activity induced by real experience gives rise to a further selection of the possible types of connections between the groups of neurons. The effect of these two successive stages of selection across different maps is the organization of dynamic processes called re-entries (a scheme of reciprocal connections), which makes the spatiotemporal synchronization of the activities of the neuronal groups possible.

Consciousness as dynamic core and the “value” system Within this broad system of connections, the dynamic core forms as a subset of the associative network, and its specific characteristics create the experience of consciousness. The core is formed by the integration, in a very short space of time (100s of a millisecond), of re-entrant interactions in the thalamo-cortical system and cannot be identified by a specific group of areas of the brain but by an aggregate of neurons that activate one another in synchronicity between the various maps. Consciousness transits through the different aggregations of this dynamic core, the composition of which can change over time. A group of neurons can become part of this core and give rise to a certain conscious experience, but in other moments they may be excluded, while still remaining involved in other non-conscious processes. This, according to Edelman/Tononi, explains the limited capacity of consciousness, which is the result of the large number of possible independent subprocesses in the core and the serial nature of consciousness, which is caused by the continuous dynamic movement of the core in this large system. The third arrangement, the value system, concerns the properties of the constraints that the arrangement of a diffuse projection system maintains as necessary for the process of re-entry between maps. Edelman/Tononi attribute the properties of values to the activation system of the brainstem–including the reticular forma-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 51

19/9/07 16:25:31

52

The Development of Consciousness

tion–that has long been considered necessary for consciousness. The system of constraints that expresses values is therefore at the basis of neuronal selection and, at the same time, of states of consciousness. For these reasons, Edelman/Tononi’s model is a very attractive one for the psychoanalyst. The first discriminations in the dynamic core (the qualia that begin its development) originate in the brainstem from signals that are multimodal, proprioceptive, and somatosensory, and come from the autonomous nervous system. It is these signals that form the dimensions of the proto-self. This initial primary corporeal consciousness provides the constant exchange between the value systems and the more complex categorizations of the dynamic core. It is easy to understand how, despite the abstract language of the qualia, this primary consciousness attracted the attention of psychoanalysts interested in the initial stages of development, as it is based on the phylogenetic roots that were so dear to Freud.

Damasio and the emotional development of consciousness from the proto-self The complementary interest in Damasio’s model (1999) derives from the way in which emotion contributes to the phenomenon of consciousness. Consciousness forms as a subjective feeling from the integration in the higher structures of a primary sense of self, located in the proto-self, which only in part coincides with Edelman/ Tononi’s proto-self. The sense of self is the continuous response of the organism to the change felt in its own primary neural patterns as a result of interaction with the object. The integration of this primary sense of self–core consciousness–in the second order structures of this primary sense transforms it into a feeling of a feeling, which constitutes the complex background of the subjective feeling of extended consciousness, which is typically cortical. In Damasio’s proto-self emotion originates from bodily changes, highlighting a constant link between body and the most highly evolved property of consciousness, the mind. A continual adjust-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 52

19/9/07 16:25:31



Recent progress in the field of neuroscience

53

ment between movement, perception, and emotional reactions reorganizes in memory the organism-object predispositions, contributing to the subjective feeling of consciousness. This process occurs in Edelman/Tononi’s global map, but their interest was above all in the function of the proto-self in the interaction between object and organism. Two groups of structures converge in the proto-self during the interaction: one comprises the areas of object representation, the other the areas that carry out its integration and both evolve from the proto-self. Their unification is based on the activation system of the encephalic brainstem and of its extension into the thalamus, whose functions Damasio (1999, p. 275) ponders on: “What drives those regions to perform the tasks they perform? What is the purpose of their labors?” As can be seen, Damasio’s model also highlights the activation system of the brainstem, attributing it with the origins of consciousness in the first integration between organism and object (the self conceived by Panksepp [1998] has similar properties).

Freud’s mental laboratory and what we know today Freud, as author of the Project, would today certainly agree with Damasio’s description of how the organism responds to changes induced by the object and how emotion is at the basis of consciousness. He would undoubtedly also enthusiastically observe the neuroimages that show, albeit in a still rather imprecise way, the visible traces of some of the neural processes that can now be identified in the vast brain mapping. Undoubtedly, however, he would also claim that we still do not see what he had imagined in his mental laboratory. He would explain to us in his politely ironical way (which was often a sign of his total disagreement) that science, in any case, freezes the dynamics of cognitive processes into inevitable immobility. Indeed, the neuroimages that ought to clarify the nature of this dynamic complexity still reveal very little of the extensive neuronal cooperation regulating the encoding of the sensorimotor processes that so interested Freud.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 53

19/9/07 16:25:31

54

The Development of Consciousness

This may however help explain why when psychoanalysis first came into being, mental dynamics were not considered anywhere near as varied as they are today. The dynamics perceived are a simplified reflection of the real dynamics: it is conditioned by the very structure of our alert consciousness, which, as Edelman/Tononi explained, requires a certain amount of time before it can become sufficiently present in our minds. Perhaps this enables us to better understand why Freud focused his attention on dreams after he had given up the Project; dream consciousness has the advantage of putting us more in contact with the original dynamic structure before the secondary process can trick us with the limits of consciousness. We can therefore assume that he would have pondered over the function of brainstem activation, which is so important in supporting consciousness but also so necessary for dreams.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 54

19/9/07 16:25:31

CHAPTER THREE

The current idea of a child’s mental development

Observing a child’s natural behaviour

A

long time has passed since Freud first developed his idea of energy discharge and announced his drive model, many of the theoretical aspects of which are still important today. We now have a far more detailed knowledge of the structure of the brain and also a far better understanding of the psychic complexity of a child, including the existence of a child’s wide range of spontaneous and relational activities, which were not conceptualized by psychoanalytic theory in the past. The main reason for this can be summarised in the contraposition between the tendency towards inertia in the nervous apparatus as imagined by Freud and the child’s natural propensity to search for stimuli. This evident predisposition has been the basis for many studies regarding the significance and validity of the Freudian concept from a developmental point of view (Peterfreund, 1971; Lichtenberg, 1989), with the result that many of its metapsychological foundations have been severely undermined (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Eagle, 1984). Mothers and children show a clear tendency towards reciprocal communication and the search for an optimal tension that is

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 55

55

19/9/07 16:25:31

56

The Development of Consciousness

affectively positive (Emde, 1980). This tension in communication is very different from the purely anaclitic state imagined by Freud and presupposes a type of object relations that is even more complex than that of Klein. A child clearly displays, for example, a preformed knowledge of the representation of the object (Mounoud & Vinter, 1981) and actively interacts with it. The mother, on the other hand, communicates her own emotions to the child (Emde & Buchsbaum, 1989) and transforms those of the child, especially the negative ones. In many ways, the child appears as an initiator of communication (Trevarthen, 1979, 1998), endowed with a memory of the type of interaction that is taking shape with the mother. The first theoretical model to highlight the complexity of mother-child relations is the attachment theory developed by Bowlby (1969, 1973), who identified the main styles of affective regulation that render communication between mother and child stable. It is defined as an internal working model of representation of the self that begins during attachment to the mother, and it reveals the types of interaction that become active and lasting in the relationship. Since then a great deal more has been learnt about the communication of a child with its mother, but the brief outline provided below should be sufficient to give an idea of the true complexity that has emerged from the many studies.

The child’s innate predisposition for interaction with its mother What appears evident is that from birth onwards, the child is not a passive organism, stimulated solely by the environment that surrounds it. It possesses a vast array of self-regulatory processes with their own underlying rhythms, which correspond to the needs of, and opportunities for, the child’s neurophysiological maturation. These features can only be understood if seen in relation to development processes, the goal of which is a good mutual adaptation between adult and child. This adaptation is regulated by several kinds of internal clocks that modulate the optimal interaction of their relations.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 56

19/9/07 16:25:32



THE CURRENT IDEA OF A CHILD’S MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

57

It is important to highlight the early neural activity that guides the development of the interaction from birth onwards (Livingston, 1967). This reveals itself in cycles of activity (Kleitman & Engelmann, 1953; Gaensbauer & Emde, 1973) and clearly shows how the child’s vigilance in its environment cannot be explained in terms of drive reduction. The child recognises its mother’s facial movements and modifies its own in relation to the effects that this mimicking has on the communication. The child’s affective responsiveness implies that it is endowed with a vast innate series of neural images of facial expressions, and that it has the ability to control them during the interactions (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982). This explains why an infant child is able to imitate its mother’s facial, vocal, and gestural movements from birth (Heimann & Schaller, 1985), and to do this during the interaction in a way that is not mechanical, but self-corrective (Meltzoff & Moore, 1992). Freud, as we have seen in the Project, was well aware of this natural imitative ability, although he does not expressly refer to it in relation to children. It is through actions, facial movements and intonation that the communication of object and attachment models is established. The behaviour of an infant, as revealed by modern studies, is clearly quite different from the way it was conceived in classical psychoanalysis. The recognition of this innate ability does not necessarily exclude the idea of a dependence on primary needs, dealt with by psychoanalysis in terms of drive. It merely highlights that these needs do not provide a complete picture of the infant’s motivation for developing, which includes a predisposition towards interaction with human beings. This natural ability of children can be described, almost in opposition to the classical model, as a strong natural predisposition towards relations with the object that exists long before this ability can be seen as an early stage of development. The shaping of the affective nucleus of the self in infancy seems to depend on this strong self-regulatory ability of development (Clarke & Clarke, 1976), with strong spontaneous social competencies. The infant shows a clear preference at birth for the sensory characteristics of the person looking after it (Cernoch & Porter, 1985): the face (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975), the sound of the voice

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 57

19/9/07 16:25:32

58

The Development of Consciousness

(Friedlander, 1970), and the taste of its mother’s milk. The child explores these as aspects of interaction with its mother through a repeated process of trial and error. During this interaction, there is development of expectation and sensorimotor relations in both mother and child. These are similar to event schemas (Mandler, 1979) or behavioural scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977), which the child learns to deal with dynamically (Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). During these processes a reciprocal transaction rapidly develops in the way they look at each other, with a synchronization of the visual bond (Feldman, Greenbaum, & Yirmira, 1999). These interactions lead to the styles of attachment described by Bowlby, which remain as stable properties in later development. During the first two months of its life, for example, an infant can already learn to avert its mother’s gaze when she is affectively unavailable (Cohn & Tronick, 1983) in the type of attachment described as insecure and avoidant, immediately giving rise to the first forms of defensive interaction (Fraiberg, 1980). At six months of age, an infant may have already consolidated the avoidance of attention (Jaffe, Stern, & Peery, 1973) and gaze (Brazelton, Koslowski, & Main, 1974) in an attempt to modulate its mother’s intrusiveness. It is through the complexity of this development that the rudiments of the ego are shaped. As Schaffer highlighted (1975), the mother does not create order from chaos in the child, she modifies her own behaviour to adapt it to that of the child, who is an active protagonist in this interaction. The child acquires a specific control over its own requirements, which it regulates in its relations with its mother (Lewis & Rosemblum, 1974). The child’s goal is clearly to keep as close as possible to its mother and to verify this closeness by means of reciprocal exchanges, albeit very brief ones. The frequency of these exchanges, which involve continuous corrections, can be extraordinarily high, with a monitoring of the situation every three to five seconds (Tronick & Cohn, 1989). The study of this intensive interaction reveals how, at about three months, events are already transformed into internal representations and how internalization is, in general, a very early process which develops together with this exploratory behaviour

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 58

19/9/07 16:25:32



THE CURRENT IDEA OF A CHILD’S MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

59

and in any case long before it becomes recognisable at about eight to ten months. This aspect of interaction concerns the very origin of language, which is based on the proto-conversations that a child begins at a very early age with its mother (Stern & Gibbon, 1980). It also lies behind the constant process of creation of new events in their relations and their modulation in order for the child to keep the contact with its mother alive (Fogel, 1993). Observed during its ordinary interaction with its mother, an infant does not correspond to the psychoanalytic hypotheses of energy discharge tending towards inertia. The infant is active and searches for stimuli so as to interact with its environment. This means that the drive theory must be altered in the light of this evidence of a child’s active organization aimed at acquiring a satisfactory control over the interaction, which remains fundamental even when the infant’s primary needs have been satisfied. As Guntrip stated (1962), these observations modify an important assumption of Freudian theory, as the goal of the libido no longer appears to be pleasure, but the object.

Modifying the psychoanalytic drive theory If one takes a look at developments in psychoanalytic theory, it is clear that the aim of many of the innovations has been to modify Freud’s hypotheses. In a way, it is easy to claim that since Freud’s death, attention has become increasingly focused on the complex dynamics of child development, almost as if to make up for the shortcomings of a concept that did not sufficiently reflect either clinical facts or the new knowledge concerning child development. From that point of view, however, the different approaches attempted in post-Freudian psychoanalytic models reveal a certain difficulty in integrating classical hypotheses with modern notions concerning a child’s natural adaptation to its environment. As is often mentioned, psychoanalytic theory is indebted to Klein for the first important opening up towards object relations (1935, 1940, 1946). Anna Freud (1951, 1957), though rejecting Klein’s model, also agreed with the accurate observation of a child’s rela-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 59

19/9/07 16:25:32

60

The Development of Consciousness

tionship with its mother. In the history of psychoanalysis, it is this shift that helps to broaden the original theory and provide a better understanding of a child’s relationship with its mother, without managing, however, to fully explain this relationship. The approach adopted by Winnicott (1945) during the same period is quite different, with the focus being placed on the dyadic function of the relationship rather than in its metapsychological definition. When the Project was published in the 1950s, Freud’s original hypothesis was being developed in these three different directions. Since then, the role of the mother has been the subject of much study and also considerable controversy with regard to the understanding of the interaction with the child. Important aspects of this change can be found in Bion’s idea (1963) of the containing function of the mother and in the highly productive area of the psychoanalytic observation of child development deriving from Spitz (1957, 1965) and Mahler (1968; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). In order to understand just how difficult it has been to attempt to reorganize the Freudian model, it is worth highlighting two of the most obvious difficulties encountered by the various theorists: the concepts of the ego and narcissism. In the second topic (The Ego and the Id, 1923b), Freud had already defined a structural tripartition between the id, ego, and superego, but the difficulties in clearly distinguishing the conscious-unconscious characteristics in the first topic led Hartmann (1950) to conceptualize the autonomous functions of the ego and to introduce into his model a psychological concept that was not strictly Freudian–the self–to serve as a unifying factor between the Freudian tripartition. The concept of self also appealed, though for different reasons, to Winnicott (1962), facilitating a clinical use that later became popular among psychoanalysts who were interested in re-examining primary development. In this concept of self, narcissism, a subject that became central to Freud’s theoretical development with On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914c), is not explained in the classical way, as can be seen in several important theoretical models developed in the years after the concept had been accepted in the field of psychoanalysis. The original meaning of this Freudian concept is more complex than is commonly thought, as will be explained in greater detail in Chap-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 60

19/9/07 16:25:33



THE CURRENT IDEA OF A CHILD’S MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

61

ter Seven. It is worth mentioning here, however, how the different approaches adopted by the more innovative analysts differed from the classical model. While for Freud narcissism was the pathological withdrawal of one’s libido from other objects, which is then directed inwards towards the ego, Greenacre (1971), for example, considers it as being actively directed towards objects, which is a natural part of the child’s maturation and is necessary in order for the child to relate to its environment. Not even the maturation of the foetus before a child can interact with its environment can be interpreted as being narcissistic. It is instead an active neurophysiological process that prepares the child for future object relations. During the foetal situation the object relations encoded in phylogenetic memory are reactivated as a result of ontogenetic development and the old Freudian phylogenetic concept becomes for Greenacre the promoter of relations. Similarly, Jacobson (1964) considers brain maturation to proceed from a primitive psycho-physiological self, which is predisposed to integrate the self with the object. These two models, both of which derive from the classical area, typify the kind of theoretical change that occurred in the psychoanalytic idea of child development. Both models make reference to primary endogenous drives in the psychic development of the child, but these are not the simple original drives of psychoanalysis. They are characteristics of the neurophysiological development necessary for the child to be able to interact with its mother. The classic drive theory is not easily modified however, not even when it is included in models that are undoubtedly better able to describe a child’s real development. A certain conviction as to the initial inability of the child remains, for example, in Mahler (1968), who identified an initial autism. Kernberg (1991, 1992) believes the integration of libidinal and aggressive drives occurs through interaction with the mother, even though she is still conceived of as a prevalent object of drive desire–in a certain sense a source of mechanical satisfaction. This idea is very different from that of Sandler (1978) as regards the expectations that the child shapes during the interaction with

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 61

19/9/07 16:25:33

62

The Development of Consciousness

its mother. These expectations constitute a dynamic integration between past and future in the child’s relations with the mother. The maternal object, though invested with desire, is at the centre of an action scenario conceived to initiate and maintain the positive effects of the interaction, and does not produce drive frustration. Sandler’s concept is in fact related to the theory of “scripts” as for the expectations that a child creates regarding the self in relation to others (Nelson, 1986), and its conceptual background is to be found in child development theories that appear best suited for the reformulation of the traditional psychoanalytic model. A child possesses an internal representation of its relationship with its mother and the possible mental states she can have: maternal responsiveness clearly seems to offer evidence of a style of communication, just as the different moods of children are recognisable (Belsky, 1997). The very early age at which complex models of interaction form in a child is, in a way, the least controversial aspect of the direct observation of a child and its mother, but it is also the most difficult to accept from a psychoanalytic viewpoint. A great deal of prejudice remains in American psychoanalysis, for example, as regards the real possibility of attributing a child with such well structured intrapsychic representation during the first few months. Even for Lichtenberg (1983), one of the theorists most open to new ideas, the self only assumes easily identifiable traits during the second year, after symbolic activity has been displayed in a sufficiently developed way as to be clearly recognized as being representational. More generally, even in the new theories there appears to be a certain defence of the psychoanalytic specificity of the classical model or its first post-Freudian reformulations, making it difficult to integrate these theories with new child development models. This led Wallerstein (1988) to declare that there are now many psychoanalyses, while Schafer (1983) announced more radically that, given this kind of development, it seems inevitable that metapsychology–undoubtedly the most problematic heritage left by the founder of psychoanalysis–will have to be abandoned. Nevertheless, there is no question that an integration between psychoanalytic and development models is not only necessary, but also advantageous. Bion’s and Winnicott’s classic concepts about

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 62

19/9/07 16:25:33



THE CURRENT IDEA OF A CHILD’S MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

63

maternal containment still appear to be a valid basis for the psychoanalytic understanding of child development, but they can also be profitably re-explored in the light of the extraordinarily intense dynamics that can be recognized in the infant’s relational attitude. The intrapsychic world of early childhood seems to be the dialectical effect of the infant’s original character and the mother’s responsiveness, in a complex mixture of developmental predispositions and interactive dynamics.

Sensory-perceptual and mental development in the child What conclusions can be drawn from this brief review of the present knowledge of child development? Traditional psychoanalytic theory undoubtedly clashes with the direct experience of observing a child with its mother, and it is not easy to reconcile these two different approaches using just the classic model of psychoanalysis. The original psychoanalytic concept is only of value if we suppose that drives make an essential contribution to the development of the affective dynamics that characterize other child developmental models. It is this extremely varied dynamic aspect, with its important relational consequences, which reveals how the original psychoanalytic concept is the result of an oversimplification made by Freud as regards the neurophysiological apparatus. When considering a child’s neurophysiological development, we must take into consideration the numerous different processes that contribute to the child’s physical and mental growth. During the first two months the child has a wide range of active reflexes, which disappear with the postnatal maturation of cortical inhibition (Peiper, 1963). This early predisposition reveals the innate repertoire the child possesses, enabling us to surmise that it not only has a potential for preformed replies, but also that it needs to reorganize these replies as a function of the brain development that continues after birth. Presumably, two different types of internal development overlap in a network of functions with two different goals: one mere survival and the other the coordination

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 63

19/9/07 16:25:33

64

The Development of Consciousness

of the first mental states in relation to the objects–human or inanimate–in the environment. The sensory-perceptual system, the purpose of which is to explore the outside world, already has complex discriminative abilities, as can be deduced from observing the strong personal interest the child shows in the development of its own abilities. The child shows above all that it is able to distinguish people from inanimate objects and this shows that it organizes a space that is not just perceptual. It is a space that also includes different kinds of relations, in which the child’s exercising of its will rapidly brings about a diversification in its behavioural and emotional skills. It is clear to an observer studying mother-child relations that the mental processes the child must rapidly learn to control are both intrapsychic and relational, and that the mother has an extremely active, transformative role based upon affective and cognitive processes. It is also clear that the child’s main goal is to regulate both negative and excessively positive affects. During this complex process, the development of psychopathological processes undoubtedly derives from the repeated failures that can occur in the interaction between mother and child. The observation of the interaction between mother and child raises a number of important questions, which, in the current debate, seem to centre around the intentionality of communicative acts during early development. This aspect of the problem has certain relevance as regards the conceptualising of when a child actually starts to acquire a mental cognition of its own interaction with the object. From a psychoanalytic point of view, this aspect includes the differentiation between self and object, and is therefore of critical importance in the current debate as to the most profitable points of contact between psychoanalytic and developmental models. This implies being able to explain the particular mental apparatus that enables a child to understand other people’s minds. The child’s empathy is matched by that of its mother’s and develops together with this, though drawing on the evolutionary arrangement of the brain during maturation. From this point of view, the infant mind displays a precocious empathic access, but, even with current knowledge of

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 64

19/9/07 16:25:33



THE CURRENT IDEA OF A CHILD’S MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

65

post-fetal maturation of the brain, it is difficult to understand how the mind forms in the brain’s complex structural cooperation.

The influence of mother-child interaction on early brain development All these aspects help explain the continual interest of neurophysiology in the infant’s brain as it strives to provide a better description of, or at least circumscribe, the nature of early development. Brain structure is largely immature at birth, above all at the neocortical level, so it is the prevalently subcortical system that regulates the infant’s first activities, which are aimed primarily at the homeostatic maintenance of the organism. Nevertheless, this system already seems to be self-regulated in a complex manner and, as shown in the previous chapter (LeDoux, 1996; Brothers, 1997), the limbic lobe attributes values and meanings to the stimuli, immediately including these values and meanings in the elaboration of emotions (Harrè, 1986; Ciompi, 1991), in a process that involves the entire brain. This structure, which is old in evolutionary terms, organizes the cognitive structure of emotions in interpersonal relationships (Ortony & Turner, 1990), extending its processes to the mind as it starts to organize itself (Dodge & Garber, 1991). According to this idea, it is the self-stimulation of the brain that operates, from the very first behavioural activities, as a positive reinforcement for neural activity, involving the entire limbic system and gradually spreading to the frontal cortex. This produces the gradual complex organization of the child’s interactions, which are associated with cognitive actions and physiological responses of the autonomous nervous system, the endocrine system and the cardiovascular system (Sroufe, 1996). Is mother-child interaction important in this neurophysiological development? The reciprocal mother-child responsiveness described previously requires certain signals for the co-regulation of two minds (Hofer, 1984), and this cooperation results in the continual reorganization of the child’s expectations. As Schore (1994) notes, the possibility of tuning into other people’s minds is fundamental

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 65

19/9/07 16:25:34

66

The Development of Consciousness

for the maturation of the neural arrangements that determine the child’s capacity for self-regulation. The development of a secure or insecure kind of attachment occurs, according to this idea, within the orbitofrontal cortex, which integrates complex behavioural strategies and whose maturation depends, in the initial stages, on the appropriate communication patterns. All these processes involve, from a neurophysiological point of view, considerable brain activity, and this produces the numerous initial orientating responses necessary to differentiate states of mind (Barbas, 1995; Rolls, 1995; Lewis, 1996) in order to adjust discrepancies between stimuli and expectations (Sroufe, 1996). As can be seen, it is the nature of the neurophysiological process that provides indications useful in trying to understand how the mind develops. The important changes in the flow of information due to specific patterns of attention between the different neural areas become part of the dynamic properties of mental states (Ekman, 1992). A mental state is understood as a dynamic link between numerous perceptual and conceptual processes, with different kinds of regulation for emotions and memory, involving mental models and behavioural responses. According to Harter, Bresnik, Bouchey, & Whitsell (1997) and Sroufe (1996), a careful analysis of the complexity of this kind of cooperation suggests that there are different states of the self that are simultaneously present in brain activity. Some of these structural characteristics seem to derive, as described in the previous chapter, from the variety of functions in the right hemisphere, as can be seen from neuroimages (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997). Other characteristics depend on the different types of encoding for episodic and implicit-procedural memory (Galin, 1974; Hugdahl, 1995), which has also already been dealt with in detail. This feature helps justify the existence of infant amnesia, an important topic in the field of classic psychoanalysis, as a plausible effect of immaturity during early infancy of the hippocampus and orbitofrontal areas, the integration of which causes a change in the encoding of access to long-term memory (Howe, 1998; Nelson & Carver, 1998).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 66

19/9/07 16:25:34



THE CURRENT IDEA OF A CHILD’S MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

67

We now have a very detailed picture of both neurophysiological and psychological child development. It is, therefore, clearly of importance to understand exactly how the child is able to enter into a relationship with its mother. Perhaps it is now easier to understand the meaning, at least in its essential aspects, of the theoretical problem that so interested Freud, i.e. how sensorimotor organization can act as a guide to object relations, although it is clearly necessary to abandon the simple concept of discharge along neural pathways. If we consider the wide range of activities displayed by the child, we must presumably replace this concept with one that is consistent with the natural, spontaneous dynamics of the brain used continuously by the child during its maturation.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 67

19/9/07 16:25:34

CHAPTER FOUR

A new model of brain development

Unifying psychoanalysis and neurophysiology

T

he previous chapters have identified the main questions that a neurophysiological theory of child development needs to answer. Drive theory does not seem to correspond to the real complexity of initial maturation except from the conflictual intrapsychic viewpoint, which does not, however, explain the predisposition towards relations with the mother observable in the infant. A neurophysiological theory should therefore be able to provide a framework of neural integration that is broad enough to include the developments described by both psychoanalytic and evolutionary theories. Though difficult to define, the mind starts to form at the very beginning of neural maturation, when there is already considerable autonomous activity. It creates complex representations by means of processes of spatiotemporal integration of perception (input) and action (output) in an attempt to interact appropriately with an environment that is changing temporally and spatially, and in which the mother is the privileged object in this search for interaction. From a neurophysiological point of view, it must therefore be supposed that in the newborn there is a process of dynamic integration

68

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 68

19/9/07 16:25:34



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

69

between the brain’s numerous subsystems that can explain how the newborn is able to rapidly achieve the coordination of the first mental processes necessary to achieve sufficient cohesion of self. All these topics are crucial if we are to achieve unification of psychoanalysis and neurophysiology as called for by Reiser (1985), Modell (1996), Kandel (1998), and Pally (2000). Rangell (1997) has specified the need for a theory that is capable of reconciling the numerous differences that have arisen over the years in the field of psychoanalysis whilst remaining sufficiently unitary. I think that it is important to show how the old Freudian concept of perceptual-motor pathways is the most useful feature of this theory and how it can be revised, taking into account–something Freud did not do–the natural dynamics of the brain’s neuronal systems. It is even more interesting to imagine for this theory an explanation of phylogenetic origin–wholly appropriate to Freud’s ideas–rooted in our most distant past. Edelman/Tononi (2000) and Damasio (1999), for example, place in the activating system of the brainstem, the evolutionarily oldest structure of the brain, a fundamental support for the brain network, but the activation of the wake-sleep cycle, from which Freud’s major interest–dreams–originate, also depends on the brainstem. It is therefore necessary to try to clarify in this theory why brainstem activity is so essential for the activation of the brain system and the origin of dreams, but in such a way that also explains the complexity of the child’s mental development within an evolutionary concept of the nervous system. The Project helps to unify two areas of psychoanalytic thought that Freud considered of fundamental importance: the phylogenetic nature of psychic development and the meaning of dreams. This theory also needs to satisfy a more general Freudian concept. Freud based many of his ideas on Jackson’s model of the brain–a hierarchical structure of functions (Sulloway, 1979; Goldstein, 1995) in which each higher level presents anew and expands with a more complex organization the functions present in the lower levels. Freud’s concept of regression and the control of the higher levels over the lower levels were based on this model. The significance of this original hierarchical view of the brain is appropriately mentioned by Luu and Tucker (1996), who reveal the

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 69

19/9/07 16:25:34

70

The Development of Consciousness

clinical utility of the concept of the vertical organization of the brain left to us by Jackson and its importance in helping us to understand the regulation of the developing brain. As highlighted by Schore (1999), the narrowing of the distance between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences means that a more detailed study needs to be carried out on the important link that Freud imagined between Jackson’s hierarchical structure and psychic organization. The developing brain is different from the adult brain (Noebels 1989; Thatcher, Lyon, Rumsey, & Krasnegor 1996), and the nature of this complex vertical stratification, as described in the second chapter, raises the important question of how this development occurs in the child during the maturation of the different structures in this complex hierarchy. I think what Damasio has to say may be useful in helping us to focus on the new questions–and also expectations–that have arisen as a result of a more complete evolutionary concept of neural development. There are curious parallels to the scientific neglect of emotion during the twentieth century. One of those parallels is the lack of an evolutionary perspective in the study of brain and mind. It is perhaps an exaggeration to say that neuroscience and cognitive science have proceeded as if Darwin never existed, but it certainly seemed so until the last decade. Aspects of brain and mind have been discussed as if designed recently… (Damasio, 1999, p. 39).

Damasio’s final observation could not be a better invitation to caution in accepting the theoretical model I am about to describe: I regard the proposal outlined…as ground zero for a research program on the neural basis of consciousness. Only future investigation of these proposals, using a variety of approaches, will decide the merits of the ideas presented here. (Damasio, 1999, p. 234).

I believe the hypotheses that helped guide me when I developed this neurophysiological model led to an evolutionary concept that can facilitate a wider debate. I shall now, therefore, describe the evolution of the brain, placing its roots in our ancient phylogenetic past.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 70

19/9/07 16:25:35



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

71

The metameric origin of the nervous system The human brain evolves most directly from the phylum of the chordates, from which vertebrates, including man, descend, but its origins are much older. Observing the cephalic ganglion of leeches, of the same Metazoan order from which chordates evolved, leading eventually to the development of man, it is possible to find traces of the first neural development comparable to that of man (Figure 4.1). ANTERIOR SUCKER

CEPHALIC GANGLIA

SEGMENT CENTRAL ANNULUS

SENSORY PAPILLAE

CAUDAL GAGLION

POSTERIOR SUCKER

SEGMENTARY GANGLIA

Figure 4.1 The body of the Hirudo medicinalis leech comprises a number of segments that are identical except at the two ends. The surface of most of the segments is divided into five circular rings. Each segment has a ganglion that controls the functions of that segment. Along the leech’s axis, on its ventral side, runs the ganglionic chain, which is made up of the same number of ganglia as there are segments. There are two “brains” one at each end, which are the fusion of seven and four ganglia respectively (Nicholls & Van Essen, 1974, p. 39). Fig.4.1

The leech is a metameric creature, i.e. it is made up of a series of repeated body segments and ganglia–a kind of organization adopted by evolution in order to render a species more complex. The orderly repetition of the ganglia forms the central chain and the joining together of some of these ganglia at both ends forms the basis for the leech’s two brains. The human nervous system descends from this development, as can be seen from our spinal chain of ganglia, which is clearly metameric. Similarly to what happened in the case of the leech, this chain contributed to the formation of the human brain, producing at the lowest level the brainstem, where the metameric organization is still recognisable. Metamerism is an economical way in which evolution experiments with more complex organisms, deriving them from the repetition of certain elements. Even though it may appear to be a simple process, metamerism involves the selection of innovative

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 71

19/9/07 16:25:35

72

The Development of Consciousness

organisms by combining the ganglia in such a way as to coordinate their functions in order to achieve a better kind of adaptation. This task of selection is not easy and explains why this process appeared relatively late in evolution, remaining however as a source for the future diversification of different species. This development implies that connections are formed between homologous neurons of the different ganglia so as to modify their local functioning, which was identical in the beginning, such that neural pathways, grouped together in the dorsal cord, can enable the neurons to communicate with one another by means of appropriate impulses in order to carry out the new coordination of the information passing between the networks. This development also implies that as the organism grows in complexity, the impulses sent by the various local ganglia become part of a more unitary kind of processing in the concentrations of terminal ganglia, where, as a result of their proximity, the ganglia are able to form a larger network that is capable of evolving as brain coordination. In this type of cooperation, the ganglia must develop, together with the neurons, very sophisticated properties for the control of neural impulses and this again explains why metamerism appears late in evolution. It directly promotes the innovative properties of communication between neurons that permit the development and evolution of the brain. Imagining the small metameric brain at the start of its development (Figure 4.2), its most striking evolutionary aspect, which forms the very basis for this model, is immediately noticeable. As the ganglia are all identical and crushed one against the other, they initially form a perfect correspondence between the respective neurons. This proximity gives rise to privileged neural pathways between homologous neurons in the ganglia both above and below, and these pathways constitute a continuation of the neural pathways arriving from the ganglion chain (Figure 4.2a). This system of pathways, crushed in a kind of ganglion sandwich, tends to remain orderly even though other connections later form between the neurons of the different ganglia, thereby permitting a Darwinian experimentation with new adaptive properties for this system (Figure 4.2b). Such a type of development enables a neural network

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 72

19/9/07 16:25:35



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

73

that was initially identical in the different ganglia to evolve, while still maintaining the primary arrangement of connections between its neurons. This network gradually includes new pathways and new neurons in the ganglia above, which allows it to slowly expand and acquire new, more complex properties (Figure 4.2c). As this ganglion sandwich gradually expands during evolution, it still maintains the initial order of these privileged vertical pathways, which is rather reminiscent of certain characteristics of the brain described in Chapter Two. The stratified arrangement of the ganglia means that information can pass between homologous neurons in the neural networks of ganglia and be processed along these vertical pathways in a succession of homologous functions, which become more and more evolved, as happens in the case of the real brain. During the development of the ganglia, the vertical pathways maintain the topographic correspondence between homologous neurons in a similar way to which, in the brain, a topographic order is repeatedly maintained between homologous structures or neural maps on the different levels. According to the evolutionary model described here, it is this initial arrangement that gives rise to Jackson’s hierarchy of the brain (from the very earliest nervous system) and explains the importance of the sensorimotor pathways on which Freud wanted to base his Project.

fig.a

fig.b

fig.c

Figure 4.2 A cerebral ganglion is formed from the proximity of similar networks (a) due to the redundancy of pathways and cells (b). Basal control makes expansion and gradual evolution of higher networks possible (c). Fig.4.2

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 73

19/9/07 16:25:41

74

The Development of Consciousness

The evolutionary model of a primary neural network The brain development described here originates, like the small brain described above, from a primary neural network. This is not a real network, but an ideal simplification in order to provide a rapid idea of the evolutionary process that, according to this model, the brain underwent (Figure 4.3). This ideal network possesses several sensory and motor units, which it uses to analyse simple patterns of external or internal information: the units are not very highly evolved (single neurons or groups of neurons) and the sensory differentiation is not yet very specialized. For reasons that will be explained shortly, the sensory units are identified as “o” and the motor units as “s”. undifferentiated systems

control specialisation

perceptual specialisation Figure 4.3 The figure shows a primitive neural network. Only the various kinds of differentiation between control elements (“s”) and sensory-perceptual elements (“o”) are indicated. Sensory specializations are not shown. The figure only includes local connections in which the control and perceptual elements are still joined together as in “so”; connections in which they are starting to separate locally as in “s–o” and “s– o”; and connections that are now merely distal with the “s” and “o” elements already separate. The separate “s” and “o” elements, either on their own or grouped together, indicate the Fig.4.3 formation of the first control and sensory-perceptual specializations, which imply the growing development of connections of distal communication.

The units are linked by short or developing connections, and the network tends to operate by means of stimulus-response properties, which are triggered by the impulses passing along the neural pathways on their way from the sensory units to the motor units (their discharge process is therefore similar to that proposed by Freud). The network is intentionally simple, but it already contains

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 74

19/9/07 16:25:42



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

75

in its neural composition the essential features that enable evolution to experiment during the network’s metameric development. The beginning of this type of development is very similar to the type already described. When metamerism begins, some of these networks–as in the case of the leech–become denser at the end of the ganglion chain. The homologous units form a vertical system of preferential pathways, which continues the vertical system begun in the axis (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4 The development of the end of the ganglion chain is generated in the example here by the gradual expansion of five elementary networks. The process begins (left) with the type of integration shown in Figure 4.2, before starting to expand rapidly (right).

We can now attempt to imagine the evolutionary development Fig.4.4 of this simple system, beginning with that of the sensorimotor pathways.

The development of “s-o” pathways and the control of information over different levels The sensory units in this ideal network analyse, as already mentioned, both internal and external information. The type of development that best exemplifies the evolutionary process is that of external sensory analysis, which is therefore described first. More-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 75

19/9/07 16:25:43

76

The Development of Consciousness

over, this type of development can be simplified by referring to the development of a generic stimulus-response unit. It does not therefore show the real development of a certain kind of specialization, but describes an abstract form that is common to all specializations and therefore useful in helping to explain how the evolutionary process has been able to proceed in such a coherent way throughout the entire system. The sensory units were previously identified as “o” elements and the motor units as “s” elements, the reason for which will now be explained. If the sensory units “o” are referred to as object elements and the motor units “s” as subject elements, we can immediately interpret the evolutionary significance of these elements: the “o” object elements evolve into the sensory-perceptual structures of object analysis, while the “s” subject elements become the “subject-complex” to which Freud made reference, i.e. the motor structure from which subject functions derive (the developments of the pathways of the internal sensory units also converge here, as will be explained later). At the beginning of metameric development, this generic “s-o” pathway appears in the cerebral ganglion as in Figure 4.5a. It is copied in each network of the ganglion and creates a small system of “s-o” pathways that are interconnected by the homologous “s” and “o” elements from the vertical pathways arriving from the ganglion axis. It is metamerism itself that suggests how the complexification of these pathways occurs and how this system gradually evolves. As has already been seen, metamerism makes use of the replication of ganglion networks. If this principle is extended to the neural units that make up these networks, then the individual “s” and “o” elements of a pathway can also be copied, giving rise to the development of an “s-s-…o-o-o” type of pathway from the original “s-o” pathway. The simplest evolutionary aspect that meets this criterion is that in which the new element “o1” is formed at the very beginning of the development along the pathway immediately above the basal pathway of the mapping, starting from the “s←o” direction of sensory stimulation (Fig 4.5b).3 The “s←o” and “s→o” directions refer to the ordinary representation of the brain as seen from the left hemisphere.

3

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 76

19/9/07 16:25:43



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

77

Figure 4.5 The development of a generic “s-o” pathway starts from a system of replications (a), and proceeds, through sensory stimulation “s←o”, with the progressive incorporation of new “o” elements, beginning at the lower levels, and then developing “s→o” control re-entries.

If the element is successfully incorporated, the process can be replicated in the identical pathways above, thereby extending this new property to the whole system and forming a new vertical pathway of homologous elements. This type of development economizes the initial selection task, ensuring that a pathway above cannot evolve unless it maintains a functional correspondence with the pathway immediately below. This satisfies Jackson’s conservation principle, which guarantees an optimal response for the organism throughout evolution since the response can be obtained at a lower evolutionary level. The interesting theoretical aspect of this process is that although it originates from the “s←o” direction of sensory stimulation, it must proceed with the inverse development of the “s→o” pathways necessary to maintain this order. Initially, a new element operates

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 77

19/9/07 16:25:44

78

The Development of Consciousness

as a merely vicarious element of the original element and is quite redundant. Its only task is to retransmit information in the “s←o” direction. When it acquires, in evolutionary terms, a new property, the pathway must develop control pathways for the new element in the opposite “s→o” direction in order to coordinate this new function in the motor process. As these new elements gradually become part of a pathway, new “s→o” pathways, necessary to coordinate these elements, are formed. For this process to comply with the principle of conservation, it must take place gradually. The innovative homologous elements in the pathways below and above have to be subject to controls and this is what produces the new ascending-descending pathways. Moreover, development also increases in the “s” elements as the pathways in the “s→o” direction gradually increase (Figures 4.5c, d, e, f). According to the theoretical model presented here, it is this extensive system of controls that initiates, from the very earliest form of brain development, the type of mapping conceived by Edelman/ Tononi. The controls performed by the inverse pathways result from the redundancy of the elements and operate as re-entries, both vertically and horizontally, binding the functional properties of the new elements. Evolution proceeds very cautiously and the expansion of an “s-o” pathway is at first barely noticeable, especially in the lower pathways. Each success, however, constitutes not only a local evolutionary step forward, but is also confirmation of the stability of the whole system, a stability that is maintained by means of the vertical pathways of homologous elements (which is why they still form the basis for the homologous structures of analysis in the different structural levels of the real brain). When the successes become more numerous, the entire system acquires important self-regulating properties and development can accelerate thanks to the many corrective features. This development suddenly becomes exponential, characterizing the expansion of the cortex in mammals and, above all, the massive expansion of the human cortex.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 78

19/9/07 16:25:45



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

79

The ideal reticulum for the architecture of the brain This description of the ideal evolution of an “s-o” pathway is useful in helping to explain how an element develops. If we indicate the “s-o” pathway with the letter “B”, for example, the brain levels that seem to be of greatest importance to development (Figure 4.6) can then be indicated by means of a simple system (Β, b, β) in order to make it easier to follow the evolution of a particular element along the vertical (for example, between bo1 and bo2) and horizontal connections (for example, between βo, βo1, and βo2).4

Es

Es1

Es2

bs

bs1 Bs

Eo2 bo1

Eo1

Eo

bo Bo

Figure 4.6 The development of Bs-Bo pathways into bs-bo and βs-βο as new elements bs1 and bo1 and βs1, βs2, βο2, βο1 are incorporated. During development, vertical control pathways bs1–βs2 and bo1–βo2 are created.

If we imagine the contemporary development of the “s-o” pathways of the different sensory specializations (A, B, C, D…) of the ganglion network, the development of the entire network can be Fig.4.6 as a kind of fan opening up. This describes in an abstract depicted way the evolution of the original ganglionic system, a reticulum formed by the elements of the various specializations and potentially connected to one another by the neural pathways accepted by evolution (Figure 4.7). In this ideal evolutionary process, the reticulum represents the general structure of the brain, a type of neural organization that distinguishes the development of the brain of all mammals. As a result of its combinatorial nature, the reticulum forms the basis for the real development of the elements and connections that, for each species, determine the complex behaviour that derives from the 4 I chose the B-b-β progression in order to indicate the generic element flowing into β in the last level, in tribute to Bion’s theory regarding β elements.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 79

19/9/07 16:25:45

80

The Development of Consciousness

sagittal plane of the two hemispheres

Figure 4.7 The expansion of the brain can be considered the result of a series of individual expansions. Here we have the development of four distinct elements– A, B, C, D–in the left hemisphere. As a result of the increased expansion of the higher levels, these levels become more and more distant from the symmetrical plane between the two hemispheres, as when a fan is opened outwards. The associative connections between the vicarious networks of the different distal connections form the integrative properties of brain development as a result of the cooperation between the different elements.

simple, original stimulus-response functions that begin the process of brain evolution. This behaviour is encoded in the networks of the reticulum: the so-called “engrams” of sensory-perceptual and motor information that, for each individual species, have become the source of the responses necessary for survival in the environment and, throughout evolution, of ever more complex behavioural properties as regards both adaptation and planning. In this reticulum the object “o” elements are all on one side and the subject “s” control elements are all on the other side, with a spatial arrangement that basically corresponds to that of the real brain, in which perceptual specializations for the object are unified in the occipital area while motor and more complex programming properties, typical of the gradual emergence of subject functions, are located in the frontal area.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 80

19/9/07 16:25:46



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

81

Looking at the shape of the reticulum, it is intuitively possible to see why in the real brain the “o” systems and the “s” systems are unified at opposite ends. Perception can associatively process the different types of stimuli coming from an object while the motor control elements can similarly have access to the common coordination of the muscular system. This type of unification, which appears to have been deduced here on the basis of an ideal development, is however the order recognisable in the spinal cord: the neural pathways of somatic sensitivity are grouped together in the dorsal fasciculus and the motor pathways in the ventral fasciculus. This evolutionarily old arrangement reveals the orderly criterion already present in the original metamerism that still influences the cortical arrangement, and the reticulum reproduces this order in the separation of the “s” and “o” elements. These “s-o” pathways are obviously neural pathways, although the latter clearly do not correspond to the ideally ordered drawing shown here. These pathways pass through the brain linking its different structures so that the elements that evolution has learnt to differentiate can be distributed in both specific areas of analysis and in areas in which they can associate with elements from other pathways. This makes a pathway a very complex system for the integration of information, capable therefore of contributing efficiently to the increased encoding of the engrams on which behavioural development depends. The ideal regularity of the reticulum corresponds, therefore, only minimally to the real structure of the brain, although it does offer many useful interpretations as to its structure. Imagining the development of a single pathway in a very simple form, it is possible to understand the most significant aspect of this evolutionary process, which concerns the representational function of the reticulum. This function emerges fairly clearly from the type of development of elements along the “s-o” pathways as the reticulum gradually gets bigger during the evolutionary process.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 81

19/9/07 16:25:46

82

The Development of Consciousness

The origin of representation in the control of perceptual information It is in fact quite easy to understand the origin of the representational properties of the reticulum if one looks at how a new element modifies the perceptual information along an “s-o” pathway. Consider, for example, the inclusion of the “o1” element that begins the development in the bottom “s-o” pathway of the reticulum (Figure 4.8). When the perceptual information arriving from “o” encounters the new internal element “o1”, it is necessarily modified by the properties that this element has acquired within the system as a result of either the local expansion of the pathway or the new associations that the element can establish along other pathways in the reticulum (Figure 4.8a). This modified information therefore represents within the pathway the perceptual information, but not in its original form. This modified information, the result of a new element within the pathway, now replaces the original information and acquires the meaning of representation. This change plays a decisive role in the inverting of the flow of information along the pathway. This process becomes evident when we consider how the re-entry operates in controlling the new information (Figure 4.8b). modified information

fig.a

s

o1 reentry

fig.b

s

REENTRY DEVELOPMENT:

fig.c

s

perceptual information

o

representational access and retrieval

o1 representational reentry

o1

o hallucinatory reentry

o

Figure 4.8 The modification of perceptual information (a) and representational (b) or hallucinatory (c) recovery.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 82

19/9/07 16:25:47



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

83

When, during the development of the reticulum, the re-entry starts to form from the “s” element along the pathway in the “o” direction, it necessarily encounters first of all the internal element “o1” in order to control its new information. It can also have access to the original “o” information, but the re-entry that is developing along the pathway must, during this innovative stage, consider above all how the new element operates, as it can disturb, with its different information content, the pathway’s original response. The re-entry therefore evolves above all from the control of the “s” element on the internal element in the direction “s→o1”, and this is what gives rise to ordinary representation. The re-entry in fact tends to stop at the internal information content to explore its properties, which produces the recovery of the “o1” information. Although this information is derived from the original perception, it has the typical quality of representation, i.e. it can be actively accessed whilst being kept distinct from perception and at the same compared with it. It is naturally the correct development of this process that makes it possible for the brain to distinguish between the recovery of the representational “o1” elements and the perceptual “o” elements. If this distinction cannot be made, representational recovery has the sensory qualities of perception and therefore becomes hallucinatory (Figure 4.8c). In the Project, Freud was interested in precisely this kind of development, as he wanted to define the properties of motor control (what he called motor images) that could distinguish between representation and hallucination. This aspect of the model enables us to understand quite easily how representational-motor connections form in the brain. When a new element is included in a pathway, it is its control, by means of a re-entry, which enables it to be used representationally. Since the re-entry originates from a motor element, the control of a representation forms together with the control of the real movement, and this control of representation is compared with the perceptual effects that derive at the same time from real movement. In this way, the explorations of the representational elements gradually form maps of reference for real movements, without the two being confused. It is as though perception, from its initial dependence on external information, became “internal” and could be

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 83

19/9/07 16:25:47

84

The Development of Consciousness

explored instead of the “real” perception by means of a movement that is in turn internal. We can imagine this movement to be like that of an “incorporeal” arm exploring an interiorized perceptual field, preventively measuring the paths open to real action or, as these paths increasingly involve more abstract objects, the relations between concepts and projects (Figure 4.9). CONTROL REENTRIES DEVELOPING REPRESENTATIONAL MAPPING

o’3 o’2 o2

COMPARISON BETWEEN REPRESENTATION PERCEPTION AND MOVEMENT

o’’2 o1

o’1

s s

’

o

o

PERCEPTUAL INFORMATION

MOTOR INFORMATION

Figure 4.9 Effective control of re-entries distinguishes between “internal representational” and external perceptual movement without giving rise to hallucinatory confusion.

As has already Fig.4.9been mentioned, for Gray (1995) a central comparator produces the comparison between perception and anticipatory states. It seems logical that as the elements increase, the maps of reference for these internal movements become increasingly important in brain development. These maps are the representational properties of the re-entries by means of which the “s” elements can retrieve the information contents of the internal elements along the pathways and use these instead of the perceptual information.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 84

19/9/07 16:26:17



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

85

Freud’s serial memory traces model and the development of “s-o” pathways With regard to the reticulum, it is possible to consider each of its “o” type elements as a representational entity (generically indicated as on), and therefore able to represent the different configurations of elements that characterize objects. Considering the real development of the brain, it appears evident that perception evolves into representation starting from the distal “o” elements located in the primary sensory-perceptual areas (---o3←o2←o1), before becoming an increasingly complex property of the associative areas. It is precisely these characteristics that confirm the current hypotheses regarding the encoding of percepts in the same sensory structures that process them and their representational retrieval in the same areas during the recall process. It is interesting to note here how this kind of development of elements along the “s-o” pathways is very like the serial arrangement of memory traces in Freud’s diagram mentioned in Chapter One. Moreover, if referred to the levels of the reticulum, this striking resemblance intuitively makes it possible to define mnestic processes characterized by different evolutionary properties. These processes are more elementary in the lower levels, where the representational system is made up of a smaller number of elements. The characteristics of “motor images”–to use Freud’s terminology–depend not only on the number of “o” elements available, but also on the properties of the “s” elements that organize the reentries and, during evolution, develop themselves into ideational functions. Representation, according to this evolutionary model, does not have the same properties at each level, depending as it does on the efficiency of the re-entries. The innovative elements are far more numerous at the higher levels, and the representational efficiency depends on the real control the re-entries of the “s” elements manage to have on their information content. As we shall see, these simple reflections are extremely useful when we come to explain how representational development is modified as a child’s brain evolves. The difference between procedural memory and semanticepisodic memory discussed in Chapter Two, which is of such

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 85

19/9/07 16:26:18

86

The Development of Consciousness

importance for man, can be explained intuitively by these different types of development. Procedural memory necessarily forms during evolution from the elements available at the lowest levels. As the reticulum expands, memory can assume new properties, which, as a result of the size of the neocortex, become characterized in man by innovative and more complex types of representational encoding (the important difference between procedural memory and semantic-episodic memory is discussed in greater detail later). Despite being an abstract, and therefore rather generic, model, it is nevertheless possible to identify certain properties of the known architecture of the brain and provide explanations that may help to clarify the most important features of psychoanalytic theory, which Freud based on Jackson’s evolutionary concept.

Cooperation between motor-perceptual pathways in the neocortex The motor-perceptual cooperation described above finds a real correspondence conceptually in the neocortex. The real brain architecture creates this cooperation in a way that needs to be interpreted with regard to how the pathways develop. There are mainly two types of “s-o” pathways in motor-perceptual cooperation: one connecting the motor “s” elements to the visual-perception “o” elements, which results in visual representation, and the other connecting the motor “s” elements to proprioceptive and tactile sensitivity, which results in bodily control over movement. The cooperation between these two kinds of pathways produces the coupling that is indispensable if visual representation is to be used as a guide for motility (this cooperation can involve acoustic representation in a similar way). Figure 4.10 shows the topographical arrangement, along the cortical pathway A-B, between the primary motor area 4, and the nearby somatosensory areas 3a, 3b, 1 and 2 of the post-central gyrus and the posterior parietal areas 5 and 7 (using Brodmann’s classic numbering of these areas), which provides an interpretation of the somatomotor cortex pathways (let us term them “sc-oc”, where “c”

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 86

19/9/07 16:26:19



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

SOMATOSENSORY CORTEX

87

POSTCENTRAL GYRUS POSTCENTRAL SULCUS

CENTRAL SULCUS

POSTERIOR PARIETAL LOBE

B

A

LATERAL SULCUS

POSTCENTRAL GYRUS CENTRAL SULCUS FRONTAL DEVELOPMENT

POSTCENTRAL SULCUS

s c1

oc2 1

o c1 3a AREA

3b 3b AREA 3a

oc

o c6 oc4

AREA AREA AREA44

PARIETAL DEVELOPMENT

o c3

sc

oc5

1

7 AREA

7

2 2 AREA 5 AREA

5

Figure 4.10 The cortical pathways along A-B link the motor area 4 with the somatic sensitivity areas 3a, 3b, 1, 2, and the parietal areas 5 and 7. The connections indicate a somatomotor pathway, “sc-oc”, which develops into the elements “sc-… sc1- oc1-oc2-oc3-oc4-oc5-oc6…-oc”, specific to the different areas. Development continues in a frontal and parietal direction, integrating with Fig.4.10(adapted from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991, p. 26). other pathways

stands for corporeal). The motor area 4 is immediately next to the somatic sensitivity area 3a, and association connections link area 4 to areas 3a, 3b, 1, and 2, and areas 5 and 7. According to this model, the connections indicate an extensive “sc-oc”, development of the “sc-…sc1-oc1-oc2-oc3-oc4-oc5-oc6…-oc” kind that connects the “s” elements of the primary motor cortex to the evolutionary development of the replicated “o” elements of somatic sensitivity. By carefully considering how the elements in the pathway increase, it is possible to understand why each one of these areas has a complete somatotopic projection.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 87

19/9/07 16:26:19

88

The Development of Consciousness

Each initial “sc-oc” pathway creates a correspondence between one motor element and one somatic element, and so the whole system of pathways defines, among all the elements, two complete topographic projections–motor and somatic–of the body surface (depicted by two typical motor and sensory homunculi of the two areas). Similarly, each “oc1, oc2, oc3, oc4...” element, as it becomes part of the pathway, contributes to a new complete somatotopic projection. The different nervous areas in the figure can therefore be interpreted as effective developments, though now extremely complex, of the once simple elements in the original “sc-oc” pathways. The parietal area 7 belongs to this development and its function in that part of the cortex also explains its evolutionary significance. It has control properties over ocular movement in visual perception, which has its relevant associative development in the parietal proprioceptive-spatial area. Area 7 therefore derives its control properties for movement from the “sc” motor properties in the “sc-oc” pathways and, as an area whose somatic properties form from the original “oc” elements, it acquires proprioceptive-spatial properties, establishing connections with visual representation. The extensive parietal area, according to this development, contributes to the motor-representation coupling described above. If we try to describe the visual “s-o” pathways, we find an even more extensive development. Twenty visual areas can be traced to the cortex, and this clearly reveals the extent of the development of the “o” elements that are replicated in these “s-o” pathways and that evolved as a result of the associative links between these visual “o” elements and the other elements in the cortex. Some of the “s” elements in these pathways are recognisable in this model in the frontal oculomotor fields (Figure 4.11) in the large area developing from the primary motor cortex. Ocular control is obviously essential for perception and the fact that it depends on the frontal fields corresponds to the hypotheses of this model, i.e. a motor property derived from the general type of “s-o” pathway that originates this development.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 88

19/9/07 16:26:20



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

FRONTAL EYE FIELDS

(CONSISTING OF PARTS OF AREAS 8, 6, 4, 9)

89

SUPPLEMENTARY EYE FIELDS (CONSISTING OF A PART OF AREA 6) POSTERIOR PARIETAL CORTEX (AREA 7)

SUPERIOR MEDIAL TEMPORAL CORTEX (CONSISTING OF PARTS OF AREAS 19, 39, 37) STRIATED CORTEX (AREA 17)

MEDIAL TEMPORAL CORTEX (CONSISTING OF PARTS OF AREAS 19, 37) DORSOLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX (AREA 46)

Figure 4.11 The cortical areas active during ocular movement. The frontal areas indicate “s” elements and the parietal and temporal areas “o” elements (adapted from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991, 43.14).

Fig.4.11 Other more evident “s” elements are to be found in the prefrontal motor area 45, in which the mirror neurons respond to the visual presentation of movements with motor functions corresponding to the actions shown (Gallese, 1999, 2003; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). This correspondence reveals the original motor-perceptual links of the “s-o” pathways and shows, given their motor origins in the prefrontal cortex, how they stretch the whole length of the cortex. Many known connections in the neocortex can be interpreted more generally as “s-o” pathways that have developed between the specific sensory-perceptual and motor areas, whose interlacing produces the multimodal associations used to encode object information (Figure 4.12).

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 89

19/9/07 16:26:21

90

The Development of Consciousness

SOMATOSENSORY

4

6

5

5

S

46

7

45

STS

VISUAL

46

8A

17 20

PrCo

STS 21

20

TG

21

AUDITORY

8B

9 A STP

8B 10 STP 22

12 TG

22

STS

Figure 4.12 The connections between cortical areas represent stages in the analysis of somatosensory, visual, and auditory information (adapted from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000, 19.3).

Fig.4.12

Returning to the previous somatomotor development, it can be observed that the description of the “s-o” pathway between area 4 and areas 3a, 3b, 1, and 2 is of the “s-oc1→oc2→oc3→oc4” type, which is inverted compared to the “s-oc4←oc3←oc2←oc1”typethatonewouldexpect given its development from the distal end. This inverted arrangement suggests that the development of a pathway begins not just from the end moving inwards, but also from within the pathway itself. It is the evolutionary pressure that presumably brings about, in this case, a positive integration between the developing sensorimotor pathways. The inverse development of somatic sensitivity, “s-oc1→oc2→oc3→oc4→…”,canbecomeintertwinedwiththatofdirectvisualperception“←…ov6←ov5←ov4←ov3←ov2←ov1”(where“v”standsforvisual), while motor development can also proceed in the rostral direction “←…sc4←sc3←sc2←sc1”. The development of the sensorimotor system seems to indicate in the central sulcus, according to this model, an interesting

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 90

19/9/07 16:26:33



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

91

evolutionary stage in the functions of the growth of the pathways. Evolutionary selection seems primarily to define the principal “s-o” pathways of somatomotor control, which act as a guarantee for each successive evolution, and then, from its stable “s” and “o” elements, develops “s-o” pathways that integrate in a more complex way following a “←s-o→” type expansion. The development of the “s” elements occurs later in this process, but it is the most evident as it results in the formation of the frontal lobe. The entire development gradually increases the size of the cortex and also increases the length of the visual “s-o” pathways, located between the occipital and frontal lobes. Observing the gradual expansion of the frontal and association cortices in the recent evolution of mammals, I believe that the type of development of pathways presented here can be considered realistic (Figure 4.13). There has been no further increase in the genetic information in the phylum of mammals for some time (a topic discussed later), but the association and frontal cortical areas have increased enormously. It is not difficult to imagine that the “s-o” pathways merely increase the number of elements they are made up of, which then form new areas, which are typically association areas. The original design remains simple and evolutionary experimentation can limit itself to testing the new elements in the “s-o” pathways by means of just a few controls.

HEDGEHOG

MONKEY

CAT

DOG

HUMAN

Figure 4.13 Progressive differentiation of the cerebral areas. A: hedgehog brain. B: rat brain. C: dog brain. D: monkey brain. E: ape brain. F: human brain. The large dots indicate the primary areas, the medium-sized dots the secondary areas, and the small dots the tertiary association areas. (Adapted from Luria, 1962, Fig. 15). Fig.4.13

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 91

19/9/07 16:26:34

92

The Development of Consciousness

Cortical and subcortical representational system How large and complex is the representational system? On the basis of this simple example, it must be enormous and results from the gradual specialization of the redundancy of the original elements. The entire system also includes all the subcortical levels. Despite this evident complexity, there is an ideal correspondence in the structural form of the reticulum between the different levels, which makes the reticulum easier to understand. It is this ideal correspondence that explains the great importance neurophysiologists attach to the regularity that exists between the functional maps of the cortical and subcortical structures of the brain described in Chapter Two. The most striking structural aspect of the topographical correspondence occurs between the different areas of the thalamus and the cortex, which, as already noted, is one of the three mapping systems considered fundamental by Edelman/Tononi. Taking a closer look at this system of correspondences, it does not appear, in general, to be homogeneous for the different sensory modalities, which do not evolve in a similar way at all levels (such as taste, smell and hearing). This more realistically suggests a system of “s-o” pathways that develops from the very start in a dishomogeneous way in the different levels. The previous observations show how this model can be usefully interpreted however. The “s-o” pathways, when they can be identified, indicate a concept of neural structure that makes it possible to define, at least theoretically, its representational function. This is not limited, however, to the cortex but, as a result of the particular type of evolution of the reticulum, is also found in subcortical areas. Representation originates from the perceptual information that can be encoded in all these “s-o” pathways, and it is over this global information that the “s” elements of motor origin (both cortical and subcortical) may exert appropriate control, making use of this information as a complete representational map of environmental configurations. This important property of motor control also helps explain certain characteristics of the internal representational system and complete the evolutionary description of the “s-o” pathways in the reticulum.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 92

19/9/07 16:26:34



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

93

The internal representational system From a theoretical point of view, the “s-o” pathways of internal sensation (which can be called “si-oi” where “i” stands for internal) do not differ as regards their development from those of external perception. The somatic-motor pathways described earlier, for example, can be partially treated as internal pathways, since the body surface is between the external and internal environments: the most typically internal bodily sensations, for instance, become part of the proprioceptive system. Certain developments of the “si-oi” pathways of specifically internal sensation suggest real differences, however, based on the evolutionary history of these pathways. These pathways affect the functions of the hypothalamic system, which has many homeostatic properties, and also those of the limbic cortex. Both of these structures are important in relation to Freud’s original concept, the former as a result of its relevance to drives and the latter as a result of its relevance to affects. According to this model, these two structures are characterized by certain primitive properties of the “si-oi”, pathways that do not allow the re-entries to have an efficient representational function for various reasons of evolutionary development (Figure 4.14). The hypothalamus seems to be able to be interpreted as a kind of cephalic ganglion of the autonomic nervous system (Ranson 1934; Hess 1954) without any motor properties of its own. A complex system of afferents and efferents, both neuronal and hormonal, make this system a centre of coordination between the limbic system (and also the cortical system, via the limbic system) and the autonomic nervous system. According to this concept, the hypothalamic “s” elements have their roots in the limbic lobe and the “si-oi” pathways diversify into neurohormonal pathways. The evolutionary origins of the limbic lobe suggest, however, that its “si-oi” pathways do not have the same characteristics as the typically representational pathways of the other cortical and subcortical systems, and that many of its motivational and emotional properties depend on this fact. The limbic lobe derives from the evolutionarily older paleocortex, which was once the highest level of the reticulum. The complex

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 93

19/9/07 16:26:35

94

The Development of Consciousness LIMBIC LOBE MOTIVATIONAL-EMOTIONAL S-O PROCESSES

S-O PALEOCORTICAL MOTOR-PERCEPTUAL PATHWAYS LIMBICHYPOTHALAMIC PATHWAYS

si si

oi

oi

HYPOTHALAMUS NEURO-HORMONAL PATHWAYS

Figure 4.14 Internal “si-oi” homeostatic and neuro-hormonal regulation pathways converge from the limbic lobe on the hypothalamus. The entire limbic lobe canFig.4.14 be seen as a network of paleocortical “s-o” pathways.

system of structures that make up the limbic lobe emphasises its folded form, resulting from its having had to adapt to the space below the neocortex, the new more highly evolved level of the reticulum. The arrangement of the limbic structures in this new position does not display the simple kind of correspondence that exists between the neocortex and the thalamus. This spatial reordering during evolution of this older level of the reticulum results in its relative isolation from the higher cortical system. The topographical correspondence between the thalamus and the cortex is instead, according to this evolutionary model, a newly ordered reorganization of the recent development of the reticulum, which reappears along the original ascending-descending pathways. It is the old order of the reticulum that is, therefore, now difficult to recognize at the paleocortical level.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 94

19/9/07 16:27:06



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

95

The emotional-representational functions of the paleocortex It is interesting to note how the relative isolation of the limbic lobe can quite easily explain in this model its emotional-motivational functions, and also the cognitive meaning now attributed to emotions. As has already been seen, the “s” elements in this system form “s-o” pathways in the hypothalamus to receive internal sensory information and this important feature is the basis for the emotional-motivational properties of the limbic lobe. Yet, with regard to the general properties of the reticulum, the “s-o” pathways must still, even today, perform the motor-perceptual control functions in the limbic lobe that were once the task of its most highly evolved level. They therefore still organize responses of a cognitive type to external perceptual information, albeit with a certain autonomy in relation to neocortical responses as a result of their evolutionarily older, tried and tested integration. They consequently produce a representational map that concerns, in particular, the characteristics of internal sensations. Emotional-motivational properties and cognitive functions that are already very complex can thereby integrate with one another in the limbic lobe, while still maintaining the general connections with the cortical mapping. According to this model, the “s-o” pathways have already undergone a very marked differentiation in their “s” and “o” elements in the limbic cortex, and are connected to many homologous cortical and subcortical elements. It is more difficult to reconstruct the evolutionary correspondences of these elements, but it may be supposed that the overall architecture of the reticulum is maintained, and this helps explain how integration between the mainly emotive properties of the paleocortex and the typically cognitive properties of the neocortex is possible. The representational system of the limbic lobe and the hypothalamus does not, however, seem to be as easy to deal with as the typically neocortical system. The “s-o” pathways are evolutionarily older and it is plausible that the “s” elements should have few re-entries capable of controlling the internal “o” elements. Evolution organizes complex pathways in this case too, even though there is less need to transform the internal “o” elements into rep-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 95

19/9/07 16:27:07

96

The Development of Consciousness

resentational elements. This transformation results primarily from external perception, which tends to vary, and much less so from the more stable internal perception. The difference between these two processes provides many indications that help explain the problem of unconscious representation by means of the different development of the re-entries in the “s-o” pathways. The development of the re-entries also depends, however, on other processes, such as the interaction between a child and its mother, as will be explained later.

Subject and object in the integration of levels Despite the differences in development, it can be concluded that the “s” elements operate on all the levels described and that the “subject-complex” (to use Freud’s definition) necessarily forms as a result of their cooperation. The entity we call subject, as can be seen, is not easy to define, except in relation to its most simple functional aspect as a derivative of motor actions. It is nevertheless possible, with a certain caution, to arrive at a concept of the mind that is sufficiently complex to justify how the mind can form from this old motor derivation. It is much easier, on the other hand, to define objects. These are percepts of a combinatorial nature of the information encoded, in the various levels of the reticulum, in the perceptual elements placed towards the “o” end of the pathways. According to current ideas in the field of neurophysiology, the encoding of these percepts is distributed over large areas, which coincides with the kind of development described here, as this evolves from an extensive diversification of sensory information starting from the object end of the pathway. This development, however, also highlights the organization of the percepts on different levels and this is important in order to understand how the infant brain, which is still largely immature at birth, allows object information and at the same time information from the “subject-complex” to cooperate. Their mutual integration can, in fact, result in significant changes in the nervous system, thereby forming early defence mechanisms during

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 96

19/9/07 16:27:07



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

97

brain maturation, which are clearly of particular interest in the field of psychoanalysis. The representational content can only form through the access of “s” elements to the perceptual content, which is typically visual. It is the re-entries of the “s” elements that ensure that a distinction can be made between representation and perception. The general structure of the re-entries forms during the evolution of the reticulum, and this is undoubtedly the most important property of the reticulum. This essential feature was one of the topics studied by Freud in the Project. This description of the evolution of the reticulum is clearly not complete but it is nevertheless sufficient in order to be able to grasp its general meaning. I shall now describe in a little more detail certain features that are of particular importance in explaining the development of the human brain in early childhood and how this relates to the child’s development of identification.

Dynamic assembly of the reticulum and basal activation The first consideration involves a general characteristic of genetic coding that must intervene from the very beginning of evolution in this development of the reticulum. When evolution successfully experiments with a new element in a pathway of the reticulum, the genetic baggage of the species is then able, for each new organism, to build the control pathway for this element as well. This means that it no longer builds the pathway solely in the simple stimulusresponse “s←o” direction but also in the opposite direction. It is clear that, in order for this to happen, the genetic coding must, in general, form the synaptic connections between the pathways, and this is indispensable above all for the controls in the inverse direction for the new “on” element. These synaptic connections form the general structure of re-entries necessary for the coordination of the maps. This simple process reveals the complexity of the structural change that the genetic coding must gradually bring about. The inclusion of each new element changes the organism’s response to the

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 97

19/9/07 16:27:07

98

The Development of Consciousness

sensory patterns and increases its dynamic activity. Yet, since this dynamic activity must correspond to dynamic activity predisposed to interact with external information, the genetic coding has to be able to create this dynamic activity before the organism actually enters into contact with its environment in a kind of simulation of the future activity of the organism. Since the construction of the neural assembly is not immediate, the repetition of this activity must also last a certain length of time. Given also that the flow function has to be regulated in both directions of the “s↔o” pathways, this preparatory activity naturally follows the flow of signals, which travel in a systematic manner, oscillating in both directions, so that the main synaptic connections can be fixed. Consequently, when the assembly has been completed, the patterns of activities available to the organism, which are now capable of maintaining the representational properties of the new element along the “s-o” pathways, have in fact been organized by genetic coding. This structural aspect of the assembly of the neural network has an important effect on the life of the organism, even when imagined at a very primitive stage of its evolutionary development. When the reticulum has been assembled, the organism apparently uses these dynamic patterns as mere responses to perceptual configurations. Sensory stimulation modulates them, eliciting the range of possible responses, but this dynamic activation does not end, as Freud believed, once the sensory stimulus stops. The dynamic activation remains as an anticipatory property of the possible responses of the organism to environmental stimulation. This explains the spontaneous dynamic activities possessed by all neural systems, even the most elementary ones. They are properties of the circulation of information that keeps the dispositional structure of the neural network alive and that genetic coding gradually binds during evolution in the patterns of activity of the reticulum. What is developed during the process of evolution, therefore, is the increase in genetic coding of the structural properties of dynamic patterns. These dynamic patterns are also of particular significance in relation to the evolution of the reticulum. As a result of the way in which the reticulum has been conceived, they necessarily originate in the lower levels, where they must remain stable in order

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 98

19/9/07 16:27:08



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

99

to guarantee the correct development of the reticulum, and this is why they are then replicated in the higher levels together with the homologous elements that support them. Being supported by these homologous elements, the dynamic patterns can gradually evolve with the inclusion of new elements. This implies that dynamic patterns are an important regulating property of the integration of the reticulum since the inclusion of new elements is controlled by patterns that have already been implemented and the most stable of these are organized, for reasons of evolutionary conservation, on the first levels of the reticulum.

The dynamic integrative properties of the brainstem It is this process that explains the great importance that the ascending activating system of the brainstem and the reticular formation have in the evolution of the reticulum. This system possesses essential rhythmical patterns which activate the higher systems, and this makes it possible to suppose that these patterns contribute decisively to the assembly of the dynamic patterns distributed throughout the CONSTRUCTION OF S-O PATHWAYS AND DYNAMIC CORTICAL-SUBCORTICAL PATTERNS

ASCENDING ACTIVATING SYSTEM (ERTAS)

BASAL ACTIVATION DYNAMIC PATTERNS

Figure 4.15 The ascending activating system diffuses the basal patterns across the higher levels creating the principal “s-o” pathways and cortical and subcortical cooperation through the reticulum.

Fig.4.15

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 99

19/9/07 16:27:39

100

The Development of Consciousness

reticulum. This means that it is these genetically encoded patterns that determine the principal neuronal connections of the “s-o” pathways in the reticulum. As these connections are being established, certain dynamic flows of information pass along the pathways in the two directions “s↔o”, thereby contributing to the development of the main connections in the reticulum (Figure 4.15). Many activating characteristics of the brainstem, including the well-known ones of the reticular formation (Butler & Hodos, 1966; Brodal, 1959; Olszewski, 1954), can be interpreted according to this general property of integration. The reticular formation is both an important centre for the regulation of neurotransmitters and a complex activator of patterns of signals. That is why the cooperation between the rhythmic modulation of signals and neurotransmitter modulation offers the properties needed to help create the assembly of the fundamental junctions of a neural network and maintain their properties of dynamic integration over time so that the reticulum can continue to evolve. The reticular formation also has the function of maintaining attention while new stimuli are integrated. During the development of the reticulum, the inclusion of a new “o” element in a pathway is a potential source of disturbance to the system; it is only correctly integrated if suitable control re-entries develop from the “s” elements. In the inclusion of a new element during this integration process, patterning of the reticular formation must therefore increase the support for the network that has already been assembled, in order to prevent it from disintegrating. The third aspect concerns the amodal properties of the neurons in the reticular formation that can respond to different sensory signals and also stimulate different cerebral specializations. This would seem to indicate the strong initial participation of common patterns in the different neural systems and therefore the spread of common properties of implementation. It also seems plausible that the slow initial development occurs during the difficult task of simultaneously expanding the different “s-o” pathways. Any new element in a specialization disturbs the whole pattern of the network and this is useful as every single source of disturbance sends alarms everywhere and, in an aspecific sys-

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 100

19/9/07 16:27:40



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

101

tem, all the “s” control elements can intervene. All these general features also suggest the neurophysiological origin of the reticular formation. The reticular formation probably originated from what remained of the original metameric core, which began the development of the reticulum, and the primitive neural structure of this core evolved into the apparently scarcely differentiated structure of the reticular formation. This evolutionarily old neural structure in fact provides, as in the past, the basis for the development of the reticulum, making use in neural control of very refined properties that had already been developed during that early stage of evolution. This helps explain why the reticular formation can still regulate many functional aspects of the reticulum by means of configurations of signals and neurotransmitters, the properties of which are very complex and still not clear to us.

Immaturity and redundancy in the human cerebral reticulum A far more important reason for considering the base of the reticulum as the regulatory centre for the evolutionary construction of the reticulum is the explanation that can quite easily be deduced from the immaturity of the human brain at birth (known as neoteny).5 As it is this immaturity that gives rise to a child’s dependency on the maternal object, it is important to understand why the human reticulum is not completed during the foetal period. Our understanding of the gradual maturation of the child’s brain can in this way be improved, which in turn can help us to understand how the organization of the reticulum immediately influences relations between child and mother. As was seen in Chapter Three, a child has its own autonomous rhythms. It is therefore legitimate to suppose that in the immature brain these rhythms depend on the lower levels of

Neoteny is the phenomenon whereby certain animals can become adults and sexually mature while retaining some embryonic and larval characteristics. The hypothesis as regards humans was first put forward by Bolk (1926), and subsequently reviewed (Montagu, 1962; Schultz, 1968).

5

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 101

19/9/07 16:27:40

102

The Development of Consciousness

the reticulum. Knowing the reasons that lie behind the slowness of brain maturation helps attribute the necessary importance to these patterns during the initial and successive development of the reticulum. The reason for the slowness of maturation of the human brain depends, according to the model presented here, on what is in a certain sense a simple property of evolution: the reticulum already reaches a nearly definitive structural arrangement at the beginning of the speciation of mammals, when the genetic coding begins to be stable, reaching its maximum level. From that moment on, brain development continues by reusing in a different way the replication principle that inaugurated evolution. In this new stage of development, the evolutionary process no longer replicates the elements in the reticulum, but the reticulum itself, by forming entire new replicated reticula, which enter into contact each other. The figure below (Figure 4.16) makes it is possible to imagine the development of this new redundancy of the reticula, which thicken around the original reticulum, thereby creating further possible connections between the original “s-o” systems (the figure shows an associative junction obtained from the redundancy of the reticula):

associative redundancy node replicated reticula

Figure 4.16 During evolution, the reticulum replicates through redundancy. Each element can then become an associative junction for new processes.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 102

19/9/07 16:27:41



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

103

As a result of the new properties of these junctions, small genetic mutations produce local functions of far greater importance in this more complex reticulum, and these functions are able to make better use of the associative networks available in the redundancy or extract more adaptive characteristics from it. Yet, the basal core in this new evolutionary development must be able to support the simultaneous assembly of several reticula, and this more complex task can explain why in a more highly evolved species it is necessary to lengthen the time required for brain maturation before birth. The newer, larger human brain explains therefore why this maturation cannot be completed during gestation: an enormous number of reticula can form inside this huge brain and the basal core can only create, before birth, an incomplete architecture of them. What appears most persuasive in this conceptualization is that it is easy to link the enormous expansion of the human brain –especially of the neocortex–to its initial immaturity. The evolutionary jump implied by the considerable enlargement of the human neocortex highlights the reliability of the basal core, and this may explain the function of maturation in the postnatal period: it follows the development of the original structure of the reticulum, but this development is clearly conditioned by the specific constructive work of the basal regulatory core. This particular view of the genetic-structural dynamics of the reticulum can, if suitably interpreted, shed some light on the complex characteristics of the interaction between child and mother during the initial immaturity of the brain, when this work of construction is presumably most intense.

The dynamic “s-o” core and subject-object integration The reticulum described here, which is clearly an abstract model of the brain, shares many features in common with Edelman/Tononi’s model even though it is based on a different conceptual principle. According to Edelman/Tononi, for example, the mapping extends all the way from the frontal lobe to the occipital lobe, and this global type of arrangement is the same as that of the “s-o” pathways in the reticulum between the subject pole and the object pole.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 103

19/9/07 16:27:41

104

The Development of Consciousness

In Edelman/Tononi’s model, the brainstem has an essential role as the system of “innate values”, indispensable for brain function, depends on this. In the model presented here, the brainstem has an equally important role and explains above all the very origin of global mapping, which forms under the activating influence of the brainstem during the gradual evolution of the reticulum. One of the most interesting features of Edelman/Tononi’s hypothesis is that there are many systems capable of carrying out the same function in the brain (which they call degenerate), and these determine the properties of associative memory and the cooperation between the different parts of the brain. The model presented here has some similar features, resulting from the hypothesis that the original reticulum can be replicated many times in the redundancy of the brain–above all in the neocortex of the human brain–thereby producing a multiple reticulum. The idea that the human brain is made up of a multiple reticulum resulting from the repeated replication of a basal reticulum shows another interesting similarity to Edelman/Tononi’s concept. They attribute consciousness to a dynamic core of the global mapping, a smaller functional aggregation that can continually change its composition in the mapping. The fact that only a part of the mapping contributes to the dynamic core of consciousness explains why consciousness is selective as regards the processing of information by the brain. In the model described here, both these aspects can be derived from the limited characteristics of genetic coding. The genetic coding constructs the main reticulum and this acts as a support for the vicarious associative networks of the other reticula that form the global mapping. The global associative network, though forming between the reticula, continues to depend on the network of the main reticulum, and this gives rise to the mobile but limited properties of the dynamic core. This does not alone explain consciousness–as will be explained later–but it does offer certain hypotheses that can help explain conceptually how certain neurophysiological limits of the associability of the reticula produce processes of varying stability, as they can become functionally isolated and, in relation to the others, unconscious.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 104

19/9/07 16:27:41



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

105

I have immediately highlighted these different aspects as they retranslate Edelman/Tononi’s concept into the Jacksonian one, albeit with an important difference, which I think is fairly clear even before a detailed analysis is provided. The relational concept immediately appears to be more important than the drive concept. Since we have the representation of the object in the object pole and the organization of its control in the subject pole, the “s-o” mapping attributes greatest importance to object relations as they are neurophysiologically based.

The dynamic support of the brainstem and Freud’s dream theory The model presented here is based not upon the simple reticulum, but upon the system of “s-o” pathways that make up the reticulum. The reticulum could not have acquired its present structure if the neural information circulating between the simple original “s-o” pathways had not been able to provide the basis for the gradual development of reconnections between the new elements in a pathway (for example, s1↔o3, s2↔o4, s3↔o6, etc.) and for the creation of innovative associative functions of these elements with other elements in the reticulum. Similarly, this gradual diversification of the elements along each pathway could not have occurred if the patterns of information produced by the brainstem, both globally and locally, had not acted simultaneously as both guide and support in order to maintain the essential connections between the homologous lower and higher levels. This is the simplest explanation for the fact that sleep and dreams originate in the animal brain from brainstem activity. From a functional point of view, as has already been seen, the most recently evolved reticulum is neither stable nor complete, and so it is understandable that, by producing its patterns of support at night, the brainstem systematically takes charge of this unstable development of the reticulum. These patterns might tend to reorder the information encoded in the reticulum, thereby performing the task with which they were entrusted by evolution. This process, which

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 105

19/9/07 16:27:41

106

The Development of Consciousness

appears to be solely neurophysiological, therefore sustains the dynamics between the subject and object poles that can reform in the reticulum even without external information, and the brainstem’s activations intuitively indicate its more general properties that become part of dreams. Basal reorganization is in fact entrusted to evolutionarily older patterns, the function of which is to ensure that the patterns of the higher levels, modified by information arriving from the environment, correspond to the fundamental characteristics of the reticulum. This is why the associative networks of the higher levels return to regressively defend the primary patterns of development, and the object information is automatically reintegrated in a similar manner, because it has to satisfy the primary needs of the subject pole. The core of Freud’s dream theory–the satisfaction of desires– finds its most evident explanation in the evolutionary age of the brainstem: Freud had always hypothesized the phylogenetic origin of the dream process and the brainstem is the evolutionarily oldest part of phylogenetic development. Freud also thought that dreams were the guardian of sleep. This idea does not really contrast with what has emerged here as regards the clearly important properties of the brainstem, which, with its functions, is the hidden guardian of the evolution of the cerebral reticulum.

Introjective and projective coding of the representational system The model presented here, with all its structural and dynamic properties, raises a whole series of questions, the most interesting of which I shall mention now, at the end of the chapter, given its relevance to many of the ideas that will be developed in the following chapters. This question concerns the concept of the introjective and identificatory processes that emerge quite naturally from this model. This concept is the theoretical pivot that makes it possible to tackle the most important aspects of psychoanalytic theory in a sufficiently complex manner, albeit from a neurophysiological point of

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 106

19/9/07 16:27:41



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

107

view, to explain the development of identification in the child and adult. It is the structure itself of the “s-o” pathways of the representational system that justifies how this development is necessarily organized in ways that we define, psychoanalytically, as introjective and projective (Figure 4.17). This depends on the fact that when an object stimulates perception, the sensory “s←o” flow produces, in a specific way, an introjective type of integration of the representational elements. As has already been seen, the flow modifies the content of the “o” elements and at the same time gives rise to dynamic patterns between the “s” elements. In this way, a sensory-perceptual property becomes a stable part of the representational system, together with the dynamic pattern that guides its flow in the “s←o” direction (Figure 4.17a). This change binds the subject pole to this representational content and this explains how the introjection of a property of the object is formed. INTROJECTION

fig.a

s

representational encoding of perceptual flow

on

PROJECTION

o1

o

control of reentry on representation encoding

development of reentry

fig.b

s

on

PROJECTION

fig.c

s

o1

o

control of reentries on representation retrieval

on

o1

o

projection

Figure 4.17 When perceptual information becomes representational, it becomes part of the elements of the pathway and corresponds to an introjective process (a). A new representation can be influenced by re-entry reactivating previous coding “o1” (b) and, generally speaking, re-entries can modify representational reactivation (c). Both these processes are projection.

Fig.4.17

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 107

19/9/07 16:27:42

108

The Development of Consciousness

We can conceptualize in a similar way how a projection is formed. When the representational system develops, the controls of the “s” elements regulate the integration of the representational elements and then allow the “s” elements to have access to the information of the “o” elements. In this process the control information of the “s” elements in the “s→o” direction can influence the integration of the “on” elements in the global pattern of the reticulum, modifying its content while it is being encoded (Figure 4.17b) or retrieved (Figure 4.17c). In both cases, this binds the representation of an “s→o” type of subject information, thereby providing the neurological basis for how a projection functions. These observations may seem too simplistic to explain psychological properties, but, as a result of the way in which information is encoded in both directions of the pathways, representational events cannot form without leaving an introjective-projective trace. It is important to remember where the origin of these fundamental properties lies as they are of such importance to psychoanalytic theory. They depend precisely on the fact of having conceptualized the representational system as a system of “s-o” pathways along which information can travel in both directions. The intrinsic dynamic properties of the reticulum, moreover, help explain how the introjective process does not depend solely on the sensory stimulation of an object or the projective process solely on the controls of the subject pole. The introjective-projective function originates, in other words, because the reticulum is intentionally structured to select and process the patterns of information in both directions as this was the only way in which, during evolution, the brain could rapidly assimilate environmental information and modify it in the best possible way for the organism. These considerations show, in an intuitively clear way, how the identification ability on which human psychology is based has its roots in what is a fairly simple process, i.e. the need for the cerebral reticulum to have its own intrinsic dynamics, which are capable of interacting with the environment. Of course, the fact that the reticulum has its own dynamic integration between the subject and object poles explains why this dynamic integration is the source of the extensive introjective-projective predisposition of the child to object relations.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 108

19/9/07 16:27:42



A NEW MODEL OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT

109

Returning briefly to Freud’s hypotheses, it can be seen that in the Project he often comes close to the idea of subject-object dynamics, without however managing to conceptualize it adequately, despite his obvious goal of defining an active ego that can operate on the “perceptual complex”. The discharge process functions essentially in just one direction of the neural pathway (although, as has already been seen, Freud repeatedly inverted its direction), and this concept remains in the schema (shown in Chapter One) in the Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), influencing the whole of psychoanalytic theory. What is missing in psychoanalytic theory, according to the model presented here, is a dynamic conceptualization that can explain neural activity. This can only acquire a clear structural shape, however, if we imagine an evolutionary type of reticulum, regulated by dynamic patterns, in which information passes along the “s-o” pathways.

J6916_Sasso_P007_109.indd 109

19/9/07 16:27:42

CHAPTER FIVE

Drive dynamics and maternal modulation

Drive theory and the object according to Freud

S

o what are the limits of drive theory? Is it possible to overcome these limits by employing the neurophysiological approach described in the previous chapter? This would undoubtedly provide a more coherent picture of the controversial development of post-Freudian psychoanalysis, in which, from Klein onwards, theoretical concepts focus mainly on a child’s object predisposition towards its mother. It is therefore useful to show how the dynamic hypotheses of the cerebral reticulum offer some valid explanations for the drive model and also show how it can be interpreted in the light of modern relational and evolutionary theories. Let us therefore briefly consider the Freudian drive model. In Freud’s opinion, drive identifies the tension that causes an organism, upon stimulation by a somatic source of excitation, to achieve the goal of satisfaction by means of a suitable object. In Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915c, p. 122), Freud defined the relationship between drive and object as follows: “the object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim”, without any mention of the properties of the

110

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 110

19/9/07 16:35:46



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

111

object in regard to which or through which satisfaction can be achieved. This concept summarises the numerous observations made in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d): the somatic sources of the excitation are described as the real goal of the instinctual drive, without this drive seeming to be guided by any precise information as to the object. Only the vicissitudes of libidinal tension clarify its evolution. This concept undoubtedly focuses the analyst’s attention above all on drive tensions, but it neglects the real characteristics of the object. It is this, put very succinctly, that marks the difference from the relational approach, in which the object is considered to be of primary importance. As is clear from his writings, Freud was very much aware of the importance of a child’s relationship with its mother. He was interested above all, however, in the autonomous properties of the instinctual biological maturation of drive development, which he even described in terms of distinct genetic stages. By examining the way that Freud analysed percepts in the Project, it can be seen that his aim was to provide an accurate objecttype definition of them in order to distinguish between primary and secondary processes. The identification of an internal regulating principle is, however, the most evident aim of the Project, in which Freud’s attention was focused on attempting to clarify how the apparatus evolves to transform energy, be it external or internal, excessive or uncontrollable. This theoretical goal remains in the drive theory and explains why the relational background of the object is clearly distant As will now be shown, the initial maturation of the reticulum explains why it is difficult to describe the neurophysiological notion of object and its relationship with the Freudian concepts of the source and goal of drives. The difficult conceptual core of drive theory and its differences from relational theories can be resolved however by referring to the development of the cerebral reticulum outlined in the previous chapter.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 111

19/9/07 16:35:46

112

The Development of Consciousness

Maturation of the cerebral reticulum It is first of all necessary to briefly consider the maturation of the reticulum, which is still largely incomplete at birth. Integration ideally follows the phylogenetic plan, with the “o” and “s” elements forming slowly at first in line with this evolutionarily old design. A useful indication as to how to interpret this development is provided by neuroimages (Chugani, 1999), which reveal that the most active structures of the brain at birth are the encephalon, hypothalamus, the subcortical basal nuclei and thalamus, the somatosensory and motor cortices, the cingulum, and, after a few months, the ventromedial frontal lobe and amygdala. The neuroimages obviously do not show the actual “s-o” pathways, but they do suggest how they might be reconstructed from the brain areas in which activity is greatest. The somatosensory cortices, for example, can be interpreted as “oc” elements of corporeal tactile perception, as shown in the previous chapter. Since they are right in front of the motor cortices, where “s” type elements are located, their precocious activity at birth probably signals the “sc←oc” direction of the pathways that inaugurates sensorimotor control. These pathways are naturally of fundamental importance for the child’s bodily development and so they mature rapidly at the cortical level. Their merging in the medial part of the cortex gives rise to a more extensive meshing of the pathways between the subject and object poles of the reticulum, as described in the previous chapter. Although neuroimages have not yet revealed this extensive cortical integration at birth, they have revealed the activity of the cingulum, an archaic cortex extending between the two poles. It can be assumed, therefore, that it is this less highly evolved cortex that compensates for the lack of maturation at the cortical level. This hypothesis as to the integration of the “s-o” pathways also explains the subsequent maturation of the ventromedial lobe and the amygdala in the neuroimages. These two structures extend across the frontal pole, which is where, in this model, the “s” elements of the more complex controls are located. These structures are therefore responsible for the growing coordination that develops in the cortex. The amygdala is part of the limbic lobe and this also reveals how the integration of emotions quickly merges with the first somatocorporeal control.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 112

19/9/07 16:35:46



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

113

If these observations are referred to the cerebral reticulum, they suggest how the “o” and “s” elements form in the pathways and on the different levels according to certain evolutionary priorities rather than in a uniform way. Evidently, a phylogenetic hierarchy immediately predisposes the functioning of the alimentary canal and its connection to the hypothalamus, together with the initial sensorimotor organization. As a result of this phylogenetic development, object perception is characterized during the initial stages by the tactile property of the somatic cortex and the olfactory-taste property of the hypothalamus, while acoustic and visual perception are still unrefined. Acoustic and visual perception first forms in the subcortical nuclei (including the thalamus) and only later in the specialized cortical areas. As neuroimages of a more mature brain show, the integration plan develops in an ascending order, culminating in full activity only in the third year of life, after complete myelination of the neocortex has occurred. This indicates a necessary reorganization during the maturation period of the homologous functions that are integrated on the different levels. Indeed, myelination implies not only the completion of the cortical “s-o” pathways of the reticulum, but also of the ascending-descending pathways of the homologous “o” and “s” elements, indispensable for the cooperation between cortical and subcortical structures. The reticulum, however, as explained in the previous chapter, develops under the active influence of the brainstem and it is the dynamic properties of these “s-o” pathways that make it possible to identify a number of elements that support the Freudian concept.

Proto-objectual and objectual integration At birth, it is the constructive activation of the brainstem that stimulates the oscillatory “s↔o” patterns in the reticulum needed to join the pathways in the two directions, and it is this activity that leads to the integration, in a particular order, of the neural pathways on the different levels, starting with the subcortical pathways. This process mainly involves five types of “s-o” pathways, the coordina-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 113

19/9/07 16:35:47

114

The Development of Consciousness

tion of which seems able to explain, albeit with certain simplifications, the difficulties that arise during the initial maturation. First of all it is worth reflecting on how the encoding of external object “s←o” information occurs (Figure 5.1). As the neocortex is still not particularly well integrated at birth, information is analysed and recorded initially only on the subcortical levels, which are maturing as a result of the oscillatory “s↔o” activation of the brainstem. On these levels, genetic coding is therefore still building the sensory-perceptual structures, the properties of which are still not therefore very highly evolved and are essentially determined by endogenous activation processes. External information is therefore PROTO-OBJECTUAL CORTICAL - TACTILE

ocp

scp

ENCODING

SUBCORTICAL – PERCEPTUAL

OBJECT ENCODING CORTICAL – PERCEPTUAL

(oo) (oo)

(so) (so)

sp

op

op (oo)

sp op

sp VISUAL INFORMATION

sp

op

BASAL ACTIVATION PATTERNS

SOMATOSENSORY INFORMATION

Figure 5.1 Encoding of external information takes place initially in the “op” elements of the proto-object structures shaded. As maturation progresses, external information is also encoded by “oo” elements of the cortical object structures shaded.

Fig.5.1

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 114

19/9/07 16:36:05



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

115

encoded on the basis of the only sensory-perceptual characteristics available during this initial integration (which, as mentioned previously, are more numerous in the tactile and olfactory-taste channels than in the acoustic and visual ones). These “s-o” pathways, which identify as yet incomplete properties of object encoding, can be defined as proto-objectual and are indicated as “sp-op” pathways (with the index “p” standing for protoobjectual). They derive from the first neural evolution, when the tactile-motor and olfactory-taste organization is of primary importance and the perceptual systems (especially the visual one) still have few “o” elements. There is therefore little likelihood of there being new encodings capable of providing a more complex, precise object representation. In other words, the cortical pathways of corporeal-tactile perception, “sc-oc”, can be expressed more precisely as “spc←opc”, cortical pathways that also carry initial integration of the proto-objectual tactile properties of the object. It is these phylogenetically archaic characteristics, the main purpose of which is to analyse and encode evolutionarily primary properties of the object, which are influenced by innate structures that predominate during the endogenous reconstruction. They therefore form the proto-object neurophysiological matrix in which the first information originating from the mother can be encoded. What happens on the higher levels–primarily the neocortical level–is quite different, however. When the integration of the “s-o” pathways begins to result in efficient connections as cerebral maturation progresses, external “s←o” information can then also be analysed and encoded by the cortical sensory-perceptual structures. These structures, which are more complex and adaptive, are able to assume the representational characteristics needed to identify specific features of the object. External information can therefore be explored by means of progressively more efficient properties of neural encoding, which more closely reflect the real information of the mother. This more typically objectual aspect therefore concerns pathways that can be indicated as “so-oo” (in which the “o” index stands for object). It is important to understand therefore that, during the development of the brain, external information is necessarily distributed

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 115

19/9/07 16:36:07

116

The Development of Consciousness

differently in these two main structures (subcortical and cortical) as their maturation and integration progresses. The first type of encoding to occur is subcortical and so this proto-objectual encoding acts as a support, together with the ascending pathways of the reticulum, for the cortical encoding. Cortical encoding, which is more objectual, is continuously behind proto-objectual encoding during brain maturation. These observations immediately offer certain explanations, however simplicistic, for the Freudian idea of an imprecise role of the object. The object has various different properties: “op”; “opc”; “oo”. During the initial stage of maturation, the object is characterized more by proto-objectual integration than by objectual integration and does not therefore have complete objectual characteristics. Furthermore, proto-objectual integration is essentially of an endogenous type and this explains the importance of endogenous drives, considered to be of such fundamental importance by Freud.

SOMATIC SOURCES OF LIBIDINAL EXCITATION DIENCEPHALIC-LIMBIC INTERNAL REGULATION

oci

sci

MATERNAL PROTO-OBJECTUAL PATTERNS: BREAST, MILK

SEXUAL PROTO-OBJECTUAL PATTERNS: PENIS, VAGINA

sp si si

oi

op

oi sp

op

sp

op

BASAL ACTIVATION PATTERNS

SOMATOSENSORY INFORMATION

Figure 5.2 Encoding of internal information involves “sci←oci” pathways from libidinal excitatory sources and “sp←op” diencephalic-limbic pathways for maternal proto-objectual patterns.

Fig.5.2

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 116

19/9/07 16:36:23



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

117

The integration of internal information It is now possible to consider how the information specific to internal pathways (marked by the index letter “i”) is integrated. This involves two main structures, responsible respectively for control of the body and for control of the internal environment (Figure 5.2), as described in the previous chapter. As has already been seen, cortical maturation has already begun in the somatosensory cortex at birth and this shows the priority of “sc←oc” integration, both in initial relations with the mother and as regards the necessary internal control of the body. The fact that somatic sensitivity matures first also seems to offer an explanation for the properties of the sources of excitation of bodily innervation. Indeed, Freud conceived them as both a generalized libidinal source and as specific properties of instinctual drive (typically those that activate oral and anal sensitization). The general feature of “sc←oc” sensitization can therefore be interpreted as a libidinal property of bodily integration and the more specific sensitization of the mucous membranes of the mouth and anus as particular sources of drive motivation. Since this is internal, it involves pathways that we can indicate as “sic↔oic”. It is important to note that the tactile “sc←oc” properties also become part of the primary, more important, proto-objectual encoding that occurs during the bodily contact between the child and its mother. The pathways of the somatosensory cortex therefore have the double function of internal corporeal control (sic↔oic) and the proto-objectual encoding of the mother (spc↔opc). The analysis of the information concerning the internal environment is certainly the most complex as it involves all the “si←oi” pathways of primary regulation of the mesencephalon and diencephalon (and their accesses to the limbic lobe), together with a number of other “sp←op” pathways of proto-objectual integration. This system of two different types of pathways is necessary to ensure the bond between child and mother by integrating both internal and external information. For example, the neural pathways of the alimentary canal have already reached maturity at birth, but they work in conjunction with patterns of recognition concerning the mother’s breast, milk, etc. These patterns must

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 117

19/9/07 16:36:24

118

The Development of Consciousness

therefore already have been formed in the proto-objectual sensoryperceptual structures before birth as they are indispensable for the child’s survival. Moreover, given the maturation of the phylogenetic plan, it is plausible to assume that the more archaic sexual “si-oi” pathways and the respective innate patterns of recognition (for the breast, penis, and vagina) also begin to develop precociously and are encoded in the developing proto-objectual structures. These aspects of integration, which give rise to a complex mesh of different integrating pathways, offer more precise explanations for the Freudian concept.

A drive theory interpretation of proto-objectual integration Indeed, by considering all the preceding “o” sensory-perceptual systems, it can be seen that there are actually five different types (oo, op, ocp, oci, oi), which involve the integration of both proto-objectual and objectual properties (op, opc, oo) and more strictly internal properties (oic, oi). These properties relate to different characteristics of the pathways and their inclusion in the same group–that of the “o” elements–may appear a source of confusion. This unification is conceptually useful, however, as it highlights the potential equivalence that can exist between different sensory properties of the “o” type–external and internal–as a result of the initial immaturity of integration (with no distinction being made, for example, between the properties of the child’s own body or internal environment and that of the maternal object). It is plausible to assume that a certain lack of differentiation in the original phylogenetic plan between the internal and external environment lies behind this potential unification. The significance of this unification becomes clear above all if one considers that the integrative process of the subject pole requires the cooperation of the “s-o” pathways in all these systems. Indeed, during maturation the subject pole forms from the coordination of the various “s” elements in order to achieve an efficient control over all the different pathways that are developing, and this potentially binds together the different “o” properties.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 118

19/9/07 16:36:24



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

119

This difficult aspect of integration can be related to the special interest shown by Freud in an infant’s basic drives. During the initial maturation, as a result of the limited integration of the typically objectual cortical pathways, the development of the reticulum seems to depend above all on the proto-objectual pathways, characterized by the predominance of endogenous activation after birth. Furthermore, the tactile proto-objectual tension caused by the mother and the internal tension due to somatic excitation are both present in certain privileged areas during maternal interaction (typically the mouth and anus). These observations suggest that in Freudian theory drive corresponds to the dynamic “s-o” structure during the first stage of proto-objectual integration in the reticulum (sp-op, spc-opc, sic-oic, si-oi), while the structure of the object refers specifically to the sensoryperceptual encoding “o” of the proto-objectual type (op, opc, oic, oi). This conceptualization explains certain problematic characteristics of the Freudian hypothesis, as it identifies the sources of drives, in general, in all the endogenous activations that originate from the “o” elements(sp←op, spc←opc, sic←oic, si←oi) and identifies their goals in the integration of the very same “o” sources (sp→op, spc→opc, sic→oic, si→oi) as a result of the properties of endogenous oscillation. This explains a certain lack of distinction in Freudian theory between sources and goals with regard to the same erogenous zone, and explains the autoerotic function of drives, which derives from the need for a prolonged endogenous sensitization of the “o” elements during the oscillatory activation in order for the “s-o” pathways to be connected in a suitable way. The goals, in turn, are “o” properties, not only of corporeal or internal sensitivity, but also–as was seen previously–of the developing proto-objectual patterns in the reticulum, and this explains Freud’s ambiguous definition “…the object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim.” (1895, p. 122). These different aspects, when considered in relation to the maturation of the reticulum, make it possible to clarify the enormous theoretical distinction between drive theory and relational theory.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 119

19/9/07 16:36:24

120

The Development of Consciousness

Drives and relational predisposition during integration Considering the general integration of the reticulum, it is easy to note how drives necessarily correspond to an internal activity that is predisposed towards the object in a relational way. During maturation, the subject pole forms contemporaneously with the object pole from the development of all the “s-o” pathways. Neural flows cannot therefore travel along the pathways without continuously connecting subject encoding to object encoding. The endogenous activations of the primary levels, which can be considered a characteristic of drives, cooperate immediately after birth with the information entering the sensory-perceptual structures during maturation. On the higher levels in particular, the sensory-perceptual elements form with the substantial integrative contribution of real properties of the object. This process, from the beginning of maturation, thus involves the cooperation between proto-objectual and object pathways of external information and pathways of internal information, all of which converge on the subject pole of the respective “s” elements. It is the motor function of these “s” elements that leads to the coordination of the different patterns of object information that develop in the different sensory-perceptual areas during maturation. All the functions of the reticulum emerge from the integration of the subject and object poles, and therefore necessarily imply relational aspects as real information concerning the mother immediately forms part of the object pole. This enables the different types of information of external or internal origin passing through the reticulum to be combined in many possible ways. An example of this shared integration is shown by the way sexual fantasies can form, during the initial development, with both a drive and relational function. During the mesencephalon-diencephalon maturation of the “sp-op” pathways the most archaic proto-objectual configurations of sexual recognition of the object (penis, breast, etc) begin to form very precociously. During the interaction with the mother, however, maternal representation starts to be encoded at the same time on these proto-objectual levels before being integrated with the objectual encoding on the higher levels.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 120

19/9/07 16:36:24



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

121

The endogenous representations of a sexual type are therefore associated with the maternal representations that are gradually being integrated. In this way, the primary drive patterns immediately have relational properties, influencing the subsequent object development. The object initially evolves from a configuration of endogenous and exogenous proto-objectual elements to include an increasing number of exogenous objectual elements. This explains the relevance of precocious sexual fantasies in drive theory and their continuation as relational properties during the subsequent integration of the object. Libidinal issues, which were of particular importance to Freud in trying to explain how the drive’s aim is in any case related to the object, derive therefore from the complexity of the first proto-objectual properties, which are stimulated by endogenous activation and in any case destined to support integration of the object. The protoobjectual characteristics of the primary patterns of recognition obviously concern the entire somatosensory constellation, which is predisposed at birth for the first interactions. Their main concern is control of the alimentary canal, specifically the oral and anal cavities, as well as that of the entire somatosensory system, including the sexual system. Guiding this interaction is the somatic cortex, which binds the child to its mother through tactile sensitivity that is as yet undifferentiated from future sexual development and object relations. The integration of all the “s-o” processes that depend on this constellation involves many discontinuities, which is reflected in the different objectual characteristics that can become of primary importance for the child. They constitute the extensive system of partial objects capable of inaugurating the libidinal development of the object. Interestingly, this problematic intuition of the complexity of the integration of proto-objectual and objectual properties lies at the basis of object relations in the Kleinian model. According to Klein’s model (1930), objects are basically intrinsic to drives, which depend on the patterns of perception already formed in the child for objects of the external world (breasts, penis, womb, children, etc). These patterns, as is clear from the type of development indicated here, are neural encodings that are essential in order to be able to offer an adequate theoretical description of sexual maturation. These neural

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 121

19/9/07 16:36:25

122

The Development of Consciousness

encodings can consequently only be encoded in the same perceptual structures as those of objectual analysis, i.e. as properties of the nascent object relations with the mother. In this current ethological and neurocognitive hypothesis, the more attentive approach of the Kleinian school of thought is supported by the extensive neural organization of drives, which involves all the motivational systems. That is why Kernberg (1976) conceptualized drives directly as innate biological models of integration.

The introjective and projective characteristics of objectual information Child maturation, as emerges from the above considerations, can be explained in relation to the ability to define, with a certain accuracy, the integration of internal and external information during the development of the cerebral reticulum. Exactly how this occurs is undoubtedly the most problematic and interesting aspect, with this model attempting to provide some detailed explanations. Child development can be described quite simply and in an innovative way if one considers, as illustrated at the end of the previous chapter, the projective and introjective properties that form along the “s-o” pathways during the integration of the representational system. It is this structural function that explains how object information has contemporaneously representational and identificatory features, both of which depend on the interaction with the mother. Since this conceptualization is very important in terms of the ideas presented in this book, it may be useful to briefly re-examine and develop the explanations given for the introjective meaning of the “s←o” flow and the projective meaning of the “s→o” flow (which for simplicity’s sake will be indicated respectively as I and P). If one considers the development of the reticulum, it immediately becomes evident why the “s←o” flow has an implicit introjective I meaning, given the “on←o” neural information that modifies the elements in the “s-o” pathway. When a new “on” element forms, its encoding originates from the processing of the information concerning the object and becomes an internal property of the reticulum. Its content can then be recalled, as was seen in the previous chapter, by

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 122

19/9/07 16:36:25



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

123

means of an opportune re-entry from the “s” element, thereby becoming a representational property. The “s←on” flow implies however that, from this moment onwards, a specific encoding of the reticulum derived from the object has an influence over “s”. This explains why this process can be considered the structural equivalent of the introjective process, which also involves the acquisition of a feature of the object. The specific significance that this process assumes within this model depends however on the structure of the reticulum. In a pathway that has become full of representational elements, not only of the “o” type, but also of the “s” type, this kind of development can produce, during the progressive maturation of the reticulum, different types of introjective bonds (s←o1, s1←o3, s2←o4...). The combination of these bonds in the different pathways helps to form the (generally complex) maturing structure for the introjection of the object, which involves various structures (Figure 5.3a). This obviously raises a number of questions as to the properties that introjection acquires in the various sensory channels and during the different stages of maturation, as will be seen in the following chapter. INTROJECTION

I

introjective subject encoding

fig.a

s

s1

s2

representational encoding s-o bonds

on

associative nodes

o2

o1

o

associative bonds in the reticulum PROJECTION

P

projective subject re-encoding

fig.b

s

s1

s2

representational re-encoding reentries

on

o2

o1

o

projection

Figure 5.3 The introjective process may involve several bonds (a): “o1” may bind “s” and, with further development, also “s1”; “o2” may then become a part of the “s1” bond. Vice-versa (b), activation of “o1”, during “on” encoding, involves projection of representational content; during representational recall, re-entry control may project the properties of “o1” and “o2” on an “on” element.

Fig.5.3

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 123

19/9/07 16:36:28

124

The Development of Consciousness

For similar reasons, the way in which this process is established also explains the projective P significance of the “s→o” flow, which originates from the re-entry connections that have become stable in the control of representational elements, whose information can travel along the pathway in the “s→on” direction (Figure 5.3.b). This inverse flow occurs not only during the recall of representational content, but also during ordinary perception. Ordinary perception is not a passive process, resulting solely from information in the “s←o” direction, it also makes use, by means of the re-entries in the pathway, of the active exploration of representational elements (Freud was very much aware of this characteristic in the Project). The perceptual flow is thereby integrated with the “s→on” representational properties, which anticipate or complete the information pattern. The control carried out by the re-entries makes it possible to shift the integration to elements distributed differently in the pathway; it can also be directed in various ways along the association nodes that the elements form with the other pathways of the reticulum (as will be seen in Chapters Six and Seven). In all these cases, the “s→on” bond implies an influence over the original representational element, the properties of which are reorganized as a result of the involvement of other elements in the reticulum. This modifies perception or object representation, making it dependent on a subjectual control property. For this reason, the “s→on” bond can be considered the equivalent of the psychoanalytic projective process, which also functions by attributing the object with a subjectual property acting as a control. Different types of projective bonds are possible (s→o1, s1→o3, s2→o4...) in a pathway containing numerous representational elements and the combination of these bonds in the different pathways of the reticulum in turn forms the maturing structure for the projection of the object.

The integrative properties of endogenous introjectiveprojective modalities The most useful point that derives from all these considerations is the possibility of conceptualizing the introjective-projective process from

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 124

19/9/07 16:36:29



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

125

the moment the reticulum begins to form, i.e., during the foetal period before the child is born. As has already been seen, the pathways form as a result of the activation support of the brainstem, which stimulates the creation of neural pathways with patterns that enable the endogenous signals travelling in the “s←o” and “s→o” directions to establish the fundamental elements of the reticulum in these pathways. The “s←o” and “s→o” stimulations are therefore equivalent to the endogenous introjective-projective modalities (which consequently can also be indicated as I and P). These stimulations enable genetic coding to start constructing, from the evolutionally inherited programming, the representational map of the reticulum on a level that is still entirely proto-objectual (Figure 5.4). CONSTRUCTION OF CORTICAL-SUBCORTICAL ENDOGENOUS PATTERNS P AND I

I

P

I

P

P P

ASCENDING ACTIVATING SYSTEM (ERTAS)

I

I BASAL ACTIVATION ENDOGENOUS PATTERNS P AND I

Figure 5.4. Basal activation patterns are equivalent to endogenous introjectiveprojective modalities that construct the representational map necessary for dynamic interaction with the environment.

If these properties necessary for the maturation of the reticulum are taken into consideration, it is possible to better understand what happens at birth. Fig.5.4

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 125

19/9/07 16:36:46

126

The Development of Consciousness

The activation of the brainstem is then still indispensable, as the reticulum is largely immature and therefore continues to produce an intense introjective-projective endogenous stimulation in the pathways. Now, however, external sensory information starts to travel along the pathways in the “s←o” direction, which therefore makes a real introjective contribution. The process of implementation of the elements in the reticulum originates therefore from the integration of these two different flows. Both these flows are dynamic, as external sensory information reflects the dynamic activity of the object and is not therefore uniform. The real introjective influence is consequently fixed as a modification of the endogenous introjective-projective dynamics. One of the main features highlighted by child development theories is the synchronization between mother and child, i.e. the kind of rhythmic or synchronized interactions that form in the relationship (Sander, 1985). What unifies all the rhythmical interactions between mother and child from a psychoanalytic point of view is the way in which the synchronization between mother and child becomes a part of the introjective-projective dynamics on the lower levels of the reticulum. It is obviously important to clarify exactly which oscillatory properties of the brainstem act as a support for the construction of the reticulum. As pointed out in the previous chapter, it appears possible to derive them implicitly from the known properties of the reticular formation, which are indispensable for both sleep and waking. The most suitable properties for the development of the reticulum can be considered activations that alternate, with a certain systemicity, the integrations in the two directions (s←o and s→o) of the pathways so as to establish connections that are fundamental for the passage of information in both directions. It is now possible, on the basis of this model of integration, to illustrate how the different projective-introjective dynamics stabilize in the child’s developing brain as a result of the mother’s influence.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 126

19/9/07 16:36:47



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

127

Maternal introjective-projective modulation of endogenous integration In order to follow this development, consider a generic pathway from the lowest levels of the reticulum, the integration of which can act as an example for other pathways. To highlight the most important developmental aspects, I will look at just three levels (B basal, b subcortical, b cortical), as shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, which are generally characteristic of pathway development. Not long before birth, this pathway is still following the foetal integration (Figure 5.5) and is being stimulated, alternately, in both directions by endogenous information alone, which has already completed the basal level of the reticulum and is supporting the still incomplete integration of the pathways of the higher levels.

I

MODULATION

MODULATION

(Eo)

(Es) (bs)

(bn) Bs

Bn

basal activation

I (b ) o

(Es)

(Eo) (bs)

I B o

I

P

P Bs

basal activation

P

(bn) P

Bn

(bo) Bo

Figure 5.5 During the prenatal period, P-I endogenous induction creates neural pathways in the “s←o” (a) and “s→o” (b) directions, endowing the neural system with innate representational properties. The full subcortical pathways indicate the pathways that have already been formed, while the upper dotted pathways (and the elements in brackets) indicate the delay in Fig.5.5 maturation of the human brain, which continues maturing after birth.

After birth, however, external sensory information begins to pass along both the already formed subcortical pathway and the as yet not fully matured upper pathways (Figure 5.6). By indicating endogenous oscillation as P-I (to highlight its projective and introjective significance) and the external, introjective contribution of the mother as Im, it becomes easier to understand how, in broad terms, postnatal integration occurs. This process gives rise to just two fundamental types of integration: the concordance or discrepancy of

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 127

19/9/07 16:36:48

128

The Development of Consciousness

the projective and introjective endogenous flows in relation to the maternal introjective flow. MODULATION

I+

Im

MODULATION

(Eo)

(Es) (bs)

(bn) Bs

Bn

basal activation maternal activation

(bo) Bo

I Im

P

+

Im

(Es)

(Eo) (bs)

(bn) Bs

P

Bn

basal activation maternal activation

(bo) Bo

Im

Figure 5.6 When endogenous modulation P-I passes along the neural pathways in both directions, external information Im only passes along the pathway in the “←” direction. This is concordant with the endogenous oscillation of the “←I” polarity (a) and discordant with the “P→” polarity (b). This process involves the formation of projective and introjective states in the relationship Fig.5.6 on the cooperation between external information with the object that depend and endogenous proto-objectual states.

When endogenous oscillation is of the I type, the flow of information travelling along the pathway creates “on←o” bonds in the developing representational elements. In this situation, the Im flow of information has characteristics that are concordant with those of I and can thereby facilitate the integration of object information in the elements in the pathway. The flow of information of the I type can therefore be interpreted as endogenous introjective states that favour the introjection of real properties of the object. It is important to note that if one sensory pathway matures more actively than the others, the introjective endogenous flow of information functions as a proto-objectual selective filter of the characteristics of the object. So when the I flow reaches a certain intensity during a given stage of sensory integration, it can make a greater contribution than the introjective contribution of the object itself, as will be seen in the examples that follow. When, on the other hand, the oscillation is of the P type, the flow of information passing along the pathways creates bonds of

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 128

19/9/07 16:36:48



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

129

the “s→on” type in the developing representational elements. In this situation, the information resulting from the Im contribution has discordant “on←o” characteristics. The P type flows of information can therefore be interpreted as endogenous projective states that contrast with the real introjective properties of the object. In this case, the process of integration occurs in the pathway with a necessary modulation between the real introjective properties of the object and the endogenous projective properties. Here too, the kind of sensory channel active during this stage of maturation functions like a proto-objectual filter–this time projective– with regard to the integrability of the object, which can give rise to projective properties that contrast with its real introjective contribution. Even though the integration scheme may appear simple in the two modalities, I and P, it in fact implies two non-symmetrical types of integration. This is due to the fact that the information coming from the object may pass in both cases along the neural pathways in just the “s←o” direction, either in accordance with I or in contrast with P. This non-symmetry of endogenous modulation makes it possible to conceptualize numerous structural forms of pairings between exogenous and endogenous activation patterns during maturation, examples of which now follow.

Excitation, attenuation, and regulation of spontaneous patterns A newborn infant may find itself during interaction with the mother in a particular I integration modality, such as the tactile channel. It is therefore predisposed, in that moment, towards selecting and receiving that specific sensation from its perceptual system, as it has the same “s←o” direction as the stimulation coming from the mother. The maternal sensory characteristics are therefore filtered and bound to the proto-objectual levels during this interaction in such a way that the tactile channel can become the primary organizer of the introjective relations with the mother. This bond can become fixed not only because of the endogenous facilitation, but above all because of the rhythmicity that can occur, quite naturally, between maternal stimulation and the infant’s responses.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 129

19/9/07 16:36:48

130

The Development of Consciousness

Mothers have an innate ability to realize whether their children are in general responding to the corporeal stimuli they are providing, and this makes it easier for the maternal rhythms of stimulation to combine with the endogenous rhythms of reception. The type of combination undoubtedly depends on the specific features of the mother-child pair, but it may also depend on the specific endogenous features of the child. The precocious origin of tactile patterns explains why, shortly after birth, the skin can already represent complex mother-child relations, as observed by Bick (1968). Similar processes in specific integrations of the endogenous modulation I can bind visceral, somatosexual or sensory-perceptual functions of the child to specific introjective relations of the mother. A simple way of imagining how such precision and intensity are possible in the mother-child pair is to liken the child’s endogenous oscillation to a pendulum that receives impulses at one end. The repetition of an impulse, however weak, in the direction favouring motion will produce an oscillation that follows the rhythm of the pendulum, but if the impulse is increased, even by just a small amount, the arc of swing increases visibly. It is similarly possible to understand how a mother can maintain a natural stimulation of the child’s rhythm or can excite it by intensifying excessively the stimulation pattern she has been using during her relationship with the child. It is also possible to understand how the endogenous oscillation can be reduced in intensity. At a certain level and moment of maturation, the child may only be ready for the integration of certain somatosensory processes, but not for others. The mother, on the other hand, follows her own preferential activation pattern (such as a visual-acoustic one when the child is hungry or cold). In this case, the integration processes that remain independent of the mother may oscillate freely, integrating themselves solely with endogenous proto-objectual properties, but they may also be reduced in intensity by the lack of a response. The integration process stimulated by the mother, on the other hand, is organized by a forced oscillation, the pattern of which is significantly altered. The latter case is more intuitively understandable and it is possible to see how maternal introjection acts in practice. The auton-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 130

19/9/07 16:36:49



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

131

omous pattern is not just regulated, but also modified, and this is equivalent to the acquisition of a supplementary rhythm, which is stably encoded with the proto-objectual representation of the mother that is being integrated into the sensory-perceptual system. Even though the mother is an external object for the child, she now becomes an internal property of the reticulum. It is important to note that the representational elements fixed during the interaction are not necessarily all maternal. They, in fact, derive from both endogenous proto-objectual elements and exogenous objectual elements. Nevertheless, the dynamic pattern that forms integrates the endogenous proto-objectual elements during the interaction with the mother and therefore represents her in both endogenous and relational ways. This aspect of integration is clearly present even if the effects on the child of the P modality are considered. The child can, in fact, be in an endogenous integrative P modality in a certain sensory channel, which then favours the development of an “s→on” re-entry (tactile, visceral or somatosexual). If the P modality of that channel predominates over the sensory information that the neural system receives in other channels from the mother, a non-objectual property can form, which is usually of a hallucinatory nature. It can, however, also produce the transformation of an introjective relation I that is stabilising in the pathways of that channel, modifying it with the contribution of the opposite P polarity. In both cases there is the contrasting cooperation of projective protoobjectual elements and introjective encodings, which can fix projective sensory properties as stable characteristics of the relationship with the mother. The transformation of proto-objectual properties into evolved objectual properties is clearly the most important process of neural maturation. This transformation depends above all on the ability of the mother to regulate in an optimal way in her interaction the cooperation between endogenous and exogenous states, and to modify the harmful effects of the proto-objectual introjections and projections. This identifies, as will be explained in the following chapter, the general properties of maternal interaction and modulation of the P-I oscillation.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 131

19/9/07 16:36:49

132

The Development of Consciousness

The influence of primary patterns on later development I believe that it is useful to show how the drive concept, which is at the origin of psychoanalytic theory, can not only be clarified within this framework of reference, but can also justify the powerful effects of the primary patterns of mother-child interaction in later maturation. By considering the concept of the source of drives, it can be seen that this basically identifies a partial libidinal and autoerotic property of the child’s somatic “baggage”. According to the concept presented here, on the other hand, it is a property of the initial integration of “sic↔oic” pathways of the somatic cortex during the interaction with the maternal object. Oral and anal personality traits, both normal and pathological, are therefore determined together by the properties of the “sic↔oic” pathways and early proto-object relations “sp↔op”. Despite their apparently simple manifestations, they, in fact, involve what are already very complex neurophysiological characteristics of integration, which then have to support the subsequent, typically objectual integration. This specific development explains why these personality traits remain recognisable in later symbolic manifestations (which, according to the classical viewpoint, is the basis for drive theory). Sucking, for example, involves temporal coordination between different tactile, taste, and motor modalities; furthermore, it involves many reorganizations of the physiological anticipatory expectations of the internal environment, the oral cavity, and explorable visual space. All of these patterns are therefore established during the first relationship with the object. During subsequent integration, these different modulations of the first dynamic organization of the reticulum can therefore support similar patterns, but in situations that are very different from the original ones. For example, the act of sucking may correspond to the rapid change, in mental activity, in the states of external-internal perceptual representation or to their simultaneous temporal acceleration in the associative flow. This type of development and propagation of integration patterns is easy to understand if the ascendant-descendent bonds between maps on the different levels are considered. A primary pat-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 132

19/9/07 16:36:49



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

133

tern that is organized dynamically between certain elements can replicate its own function in the homologous elements on the higher levels. Moreover, as a result of the numerous associations of the reticula, it can diversify into complex modalities, which maintain their original properties however (Figure 5.7).

Gs

Js

Es

Ds

cortical associative node

Go

cortical patterns

basal patterns of primary s-o pathways

Jo

Fig E o

Do

association reticula

Bs Ds C s

As x

x

x x

x

Do Co

A Bo o

Figure 5.7 A primary pattern may extend along ascending pathways and become the associative source of other patterns in secondary reticula. .5.7

All psychoanalysts quickly recognize the type of evolved transformation that can be traced back to a more elementary trait of the original pattern established with the mother. They implicitly treat this transformation not as a mere drive derivative, but as the effect of a general type of organizer. Another equally interesting example can be found by considering the classical symbolisms of pathology, such as a faecal penis, baby-faeces or anus-vagina, which indicate an original confusion of properties of primary representation in the different visceral-sensorimotor systems. Reflecting on the exiguity of the genetic code, it is possible to offer some explanations for their importance and significance. Sphincter control, for example, is clearly an archaic function that has been tried and tested over a long period of time and evolution, by means of small genetic changes, differentiated this into anal, vaginal, pharyngeal, and gastro-duodenal control. It is plausible to assume therefore that during postnatal immaturity the different controls for the various sphincters can make use of common char-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 133

19/9/07 16:37:00

134

The Development of Consciousness

acteristics of muscle control and sensitivity. In this way, the properties of retention and contact of the anal mucous membrane with the faeces can be shared during ontogenetic maturation with those of retention and contact of the penis in the vagina, together with the common characteristics of visceral excitation. Discontinuous or systematic patterns of the relationship with the mother can contribute during the initial integration to fixing in a variety of ways these states of endogenous and exogenous excitability, which during the subsequent maturation maintain the relational properties that made them important during the first stage of development.

Dynamic drive patterns and object integration Once the different characteristics of the drive have been defined, starting with the dynamic properties of the various “s-o” pathways, it should be easier to understand how the different functional properties attributed to the drive operate. The sources of drives are the numerous sensory-perceptual “o” elements that endogenous activation sensitizes in the “s←o” direction of the pathways, while their goal is to achieve the necessary integration effects in the opposite “s→o” direction. This recursive process is indispensable for the completion of the constructive sense of endogenous oscillation, the purpose of which is to integrate the “s↔o” dynamic patterns necessary for the development and control of the sensorimotor apparatus. The fact that the source and goals of drives can refer to the same “o” elements is not difficult to understand in this model as the sources serve to initiate dynamic patterns and the goals to conclude them locally. Typically, the somatosensory areas of bodily erotization constitute the sensitive surface of the psychic apparatus of greatest drive evidence as they put the child in contact with its mother. As Freud noted, however, drive properties can involve the entire muscular and perceptual system, as well as the sensitization of the whole of the internal system. Considering that drive is generally a dynamic property of the “s↔o” patterns, it is possible to conclude that these patterns are

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 134

19/9/07 16:37:01



DRIVE DYNAMICS AND MATERNAL MODULATION

135

necessarily an implicit goal of the drive, which has to exist in order for satisfaction to be achieved. It may therefore seem surprising to conclude that–unlike Freud, for whom the satisfaction of the goal of a drive lay in neural discharge–the dynamic patterns themselves are the goal of integration. This depends, however, on the very concept of the cerebral reticulum, the neurological life of which is dynamic. On the basis of this idea an “s-o” relation can only be defined in terms of neural dynamic patterns that are integrating between the subject and object poles, at the same time as flows of information for bodily and internal control are being integrated. It must therefore be accepted that even when a certain proto-objectual predominance may lead us to imagine, in the child or adult, a decidedly intrapsychic origin of early maturation, this necessarily forms under the influence of an objectual integration. Moreover, this integration could not occur without the constructive activation of endogenous oscillation, which explains why the proto-objectual maturational tension becomes part of the interaction with the mother. I believe that it is possible to justify fairly easily the observations of the numerous authors mentioned in Chapter Three concerning the development of mother-child interaction by considering endogenous oscillation. This interaction is undoubtedly aimed at the search for, and support and confirmation of multiple modulations of the sensory and perceptual levels necessary for communication, which make it possible to share and regulate the interaction in such a way as to obtain a correct objectual development. As was noted earlier, in Lichtenberg’s opinion (1989) initial development already implies schemata or scripts, which then provide the basis for the different motivational systems. For Emde (1988), too, there is an internalization of specific models of mother-child relations, while for Brody (1982) the self-regulated schemata established in childhood persist throughout adolescence. According to Call (1980) mother-child interaction occurs by means of reciprocal visual, sensorimotor, auditory, and kinaesthetic activities. It therefore appears convincing when Sander (1985) describes this process as the growth of a specific synchronized complementarity between the child’s interactions with its mother.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 135

19/9/07 16:37:01

136

The Development of Consciousness

Each of these points indicates the importance of the mother-child interaction in bringing about a suitable sensory-perceptual stimulation so as to modulate the spontaneous endogenous oscillation of the child and integrate it with the object-relational development. It should now be understandable why such importance has been attached to the P-I endogenous oscillation. This is indispensable if the pathways are to be constructed in both the “s→o” and “s←o” directions and the two functions of greatest interest to psychoanalytic theory–projection and introjection–are to be predisposed. This explains how these two functions interact from the very beginning with the introjective Im properties of object information. Without such a dynamic definition, it would not be possible, according to this model, to understand the complexity of a psychoanalytic type of child development.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 136

19/9/07 16:37:02

CHAPTER SIX

Normal and pathogenic development of mother-child interaction

The P-I dynamics of mother-child interaction

T

he dynamic concept of the reticulum is very useful in helping to understand drive development and its relationship to relational development, as was seen in the previous chapter. The characteristics of the P-I dynamics are even more interesting, however, as they permit a thorough analysis of Edelman/Tononi’s hypotheses about neuronal selection in cerebral mapping, and suggest other more complete explanations of how maternal interaction can modify the child’s brain. The widely held belief that mother-child relations necessarily produce cerebral changes (Schore, 1994; Hadley, 1989) has a plausible explanation in the effects that maternal patterns can have on the development of the “s-o” pathways of the reticulum, as will now be illustrated. The most interesting feature of these changes is not however their mere neurophysiological significance, but the kind of theoretical framework they provide for the different psychoanalytical models, from Freud onwards. The P-I dynamics, approached in the right way, shed light not just on the way in which the mother directly influences the maturation of certain neural areas, but also on the way in which these developments typically identify different perspectives in psychoanalytic theory. 137

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 137

19/9/07 16:37:02

138

The Development of Consciousness

I believe that the advantages of this analysis are quite evident as it enables the different psychoanalytic models to be explained in the light of a common dynamic process. This is achieved, moreover, without any loss of their specific characteristics by using the general properties of cerebral dynamics rather than by unifying them in some generic way. Were this hypothesis to be embraced by the psychoanalytic community, it would undoubtedly enhance the significance of theoretical models that tend to be overlooked nowadays, by helping to reveal in a more precise way the ideas on which they are based. Furthermore, this would enable them to be described in terms of a single framework that is no longer characterized by excessively dogmatic distinctions. The pre-eminent aspects of all of these processes can be traced back to certain preferential P-I dynamics in the reticulum, which maternal interaction can help to fix in the child. These dynamics can be conceptualized by using certain typical classes, which highlight the effects of the greater or lesser prevalence of projective P or introjective I modalities in the “s-o” pathways. They also make it possible to define a kind of generative tree of the different types of maternal influence during brain maturation (Figure 6.1). There are numerous classes but, as will be seen shortly, it is sufficient to understand the function of some of the main ones in order to be able to rapidly identify the properties of the others. A number of symbols facilitate the interpretation of these classes in the tree. The dynamics indicated by P° and I° define dominant projective and introjective modalities: P and I refer to strong modalities, P and I to normal modalities, and (P) and (I) to weak modalities. The importance of the generative tree is not merely that it attempts to offer a unified picture of a child’s development of identification, but that it above all clarifies how the different classes generate the precursors of pathogenic development. In this model, the precursors help to explain Freud’s primal repression and its retranscription during the subsequent maturation of the various levels, although there are certain conceptual differences resulting from the type of dynamics hypothesized here for the integration of the reticulum. The different ways in which these dynamics are established precociously in the reticulum produce (as

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 138

19/9/07 16:37:02

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

139

will shortly be illustrated), a number of properties of the unconscious that cannot be explained simply in terms of the repression concept. These properties must also be explained in terms of certain characteristics of procedural memory. As a result, precursors are very complex dynamic structures and only their main features are identified by the classes. Correctly interpreted, however, they can offer considerable insight into the difficulties a child may encounter during its brain maturation. TOTAL ABSENCE OF THE OBJECT

PREDOMINANT ABSENCE OF THE OBJECT

P°

I°

P-(I) W1

DISCONTINUOUS ABSENCE-PRESENCE

P-I

W2

TRANSITIONAL CLASS W1

P-I

P

PREDOMINANT PRESENCE OF THE OBJECT TRANSITIONAL CLASS W2

W3

NORMAL PROJECTION

ABSOLUTE PRESENCE OF THE OBJECT

TRANSITIONAL CLASS W3

I

NORMAL INTROJECTION

Figure 6.1 Generative tree of the different pathogenic classes.

The generative tree derives from two main classes, indicated by the symbols P° and I°, which indicate the two extreme modalities of development, i.e. the total absence or total presence of the mother. These two classes serve to highlight the basic effects of the interaction. The main characteristics of this tree can be understood by beginning with the properties of these two classes and the more normal properties of the two P-(I) and P-I classes that derive diFig.6.1 rectly from them. These four classes characterize the typical aspects of the different types of child development and that is why a fairly detailed description will be provided. The other classes, as will become clear, derive from these basic properties.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 139

19/9/07 16:37:02

140

The Development of Consciousness

The P° class: the total absence of the object The P° class provides a useful introduction to the properties of this generative tree. Ideally, this class represents the situation of total abandonment of the child, whose brain system receives no stimulation at all from the mother. In this case, the only information arrives from the inanimate environment, the contribution of which to the stimulation of the child will be ignored for the moment. The child’s brain here is apparently in the most suitable modality for its own autonomous development as the P-I endogenous oscillation, which alone guided the integration of the neural pathways of the reticulum during the foetal period, is not subject to any kind of interference. But what happens in this situation to the natural P and I properties of the oscillating rhythm that are constructing the neural pathways in the two directions? According to this model, the oscillation is evolutionarily predisposed in such a way that the increasing maternal introjection cooperates with endogenous introjection, thereby contrasting the P modality in a balanced way. If the mother is absent, however, there is no introjection on her part and so this balance is upset, causing P to become dominant. As a result, the influence of the flow in the “s→o” direction increases during the maturation of the pathway. Each developing “on” element is stimulated towards integration, thereby privileging, from that moment onwards, the flows of information travelling in that direction. The flow of information in the pathway therefore becomes more active in the projective modalities. If Edelman/Tononi’s hypothesis of neuronal selection is used to interpret this kind of flow, it can immediately be noted how the projective predominance translates not into a simple preferential direction for the processing of the information, but into a more complex structural change in the pathway. Consider, for example, a pathway containing various elements (s1-s2...o3-o2-o1). They generically represent neuronal structures that are connected by the pathway to the different parts of the brain, and therefore correspond to the groups of neurons in Edelman/Tononi’s primary and secondary repertoires in the different maps (the “s1” element is found in map “m1’, the “s2” element is found in map “m2” etc). In this model, the primary repertoire corresponds to the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 140

19/9/07 16:37:03

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

141

elements available in the basic reticulum and its replications, which originate as a result of the redundancies. The secondary repertoire, obtained from the interaction with the environment, corresponds to the elements that are being integrated as a result of the information being received from the mother. When the absence of maternal introjection causes P to become dominant, the pathway develops massive re-entries between the maps in the “s→o” direction, directly influencing, immediately after birth, the primary repertoire of elements in the pathway. During this process, the re-entries direct themselves above all towards the elements in the sensory and perceptual maps situated at the end of the pathway, while the representational maps, which are more internal, do not form from a suitable selection of elements from the secondary repertoire as a result of the absence of object information. This defective process of selection is equivalent to an excessive control by the re-entries in the “s→o” direction, extending to the very end of the pathway, where the perceptual systems are located. These are not normally affected by the re-entry of the “s” elements and are therefore inaccessible to internal information. This is why they are considered encapsulated, to use the definition given by the systemic theories of brain organization (Fodor, 1983; Napolitano, 1990) to this inaccessibility. In practice, the increase in the number of re-entries potentially involves a complete reversal of the flow (of a hallucinatory type) towards the perceptual extremum, while representational information is both insufficient and proto-objectual (Figure 6.2). excessive development of perceptual inadequate development of representational

P s

o subject activation

predominant perceptual sensitization

Figure 6.2 The effect of a predominant P on the development of re-entries.

Fig.6.2 J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 141

19/9/07 16:37:03

142

The Development of Consciousness

If a general interpretation is given to this process, it can be seen that the development determined by maternal abandonment theoretically influences all the “s-o” pathways involved in early brain development, for both external and internal information. It therefore emphasises the hallucinatory perception of the “o” extrema of the typically perceptual proto-object pathways “sp→op” (visual and auditory), somatosensory pathways “spc→opc” and “sic→oic” (tactile and erogenous) and internal stimulation pathways “si→oi” (hunger, thirst, and the visceral-somatic stimulation of the alimentary canal). In this extreme situation there is no interaction with the mother at all and so the various sensory-perceptual “s-o” pathways cannot be coordinated by sufficiently stable maternal patterns, which enable the different dynamics to cooperate. These dynamics are therefore regulated exclusively by the autonomous endogenous oscillations. As a result, the “s” elements form ties that depend on the instability of the initial integration and this instability is reflected in the hallucinatory sensitization of the “o” elements. The problems of such a type of development are clearly visible in the maturation of the representational systems of the proto-object and object levels. While the “s-o” pathways are progressively being established, they are also simultaneously connected in the vertical direction, forming pathways of homologous elements. During this vertical maturation, the basal elements provide the necessary support for the integration of new information arriving in the higher elements of the reticulum. The child’s state of abandonment drastically modifies the important properties of basal activation, however. With regard to the note in Chapter Four, a primary element Bn can continue to support the integration of the homologous elements bn and βn. Yet, even though these elements are endowed with potentially more evolved characteristics, they cannot become part of a plan that is far more highly differentiated (Figure 6.3). The absence of information from the mother does not, in fact, contribute to the Darwinian selection of other elements and so these elements tend to remain the only ones in the higher pathways. Though appearing to become integrated, the reticulum in fact becomes poorer in elements in relation to the number available, while there is an increase in the influence of the patterns activated by the brainstem, which phylogenetically controls the vertical integration.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 142

19/9/07 16:37:03

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

143

As this process intensifies, it produces a kind of evolutionary arrest, resulting in the Bn=bn=βn assimilation between the different evolutionary functions of homologous elements in the reticulum and a progressive displacement of the elements towards the object pole caused by the predominance of the re-entries as a result of P. Es

Po

En=Bn bs

Po

Bs

P

Eo

bn=Bn bo Bn Bo

basal activation CLASS

P°

Figure 6.3 In the absence of object information, the “P→” modality increases the development of elements in the “o” extremum. The bn and βn elements form as a result of the gradual assimilation of the subcortical proto-object elements Bn.

Fig.6.3 Edelman/Tononi’s hypothesis makes it possible to define, in the total absence of the mother, certain precise effects of the predominance of P, which can be attributed to a clearly pathogenic class. It identifies the hallucinatory-projective neurophysiological processes that can sensitize the entire somatosensory-perceptual system with a general impoverishment and fragmentation of the integration of the elements in the reticulum. These processes can be included within the broad clinical area of pathologies of a psychotic and schizophrenic kind, and therefore seem able to characterize the precursors of their development, involving, as will shortly be explained, the left-hand side of the generative tree. Considering the characteristics of the other main I° class, which results in the pathogenic development of the opposite kind, I believe that Edelman/Tononi’s hypothesis is extremely useful, as it immediately provides an intuitive framework for the neurophysiological effects resulting from the two basic dynamics of the reticulum, from which all of the other classes differentiate.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 143

19/9/07 16:37:03

144

The Development of Consciousness

The I° class: the constant presence of the object The I° class represents, once more ideally, the situation in which the mother is always stimulating the child. In this case, maternal information, indicated as Im in order to distinguish it from the normal Im, is abundant and pervasive. So what happens in this oscillating P-I situation? As the endogenous introjection receives continuous support from the mother, the flow of information in the “s←o” direction becomes dominant and so the P modality is attenuated. That is why the class is indicated as I° and, from a theoretical point of view, it indicates the class of the constant activating presence of the object. Applying Edelman/Tononi’s hypotheses regarding the neuronal selection of elements in a pathway, it is easy to imagine that the effects will be the opposite of what happened in the previous case. The maternal information in the “s←o” direction now favours the maturation of the “o” type elements of real perception and representation, and their connections to the “s” elements also increase. Yet, it is not possible for a sufficient number of re-entries to form in the “s→o” direction as the P modality is at best almost negligible (Figure 6.4). inadequate development of reentries

I o

s subject passivation

perceptual sensitization representational sensitization

Figure 6.4 The effect of a predominant I on the development of re-entries.

As outlined in Chapter Four, during normal development the “s” re-entries of a pathway are indispensable for the transformation of perceptual elements into representational elements, thereby favouring a suitable structural isolation of the perceptual system. During this development in which the P modality is lacking, the absence of re-entries results in an increase in the object pole of representational elements that Fig.are 6.4scarcely differentiated from the perceptual ele-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 144

19/9/07 16:37:04

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

145

ments. Interpreted dynamically, it can be seen that the characteristic feature of this process is the powerful hallucinatory introjective nature of the I° class. An “on” element bound precociously to an “s” element binds its dynamic properties stably to those of the “s” element. A pattern of “on” elements can, in this way, become a powerful binding activator of the dynamic pattern of “s” elements, which must necessarily replicate its characteristics. Moreover, the “on” elements form from the object with reduced representational properties as they maintain relevant perceptual functions, while the development of the elements tends to increase in the direction of the subject pole. The “on” elements therefore give rise to hallucinatory introjective properties in the “s” elements while the strong “s←on” bonds of the basal patterns develop along the vertical pathways into the higher patterns, in which they act as pathogenic precursors of integration (Figure 6.5). Es

mIm

En bs

mIm

bn Bs

Bn

mIm

CLASS

I°

Eo

bo

Bo maternal activation

Figure 6.5 The continuous activating presence of the object accentuates the “s←o” direction in the development of the representational elements, giving rise to hallucinatory introjections of the object. The identifying proto-object patterns can then support the developing cortical representational patterns.

This type of development makes the strong bond of identification that forms in the “s”Fig.6.5 pole intuitively understandable: the subject is the object, but with a latent deprivation of a subject function and without a representational function of the object. As this is something that will be referred to on several occasions, it is important to note that this kind of bond between “o” and “s” patterns, which assumes pathogenic properties in the I° class, can be considered a fundamental characteristic of the reticulum. This

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 145

19/9/07 16:37:04

146

The Development of Consciousness

characteristic has its origin in the way in which the flows of information in the reticulum evolved, firstly travelling along the motorperceptual pathways in the priority “s←o” direction. It therefore generally identifies the type of privileged connections that constitute the structural basis for the evolution of the reticulum. As previously noted, Freud was well aware of this natural motor-perceptual cooperation, providing in the Project a nearly identical interpretation: While one is perceiving the perception, the movement itself is copied– that is, one innervates so strongly the motor image of one’s own which is aroused towards coinciding (with the perception), that the movement is carried out. Hence, one can speak of a perception having an imitationvalue. (Freud, 1895, p. 333).

This type of motor-perceptual “copying” is supported by the discovery of the prefrontal mirror neurons mentioned in Chapter Four, which respond to visual movements with motor patterns (Gallese, 1999, 2003; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). It can therefore be stated that from a pathogenic point of view the I° class characterizes the natural predisposition to transform dynamic perception patterns into an imitative type of dynamic motor patterns, which here are interpreted as properties of the “s” elements destined to become subject elements. Perceptual sensibilization acts as a property of the object on the subject and this makes it possible to examine the broad area of developments–both hallucinatory and de-personalized–of the adhesive-imitative fusing precursors of the false self which, as will be seen, affect the right-hand branch of the generative tree.

The initial instability of integration and the ideal developmental balance The two extreme classes described define the two fundamental types of pathogenic development that, according to this model, can be encountered by a child as a result of the radicalization of the endogenous dynamics.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 146

19/9/07 16:37:04

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

147

The strong initial autonomy of endogenous oscillation suggests that, in general, brain maturation is particularly exposed immediately after birth to the danger of both these types of integration. If left alone for a long time, a child, as a result of the speed of endogenous maturation, can initiate developments of a P° type, while during an intense interaction with the mother, it can initiate developments of an I° type. This can produce very complex, unstable precursors before a specific type of dynamic modality is differentiated. It is also important to remember that the initial integration is being continuously reorganized by endogenous oscillation, which has the phylogenetic goal of developing balanced functions along the “s-o” pathways of the reticulum. This, in general, protects brain maturation by redirecting the pathogenic precursors of these two types towards a more correct integration. This aspect is exemplified in normal development by the central axis of the generative tree, which constitutes throughout brain maturation the ideal balance between the P and I properties of endogenous oscillation. The endogenous oscillation is gradually integrated by means of an optimal modulation of maternal introjection. By considering the difficult passage from free endogenous oscillation to one bound by maternal interaction, it is immediately understandable why theoretical models find it difficult to clearly identify the beginning of development. Indeed, maternal modulation seems hardly to influence postnatal endogenous regulation, which is what makes a child seem to have a natural narcissistic predisposition (according to Freud), an autistic one (according to Mahler), or objectless one (according to Spitz). According to the model presented here, this first period of development is already characterized by numerous interaction processes, but they are rendered unstable by the fairly limited dynamics of the P° and I° type precursors. The successful development of this instability occurs, ideally, in the W1 class of the central axis (discussed later), capable of producing a balanced integration of the two types of precursors. But, either side of this short period of critical development, the main precursors can evolve into two typical pathogenic classes: P-(I), derived from P°, and P-I, derived from I°. These classes make it possible to understand in practice the properties of these two fun-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 147

19/9/07 16:37:05

148

The Development of Consciousness

damental modalities of integration and immediately reveal their important influence in the primary organization. Of the two classes, however, it is the P-(I) class which can form more rapidly precisely as a result of the autonomous endogenous development that initially guides maturation.

The P-(I) class: prevailing absence of the object Indeed, the P-(I) class introduces the most easily recognisable and most dynamically interesting aspects of the lack of maternal modulation. The absence of the mother is now only partial–not total–and this relative lack of modulation helps explain how endogenous oscillation is reorganized when a certain pattern of interaction is repeated. The object information arriving from the mother is now generally insufficient and in order to indicate its reduced efficacy it has been indicated as (I)m. Its introjective contribution is therefore added to the endogenous introjection, without however managing to suitably balance the projective contribution of the oscillation, which remains predominant. That is why it is possible to indicate this type of dynamics as P-(I), in which P indicates a strong projective modality and (I) a weak introjective modality in the pathways. Following Edelman/Tononi’s hypothesis, the pathways will mature by further accentuating the re-entries of the “o” elements and by increasing the projective-hallucinatory characteristics of the pathways. Yet, the effects of the maternal modulation, though weak, are now evident in the integration of the reticulum, resulting from the recursiveness of the endogenous oscillation. It is useful to see how this recursiveness works in order to understand how the projective-introjective oscillation is generally established in the reticulum. When the mother is present, during this introjective stage, she favours the integration of her object properties, however limited, with the strong proto-object properties. Then, during the next stage, when she is absent, the P modality becomes of greatest importance and is able to construct projective re-entries for the hallucinatory proto-object elements that are developing. During each new cycle in which the mother returns to interact with the child, the new

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 148

19/9/07 16:37:05

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

149

object information is integrated with the previous elaboration, i.e. with the “on” elements permeated with proto-object projections. The introjective process therefore develops, but now with the projective proto-object properties of endogenous origins. This development can provide an interesting neurophysiological explanation for the psychoanalytic conceptualizations of the projective processes. The class, in its broadest sense, can in fact be compared, as will now be illustrated, with Klein’s paranoid-schizophrenic position and the concept of projective identification.

The properties of P and the paranoid-schizophrenic position The projective P modality in a pathway originates during evolution from the need of the “s” elements to control, by means of appropriate re-entries, the acquisition of new “on” elements deriving from environmental information. For this reason P has a constructive function in development and, above all during the initial phases of maturation, it intensifies precisely as a result of the need to actively explore the “o” end of the pathway in order to establish a suitable relationship with the object. This constructive function generally characterizes the positive nature of psychoanalytic projection and above all highlights, in the precocious P-I dynamics, the aim of preparing, by means of the intensification of the re-entries, a better control over introjection. This process explains why, when a mother’s presence is limited, this increased preparatory need of the re-entries assumes the Kleinian significance of projective identification, having to make up for this absence by means of an increased control over the object. When projective identification is begun precociously however, it draws on the P° precursors. It is therefore plausible to assume that the strong discrepancy between hallucinatory endogenous properties and real object properties must result in the integration of contrasting, unstable elements, split into opposing properties (this process is favoured by the redundancy of the reticula, which is able to sustain development of different types of integration, as explained in the following chapter).

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 149

19/9/07 16:37:05

150

The Development of Consciousness

According to this concept, the Kleinian paranoid-schizophrenic position originates from unstable precursors as a result of the recursiveness between strong projections and weak introjections, typical of the process just described. In the Kleinian model the accent is placed on projection, which splits the object, causing its persecutory reintrojection. This corresponds to the projection-introjection recursiveness described here. From a functional point of view, the process appears substantially different, however, since it does not depend, in its recursiveness, on projection alone. It is, in fact, the mother’s absence that stimulates the endogenous proto-object projections and it is the real introjective need, to which the child is predisposed, that causes the difficulty in integrating the mother’s new input of information. This favours the splitting and, as a result of the recursiveness of the presence-absence relation of the object, the stabilizing of the object’s persecutory reintrojection. In the Kleinian hypothesis, basic concepts, such as envy, greed, and idealization of the breast, which accompany the projective process of splitting (Klein, 1957), are of fundamental importance. It is important therefore to note that the meaning–and clinical use–of these concepts changes if, instead of considering them as a natural predisposition of the child, we consider them as characteristics that originate during the interaction as a result of an insufficient introjection. This different way of conceptualizing the defensive significance of the projection depends on the different process that is attributed to the interaction, which is stabilized by the dynamic properties of the precursors, thereby producing defences that are always specific. This structural significance can be explained more clearly by considering other aspects of the initial integration.

The effect of P-(I) dynamics on cerebral integration The integration just described seems to be typical of an interaction pattern that is limited, but also discontinuous between the various sensory channels that are stimulated by the mother’s modulations. The mother is only actively present during certain stages of endog-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 150

19/9/07 16:37:05

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

151

enous oscillation and is therefore only able to have a regulatory function for certain aspects of the maturation of the reticulum. This produces a lacunarity in the introjective modality, even though an integration including properties of the maternal dynamic patterns does nevertheless occur. These patterns are however mixed up with proto-object properties. This development is reflected in a relevant conceptualization in Bion’s model (1955): the origin of bizarre objects, i.e. which are characterized by projective identifications mixed up with ordinary properties of the maternal relation. Bion’s bizarre object exemplifies the type of introjection, permeated with discontinuous, contradictory properties, which can occur in the interaction with a mother who is not very active. The deficient maternal modulation can, in this way, produce many of the pathogenic effects known in clinical pathology. In general, a significant absence of the mother is caused by her emotional unwillingness to stimulate the child even though she may still maintain certain relational modalities. The child, in an attempt to maintain a stable relationship with the mother, may sensitize its own projective control over sensory and perceptual maps in order to make up for the insufficient introjection of maternal representational elements by making use of endogenous representational elements. Presumably the infant follows an equilibrium-seeking reintegration modality guided by endogenous oscillation, but it can also be assumed that the infant’s own sensory-perceptual sensitivity can lead it to privilege one sensory channel rather than another. These effects of neurophysiological sensitization in the different maps may suggest different interpretations of primary development, depending on the type of integrations of the different pathways (object, proto-object, and internal), as described in the previous chapter. A child, for example, is exposed immediately after birth to strong internal stimulations, above all to do with feeding, and an inadequate response from the mother may cause a precocious sensitization of hallucinatory properties in the whole of the intestinalalimentary canal. In this case, the child attempts in the projective modality to anticipate the presence of the object (the hallucination of the breast described by Freud), but it is the reintrojection of the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 151

19/9/07 16:37:06

152

The Development of Consciousness

absence of the object that makes this absence persecutory. On the basis of this dynamics, it may be assumed that many food disorders originate as a result of this precursor, which links the food and emotional insecurity caused by the mother to the eating of food. The compulsive activities of ingestion and vomiting that typify classic bulimia are clearly similar to the underlying biphasic dynamics that characterizes the origin of this sensitization. Ingestion satisfies the projective-hallucinatory need for a feeding mother while the vomiting satisfies the need for a defence against the persecutory reintrojection of the mother. This biphasic structure suggests, more generally, that recursive oscillation can also evolve in other, usually monophasic forms during development when the oscillation stabilizes around certain fundamental aspects of the projective-reintrojective dynamics. In simple bulimia, the oscillation associates the precursor with the hallucinatory satisfaction of being fed by the mother, while in anorexia it associates it with the rejection of food as a defence against persecutory reintrojection. The bulimic-anorexic oscillation appears therefore to result from the biphasic structure of this type of integration, which clearly produces unstable precursors as the mother’s absence prevents a state of equilibrium from being achieved. Generally speaking, hallucinatory developments of this kind also seem to be able to give rise to the poorly integrated sensitization of the tactile, visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic channels. At a different level, these developments seem to signal the precociousness with which the nuclear properties of self projectively encysted in the sensory make-up can be organized. An acute sensitivity, intended for object exploration, is not accompanied by a real introjective receptivity as the object exploration depends on endogenous protoobject properties. Similarly, as a result of the lack of maternal modulation, the numerous “si-oi” pathways of the sexual apparatus, which have both internal sources and sources in the somatosensory and perceptual cortex, can develop numerous projective re-entries in the somatic “oic” elements and in the perceptual “op” and “oo” elements. The mesh of this representational system (the somatosensory cortex is next to the perceptual cortex) results in a strong sensitization of the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 152

19/9/07 16:37:06

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

153

endogenous patterns necessary for sexual recognition, but these patterns are integrated precociously with the proto-object/object encoding of the mother, as explained in the previous chapter. The inadequate introjection of the mother, however, prevents a gradual coordination between the proto-object pathways and the pathways of the more typically object development. The discontinuous sensitization of these pathways can explain how they are able to produce a confused sexual integration in both non-genital parts of the body and in the sexual representation of the object. This projective sensitization can also be involved in the object bond, although it is normally directed towards preserving the endogenous proto-object characteristics of this integration. Although touched on only very briefly, these considerations appear useful in helping to define a broad category of projective states, which, as a result of reintrojection, involve persecutory properties and recursively fuel the fragmentation of self that results from the inadequate relationship with the mother. It therefore appears possible to interpret these projective states, with some precision, as the precursors of a schizophrenic psychotic type of development or the less pathogenic forms of a borderline type of development. The classic field of study of these pathologies in psychoanalytic theory was begun by Klein and Bion, with the most important developments occurring in the post-Kleinian branch (Meltzer, 1967, 1973; Rosenfeld, 1983, 1987). The conceptual nucleus is projective identification even though Klein and Bion’s description does not correspond to the one given here, which is aimed specifically at compensating for the lack of the mother. This fundamental difference suggests a maturing interpretation of projective dynamics, which appears essential to be able correctly to understand its function in the transference and the relational properties in the precursors just described.

The P-I class: prevailing presence of the object I believe however that the difficult balance we can hypothesize in child-care becomes evident above all in the P-I kind of pathogenic

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 153

19/9/07 16:37:06

154

The Development of Consciousness

class. P-I represents the realistic type of development, along the right axis, derived from the fundamental I° class, the characteristics of which will now be examined in detail. In this class the mother has a very active relationship with the child and stimulates it with an abundance of sensory stimulation Im, the introjective characteristics of which are therefore added to the endogenous ones. The introjective modality along the pathways, which can be indicated as I, is therefore still strong, but since it does not dominate in the same way as in the founder class, the oscillation can now maintain the P modality. Depending on the natural characteristics of the oscillation in the child, the projective modality can weaken, becoming a (P) type, or remain basically unchanged, i.e. a P type. On the basis of the hypotheses presented here, a projective modality (P) characterizes a scarcely responsive child, in whom the “s-o” pathways mature without a suitable development of the “s” re-entries. Such a development replicates, albeit to a lesser degree, the fundamental I° class of the dominant development of imitative introjection. The situation is different when a normal P modality continues to modulate a strong I introjection, which is what characterizes this class, or when the modulating response is a strong projective P modality, antagonistic to introjection, which characterizes the autistic class, as will be discussed later. The really interesting aspect of the P-I class is the conflictual function that the P modality assumes when it tends to preserve the natural dynamic properties, even when the introjective modality increases. It is the conflictual structure of the projective-introjective modulation that in fact determines the pathogenic effects of this class and makes it so very important in the generative tree. According to the model presented here, the strong introjective prevalence typical of this class means that effective reorganization of the projective re-entries will in any case be unsuccessful on the representational elements developing along the pathways. In this case the subject controls have failed. They however constitute strong integrating bonds, which preserve the original attempt to modify the mother’s imposing influence, albeit unsuccessfully. It is this process that determines the conflictual characteristics of the class.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 154

19/9/07 16:37:06

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

155

In this type of development, it is therefore possible to imagine, as in the case of the I° class, a general sensitization in the somatosensory integration. The strong introjective “s←o” flows of information bind the maternal sensory-perceptual patterns to the subject ones, increasing in the various maps the make-up of tactile, visual, and kinaesthetic properties. It is important to note that these patterns, unlike the ones discussed in the P-(I) class, are not unconnected or unstable, but derive from what are now precise modulations of the mother. It is this conceptualization that makes it possible to identify certain plausible types of pathogenic precursors of great importance to psychoanalysis.

The effect of P-I dynamics on cerebral integration Excessive maternal interaction is inevitably directed, in the beginning, towards the cutaneous somatosensory, kinaesthetic, and alimentary systems, the development of which seems to be typically autonomous after birth. If we consider the phylogenetic reorganization of the reticulum however, integration, even at the most elementary levels, involves in any case a response by the “s” elements to sensory sensitization. It is this primary availability, therefore, that may indicate how precocious failed relations with the mother may reveal themselves in the “o” elements of the skin or of the mucous membranes. Atopic dermatitis and precocious respiratory diseases can therefore be interpreted as conflictual responses to pathogenic patterns that have no other way of revealing themselves other than in the somatosensory apparatus itself, which has been excessively sensitized by the mother. Over-stimulation during feeding by the mother, which therefore becomes conflictual, seems able to provide other explanations for the pathogenic developments of an alimentary type seen in the previous classes. The need for a strong defence against the intrusiveness of maternal feeding suggests that the precursors of anorexia originate in this class. The extreme rejection of food can be explained by the impossibility of reorganising the introjective dependence caused by the mother. This conflictual aspect simi-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 155

19/9/07 16:37:06

156

The Development of Consciousness

larly characterizes the more pathogenic forms of anorexic-bulimic oscillation, together with those of the oral addiction to alcohol and drugs. It is important to note how these developments have the same biphasic structure of projective-introjective integration as the P-(I) class, though the P-I class is characterized by a more marked introjective polarization. Their dynamic aspect can be interpreted as a specific failed reorganization of addiction to food stimulated by the mother. The persecutory origin of this pathogenic development, compared to that of the P-(I) class, does not therefore lie in the reintrojection of the mother’s absence, but in the unsuccessful defence against excessive introjection. These different aspects of dynamic integration explain why the precursors are, in general, complex formations of the projective-introjective transitions that stabilize along the generative tree. Similarly, the dynamic conflictual properties (and their consequences for the transferral relation) also characterize certain precursors of corporeal erotization, which are different from those of the P-(I) class. The precocious sensitization of the surface of the body now occurs by means of a specific stimulation of sensorial patterns, which tend to form many ties between states of maternal excitation and those of the child, who is spontaneously responsive to the mother. As has already been seen, the “s-o” pathways of ordinary sexual development are rooted in proto-object “op” elements of the sensory-perceptual structures and in “oic” elements of the genital areas of the somatosensory cortices. The strong maternal introjective influence during the maturation of these proto-objectual elements may facilitate their sensitization, therefore, and produce many identification bonds in the respective “sp” and “sic” elements of the patterns of sexual behaviour. It seems plausible to assume that it is the inefficient projective responses of these “sp” and “sic” elements that determine the conflictual precursors of gender identity. These originate from the proto-object properties, which become mixed up because of excessive sensitization by the mother. Hysterical and masochistic developments seem above all directly explainable by the strong influence of maternal introjection, which cannot be modified. I believe that it is useful to be able to explain all these effects, even though they have been introduced very briefly, on the basis of

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 156

19/9/07 16:37:07

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

157

a common origin, i.e. the predisposition to rapidly form identificatory ties through sensory stimulation. The very strong ties between the patterns of the mother and child highlight the child’s imitative responses, which provide the background for all these precursors. The simple, recognisable forms of imitation are however transformed by the strong projective response, which nevertheless fails to achieve its goal, and generally become complex properties of an inadequate personalization of the subject pole. These pathogenic aspects are discussed in a vast theoretical and clinical area, at the centre of which is the Winnicottian concept of false self and includes, among others, Deutsch (1942), Winnicott (1960), Bick (1968), Gaddini (1969) and Anzieu (1985). This common theoretical area can be interpreted as a clear indication of the fact that the self does not develop correctly unless the functioning of the “s” elements follows the natural characteristics of the endogenous oscillation and controls integration in the best way possible, and in every situation. The false self appears to originate from the depersonalization resulting from excessive introjection and the failure of the projective P modality to resubjectize the introjection and adapt it to an original dynamic property of the subject pole. Resubjectivization corresponds in fact to an efficient reorganization of the representational system by the “s” re-entries, which is necessary in order to correct introjective patterns that can fix the properties of the reticulum too rigidly. The re-entries of the “s” elements, if developed in sufficient numbers, make it possible to explore the new representational encodings in detail and check their adaptability for the reticulum by means of the control of the “s” elements. This allows the introjective development to participate in a truly dynamic way in the subject development, increasing moreover its control over the representational system. The hidden hallucinatory nature of these introjective developments suggests the co-presence of an extraneous identity in the personal development achieved by a person who only appears autonomous. Although the psychotic and schizophrenic nuclei essentially originate from the P-(I) class, as a result of the strong projections that contrast maternal introjection, the P-I class also appears capable of producing equally relevant nuclei of thought disturbances. Obsessive splits or multiple personalities (including a double per-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 157

19/9/07 16:37:07

158

The Development of Consciousness

sonality) suggest a constant attempt of a conflictual individualization against the identificatory bond with the mother. What differentiates these nuclei from the psychotic nuclei is their different origin. A mother who is basically absent produces dangerously fragmented, non-cohesive functions of the original characteristics of the self. A mother who is too present, on the other hand, produces dangerously contracted, binding characteristics, which can move the self towards fragmentation in order not to be subject to the identificatory tensions.

The autistic class P°-I° Returning to the generative tree, the basic properties of these four classes make it possible to rapidly understand the properties of the other classes. The most problematic pathogenic dynamics is the one that can originate during postnatal maturation from the stable integration of the most dangerous precursors, P° and I°, which give rise to the P°-I° class of autistic development. This class occurs in order to balance the strong projective and introjective properties of the precursors P° and I°. The dynamics of this class are particularly limited because of the insufficient initial representational development. It is the strong projection, which is trying to counterbalance the equally strong maternal introjection, which can justify the apparent relational indifference displayed by autistic children. This indifference is actually the consequence of the rapid onset of a defensive form of relations which, if it becomes stable, can have a decisive influence on each subsequent relational development. The useful aspect of this concept is that it is possible to imagine different defensive reasons for which the P°-I°dynamics may initially be limited. These defensive reasons generally explain why the autistic class differentiates itself into the other pathogenic classes when it does not remain stable. The child may have an excessive innate sensitivity and not be able to tolerate the introjective patterns of the mother. On the other hand, the mother may be predisposed towards being over-alert to the child’s patterns, thereby forcing it to adapt precociously, which the child finds disturbing. Alternatively,

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 158

19/9/07 16:37:08

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

159

the mother may be totally incapable of picking up on the child’s patterns, or does so in a discontinuous way, as a result of which the child learns to do without this in order to preserve the regularity of its own endogenous oscillation. In these three cases, the autistic dynamics becomes fixed at first in an apparently identical way, but then evolves in different ways. A child of the first type, who is endowed with an excessive reactive sensitivity, shifts towards the P° class of dominant psychotic precursors. A child of the second type, on the other hand, shifts towards the P-I class of the precursors of the symbiotic tie. A child of the third type shifts towards the strong schizophrenic and borderline precursors of the P-(I) class. This seems to be the reason why these three classes are not normally characterized solely by their dynamics, but also include mixed properties, derived from some of the strong dynamics of the original autistic class. I believe that the strong contraction of the P°-I° dynamics can help explain the concept of primary defensive barriers that Mahler (1968) attributed to the autistic phase. The precociousness of the defences against maternal stimulation could also help to provide a better understanding of why the sensitization of the alimentary canal and the skin, the development of which occurs first, is a preeminent feature in the autism studied by Tustin (1981). This initial development also seems able to justify above all the adjacent-autistic position, which is proposed by Ogden (1989) as being innate in natural development. It is interesting to observe that many autistic states are characterized by oscillating sensory properties, such as body rhythm and kinaesthetics, as well as visual and acoustic-rhythmic stimulations. All of these aspects can be explained by the activations of the brainstem, in which the inter-modal organization of corporeal sensitivity is closely connected to primary motor control.

Normal early development: the fusional-transitional class W1 Normal development, which makes it possible to correct the pathogenic risks of the basic precursors, is represented, on the other

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 159

19/9/07 16:37:08

160

The Development of Consciousness

hand, by the W1 class, which is defined as being fusional-transitional (for reasons that will be explained shortly). The W1 class characterizes the optimal integration that can already be achieved, from the earliest period of brain maturation, in the lowest levels of the reticulum. This occurs when the maternal introjective modulation manages to counterbalance the projective endogenous modalities, providing at the same time an introjectable object contribution. If this integration occurs, it inaugurates the stable properties of the subject pole (Figure 6.6), while, at the same time, object representation development begins to differentiate itself from the proto-object development, which is still hallucinatory. Es Po

mIm

En bs Po

bn

mI

Eo Es Po

bo

Bs Po BnmIm Bo basal activation

maternal activation

W1 fig. a

CLASS

mIm

En mIm

bs Po bn

Eo

bo

Bs Po Bn mIm Bo basal activation

maternal activation

P-I fig.b

CLASS

Figure 6.6 In the W1 fusional-transitional class (a), the proto-object P modality and the object Im modality form the first representational Bn elements. The class is unstable and as “←Im” becomes stronger, it turns into the P-I class (b).

This development is not without problems as a result of the archaic levelFig.6.6 of the pathways and the autonomy of endogenous oscillation. As was seen, the primary pathways are above all pathways of sensorimotor integration and tactile and visceral sensitivity, while sensory and perception pathways of external information are still poor in representational elements. These structural aspects, which are lacking in truly representational properties, give rise to a certain initial indifferentiation between the subject pole and the object pole in the reticulum, and this explains why it is convenient to define this class as fusional. Its maturation transition is however a complex process.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 160

19/9/07 16:37:08

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

161

When the number of representational elements begins to increase as a result of the interaction with the mother, the two poles begin to diversify. Maternal stimulation, which is necessary for this development, can however result in excessive introjections and give rise to bonds that are too strong. Development, in that case, assumes strictly symbiotic properties (this class therefore corresponds quite closely to Mahler’s symbiotic-fusional phase, 1968), and veers towards the pathogenic P-I class in which P is unable to alter the strong introjection. The development that leads to the integration of the W1 class is in fact unstable, but during normal development it enables the following class, W2, which (as will be shown) corresponds to the Winnicottian concept of the transitional object and that is why the three classes of the axis are named after it.

The transitional-Winnicottian class W2 and class W3 The interesting aspect of this class is the simple explanation it offers for Winnicott’s concept of child development. The W2 class (Figure 6.7) represents an already advanced form of cooperation between the “sp-op” subcortical areas and the “so-oo” cortical areas. The introjective-object information of the mother also begins to spread now along the pathways of the reticulum from the “o” elements of more mature structures and, as the integration proceeds, more and more “s” re-entries form for the “o” elements. This leads to a certain delay in the development of the “s” re-entries in those levels in which the representational “o” elements have already reached maturity, which is reflected in their lack of projective remodulation. The W2 class is therefore characterized by consolidated projective properties in the lower levels, while, as a result of the still insufficient development of “s” re-entries, the introjective modality is still pre-eminent in the upper levels.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 161

19/9/07 16:37:08

162

The Development of Consciousness

Es)

(Eo) (bs)

bn

mIm

Bs P o Bn basal activation CLASS

bo

Bo

W2

maternal activation

Figure 6.7 The “s” elements, indicated in brackets, mature more slowly than the “o” elements and this gives rise to the P-I dynamics between the different levels. The W2 transitional class is characterized by a hallucinatory protoobject projective modality “Bs→” and by an object introjective modality “←bo”: the object is at the same time both realistic and hallucinatory.

Fig.6.7 Examining the characteristics of this discordance between projective and introjective properties, it is easy to understand how it can be interpreted in the Winnicottian sense. The integration occurs, along the vertical pathway, between two homologous elements with different representational functions: a hallucinatory endogenous protoobject projection is still pre-eminent in the lower element, while in the upper element the introjection of an object representation occurs. Winnicott’s conceptualization (1953) regarding the double properties of the transitional object, which is contemporaneously hallucinatory and real, can, therefore, be rediscovered in this process of integration. It is this kind of integration between the different levels that highlights the structural importance of this important node to the balanced maturation that ideally characterizes the central axis. While introjection stimulates the maturation of the “o” elements in the upper structures, the projective characteristics on the lower levels continuously act as a support for integration, thereby preserving the primal autonomy of the subject pole in order to gradually adapt it to the new introjection. The slowness of brain maturation, for example in the frontal lobes (where the greatest level of development of the “s” elements occurs), explains why this maturation should be interpreted by looking not only at the integration between different levels, but

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 162

19/9/07 16:37:09

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

163

also at the cooperation between the different sensory systems that are developing and whose controls eventually converge on the frontal area. This delay helps explain why the states of representation evolve gradually as hallucinatory derivatives of primary “s-o” relations and real derivatives of the object, which are only encoded very slowly in the enormous number of neocortical elements available. The hallucinatory derivatives constitute a major property of subjectivity, by means of which the subject pole actively intervenes in the integration of a new introjective piece of information. It is therefore important to note how projection functions as an indispensable support for this process. It makes use of the endogenous proto-object properties, and then the object properties that have already been encoded and are able to actively cooperate with the introjection. This explains why transitional development should be interpreted in a general sense and why, after infancy, it continues in the W3 class, systematically organizing the cooperation between projective modalities on the lower levels and introjective modalities on the highest level. It can be surmised therefore that as the cooperation gradually continues, it is precisely this difference in the levels that corrects the maternal (and environmental) information, thereby preserving a certain conservative autonomy of the subject pole, without the P or I modalities necessarily becoming dominant. The successful integration of the reticulum during this difficult process, as will be described in the next chapter, renders plastic and adaptable the associative network of the secondary reticula that develop from the main reticulum, which has become stable during the maturation. This type of maturation corresponds, according to Winnicott (1953), to the dispersion of the transitional object over an intermediate territory between internal psychic reality and the cultural world.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 163

19/9/07 16:37:09

164

The Development of Consciousness

The autistic class P-I and the W1-W2 node The development that has been described therefore finds its balance in the central axis of the Winnicottian type of integration, which starts to form from the W1 class. It is important to observe that this instable node, which balances the two pathogenic classes P° and I°, gives rise to a separate autistic class that is less contracted than the initial P°-I° class. This class is indicated by P-I and it is interesting to note that this class may be interpreted as the strengthening of the projective defences of the pathogenic P-I class. That is why the P-I class is on the left axis of the tree, symmetrically to the P-I class, in order to indicate the different modulation that the projection can now carry out from the strong maternal introjection. This particular autistic development is useful in understanding the difference between the two classes, which specifically concerns the unsuccessful defence of P in the introjective class and the successful P in the autistic class. The ideal P-I balance of the Winnicottian W1 class, which constitutes the central axis of development, is in a certain sense also achieved by the P-I autistic class, albeit with an evident impoverishment of the available introjection, i.e. of a relation with the object. The P modality may evidently drastically change, with its strength, the depersonalizational influence of an excessive introjection, although it inevitably accentuates the properties of the pathogenic projective precursors. The properties of this class derive, therefore, from those of the autistic class P°-I°, even though its dynamics are less contracted. They include, however, successful projective defence faced with excessive maternal introjection, although this limits relational availability. These observations highlight the most important significance of the classes. They identify dynamic processes that can be interpreted as real neurophysiological dynamics, but they also signal that their development is complex, as it derives, plausibly, from the instability of the relationship with the mother and other objects. Observing the tree carefully, I believe that it is possible to agree that the position of the Winnicottian W2 class indicates the difficult transition that occurs from class W1 at this point in maturation between the different classes of the tree.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 164

19/9/07 16:37:09

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

165

Clinical literature presents many examples that demonstrate the wealth of possible developments in this passage of maturation of a child. Tustin (1981, 1986) notes, for example, certain properties of transitional objects in the stage of normal autism; Modell (1968) considered borderline cases an evolutionary arrest of the transitional stage; while the use in psychotherapy of the transitional area with schizophrenics is known (Searles, 1979; Feinsilver, 1986; Zapparoli, 1967). This wealth of possible developments helps clarify once more both the difficult maturation of a child’s brain and the complexity of the evolutionary processes that can occur in the transferral dynamics. Only our attention towards the minimum changes in the transferral dynamics can enable us to understand the original meaning of the evolutionary processes. It may therefore be useful to repeat that the single classes are not on their own sufficient to define the real characteristics of development. Their purpose is to identify properties that emerge during maturation, which can be modified or merge into different dynamics. Indeed, the recursive nature of projective-introjective integration justifies many different evolutionary changes of the precursors: the shifting of the pathogenic classes towards the central axis (as can be imagined in the most simple cases of neurotic development), and the complex hierarchies of the precursors and their evolutionary transformation along the classes (as in the case of the wide variety of pathologies that we have gradually learned to recognize).

The influence of these classes on development of the reticulum These classes, as has hopefully been shown, already indicate how specific cerebral areas can be affected by the dynamic properties of endogenous oscillation. Despite the fact that only the general properties of integration have been discussed, it appears clear that the early maturation of the alimentary canal and the somatosensory cortex provides a functional basis for the rapid encoding of those patterns that can be regulated by the mother. It is also evident that

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 165

19/9/07 16:37:09

166

The Development of Consciousness

the more complex representational systems, such as the cortical ones, influence object encoding because of their delay in maturation. This produces an inevitable discrepancy between the different proto-object and object properties of the reticulum, which depends on the availability of the neural maps to receive internal and external information during maturation. It seems plausible, for example, that visual and acoustic perception processes are precociously reorganized in the geniculate nuclei of the thalamus as a result of their important function in brain evolution. It is important therefore to bear in mind that relevant proto-object properties are precociously available for integration even though their functioning in terms of subject-object dynamics is destined to change as the homologous vertical elements are gradually connected to the proto-object elements. These archaic features constitute the basis for the maturation of both the characteristics of the object and the subject development. It also seems clear that the “o” elements of the somatic cortex, which are contiguous with the “o” elements of the motor cortex, indicate characteristics of corporeal representational development, which are initially more important than the representational development of the object. This explains why this mapping, which is limited to the surface of the body, is intended to immediately unify sensorimotor activity. The ego for Freud was above all corporeal, and this maturation predisposition appears to be the most recognisable neurophysiological support for the ego. The problem of how to correctly define the ego is undoubtedly a difficult one, given the large number of cortical structures that cooperate, after birth, in cerebral activity. The brainstem is the activator, in this model, of cerebral development, but it also has the function indicated by Damasio of a proto-self that already integrates important properties of sensory-perceptual representation with that of internal somatic and affective sensitization. There are therefore already numerous “s” elements of this primary integration of the self and it can be assumed that they are in the basal and medial-ventral nuclei of the paleocortex, as well as in the reticular formation itself–the most recognisable generator of endogenous activation.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 166

19/9/07 16:37:10

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

167

The type of maturation of the “s” elements after birth appears therefore of importance in order to understand how the subject pole starts to be integrated. An example can clarify this point. According to Schore (1996), the mother-child interaction determines an early inhibitory component in the medial-ventral region, the area in which the prefrontal lobes become part of the limbic system. This hypothesis corresponds in the model presented here to the type of motor-affective integration of the “s” elements in the prefrontal area during maternal interaction. It therefore seems plausible for Solms (1996) to interpret this inhibitory component as the function of an internalized mother. This corresponds to the introjective functioning of the dynamic “s-o” integration, which inevitably begins during the early stages of maturation. More generally, however, this model suggests a broad integration, during maturation of the original phylogenetic pathways, of the regulatory patterns that converge on the “s” pole. The purpose of these classes is to find out how the neurophysiological sensitizations of the different areas explain the pathogenic phenomena of development. By looking at the different types of development of the “s” re-entries in the four classes just described, it is possible to obtain certain useful indications as regards the Freudian concept of the unconscious.

Lacunar unconscious and the repressed unconscious These considerations are based on the fact that the unconscious, in the different types of dynamics fixed precociously during interaction, does not appear to be able to be explained solely by the traditional concept of repression. The unconscious is only characterized by the specific meaning of repression if the “s” re-entries are able to truly modify a primary memory content, something which is not generally characteristic of all the classes described. For example, in the classes in which maternal introjection is decisive (such as the imitative case I), it involves a lack of P. So, following Edelman/Tononi’s hypotheses, the result is an impover-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 167

19/9/07 16:37:10

168

The Development of Consciousness

ishment of the “s” re-entries on the representational “on” elements. These therefore originate as permanent memory contents, but they cannot be modified by projective modulation. The lack of re-entries renders them inaccessible, but not as a result of a defence that actually represses their content. There is an inverse process in the P classes characterized by maternal absence, when the increased projective modulation amplifies the number of re-entries on the “on” elements. They form, however, with a lack of real object memory content, and the strong projective defence therefore acts on basically proto-object properties. So the development of the re-entries does not have a true repressive meaning in this case either. The projection does not inaugurate defensively in order to oppose object information, but to compensate for the lack of it. Both these types of the unconscious can be defined as lacunar: the former because of the small number of re-entries, which do not allow access to memory content, and the latter because of the lack of object memory content.6 The control of the “s” re-entries, on the other hand, produces an unconscious that is basically similar to the repressed unconscious in the important conflictual P-I class. The purpose of this class is precisely that of preventing extreme introjective effects by means of the defensive P modality. The opposition of P to I tries to prevent, in this case, the integration of the exogenous representational content and therefore functions in a similar way to Freudian repression. Even though only the most simple aspects of the classes are described here, these classes are clearly extremely useful as they enable the concept of the unconscious to be broadened by making it possible to define different inaccessible properties of the memory contents. They explain, contemporaneously, how these contents are encoded in any case and immediately during the integration of the “s-o” pathways of the reticulum. This type of unconscious therefore necessarily depends, in subcortical areas, on the characteristics of procedural memory that activate the first memory encodings as soon as one is born. The concept of lacunar is at the centre of Scoppola’s theory (2005) on the inadequate integration of self in early development and the resultant definition of lacunar self.

6

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 168

19/9/07 16:37:10

NORMAL AND PATHOGENIC DEVELOPMENT OF MOTHER-CHILD INTERACTION

169

These unconscious memories are clearly dynamic patterns that are already integrating highly complex processes as soon as maturation starts. They therefore become part, in adults as well, of the maps sensitized by the primary projective-introjective interaction of a child with its mother. The possibility of imagining unconscious processes other than that of repression in the patient is clearly important as this can help us to understand how they are replicated in transference and what their real meaning is in the relationship.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 169

19/9/07 16:37:10

CHAPTER SEVEN

Defence structures and the development of consciousness

P-I dynamics and Freud’s theory of cathexis displacement

I

believe that the dynamic concept of the different pathogenic classes offers some useful insights as to the kind of processes that Freud wished to conceptualize with regard to the neural apparatus. The explanations presented here repropose in a modern version the cathexis displacement so dear to Freud together with a number of hypotheses concerning their dynamic meanings. This analogy shows, however, how the Freudian idea of discharge drastically changes into that of reintegrable function along the pathway and can be recomposed among the various “s” and “o” elements through dynamic flows of information. This different theoretical aspect therefore also translates the important Freudian concept of cathectic mobile energy in the psychic apparatus. The concept of binding cathexis, which is so important in Freud, has a precise correspondence in the model presented here: the P and I modalities explicitly indicate the respective directions of the anticathexes and cathexes, although they are now interpreted as projective-introjective characteristics of an element in the pathway. What clearly distinguishes these two conceptualizations is the important function assigned to the endogenous P-I oscillation, 170

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 170

19/9/07 16:37:10



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

171

which produces an enormous variety of dynamic integrations of the classes described in the previous chapter. Without these, it would be impossible to offer a sufficiently clear explanation of maternal influence on the psychological-identificatory development of the child. As has already been shown, the introjective I and projective P properties have different intensities in these classes, and I believe therefore that the following remark, made by Freud (The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence, 1894a) some time before he began writing the Project, to try and explain the difficult quantitative aspects of charges, is particularly interesting: …in mental functions something is to be distinguished - a quota of affect or sum of excitation - which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity (though we have no means of measuring it), which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body… (Freud, 1894a, p. 60), (author’s italics).

This stronger analogy with the properties of P and I can be considered, in my opinion, a plausible aspect of this model’s adherence to Freud’s original intents, but it also highlights how he was aware of the descriptive limits of his intuition, which he kept open for further exploration, as he states in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a, p. 599): “The mechanics of these processes are quite unknown to me; anyone who wished to take these ideas seriously would have to look for physical analogies to them and find a means of picturing the movements that accompany excitation of neurones.” The same caution must also clearly be expressed as regards this model, which although following a different, undoubtedly more modern physical analogy, is presumably only a little less naïve and therefore still needs to be adapted to the extraordinary complexity of the real structure of the brain. I think it is interesting, however, in order to further clarify the meaning of the P-I dynamics, to reconsider certain aspects of the primary development presumed by Freud without this projectiveintrojective function. What can be acknowledged is how this very type of dynamic can actually be traced back to some particular aspects of Freudian theory, and it seems to reappear gradually in later theoretical development, without ever being clearly defined.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 171

19/9/07 16:37:11

172

The Development of Consciousness

P-I dynamics and the modification of the concept of narcissism by Freud For Freud, primary development was regulated by drives during the various evolutionary phases–oral, anal, and phallic–according to an essentially autoerotic concept of the child’s relationship with the object. Freud then broadened this concept in On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914c), where he examined the function of the libido in object investment; how the withdrawal-reappropriation of the libido from objects gives rise to narcissism and how secondary narcissism is based on primary narcissism. The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism…This leads us to look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object­ cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences. (Freud, 1914c, p. 75).

Indeed, this conceptual development reveals a certain change in the function of the libido. This function, in the drive concept, organizes above all the cathectic corporeal energy while in the narcissistic concept it includes the ego-object relationship. The withdrawal of the libido from the objects on the ego was, according to Freud, narcissism in its pathological aspect. I believe that, on the basis of this model, Freud shifted his attention from the internal integration of the “si-oi” and “sic-oic” pathways (which are essentially somatocorporeal), to that of the “sp-op” and “so-oo” pathways of the representational system (which organize the subject-object dynamics). As the following passage clearly explains, in this dynamic integration the libidinal cathexis can be directed towards the outside but also redirected back to be divided between ego and objects, its total quantity remaining constant: Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out… All that we noticed were

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 172

19/9/07 16:37:11



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

173

the emanations of this libido–the object-cathexes, which can be sent out and drawn back again. We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido. The more of the one is employed, the more of the other becomes depleted. (Freud, 1914c, pp. 75-6).

If the ego is referred to the subject pole, it can be seen that the libidinal object investments, which are mobile, correspond to the dynamic integration of the subject elements towards the representational ones in the “s→on” direction. The libido that is drawn back from the objects to the ego is equivalent, on the other hand, to the reorganization of the flow in the opposite “s←on” direction. This process produces a subject cathexis and if it is a stable priority compared to the object cathexis, it can correctly be defined as narcissistic. It is possible to assume, therefore, that Freud, though still using a quantitative model, wanted to describe two directions of libidinal mobility in order to explain the dynamic properties of the ego-object relation. Freud’s interest in this relation is fairly evident in his re-elaboration of narcissism in the second topic (The Ego and the Id, 1923b) that defined secondary narcissism as being quite different, a typical consequence of object relations. Indeed, his new concept involved a more highly organized process of libidinal mobility. It is the identificatory meaning attributed by Freud to secondary narcissism that clarified his new dynamic concept: It may be that this identification…especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes… (Freud, 1923b, p. 29). At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id…The id sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego...tries to get hold of this object-libido... The narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects.7 (Freud, 1923b, p. 46). Freud anticipated this conclusion in a note a few pages earlier: “…we must recognize the id as the great reservoir of libido indicated in my paper on narcissism. The libido which flows into the ego owing to the identifications described above brings about its “secondary narcissism”.” (Freud, 1923b, p. 30).

7

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 173

19/9/07 16:37:11

174

The Development of Consciousness

Freud, therefore, once again referred to libidinal mobility directed towards the ego but as an effect of normal identification development and, therefore, a positive modification of the primary narcissism of the id. It is precisely this passage from primary to secondary narcissism, apparently justified by the growing relation between child and mother, which can be explained by the representational development of the pathways of the reticulum. As the endogenous dynamics of the “s-o” pathways are modulated by the mother, the “s→on” re-entries, first of the basal levels and then of the higher levels, regulate the “on←o” object introjections. The information encoded in the representational elements gradually becomes, as integration progresses, properties of the “s” elements as well. This modifies the meaning of the striking primary narcissistic disposition, making it an object derivative. In an almost identical manner, but to use the language of Freud, secondary narcissism reveals itself as a libidinal withdrawal from objects onto the ego, i.e. like an introjective derivative of a maternal modulation now available in the subject pole. If one considers the bi-partition in the second topic between primary and secondary narcissism, it now acquires a clearer, dynamic meaning when interpreted as a libidinal movement that is directed firstly towards the objects and, later, reorganized as a flow from the objects towards the ego. This movement re-expresses the one described in On Narcissism: an Introduction, no longer in its pathogenic meaning but in the maturational one, which progressively transforms primary narcissism into secondary narcissism. This interpretation seems convincing when one remembers that in The Ego and the Id primary narcissism characterized the id and that its modification through the frustration of the reality principle differentiated, for Freud, the ego from the id. It is therefore possible to relate this development of the concept of narcissism to Freud’s increasing attention (albeit expressed in rather different terms to the ones used here) towards the P-I dynamics between the subject pole and the object pole which, as a result of maternal introjection, produces the development of the representational system. These observations clearly suggest that Freud was developing a dynamic concept of the identificatory functions, although he did not define these functions within a specific theoretical model.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 174

19/9/07 16:37:11



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

175

Initial immaturity and the regulatory function of P The considerations expressed here also have a more general meaning within the complex theme of narcissism Freud left us. It can be presumed, for example, that it is precisely the projective P properties, still immature of the “s” re-entries, which presumably characterize primary narcissism during initial development. This therefore appears more correctly interpretable by taking into account a suitable integration of the “s” re-entries in the control of the introjection, which cannot be limited to their simple cerebral development. The second Freudian conceptualization suggests, more precisely, how a maternal pattern is an indispensable narcissistic support for the harmonious development of the motor and ideational systems of the “s” pole, the functions of which are easily modified during initial maturation. If, instead of accepting the classic definition of narcissism, we consider the need for the “s” elements to acquire a suitable control over all the somatosensory and representational systems, we can understand the difficulties faced by a child. In this hypothesis, the notion of narcissism actually depends on the regulatory destiny of the projective P modality, which is immediately intertwined with that of the Im introjection modulated by the mother. This development implies that an optimal integration must be able to modify, by means of projections regulated by the “s” re-entries, the representational dynamics in order to bring about a continued resubjectization of the introjective properties. Resubjectization, with a new organization of “s→on” bonds, reorganizes the representational access, maintaining, however, an adequate relationship with reality. The organization of these re-entries actually corresponds to the sort of “incorporeal arm”, described in Chapter Four, which continuously explores the representational system, anticipating mental movements in order to correct them as regards the real ones to be made. In introjection, the sensory-perceptual properties enter into the representational system, altering it considerably. The organization of the “s” re-entries that occurs in resubjectization learns to distinguish properties that can be integrated from those that disrupt the original dynamics of the “s” elements; in so doing, it redefines, while taking introjection into consideration, representational accesses that are suitable for subject development.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 175

19/9/07 16:37:12

176

The Development of Consciousness

As was illustrated in the previous chapter, this kind of development, as regards its normal narcissistic aspects, is favoured in those classes in which maternal introjection produces a normal modulation of the endogenous P-I dynamics, while this is difficult if the modulation is insufficient or excessive. Consequently, in those classes in which the projective characteristics of the re-entries become dominant in representational control, resubjectization has a pathogenic narcissistic meaning. It can be directed at compensating for the deficient introjection of the P-(I) class or at contrasting excessive introjection in the P-I and P-I classes, thereby displaying different narcissistic properties. I believe that, from this point of view, the protective shield (which Freud described in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920g) provides a clear explanation of the difficulties Freud had in conceptualizing a normal narcissistic organization. He conceived this shield as a real neuro-physiological barrier that opposes excessively strong sensorial stimulations and can, for this reason, be interpreted in an interesting way. Since the shield provides protection from excessive stimulation, it can be noted that Freud, when attributing this excess to the mother, considered the barrier as necessary to oppose her strong introjective influence rather than normal maternal stimulation. This Freudian conceptualization therefore considered as implicitly natural the pathogenic Im modulation, which refers to the excessively sensitizing presence of the mother, typical of the P-I class. This observation is confirmed by the type of transfer that, in the first clinical-theoretical approach, psychoanalysts have learnt to decipher, the one in which maternal influence is easily traced and therefore immediately referable to the object, which is typical of this class. I believe that this obvious aspect of defence from the object helps to explain the meaning of the primary narcissism attributed by Freud to the child, whom he obviously considered defensive for natural reasons, just as the strong maternal Im introjection seemed natural to him. It can be put forward that it is precisely this implicit theoretical assumption that influenced the Freudian model in a decisive manner.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 176

19/9/07 16:37:12



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

177

P-I dynamics in Klein I believe that it is useful to note how the endogenous P-I dynamics finds significant support not just in Freudian theory, but also in later developments in psychoanalytic theory, such as Klein. Consider, for example, the importance that Klein attached to the notion of projective identification, which she considered fundamental in psychic functioning. Projection is also indispensable for ordinary relations with the object in the model proposed in this book. Indeed, the subject pole can only interact with the external object as a result of the internal control of its representation, and this is only possible if there is an adequate system of functionally projective accesses in the “s→on” direction. When this control increases, it shifts into the control of projective identification, which consists in a privileged selection of “s→on” relations by means of which the P modality becomes predominant in the development of the pathways. As explained in Chapter Six, this is the process that characterizes the type P° precursors that form during the first post-natal phase in the mother’s absence and join the P-(I) class of psychotic and schizoid pathogenic precursors on the left axis of the generative tree for the different classes. Klein’s schizoid-paranoid position (1935, 1940, 1946) refers to the child’s initial development and therefore corresponds to the characteristics of the P° and P-(I) classes, typical of the maturation of a child deprived of the object, which highlights the P function in endogenous oscillation. One could also ask therefore whether, symmetrically, the Kleinian depressive position is also able to acquire a meaning in relation to the generative tree and be associated with the I function in endogenous oscillation. The following considerations are, I believe, particularly interesting as they introduce a plausible neuro-physiological interpretation of depression. Indeed, the explanation of Klein’s second position becomes clear if depression is conceptualized as a neurophysiological response to the inefficacy of subject control over object representation. This inefficacy can occur for various reasons: absence of the maternal object, which always involves the danger during early maturation of a failed adaptation between representational and motor

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 177

19/9/07 16:37:12

178

The Development of Consciousness

control; discontinuity of the maternal object representation, which may, more generally, prevent the stable integration of different dynamic patterns; or the endogenous development of the reticulum, which may, in turn, mean that new maturation properties are continuously necessary for reintegration. From this point of view, the depressive modality can be interpreted as a neurophysiological process necessary for the reorganization of the “s→on” elements in order to obtain new, more suitable types of representational control. The reticulum, in this situation, evidently produces an autonomous reintegrative response of the “s” re-entries, which is therefore an aspect of the previously described resubjectization. During this extensive reorganization, there is undoubtedly an intense emotive-affective modulation of the subcortical areas, and it can be supposed that the depressive tonality comes from the total restructuring of the representational cathexis. This implies a real modification of the previous “s→on” projective bonds and the dynamic reorganization of the “s” elements in the neocortex and limbic lobe. This process seems to be revealed in neuroimages of the prefrontal area near the corpus callosum, the activity of which decreases during depressive episodes and increases during maniacal ones (Drevets et al., 1997). This area can be interpreted, in this model, as a typical location for “s” elements capable of integrating the cortex with the limbic lobe in order to reorganize representational access as a function of emotive-affective access. The bipolar depression-mania modality, with its opposing activating effects, therefore suggests a specific modulation of the “s” elements, necessary to match the representational accesses with the modification of the environment. As is intuitively clear from these considerations, however, depression does not necessarily correspond to a typical or univocal phase of child development. It more generally identifies variable forms of possible reintegrations suitable for accepting new introjections. From this point of view, the Kleinian depressive position, because of its particularly marked aspects, seems to indicate a massive kind of reorganization: one capable of balancing, by means of the strong I polarity, the P° type schizoid-paranoid polarity in order

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 178

19/9/07 16:37:12



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

179

to introject new “on←o” encodings. For these reasons, the depressive position seems to be characteristic of the P-I class, which in the generative tree represents more evolved pathogenic developments of introjective integration.8 So it also seems possible to relate Klein’s two positions to the properties of the dynamic P-I oscillation, the most relevant emotive-affective aspects of which are expressed by them throughout a child’s maturation.

P-I dynamics in Bion and Winnicott Indeed, the interpretation of the schizophrenic-paranoic and depressive positions as strong structural properties of endogenous oscillation during maturation offers further explanations as to the theoretical developments in psychoanalysis. For example, Klein, too, considers a normal oscillation between the two positions during maturation, which seems therefore to correspond to the normal dynamics of the central axis of the classes. It is interesting to note that this more elastic concept is also evident in Bion (1963), who extended the two positions to the Ps↔D oscillation, which he considered necessary for continuous mental maturation. These more general dynamic aspects show therefore how the characteristics of endogenous oscillation seem to be increasingly and more precisely traceable in the development of psychoanalytic theory despite the fact that they were never explicitly conceptualized by Freud or his successors. These different aspects also indicate that the depressive position has various meanings, which depend on the properties of the precursors that reappear during integration, giving rise to different theoretical models. With regard to Winnicott’s model of child development (1954), it can be assumed that the W2 class, as regards the generative tree, If referred to the P-I oscillation, the process includes two different depressive features. One is a consequence of the persecutory reintrojection due to the P polarity and the other to the real persecutory modality due to excessive pressure I of the object. This common persecutory nucleus emerges in the link between the two Kleinian positions and sense of guilt, differentiable in persecutory guilt and depressive guilt (Speziale-Bagliacca, 1997).

8

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 179

19/9/07 16:37:13

180

The Development of Consciousness

better enables the reintegration of the precursors of the P-(I) and PI classes. The depression arising after this stage reveals itself in a significantly less evident way than with that of Klein’s model, as a result of the projective-introjective equilibrium characterizing this class. As explained in the previous chapter, during the transitional phase the projective influence draws on the proto-object level, giving the representational system a hallucinatory quality, providing the basis of illusion, while disillusion, on the other hand, reintroduces introjective properties. Depressive elaboration is clearly involved, during this process, in the conservation and development of the properties of resubjectization of the “s” elements in order for the introjective relations to be able to become effectively integrable. The apparent ease with which this process can occur in the Winnicottian class makes it easier to understand why the P-I dynamics are not easily recognisable, as highlighted in the previous chapter in relation to the autistic classes, which are characterized by very reduced projective-introjective dynamics. On the basis of what has been stated so far, at first these types of dynamics seem to be missing in Freud’s work, and only a careful reconstruction makes it possible to identify these in Freud’s concept of narcissism, but then also in the Kleinian-Bionian development and (with noticeable differences) in Winnicott. This may explain the complex passage that, from Freud via several different models, has led to the concept of a subtle, but unstable, dynamic equilibrium regulating mother-child interaction, which the generative tree of classes attempts to summarise.

Associative dynamics between main and secondary reticula In order to complete the picture of brain maturation, it is now important to consider certain more general aspects of the dynamic integration of the nervous system. The properties described so far relate to the basic characteristics of the main reticulum, which are sufficient to explain the effects of the P-I dynamics of the different classes. Without considering other important aspects of this model,

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 180

19/9/07 16:37:13



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

181

concerning the associative complexity of the secondary reticula and their relationship with the main reticulum, these properties alone would be incomplete. Indeed, the associative properties offer many explanations regarding the development of defences in childhood and the general organization of consciousness according to this model. These structural aspects together explain the origin of language and the complex function of language in the dynamic reorganization of representational development. As explained in Chapter Four, the main reticulum is the basic structure of the brain system, which stabilized after a long evolutionary process culminating in the phylum of mammals. It is this stability that allows evolutionary processes to replicate it in order to gradually experiment with a growing redundancy of the secondary reticula. It is this tried and tested evolutionary process that has led to the development of a human brain endowed with an enormous number of secondary reticula. It is only after birth, however, that these reticula can be reciprocally integrated and this very gradual process is only possible with the support of the main reticulum. According to the ideas presented here, the child’s brain develops in a fairly simple way at birth. The main reticulum is the first gradually to form, storing, from the very outset, the projective-introjective dynamics illustrated in the previous chapter. As brain maturation progresses, the main reticulum provides the support for the development of other reticula from the cerebral redundancy. The projective-introjective dynamics fixed in the precursors contributes after that to the development of associative networks in the secondary reticula, which increasingly collect and integrate information from the environment. This development is regulated by controls within the original vertical pathways that are carried out by the ascendant-descendant re-entries among the Bn-bn-βn elements. It also depends on the growing number of re-entries that reach these elements from the secondary reticula in rapid differentiation (Figure. 7.1).

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 181

19/9/07 16:37:13

182

The Development of Consciousness

redundant secondary reticula   

Es

development of associative bonds

main reticulum Es

Es

P P P





En



En

En

cortical associative node

I

I



I



bs



 

bs

P

P 

bn

Bs P

basal pattern element



bn

Bn

Eo

subcortical associative node

I

I



I

Eo

Eo



bo

bo

Bo

Figure 7.1 The Bn-bn-βn development is regulated by retroactions in an upwards and downwards direction in order to modulate the P-I relations, which in the nodes guide the integration-association of the neural pathways Fig.7.1 of the secondary reticula.

The most important meaning of this associative development therefore concerns the mainly conservative properties of the main reticulum while the integration of the redundant secondary reticula is taking place. Indeed, these properties have the precise goal of preserving the original dynamics of the main reticulum while favouring suitable transformations of the secondary reticula in order to enable their gradual complexification. During brain maturation, changes in the relations with the mother or other objects can occur, giving rise to different introjective properties in the “s-o” pathways. The effects themselves of this maturation can, with the endogenous development of new associative pathways (including the limbic pathways), result in dynamics that are distributed differently in the reticulum. The regulating activations of the reticular formation finally reintroduce the necessary corrective patterns into the reticulum (including the oneiric ones). All these processes can cause the subject pole to modify, with the re-entries that have already formed, the representational accesses to the new elements of the secondary reticula in order to coordinate

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 182

19/9/07 16:37:20



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

183

the growing amount of information. According to this model, however, a more specific modifying response to the new encodings is made possible by certain general properties of perception analysis, which act as a background for representational development. Let us return to the following consideration: The same general rules for coding that we have encountered in the other senses – labeled line codes, analysis of contrast, and parallel processing – may also apply to smell and taste. Thus, all sensory systems rely on the same basic principles of processing and organisation, not only in humans, but throughout much of phylogeny. (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991, p. 528).

In this rapid summary of the general characteristics of the brain, these particular labelled lines correspond to the “s-o” pathways of the different sensory-perceptual channels of the main reticulum, while the parallel processing corresponds to the coordination of the secondary reticula. The analysis of contrast, on the other hand, corresponds to the general ways in which the sensory-perceptual channels encode information in the representational elements. They all operate by discriminating the sensory-perceptual characteristics into basically contrasting properties (e.g. hot-cold, soft-hard, lightdark, etc). It is this type of local encoding (a binary commutation ± between two states of the element, to use a cybernetic definition) that can be modified, during the introjection of the “on←o” flow, by the concomitant projective control of the “s→on” re-entries, since these are neural pathways the purpose of which is to check the effective cooperation of the representational element. Re-entries can transmit signals that modulate their integrable properties and thereby modify the local properties of the commutation as well as its associative effects in the node. By imagining this process in the coordination of a large number of secondary reticula, I believe it is possible to understand how the original dynamics of the main reticulum can only effectively spread if there are many changes.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 183

19/9/07 16:37:21

184

The Development of Consciousness

The dynamic origin of some of the defences postulated by Freud Indeed, when the enormous development of the secondary reticula, above all in the neocortex, begins to depend on the main reticulum, the introjectable relations become numerous and the cooperation of the “s” elements becomes particularly difficult. The associative networks on each single element grow disproportionately in number and the anticipatory influences of the limbic lobe, which constitute the emotional background to integration, become of decisive importance. The general difficulty of integration seems understandable, above all in the development of the pathogenic classes, the basal patterns of which form, from the very beginning, from contrasting flows of external introjective information and internal projective information. Indeed, the representational properties of an “on” element have to be modified by the cooperation between the two opposing flows that converge upon it. When the patterns spread into the secondary ones, it is the ever-greater development of the “s” re-entries that produces the possible commutations of the “on” elements in the associative network. This process makes increasing resubjectization of the representational dynamics of the main reticulum possible, thus modifying them in the secondary reticula. This development also involves the “sn” elements that are gradually reaching maturation so that a complex interaction between modifications of the “sn(±)↔(±)on” type becomes a part of the integration. During this process, the “sn” elements gain increasing control not only over the “on” elements but also over the “sn” elements, thereby giving rise to the development of “s→(±)sn” functions. In this way, the subject pole learns how to modify the characteristics of its internal control, which will give rise to the reflexive function (Fonagy & Target, 1997) by means of which the child can evaluate and modify its mental processes. It is this structural aspect of the diffusion and reorganization in an association node of the effects of local commutation and the P-I dynamics that seems to be particularly useful in helping to understand the defensive transformations in the secondary reticula.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 184

19/9/07 16:37:21



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

185

The main transformations, starting from the process described above, are undoubtedly the reversal into its opposite and the splitting of the original integrative characteristics of an association node into two or more reticula regulated by different dynamics. This can give rise in the reticula to potentially autonomous developments, although the reticula remain bound to the common basic dynamics that originated their splitting. This kind of process appears to be particularly important when one supposes that the influence of the “s” re-entries can give rise in a secondary reticulum to another important Freudian defence: the change from activity to passivity. This particular transformation of the main reticulum into a secondary reticulum, if conceptualized as in Figure 7.2, implies a potential reverberation of projective-introjective flows in a circuit closed between the two reticula. The flow in this circuit stabilizes the inversion and provides a simple neurological model of how a strong projection can imply a continuous reintrojection, depending on the type of pathogenic P-(I) class illustrated in the previous chapter. reorganisation of reentries

original introjective dynamic

reentrie

projective transformation

ACTIVITY-PASSIVITY CHANGE

DISPLACEMENT

Es

REVERSAL INTO ITS OPPOSITE

I

nE s

associative node

}

P

projective-introjective reverberation

REPRESSION

rE n

rn

En

bs

P

nE o r b n

Bs

I

I

I

Bn

I

Bo

Eo

main reticulum

secondary reticulum bo

introjective flow

Figure 7.2 Projective control of re-entries in a secondary reticulum can give Fig.7.2 rise to the inversion of the introjective dynamics of the main reticulum. The inversion is self-sustaining between the two reticula and can be interpreted as the basis of the reversal into its opposite, the activity-passivity change and splitting.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 185

19/9/07 16:37:22

186

The Development of Consciousness

What seems likely therefore, considering the general properties of these defensive transformations, is that they can quite realistically fractionize the system of the reticula so as to permit a suitable reorganization of the original dynamic processes as well as the new ones. In this model, normal narcissistic development uses this potential of the reticula to modulate the projective-introjective dynamics originating from the mother. This protects the child not only in terms of the intentionality of its subject pole, but it also allows it to tap into different identificatory properties which have been transformed from the original processes and available in the reticula. These properties constitute the basis of the inventions and fantasies (regarding human and inanimate objects) that, even autonomously, gradually enrich the identificatory development of the child and then, as we shall see, come to form part of language. Pathological narcissism, on the other hand, develops from the more defensive dynamic transformations of the original projective-introjective modulation, reorganized by P type re-entries, which give rise to dominant projective dynamics within reticular collaboration. The different defences described by Freud (starting in the Project) appear in some ways more realistic if one tries to understand how information flows develop, during the maturation of the different levels, in the associative nodes of the secondary reticula. They have to pass along certain privileged pathways, but it must also be possible to direct them, if regulated correctly, along other pathways and keep them stable in these new pathways (Figure 7.3). MAIN DEFENCE MECHANISMS

activity-passivity ambivalence reversal splitting displacement

Figure 7.3 The different ± transformations in the integration of the representational nodes. The main property of a node is its binary structure, which permits local modifications, such as the reversal into its opposite, activity-passivity change, displacement and splitting.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 186

19/9/07 16:37:22



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

187

Certain forms of defence, such as reversal into its opposite, change from activity to passivity and displacement seem to be related to local processes (the neocortical level is undoubtedly the most accessible as for representational modifications). Other forms, such as regression and repression, appear necessarily, on the other hand, to be dynamic processes involving different levels, typically the basal level. What in any case appears evident, if one accepts that several reticula must cooperate, is the hard work of the subject pole (which, in the Project, Freud called the ego) in keeping stable associative dynamics that form from multiple, potentially contrasting introjections. It would certainly seem that this extensive neurological space actually provides the best explanation for the subtle pathology of what is seen as normal consciousness and which provides the backdrop to actual pathology. Psychological identity is never constant, even in a normal person, changing according to circumstance and context. It is useful, therefore, to note Freud’s comments in The Ego and the Id reflecting on the potential multiplicity of the ego’s object identifications: It may come to a disruption of the ego in consequence of the different identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps the secret of the cases of what is described as “multiple personality” is that the different identifications seize hold of consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as this, there remains the question of conflicts between the various identifications into which the ego comes apart, conflicts which cannot after all be described as entirely pathological. (Freud, 1923b, pp. 30-31).

The redundancy of the secondary reticula provides a clear and simple explanation for the pathological development of a “multiple personality” in that each reticulum can bind the subject pole to a different identificatory property. This model also suggests, however, that “normal” development depends on the ability of secondary reticula to take on a wide identificatory range since this is necessary to resubjectize the original dynamics. Some of the properties of consciousness (such as that described by Freud of being captured by a specific identification) relate, as I shall now show, to the need during brain development to reorganize the original dynamics with suitable defences. Repression, for instance,

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 187

19/9/07 16:37:22

188

The Development of Consciousness

is particularly useful in clarifying certain difficulties as regards its definition as Freud saw it, and in explaining, within the framework of the model, how consciousness diversifies through the reticula.

The dynamic origin of repression Freud identified (The Unconscious, 1915e) three different types of repressive processes: primal repression, secondary repression, and the return of the repressed. The theoretical issue raised by this tripartite division concerns the fact that since it is the primal repression that produces the first unconscious formations, repression cannot be explained by means of a cathexis by the unconscious, which has not yet formed. As Freud stated (1915e, p. 181): “The anticathexis is the sole mechanism of primal repression.” In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d, p. 94), however, he offered an interesting explanation of how anticathexis produces primal repression: “It is highly probable that the immediate precipitating causes of primal repressions are quantitative factors such as an excessive degree of excitation and the breaking through of the protective shield against stimuli.” I believe that it is possible to agree that the term anticathexis, which expresses the defensive response to the overly strong excitation force, indicates a contrast between flows of the P and I types, as was shown at the beginning of this chapter. The excitation travels along the pathway in the introjective “s←o” direction, while the anticathexis contrasts it in the opposite projective “s→o” direction. Anticathexis is clearly the equivalent of a strong P projective modality, the purpose of which is to oppose a strong I introjective sensorial flow on a primary “on” element. This strong contrast, however, as was seen in the previous chapter, produces a pathogenic precursor of development. The primal repression can therefore be explained, in this model, without preventively making use of the concept of the unconscious. It is quite simply the basic dynamics (predisposed towards interaction with the object), which immediately cause the projections of the subject pole to cooperate with the first object introjections. It is interesting to note that Freud believed a predominant sexual mnes-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 188

19/9/07 16:37:23



DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

189

tic trace was present in pathological defence. In the development of the precursors, the pathogenic function of all of the endogenous dynamisms is more exactly pre-eminent. The type of unconscious that typically characterizes repression, as explained in the discussion concerning the pathogenic classes, does not exactly identify, however, the pathogenic properties of all of the classes, which also include the type of unconscious I have defined as lacunar. The defensive reorganization of the pathogenic precursors, nevertheless, generally produces the three-stage sequence presumed by Freud during the maturation of the reticulum. Indeed, a precursor acts as a potential attraction for representational development in the higher level. For this reason, the repression proper–the secondary repression–reveals itself as a retranscription of these basic defensive dynamics. The development of the associative network of the reticula, as maturation continues, spreads the influence of the precursors in the secondary reticula even further and encourages the return of the primary dynamics that formed the basis for the first development of the reticulum. This dynamic retranscription does not therefore correspond exactly to repression as conceived by Freud, but it does nevertheless replicate its original properties. This whole defensive development forms, more precisely, during the passage from the procedural memories of the basic patterns to the various, more highly evolved, encodings of episodic and semantic memory. The maturation of these different types of memory, which ontogenesis gradually integrates in the reticulum, therefore explains the most essential aspects of transcription.

Consciousness and unconscious processes It is this fundamental aspect of the integration of the “s” elements between the various reticula that suggests a specific meaning of consciousness and unconscious processes. As already mentioned in Chapter Four, the neurophysiological support for consciousness in this model is provided by integrating properties that genetic coding has rendered stable in the main reticulum, these properties providing a specific support for the associative bonds with the other reticula.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 189

19/9/07 16:37:23

190

The Development of Consciousness

Conscious activity rests on this limited characteristic of genetic implementation. When secondary reticula begin to form from the main reticulum, the new integrations distributed among the associative bonds between the reticula therefore provide the neurophysiological basis for the mobility of consciousness, which consequently displays the same limits of integrability as the main reticulum. According to this model, consciousness operates like a particular system of mobile pathways which, out of respect for Freud’s ω neurons of consciousness in the Project, we can indicate as “sω-o”. How can this simple definition be extended to the complex properties of unconscious processes? It can be assumed that during the initial maturation the dynamic patterns, which have basically been encoded in the procedural memories of the main reticulum, already possess certain properties of consciousness, however little evolved they may be. This is the argument laid out by both Edelman/Tononi and Damasio, who attribute a primary consciousness to the protoself, situated in the brainstem. According to them, it is a band of proto-object “sω-o” pathways in the main reticulum that starts to form the first outline of consciousness by means of the relative patterns. As the levels of the main reticulum gradually reach maturation, the basic patterns of the proto-object “sω-o” pathways evolve into the object pathways, with a growing integration of the properties of consciousness. At the same time, the main reticulum becomes the support for the maturation of the secondary reticula, and the protoobject and object “sω-o” pathways therefore become part of the association nodes between the reticula. The associative paths of the “sω-o” pathways in the reticula are not however completely available: those produced by the defences in the nodes act as preferential guides for the real integration of the “sω-o” pathways between the reticula. The exclusions of possible paths of consciousness is something that is therefore immediately related to the psychoanalytic unconscious (Figure 7.4). During the maturation and integration of the reticula, the action of the “s” re-entries to bring about defensive transformations of the “on” elements prevents the mobility of consciousness along several pathways that were originally available. This suggests, clearly in a very simplified way, how an unconscious process can become conscious, i.e. by restoring access to the original dynamic pathways.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 190

19/9/07 16:37:23



GsZ

DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Js Z

EsZ

191

associative development in cortical patterns of primal sZ-o basal pathways

DsZ

Go

A BsZ sZ DsZCsZ Do C o

Jo

Eo

Do

A Bo o

proto-object sZ-o pathways of basal patterns

Figure 7.4 Fig.7.4

What can be legitimately assumed on the basis of the previous considerations, however, is that the complexity of the flows of information passing through the reticulum does not always permit this retrieval, above all when they are under the influence of pathogenic precursors, which establish particularly rigid dynamics.

Primary P-I dynamics and the internal object If we now consider the dynamics of the different classes outlined in the previous chapter, and the transformations to which they can give rise in the secondary reticula, it can be seen that they provide a clear explanation of what is still the most important Freudian concept in psychoanalysis, the nature of transference. As specific interactions with the mother are repeated, the projective-introjective dynamics provide inevitable preferential accesses in the basal pathways of the main reticulum. The primary processes start to be modified during these interactions, while becoming a part of the dynamic patterns that characterize them. These patterns are subsequently spread from the main reticulum to the secondary reticula, even in the retranscription of memory and in the defence and transformation arrangements described in this chapter.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 191

19/9/07 16:37:23

192

The Development of Consciousness

The entire process converges on the projective-introjective properties, which pass from the main reticulum to the secondary reticula, producing the interaction between the original identificatory nucleus and its transformations. At the same time, this process also differentiates consciousness into the identificatory properties distributed defensively over the reticula. This whole development provides the dynamic basis for transference and the ubiquitous nature that is evident in clinical practice; it explains why it is difficult to associate the defensive organization of consciousness with a unitary process. The original encoding of the maternal patterns also provides a good explanation for the structural and dynamic meaning of the internal object. When the secondary reticula develop from the main reticulum, the basic dynamics remain as a necessary foundation for the diversification of the reticula from the original nodes. There are many objects (real or immaginary) that the secondary reticula can encode, but all of them depend on the particular object that is introjected, starting from the main reticulum, during the first stages of maturation. This, of course, explains the difficulty in modifying the associative structure of the secondary reticula, since the development of the reticula depends on the primary patterns that have already become stable in integration. In psychoanalytic therapy, we operate in such a way that language modifies these dynamics. It is undoubtedly interesting, therefore, to attempt to explain how verbal interaction can result in an efficient change in the associative structure of the reticula. This depends, as will be shown in the following chapter, on how, in a child, language forms from the first nucleus of its neural maturation.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 192

19/9/07 16:37:24

CHAPTER EIGHT

The origin of language

The problem of the origin of language

F

reud believed, in line with the positivist training he received in his studies, that by using words in order to recover memories it was possible to gain access to the unconscious and thereby resolve psychic conflicts. Freud would probably be struck by the changes that have occurred, in the various psychoanalytic models and the way in which his original hypotheses are used, even though he himself had had to modify them several times during the practice of his clinical work after his initial expectations had been proved wrong. Does language truly help us gain access to the unconscious? If so, what really happens in the patient’s mind? The difficulty in answering these questions depends, according to the model proposed here, on an essentially abstract concept of language, which does not take into sufficient consideration the nervous system of the brain. I think however that a more precise meaning of language can be intuitively understood if an explanation can be given of how its functions form from the dynamic properties of the reticulum, which is continuously subject to projective-introjective flows. In this case, language can be interpreted as something quite different from an abstract process of signification

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 193

193

19/9/07 16:37:24

194

The Development of Consciousness

(of a linguistic or cognitive type). Indeed, it appears clear how language has to interact in a concrete way with these flows of information, and therefore brings about real effects in the personal dynamics of the reticulum. As a consequence it is very important to show how, according to this model, the origin of language in our species lies in certain properties that are connatural to the long evolutionary process of the reticulum. Its sudden appearance during the more recent development of the brain therefore implies continuity during phylogenetic growth rather than discontinuity. This evolutionary process also offers a simple explanation of how language can originate in a child and be linked to the development of the entire dynamics of the brain, as well as why it can later be used in the therapeutic relationship. The most important aspect of this concept is a certain striking contradiction in the development of the human brain. The neurological structures of a linguistic type only form in one hemisphere but, as was explained in Chapter Four, in the passage from primates to man genetic encoding remains more or less constant. It can therefore only produce certain partial changes in the general brain structure, which must be capable however of explaining the sudden appearance of a new function. According to the model presented here, the origin of linguistic structures lies plausibly in an essentially qualitative reorganization of the growing redundancy of the secondary reticula during early brain development. Greatly simplifying this concept, it is possible to state that the entire neural structure devoted to language is a grouping of tertiary reticula that develops these specialist properties from those of the huge quantity of secondary reticula gravitating around the main reticulum. This grouping of tertiary reticula (which for simplicity’s sake has been termed the linguistic reticulum) is normally situated in the left hemisphere, although it does not constitute the entire hemisphere since it is permeated–as will be explained later–by the secondary reticula, from which it has differentiated and with which it remains associated. The evolutionary process undoubtedly selected certain genetic characteristics that favoured this important innovation in

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 194

19/9/07 16:37:24



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

195

the reticula. The importance of this concept, however, is its ability to explain the origin of language primarily from the redundancy of the reticula, and the gradual development of this redundancy explains the development of the brain through mammals to man.

The transformation of the secondary reticula in tertiary linguistic reticula The transformation of the secondary reticula into tertiary linguistic reticula is facilitated, according to this concept, by a critical period in cerebral maturation towards the end of the first year (Lenneberg, 1967). In this period, the first secondary reticula begin to replicate and differentiate from the main reticulum. As we saw in the previous chapter, the immature mind learns to regulate the dynamic flows of the “s-o” pathways of these secondary reticula. As a result of this initial maturation, many replications of partial or entire sections of these “s-o” pathways, which are still unstable and receptive to forming new bonds, form from the redundancy of the secondary reticula. This associative development creates, in the growing redundancy of the reticula, a fluid band of “s-o” pathways waiting to be integrated. It is the presence of such a large number of “s-o” pathways, above all in the cortex, which provide the physiological basis, as will now be explained, for the tertiary reticula that enable language to originate. The objects (and the relations the child has with them) correspond to projective-introjective dynamic properties of the “s-o” pathways, so when these pathways are replicated in the tertiary reticula, they represent object-relational properties in the new association system, which has many as yet indeterminate connections in the various sensory channels (they are the equivalent of Edelman/Tononi’s primary repertoire). It therefore seems plausible that the attribution of a name to a certain object can, if carried out in a systematic way, lead to a cooperation between the acoustic areas and the object characteristics encoded in the “sL-oL” pathways (“L” indicates their new linguistic function). (Figure 8.1).

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 195

19/9/07 16:37:24

196

The Development of Consciousness

s

secondary reticula of the right hemisphere

sL o

auditory area

oL

tertiary reticula of the left hemisphere Wernicke’s area

sagittal plane of the two hemispheres

Figure 8.1 A word corresponds to an association between the acoustic area and object information recodified in the tertiary reticula gravitating in Fig.8.1 Wernicke’s area; it involves both cortical and subcortical pathways.

It is possible to understand how, in this way, the repeated association made by the mother between a name and an object, or between a name and a relation that the child has with the object, gradually selects from the redundancy of connections specific bonds between the acoustic areas and the pathways of the tertiary reticula, giving rise to linguistic encoding. This process typifies, first and foremost, the development of links between the acoustic area and the neighbouring Wernicke’s area, which forms from the associative areas of object encoding. The act of listening to a name therefore activates the band of “sLL o ” pathways that correspond to the object encodings established during learning, while the development of the re-entries between the “sL-oL” pathways, the acoustic areas and the areas of verbal articulation makes it possible to re-establish the association from the inside so as to be able to pronounce the name that corresponds to the activity of the “sL-oL” pathways. This happens when other connections are formed with Broca’s area (adjacent to the motor-phonatory area) enabling control and pronunciation (Figure 8.2). This development allows the child, on pronouncing a word, to communicate to the mother the state of its representational system.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 196

19/9/07 16:37:29



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

197

secondary reticula tertiary reticula

s

sL o oL

Broca’s area

Wernicke’s area

sagittal plane of the two hemispheres

Figure 8.2 The development of re-entries from Broca’s area onto the tertiary reticula Fig. of 8.2 Wernicke’s area and their association with verbal articulation enables reactivation and pronunciation.

Once the child is able to reactivate this encoding, it can also use it alone, to think in verbal terms about the relations incorporated in its representational system. As the attribution of nouns, adjectives, and verbs increases, the process of linguistic encoding specializes the “sL-oL” pathways of the tertiary reticula, specifying with ever greater accuracy the properties that can be derived from the secondary reticula. This not only allows a gradual refinement of linguistic encoding, but also a growing precision in the encoding of the “sL-oL” dynamics of the linguistic reticulum, which correspond to the “s-o” dynamics of the secondary reticula. This development explains how language becomes of fundamental help in the general coordination of the brain: it is driven by the “s-o” dynamics of the secondary reticula and can interact with these reticula through the control of the “sL-oL” pathways, which determine more precise specializations of the original dynamic organization. At the same time, acoustic encoding (and later the encoding of writing) makes it possible to communicate to others the dynamic processes that are being encoded between the secondary and tertiary reticula.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 197

19/9/07 16:37:36

198

The Development of Consciousness

It is therefore important to note that language always implies neural activity of the secondary reticula from which it originates and with which it continually interacts. The sound-object association is formed from the replication of dynamic “s-o” pathways, from which it therefore inherits the projective-introjective properties. Naming even a simple object signifies, according to the concept presented here, re-establishing the specific dynamics of that object in the neural pathways, albeit along the “sL-oL” pathways rather than in the original “s-o” pathways. The fact that pathways are not greatly differentiated at the beginning of linguistic development also explains why words have very concrete properties for a child, producing dynamics in its neural system that are very similar to those of the real object.

Functional differentiation of the linguistic reticulum Before taking a more detailed look at certain structural characteristics of language, it is interesting to note how the linguistic reticulum, in its cortical level, can be quite easily traced back to the left hemisphere. As has already been seen, the “o” elements of the secondary reticula are situated in the cortex in the perceptual areas (acoustic, kinaesthetic, and visual), while the “on” elements are located in the association areas next to them; the “s” elements, on the other hand, are located in the premotor and motor areas of the frontal lobe. If we look back at Figure 2.1, Broca’s area of linguistic specialization is located here in the prefrontal “s” area, while Wernicke’s area is situated near the association areas of the “on” elements. Moreover, it is important to note that these two areas are not isolated from one another as they are joined by the neural pathways of the arched fascicle. Indeed, the known linguistic properties of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas correspond to the properties of the elements of these two areas: Broca’s area is grammatical and can therefore derive this function from the motor-articulation function, which is now directed towards the control of language; Wernicke’s area is both semantic and conceptual, and can in turn derive these characteristics from the sensory-perceptual encoding of the objects. The damage caused

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 198

19/9/07 16:37:36



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

199

by the disconnection of the arched fascicle in some neurolinguistic syndromes highlights that it is essential to the cooperation between the two areas (Figure 8.3). FRONTAL AREA

S

ARCUATE FASCICULUS

O

ELEMENTS

BROCA’S

VISUAL CORTEX

AREA SYLVIAN FISSURE

ELEMENTS

ANGULAR

WERNICKE’S CONVOLUTION AREA

Figure 8.3 Wernicke’s area includes, as a result of its central position, the “onL” representational elements derived from the sensory-perceptual elements Fig. 8.3 (cortical and subcortical) of the object. Broca’s area is specialized in the L “s ” motor elements derived from the “s” elements of the frontal lobe, which arrange the “onL” linguistic representational elements. The arched fascicle, which connects Broca’s area to Wernicke’s area, is part of the linguistic band, which forms from the “s-o” pathways. The subcortical systems also take part in linguistic coordination (adapted from Geschwind, 1972, p. 78).

In particular, the grammatical and syntactic functions typical of Broca’s area offer a precise neurophysiological interpretation of the way they are created in the linguistic reticulum. As the “sL” reentries of this area gradually grow in number, they can presumably control particular tracts and nodes of the pathways, isolating their local characteristics and learning to reorder them differently. This provides an explanation for the way in which the tracts of the band of “sL-oL” pathways that are able to deal with nouns, verbs and adjectives are differentiated. They can be interpreted as flows of information from the secondary reticula that can be distinguished locally by means of the numerous new accesses to the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 199

19/9/07 16:37:37

200

The Development of Consciousness

elements of the reticula as a result of the plasticity of the tertiary reticula. It can therefore be supposed that as the number of words learnt increases, the typically perception-representation properties, which have their association nodes in the “o” and “on” elements, are differentiated into nouns and adjectives, while the more typically motor properties, which have their nodes in the “s” elements, are differentiated into verbs. As a result of becoming less stable in the “sL-oL” pathways, the highly evolutionary structure of the “s-o” pathways favours the establishment of the re-entries on the fundamental nodes and the natural differentiation of the grammatical categories. The increasing abundance of these nodes also explains the combinatorial, semiotic and categorical properties universally present in languages. This development seems sufficiently simple, deriving as it does from natural properties of the pathways, to explain why the motor organization of the controls of Broca’s area does not necessarily form from a truly innovative genetic encoding. It can, in fact, originate directly from the immaturity of the pathways, which favour, as a result of their different possibilities for reorganization, the immense compositional capabilities of language.

Cooperation and reflexivity between left and right hemispheres From a structural point of view, the most interesting aspect of this concept for psychoanalysis concerns the kind of maturation that characterizes the linguistic reticulum during the gradual development of the brain. The band of linguistic pathways, for example, necessarily starts to form from the basal levels, which become stable during early brain maturation. It cannot therefore develop sufficiently in the limited redundancy available, developing later instead in the higher levels where the increased redundancy makes it possible to clearly differentiate the “sL-oL” pathways from the “s-o” pathways of the secondary reticula. This explains why it is in the great redundancy of the neocortex that the linguistic band clearly identifies its areas

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 200

19/9/07 16:37:37



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

201

of specialization, even though certain properties of the linguistic band can also be found in a less highly developed form in the subcortical levels. Linguistic lateralization, which generally occurs in the left hemisphere, can moreover be easily explained by this type of development. The linguistic refunctionalization of the tertiary reticula at a neocortical level is not a stable process and depends on the massive support that the secondary reticula of the right hemisphere can provide the left hemisphere through the corpus callosum. This development creates a truly functional asymmetry between the two hemispheres, which is, however, more complex than is usually supposed. The linguistic reticulum does not, in fact, occupy the whole of the left hemisphere, but only a part of it, and it also cooperates with the secondary reticula of its own hemisphere as well as those of the other hemisphere. Were it not for this partial refunctionalization, it would be impossible to explain how children who have had a hemisphere removed still have normal linguistic development, albeit sometimes with more critical periods as regards its development in the substitutive hemisphere (Schuman, 1997). The linguistic reticulum necessarily forms, in this case, from a smaller number of secondary reticula in the substitutive hemisphere, while the other secondary reticula have the stabilizing function that is normally performed by the other hemisphere. It is important to note that the asymmetry between the two hemispheres seems to be something for which there is a genetic predisposition. Lateralization becomes evident after the first year of age even though it in fact begins during the foetal period and continues until the age of twenty (Fride & Weinstock, 1988). During the first three years of life, before this lateralization starts to stabilize, the activity of the right hemisphere is greater (Thatcher, Walker, & Guidice, 1987; Chiron et al., 1997) and it is this initial predominance of the right hemisphere that may be interpreted as the necessary support for the transformation of the secondary reticula into linguistic reticula in the left hemisphere. The most important effect however appears to be produced by a specific constitutive asymmetry of the two hemispheres, and the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 201

19/9/07 16:37:37

202

The Development of Consciousness

prominence of the ventral pathway in the left hemisphere and the dorsal pathway in the right hemisphere. As the ventral pathway privileges the “s” elements, it predisposes the subject pole of the left hemisphere projectively, while the dorsal pathway privileges the “o” elements and predisposes the right object pole introjectively. This asymmetry suggests that the introjective-projective properties can engage in different types of cooperation between the two hemispheres as cerebral maturation proceeds. When lateralization begins to develop, the progressive myelination of the corpus callosum favours similar dynamics in the two hemispheres, while the subsequent increase in lateralization also involves differences between their projective and introjective dynamics, which can produce a recursive flow of information (Figure 8.4).

secondary reticula tertiary reticula

s

projective linguistic flow introjective perceptual flow

sL o oL

Broca’s area

Wernicke’s area

sagittal plane of the two hemispheres

Figure 8.4 The two hemispheres are dynamically different. The right hemisphere Fig. introjective 8.4 favours the flow while the left hemisphere favours the projective flow. When lateralization is established, a recursive flow of information is produced. This facilitates the projective development, from Broca’s area, of re-entries on the “on” elements of the tertiary reticula recoded following the processes shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.2.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 202

19/9/07 16:37:42



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

203

This process provides an interesting explanation for the reorganization that occurs between the two hemispheres when the linguistic reticulum begins to stabilize at this cortical level. The prominent projective dynamics of the linguistic reticulum gradually predispose the system of “sL” re-entries of Broca’s area so as to organize the bonds of the linguistic representational system; at the same time, the introjective dynamics of the right hemisphere favour the main organization of perceptual information arriving from the environment. This partitioning of development suggests a complex distribution of cooperative and recursive dynamic properties. The interhemispheric dynamics seems to be the most plausible structural support for the self-reflexive function of language. When the recursiveness starts to become stable, the linguistic reticulum predominates in the interaction with the secondary reticula of the right hemisphere, extracting environmental information from them. In this way, there is a constant linguistic refunctionalization of the “so” introjective-projective dynamic relations of the ordinary sensory-perceptual representation that produces the rapid autonomous formation of the linguistic reticulum as a dominant characteristic of the subject pole. It is this rapid autonomous development of language that makes us interpret language as a totally innovative specialization in evolution, when it can, in fact, be traced back to the refunctionalization of the original reticulum. As already mentioned, lateralization seems to have the aim of reducing the potential conflict between two similar processing structures (Levy, 1969). Indeed, it turns this conflict into cooperation and, according to this concept, language becomes advantageous in evolutionary terms precisely because it involves a constant self-reflexive extraction of information by one hemisphere from the other. It is precisely this process that can be interpreted as being evolutionarily responsible for neocortical growth (especially frontal) and the mental coordination that is possible with language. The autonomization of language is extremely important in explaining the reorganization of the projective-introjective flows of the main reticulum in the child (and then the adult). The P-I dynamics in the secondary reticula, originally regulated by the mother, undergoes numerous transformations, creating more

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 203

19/9/07 16:37:43

204

The Development of Consciousness

flexible identificatory functions better able to adapt to relations with other human objects. The P-I dynamics of the secondary reticula continue to be bound to the main reticulum, while the tertiary reticula group together identificatory transformations that are much freer with respect to the primary transformations of the main reticulum. The child’s fantasies, within this framework, contain the projective-introjective transformations which would not stabilize in a secondary reticulum and which are made possible only thanks to the distinctive mobility of the tertiary reticula. The “realistic” meaning of a child’s language also shows that its origin in the encoding of the perceptual reticulum preserves highly concrete representational properties of reality, which the child uses directly as identificatory material for both human and inanimate objects. This early property of language corresponds to the “psychic equivalence” (Fonagy & Target, 1996) whereby the child treats mental and physical events in the same way. The increasing autonomization of the linguistic from the perceptual reticulum allows the child to access the “imaginative mode” (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991) through which it can experience representational ideas and feelings while remaining separate from external reality. This progressive autonomization is typical of the huge development of the linguistic reticulum in the adult in whom narration and fantasy have a similar identificatory function. The defensive structure, which converges in the linguistic reticulum, therefore produces more complex transformations than those met with in the primal dynamics of the main reticulum.

Maturation and the dynamic function of a word It will now be shown how this development of the linguistic reticulum, though clearly the result of various processes, makes it possible to analyse certain simple features of the way in which a word operates in the brain. These features are particularly useful in trying to understand how language operates in the psychoanalytic relationship.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 204

19/9/07 16:37:43



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

205

As already explained, learning a word involves selecting a certain number of connections between the acoustic area and the “sL-oL” pathways of the tertiary reticula in order to form a stable association between a word and the properties of a given object. The development of re-entries from the “sL” areas (especially Broca’s area) on the same “sL-oL” pathways and that of the re-entries on the areas of control over phonation, on the other hand, make it possible to reactivate a specific activity of the “sL-oL” pathways and pronounce the word associated with it. These two processes are both characterized by the fact that the associative connections form gradually and in an imprecise way and that they have to establish many types of bonds. All these connections therefore initially fix only certain elements of the pathways of the linguistic reticulum. As neural maturation progresses, the continuous selection of new connections implies increasingly precise “sL-oL” relations, gradually producing the array of acoustic and visual signs that a child normally becomes competent with. This general increase in the number of bonds requires a considerable development of the re-entries for them to be coordinated, and explains (as has already been mentioned) why linguistic encoding is initially unstable and imprecise. When it first forms, the band of “sL-oL” pathways is not easily distinguishable from the band of “s-o” association pathways replicated in the redundancy, nor is it regulated by a suitable number of re-entries. As a result, a continuous refunctionalization of secondary into tertiary reticula remains available during cerebral maturation, making it possible to broaden the meaning of a word so as to modify it during learning by means of suitable re-entries. This gradual increase in the number of bonds seems best able to explain how a word corresponds, neurophysiologically, to precise characteristics of the flow of information along the “s-o” pathways, which are established during neural integration as a result of specific individual experiences. It is not difficult to imagine that this will cause continuous transformations during linguistic development between different types of encoding during the integration of the reticulum. These encodings are undoubtedly more sensory and perceptual in the lower levels and more conceptual and abstract during the evolution of the higher levels.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 205

19/9/07 16:37:43

206

The Development of Consciousness

The word “mother” for a child, for example, undoubtedly corresponds to a whole range of essentially primary dynamic relations, encoded in the tactile and alimentary sensorial systems as well as in the emotive-affective ones of the child’s need for security. For every child, however, the word “mother” can stimulate different introjective-projective dynamics in the different levels as a result of different relations the child may establish during its development. During cerebral maturation the meaning of this word will naturally change, and this may occur by both accentuating the original dynamics and by means of their modification in the organization of the levels of the association reticula. In an adult, the meaning of the word “mother” is not necessarily stable therefore and depends on the kind of context that can stimulate specific aspects of its entire integration. It can therefore produce different emotive or rational responses in different circumstances, corresponding to the different dynamic introjective-projective properties. Similar considerations can obviously be made about every other word. The most important aspect of this concept therefore concerns both the stratification of the original dynamics of a certain word (and consequently the variability available in the different levels), as well as the greater dynamic intensity in the primary levels. Linguistic maturation, indeed, enables an ever-greater participation, at a neocortical level, of the association nodes of the reticulum, which establish its more abstract properties. The flow of information between these nodes is not, however, regulated by the original dynamics of the “sL-oL” pathways of the initial development to the same extent as it depends on the increasing disarticulation of the neocortical level. So, generally speaking, conceptual language retains only part of the original dynamics of the primary levels as it adapts itself to the need for a broad reorganization of the flow of information between the nodes. Words, according to this concept, acquire very complex properties, which explain their numerous uses in the reticulum. They designate objects and concepts, though not rigidly, deriving their specific meanings from the actual encodings that can be re-established, in each situation, in the levels. This is true, for example, of psychoanalysts themselves, for whom the word “breast” may rep-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 206

19/9/07 16:37:44



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

207

resent, in different contexts, a concrete object, an affective state, a concept or a physiological process, but always with noticeable personal differences. This is even more true for patients, for whom a certain word usually involves a strongly idiosyncratic access to their possible relational meanings. The word responsibility, for example, can evoke in one patient a dangerous dependency as a result of a strong persecutory introjection of the mother, and in another case a sense of renewed autonomy as a result of the recovery of a satisfactory ability to elaborate maternal introjection. The same word can evidently involve different accesses along the pathways of the reticulum, each with its own specific projective-introjective dynamics.

Double associative dynamics: linguistic and perceptual It may be useful to try to give an intuitive, but realistic, representation of how to imagine these specific characteristics for a particular word. In the diagram below, a word has re-entries that only form on certain “sL” and “onL” elements of the linguistic reticulum (indicated by large filled dots), which are connected to the corresponding “s” and “on” elements (indicated by large empty dots) of the secondary, perceptual reticula. Both the “sL” and “onL” elements and the “s” and “on” elements can simultaneously form associations among the numerous other elements (small dots) of the respective reticula (Figure 8.5). The nodes bound by the re-entries make it possible to recover the most stable information along the respective tracts between the nodes (they are therefore shown as thicker), defining the basic configurations of the word. Information passes more freely, on the other hand, along the tracts (thinner) of the other pathways, which are only associatively reactivated in the reticula. According to the theory presented here, when a word acquires a new re-entry, this can substantially modify the flow of information in its basic configurations and in its association network. The new stable tract that forms also therefore influences the flow of information in the reticulum, binding it to the specific information that flows along that tract.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 207

19/9/07 16:37:44

208

The Development of Consciousness

linguistic cortical configuration perceptual cortical configuration

tracts controlled by reentries s

q q

sL x

x

x

x

x

x

q

subcortical linguistic configurations

x

x

q

q

x

x

q

x

q

q q

o

oL

q

x

Wernicke’s area

q q

x

x

Broca’s area x

q

x x

x

x

q

q

q

x

q q

q

sagittal plane of the two hemispheres subcortical perceptual configurations

q

Figure 8.5 A word comprises two configurations, one perceptual and the other linguistic (large empty and filled dots respectively) as well as associative links Fig. 8.5 (small empty and filled dots). Broca’s area can retrieve directly only linguistic information controlled by re-entries; the rest of the information can only be retrieved associatively. The configurations involve tracts carrying projectiveintrojective flows at the various levels of the reticulum.

It is this type of process that makes it possible to understand the cooperation between several words to direct the flow of information in the reticulum. If a certain word lacks a specific tract, but another word has already acquired this tract in a stable manner, the latter can make up for the lack of this tract in the former. It can be supposed that linguistic ability consists in selecting the most suitable words in order to form a certain type of channelling in the linguistic reticulum, identifying the routes that best stabilize it in the immense association network. These aspects suggest a plausible explanation for the conscious and unconscious properties of language as a result of the more stable characteristics of the “sL” re-entries in the control of the meaning of a word. Certain observations made by Freud help to clarify this point.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 208

19/9/07 16:37:55



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

209

Words and the elementary contents of consciousness As early as the Project, Freud (1895, p. 365) indicated how the mnestic image acquired “an indication of quality and also accordingly an indication of the consciousness of the memory” in association with a verbal image. The importance of the word in the conscious process is further underlined in the definition provided in The Unconscious (1915e, p. 201): “…the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone.” The specific contribution of words to conscious processes can easily be explained by referring to the characteristics that consciousness, in this model, has in common with Edelman/Tononi’s concept of the dynamic aggregate. According to Edelman and Tononi (2000), the dynamic aggregate forms from the global mapping that transits dynamically between the different maps, which explains the mobility and limits of consciousness. The mobility and limits of consciousness can be similarly explained in this model by the bonds that the main reticulum maintains in the association nodes with the secondary reticula. In Edelman/Tononi’s aggregate, it is above all the synchronization properties of integration (including units of as little as 100-150 milliseconds) that produce consciousness, and a similar process can also be conceptualized in the type of linguistic refunctionalization described here. Indeed, a word forms from a broad system of “sLoL” and “s-o” pathways and therefore involves a unification of dynamic flows that are sufficiently complex to maintain an abundant flow of information, which must also last long enough to produce a stable integration. On the basis of these observations, a word corresponds to a stable transition in Edelman/Tononi’s dynamic core, and this means that it is stable enough to be able to bind an elementary content of consciousness. It is therefore plausible to assume that it is precisely the temporal coordination of these single processes in the linguistic reticulum that provides the basis for the typical mobility of consciousness we attribute to language.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 209

19/9/07 16:37:56

210

The Development of Consciousness

The true contribution of language to consciousness appears clearer when Edelman/Tononi’s hypothesis of the dynamic core is applied, as in the previous chapter, not only to the development of the secondary reticula and defences, but also to that of the linguistic reticula. Indeed, the dynamic aggregate follows the maturation of the “s-o” pathways and this explains why consciousness starts to form as soon as the initial integration of the basal levels begins, albeit solely with the dynamic properties typical of procedural memory. These elementary states of consciousness (which correspond to Damasio’s primary consciousness) support the development of secondary reticula in the higher levels and, therefore, also their refunctionalization along the “sL-oL” pathways of the tertiary linguistic reticula. As has already been seen, during this maturation, consciousness is continually being modified. It forms in the reticula like a band of “s-o” pathways which, though limited, is developing all the time between the different levels, passing along the association pathways organized by the defences. In this complex development, consciousness acquires properties that depend on the specific “s-o” and “sL-oL” pathways of the secondary and linguistic reticula, which gradually become part of the dynamic aggregate core. It is therefore possible to attribute the mobility of consciousness to the specific control of the “s” and “sL” re-entries on these tracts of the perceptual and linguistic representational system so as to guide the flows of information that characterize consciousness. A more detailed study of the different properties of these subjective elements makes it possible to introduce, albeit in a rather basic way, the different contributions these controls make to conscious states during mental processes.

The conscious and unconscious integration of mental processes From this point of view, effective conscious integration of new mental processes appears to be a specific aspect of linguistic properties. In early infant maturation, the control of the subject pole occurs

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 210

19/9/07 16:37:56



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

211

without the contribution of the linguistic reticulum and is therefore the control of only the “s” re-entries of the somatoperceptual representation system of the lower levels. The properties “sω” of consciousness during early infant maturation, which are still very elementary, then evolve into more complex integrations of the numerous associative flows of information between the rapidly developing secondary reticula, though still remaining fluid and unstable in the control of somatoperceptual dynamics. Words, on the other hand, are units of information that tend to stabilize from the tertiary reticula, which binds more reduced flows of information, as they can only pass through certain specific nodes, but they provide a more specific contribution to consciousness. Indeed, despite the fact that words only have a limited number of re-entries, they can cooperate with other words to produce patterns of re-entries “sL” and “sωL” that are better able to identify the representational accesses. More specifically, the re-entries “sωL” can determine more precise flows of consciousness. This makes it easier to understand why conscious processes constitute a privileged route for the pathways resulting, by means of words, from a new integration between secondary and tertiary reticula. This aspect of the interaction between reticula makes it easier to understand how an infant’s consciousness, though intentional and while drawing on specific mental processes, seems to be qualitatively different from the consciousness that develops with the subsequent re-entries. Indeed, it is the poverty of re-entries of the “sωL” elements during initial linguistic maturation that can explain why it is not possible to recall specific memories from early infancy. It is the very linguistic representational complexification, with the enormous subsequent development of the re-entries, which makes it difficult to re-establish the conscious properties of the first re-entries. Language therefore seems above all able to acquire the original P-I dynamics of early mental integration, i.e. the projective-introjective structure of the relation patterns of the initial levels rather than their effective mnestic content. In adults, on the other hand, words, even when they have evolved at the cortical level, remain rooted in these initial integration dynamics and this explains why it is pos-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 211

19/9/07 16:37:56

212

The Development of Consciousness

sible to interact dynamically with those patterns and even modify them during verbal communication. As can easily be understood, less conceptual and abstract words, which better preserve the primary projective-introjective dynamics, are best able to re-establish the processes established during initial brain maturation. The most useful aspect of these considerations is the broad meaning that can be given to the process of mental integration during therapy, so as to clarify the properties of the two most important types of cerebral integration that together contribute to the patient’s development: unconscious and conscious integration. When a patient unwittingly elaborates new, less defensive mental processes between the associative reticula, cerebral integration involves the system of the “s” and “sL” elements, which are usually extremely numerous. During conscious mental processes, on the other hand, the patient draws more precisely on the “sω” properties, particularly on the linguistic properties of the “sωL” re-entries, which can explore the new integration in a specific way. When this twofold process takes place correctly, it organizes the integration of mental processes in a cortical type of dynamic, which is better guided by conscious verbal control, and a subcortical type of dynamic which, despite not having such precise control, is nevertheless reorganized by means of the bonds that have been maintained between the different levels of the reticulum. Considering the number of reticula and their organization on the different levels, it is possible to state that new mental integration usually involves the widespread stabilized cooperation of “s”, “sω”, “sL”, and “sωL” elements. Its particular conscious properties do not derive simply from their integration, however. They derive from the intentional mobility that the subject pole can have in the system of pathways left free for the passage of associative information by the defences.

Conceptual content and tonal modulation It is now possible to see the most important feature of this complex set-up: the specific function of language in patient-analyst therapeutic relations. It can be supposed, on the basis of what has been stated so far, that these two people are guided during the interaction by

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 212

19/9/07 16:37:56



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

213

their own particular P-I cerebral dynamics. This involves, in addition to the dynamic properties of the perceptual reticula, the dynamic encoding of words in the tertiary linguistic reticula. When the patient or analyst pronounces a particular word, it produces in the interlocutor two basic processes. These cooperate with one another to give rise to specific dynamics throughout the brain system (which obviously become more complex the greater the number of words). The first of these processes is the starting of the perceptual analysis of the word in the acoustic areas, the elaboration of which involves a typically associative exploration of all the cerebral areas (in both the secondary and tertiary reticula) that contributed during the learning of the word to giving it a meaning. Though this process may seem spontaneous and simple, it reorganizes the meaning of the word starting from the more stable association nodes or those that have already been activated by other latent associations. The projective-introjective dynamics that are re-established on different levels constitute the available identificatory properties of the meaning of the word, which in this way is reorganized to provide a potential relational background for its understanding. The second process is the modulation of this extensive integration as a result of the sensory-perceptual stimulation that the speaker causes in the listener, which can modify important properties of local elaborations in the different neural areas. Body language, in general, can stimulate specific sensory channels (of somato-kinaesthetic, olfactory and acoustic perception and, in the visual channel, of ocular-motor control), increasing the importance of their associations in the respective areas and thereby selecting particular meanings of the word and its projective-introjective identificatory dynamics. The most interesting aspect of this process concerns the tonal modulation with which a word is pronounced. Its analysis involves, in addition to the sensory-acoustic area in the right hemisphere, properties from, most importantly, the subcortical affectiveemotive integration by means of which an infant interacts vocally with its mother prior to learning to use language. When words subsequently start to be encoded, their encoding includes this large precocious sensitization of the association areas. A particular tonal modulation on the part of the speaker can therefore re-establish for

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 213

19/9/07 16:37:57

214

The Development of Consciousness

a given word specific nodes of its integration and modify its identificatory meaning considerably. The sensory-perceptual stimulation, above all tonal, by the speaker shows how the meaning of the word is reconstructed in the listener starting from real experiences that have contributed to his linguistic development throughout brain maturation. During this process, for each word, the listener’s own conceptual contents therefore interact with the speaker-induced perceptual-acoustic contents, thereby stabilizing certain pathways of the possible cooperation, on the various levels, between secondary and tertiary reticula. During verbal communication this dynamic aspect acts as a guide for every word for a continuous reintegration of information along the association nodes of the linguistic and perception reticula, stabilizing them along certain tracts rather than others, and modulating their projective-introjective dynamics on the different levels. It is therefore also possible to understand how a succession of several words is able, by means of the relations between their meanings and their introjective, perceptual and tonal effects, to result in preferential paths between the reticula and to accentuate their specific projective-introjective dynamics. This gives an idea of the complexity of the network of P-I relations that are established between two speakers in their respective brain systems, resulting in specific modulations of the flows of information in both the linguistic-tonal and perception channel in both speakers.

The syntonization of P-I dynamics between patient and analyst In this model, the truly important aspect of the reciprocal modulation between two interlocutors is that this modulation is established, during the verbal interaction between patient and analyst (and, more generally, between two individuals), as a potential syntonization of the introjective-projective dynamics created by the words in the reciprocal cerebral reticula. Even though these dynamics are complex and develop in two distinct neural systems, they merge in time. Put very simplistically, syntonization stabilizes op-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 214

19/9/07 16:37:57



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

215

timally when the dynamic P-I organization internal to the patient and the analyst becomes complementary between the two of them, thereby allowing a regular cyclical process between projections and introjections in the two reticula (Figure 8.6).

(P

I) patient

(P

OSCILLATION

(P

I) patient SYNTONIZATION

I) analyst

(P

I) analyst

Figure 8.6 On the left is the initial phase of syntonization: when the patient is in the P polarity, he or she produces an I polarity in the analyst and, vice-versa, when in the I polarity, this produces a P polarity. On the right is syntonization: the P polarity of the patient produces an I polarity that is reorganized in the analyst as a P polarity. This in turn causes an I polarity in the patient, which is reorganized as P, thereby giving rise to a cyclical process.

Fig. 8.6

This does not mean that the complementarity of I and P during verbal interaction should be considered the norm on all levels. It can also be discontinuous on different levels of the reticula and in the perceptual and linguistic channels, although it tends to operate as a reciprocal syntonization, which is natural, given its physiological origin. It is the sensitization of minimal effects of the projective-introjective modulation on the different levels that determines the importance of the information content that is stabilized in both brain systems. The process of syntonization may involve the various sensory-perceptual channels considerably, but it is generally the linguistic-tonal channel that can act as a bridge, as a result of the bonds it has with the secondary reticula, between the patient’s and the analyst’s brain systems. It is therefore above all in the intensive cooperation between the different levels of reticula that projectiveintrojective syntonization can also gain access to the basic dynamics and bring about–as will be explained in more detail–a precise regulation of these dynamics. This interaction clearly corresponds to the type hypothesized by Siegel (1999) in the therapeutic relation, i.e. a dyadic form of effect between two minds. If linguistic interaction is considered from a neurophysiological point of view, it can be seen to involve specific

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 215

19/9/07 16:37:57

216

The Development of Consciousness

P-I oscillations in the “s-o” pathways in the different maps, the syntonization of which implies a true effect between local activations of the two neural systems. For this reason, agreement between the two systems requires a sort of gradual learning of the time necessary, in both the reticula, for the most complex integrative processes to become part of the syntonization. Syntonization is not just a linguistic-tonal property, as it also involves perception due to the bonds that exist between the secondary and tertiary reticula. This implies a continuous cooperation between the two hemispheres. It is understandable, therefore, that there is an increase in the perceptual sensitivity of the patient (Major & Miller, 1984), and a change in the style of hemispheric coordination (Lichtenberg & Meares, 1996). Similarly, Levin’s theory (1991) that the metaphoric potential in language implies a permanent change in neural organization appears justified. In particular, the fact that the P-I properties regulate syntonization provides further structural support for Lichtenberg and Meares’ belief (1996) that the brain is stimulated by both the patient’s and the analyst’s exploration and assertiveness. Clearly, however, syntonization does not always involve an optimal regulation and there will inevitably be considerable discordance between the two members of the couple. This explains how the analyst is able to gain access to the patient’s mental process.

The analyst’s contribution to mental integration Verbal information, in the analyst, becomes stable firstly in the main nodes of the linguistic reticulum controlled by the typically cortical re-entries, which supply the immediately recognizable conscious content. The patient simultaneously modulates the introjective identificatory meaning of this conscious content by means of the projective tonal modality. The information then spreads through the reticula by means of the association nodes, producing less stable properties of consciousness as a result of the extensive reintegration of the flows of information on the various levels of the linguistic and perceptual reticula.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 216

19/9/07 16:37:58



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

217

If we suppose that the analyst is able to store neurophysiologically both the stable and unstable modulations of the patient’s verbal and perceptual flows of information, it then becomes possible to understand how the analyst is able to use them to reconstruct the unconscious mental dynamics being produced by the patient. This ability on the part of the analyst is explained by the general introjective “s←o” properties of the cerebral reticulum, which syntonization gradually renders stable. The dynamic effect that is established in the linguistic and perceptual reticula necessarily produces an integration of all the “s”, “sω”, “sL”, and “sωL” elements in its subject pole, thereby enabling the analyst to learn how to use it as an identificatory tool. This dynamic process is clearly similar to the identificatory process produced by all human interaction. It is of greater importance here, however, as a result of the analyst’s ability (improved by means of specific training) to accommodate the introjection in the extensive neurophysiological space within his own reticulum in order to explore the realistic effects in his own subject pole. He may, for example, become aware of a sudden bodily somatization, an “s” resonance in a specific sensory channel, but which takes its conscious meaning “sω” from the interaction with the patient. Similarly, he may experience unknown thoughts or feelings which are complex “sL” resonances and of which he can trace the conscious meaning through his own access to the “sωL” elements. The actual introjective outcome of the relationship explains the projective defence that can arise in the analyst in order to oppose the patient’s projective communication, which constitutes the countertransference. Identification is, indeed, a risky neurophysiological process as it involves an actual integration, albeit transitory and unstable, of the subject elements, which can however be rendered stable by a strong projection of the patient, as in the case of projective identification. The transference-countertransference dynamic is generally, for the analyst, the most recognisable aspect of the strong discontinuities in the P-I syntonization, because of the clearly emotive aspects produced by the projective modality in the patient or the analyst

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 217

19/9/07 16:37:58

218

The Development of Consciousness

himself. It is therefore important to note that, according to this model, it is in fact the more subtle, unnoticeable modulation of syntonization that produces the most complex effects of the patient’s mental dynamics. It is these “small” projective and introjective properties that explain the efficacy of the therapeutic process and allow the development, in the patient, of introjectable identificatory relations on the different levels of the reticulum.9

Co-ordination of basal level P-I dynamics What we can suppose generally occurs to the analyst, therefore, is an unstable integration between the specific dynamics of his own cerebral flow of information and that of the introjective flow stimulated by the patient. The analyst’s mind is induced to receive the original dynamics of the patient, whose verbal and perceptual communication produces specific integrations between the analyst’s secondary and tertiary reticula. This process produces specific integrations in the analyst of the “s”, “sω”, “sL”, “sωL” elements the organization of which is generally complex as it derives from the confused and contradictory dynamics in the patient. It is important to note however that the dynamic organization of the analyst’s “s” and “sL” elements can still be a precise source of information, originating as it does as a specific effect of the syntonization produced by the patient. It is the structural aspect characterizing these flows of information organized in the reticulum that can explain how the analyst is able to verbalize these flows. Indeed, unlike the patient, the analyst is able to follow the effects of the flow of information in a reticulum that is less organized by defences (and which the analyst can recognize as such) and endowed with specific linguistic “sωL” properties. So when the flow of information involves tracts of the pathways that are part of the Molinari (1990, 1991) posits an oscillatory model that he calls M↔D (manic-depressive) taken from the Kleinian-Bionian Ps↔D model, which is in many ways similar to the model described here. The M↔D oscillation is seen as a necessary generator of the mental apparatus and includes even the smallest typically Kleinian-Bionian oscillatory properties. Even though unnoticed or deemed irrelevant by analyst and patient, these properties constitute the backdrop to transference-countertransference.

9

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 218

19/9/07 16:37:58



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

219

analyst’s linguistic organization and systematically passes along certain stable pathways, it is the introjective flow that can start to guide him in recalling the words that can help give a conscious meaning to his dynamics. This is the process the analyst tries to reconstruct in the patient by means of language. Using words, the meanings of which he has gradually learnt to share with the patient, he attempts to reconstruct for the patient the real meaning of the patient’s mental processes, which are still strongly influenced by defence processes. It is clearly the inadequate development of the “sωL” re-entries in the patient, as a result of the defences that have limited his contribution to this development of consciousness, which can explain the patient’s difficulty in reintegrating the verbal aspects. This is why the analyst’s task is so difficult. The patient’s words are structurally poor, but the continued syntonization of the two brain systems continually reorganizes the patient’s words during the verbal interaction. They become more precise, not as regards their simple linguistic meaning, but in terms of the functional accesses that are reorganized during the interaction, and follow the pathways of the complex mapping stimulated by the syntonization with the analyst. During this development, the introjective-projective dynamics become more complex, and also increase in intensity in the basal levels, which are undoubtedly the most important levels as it is from these levels that a new expansion of the primary dynamics encoded in the reticulum can develop. Such an expansion drastically modifies the type of relations fixed precociously, making it possible for the original dynamics to be re-established in the reticulum. When this process begins, the analyst can, by coordinating these dynamics with one another, guide from within the patient those flows of information best able to identify, albeit gradually, the defensive representational organization that is not present in his consciousness. When this happens, there is a local neurological development of new re-entries and this reveals itself to the analyst and patient as a development of consciousness.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 219

19/9/07 16:37:58

220

The Development of Consciousness

Primary syntonization and the reintegration of self By considering this process carefully, it is possible to see that the reintegration of conscious accesses cannot occur merely as a result of a conceptual contribution of verbal interaction. This necessarily requires the projective-introjective dynamics regulating the syntonization on the subcortical and basal levels as a support, which gradually modifies the precociously established dynamics. Through play and drawing, therapy in children makes direct use of the primary dynamics without which language cannot help the child from the introspective viewpoint. Though less evident, this process is also true for the adult precisely because of the origin of the dynamics involved in linguistic development in early childhood. Language is therefore a necessary link for the syntonization of the patient’s and analyst’s neural systems, but syntonization effects, in both cases, the different dynamic properties of the various levels of the secondary and tertiary reticula. This continually results, in the patient, in a gap between mental processes that cannot be accessed by consciousness and the more precise, conscious mental processes at the cortical level. The former are regulated by the original subcortical dynamics, while the latter are regulated by re-entries. It is understandable, for example, why the tonal organization of language is of such importance in the patient, since it is the first type of linguistic organization to develop during the relationship with the mother that already has projective-introjective modalities. Indeed, tonal modulation explains the important affective-cognitive relations that words can sustain independently of their meaning (Mancia, 2004). A neutral conceptual content, if accompanied by a striking tonal quality P, which is therefore strongly projective, can re-establish in the listener a strong introjection I of a primary identificatory type. A weak tonal quality P, on the other hand, can give rise in the listener to a projection and a subjective reorganization of a conceptual content of the speaker. The properties of P modulation structurally characterize all verbal output and their tonal dynamic organization is, presumably, a particularly refined process in the regulation of the syntonization that unwittingly, but with great precision, finds support in the innate emotive competence of all speakers.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 220

19/9/07 16:37:58



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

221

The first maternal vocalizations can be interpreted, from this point of view, as early mental characteristics of mother-child relations, which provide the foundation for the affective-emotive aspects that guide, in adults, the sensitivity of their own primary levels to syntonization. These sonorous properties represent the mother, in the child’s mind, as an object-self, which is already extremely responsive to the child’s subject pole. It is plausible to suppose, therefore, that in interaction a word assumes the function of an object-self, which involves, for whoever listens, two types of properties: those of conceptual-verbal content and those of the self of the interlocutor. The abstract conceptual-verbal meaning and identificatory meaning converge in language and, by means of language, the two selves, that of the analyst and that of the patient, interact with the respective mental processes. The fact that the analyst is held to become the modulator of this syntonization means that he is attributed with the truly primary function of the mother, who is at the same time both a natural and a cultural-linguistic object.

Interpretation and syntonization I believe that the maturation of the neural system clearly shows that language, though necessary to make a specific contribution to the conscious properties of the mind in terms of content, cannot inaugurate a real modification without first inducing a new regulation of the primary cerebral dynamics. These considerations explain the difficulty, highlighted by Freud, in transforming conscious understanding into an efficient change in the unconscious processes. The linguistic reticulum is truly transformed by mental processes that can be recovered by consciousness, but its association cortex network makes it possible for many defensive dynamics to develop before they are completely reintegrated with the primary dynamics. For this reason, conscious integration necessarily requires a primary type of syntonization between patient and analyst.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 221

19/9/07 16:37:59

222

The Development of Consciousness

An important feature of this concept is the fact that the P-I syntonization involves all sensory channels and is a property of the reticulum that is always available in the patient, constituting the indispensable basis for their cerebral regulation. It appears evident that syntonization must provide the indispensable regulatory support for the patient’s self and that this support is reactivated merely by the analyst’s physical presence. As a potential relation object, the analyst spontaneously stimulates the patient’s reticulum to reactivate it in projective-introjective dynamics. Even when it cannot be noted at all in the transference, this process still seems to be essential in order to be able to carry out a precise assessment of the importance of the projective-introjective dynamics that act as a silent support for the reintegration of the self. If we consider useless and paradoxical transference (Racamier, 1980), or parasitic transference (Rosenfeld, 1983), they seem more comprehensible if they are seen in relation to the natural responsiveness of the patient’s self towards the analyst and, at the same time, to the primary responsiveness of the analyst’s self towards the patient. Autistic defensive manoeuvres (Tustin, 1981) and the mechanisms for maintaining symbiotic-autistic relations (Mahler, 1968), which characterize the broad area of self-non-self indistinctions, can be attributed to these self-regulatory properties of the self. The patient’s responsiveness towards spontaneous integration and their rapid syntonization in the projective-introjective dynamics correspond well to the concept of maturation drive (Guntrip, 1971; Kohut, 1984), which can be seen to be spontaneously reactivated during the transference of the object-self. The cooperation between the responsiveness of the self of the patient and that of the self of the analyst can actually be considered as implicit in the concept of holding, which provides the basis for development models focusing on evolutionary arrest. Historically, these were the first models to distinguish between classic drive transference and relational transference. There are undoubtedly numerous reintegration properties of the self, but they do not mean that the analyst can limit himself to interacting just a little or that his or her presence alone can guarantee reintegration. The dynamic

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 222

19/9/07 16:37:59



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

223

properties of the self, however, provide the indispensable contribution for the recovery of the patient, even when they do not appear clearly in the therapeutic relationship.

The identificatory-introjective function of verbal interaction Taking into account the complexity of the levels, the dynamic syntonization between patient and analyst can, in my opinion, clarify the difficulties in psychoanalytic theory in defining the real contribution of language during therapy. Projective-introjective processes are, according to this model, the most important aspect of this and they reflect the complex properties of verbal relations during interaction. Current studies highlight the fundamental importance of story-telling to help a patient access their own identificatory experience. The analyst takes an active part in this process, following the rhythm with which the patient explores their internal identificatory dynamics and the more direct transference dynamics. From the description offered here, it is clear that language does not satisfy the classic hypotheses of neutrality, since the analyst, because of the projective-introjective properties of linguistic (and also non-verbal) syntonization, must always be considered active in the relationship. The development of psychoanalysis clearly indicates, however, the unease caused by an abstract concept of linguistic communication. Historically, interpretation was always considered the main aspect of analysis (Strachey, 1934, 1937; Greenson, 1972; Rosenfeld, 1972; Segal, 1973). It is clear, however, that this concept was too optimistic as regards the conscious contribution of language and that soon the attention shown towards the patient’s emotive reality meant having to distinguish between different functions of language in the various moments of analysis (Loewenstein, 1957), and compare them with other types of verbal intervention (Glover, 1955; Bibring, 1954). On the basis of what has been stated so far as regards the subjective meaning of words, the reasons given by Win-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 223

19/9/07 16:37:59

224

The Development of Consciousness

nicott (1945, 1969) for focusing on the autonomous comprehension of the patient become quite clear. Similarly, the importance of affective and emotive sharing in verbal communication in the theories of evolutionary arrest (Balint, 1950) also becomes evident. Looking back at the history of psychoanalysis, it can be seen that the problems inherent in understanding verbal interaction had already led to the identification of many aspects that can be attributed to syntonization. These are: modalities of interpretation of the transference-countertransference dynamics (Neyraut, 1974); asymmetry and the discontinuity of analyst-patient interaction (Faimberg, 1981); unconscious properties of verbal interaction derived from the language of action (Levenson, 1983); and active containment without interpretation (Rosenfeld, 1987). The focal point of current intersubjective theories (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) is undoubtedly syntonization. It is interesting to note therefore how the different properties of memory, especially the procedural ones, now provide the neurophysiological background for many current observations concerning the properties of transference and therapeutic relations. Joseph (1985), for example, considers transference as a “total situation”, i.e. the sum of all transferences encoded in the different representational memories. Their re-elaboration necessarily involves different modalities in countertransference management, in line with the type of unconscious communication that forms during the relationship. Fonagy (1999) links the preverbal dimensions of transference to implicit memories in the “schemata related to Self-Other,” which are transformed by means of the transference-countertransference relation. Mitchell (2000) also highlights the clinical value of representing early “implicit relational memories” in the therapeutic process. As Bollas has stressed, it is this “implicit” knowledge reestablished in the very midst of the analytic relation that enables the analyst to gain access to the primary experience of the patient (Bollas, 1987, 1992). The meaning of enactment in the current debate highlights quite clearly the complex cooperation of roles and actions in the analytic relationship (McLaughlin, 1991; Chused, 1991; Filippi & Ponsi, 1993). This kind of interaction appears to result from

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 224

19/9/07 16:37:59



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

225

the dynamic projective-introjective properties of verbal and nonverbal relations described in this model. Indeed, these dynamic properties explain aspects of the transference-countertransference dynamics in patient-analyst interaction that would otherwise be incomprehensible. I do not believe that the considerations made here concerning the properties of language in any way lessen the importance of interpretation. Historically, this concerned the semantic-reconstructive aspects of verbal communication, which Freud stressed in his very rational view of therapeutic effectiveness. It seems more likely, however, that in verbal communication, rather than the mere conceptual content, the most important aspect is the introjective identificatory content, which arises from the sharing of even minimal properties of the mental processes of the two members of the couple. This type of sharing involves the whole range of verbal actions of the analyst and not just those strictly defined as interpretation. What emerges above all is the specific importance of the non-verbal characteristics of language. Words are less abstract than is supposed and go beyond the usual cognitive definition of language. Language seems to operate primarily through words that can be interpreted as different types of object-self that serve as introjectable properties of the analyst’s object-self. This complex system of verbal properties, therefore, continually integrates the linguistic reticulum with the secondary reticula, uniting the different mental processes that gravitate around the self. In his or her intense participation in the relations with the patient, the analyst is responsible, therefore, for this extraordinary process.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 225

19/9/07 16:38:00

CHAPTER NINE

Child development and the integration of psychoanalysis and neuroscience

Freud and the convergence of psychoanalysis and neuroscience

W

hat conclusions can we draw, therefore, from the many ideas examined in the previous chapters? In the Project, Freud tried to ground the concepts that were to become the foundations for psychoanalysis in the neurophysiological knowledge of the time. There is no doubt but that it was the mistaken hypothesis of energy directed at fulfilment that gave rise both to the fertile nucleus of the entire theoretical framework and to its limitations. Clear advantages and disadvantages have resulted from Freud’s choice. It would surely be in no way reductive to suggest that the highly condensed nature of this conceptual nucleus had to be expanded, first and foremost, through clinical and theoretical development, and that only recently has it been possible to return to the original neurophysiological focus. For over a century, Freudian concepts have been useful in describing mental activity and though fraught with controversy, this may well have made it possible for them to acquire, over time, probative value for the neuroscientist. To fully understand this new convergence of interest between psychoanalysis and neuroscience 226

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 226

19/9/07 16:38:00

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

227

we do, however, need to take into account the crucial importance of the rapid growth of knowledge about the brain. Can this model help, therefore, to define better the convergence or divergence between the two disciplines, and clarify the importance, for both, of Freud’s conceptual nucleus? Looking back at the theoretical complex, we can trace the hierarchy of his hypotheses and demonstrate what kind of contribution the two disciplines have made. This will allow us to put together a more complete picture of his theory and how it touches different aspects of both the psychoanalytical and neurophysiological worlds.

The metameric hypothesis and the activating function of the brainstem What then is the main hypothesis of this model? It sees the structure of the modern brain as the phylogenetic expansion of a primitive metameric aggregation, the legacy of which remains in the brainstem where it regulates the dynamic patterns of the brain. Because I suspect that, because of the level of abstraction through which it is conceptualized, this hypothesis may meet with reservations, I feel it may be useful to take another look at its structural architecture. It is from this, in effect, that the two main concepts prompting the ultimate alliance between psychoanalysis and neuroscience derive. The brain may be defined as a system of “s-o” pathways on a number of different levels, carrying basally unified patterns that continually integrate the subject pole with the object pole. Dreams can be interpreted as a property of the regulation of these basal patterns and, therefore, in turn of subject-object integration. Why are these two characteristics of such importance? The first makes it possible to explain the development of the brain in terms that are coherent enough to fit in, as I explained in Chapter Four, with a typically Darwinian and classical description of evolution. The resultant cerebral blueprint is the Jacksonian one to which Freud referred and whose main nucleus lies in the phylogenetic organization of the different levels all working together. This architecture is important in clarifying the evolutionary development of the mechanisms of memory, attention and perception (Reiser, 1985;

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 227

19/9/07 16:38:00

228

The Development of Consciousness

Luu & Tucker, 1996; Jensen & Hoagwood, 1997). It is by investigating these functions that we can make significant changes to psychoanalytical theory. Obviously, it may be argued that the idea of cerebral levels working together is not unique to this hypothesis alone. The way it is proposed here, however, has the merit that it provides a simple explanation of how, through evolution, neural information develops dynamically along the pathways of the reticulum and between the different levels. The dynamic organization of this information underpins, basically, all the theoretical development outlined here, starting from the clarification of the controversy surrounding drive and relational models up to explaining the origin of language. The most straightforward significance, however, is certainly that of the link that this model highlights between the regulatory functions of the brainstem, which are essential in neurophysiology for the wake-sleep-dream cycle, and Freud’s dream theory. Psychoanalysis would not exist if Freud had not placed the dream at the centre of his understanding of psychic functioning. Since the dream depends on basal activity, it would seem only natural to presume that the brainstem conceals the structural nucleus shared by psychoanalytical properties and those of the ordinary functions of the brain. It is useful to remember, also, that it is this type of hypothesis that attracted the interest of Edelman/Tononi and Damasio to basal activating functions. The fact that they all interpret the brainstem as the proto-self structure derives from the need, itself essentially neurophysiological, to locate the primary aspects of consciousness here. Without this primary consciousness, it is impossible to understand how higher order brain activity could produce consciousness. The importance of the positioning of self is reiterated by Panksepp (1998) who, like Damasio, makes it the centre of complex emotional processing. In brief, I believe the reader will appreciate why I have felt it necessary to try to construct a sturdy foundation for the basal activation function. I also believe that by accepting that the type of conceptualization put forward here is plausible, the new perspective it offers in finding

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 228

19/9/07 16:38:00

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

229

better points of contact between psychoanalysis and neuroscience for a better understanding of child development becomes clear.

The dynamics of the pathways and representationalidentificatory development The central tenet of these considerations is the type of actual functions that can be attributed to the “s-o” pathways of the reticulum and the nature of the dynamic patterns that basal activation propagates before and after birth. As I showed earlier, while the “s-o” pathways serve Freud’s original purpose, his concept of energy directed at inertia comes to involve dynamic neural information. Both attention to the general motor-perceptual characteristics of the pathways and the type of activation running through them depend upon the constructive function assigned to the patterns of the basal structures. Without these dynamic properties, it is not possible to explain early neural activity (Livingston, 1967) or the child’s endogenous control from birth, regulated by the rhythmic organization of activity cycles (Kleitman & Engelmann, 1953). The dynamic properties already working in the reticulum explain this integration and the child’s natural responsiveness to interaction with the mother’s patterns, regulating them according to need. The child’s ability, in particular, to imitate the mother’s facial expressions may relate to an innate body schema (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993) of proprioceptive and motor-perceptual pathways. As I illustrated in Chapter Six for the various pathogenic classes, starting from imitation, relational-identificatory development binds with the regulatory function of the basal structures. It must be pointed out, however, that the basal patterns suggested here have not, as yet, been studied by the neurosciences. The spatial and temporal resolution of the imaging processes available today are still too coarse to be able to identify the rapid relations that intertwine between the areas of the brain. The fact that this particular basal dynamic has not as yet been observed in studies of the brain can be interpreted in two ways: as proof of an error in the core hypothesis of the model, or as the theo-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 229

19/9/07 16:38:00

230

The Development of Consciousness

retically correct deduction of basal regulation which cannot as yet be seen (but will be discoverable in the future). Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) consider the psychoanalytical significance of basal activation to be evident, and attribute to the ascending activating system the “reservoir of the libido.” It is this very concept of libido, however, that changes in this model, from energy to dynamic continual regulation of information in the reticulum. Whatever the viewpoint, the “s-o” pathways provide the most meaningful starting point for attributing psychoanalytical meaning to neurophysiological properties, most obviously by suggesting an explanation of the perceptual-motor association that is quite similar to that described in the Project but dynamic in character. This innovation may reassure the psychoanalytic community, which might see in it proof of the substantially correct intuition by the founder of psychoanalysis, limited only by insufficient knowledge of the dynamic characteristics of the brain. The structural aspect that could turn out to be equally convincing for the psychoanalytic community is the possibility of deriving both representational development and identificatory development from the characteristics of the pathways themselves. Every new encoding is necessarily interpretable as a widening representation of the “s-o” pathways. At the same time, this also entails projectiveintrojective organization implicit in the two types of information flowing along the pathways. If, therefore, we wanted to identify the most innovative feature of this model compared with the Project, it would be that a dynamic concept of the storage of information itself involves the essential functions of the identificatory process. This structural unit takes the form of an indivisible nucleus and makes it possible to link psychoanalytical processes to brain function. Epistemologically, this is an important outcome that clearly highlights the collaboration between psychoanalytical and neurophysiological processes.

The autonomous generator of relational dynamics It is this unique dynamic and identificatory concept of the reticulum that seems really useful in trying to tie together the main psycho-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 230

19/9/07 16:38:01

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

231

analytical theories, as I showed with the different classes in Chapter Six. That the immature brain of the child justifies a strong maternal influence over its identificatory development seems, in fact, quite obvious. Despite this, in the psychological and neurophysiological literature there is no clear explanation as to how this process takes place. It is taken as given, even though the significance of identificatory development has changed profoundly, even within psychoanalysis itself, the child’s active proneness for self-regulation. As we have seen, the child is the initiator of communication (Trevarthen, 1979, 1998), ready to interact with the mother, establishing specific defences such as avoidance, opposition, and freezing (Fraiberg 1980). It is clear that this type of interaction does not fit in with the classical theory. However, not even the hypothesis of generic endogenetic development can explain the wealth and speed of the child’s identificatory development. According to our model, the analysis of external information and its encoding in the brain cannot take place without an internal autonomous generator of information which, through the “so” dynamics, stimulates interaction with the mother. This process satisfies the type of psycho-biological fine-tuning between mother and child that is now considered to be necessary for attachment to take place (Field, 1985). A reticulum regulated by dynamic patterns not only satisfies the requirements of development, it also provides an explanation of how, under the mother’s influence, the child can self-regulate, providing the ideal conditions for foetal development. This clarifies sufficiently flexibly the contrast between classic drive theory and relational theory. Edelman/Tononi’s re-entry concept explains quite neatly how the information flows travelling along the pathways influence development. Projective-introjective dynamics make stable changes to the pathways, which can explain the psychoanalytical and neurophysiological significance of certain pathogenic classes. Although the progression and differentiation of these developmental classes is certainly an incomplete description of child development, its strength lies in providing clear examples of how dynamic interaction finds expression in the motor and perceptual characteristics of the reticulum.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 231

19/9/07 16:38:01

232

The Development of Consciousness

The generative tree of pathogenic classes actually provides a kind of ideal framework within which the main psychoanalytical concepts developed over the course of the last century can be placed. It is, of course, always possible to account for the rich multifaceted nature of psychoanalytic theory by adopting an eclectic approach but, in developing this model, I have always thought the orderliness of the progression of pathogenic classes remarkable. While it is clear that their properties need further investigation, the classes seem to be necessarily grounded in a dynamic order that corresponds with cerebral integration. If we want to find a unitary description of the human brain that also satisfies psychoanalytic theory, dynamic P-I development of pathogenic classes seems to identify a valid collaboration between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.

The implications of the reticulum for the study of the architecture of the brain All these considerations clearly need to be examined further. Presumably of particular interest for the neurosciences is how the reticulum can help define the basic characteristics of the architecture of the brain. I believe that, interpreted correctly, the abstract regularity of the reticulum can be useful in defining a more ordered organization than that commonly posited and suggest a certain mobility of its structural links. As we have seen, when we examined the development of the reticulum, the ascending pathways indicate homologous elements at different levels. This may prompt a search, within the brain, for contributions to the integration of homologous “s” or “o” elements, situating them in the context of the evolution of their functions across levels. The horizontal pathways of the reticulum, on the other hand, signal “s” and “o” expansion of the original motor-perceptual elements. The evolution of the “s” elements converges in the developmental characteristics of the mind. The integration of the subcortical-cortical maps can explain, therefore, how initial motor control is transformed into mental control. This makes it easier to

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 232

19/9/07 16:38:01

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

233

determine the functions of the brain where the organization is deformed by a different physical stratification of the levels (as I suggested for the paleocortical-limbic cortex). In particular, this model suggests that, during evolution, a pathway always tends to preserve reconnectability between internal (s3↔o2 or s2↔o4 or, more generically, sn↔on), as well as external “s” and “o” elements. This means that evolution progressively adapts perceptual-motor reconnectability to new associative pathways of the reticulum, making the integration of a mature brain a potentially flexible property with regard to the dynamic flows along the pathways between its various elements and across different levels. This theoretical construct actually suggests that the initial equipollence of the elements remains as a cornerstone of integration of the reticulum. This effectively makes the brain flexible and adaptable, even though this entails a degree of functional imprecision. Nevertheless, the transformation of the original elements of the pathways necessary to evolution, can help us to understand how the function of a given brain structure actually emerges from the associative network of the different pathways. The transformation of motor into psychodynamic elements derives, as we have seen, from gradual evolutionary development and would be unrecognisable if it were not for the developmental architecture of the reticulum. The example that best describes this developmental aspect is the explanation derived from the “s-o” pathways of the oft-mentioned mirror neurons. These are type “s” and their motor correspondence to perceptual stimulation takes meaning from the original function of the pathways of the reticulum. This helps us to understand not only the imitative origin of early identifications but also how identificatory processes in general develop. Projective-introjective dynamics are all regulated by “s” elements and form, therefore, from their growing complexity. The characteristics of these identificatory processes are thus grounded in the comprehensive knowledge of the pathways and the way in which they intertwine progressively in the frontal pole during development.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 233

19/9/07 16:38:01

234

The Development of Consciousness

Sensitization of early mapping How can we describe, therefore, early childhood development? The simplest way is to imagine it as the need to provide regulatory support to the initial coordination of the “s-o” flows of the reticulum as they weave their dynamic structure in the immediate postnatal period. At birth, some of these flows, in the alimentary canal and tactile system, are already predisposed for object interaction and we can easily recognize their presence and dynamic function in the relationship with the mother. At the same time, however, there is an extraordinary complexity of dynamic flows in all the sensory channels accompanying these more evident flows. It is, therefore, with this extraordinary breadth of potential dynamic relations that the mother enters into relations. This model suggests that the subcortical mappings, as intended by Edelman/Tononi, are already sufficiently mature at birth for complex developments in representational “o” elements to be encoded and connected with the corresponding “s” motor nuclei, which are already partly integrated with cortical nuclei. These processes interact immediately with the feeding, tactile, visual and auditory characteristics of the interaction with the mother and rapidly contribute to the child’s endogenous P-I modulation. The child may suffer from self-regulation disorders (Greenspan 1992) and present strong individual differences in the responsiveness of the nervous system (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994), predisposing it to severe pathogenic developments. Generally, however, the model suggests that the child receives from the mother the main contribution to the dynamic P-I regulation of the developing “s-o” flows and the characteristics of the mother’s modulation determine initial pathogenic onset. Many inevitable precursors are formed, therefore, from the newborn’s difficult task, over its first few months, of regulating its emotions when the relationship is interrupted or there are internal difficulties due, for instance, to hunger or excessive sensory stimulation (Tronick, 1989). These proto-object properties can immediately be fixed in the alimentary canal, in the dorsal tegmentum, and in the roof of the upper brainstem, even if their identificatory function in the sub-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 234

19/9/07 16:38:01

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

235

ject-object dynamics (as the homologous vertical elements are connected), may be rebalanced during integration. The “o” elements of the sensory cortex in particular, juxtaposed with the “s” elements of the motor cortex, indicate the characteristics of bodily representational development that at the beginning take priority over, and can influence, object representation. This limited body mapping is what will combine the fundamental internal pathways of libidinal sensitization with the sensorimotor integration, which starts up the representational system in the cortex where object dynamics will be encoded. Proto-object libidinal sensitization can become the pathogenic backdrop to object dynamics. Clearly, feeding and somatosensory interaction with the mother can affect these early mappings from the outset, accentuating the fixing of the endogenous dynamic of the “o” and “s” elements, following the basic class types described in Chapter Six. During this kind of development, the characteristics of what we define as somatization derive from the complexity of the primary perceptual-motor control system, itself situated initially in the ventral and dorsal segmental areas of the brainstem. This system actually spreads out from the brainstem and along the central axis of the brain, providing early support for mediation of the numerous “s-o” flows that are being integrated at the different levels of the reticulum. The brainstem is the activator, in this model, of brain development but it also carries the significance proposed by Damasio of a proto-self that already integrates properties relating to sensoryperceptual representation with those of internal somatic and affective sensitivity. The dorsal tegmentum and the roof of the upper brainstem are actually where all the sensorimotor modalities converge, supplying an initial unitary representation of the internal states of the body and its relationship with its surroundings. This is why, like Damasio, Panksepp (1985) defines this area as SELF (“Simple Egolike Life Form”), the underlying basis of the self. The “s” and “o” elements of this early integration of the self are, therefore, already active at birth and present in several areas of the brain. Their presence can be assumed also in the basal and medio-ventral nuclei of the paleocortex as well as in the basic activating system in the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 235

19/9/07 16:38:02

236

The Development of Consciousness

brainstem, the most easily identifiable generator of endogenous activation. These properties of early integration show directly, therefore, the importance of early regulatory processes as precursors of attachment and emotions (Fogel, 1982; Hofer, 1994).

The neuroscientist and the psychoanalyst combining forces These observations clearly hinge on aspects of cerebral integration that the model presents on the basis of a psychoanalytical reconstruction of the precursors of development. It will be possible to explore these neurophysiological events one day with increasing precision. It is also important to underline, as I have already mentioned, that the neurophysiological projective-introjective dynamics presented in this model involve the fine-tuning of the various structures of the brain and temporal integrations that may well be much more rapid than observation of the mother-infant interaction shows (Tronick & Cohn, 1989). The typical process proposed here is also formed from the subcortical-cortical collaboration between the various structures such that, to be able to understand the general organization of the pathways of the reticulum, it is necessary to differentiate accurately local integrative contributions. While this may seem discouraging (given the instruments currently available), it actually provides greater motivation for further refining the methodology of dynamic examination of the brain and the theoretical stimulus to accelerate neurophysiological understanding of infant brain development. There is no doubt but that, from this point of view, the psychoanalytical focus on the plasticity and co-presence of identificatory developments that are present in adult transference provides unique material for following the tracks of primary identificatory dynamics and the highly complex transformations suggested by integration of the reticulum. The structure of the reticulum, as I pointed out in Chapter Four, is no more than a simplified version of the extraordinary network

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 236

19/9/07 16:38:02

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

237

of cerebral structures, and this is certainly not going to be enough for the neuroscientist. Nevertheless, if the hypotheses underlying this model are correct, the analyst’s responsiveness to the patient’s P-I dynamics, as illustrated in the previous chapter, inevitably reorganizes the internal dynamics of the former to be congruent with that of the patient. This suggests that the analyst’s awareness of the neurophysiological mapping of the brain can facilitate his construction of more fertile hypotheses regarding any given dynamic-identificatory process. The psychoanalyst can thus effectively collaborate with the neuroscientist because he or she is in a position to put forward interpretations that will help to understand workings of the brain, which the neuroscientist will then be able to compare with the actual functioning architecture of the brain.

The importance and difficulty of primary dynamics These processes, therefore, provide a neurophysiological basis which, given time, will corroborate the widespread opinion that early patterns determine the development of the brain’s neural pathways (Schore, 1994). More generally, however, they may spur us to rethink the mother-infant relationship since the dynamics clearly appear to influence both normal and abnormal development. Microanalytical studies of breastfeeding, for instance (Kaye, 1977, 1982; Schaffer, 1996), show a complex interaction of turn-taking and pauses. These rhythms could be re-examined, starting from the infant’s need for the P-I dynamics to autonomously regulate maternal introjective modulation. Similarly, looking at the disorganization of these processes, it would be possible to examine forms of child anorexia that seem to depend upon lack of affection, such as severe anorexia and psychogenic vomiting, or the constriction-intrusion of the mother (Kreisler, 1985). These various aspects of introjective modulation would appear to assign severe anorexia and psychogenic vomiting to the P-(I) class and more common anorexia to the P-I class. In general, the many studies highlighting the mother’s contradictory be-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 237

19/9/07 16:38:02

238

The Development of Consciousness

haviour (Bruch, 1973) or excessive expectations of one’s own role (Chatoor, 1989, 1996) can be traced back to endogenous regulation disorders during feeding. It is the differentiation of these endogenous processes with respect to maternal modulation that would seem also to explain the difficulties that arise from Anna Freud’s classificatory model, aiming at distinguishing organic from non-organic disorders and separating drive disorders (deriving from the discrepancy between alimentation and the infant’s desires) from neurotic disorders (dependent upon conflict with the mother). The intertwining of these different factors depends upon the endogenous characteristics that predispose the child’s alimentary canal for balanced interaction or interaction leaning towards the P or I axis. More precisely, it is the entire somatosensory P-I dynamic that converges on interaction with the mother to render the meaning of feeding far more complex. Drive disorders, as I explained in Chapter Five, do not arise independent of maternal relations. They remain locked in, as conflicts that derive, inevitably, from the mother’s defective introjective modulation of the child’s particular projective-introjective characteristics. I believe that adopting this type of approach makes it possible to evaluate appropriately the importance of transactional models of development (Sameroff & Emde, 1989; Sameroff & Fiese, 2000), which focus on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors and their interdependence in the specific context of mother-child interaction. The properties of the P-I dynamic actually take on a special meaning if we look at the necessarily discontinuous integration that, in the early phases of development, leads to the coordination of the sensory channels. This suggests, for example, that disorders that are currently defined as multi-systemic (of regulation and relation, therefore), should be interpreted as problems in stabilizing the endogenous P-I dynamic in patterns that can be modulated coherently by both mother and child. This modality, which in a certain sense is specific to initial integration, takes on a special significance in how the current debate about child development is approached. The most problematic aspects of early development derive, as already stated, from the rapid onset of P° and I° precursors. The

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 238

19/9/07 16:38:02

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

239

most dangerous class, which can develop very early on, is the autistic P°-I° but this can include potentially different developmental lines. From the point of view of the model in discussion here, developmental instability is a sign of the initial co-presence of inhomogeneous endogenous regulation in the different processes (sensory, motor, cognitive and affective), which are the foundation of relations with the mother. This unstable aspect of the dynamic seems to justify the recent shift from autistic disorder to “autistic spectrum” and the progression of children diagnosed as autistic towards normal development (Stone et al., 1999). The studies of Misés et al. (1988) also identify unstable development with mosaic functioning (neurotic, psychotic, and inadequate). It appears, therefore, to be characteristic of the type of development that groups around the P axis while maintaining the various initial pathogenic developmental traces. The P-I dynamic seems to offer a unique kind of differentiation of these difficult typologies and to offer the possibility of a study approach that supplements the better-known paths, with the aim of defining the onset of more complex pathogenic factors.

The initial mother-child pairing-separation nucleus These processes show, I believe quite clearly, that a careful conceptualization of early infant development is crucial to understanding the later evolution of the child. Knowledge of the neurophysiology of cerebral integration is inevitable and requires attentive investigation because it throws light on important aspects of the psychoanalytical concept of development and its significance in the endogenous dynamic. There is a particular point that will help us to understand the special importance for P-I dynamics of the separation between mother and child and the meaning of current attachment theory. As explained earlier, the clear core of mother-infant interaction is in the somatic cortex, where early maternal proto-object encodings and the primary sources of bodily eroticization tend to come together. From this point of view, Freud’s concept of a distributed erotic somatic basis is clearly justified if we take into account the development, after birth, of the primary somatosensory areas.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 239

19/9/07 16:38:03

240

The Development of Consciousness

These areas are stimulated by endogenous sources and, at the same time, by the mother’s exogenous, tactile stimulation, the aim of PI oscillation being precisely to connect these up with the adjacent motor areas necessary for sensorimotor integration. This process explains the origin of the most problematic obstacle to child development. The representational system of the infant’s own physical sensitivity and that of tactile recognition of the body of the mother need to be accurately distinguished precisely because initially they are confused in the representation system of the somatic and motor cortex. It is, therefore, this difficult work of differentiation which, according to this model, sets the scene for the general subject of hysteria that so fascinated Freud. Two physical surfaces, that of the child and that of the mother, innervate confusedly in the somatic and muscular-articulatory apparatus. From this point of view, the neurophysiological development described above of the cortical and subcortical proto-objectual structures, which are dependent upon this initial somatic nucleus, includes a system of projective-introjective relations that will later integrate precariously with the object representation. This has to be separated from the initial representational match that the child has of self and mother. This explains how the early psycho-motor identity becomes the source of a body image mastered only precariously as regards sexual differentiation, in line with the pathogenic development shown in the various classes described in Chapter Six. From the representational perspective, while apparently simpler, this process is initially more complex. Maternal modulation of the P-I dynamic of the child actually regulates many relational aspects of the physical space potentially available to the child and which it must learn to master. Keeping close to the mother means interacting with her regulatory patterns, producing effects both within the body and in motor responses. Separation or withdrawal from the mother means the child can assume confident control of its own motor behaviour and also of its own internal activating patterns. Since the internal activating patterns are coupled continually with the modulatory patterns of the mother during development, physical separation from the mother is a process that can only be successful if there is a double mastery of internal activation patterns and of the mother’s influence over these.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 240

19/9/07 16:38:03

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

241

This explains why separation is not just physical but essentially psychic. The child actively differentiates its own representational system from that which has formed as a result of the mother’s activating influence. This distinction implies that the representational system has developed well enough to be able to recognize the dynamic diversification that the child may attribute to its own intentional processes such that they can be compared with, and distinguished from, those of the mother. As illustrated in Chapter Six, this process is possible only when the “s-o” pathways of the reticulum are mature enough and have sufficient elements to be able to distinguish subject properties from object properties and when intentional control further diversifies these dynamics in the secondary reticula, making increasingly complex identificatory dynamics possible. It is this representational development that, in this model, shows that the P-I dynamic underlies the two complementary functions necessary to development. Firstly, it sustains initial pairing between endogenous forces and the mother’s modulatory interaction and then it initiates the separation and growing autonomy of the child from the mother. Various important characteristics of this process illustrate how the P-I dynamic comes to guarantee, right from the start, successful mother-child separation.

Maternal modulation and reverie This concept follows on directly from the fact that the aim of maternal modulation is the correct integration and dynamic regularization of “s-o” flows. From the very beginning of development, however, this process necessarily entails the infant’s ability to reorganize the representational system by controlling the “s” elements. This process means that the child’s mind begins to develop very early on, when the first “s” elements are integrated, which is always intentional. According to Leslie’s modular theory (1987, 1991), the child develops its first mental apparatus, TOBY (“Theory of Body Mechanism”), at some time between three or four months of age. TOBY refers to the construction of a theory of physical objects, a prelude to the theory of human objects. According to our model, on the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 241

19/9/07 16:38:03

242

The Development of Consciousness

other hand, within the constraints of the development of the representational system’s “s” re-entries, the child tries to regulate its interaction with the mother right from the beginning. The security of its mind actually derives from the ability of the “s” elements and their re-entries to regulate “s-o” flows early on. Maternal modulation of the “s-o” flows is a back-up for the child’s mind, which starts straight away to organize itself from integration of the “s” elements and its increasing mastery of the relational space that extends from that first physical bond with the mother. This sheds light on one of the most important properties of maternal syntonization, the fact that the somatosensory modulation does not actually only regularize primary integration but also the infant’s developing thought. It would not be possible to identify this specific mental process without taking into account the fact that mother-child interaction takes place along the “s-o” pathways. Maternal modulation of the child’s sensory “o” elements constrains the projective-introjective dynamics of the pathways and, therefore, “s” element cooperation. This modifies their function in the child’s subject pole, being integrated in early mental organization. From the very beginning, mother-child syntonization is extraordinarily complex, even though–as mentioned above–identifiable only in sensorimotor behaviour that is observable in practical terms. It is, however, this specificity of the syntonization sustained along the “s-o” pathways that makes it possible to understand certain aspects of maternal regulation that would otherwise be difficult to explain. Successful containment of Bionian “reverie” (1962) is, in effect, a “mental” property that the mother makes available for the child but the process is characterized by the “mediation” of sensory syntonization. Potentially, this can involve all the perceptual channels (tactile, proprioceptive, auditory, and visual, with tactile and proprioceptive being the preferential channels early on). “Reverie”, therefore, is an implicit property of sensory syntonization that takes on its “mental” function for reasons that are a natural part of the bond established between the mother’s and child’s “o” elements and the respective “s” elements.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 242

19/9/07 16:38:03

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

243

The verbal syntonization process described in the previous chapter is based on the same sensory-based interaction, the bond that a privileged channel (auditory-verbal) can maintain with two “s-o” dynamics. As I specified above, however, this syntonization naturally includes the other sensory channels as well.

Normal dysregulation of syntonization These reflections are useful in that they highlight how, at the very start of maturation, “sensorimotor” development necessarily takes on “mental” properties that are the result of relational patterns shared with the mother. The projective-introjective functions of these patterns are not, therefore, simply integrative properties of the “s-o” pathways modulated by maternal introjection. They are implicit characteristics of contemporary “mental” integrations that the “s” elements meet with. Syntonization should not be interpreted here as a simple temporary association between the mother’s modulatory introjective patterns and the endogenous projective-introjective patterns of the child. From the child’s point of view, the association involves continual adaptation to the temporary disorganization of the patterns (as is also the case for the mother). This means learning to regulate the typical dysfunctions and irregularities of the modulation in order to be able to anticipate both how the mother’s regulatory function works and the type of response that its own sensorimotor system can give to regulation. This type of process is described in many different ways by research into mother-infant interaction. It is moderate levels of maternal involvement that favour the child’s independent development (Malatesta, Culver, Tesman & Shepard, 1989; Murphy & Moriarty, 1976; Belsky, Rovine & Taylor, 1984). The process is easy to understand if we consider the pathogenic function of a mother’s excessive involvement (identified in this model by the I axis that produces patterns that are too binding) or, vice versa, the opposite disruptive effects on the classes on the P axis (resulting from lack of involvement).

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 243

19/9/07 16:38:03

244

The Development of Consciousness

“Moderate” involvement implies non-perfect syntonization, which requires specific attention to the properties of mutual dysregulation of the P-I dynamics. This involves an evaluation both of the interaction that has given rise to communication breakdown and of that which on either the child’s or the mother’s side has made it possible to reinstate communication (Gianino & Tronick, 1998; Klein, G., 1967; Tronick & Cohn, 1989; Beebe & Lachman, 1994). From the perspective of the current model, it is the “natural” function of dysregulation in “normal” syntonization that allows the child to articulate flexibly the “communicative” effectiveness of its P-I dynamics and to monitor increasingly well the mother’s responsiveness. The child’s trust in the mother develops from this monitoring of expectations in order to compensate for defective syntonization. This establishes the child’s “baseline trust”, a complex pattern of strategies that can flexibly modify its syntonization capacities. At the same time this process distinguishes between the two dynamics of the child’s representational system, separating intentional control from maternal modulation. The infant’s baseline trust and its developing anticipatory control of maternal modulation evolve into complex dimensions designed to process or modify the influence of maternal modulation and compensate for any dysfunctionality. To do this the child may, for instance, intentionally attempt to correct the type of somatosensory relations that are forming with the mother, either by withdrawing physically from her or by intensifying from within (towards the P modality) control over her introjective influence. Vice versa, the child may attenuate the P modality to support introjective sensitization so reassuring itself regarding mastery over the relationship with the mother.

Differentiation of the P-I dynamics and the development of the mind Generally speaking, therefore, the immediate reaction in taking a closer look at the dynamic nature of syntonization is not to see it as

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 244

19/9/07 16:38:04

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

245

a simple coupling of the patterns of mother and child. Syntonization appears as an interaction that aims at the mutual recognition of temporary autonomy-discordance between the reciprocal patterns. This shows how the child’s reliance on the mother changes as its autonomy increases. The mother is virtually a potential regulator of the dynamic patterns by means of which the infant interacts with her and with the environment. When this regulation proves reliable and open to modulation, the child becomes increasingly able to intentionally master its own patterns, introjecting this regulation, which becomes a stable part of the P-I dynamics of the reticulum. The reliability of the regulation thus comes to form part of the integration of the “s” elements or, in other words, of the child’s mental development and its mastery over its internal regulation. Maternal “reverie” accompanies the child’s mental development throughout this process but the child gradually learns to take control and to transform it into a property of his own mind and to distinguish it from the mother’s original intentionality. When the process is well balanced, the child’s mind starts to be both separate from the mother’s and organized according to its own specific P-I dynamics. The type of development described can, I believe, help to explain how the child’s ability to “understand” others’ minds evolves (Fonagy et al., 1995), a topic currently at the centre of developmental research. This ability appears early on, between eight months and two years (Leslie, 1987, 1991) when the child is able to distinguish many of its interlocutor’s communicative intentions. As stated above, however, the process is the culmination of the discrimination between the child’s own intentionality and the mother’s, a distinction it has to learn as soon as P-I syntonization begins. Acquiring this ability has a certain affinity with the theory of Harris (1989, 1991, 2000) which states that understanding another’s mind depends on a sort of mental simulation that is formed from the awareness of one’s own mental states. The child actually has to compare continually the effects of maternal modulation with those of its own intentional processes, thereby developing understanding of the mother’s mind. A long period of preparation is necessary to reach this level of ability and it consists in being able to recognize with increasing

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 245

19/9/07 16:38:04

246

The Development of Consciousness

precision, within one’s own representational system, a P-I dynamic that is different to one’s own. That dynamic has “mental” properties because one’s own P-I dynamic acquires mental properties during development, and by contrasting the two dynamics the child learns to distinguish its own intentional processes from those of the mother. This development can, of course, quickly extend to increasingly accurate understanding of the intentional processes of other human objects.

The P-I dynamic and attachment theory P-I syntonization between mother and child is an extremely useful concept to explain how the child’s identificatory development and its autonomy-separation realistically come about. As I showed in Chapter Seven, the P-I dynamic corresponds both with the evolution of Freud’s model and with the theory of Klein and Bion. Based on what I have discussed above, however, it is possible to find properties of the P-I dynamic also in other theories of child development, particularly current ones, which clarify it further. The process of separation described above, using the P-I dynamic, provides food for thought regarding the various types of child attachment to its mother as described originally in Bowlby’s (1969, 1973) attachment theory. In the Strange Situation (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), for example, the two main categories of insecure attachment, avoidance (A) and ambivalence (C), can easily be matched to a predominance of P and I respectively in determining a difficult bond between mother and child. These can be compared with the two main pathogenic classes illustrated below. The P-(I) class, for instance, obtained from the introjection of inadequate patterns of maternal presence, produces early autonomy in the child and the development of defences that include the avoidance of contact with the mother. The P-I class, on the other hand, resulting from the mother’s excessive introjection, brings strong dependence and the conflictual need for autonomy; ambivalence, therefore, in attachment to the mother. In terms of attachment theory, the strong influence of type P or I maternal patterns in determining the development of similar pat-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 246

19/9/07 16:38:04

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

247

terns in the child is clearly confirmed in the correlation found between the Adult Attachment Interview (Main & Goldwyn, 1985-86) and the Strange Situation. The interview with parents to define their internal representation of their relations with their own mother is highly predictive of the subsequent relational pattern with the child. This correlation is easy to explain in terms of our model since it corresponds, specifically, to the inevitable and necessary syntonization that is established between the P-I dynamics of mother and child. The study of this type of child attachment to the mother also demonstrates the affective complexity of insecure relational patterns in the child that fit not only into the two classic categories (avoidance, A, and ambivalence, C) but also into a non-homogeneous class (disorganized-disorientated, D) characterized by highly contradictory behaviours. The complexity that generally typifies the different kinds of attachment, when studied in a single child, seems understandable from the point of view of the maternal PI dynamic that modulates the child’s projective-introjective process. As I have mentioned several times, though the mother tends towards a particular kind of personal behaviour, she will display discontinuous relational dynamics, which are dependent upon the personal identifications solicited by family circumstances and the actual development of the child itself. As the child grows, the mother will alter her relational patterns for many different reasons. This explains for example, why the Strange Situation does not necessarily give constant results as the child develops (Belsky, Spritz & Crnic, 1996). It also explains why attachment behaviours may be differentiable even in atypical attachments (Main & Solomon, 1986, 1990; Crittenden, 1985, 1988, 1992; Lyons-Ruth, Connell & Zoll, 1989; Lyons-Ruth, Connell, Zoll & Stahl, 1987) or defined in terms of continuity between normality and pathology (Boris & Zeanah, 1999). All these factors would suggest that certain classes, which are typical of the regulation that takes place between mother and child predominate and that it is difficult to categorize them in a small number of classes because of the identifiable specificity of any given behaviour.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 247

19/9/07 16:38:04

248

The Development of Consciousness

The characteristic P and I axes in the theory of development It seems, therefore, that the P-I dynamic is inherent to the study of primary attachment so it may help in describing the projective-introjective modalities that form part of the developmental stratification of the different types of attachment. This aspect of the identificatory process, which in attachment theory presents with specific interactional behaviours, may also clarify the controversy that has long set the psychoanalytic model in opposition to Bowlby’s theory. Projective-introjective regulation derives from early sensorimotor dynamics and necessarily includes both the real and the mental representational space. The mental dynamics, however, are complex while the motor dynamics found in attachment behaviour can only presumably reveal the more significant aspects of mental reorganization of projective-introjective modulation. It is this kind of problem that suggests reformulating attachment (Hofer, 1995; Polan & Hofer, 1999) in terms of regulatory processes which are hidden, though observable in the mother-child interaction. I also think it is interesting to see how other research finds it “natural” to differentiate between different types of child-object interaction in a way that is similar to the development of the P and I axes in this model. For Balint (1950, 1959), for example, the child shows two tendencies, philobatic or ocnophilic, which are respectively adversative and dependent and which, for similar reasons to those discussed above for insecure attachment (A, C), can be linked back to type P and I classes. Blatt and Bass (1966) also suggest that it is possible in child development to distinguish introjective from anaclitic pathology that also correspond with the pathogenic development produced, in terms of our model, by P and I modalities. Defensive characteristics of the same type define the two narcissisms described by Rosenfeld (1964, 1971) of “thick skin” and “thin skin” (definitions that are particularly important when referred, as pointed out above, to the differentiation of the primary motherchild somatic bond). All these various definitions can be reorganized into a framework that can show which of the different dynamic classes will sat-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 248

19/9/07 16:38:05

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

249

isfy (with different intensities of P and I), various defensive strategies, outlining possible links with the more typical attachments to be found in Bowlby’s model (Figure 9.1). Many pathogenic classes in the generative model proposed here can be further differentiated, starting from the two fundamental P and I axes. They would seem to provide a useful parallel for examining the complexity of the projective-introjective dynamics that typify attachment in its various forms or the defensive modalities described in the literature. philobatic tendency Balint ocnophilic tendency Rosenfeld Blatt and Blass type of attachment Secure

detached

(A)

P-(I)

P-(I)

isolated

(A)

P-I

P-I

apprehensive (C)

(P)-I

(P)-I

angry

(C)

P-I

thick skin

(A)

P-(I)

P-I

thin skin

(C)

(P)-I

(P)-I P-I

introjective

(A)

axis

P

anaclitic

(C)

axis

I

P-I

narcissism

pathology

{

B secure attachment A insecure avoidance attachment C insecure apprehensive-ambivalent attachment D disorganized-disorientated B

Insecure ambivalence A Insecure ambivalence C Disorganized D

P ↔ I

{ { {

P P P P

↔ (I) detached ↔ (I) isolated ↔ I avoiding-isolating ↔ I avoiding-autistic

(P) ↔ I apprehensive-passive P ↔ I apprehensive-angry P ↔ I oppositional (P) ↔ I ↕ ↕ disorientated P ↔ (I)

Figure 9.1

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 249

19/9/07 16:38:05

250

The Development of Consciousness

This type of framework clarifies once more the defining significance in this model of the P-I dynamics. If interpreted rigidly with respect to the notation adopted here, the dynamics bear little relation to their actual relational significance. They inevitably appear to be stereotyped “dynamic formulae” that are unrepresentative of the function they normally perform in the child’s relationship with the mother. Typically, this function acts as a “dynamic base” for the mother-child “negotiations” that stipulate agreement or disagreement regarding their relationship. In normal interaction, this type of pattern accompanies the many expressions of communicative interaction between child and mother and constitutes the huge range (and unpredictability) of normal behaviour. The pathogenic effects, on the other hand, consist in the dramatic fixedness with which some patterns organize the projective-introjective dynamic, forming a “coarctated” repertory in order to keep the original somatopsychic sources of the pathogenic negotiation between mother and child under control. This rigid dynamic is characteristic of the typically Freudian “repetition compulsion”. The pathogenic dynamics do not belong to just one class, even in this case, in that they can be transformed into secondary reticula or undergo more complex transformations that take place in the tertiary linguistic reticula.

The P-I dynamic and development of self All these considerations provide clear evidence of how useful careful study of the P-I dynamic can be. From the point of view of neurophysiological integration-maturation, it would seem to be the basis for the projective-introjective development that underpins the psychoanalytical identificatory model. It would also seem to be the dynamic function that inspires the union of psychoanalytical and attachment theory, throwing further light on the importance of the relational dimension and the observation of the real child during interaction (Eagle, 1984; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Hughes, 1989). I believe also, however, that these last points also indicate quite clearly that, taking the P-I dynamic as a starting point, this model

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 250

19/9/07 16:38:05

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

251

finally outlines a unifying concept of self. This concept derives from the integrative function of the endogenous dynamic in the reticulum. Its aim seems to be to connect together the different structures of the reticulum from the very beginning of development and to make them cooperate reciprocally by means of a common overriding principle, the subject pole of the “s” elements. The subject pole operates, therefore, from the beginning, with the intention of unifying the maturation process. This is what ties it in with the self, a structure that we perceive as unitary. Maturation of the “s-o” pathways also makes it easy to interpret the self as the progressive emergence, as the reticulum develops, of a number of partial selves. This structural characteristic depends on the potential autonomy of each pathway in binding “o” elements to “s” elements. The progressive reconnection of the pathways, following the phylogenetic programme, forms different partial selves that integrate into the unitary self. This hypothesis fully satisfies the idea of different states of self (Harter, Bresnik, Bouchey, & Whitsell, 1997; Sroufe, 1996). This explains quite neatly why the post-Freudian psycho-analytical models contained different concepts of self. The self emerges progressively from different nuclei of ontogenetic reintegration. It can be studied and conceptualized in the most archaic processes, where the mind only contains strictly integrative-operational properties (Kreisler, Fain & Soulé, 1974) or in properties specific to primary psycho-physical integration (Mazet & Stoleru, 1988; Gaddini, 1981) or in more complex properties (Winnicott, 1960; Khan, 1974; Kohut, 1977; Emde, Korfmacher & Kubicek, 2000). What this model can clarify is the structural specificity with which the P-I dynamic organizes the self in an extraordinarily complex way, allowing the different properties that are gradually emerging from the integration to cooperate. The self is reintegrated from a number of initial discontinuities and already shows a degree of cohesiveness in early development during the mother’s influence on the dynamic modulation of the main reticulum, as described in Chapter Six. Very early on, however, the secondary reticula begin to emerge from the main reticulum. These secondary reticula express different dynamics

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 251

19/9/07 16:38:05

252

The Development of Consciousness

and other properties of the integration of the self. Further differentiation of the self takes place as the secondary reticula change function and become tertiary linguistic reticula. This explains how and why language rapidly becomes the child’s most important identificatory function. From this point on, fantasies and stories absorb the multiform characteristics of the self, giving rise to the human complexity that permits the child to master relations other than with the mother: real people from the family environment whose projective-introjective dynamics interact with those originally modulated by the mother and imaginary personages through which the diversification of the self can take on more articulate properties. This simple idea summarises the remarkable destiny of the endogenous dynamic that is indispensable for the child to set up relations with the mother and, at the same time, the reorganization, through human ontogenesis, of the original phylogenesis. As it thus progresses, the self is enriched by the wealth of associations available in the redundant reticula and becomes increasingly plastic and adaptable. Consciousness, however, as I explained in Chapter Seven, evolves as a mobile network of the links that the main reticulum builds up with the redundant reticula. It is actually limited, therefore, by the main reticulum, unchanged throughout recent evolution, and by the defensive processes of associative development. This is why the participation of consciousness in the self is limited to pathways left free by defences. Consciousness depends on the mobility of the subject pole and the “sω” re-entries, particularly the verbal “sωL”, which operate with precision on representational encoding. It is because consciousness is such a meagre function of the self that the specificity of the P-I dynamic highlights the more complex processes of the reticulum. It is these specific properties that explain how the P-I dynamic of the therapist interacts with that of the patient and how the two selves can interrelate despite such a limited contribution of consciousness and even at primary levels.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 252

19/9/07 16:38:07

CHAPTER TEN

The unresolved problems of Freudian metapsychology

Freudian theory and the organization of the brain

W

e started this book by re-exploring the significance of Freud’s Project but what conclusions have we come to? In the light of what we have looked at, I think we can safely say that, given the level of neurophysiological knowledge of the time, there was no way in which Freud could have ideated the P-I dynamic although it was latent in his theoretical model. Through his understanding of child development, had Freud been able to make explicit reference to this dynamic as its nucleus, he would certainly have modified his concept of the libido, toning down the sexual connotation and highlighting its relational function. At the time when Freud was working, however, sexuality was conspicuously at the centre of a patient’s disorders and Freud was inevitably led towards drive theory because of this pathogenic function. His neurophysiological assumptions in the Project were not, however, very far from our own. The original focus of his interest was in understanding how “the subject complex” could emerge, by means of proper access to the memory traces of the ψ neurons, from the necessary control of the “object complex”. It only seems right



J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 253

253

19/9/07 16:38:07

254

The Development of Consciousness

that, having reached the final chapter of this book, we should attempt, in due recognition of Freud’s work, to translate into our own neurophysiological language, some of the basis tenets on which he founded his two main topics: the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious and the ego, id, and superego. The P-I dynamic contributes to these two groupings and it would be useful to reflect once more on how Freud understood the cerebral dynamic and how this compares with what we know today. There is an important point on which they correspond, as I discussed in Chapter Four: the serial layout of the mnestic systems ψ described in The Interpretation of Dreams, the ψ neurons having the same properties detailed in the Project, and the “s-s-s…o-o-o-o” development postulated here. Some of Freud’s observations regarding this serial arrangement make clear how he saw the unconscious-preconscious-conscious tripartition. We will describe the last of the systems at the motor end as “the preconscious”, to indicate that the excitatory processes occurring in it can enter consciousness without further impediment provided that certain other conditions are fulfilled: for instance, that they reach a certain degree of intensity, that the function which can only be described as “attention” is distributed in a particular way, and so on. This is at the same time the system that holds the key to voluntary movement. We will describe the system that lies behind it as “the unconscious”, because it has no access to consciousness except via the preconscious, in passing through which its excitatory process is obliged to submit to modifications (Freud, 1900a, p. 541).

Freud’s serial arrangement posits that perceptual stimulation, which is unconscious, emerges as the final stage of the preconscious, the system positioned at the motor end. This development towards the conscious corresponds to a degree with the type of sensory-motor growth hypothesized in Chapter Four, where the “s” elements expand towards the frontal lobe following a progression of the “←s3-s2-s1” type. This structural organization of the preconscious, in the first “s” elements of the pathways of the reticulum, corresponds in part with some of the cerebral functions and memory traits we know about today.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 254

19/9/07 16:38:07



THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF FREUDIAN METAPSYCHOLOGY

255

The neural structures relating to the preconscious Erdelyi (1985) suggests that the preconscious resides in the orbitofrontal cortex that, in the model described in this book, involves the little evolved “s” elements. Focusing more particularly on the concept of vertical integration between levels, Tucker (1992) proposes the orbitofrontal cortex as the highest system of the preconscious. It is interesting to note that for Bornstein (1993) this area, which is part of the limbic system, is one of the locations of implicit memory not associated with consciousness. Another property of the unconscious memory, therefore, is that it can be linked with a location associated with the preconscious, as suggested both in Freud’s outline and in that of the “s-o” pathways. More generally, the prefrontal area can be associated with the preconscious system because of the function Freud allocated to attention (as mentioned in the extract above) of regulating the passage of stimulation from preconscious to conscious. The prefrontal cortex (Posner, 1994) is actually activated specifically when attention focuses on percepts that correspond to an intentional search. This process is one aspect of the type of local retrieval of information that accompanies (although we are unaware of it), representational access, such as when our visual image of an object activates the same visual area that was involved when the original perception occurred (Kosslyn & Sussman, 1995). This model explains this process by means of the properties of the “s” element re-entries. The perceptual flows gathered from the primary and secondary areas enter the prefrontal areas so the “s” elements can restore the corresponding “on” elements from the re-entries along the pathways. As far as we can ascertain from the neurofunctional properties of the prefrontal cortex, it is the organization of these “s” elements, which specializes before the motor elements, to retain the availability of local memory short-term memory processes (such as buffer and working memory) and allow intentional retrieval of the already stable representational encodings through attention. It is important to point out that although Freud could not conceptualize re-entries, he attributes the regulation of the mobility of perceptual flow to the attention in an almost identical way to the properties here attributed to re-entries.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 255

19/9/07 16:38:07

256

The Development of Consciousness

We know that perception by our sense-organs has the result of directing a cathexis of attention to the paths along which the in-coming sensory excitation is spreading: the qualitative excitation of the Pcpt. system acts as a regulator of the discharge of the mobile quantity in the psychical apparatus. We can attribute the same function to the overlying sense-organ of the Cs. system. By perceiving new qualities, it makes a new contribution to directing the mobile quantities of cathexis and distributing them in an expedient fashion (Freud, 1895, p. 616).

If we reinterpret Freud’s account, the close analogy with the model described here becomes apparent. Perception travels along afferent s←o pathways and as a response produces an investment of attention in the s→o direction along “s” re-entries, which can thereby guide the course of the afferent excitation. Attention investment is a projective P modulation, the aim of which is to regulate the introjective-perceptual modality and actually directs–as Freud suggested–the passage of information both in local integration in the pathway and in the associative distribution of its nodes between the various reticula. It is again important to note that in describing how the attention regulates mobile excitation of the psychic apparatus, he extends it into the overlying sense-organ, the conscious, which also similarly contributes to the direction and functional distribution of the excitation. Our model entails a similar extension in that evolution of the “s” elements expands into the new properties of consciousness, while following the original development of the main reticulum. The extraordinary expansion of the frontal lobe seems a perfect justification for the type of increase in “s” elements that would continually strengthen control of the mobile passage of consciousness. In this sense, therefore, we essentially return to the explanation provided in Chapter Seven of the properties of consciousness. The more mobile attention of the conscious compared with the preconscious justifies the type of memory control that unravels with greater precision from the re-entries. On the other hand, it is the inadequate properties of the re-entries that justify the lack of access of the subject pole to the preconscious and the conscious.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 256

19/9/07 16:38:08



THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF FREUDIAN METAPSYCHOLOGY

257

Re-entries and the properties of the unconscious and the conscious It is understandable why Freud was unable to conceptualize well the many properties of the unconscious, limiting himself to the meaning he attributed to attention; a property that he described as having characteristics that today we would define as cognitive. It is worthwhile, however, summarising once more the characteristics of the unconscious that emerge from our model. We could do this in reference to the “first unconscious attention” that is established in procedural memories, on the P-I dynamic, through re-entries of different types. The “s” re-entries of early endogenous development are not all of the same type because they develop differently during interaction of the dynamic classes illustrated in Chapter Six. In the classes, for example, where maternal introjection is determinant (as in the imitative I class, for instance), “s” re-entries on “on” elements of the representational system are impoverished. This is tied to permanent memory content through lack of projective modulation. The process is reversed for P classes due to maternal absence, where the enhanced projective modulation amplifies the re-entries onto the “on” elements but with a contingent lack of object memory content and an excess of proto-object content. Control of the “s” entries produces an unconscious that is effectively similar to that suppressed, in the P-I class, where a degree of defensive effect remains to reorganize representational content in a really repressive way. The general process that gives rise to the unconscious includes, therefore, not only the repressed unconscious but also an unconscious produced from the unbalanced development of re-entries, which prevents access to the original memory encodings. This unconscious, which we could define as lacunar, may therefore include an important part of the unconscious formed during interaction with the mother. If we consider the whole system of “s-o” pathways, from the lowest to the highest levels, we can surmise that the unconscious is formed as a typical structural property of the maturing reticulum. This takes place, of course, together with development of the “s” re-entry system in the various reticula that divide up (as I explained in Chapter Seven) between re-entries that are defences and those that can evolve

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 257

19/9/07 16:38:08

258

The Development of Consciousness

to guide the retrieval of local information, including, as we have seen, the all-important “sωL” re-entries of the linguistic reticulum. In a certain sense, in terms of this model, it seems plausible that the slightest modification of the control properties of the “s” elements will produce, during the introjection of information from the environment, striking changes to the unconscious-conscious division. The unconscious appears to be extremely extensive, permeating the entire structural density of the reticula, at all levels, particularly the subcortical levels. The conscious also seems extensive, but mainly in terms of the associative complexity in the linguistic reticulum. The conscious content is, however, permeated by unconscious properties that are formed during its development from repressed content and procedural defensive dynamics.

The unconscious and procedural memory It certainly would not be far from the truth to say that, at a time when cognitive and neuropsychological ideas are occupying a prominent position, psychoanalysts are justified in their concern that the innovative significance of Freud’s unconscious and the idea itself of the unconscious is being lost. I am convinced, however, that the type of framework described here helps to clarify that original significance and also explains many of the recognized properties of brain maturation. Procedural memories are generally evident in motor skills but Grigsby and Hartlaub (1994) suggest they contribute to a person’s character and to the type of interaction they have with the object. The strong connection between frontal cortex and basal nuclei (Wise, Murray & Gerfen, 1996) shows the type of cooperation considered here to be essential for the integration of “s” elements. The basal ganglia regulate the behavioural patterns acquired while the frontal cortex elaborates more complex alternatives for information from the environment. This integration of subcortical motor areas (basal nuclei) and the cortical areas responsible for more abstract programming (frontal lobes) provides an example of the type of developmental relationship between implicit coding and explicit

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 258

19/9/07 16:38:08



THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF FREUDIAN METAPSYCHOLOGY

259

processing. This model sees integration as more general, and dependent upon the continuous reprocessing of the information coded between levels. It seems clear, in this sense, how child amnesia can be related to the immaturity at birth of the orbitofrontal areas and the hippocampus (Howe, 1998; Nelson & Carver, 1998; Joseph, 1996). In this model, their integration reabsorbs procedural memories into semantic-episodic memory where the development of the neocortical memory store inscribable in the new and extraordinary wealth of available secondary and tertiary reticula takes place. It may be useful to reflect on the transformation that attention– which Freud, as we have seen, located in the preconscious–can undergo during development, with reference, by way of example, to perceptual attention. Visual attention is mediated by different subcortical structures (pulvinar, claustrum, and superior colliculi) and partly by the prefrontal cortex (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1991), demonstrating the wide collaboration that is already created for control of the subcortical representational mappings. Since the child’s avoidance of the mother’s glance, where attachment is insecure, is already in place at two months of age (Cohn & Tronick, 1983), this visual attention mode is initially subcortical and then procedural. Subsequently, the subcortical integration extends to the prefrontal cortex, converging with the structure in which, as we have seen, the preconscious and, therefore, the type of attention which interested Freud, can be located. Procedural attention, which is unconscious, can thus evolve into a more articulated attention typical of the preconscious. Unconscious procedural attention, however, becomes part of preconscious attention, thereby limiting the mobility of access.

The neural structures relating to the id Thinking back to the development of Freudian theory, it seems likely that Freud had imagined that these different forces were operating in the unconscious even though he did not know exactly how to distribute them in the context of child development. In the

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 259

19/9/07 16:38:08

260

The Development of Consciousness

structural vision of The Ego and the Id (1923b) he certainly sought to position the structure of these unconscious forces better in the tripartition of the ego-id-superego. We may wonder, therefore, how it is possible to relate the ego-id-superego trio to the reticulum to clarify further the contribution that the neurophysiological perspective can make to Freud’s original model and to our understanding of child development. From the point of view of current knowledge, it seems logical to relate the id to the internal somatosexual and somatovisceral system generally stimulated by endogenous information. The properties of this integration involve Freud’s drive theory, as discussed in Chapter Five, and the different function of re-entries in this context. Endogenous sources operate as “sic←oic” and “si←oi” pathways (in the latter internal information appears not to be regulated by re-entries) while the representational properties of the goal are situated in the bodily “oic” elements, particularly in the developing proto-object “op” elements, which can be modified by the “s” re-entries. The inadequacy of the internal representational system, both somatosexual and somatovisceral, and its specific properties, defines, therefore, the type of unconscious that originally interested Freud. It is interesting to observe that this specific difference in the way the re-entries operate on the “oi” as compared to the “oic” and “op” elements lends some support to the fact that, in Freud’s model, repression does not develop in the entire mental apparatus, but only in the representational component (which Freud calls the psychical representative). Generally repression develops in the “op” element that has the most re-entries. Freud also maintains that repression involves a second psychical representative, the affect. If we relate this to an “s-o” pathway, it is easily attributable to the dynamic properties of the “sn” elements of the paleocortex of the limbic system (usually the amygdala), which is involved in emotional processes and, in our model, is a necessary influence on the regulation of the representational system. The two psychic representations, affect and ideational representation, relate quite precisely, therefore, to the two types of “sn” and “on” elements of the “s-o” pathways that are integrating in the sub-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 260

19/9/07 16:38:09



THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF FREUDIAN METAPSYCHOLOGY

261

cortical-limbic levels and the somatosensory and perceptual levels respectively. The junction of this integration is the limbic lobe whose “s-o” pathways are also mainly autonomous. This structure provides the affective-emotive backdrop that integrates with the two perceptual and internal representational systems as the reticulum brings the levels of the limbic paleocortex and the neocortex into cooperation. The id corresponds, therefore, to the first phase of integration between the sensory-sexual-visceral system and the paleocortex. This system, in turn, is integrated–though feebly–with the sensorymotor cortex “sc-oc”, which is mature at birth (subcortical and cortical). Through this link, the early structure of the id can interact with the motor apparatus and begin to be regulated by it and develop from its initial function.

The neural structures relating to the ego Where could the ego be located, therefore? As we know, Freud believed the ego originated mainly from the body. The sensory-motor cortex “sc-oc”, which is already mature at birth, forms the initial bodily nucleus of the ego. This development takes place while the entire sensory-perceptual system starts to integrate from the first somatosensory subcortical-cortical nucleus, establishing its control principally in the frontal lobe. The paleocortex, having an important affective function, acts as go-between for the neocortical integration of the first sensory-motor nucleus of the ego and the complex and ancient representational function of the affects, which become a part of the more highly developed neocortical representational structure. The affects unite the ego and the id, acting as mediator to their cooperation. This concept underpins the progressive development of all the “s” elements and the type of sensory-perceptual integration that they can gradually access in the representational system. It is clear that from birth the ego is like an intentional motor by-product, without this necessarily entailing any conscious definition. Representational mapping has a practical significance in that the correspondence is useful for planning interaction with the surroundings. Con-

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 261

19/9/07 16:38:09

262

The Development of Consciousness

scious awareness, as Edelman/Tononi pointed out, is necessary for the adaptation of prediction to perceptual response. All this was very much a part of Freud’s work, and explains the many functions incorporated here by distinguishing more clearly conscious and unconscious properties. In the Project, the function of the ego is essentially inhibitory. Above all it stops investment in the memory image producing a hallucination. Subsequently, the instincts for self-preservation, which through reality-testing impose repressive norms on sexual drives, come to depend on the ego (Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, 1911b). Finally (The Ego and the Id, 1923b), the ego acquires highly complex properties. Its main nucleus is the conscious but it also includes functions of the preconscious, even though organized by unconscious defences. The control of motility and perception, language, reality-testing and anticipation are all a part of this. Generally speaking, these observations regarding the regulatory functions of the “s” elements and their integration in the frontal lay-out of the reticulum would suggest that the processes involved in cerebral development are unitary. It seems logical, however, that in this model this arrangement is not so straightforward. Rather, the ego appears to be an extremely extensive function of the integrative modalities of the “s” elements and of the linguistic elements originating from these. In summary, it forms from a primitive bodily ego and from procedural memories, which initially integrate with the basal nuclei. It expands rapidly from the developing “s” elements, which differentiate from the motor elements and grows in complexity through the resultant mental properties, the greatest expansion being in language. Despite becoming progressively established in the neocortex, the ego is also reintegratable with the primary structures that produce it. The ego would appear, therefore, to be mobile, according to this model. It can be reorganized throughout the entire somatomotor system of the reticulum.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 262

19/9/07 16:38:09



THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF FREUDIAN METAPSYCHOLOGY

263

The neural structures relating to the superego Where, finally, should the superego be placed, given its basically unconscious properties? In the last three months of the first year, as a result of increased myelination, the limbic lobe integrates with the cortical areas. At this time, the child develops the more complex features of the dependence upon the mother, which implicitly relate to the frontal-limbic system as well as the insula, the anterior cingulate and the amygdala. If we interpret these structures as type “s” areas, they play an important early part in the integration of procedural and affective memories which will subsequently be a determining factor in the child’s representational development of object and surroundings. In terms of its self-regulatory significance and the P-I dynamic formed from the relationship with the mother, this progressive subcortical-cortical transformation explains why Solms (1996) places the superego in this area, in the mediobasal regions of the frontal lobe. Solms follows Schore’s reasoning regarding the formation of an inhibitory component during early interaction with the mother. Neural maturation of the “s-o” pathways, as suggested by this model, makes this hypothesis seem plausible. The maternal patterns are written in the procedural memory belonging to that phase of development and the child integrates “s” elements as a property of its own introjective identificatory process. Vertical cooperation also suggests (Luu & Tucker, 1996) developmental integration of the three limbic levels (amygdala, cingulate, and insula-orbitofrontal) and the progressive transformation of procedural rules into functions that are gradually enriched by affective-emotional properties. Considering the superego in this context, while according to Freud it appears late in child development, it would seem necessarily to form–in support of Kleinian theory–from very early dynamics that are organized rapidly from motor memories and are bound immediately to early affective development. The superego, therefore, would seem to be a structural part of the early formation of the unconscious that starts by being distinguished from the memory content established by maternal interaction. It then continues to reorganize itself into a more evolved type of unconscious which, in

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 263

19/9/07 16:38:09

264

The Development of Consciousness

the superego of later development, becomes a more complex setting for the defensive constraints of the conscious dynamic. The complexity of this early integration explains why we attribute so many meanings to feelings and emotions (Basch, 1976) or to the innate and subsidiary affects (Tomkins, 1962, 1964) that necessarily permeate the defensive organization that derives from this first nucleus. If we move beyond psychoanalytic theory, it seems clear that this type of primary development satisfies the conceptual nucleus of developmental theory. Procedural memories correspond to schemata of events (Mandler, 1979) or to scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) that are generalized representations (Nelson & Gruendel, 1981) of parent-child interactions that the child is seen to develop from early infancy (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). This description of the ego-id-superego basically concurs with that of Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) but I hope that the dynamic functions of the cerebral reticulum described here make a useful contribution, helping to account for the difficulties we have had in defining precisely where the ego-id-superego are to be found.

Finding a place for Freudian concepts It would seem, therefore, that the complexity that makes it so difficult to find an obvious and precise location for these psychoanalytic concepts and the diversification of the conscious-unconscious properties of psychic development underlie a basic unity of the various inextricably entwined processes identified. This unity may explain why the concept of self is its natural point of reference, as I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter. We can interpret the best of Freud’s legacy in these terms. We would be unable, today, to access the significance of the different structural properties of the self if Freud had not first sought to define the separate functions in order to understand them better. The child’s world is seeped in the need to reorganize the powerful introjective forces stimulated by the mother and we could never have even begun to identify these without reference to the structural organization that forces us continually to reflect on the network of its

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 264

19/9/07 16:38:10



THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF FREUDIAN METAPSYCHOLOGY

265

characteristics and its effects on the identificatory development of the child. The extraordinary complexity of the child’s identificatory development is particularly evident when we look at the organization of the brain. This would not have surprised Freud but it would certainly have backed up his conviction of how difficult it would be to position psychological processes within it and the hope that eventually this would be possible. Freud was attracted by the unconscious. It drove him incessantly to wrestle with his aspiration to define better the forces that dominate the psychic life of the child and of the adult. This is the task he has left in the hands of the psychoanalysts and neuroscientists of today.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 265

19/9/07 16:38:10

CONCLUSION

I

t is clear to me that psychoanalytic theory is fundamental to our understanding of the underlying significance of a child’s identificatory birth. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this can or should be considered in isolation from today’s neurophysiological knowledge of the brain and of how neural information operates. When and how does a child shift from its original mental pathway, a shift that then determines its identificatory development? If this adaptation is made possible because of the neurological reserves of the reticula, it can certainly only take place thanks to the simultaneous convergence of many different processes. It is this wealth of mental processes, to which the psychoanalyst is accustomed in his work with adults, which moves us to wonder about a similarly complex neurological involvement in child development. It is encouraging to think that, in time, it will be possible to reconstruct the key characteristics of these processes in the neural network of the brain but there is an understandable risk, particularly if we think about the evolutionary significance of the reticulum, that something non-human may emerge from this overly separatist view of the intrapsychic space. The introspective awareness of the 266

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 266

19/9/07 16:38:10



CONCLUSION

267

observer may be lost in what consciousness seems to be as it emerges from the fragmentary development of the neural reticulum. Perhaps if we maintain the duality of this idea (the scientist who observes the consciousness outside himself and consciousness that observes the scientist within itself) we could avoid any spurious vision. We would not lose the awareness that attracts the psychoanalyst and the neuroscientist to this common object of observation–of a brain permeated with consciousness. We could actually mutually acknowledge that only a common, non-conflictual contribution can retain the real meaning of our cognitive intention that is not a precise exploration of the structure of the brain but increased respect, as human beings, for the mysterious functions from which consciousness develops. If we think about the theoretical tissue of the model presented in this book, it is surely evident that it could never have been formulated without the contribution of both disciplines. The need to place mental processes in a neurophysiological space suggests that their dynamic must have a correspondence in cerebral processes. Similarly, the wealth of neural structures must be reflected in that of the mental processes. Even though psychoanalytic theories of child development tend to be considered highly sophisticated, in reality they can easily become impoverished by the stereotyped exploitation that they themselves tend to perpetuate. So it may well be beneficial to review them from a different, neurophysiological, perspective. This seems a particularly useful idea if we remember that the dynamics of the mental processes that psychoanalytic models are able to reveal are, in reality, always more complex than the models themselves. This discrepancy spans the entire theoretical and clinical history of psychoanalysis and may be interpreted as a shortcoming of the psychoanalytical approach or just as an example of the immense richness of the mental dynamic. Balanced attention to both the psychoanalytic and the neurophysiological simply shows that introspective-identificatory receptiveness is naturally greater than descriptive-theoretical receptiveness but that without the latter identificatory receptiveness cannot be processed. This lesson is also true for those who, like myself, are led to reflect on the unique transference object that is the brain and cannot

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 267

19/9/07 16:38:10

268

CONCLUSION

but draw on the descriptions of neuroscience. Without realising it, the neuroscientist’s theoretical and introspective vision endows the nervous system with an affective world. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that, as a psychoanalyst, I am fascinated by the possibility of translating a mental event into a neurological description, even though I shall perhaps never know the emotions of those who discovered it. It would seem, in a certain sense, that natural mental events (a person thinking about another person), and scientific mental events (a person thinking about a person’s brain), are not comparable but it is certain that, in my mind, these two events are in search of one another, like two maps that want to overlap and slide insistently over points they know coincide. There is a mental dynamic and a neurophysiological dynamic; a wealth of associative intersections and of neural structures; a hierarchy of passions and a hierarchy of processes. This extraordinary superposition has been “condensed” into the architecture of an abstract reticulum that seeks to compose a narrative, still unerringly human, about who we are as we observe our brain.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 268

19/9/07 16:38:10

References

Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of Attachment: A Psychological Study of the Strange Situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Andreasen, N. C., O’Leary, D. S., Arndt, S., Cizaldo, T., Hurtig, R., Rezal, K., Watkins, G. L., Ponto, L. L. B., & Hicwa, R. D. (1995). Short-term and long-term verbal memory: a positron emission tomography study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, 92: 5111-5115. Anzieu, D. (1985). Le Moi-PEAu. Paris: Bordas. C. Turner (Trans.), The Skin Ego, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. Ashby, W. R. (1952). Design for a Brain. New York: John Wiley& Sons. Balint, M. (1950). Changing therapeutical aims and techniques in psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 31: 117-124. —– (1959). Thrills and Regressions. New York: International Universities Press. Barbas, H. (1995). Anatomic basis of cognitive-emotional interactions in the primate prefrontal cortex. Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews, 19: 499-510. Basch, M. (1976). The concept of affect: a re-examination. Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, 24: 759-777. 269

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 269

19/9/07 16:38:11

270

REFERENCES

Beebe, B., & Lachman, F. M. (1994). Representation and internalization in infancy: three principles of salience. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 11: 127-165. Belsky, J. (1997). Theory testing, effective-size evaluation and differential susceptibility to rearing influence: the case of mothering and attachment. Child Development, 4: 598-600. Belsky, J., Spritz, B., & Crnic, K. (1996). Infant attachment security and affective-cognitive information processing at age 3. Psychological Science, 7: 111-114. Belsky, J., Rovine, M., & Taylor, D. G. (1984). The Pennsylvania Infant and Family Development Project. III. The origin of individual differences in infant mother attachment: maternal and infant contribution. Child Development, 55: 718-728. Bibring, E. (1954). Psychoanalysis and the dynamic psychotherapy, Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, 2: 745-770. Bick, E. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49: 484-486. Bigler, E. D., Johnson, S. C., Anderson, C. V., Blatter, D. D., Gale, S. D., Russo, A. A., Ryser, D. K., Macnamara, S. E., Baailey, B. J., Hopkins, R. O., & Abildskov, T., (1996). Traumatic brain injury and memory: the role of hippocampal atrophy. Neuropsychology, 10: 333-342. Bion, W. (1955). The development of schizophrenic thought. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 37: 344-346. —– (1962). Learning from Experience. London: William Heinemann. —– (1963). Elements of Psychoanalysis. London: William Heinemann. Bjork, R. (1989). Retrieval inhibition as an adaptive mechanism in human memory. In: H. L. Roediger, & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 309-330). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Blatt, S. J., & Blass, R. (1996). Relatedness and self definition: a dialectic model of personality development. In: G. G. Noam & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Development and Vulnerabilities in Close Relationships (pp. 309-338). Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Bolk, L. (1926). Das Problem der Menschwerdung. Fischer: Jena. Bollas, C. (1987). The Shadow of the Object. Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. New York: Columbia University Press. —– (1992). Being a Character: Psychoanalysis and Self experience. New York: Hill and Wang.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 270

19/9/07 16:38:11



REFERENCES

271

Boris, N. W., & Zeanah, C. H. (1999). Reactive attachment disorder. In: H. I. Kaplan & B. J. Sadock (Eds.) Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry. Philadelphia: Williams & Wilkins. Bornstein, R. F. (1993). Implicit perception, implicit memory, and the recovery of unconscious material in psychotherapy. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 181: 337-344. Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss, Vol. I. Attachment. New York: Basic Books. —– (1973). Attachment and Loss, Vol. II. Separation: Anxiety and Anger. New York: Basic Books. Brazelton, T. B., Koslowski, B., & Main, M. (1974). The origins of reciprocity: the early mother-infant interaction. In: M. Lewis, & L. A. Rosenblum (Eds.), The Effect of the Infant on its Caregivers (pp. 49-76). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Breuer, J., & Freud, S. (1895d). Studies on Hysteria, Standard Edition, Volume 2 (pp. 1-309). Brodal, A. (1959). The Reticular Formation of the Brain Stem: Anatomical Aspects and Functional Correlations. Edinburgh: The William Ramsay Henderson Trust. Brody, S. (1982). Psychoanalytic theories of infant development and its disturbances: a critical evaluation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 51: 526-597. Brothers, L. (1997). Friday’s Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bruch, H. (1973). Eating Disorders: Obesity, Anorexia Nervosa and the Person Within. New York: Basic Books. Butler, A. B., & Hodos, W. (1996). The reticular formation. In: A. B. Butler, & W. Hodos (Eds.) Comparative Vertebrate Neuroanatomy: Evolution and Adaptation (pp. 164-179). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Cajal, S. R. (1911). Histologie du système nerveux de l’homme et des vértebrés (2 vol). Paris: Malojne. Call, J. D. (1980). Some prelinguistic aspects of language development. Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, 28: 259-289. Cernoch, J. M., & Porter, R. H. (1985). Recognition of maternal axillary odours by infants. Child Development, 56: 1593-1598. Chatoor, I. (1989). Infantile anorexia nervosa: a developmental disorder of separation and individuation. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 17: 43-64.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 271

19/9/07 16:38:11

272

REFERENCES

—– (1996). Feeding and other disorders of infancy or early childhood. In: A. Tasman, J. Kay, & J. Lieberman (Eds.) Psychiatry (pp. 638701). Philadelphia: Sauders. Chiron, C., Jambaque, I., Nabbot, R, Lounes, R., A., & Dulac, O. (1997). The right brain is dominant in human infants. Brain, 120: 1057-1065. Chugani, H. T. (1999). Metabolic imaging: a window on brain development and plasticity. Neuroscientist, 5: 29-40. Chused, F. J. (1991). The evocative power of enactment. Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, 393: 615-640. Ciompi, L. (1991). Affects as central organising and integrating factors: a new psychosocial/biological model of the psyche. British Journal of Psychiatry, 159: 97-105. Clarke, A. M., & Clarke, A. D. B. (1976). Early Experience: Myth and Evidence. New York: Free Press. Cohn, J. F., & Tronick, E. Z. (1983). Three month-old infants” reactions to simulated maternal depression. Child Development, 54: 185-193. Crick, F. (1994). The Astonishing Hypothesis: the Scientific Search of Man: a Clinical Study of Localization of Function. New York: Macmillan. Crittenden, P. M. (1985). Maltreated infants: vulnerability and resilience. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 26: 85-96. —– (1988). Relationships at risk. In: J. Belsky, & T. Nezworski (Eds.) Clinical Implication of Attachment (pp. 136-174). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. —– (1992). Quality of attachment in preschool years. Development and Psychopathology, 4: 209-241. Damasio, A. R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace. Deutsch, H. (1942). Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 11: 301321. Dodge, K. A., & Garber, J. (1991). Domains of emotion regulation. In: J. Garber, & K. A. Dodge (Eds.), The Development of Emotion Regulation and Dysregulation (pp. 3-11). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Drevets, W. C., Price, J. L., Simpson, J. R., Todd, R. D., Reich, T., Vannier, M., & Raichle, M. E. (1997). Subgenual prefrontal cortex abnormalities in mood disorders. Nature, 386: 824-827.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 272

19/9/07 16:38:11



REFERENCES

273

Eagle, M. (1984). Recent Developments in Psychoanalysis: a Critical Evaluation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eccles, J. C. (1973). The Understanding of the Brain. New York: McGrawHill. G. Spinetti (Trans.) La Conoscenza del Cervello. Padova: Piccin, 1976. Edelman, G. M., & Tononi, G. (2000). A Universe of Consciousness. How Matter Becomes Imagination. New York: Basic Books. Ekman, P. (1992). Facial expressions of emotion: new findings, new questions. Psychological Science, 3: 34-38. Emde, R. N. (1980). Emotional availability: a reciprocal reward system for infants and parents with implications for prevention of psychosocial disorders. In: P. N. Taylor (Ed.), Parent-Infant Relationships (pp. 87-115). Orlando, FL: Grune and Stratton. —– (1988). Development terminable and interminable. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 69: 23-42. Emde, R. N., & Buchsbaum, H. K. (1989). Toward a psychoanalytic theory of affect: II. Emotional development and signaling in infancy. In: S. I. Greenspan, & G. H. Pollock (Eds.), The Course of Life, Volume I, Infancy (2nd ed.), pp. 193-227. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Emde, R. N., Korfmacher, J., & Kubicek, L. (2000). Toward a theory of early relationship-based intervention. In: J. D. Osofsky, & H. E. Fitzgerald (Eds.), World Association of Infant Mental Health. Handbook of Infant Mental Heath, Early Intervention, Evaluation and Assesment, Vol 2. (pp. 2-32). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Erdelyi, M. H. (1985). Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Cognitive Psychology. New York: Freeman. Faimberg, H. (1981). Une des difficultés de l’analyse: la reconnaissance de l’altérité. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 45: 1351–67. Difficulty in psychoanalysis: the recognition of otherness. In: H. Faimberg (Ed.) The Telescoping of Generations: Listening to the Narcissistic Links between Generations. London: Brunner-Routledge, 2005. Feinsilver, D. B. (1986). Continuing towards comprehensive model for schizophrenic disorders: Conclusions and implications. In: D. B. Feinsilver (Eds.), Towards a Comprehensive Model for Schizophrenic Disorders (pp. 347-397). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Feldman, R., Greenbaum, C. W., & Yirmiya, N. (1999). Mother-infant affect synchrony as an antecedent of the emergence of self-control. Developmental Psychology, 35: 223-231.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 273

19/9/07 16:38:12

274

REFERENCES

Fessard, A. E. (1954). Mechanisms of nervous integration and conscious experience. In: J. F. Delafresnaye (Ed.), Brain in Mechanism and Consciousness (pp. 200-236). Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. Field, T. (1985). Attachment as psychobiological attunement: being on the same wavelength. In: L. M. Reite, & T. Field (Eds.), The Psychobiology of Attachment and Separation (pp. 415-454). Orlando: Academic Press. Field, T. M., Woodson, R., Greenberg, R., & Cohen, D. (1982). Discrimination and imitation of facial expressions by neonates. Science, 218: 179-181. Filippi, S., & Ponsi, M. (1993). Enactment. Rivista di Psicoanalisi, 39: 501-516. Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fogel, A. (1982). Affect dynamics in early infancy: affective tolerance. In: T. Field, & A. Fogel (Eds.) Emotion and Early Interaction (pp. 22-58). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. —– (1993). Two principles of communication: co-regulation and framing. In: J. Nadel,& L. Camaioni (Eds.), New Perspectives in Early Communicative Development (pp. 9-22). London: Routledge. Fonagy, P. (1999). Memory and therapeutic action. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80: 215-223. Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Leigh, T., Kennedy, R., Mattoon, G., & Target, M. (1995). The predictive validity of Main’s Adult Attachment Interview: a psychoanalytic and developmental perspective on the transgenerational transmission of attachment and borderline states. In: S. Goldberg, R. Muir, & J. Kerr (Eds.) Attachment Theory: Social, Developmental and Clinical Perspectives (pp. 233-278). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1996). Playing with reality: I. Theory of mind and the normal development of psychic reality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 217-233. —– (1997). Attachment and reflective function: their role in selforganization. Development and Psychopathology, 9: 679-700. Fraiberg, S. (1980). Clinical Studies in Infant Mental Health. New York: Basic Books. Freud, A. (1946). The psychoanalytic study of infantile feeding disturbances. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2: 119-132. The Writings of Anna Freud, Volume 4. (pp. 39-59). 1968.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 274

19/9/07 16:38:12



REFERENCES

275

—– (1951). Observations on child development. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 6: 18-30. The Writings of Anna Freud, Volume 4 (pp. 143-162). 1968. —– (1957). The contribution of direct child observation to psychoanalysis. The Writings of Anna Freud, Volume 5 (pp. 95-101). 1970. —– (1966-1980). The Writings of Anna Freud, Volumes 1-8. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, S. (1891). On Aphasia: a Critical Study. Ed. E. Stengel. New York: International Universities Press. 1953. —– (1895). Project for a Scientific Psychology. Standard Edition, Volume 1 (pp. 295-391). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1953. —–(1894a). The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence, Standard Edition, Volume 3 (pp. 45-61). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1962. —– (1900a). The Interpretation of Dreams, Parts I and II Standard Edition, Volumes 4-5 (pp. 1-625). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1957. —– (1905d). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Standard Edition, Volume 7 (pp. 130-243). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1953. —– (1911b). Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, Standard Edition, Volume 12 (pp. 218-226). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1958. —– (1914c). On Narcissism: an Introduction, Standard Edition, Volume 14 (pp. 73-102). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1957. —– (1915c). Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Standard Edition, Volume 14 (pp. 117-140). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1956. —– (1915e). The Unconscious, Standard Edition, Volume 14 (pp. 166204). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1957. —– (1920g). Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Standard Edition, Volume 18 (pp. 7-64). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1961. —– (1923b). The Ego and the Id, Standard Edition, Volume 19 (pp. 12-66). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1960. —– (1926d). Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Standard Edition, Volume 20 (pp. 87-172). Freud, S. (1953-1974), 1959. —– (1953-1974). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volumes 1-24. Trans. and ed. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press. Fride, E., & Weinstock, M. (1988). Prenatal stress increases anxiety related behavior and alters cerebral lateralization of dopamine activity. Life Sciences, 42: 1059-1065.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 275

19/9/07 16:38:12

276

REFERENCES

Friedlander, B. (1970). Receptive language development in infancy. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 16: 7-51. Gaddini, E. (1969). On Imitation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 50: 473-484. —– (1981). Note sul problema mente-corpo. Rivista di Psicoanalisi, 27, 1: 3-29. Gaensbauer, T., & Emde, R. N. (1973). Wakefulness and feeding in human newborns. Archives of General Psychiatry, 28: 894-987. Galin, D. (1974). Lateral specialization and psychiatric issues: speculation on development and the evolutionof consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 299: 397-411. Gallese, V. (1999). From grasping to language: mirror neurons and the origin of social communication. In: S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, & D. J. Chalmers (Eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III, The Third Tucson Discussion and Debates (pp. 165-178). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —– (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: The quest for a common mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 358: 517-528. Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8: 396-403. Geschwind, N. (1972). Language and the brain. Scientific American, 226(4): 76-83. Gianino, A., & Tronick, E. (1988). The mutual regulation model: the infant’s self and interactive regulation and coping and defensive capacities. In: T. Field, P. McCabe, & N. Schneiderman (Eds.) Stress and Coping (pp. 47-68). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Glover, E. (1955). The Technique of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. Goldstein, R. G. (1995). The higher and lower in mental life: an essay on J. Hughlings Jackson and Freud. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 43: 495-515. Gopnik, K. A., & Slaughter, V. (1991). Young children’s understanding of changes in their mental states. Child Development, 62: 98-110. Goren, C. G., Sarty, M., & Wu, P. Y. K. (1975). Visual following and pattern discrimination of face-like stimuli by newborn infants. Paediatrics, 56: 544-549.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 276

19/9/07 16:38:13



REFERENCES

277

Gray, J. (1995). The contents of consciousness: a neuropsychological conjecture. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 18: 659-722. Greenacre, P. (1971). Emotional Growth: Psychoanalytic Studies of the Gifted and Great Variety of other Individuals. New York: International Universities Press. Greenberg, J. R., & Mitchell, J. R. (1983). Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenough, W. T. (1986). What’s special about development? Thoughts on the basis of experience-sensitive synaptic plasticity. In: W. T. Greenough, & J. M. Juraska (Eds.), Developmental Neuropsychobiology (pp. 387-407). New York: Academic Press. Greenson, R. R. (1972). Beyond transference and interpretation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 53: 213-217. Greenspan, S. I. (1992). Regulatory Disorders. Infancy and Early Childhood: The Practice of Clinical Assessment and Intervention with Emotional and Developmental Challenges. Madison: International University Press. Grigsby, J., & Hartlaub, G. H. (1994). Procedural learning and the development and stability of character. Perceptual Motor Skills, 79: 355-370. Guntrip, H. (1962). Personality Structure and Human Interaction. London: Hogarth Press. —– (1971). Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy and the Self. New York: Basic Books. Hadley, J. (1989). The neurobiology of motivational systems. In: J. Lichtenberg (Ed.) Psychoanalysis and Motivation (pp. 337-372). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Haeckel, E. (1866). Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, Volume 2, Allgemeine Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen. Berlin: Verlag Georg Reimer. Harrè, R. (1986). The Social Construction of Emotions. Oxford: Blackwell. Harris, P. L. (1989). Children and Emotion: The Development of Psychological Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell. —– (1991). The work of the imagination. In: A. Whiten (Ed.) Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading (pp. 283-304). Oxford: Blackwell. —– (2000). The Work of the Imagination. Oxford: Blackwell.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 277

19/9/07 16:38:13

278

REFERENCES

Harter, S., Bresnik, S., Bouchey, H. A., & Whitsell, N. R. (1997). The development of multiple role-related selves during adolescence. Development and Psychopathology, 9: 853-854. Hartmann, H. (1950). Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of the rgo. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 5: 74-96. Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior. A Neuropsychological Theory. New York: John Wiley& Sons. Heimann, M., & Schaller, J. (1985). Imitative reactions among 14-21day-old infants. Infant Mental Health Journal, 6: 31-39. Hess, W. R. (1954). Diencephalon: Autonomic and Extrapyramidal Functions. New York: Grune & Stratton. Hofer, M. A. (1984). Relationships as regulators: a psychobiologic perspective on bereavement. Psychosomatic Medicine, 46: 183-197. —– (1994). Hidden regulation in attachment separation and loss. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59: 192207. —– (1995). Hidden regulators: implications for a new understanding of attachment, separation and loss. In: S. Goldberg, R. Muir, & J. Kerr (Eds.), Attachment Theory: Social, Developmental and Clinical Perspectives (pp. 203-230). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Holt, R. (1965). A review of some of Freud’s biological assumptions and their influence on his theories. In: N. Greenfield, & W. Lewis (Eds.), Psychoanalysis and Current Biological Thought (pp. 93-124). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Howe, M. L. (1998). Individual differences in factors that modulate storage and retrieval of traumatic memories. Development and Psychopathology, 10: 681-698. Hugdahl, K. (1995). Classical conditioning and implicit learning: the right hemisphere hypothesis. In: R. J. Davidson, & K. Hugdahl (Eds.), Brain Asymmetry (pp. 235-267). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hughes, J. M. (1989). Reshaping the Psychoanalytic Domain: The Work of D. W. Winnicott, W. R. D. Fairbairn, and Melanie Klein. Los Angeles & London: California University Press. Jackson, J. H. (1931). Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson. J. Taylor (Ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton. Jacobson, E. (1964). The Self and the Object World. New York: International Universities Press.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 278

19/9/07 16:38:13



REFERENCES

279

Jaffe, J., Stern, D. N., & Peery, J. C. (1973). Conversational coupling of gaze behavior in prelinguistic human development. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 2: 321-329. Jensen, P. S., & Hoagwood, K. (1997). The book of names: DSM-IV in context. Development and Psychopathology, 9: 231-249. Jones, E. (1953). The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. New York: Basic Books. Jones, E. G. (1986). Neurotransmitters in the cerebral cortex. Journal of Neurosurgery, 65: 135-153. Joseph, B. (1985). Transference: the total situation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 66: 447-454. Joseph, R. (1996). Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology and Clinical Neuroscience. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins. Kandel, E. R. (1970). Nerve cells and behavior, Scientific American, 223(1): 281-292. —– (1979). Small systems of neurons. Scientific American, 241: 67-76. —– (1989). Genes, nerve cells, and remembrance of things past. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 1: 103-125. —– (1998). A new intellectual framework for psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry, 155: 457-469. Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessel, T. M. (1991). Principles of Neural Science (3rd ed.). New York: Elsevier Science Publication. Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessel, T. M. (2000). Principles of Neuro Science (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Kaplan-Solms, K., & Solms, M. (2000). Clinical Studies in NeuroPsychoanalysis: An Introduction to Depth Neuropsychology. New York and London: Other Press/Karnac Books. Karni, A., Tanne, D., Rubenstein, B. S., Askenasi, J. J., & Sagi, D. (1992). No dreams, no memory: the effect of REM sleep deprivation on learning a new perceptual skill. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 18: 387. Karr-Morse, R., & Wiley, M. S. (1997). Ghosts from the Nursery: Tracing the Roots of Violence. New York: Adantic Monthly Press. Kaye, K. (1977). Toward the origin of dialogue. In: H. R. Schaffer (Ed.), Studies in Mother–infant Interaction (pp. 89-117). London: Academic Press. —–(1982). The Mental and Social Life of Babies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 279

19/9/07 16:38:13

280

REFERENCES

Kernberg, O. F. (1976). Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis. New York: Jason Aronson. —– (1991). Aggression and love in the relationship of the couple. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39: 45-71. —– (1992). Aggression in Personality Disorders and Perversions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Khan, M. (1974). The Privacy of the Self. New York: International Universities Press. Kinsbourne, M. (1998). Unity and diversity in the human brain. Daedalus, 127: 233-256. Klein, G. (1967). Peremptory ideation: structure and force in motivated ideas. In: R. R. Holt (Ed.), Psychological Issues: 5(2-3), Monographs 18-19. New York: International Universities Press. Klein, M. (1930). The importance of symbol-formation in the development of the ego. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 11: 24-39. —– (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 16: 145-174. —– (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 21: 125-153. —– (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 27: 99-110. —– (1957). Envy and Gratitude: A Study of Unconscious Forces. New York: Basic Books. Kleitman, N., & Engelmann, T. G. (1953). Sleep characteristics of infants. Journal of Applied Physiology, 6: 269-282. Kohut, H. (1971). The Analysis of the Self. A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders. New York: International Universities Press. —– (1977). The Restoration of the Self. New York: International Universities Press. —– (1984). How Does Analysis Cure? Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. Kosslyn, S. M., & Sussman, A. L. (1995). Roles of imagery in perception: or, there is no such thing as immaculate perception. In: M. S. Cazzaniga (Ed.) The Cognitive Neurosciences (pp. 10351042). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 280

19/9/07 16:38:14



REFERENCES

281

Kreisler, L. (1985). Conduites alimentaires déviantes du bébé: A. L’anorexie mentale; B. La rumination ou mérycisme; C. Les vomissements psychogénes. In: S. Lebovici, R. Diatkine, & M. Soulé (Eds.), Nouveau traité de psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent (pp. 2061-2080). Paris: PUF, Quadrige. Kreisler, L., Fain, M., & Soulé, M. (1974). L’enfant et son Corps. Etudes sur la clinique psychosomatique du premier âge. Paris: PUF. LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The Emotional Brain. New York: Simon and Schuster. Lenneberg, E. H. (1967). Biological Foundations of Language. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Leslie, A.M (1987). Pretense and representation: the origins of “theory of mind’. Psychological Review, 94: 412-426. —–(1991). The theory of mind impairment in autism: evidence for a modular mechanism of development?. In A. Whiten (Ed.), Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading (pp. 65-78). Oxford: Blackwell. Levenson, E. (1983). The Ambiguity of Change. New York: Basic Books. Levin, F. (1991). Mapping the Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Levy, J. (1969). Possible basis for the evolution of the human brain. Nature, 224: 614-615. Lewis, M. D. (1996). Self-organising cognitive appraisals. Cognition and Emotion, 10: 1-25. Lewis, M., & Rosemblum, L. A. (1974). The Effect of the Infant on its Caregiver. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Lichtenberg, J. D. (1983). Psychoanalysis and Infant Research. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. —– (1989). Psychoanalysis and Motivation, Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Lichtenberg, J. D., & Meares, R. (1996). The role of play in things human. Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, 13: 3-16. Livingston, R. B. (1967). Brain circuitry relating to complex behaviour. In: F. O. Schmitt, G. C. Quarton, & T. Melnechuk (Eds.), The Neurosciences (pp. 568-576). New York: Rockefeller University Press.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 281

19/9/07 16:38:14

282

REFERENCES

Llinas, R. R. (1990). Intrinsic electrical properties of mammalian neurons and CNS function. Fidia Research Foundation Neuro­science Award Lectures, 4: 175-194. New York: Raven Press. Llinas, R. R., & Pare, D. (1996). The brain as a closed system modulated by the senses. In: R. Llinas, & P. Churchland (Eds.), The Mind-Brain Continuum (pp. 1-18). Cambridge, ma: mit Press. Loewenstein, R. M. (1957). Some thoughts on interpretation in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 12: 127-150. Luria, A. R. (1962). Vyssie korkovie funkcii celoveka i ich narusenija pri lokal’nich porazenijach mozga. B. Haigh (Trans.), Higher Cortical Functions in Man. New York: Basic Books (2nd ed.), 1980. Luu, P., & Tucker, D. M. (1996). Self-regulation and cortical development: implications for functional studies of the brain. In: R. W. Thatcher, G. Reid Lyon, J. Rumsey, & N. Krasnegor (Eds.), Developmental Neuroimaging: Mapping the Development of Brain and Behavior (pp. 297-305). San Diego: Academic Press. Lyons-Ruth, K., Connell, D. B., & Zoll, D. (1989). Patterns of maternal behavior among infants at risk for abuse: relations with infant attachment behavior and infant development at 12 months of age. In: D. Cicchetti, & V. Carlson (Eds.), Child Maltreatment, Theory and Research on the Causes and Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect (pp. 464-493). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Lyons-Ruth, K., Connell, D. B., Zoll, D., & Stahl, J. (1987). Infants at social risk: relationships among infant maltreatment maternal behavior and infant attachment behavior. Developmental Psychology, 23: 223-232. MacGregor, R. J. (1987). Neural and Brain Modeling. San Diego: Academic Press. MacLean, P. D. (1955). The limbic system, “visceral brain’) and emotional behavior. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 73: 130134. Mahler, M. S. (1968). On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation, Volume 1, Infantile Psychosis. New York: International Universities Press. Mahler, M. S., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). The Psychobiological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation. New York: Basic Books.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 282

19/9/07 16:38:14



REFERENCES

283

Main, M., & Goldwyn, R. (1985-1996). Adult Attachment Scoring and Classification System. Berkeley: Department of Psychology, University of California. Main, M., & Solomon, J. (1986). Discovery of a new, insecuredisorganized/disoriented attachment pattern. In: T. B. Brazelton, & M. Yogman (Eds.) Affective Development in Infancy (pp. 95-124). Ablex: Norwood. —– (1990). Procedure for identifying infants as disorganized/ disoriented during the Ainsworth Strange Situation. In: M. T., Greenberg, D. Cicchetti, & E. M. Cummings (Eds.), Attachment in Preschool Years (pp. 121-160). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Major, R., & Miller, P. (1984). Empathy, antipathy, and telepathy in the analytic process. In: J. Lichtenberg, M. Bornstein, & D. Silver (Eds.), Empathy II (pp. 227-248). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Malatesta, C. Z., Culver, C., Tesman, J. R., & Shepard, B. (1989). The development of emotion expression during the first two years of life. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 54: 1-104. Mancia, M. (2004). Sentire le Parole. Torino: Boringhieri. Mandler, J. H. (1979). Categorical and schematic organization in memory. In: C. R. Puff (Ed.), Memory Organization and Structure (pp. 259-299). New York: Academic Press. Mazet, P., & Stoleru, S. (1988). Psychopathologie du Nourrisson et du Jeune Enfant. Paris: Masson. McLaughlin, J. T. (1991). Clinical and theoretical aspects of enactment. Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, 39: 595-614. Meltzer, D., (1967). The Psycho-analytical Process. London: Heinemann. —– (1973). Sexual States of Mind. Perthshire: Clunie Press. Meltzoff, A. N., & Gopnik, A. (1993). The role of imitation in understanding persons and developing a theory of mind. In: S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, & D. Cohen (Eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism (pp. 335-366). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1992). Early imitation within a functional framework: the importance of personal identity, movement and development. Infant Behavior and Development, 15: 479-505.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 283

19/9/07 16:38:14

284

REFERENCES

Merzenich, M. M., & Sameshima, K. (1993). Cortical plasticity and memory. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 3: 187-196. Milner, B., Squire, L. R, & Kandel, E. R. (1998). Cognitive neuroscience and the study of memory. Neuron, 20: 445-468. Misés, R., Fortineau, J., Jeammet, P., Lang, J. L., Mazet, P. H., Plantade, A., & Quémada, N. (1988). Classification française des troubles mentaux de l’enfant et de l’adolescent. Psychiatrie de l’enfant, 31: 67-134. Mitchell, S. A. (2000). Relationality: From Attachment to Intersubjectivity. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Modell, A. H. (1968). Object Love and Reality: An Introduction to a Psychoanalytic Theory of Object Relations. New York: International Universities Press. —– (1996). The Interface of Psychoanalysis and Neurobiology, 12. Boston: Boston Colloquium for Philosophy of Science. December 18, 1996. Molinari, S. (1990). Il mondo degli affetti e le oscillazioni m↔d. In: M. Ammanniti, & N. Dazzi (Eds.), Affetti. Natura e Sviluppo delle Relazioni Interpersonali (pp. 66-79). Rome-Bari: Laterza. —– (1991) La psicoanalisi alla sorgente degli affetti (una teoria degli affetti). In: G. Hautmann, & A. Vergine (Eds.), Gli Affetti Nella Psicoanalisi (pp. 351-385). Biblioteca della Societa Psicoanalitica Italiana. Rome: Borla. Montagu, M. F. A. (1962). Time, morphology and neoteny in the evolution of man. In: M. F. A. Montagu (Ed.), Culture and the Evolution of Man (pp. 324-342). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moscovitch, M. (1995). Recovered consciousness: a hypothesis concerning modularity and episodic memory. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychobiology, 17: 276-290. Mounoud, P., & Vinter, A. (1981). Representation and sensorimotor development. In: G. Butterworth (Ed.), Infancy and Epistemology: An Evaluation of Piaget’s Theory (pp. 200-235). Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press. Murphy, L. B., & Moriarty, A. E. (1976). Vulnerability, Coping and Growth: From Infancy to Adolescence. New Haven: Yale University Press. Napolitano, F. (1990). Teoria modulare della mente e metapsicologia. Rivista di Psicoanalisi, 36(3): 638-667.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 284

19/9/07 16:38:15



REFERENCES

285

Nelson, C. A, & Carver, L. J. (1998). The effects of stress and trauma on brain and memory: a view from developmental cognitive neuroscience. Development and Psychopathology, 10: 793-810. Nelson, K. (1986). Event Knowledge: Structure and Function in Development. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Nelson, K., & Gruendel, J. (1981). Generalized event representations: basic building blocks of cognitive development. In: M. E. Lamb, & A. Brown (Eds.) Advances in Developmental Psychology, Volume 1 (pp. 131-158). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Neyraut, M. (1974). Le Transfert. Paris: P.U.F. Nicholls, G., & Van Essen, D. (1974). The nervous system of the leech. Scientific American, 230: 38-48. Noebels, J. L. (1989). Introduction to structure-function relationships in the developing brain. In: P. Kellaway, & J. L. Noebels (Eds.), Problems and Concepts in Developmental Neurophysiology (pp. 151160). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ogden, T. (1989). The Primitive Edge of Experience. Northvale: Jason Aronson. Oliviero, A., & Castellano, C. (1996). La modulazione della memoria. Le Scienze, 333: 62-71. Olszewski, J. (1954). Cytoarchitecture of the human reticular formation. In: J. F. Delafresnaye, E. Adrian, F. Bremer, & H. Jasper (Eds.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness (pp. 54-80). Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. Ortony, A., & Turner, T. (1990). What’s basic in basic emotion? Psychological Review, 97: 315-331. Otto, M. W., Yeo, R. A., & Dougher, M. J. (1987). Right hemisphere involvement in depression: toward a neuropsychological theory of negative affective experience. Biological Psychiatry, 22: 12011215. Pally, R. (2000). The Mind-Brain Relationship. New York and London: Other Press/Karnac Books. Panksepp, J. (1985). Mood changes. In: P. Vinken, P. Bruyn, H. Klawans, & J. Frederiks (Eds.) Handbook of Clinical Neurology, Volume 45 (pp. 271-285). Amsterdam: Elsevier. —– (1998). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press. Papez, J. W. (1937). A proposed mechanism of emotion. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 38: 725-743.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 285

19/9/07 16:38:15

286

REFERENCES

Peiper, N. (1963). Cerebral Function in Infancy and Childhood. New York: Consultants Bureau. Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge, MA: mit Press. Peterfreund, E. (1971). Information systems and psychoanalysis: an evolutionary biological approach to psychoanalytic theory. Psychological Issues, 7(1/2): 1-397. Polan, H. J., & Hofer, M. (1999). Psychobiological origins of infant attachment and separation responses. In: J. Cassidy, & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research and Clinical Applications (pp. 162-180). New York: Guilford Press. Posner, M. (1994). Attention: the mechanisms of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 91: 7398-7408. Post, R., & Weiss, S. R. B. (1997). Emergent properties of neural systems: how focal molecular neurobiological alterations can affect behavior. Development and Psychopathology, 9: 907-930. Pribram, K. H., & Gill, M. M. (1976). Freud’s Project Re-assessed. Preface to Contemporary Cognitive Theory and Neuropsychology. New York: Basic Books. Racamier, P. C. (1980). Les Schizophrènes. Paris: Payot. Rangell, L. (1997). The unitary theory of Leo Rangell, m. d. Journal of Clinical Psychoanalysis, 6: 453-592. Ranson, S. W. (1934). The hypothalamus: its significance for visceral innervation and emotional expression. Transactions & Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, 2: 222-242. Reiser, M. F. (1985). Converging sectors of psychoanalysis and neurobiology: mutual challenge and opportunity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 33: 11-34. Rolls, E. T. (1995). A theory on emotion and consciousness, and its application to understanding the neural basis for emotion. In: M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences (pp. 1091-1106). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rosenfeld, H. A. (1964). On the psychopathology of narcissism: a clinical approach. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 45: 332-337. —– (1971). A clinical approach to the psychoanalytic theory of the life and death instincts: an investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 52: 169-178.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 286

19/9/07 16:38:15



REFERENCES

287

—– (1972). A critical appreciation of James Strachey’s paper on the nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 53: 455-461. —– (1983). Primitive object relations and mechanisms. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 64: 261-267. —– (1987). Impasse and Interpretation: Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic Factors in the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Psychotic, Borderline, and Neurotic Patients. New Library of Psychoanalysis. London: Tavistock Publications. Rosenzweig, M. R., Bennet, E. L., & Diamond, M. C. (1972). Brain changes in response to experience. Scientific American, 226: 22-29. Rothbart, M. K., Ahadi, S. A., & Hershey, K. I., (1994). Temperament and social behaviour in childhood. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 40: 21-39. Ryan, R. M., Kuhl, J., & Deci, E. L. (1997). Nature and autonomy: an organizational view of social and neurobiological aspects of self-regulation in behavior and development. Development and Psychopathology, 9: 701-728. Sameroff, A. J., & Emde, R. N. (Eds.) (1989). Relationships Disturbances in Early Childhood. A Developmental Approach. New York: Basic Books. Sameroff, A. J., & Fiese, B. H. (2000). Models of development and developmental risk. In: C. H. Zeanah (Ed.) Handbook of Infant Mental Health (2nd ed.) (pp. 3-19). New York: Guilford Press. Sander, L. W. (1985), Toward a logic of organization in psychobiological development. In: H. Klar, & L. Siever (Eds.), Biological Response Styles (pp. 20-36). Washington d.c.: American Psychiatric Association. Sandler, J. (1978). On the development of object relationships and affects. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59: 285-296. Sasso, G. (1999). Struttura dell’Oggetto e della Rappresentazione. Rome: Astrolabio. Schacter, D. L. (1996). Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past. New York: Basic Books. Schafer, R. (1983). The Analytic Attitude. New York: Basic Books. Schaffer, H. R. (1975). Early Interaction (videotape). London: Open University. —– (1996). Social Development. Oxford: Blackwell.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 287

19/9/07 16:38:16

288

REFERENCES

Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. (1977). Script, Plans, Goals, and Understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Schore, A. N. (1994). Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. —– (1996). The experience-dependent maturation of a regulatory system in the orbital prefrontal cortex and the origin of developmental psychopathology. Development and Psychopathology, 8: 59-87. —– (1999). The Right Brain, the Right Mind, and Psychoanalysis. Los Angeles: University of California School of Medicine. Schultz, A. H. (1968). The recent hominoid primates. In: S. L. Washburn & P. C. Jay (Eds.), Perspectives of Human Evolution, Volume 1 (pp. 122-195). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Schuman, J. (1997). The Neurobiology of Affect in Language. Malden: Blackwell. Scoppola, L. (2005). L’esperienza di Essere Sé. Psicoanalisi, Neuroscienze e Affetti. Milan: Franco Angeli. Searles, H. F. (1979). Countertransference and Related Subjects. Selected Papers. New York: International Universities Press. Segal, H. (1973). Postscript on technique. In: H. Segal (Ed.) Introduction to the Work of M. Klein (pp. 117-124). London: Hogarth Press. Siegel, D. J. (1999). The Developing Mind: Toward a Neurobiology of Interpersonal Experience. New York: Guilford Press. Solms, M. (1996). Towards an anatomy of the unconscious. Journal of Clinical Psychoanalysis, 5: 331-367. Speziale-Bagliacca, R. (1997). Colpa. Considerazioni su Rimorso, Vendetta e Responsabilità. Rome: Astrolabio. Spitz, R. (1957). No and Yes. On the Genesis of Human Communication. New York: International Universities Press. —– (1965). The First Year of Life: A Psychoanalytic Study of Normal and Deviant Development of Object Relations. New York: International Universities Press. Sroufe, L. A. (1996). Emotional Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sroufe, L. A., & Fleeson, J. (1986). Attachment and the construction relationships. In: W. Hartup, & Z. Rubin (Eds.), Relationships and Development (pp. 51-71). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 288

19/9/07 16:38:16



REFERENCES

289

Stern, D. N., & Gibbon, J. (1980). Temporal expectancies of social behaviors in mother-infant play. In: E. Thoman (Ed.) Origins of Infant Social Responsiveness (pp. 409-429). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Stolorow, R. D., & Atwood, G. E. (1992). Contexts of Being: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Strachey, J. (1934). The nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 15: 127-159. —– (1937). Symposium on the theory of the therapeutic results of psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 18: 139-145. —– (1966). Editor’s introduction to Project for a Scientific Psychology. In: S. Freud Pre-Psychoanalytical Works and Unpublished Drafts. Standard Edition, Volume 1, pp. 283-293. Trans. and ed. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press. Stone, W. L., Lee, E. B., Ashford, L., Brissie, J., Hepburn, S. L., Coonrod, E. E., & Wess, B. H. (1999). Can autism be diagnosed accurately in children under 3 years? Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40(2): 219-226. Sulloway, F. J. (1979). Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend. New York: Basic Books. Thatcher, R. W., Lyon, G. R., Rumsey, J., N. & Krasnegor, N. (1996). Developmental Neuroimaging: Mapping the Development of Brain and Behavior. San Diego: Academic Press. Thatcher, R. W., Walker, R. A., & Guidice, S. (1987). Human cerebral hemispheres develop at different rates and ages. Science, 236: 1110-1113. Tomkins, S. (1962). Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Vol. l: The Positive Affects. New York: Springer. —– (1964). Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Vol. 2: The Negative Affects. New York: Springer. Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy. A description of primary intersubjectivity. In: M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before Speech: The Beginnings of Human Communication (pp. 321-347). London: Cambridge University Press. —– (1998). The concept and foundations of infant intersubjectivity. In S. Braten (Ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny (pp. 15-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 289

19/9/07 16:38:16

290

REFERENCES

Tronick, E. Z. (1989). Emotions and emotional communication in infants. American Psychologist, 44 (2): 112-119. Tronick, E. Z, & Cohn, J. F. (1989). Infant-mother face-to-face interaction: age and gender differences in coordination and the occurence of miscoordination. Child Development, 60: 85-92. Tucker, D. M. (1992). Developing emotions and cortical networks. In: M. Gunnar, & C. Nelson (Eds.), Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology; Developmental Neuroscience (pp. 75-128). New York: Oxford University Press. Tustin, F. (1981). Autistic States in Children. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. —– (1986). Autistic Barrier in Neurotic Patients. London: Karnac Books. Wallerstein, R. S. (1988). One psychoanalysis or many? International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 69: 5-21. Winnicott, D. W. (1945). Primitive emotional development. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 26: 137-143. —– (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 34: 89-97. —– (1954). The depressive position in normal emotional development. In: D. W. Winnicott (Ed.) Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis (pp. 262-325). New York: Basic Books. —– (1960). Ego distortion in terms of the true and false self. In: D. W. Winnicott (Ed.), The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment (pp. 140-152). London: Hogarth Press. —– (1962). Ego integration in child development. In: D. W. Winnicott (Ed.) The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment (pp. 56-63). London: Hogarth Press. —– (1969). The use of an object. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 50: 711-716. Winson, J. (1993). The biology and function of rapid eye movement sleep. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 3: 243-248. Wise, S. P., Murray, E. A., & Gerfen, C. R. (1996). The frontal cortexbasal ganglia system in primates. Critical Reviews in Neurobiology, 10: 317-356. Young, J. Z. (1964). A Model of the Brain. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Zapparoli, G. C. (1967). La Psicoanalisi del Delirio. Milan: Bompiani.

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 290

19/9/07 16:38:16

Index

A Abelson 58, 264 Adult Attachment Interview 247 Ahadi, S.A. 234 Andreasen, S.C. 43 Anzieu, D. 157 Ashby, W.R. 33 attachment theory see brain, P‑I, attachment theory Atwood, G.E. 224 B Balint, M. 224, 248 Barbas, H. 44, 66 basal activation 125 Basch, M. 264 Beebe, B. 244 Belsky, J. 62, 243 Bennet, E.L. 48 Bergman, A. 60 Beyond the Pleasure Principle see Freud

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 291

Bibring, E. 223 Bick, E. 130, 157 Bigler, E.D. 34 Bion, W. 60, 62‑3, 151, 153, 179‑80, 218n 242 Bjork, R. 43 Blatt, S.J. 248 Bolk, L. 101n Bornstein, R.F. 255 Bouchey, H. 66, 251 Bowlby, J. 56, 58, 246, 248, 249 brain amygdala 44 architecture and the reticulum 232‑3 asymmetry in 45‑6 basal activation 125 brainstem 8, 69, 99‑101, 105‑6, 113, 126, 166, 190, 228 and central comparator 19 cerebral differentiation between species 91 291

19/9/07 16:38:17

292

INDEX



cerebral ganglions 73, 75 cerebral reticulum see reticulum in child development 8 child‑mother interaction see child development cortex 27, 46 cortical areas 42, 89, 90, 92‑4 cortial structures 116 development child/mother interaction 65‑7 in enriched environment 48 of mind 244‑6, 248‑50 neuroscientific knowledge 3, 65 primary neural network 74‑5 psychoanalytic theory 3 of self 250‑52 serial memory traces 85‑6 unifying psychoanalysis and neurophysiology 68‑70 divisions 30 dreams see dreams encoding 113‑16 expansion 80 hemispheres 45‑6, 194, 200‑204 integration analyst’s contribution to 216‑18 drives and relational predisposition during 120‑22 endogenous introjective‑projective modalities 124‑6, 127‑9 of internal information 117‑18 of mental processes 210‑212 object, and dynamic drive patterns 134‑6 proto‑objectual 118‑19

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 292



internal structures 28 introjective and projective characteristics (P‑I) see brain, P‑I limbic lobe 44 linguistic maturation 206 linguistic organization in 46, 203 map of areas 27 memory see memory motor and sensory function integration 46‑7 motor system 38‑41 neocortex 26, 44, 86‑92 neocortical cloak 26 neural circuits 48‑51 neural information coding 33‑4 neural structure for language 194 neuroimages of 33, 113 neuronal group theory 50 neurophysiological activity 13, 45, 46‑8 objectual information 122‑4 P‑I 3, 8, 9, 122‑4, 137‑9, 146‑8 attachment theory 56, 239, 246‑7 autistic class 158‑9, 164‑5 cerebral integration 150‑53, 155‑8 coding 106‑9 consciousness and unconscious processes 189‑91 constant presence of object 144‑6 dynamic origin of defences 184‑8 of repression 188‑9 dynamics and Bion 179‑80

19/9/07 16:38:17



cerebral, during interaction 212‑14 co‑ordination of basal level 218‑19 and development of child 122‑3 of mind 244‑6, 248‑50 of self 250‑52 double associative 207 and Freud 170‑71, 172‑4 and internal object 191‑2 and Klein 177, 180 oscillatory model 218n in reticula 180‑83, 203‑4, 245 syntonization 214‑16 and Winnicott 179‑80 eating disorders 237 identificatory‑introjective function of verbal interaction 223‑5 initial immaturity 175‑6 lacunar unconscious and repressed unconscious 167‑9 linguistic flow of information 212‑25 maternal modulation 240 object prevailing absence of 148‑9 prevailing presence of 153‑5 paranoid‑schizophrenic position 149‑50 and reticulum see brain, reticulum in theory of development 248‑50 total absence of object 140‑43

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 293

INDEX

293

paleocortex 93‑4 emotional-representational functions 95‑6 pathways 94 pathways 27, 29, 35, 40, 69, 75‑81, 140‑43 cortical pathways 87 homeostatic 94 linguistic 200‑201, 212‑25 neuro‑hormonal 94 paleocortical 94 representationalidentificatory development 75‑158, 229‑30 reticulum see brain, reticulum s‑o pathways 75‑158 see also brain, reticulum patterns dynamic drive 134‑6 primary 132‑4 perceptual information 82‑4, 86‑92 primary patterns 132‑4 proto‑objectual and objectual integration 113‑16 re‑entries, control 84 representational system cortical and subcortical 92 emotional-representational 95‑6 internal 93‑4 introjective and projective coding 106‑9 reticulum 32, 79‑86, 93, 94, 97‑9, 99‑101, 103‑5, 201, 230‑32 and architecture of brain 232‑3 immaturity and redundancy 101‑3 influenced by P‑I and W classes 165‑7

19/9/07 16:38:17

294

INDEX

linguistic 194‑5, 198‑207 maturation 111‑13, 124‑6 P‑I dynamics see brain, P‑I replication 102, 104 reticular formation 99‑101 secondary reticula 195‑8 structure 236‑7 sensorimotor organization 12, 35, 90‑91, 243 and sleep 46‑7 somatosensory cortex 35‑7 spontaneous patterns 129 stress hormones 47‑8 structure 26‑41, 44, 47‑8, 116, 199 interaction 47 reticulum 236‑7 subcortical structures 26, 116 subject and object 96, 103‑5 syntonization see syntonization thalamo‑cortical system 51‑2 W class and autistic class 164‑5 fusional‑transitional 159‑61 and reticulum 165‑7 transitional‑Winnicottian 161‑3 Winnicottian class see brain, W class see also child development; Freud; nervous system; syntonization brainstem see brain Brazelton, T.B. 58 Bresnik, S. 66, 251 Broca, Paul 26, 28, 41, 196‑7, 198 Brodal, A. 100 Brodmann, K. 86 Brody, S. 135 Brothers, L. 34, 44, 65 Bruch, H. 238 Buchsbaum, H.K. 56

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 294

Butler, A.B. 100 C Cajal, S.R. 11, 33 Call, J.D. 135 Carver, L.J. 66, 259 central comparator 19 cerebral ganglions see brain Cernoch, J.M. 57 Chatoor, I. 238 child amnesia 259 child development attachment theory 56, 239, 246‑7 brain evolution 8 child/mother interaction 5, 25, 55‑6, 61‑3, 64, 65‑7, 135‑6, 137‑9, 150‑53, 169, 206, 237‑43 early mapping 234‑6 energy release 25 fundamental pathogenic types 146‑8 maternal containment 62‑3 maternal modulation 241‑3 mental 63‑5 neurophysiological 65‑7 and P‑I see brain, P‑I and phylogenesis 33 predisposition for interaction 56‑9 projective and introjective influences see brain, P‑I proto‑conversations 59 psychic complexity in 55 and psychoanalysis/ neuroscience 226‑52 psychoanalytic model 63 psychological 65‑7 self‑regulation disorders 234 sensory‑perceptual 63‑5 TOBY (Theory of Body Mechanism) 241‑3

19/9/07 16:38:18



see also Freud child/mother interaction see child development Chiron, C. 46, 201 Chused, F.J. 224 Ciompi, L. 65 Clarke, A.B.D. 57 Clarke, A.M. 57 Cohen, D. 57 Cohn, J.F. 58, 236, 244, 259 consciousness conscious and unconscious integration of mental process 210‑212 and dynamic core 51‑2 elementary contents of and words 209‑210 primary 210 conservation principle 77 cortex see brain cortical cloak see brain Crick, F. 43 D Damasio, A.R. 47, 70, 235 and brainstem function 8, 69, 166, 190, 228 and central comparator 19 model of emotion and consciousness 52‑3 primary consciousness 210 and sensorimotor control 12 Deci, E.L. 66 Deutsch, H. 157 Diamond, M.C. 48 discharge of energy see Freud Dodge, K.A. 44, 65 Dougher, M.J. 46 dreams 14, 22, 25, 46‑7, 54, 69, 105‑6, 228 Drevets, W. C. 178 drive theory 110‑111

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 295

INDEX

295

dynamic core and consciousness 51‑2 dynamic drive patterns 134‑6 E Eagle, M. 55, 250 Edelman, G.M. 8, 19, 47, 48‑50, 51‑2, 53, 69, 92, 103‑5, 143, 144, 148, 167, 190, 195, 209‑210, 228, 231, 234, 262 Ego and the Id see Freud Ekman, P. 44, 66 Emde, R.N. 55‑6, 57, 135, 238, 251 enactment 224 energy concept of in psychological models 5, 7‑8 discharge see Freud Engelmann, T.G. 57, 229 Erdelyi, M.H. 255 F Faimberg, H. 224 Fain, M. 251 Fechner 14 Feldman, R. 58 Fessard, A.E. 46 Field, T. 57, 231 Fiese, B.H. 238 Filippi, S. 224 Fleeson, J. 264 Fodor, J.A. 141 Fogel, A. 59, 236 Fonagy, P. 204, 224, 245 Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning see Freud Fraiberg, S. 231 Freud, Anna 24, 59‑60, 238 Freud, Sigmund 3, 4, 8‑26, 28, 33, 43, 53, 56, 193 Beyond the Pleasure Principle 13, 24, 176

19/9/07 16:38:18

296

INDEX



biological models 5 brain, organization of 253‑4 conscious 254, 257‑8 dreams 14, 22, 25, 54, 69, 105‑6, 228 drive object relationship 110‑111 properties 134 theory 8 ego 13, 20‑21, 254, 261‑2 Ego and the Id, The 1, 60, 173‑4, 187, 260, 262 energy discharge 11‑18, 21, 22, 55 Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning 262 id 254, 259‑61 Instincts and Vicissitudes 13, 110‑111 Interpretation of Dreams, The 11, 23‑4, 109, 254 libido,sexual connotation of 253 metapsychology 5 motor images 83 narcissism 60‑61, 172‑4 nervous apparatus, concept of 23‑4 neural functioning 11‑15 neural structures and ego 261‑2 and id 259‑61 and preconscious 255‑6 and superego 263‑4 neuronic inertia 24 Nirvana principle 24 On Aphasia 28 On Narcissism: an Introduction 60, 172‑3 perceptual complex and subject‑complex 18‑23 perceptual‑motor pathways 69

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 296



phylogenesis 33, 43 preconscious 254, 255‑6 procedural memory 258‑9 Project for a Scientific Psychology 3‑5, 7, 11‑18, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 54, 57, 60, 69, 73, 83, 97, 109, 111, 124, 146, 209, 226, 230, 253, 254, 262 psychical representative 260 psychoanalysis and neuroscience, convergence of 226‑7 psychoanalytic theory modified 59‑63 sensorimotor organization 12, 53 serial memory traces 85‑6 superego 254, 263‑4 theory of cathexis displacement 170‑71 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 13, 111 topographic theory 33 unconscious 254, 257‑8, 258‑9 Unconscious, The 188, 209 Fride, E. 46, 201 Friedlander, B. 58 G Gaddini, E. 157, 251 Gaensbauer, T. 57 Galin, D. 66 Gallese, V. 21, 89, 146 ganglions, cerebral see brain Garber, J. 44, 65 Gerfen, C. 43, 258 Gianino, A. 244 Gibbon, J. 59 Gill, M.M. 12‑13 Glover, E. 223 Goldstein, R.G. 33, 69 Gopnik, K.A. 204, 229

19/9/07 16:38:18



Goren, C.G. 57 Gray, J. 12, 84 Greenacre, P. 61 Greenbaum, C. 58 Greenberg, R. 55, 57, 250 Greenough, W.T. 48 Greenson, R.R. 223 Greenspan, S.I. 234 Grigsby, J. 258 Gruendel, J. 58, 264 Guidice, S. 46, 201 Guntrip, H. 59, 222 H Hadley, J. 137 Haeckel, E. 33 Harrè, R. 65 Harris, P.L. 245 Harter, S. 66, 251 Hartlaub, G.H. 258 Hartmann, H. 60 Hebb, D.O. 48 Heimann, M. 57 Hershey, K.I. 234 Hess, W.R. 94 Hoagwood , K.43 228 Hodos, W. 100 Hofer, M.A. 65, 236, 248 Holt, R. 12‑13 Howe, M.L. 66, 259 Hugdahl, K. 66 I identificatory process 3, 4 infant/mother relationship see child/mother information, concept of in psychological models 5, 7‑8 instinct theory 6 Instincts and Vicissitudes see Freud Interpretation of Dreams see Freud

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 297

INDEX

297

introjective‑projective dynamic see brain, P‑I investment of attention 256 J Jackson, J.H. 33, 44, 69‑70, 73, 77, 227 Jacobson, E. 61 Jaffe, J. 58 Jensen, P.S. 43, 228 Jessel, T.M. 40, 259 Jones, E. 12, 37 Joseph, B. 224, 259 K Kandel, E.R. 33, 40, 43, 50, 69, 259 Kaplan‑Solms, E.R. 12, 230, 264 Karr‑Morse, R. 48 Kaye, K. 237 Kernberg, O.F. 61, 122 Keysers, C. 21, 89, 146 Khan, M. 251 Kinsbourne, M. 12 Klein, G. 244 Klein, M. 24, 56, 59, 110, 121‑2, 150, 153, 177‑9, 180, 218n 263 Kleitman, N. 57, 229 Kohut, H. 222, 251 Korfmacher, J. 251 Koslowski, B. 58 Kosslyn, S.M. 255 Krasnegor, N. 70 Kreisler, L. 237, 251 Kubicek, L. 251 Kuhl, J. 66 L Lachman, F.M. 244 lacunar unconscious see brain, P‑I language conceptual content 212‑14 origin of 193‑5

19/9/07 16:38:19

298

INDEX

tonal modulation 212‑14 see also brain; P‑I LeDoux, J.E. 44, 65 leech, nervous system of 71 Lenneberg, E.H. 195 Leslie, A.M. 241, 245 Levenson, E. 224 Levy, J. 203 Lewis, M. 44, 58, 66 libido 59, 253 Lichtenberg, J.D. 55, 62, 135, 216 Livingston, R.B. 57, 229 Llinas, R.R. 12, 43 Loewenstein, R.M. 223 Luu, P. 45, 69, 228, 263 Lyon, G.R. 70 M MacGregor, M.J. 33 McLaughlin, J.T. 224 MacLean, P.D. 44 Mahler, M.S. 60, 61, 159, 161, 222 Main, M. 58 Major, R. 216 Malatesta, C.Z. 243 Mancia, M. 220 Mandler, J.H. 58, 264 manic‑depressive model 218n Mazet, P. 251 Meares, R. 216 Meltzer, D. 153 Meltzoff, A.N. 57, 229 memory, types of 41‑4 Merzenich, M.M. 48 metamerism 71‑3, 76 metapsychology 5 Meynert, T. 14 Miller, P. 216 Milner, B. 43 Misés, R. 239 Mitchell, S.A. 55, 224, 250 Modell, A.H. 69

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 298

Molinari, S. 218n Moore, M.K. 57 Moriarty, A.E. 243 Moscovitch, M. 43 mother/child interaction see child development Mounoud, P. 56 Murphy, L.B. 243 Murray, E.A. 43, 258 N Napolitano, F. 141 narcissism see Freud Nelson, C.A. 66, 259 Nelson, K.58 62, 264 neocortex see brain neoteny 101n nervous system of leech 71 metameric origin of 71‑3 and sensorimotor connections 12 neural circuits see brain neural information coding see brain neural integration 3 and mother 3, 8 neural network, primary 74‑5 neural pathways 7‑8 neural structure see Freud neuronal group theory see brain neurons, as understood by Freud see Freud, Project, discharge of energy neurophysiological organization of affects 44‑5 neurophysiology 12, 21, 22, 23, 25, 34, 46‑7, 65‑7 neuroscience and psychoanalysis see psychoanalysis and neuroscience Neyraut, M. 224

19/9/07 16:38:19



O object‑relations theory 6, 8 Ogden, T. 159 Olszewski, J. 100 On Aphasia see Freud On Narcissism: an Introduction see Freud Ortony, A. 44, 65 Otto, M.W. 46 P P‑I see brain, P‑I (introjective and projective) Pally, R. 69 Panksepp, J. 53, 228, 235 Papez, J.W. 44 Pare, D. 12 pathogenic classes 139 pathways see brain, pathways Peery, J.C. 58 Peiper, N. 63 perception analysis 183 perceptual information 82‑4 perceptual‑motor pathways 69 Peterfreund, E. 55 phylogenetic reorganization 8, 69 Pine, F. 60 Polan, H.J. 248 Ponsi, M. 224 Porter, R.H. 57 Posner, M. 255 Post, R. 48 Pribaim, K.H. 12‑13 procedural memory 258‑9 Project for a Scientific Psychology see Freud psychic functioning 5 psychoanalysis and neuroscience 10, 34, 68‑70, 226‑52 autonomous generator or relational dynamics 230‑32 metameric hypothesis 227‑9

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 299

INDEX





299

pathways and representational‑identificatory development 75‑158, 229‑30 primary dynamics 237‑9 reticulum and brain architecture 232‑3

R Racamier, P.C. 222 Rangell, L. 69 Ranson, S.W. 93 re‑entries, theory of 8 Reiser, M.F. 69, 227 representational system see brain Rizzolatti, G. 21, 89, 146 Rolls, E.T. 44, 66 Rosemblum, L.A. 58 Rosenfeld, H.A. 153, 222, 223, 224, 248 Rosenzweig, M.R. 48 Rothbart, M.K. 234 Rovine, M. 243 Rumsey, J. 70 Ryan, R. 66 S s‑o pathways 75‑158, see also brain; Freud Sameroff, A.J. 238 Sameshima, K. 48 Sander, L.W. 135 Sandler, J. 61‑2 Sarty, M. 57 Schacter, D.L. 34 Schaffer, H.R. 58, 237 Schank, R.L. 58, 264 Schore, A.N. 34, 65‑6, 70, 137, 167, 237, 263 Schuman, J. 46, 201 Schwartz, J.H. 40, 259 Segal, H. 223

19/9/07 16:38:19

300

INDEX

SELF (Simple Ego‑like Life Form) 235 sensorimotor organization 12, 53 sensory‑perceptual organization 34‑8 Shepard, B. 243 Siegel, D.J. 34, 215 Simple Ego‑like Life Form (SELF) 235 Slaughter, V. 204 sleep 46‑7 Solms, M. 12, 45, 167, 230, 263, 264 Soulé, M. 251 Spitz, R. 60 Squire, L.R. 43 Sroufe, L.A. 44, 65, 251, 264 Stern, D.N. 58, 59 Stoleru, S. 251 Stolorow, R.D. 224 Strachey, J. 12‑13, 223 Strange Situation 246, 247 stress hormones see brain subcortical structures see brain Sulloway, F.J. 33, 69 Sussman, A.L. 255 syntonization and interpretation 221‑3 maternal 242 normal dysregulation 243‑4 and P‑I dynamics 214‑19, 244 and reintegration with self 220‑23

TOBY (Theory of Body Mechanism) 241‑3 Tomkins, S. 264 Tononi, G. 8, 19, 48‑50, 51‑2, 53, 69, 92, 103‑5, 143, 144, 148, 167, 190, 195, 209‑210, 228, 231, 236, 262 Trevarthen, C. 56, 231 Tronick, E.Z. 58, 234, 236, 244, 259 Tucker, P.M. 45, 69, 228, 255, 263 Turner, M. 44, 65 Tustin, F. 159, 222 V Vinter, A. 56 W Walker, R.A. 46, 201 Wallerstein, R.S. 62 Weinstock, M. 45, 201 Weiss, S.R.B. 48 Wernicke, C. 26, 28, 197‑9 Whitsell, N.R. 66, 251 Wiley, M.S. 48 Winnicott, D.W. 24, 60, 62‑3, 157, 162, 163, 179‑80, 223‑4, 251 Wise, S.P. 43, 258 Woodson, R. 57 Wu, P.Y.K. 57 Y Yeo, R.A. 46 Yirmira, N. 58 Young, J. 33

T Target, M. 204 Taylor, D.G. 243 Tesman, 243 Thatcher, R.W. 46, 70, 201 Theory of Body Mechanism (TOBY) 241‑3 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality see Freud

J6916_Sasso_P110_300.indd 300

19/9/07 16:38:19